The Attaché Vol. 1 (2011) Editors-In-Chief Salahuddin Rafiquddin Salvator Cusimano Editors Daniel Adler Sima Atri Sarah Ellis Zack Garcia Tanzeel Hakak Samantha Lee Michael Scott Ioana Sendroiu Kerry Sun Joanne Szilagyi Steven Wang Adrian Zita-Bennett Staff Photographer and Critic Sam Khanlari Director of Advertising Ayşegül Karaküçük Layout Editor Jane Ye-Won Lee Web Master Salahuddin Rafiquddin Munk School of Global Affairs, 1 Devonshire Place, Room 004, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S2K7 ISSN 1481-7756 www.theattache.ca theattache@gmail.com Cover/Table of Contents: Yisheng Loh
From the Editor’s Desk: The quality and diversity of material contained in the two volumes we have published this year reflects our editorial team’s dedication and commitment. This year’s Attaché Team worked hard, on time, and enthusiastically. In realization of this dedication, we would like to extend a warm thank you to our team for a wonderful year. However, it shouldn’t be forgotten that the journal would not be here without the authors and photographers who submitted their work. Their achievements testify to the high level of intellectualism, creativity, and passion for learning that University of Toronto students possess and demonstrate each day. We start this volume with David Rudin’s review of Graham Allison’s classic Essence of Decision, a book that explores decision-making models in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moving to a different type of ‘decision’ entirely, Scott Moore examines the efficacy of WTO dispute mechanisms in the context of international political economy. Adam McCauley, for his part, examines civilian protection from an entirely different angle. He examines whether private military companies should be allowed to conduct humanitarian intervention. Finally, we end with Ryan Morrow’s critical perspective of the role of religion in international relations, particularly as it relates to Western perceptions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Finally, we must thank Professor Robert Bothwell, Ms. Marilyn Laville, Mr. Geoffrey Seaborn, The Munk School of Global Affairs, and Trinity College for their support throughout this process. We could not have done it without them. We hope you enjoy this year’s editions of the Attaché. Salvator Cusimano and Salahuddin Rafiquddin Editors-in-Chief
AttachĂŠ Vol. 1 (2011) An International Affairs Jounrnal At Trinity College and the University of Toronto Vol. 1 (2011)
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The Value of Theories in Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of Essence of Decision By David Rudin
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On Retaliation and the WTO: Problems and Solutions By Scott Moore
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Private Military Companies:
Reconciling Private Means with Humanitarian Ends By Adam McCauley
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From Westphalia to Tehran:
International Secularism and Iran’s Theocracy By Ryan Morrow
A Review of Essence of Decision
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The Value of Theories in Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis: By David Rudin
“In this superb update of a classic, the authors take us once again inside the U.S. government’s “black box” during the Cuban missile crisis.” - Foreign Affairs
A Review of Essence of Decision The Cuban missile crisis encapsulates many of the most challenging aspects of international relations since the advent of the nuclear bomb. In his 1971 book, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison sought to contribute to the theoretical as well as historical analysis of the crisis. This review examines the merits of Allison’s work from a historiographical perspective. The alternatives to a purely rational model of decision-making are the strengths of Essence of Decision. However, Allison’s historical chapters are much less successful. His reliance on official American sources is problematic. It diminishes the analysis of Soviet motivations to pure speculation and treats members of President Kennedy’s inner circle as infallible. Moreover, Allison’s historical chapters only serve to support his theoretical claims. As such, he offers three internally coherent yet incomplete accounts of the crisis and makes no attempt to compare them or craft a more thorough account by combining them. This betrays the main problem with Essence of Decision; it is overambitious and cannot satisfy all of its envisioned audiences. Its theoretical analysis is useful but it is not a contribution to our historical understanding of one of the pivotal events in the history of international relations.
I
n the wake of the horrors of the Vietnam War, the traditional assumption that decisions made by the American government were pre-eminently rational came under fire. Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison’s 1971 first edition of Essence of Decision is part of this movement to question the rationality of governments. Allison contends that the pure cost benefit analyses that one would expect from a rational actor do not occur because negotiation between individuals and the behavioural patterns of bureaucracies together limit the options available to the head of state. Although these theoretical models of decision making are suited for the political scientist, Allison makes it clear in his introduction that he is also writing for the historian of international relations. Accordingly, each model is paired with an explanation of what Allison deems to be the central questions of the Cuban missile crisis: why the Soviet Union installed missiles in Cuba, the United States responded with a blockade and the missiles were ultimately removed. This review
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A Review of Essence of Decision
focuses on Allison’s historical aspirations, arguing that Essence of Decision is of limited historiographical value due to its overreliance on American sources and the subordinate role of the historical chapters. Since one of Allison’s key questions about the Cuban missile crisis is why the Soviet Union opted to install missiles in Cuba, it can be inferred that he seeks to explain American and Soviet decision making during the crisis. However, Allison’s bias in favour of American sources undermines virtually all analysis of the USSR. In addition, some of the claims he makes about America limits the historiographical value of his work. The substitution of American predictions for actual Soviet views is the first area where this bias appears. In the rational actor model’s explanation for the Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba, Allison compares this decision to all the other possibilities to demonstrate that the decision fared best in a cost-benefit analysis. The only problem is that the options discussed are not the actual list of options but the best guess as to what the Soviets were thinking as calculated by the Executive Committee (ExCom), which was the group of advisers Kennedy consulted with during the crisis. Since no reference was made to substantive differences between an American guess and actual Soviet documentation, it can be assumed that Allison believes them to be perfect substitutes. However, using the American list only truly explains what Americans were thinking, not Allison’s initial question of “[why did] the Russians undertake such a drastic, risky departure from their traditional policy?”1 Such overt privileging of American sources does not advance our knowledge of the Soviet decision-making because it only repeats what America guessed in 1962. Moreover, all the theoretical chapters are uniquely based off western sources that focus on the American government. While some of their insight is transferable, it difficult to believe that Allison’s theories applies equally to the United States and the Soviet Union when their universality is simply asserted. In all fairness, most Soviet documents had yet to be released in 1971. This was not inherently problematic; Allison could have demonstrated the merits of his argument by focusing on American politics alone. The problem is that instead of acknowledging the shortcomings of his evidence and limiting his argument accordingly, he simply assumed that American sources could adequately explain Soviet politics.
At no point does Allison question the motives or veracity of the statements by
American
officials
upon which almost all his historical analysis is based upon.
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The privileging of American views does not only lead to biased analysis of the Soviet Union, it also undermines the analysis of American politics. At no point does Allison question the motives or veracity of the statements by American officials upon which almost all his historical analysis is based upon. Such trustfulness regarding the potential biases of sources is even at odds with Allison’s own analysis of how the individuals who make up a government behave since he notes, “a player’s [stance] will depend on his personal interests.”2 Indeed, it seems entirely conceivable that members of the Kennedy administration would wish to overemphasize their own contributions or the wisdom of the administration. However, Allison never translates his theoretical apprehension as to the motives of politicians into any analysis of why his own sources might not be fully objective. Ultimately, Allison’s treatment of public figures as being infallible is counterproductive since it lessens the value of the interviews that Allison conducted with ExCom members. After so much blind faith, it becomes hard to believe anything.
Beyond
the
problems
with how each individual explanation is constructed, there remains the problem of what to make of the three stories of the Cuban missile crisis that Allison presents.
4
The utility of the historical analysis in the Essence in Decision is not only limited by bias, it is also affected by Allison’s historiographical approach. Despite the fact that he aims to answer historical questions about the Cuban missile crisis, Allison’s focus is theoretical. His central argument is uniquely about conceptual models as opposed to advancing a historical interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis. The result of this tension is that his historical analysis is quite weak so as to better support the conceptual elements of the book. This can be seen at the level of each model where the use of evidence is constrained by already-formed conclusions and on a broader level in Allison’s refusal to combine the various insights that the models offer. As such, Essence of Decision only offers a minimal contribution to our understanding of the Cuban missile crisis. The primacy of the conceptual models in Essence of Decision limits the historical analysis of individual pieces of evidence. If it were a book about the Korean War, not a single conclusion would have to be changed. While this may be an achievement from a political science standpoint, it greatly diminishes the role historical interpretation of evidence – facts, documents, interviews and the like – in the work as a whole. The major
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A Review of Essence of Decision
conclusions in Essence of Decision that appear in the theoretical chapters are derived from models used in sociology, economics and political science. The sole function of the historical chapters is to illustrate those points. Thus, if a model’s conclusion is not supported by a piece of evidence, Allison opts to leave that evidence out of the explanation instead of discussing what can be learned from this tension. Thus, despite its central importance in the crisis, President Kennedy’s decision to respond to Kruschev’s initial offer of a settlement as opposed to his less favourable second proposal is completely ignored in two of the models. While this proves Allison’s point that different models will produce different explanations, it also results in two explanations with gaping holes. Moreover, in a historical analysis so driven by theory, context is effectively marginalized. Pressure from congressional committees is briefly referenced as an example of the ‘background effect’. The only source of public pressure discussed is the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Otherwise, the broader political climate, elements such as fears of communist or Soviet expansion, does not fit into any of the models. The main problem with history by categorization is that elements are put into conceptual boxes to produce internally coherent and plausible explanations but, in the end, each account has little value in and of itself because it is so narrowly shaped.
What
is
Essence
missing of
in
Decision
is an assessment of the
significance
and
relative merits of each explanation.
Beyond the problems with how each individual explanation is constructed, there remains the problem of what to make of the three stories of the Cuban missile crisis that Allison presents. Aside from a concession that “the models seem to complement each other” in the final pages of the conclusion, they are treated as being mutually exclusive throughout the book. Indeed, this separation is necessary so as to show that different models produce divergent explanations. However, to the more historically minded audiences, the failure to combine these explanations into a more cohesive whole does not just exclude important elements; it makes it difficult to build a more complex picture of what happened and why. Explaining what factors were present can only take an analysis so far. What is missing in Essence of Decision is an assessment of the significance and relative merits of each explanation. For instance, Allison never examines whether bureaucratic routines had a greater effect than bargaining or if these dynamics varied on both sides of the conflict. Rather, he creates an environment where interesting ideas are raised but are never in conflict. 5
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As an intellectual exercise, this is not particularly satisfying insofar as the greater challenge comes in understanding how variables interact as opposed to just naming them. Admittedly it would be unreasonable to expect Allison to present the one and only right answer to all the lingering questions about the Cuban missile crisis. However, Essence of Decision would make a much greater historiographic contribution to the study of the Cuban missile crisis if it were anything more than a series of disparate parts. His book tries to be too many things to too many people and, in doing so, is very uneven. Its strength lies in the sections geared more towards political scientists...
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At the outset of Essence of Decision, Allison states that he is writing for five ‘representative readers’: a colleague, a student, an informed layman, a journalist and a general reader.3 His book tries to be too many things to too many people and, in doing so, is very uneven. Its strength lies in the sections geared more towards political scientists, which clearly demonstrate that governments are not purely rational and that different conceptualizations will lead to different conclusions. Thus, Allison proves his central argument regarding the effect of assumptions on analysis. However, in doing so, Essence of Decision is unsatisfying from a historiographical perspective. It is limited by both a pro-American bias and a rigid approach to historical analysis. Whereas Allison sets out in the introduction to explain the big questions of the Cuban missile crisis, in the conclusion he is reduced to conceding, “This study has obviously bitten off more than it has chewed.”4 Essence of Decision is not without value insofar as it raises interesting questions. However, Allison’s inability to turn these questions and the pieces of evidence he possesses into a cohesive whole means that his analysis contributes little to our historical understanding of the Cuban missile crisis.
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Český Krumlov · Czech Republic · Photograph by Jane Ye-Won Lee
Amsterdam · Netherlands · Photograph by Sam Sarhang Khanlari
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Toronto 路 Canada 路 Photograph by Sam Sarhang Khanlari
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On Retaliation and the WTO
On Retaliation and the WTO: Problems and Solutions In the modern global arena, international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) must be able to regulate their constituent states if they are to be considered legitimate. In order to provide this regulation, effective enforcement mechanisms are paramount. This paper explores what scholars have dubbed the ‘retaliation mechanism’ of WTO: an enforcement mechanism that exists within the broader context of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). In particular, this paper evaluates the propensity of the aforementioned mechanism to induce compliance with WTO regulations, and to act fairly and in congruence with the goals of the WTO. In spite of the WTO’s high rate of compliance, this paper concludes that there is room for change, and that ultimately such change would be to the benefit both of the WTO and of the international community.
T
he dispute settlement system has been described as the ‘jewel in the crown’1 of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the largest central global economic organization in history. This system, as specified in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), accepts approximately 30 new cases each year from the 153 member states, about half of which are formally adjudicated.2 Essentially, these cases involve complaints from members who feel that other members have violated their WTO obligations; normally those designed to promote mutually beneficial trade liberalization.3 The process can be simplified into several steps. First, a member with a complaint (the complainant) and the respondent are required to go through mandatory consultations with each other. If these consultations fail to produce a ‘mutually satisfactory outcome’4 then an ad hoc panel is set up to hear the case and come to a decision. If the respondent is found to be in violation of its WTO obligations, the panel recommends that they then come into compliance.5 If either member is so inclined they may appeal to the Appellate Body (AB) in hopes of modifying the original panel’s findings in part or in whole. Next, if the respondent is still found to be in violation, it is given a reasonable period of time to comply, while its progress is monitored by the original panel. Finally, the
By Scott Moore
Whether the WTO succeeds or not will make little difference to most people; indeed, trade negotiations would actually go much further if the WTO simply closed
down
its
talks
altogether. - Newsweek
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complainant may be authorized by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to implement ‘offsetting retaliatory measures’6 if the respondent is still not in compliance with WTO rules after a reasonable period of time. It should be noted that this only occurs provided no compensation has been negotiated for the violation, which rarely occurs.7
The
compliance
rate
(83% as of 2005) is quite high, but the timeliness and
quality
of
this
compliance – especially among members – leaves considerable improvement.
room
for
As international trade law expert William Davey notes, the compliance rate (83% as of 2005) is quite high,8 but the timeliness and qualityi of this compliance – especially among members – leaves considerable room for improvement.9 Since it is ultimately up to member states to comply with their obligations, there is a need for effectiveii methods of coercion in order to promote compliance in the rare situations where states are not motivated to do so on their own. The goal of this paper is to scrutinize the current method of ‘last resort’10 for inducing compliance – that being retaliation by way of the “suspension of concessions or other obligations (SCOOs) – vis-à-vis its effectiveness for remedying and deterring non-compliance with WTO obligations. Finally, in consideration of the results, this paper will consider some possibilities for reform. The Current System Matters of Time The DSU states that SCOOs are “temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time,”11 and by returning for a moment to statistics presented by Davey, one can understand why this is problematic. While 83% of cases find eventual compliance, a smaller portion – 60% – find it immediately.12 Constituting the remaining 40% are cases such as EC – Bananas III, whose report was adopted in 1997 by the WTO, but not settled until 2001.13 In brief, the case involved the preferential treatment given by the European Communities (EC) to the African, i Davey (2009) defines quality as the “extent to which the complainant obtained useful redress for the violation as a result of the compliance.” ii Wilhelm Kohler in his economic analysis of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) states, “An effective enforcement mechanism for a WTO agreement would minimize, in the perfect case to zero, the number of violations. And where a defection arises, sanctions or threats of sanctions should quickly do away with it” (Kohler 324). I contend further, that in non-perfect cases retaliation should attempt to remediate fully additional costs borne by the adversely affected WTO Members.
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On Retaliation and the WTO
Caribbean, Pacific Group of States because of their colonial history. Since the reasonable period of expiry in this case was 1 January 1999,14 there were approximately two years in which retaliation was not tabled for the EC and in which retaliation had no effect at all. Former WTO panel chairperson John Jackson notes concordantly that ‘cynical countries’15 – a category in which includes the United States, coincidently a complainant in the case above – “in many instances go ahead with whatever action they intended” because “it takes three years to get through the dispute settlement process, and thus countries have a three-year ‘free pass’.”16 In such cases retaliation is removed entirely from the cost-benefit analysis of whether or not a member should undertake a temporary violation because retaliation is not configured to provide interim relief; it cannot restore the status quo ante. An example that helps illustrate this further is the US – Steel Safeguards case, in which President Bush abruptly lifted the violating safeguard measure just as the reasonable period of time had ended because “the measure [had] met its objectives ahead of schedule.”17 It might be noted in passing that in this case retaliation is not even mentioned by President Bush as a reason for the decision, but more importantly, and as in the previous case, although the measure was repealed there was no way for the complainant to recover the losses incurred for its duration.
Economically speaking, it makes little sense to give up the entire cake when it is possible to keep almost half...
Finally, WTO law practitioner and researcher Jorge A. HuertaGoldman compares Mexico’s experience with the US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) case, which began in 2000, to the theft of chocolate cake. In this scenario, Member X gets one chocolate cake per year illegally under WTO legislation and complainants are able to recover – through retaliation – four pieces of the cake representing a total of 54%. This leaves the respondent with a choice of losing 46% of the cake if they choose to continue the violation or 100% of the cake if they choose to remove the act.18 Economically speaking, it makes little sense to give up the entire cake when it is possible to keep almost half, and in fact this is what it appeared the US had decided when the Byrd Amendment to the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000iii continued – iii The Byrd Amendment to the CDSOA essentially gives funding to corporations equal to the amount of antidumping tariffs they collect. These funds previously went to the US treasury.
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On Retaliation and the WTO
The size of a WTO Member’s economy has been said, in theory, to dictate whether or not it will be able to retaliate successfully.
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post-retaliation – to hand out 46% of its pre-retaliation subsidies to US corporations. It should also be noted that the act was not taken out of effect until 1 October 200719 – not a particularly short period of violation. It is tenable, then, that in these kinds of ‘hit and run’20 cases of WTO violation retaliation is not particularly effective. As Gary Horlick, former Chairman of the WTO Permanent Group of Experts on Subsidies, states, “unless compliance truly makes the offending actors feel the cost of their inconsistency, it cannot be seen as a last resort.”21 Matters of Size The size of a WTO Member’s economy has been said, in theory, to dictate whether or not it will be able retaliate successfully. The fact that the WTO is a member-driven rules-based organization,22 that does not seek to do more than recommend a member’s compliance, can make things especially difficult for developing countries with little economic clout. Attorney Arthur Appleton – a specialist in WTO cases and international arbitration – notes that “many developing country members lack the volume of trade… required for retaliation… to be effective.”23 This statement can be taken in light of the fact that a majority of WTO members are developing countries.24 In practice, however, many of the oft-cited cases involving developing countries have had better retaliatory success than theory might suggest, foremost due to the more recent experimentation with the DSU’s ‘cross-retaliation’ option. In turn, it may be more appropriate to say that size alone does not make a member’s threat of retaliation credible – it must be calculated along side the way it is used. Without crossretaliation, a member is only allowed retaliation with the same product sector and agreement that has been violated. There is the possibility of interchange first between products, then sectors and finally agreements if and only if the first two were proven impractical and ineffective.25 Therefore, an important caveat of cross-retaliation is that it will not be granted in every situation. Presuming that a member is able to prove they required retaliation under a different agreement and that they were violated under, for example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services that member can then retaliate under an agreement more suited to their
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benefit, such as the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. This is in fact one of the major revelations of the EC – Bananas III case mentioned above. As a co-complainant along side the United States and others, Ecuador secured authorization for retaliation under TRIPS,26 which international dispute settlement expert James McCall Smith convincingly concludes led the EC to be receptive to their demands,27 which have allowed Ecuador access to a massive market.28 It is hoped that a similar result will come from Antigua’s authorized retaliation under TRIPS in the US – Gambling case,29 but it has been contended that there is a limit to how much cross-retaliation can do. The real coercive capacity of Ecuador’s TRIPS retaliation was (in part) based on the precedent it would set (if Ecuador used it) than any real damage that would come (from Ecuador’s use of it),30 this being despite the fact that they were allowed $201.6 million in retaliation annually. Furthermore, the use of intellectual property agreements comes with “a number of potential legal complications,”31 which arise primarily from the complexities of the DSU and in Intellectual Property Law in general. For example, the TRIPS agreement protects certain types of “undisclosed information”32 including things like trade secrets and regulatory data from pharmaceutical companies or otherwise. Even within these two categories, the member who hopes to suspend Intellectual Property Rights must solve some tricky problems. For example, regarding trade secrets the member would have to find a way to ensure that its constituents would no longer use the trade secrets after the period for SCOOs has ended,33 which can prove to be difficult even in well regulated countries, let alone those whose regulations are still developing. Further, regarding regulatory data, the member would have to determine at the very least whether the particular data it hopes to acquire is protected by stricter ‘exclusive marketing rights’34 or a more general ‘unfair commercial use’ rules, and which other members use the data, as well as how.35 Indeed, the above is an extremely cursory explanation of only one of the seven ‘categories’ that the TRIPS agreement covers.36
Developing countries could thus find themselves limited by litigation minefields and the meager retaliation that is often authorized.
Developing countries could thus find themselves limited by litigation minefields and the meager retaliation that is often authorized. If the EC was not worried about the US$201.6 million rewarded then 13
On Retaliation and the WTO
Part of the reason crossretaliation is thought to be so effective for developing states is that the “types of suspension that may be used in the field of goods and services may cause economic harm to the less powerful members using them.”
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surely the United States would not be worried by the mere US$21 million authorized under TRIPS for Antigua as of 2007, especially relative to the multi-billion dollar US Internet gambling industry.37 Still, Mark E. Mendel, Antigua’s lawyer, is hopeful, asserting that “Antigua has a strategy for the application of its remedies that could very well… induce the United States to comply.”38 Whether he is correct remains to be seen.39 Matters of Space Part of the reason cross-retaliation is thought to be so ineffective for developing states is that the “types of suspension that may be used in the field of goods and services may cause economic harm to the less powerful members using them.”40 As Steve Charnovitz and other scholars have suggested, the biggest problem with WTO retaliation at the domestic level is that it can be similar to “shooting oneself in the foot.”41 Domestically, specific groups of consumers, importers and exporters and sometimes politicians pay the price for retaliation through efficiency losses,42 – which in turn raises the prices of the goods and services targeted by the retaliation and requires importers in the affected country, and exporters in the violating country, to find other partners. For members with one major trading partner – such as Canada – this can be especially problematic. As well, countries with such relationships have a history that creates a situation where, as Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada lawyer Vasken Khabayan points out, “importers cannot easily find equally priced alternatives.” Hence, since a disruptinon of major trading patterns would be detrimental, the retaliation members like Canada take up against major trading partners like the United States – such as in the case of US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) – is more symbolic than economic.43 Worse yet, former GATT secretariat Professor Kym Anderson suggests that the additional domestic costs associated with retaliation can lead members – especially developing ones – not to use their SCOOs even when authorized to.44 This kind of ‘withdrawal’ from the system has, of course, not been studied under conditions of cross-retaliation as no country has yet to initiate it. One example, however, of a ‘standard’ retaliation case where a majority of the members involved chose not to use their SCOOs was in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), which, as Indian First Secretary to the WTO Atul Kaushik notes, saw only Mexico retaliate45 out of the
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four members for whom it was authorized. Additionally, Donald McRae notes that “enforcement does seem to be a factor of concern to members that have yet to use WTO dispute settlement in any significant way, if at all,” pointing to calls for reform made by African members.46 It is clear then that, especially for ‘weaker’ members, there is some reluctance to trust retaliation as it is presently configured and by consequence there are some major problems for its efficacy. Matters of Identity It might also be worthwhile to dig a bit deeper and also ask whether retaliation is a suitable mechanism for the WTO’s primary objective: liberalizing the global economy. Indeed, it may seem peculiar to hope for further trade liberalization by creating situations where trade barriers are raised. In fact, these barriers are sometimes raised strategically so that “domestic industries may seize the opportunity to secure protection from imports.”47 Most strikingly in the EC – Hormones case, the Pork industry in the United States fought for Pork to be the only product to procure this protective benefit.48 The greatest concern with situations like these is that they begin to promote retaliation. Further, if retaliation fails, then the members involved are stuck in an almost indefinite standoff. This is exactly what has happened (and persists) in the EC – Hormones case since as early as 1996.49 Another possibility is that both parties will simply agree not to change their measures at all, creating a situation of mutually agreeable non-competition. The Brazil – Export Financing Program for Aircraft and Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, in which the two states targeted each other, are two examples of this scenario. Canada had had difficulty finding products to use as SCOOs up to CAD$344.2 million annually;50 Brazil was granted USD$250 million in their case against Canada shortly after.51 Given these factors neither country ended up retaliating leading to what one might call the ‘stalemating’ effect of retaliation. On the one hand, Canada and Brazil would be able to keep their WTO-illegal measures in place and on the other they would only (realistically) ‘de-liberalize’ themselves further by raising trade barriers, hurting themselves as seen in the previous section. Neither situation restores the status quo ante, but both work against the goals of the WTO.
Another possibility is that both parties will simply agree not to change their measures at all, creating a situation of mutually agreeable noncompetition.
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On Retaliation and the WTO
A less novel but simpler solution is collective retaliation, which essentially allows a member to retaliate if they have an interest in the case at hand...
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The Future: Some Solutions As seen above, there are several issues that need addressing: retaliation does not provide any kind of full compensation and is only conditionally effective; it can harm the member using it and can create situations where compliance and trade liberalization are near impossible. Petros C. Mavroidis, a Professor of Foreign and Comparative Law, points out that “there is no more discrepancy between academia and the negotiating table regarding the issue of remedies.”52 That is, countries are beginning to see the need for certain changes and are beginning to propose them. It is thus important to briefly consider some possibilities that may be able to replace or at least improve upon the WTO’s last resort. Tradable Remedies and Collective Retaliation The idea of tradable remedies as analyzed by Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Madroivis and Robert Staiger is likely the most innovative. It suggests that when a member is granted rights to retaliate, these rights can be auctioned off to the highest bidding member, providing two advantages: the violator faces a greater possibility of retaliation and the victim would be able to obtain ‘a tangible benefit’.53 While their economic model based on auction theory advocates this idea, Bagwell and Staiger conclude by cautioning that “introducing such auctions into the WTO system is [not] necessarily a good idea.”54 What it could certainly do is work in tandem with cross-retaliation. In cases where cross-retaliation is not granted, members would be given a second chance to remediate. The major obstacle, of course, is if no members decide to bid. A less novel but simpler solution is collective retaliation, which essentially allows a member to retaliate if they have an interest in the case at hand, provided they apply for authorization.55 This, in some aspects, was applied in the EC – Bananas III case where the United States was allowed to involve itself despite not being an exporter of Bananas.56 If this was to become a general principle it could prevent cases such as aforementioned Canada-Brazil case, where neither state has any motivation to change their inconsistent measures as the threats of retaliation have cancelled each other out. Most importantly, both of these ideas would add additional dimensions that might expand into the lacunas of the currently desultory last resort.
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On Retaliation and the WTO
Transparency Another innovative – albeit selective – solution is posited by Steve Charnovitz, who argues that transparency and public opinion might be able to convince democratic states to comply with WTO rulings. He refers to the EC – Bananas III case, noting that “the European public was probably not aware of the numerous harms being caused by non-compliance.”57 A public hearing where ‘private economic and social actors’ could ask questions and voice their concerns would help the public become more aware of what their country’s retaliation entails for consumers and for numerous exporters. While this option is clearly not guaranteed to induce compliance, it would put additional pressure on members to respond to their constituents and promote values and norms that are compatible with liberalization. Financial Compensation In the current system, compensation is voluntary58 and rarely comes to fruition. Adding mandatory fines to the system would not only be a step towards a more rules-based system, but, as economists Nuno Limão and Kamal Saggi argue, “tariffs are an inefficient form of compensation because the welfare gain they generate for an injured country with market power is always less than the welfare cost for the country facing the tariff punishment.”59 Fining countries is a more efficient method, as it allows for a retroactive and non-discriminatory solution to the problem at hand. It might be objected that trying to force members into compliance in this way will lead to a stagnation of the system. Jackson, however, remarks that “‘consent’ should not be considered a requirement for every small detail or every resolution of ambiguity, nor gap-filling by a dispute settlement institution. The mere fact that the original consent of states included consent for a dispute settlement system suggests a measure of deference to the results of that system.”60 It seems necessary that this is the approach states take as, if consent is not given to members, they need not put themselves at the mercy of the DSB in the first place. Furthermore, there are already international organizations that make use of monetary compensation. This is most prominent, as Asim Imdad notes with the Treaty Establishing the European Community, wherein such fines are imposed against “a member state that fails to comply with a judgment of the European Court of Justice.”61
Fining countries is a more efficient method, as it calls for a retroactive and nondiscriminatory solution to the problem at hand.
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This idea of financial compensation also requires some careful design. Although Davey gives his support to the idea, he notes that it would “have to be designed to avoid the possibility that rich members could effectively buy their way out of obligations in a way not available to poor members.”62 This could be done in a number ways, including calculating the fine in relation to the size of the member’s economy.63 Overall, financial compensation is perhaps the most reasonable step towards solidifying the external constitutionality of the DSU and increasing the costs of non-compliance given its movement towards a retroactive, balanced and domestically friendly solution to WTO nonRetaliation is inherently compliance. harmful to its members at a domestic level where importers, consumers
exporters, and
microeconomic
other actors
recieve efficiency losses and inflation in return for government implemented retaliation.
18
Concluding Thoughts Although compliance in the WTO is high, it is far from perfect. With consideration of this, it is necessary that the WTO have an effective mechanism to ensure compliance in all situations. As has been shown, retaliation is not this mechanism as of yet. Current retaliation is selective, leaving member states such as Mexico to absorb the substantial trade losses incurred while they wait for retaliation rights, and sometimes even after these rights have been granted. It is also situational, leaving developing countries to find their own ways of responding effectively, as shown by the recent developments in Cross-Retaliation. Further, retaliation is inherently harmful to its members at a domestic level where importers, exporters, consumers and other microeconomic actors receive efficiency losses and inflation in return for government implemented retaliation. Finally, retaliation is in contrast to the very nature of the WTO as a whole, by allowing SCOOs that undo the progress towards trade liberalization the organization so tenaciously strives for. Scholars and member-states alike have begun to recognize these imperfections and have come up with some solutions that should improve, at least incrementally, the working of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. The addition of transparency and of tradable remedies would improve the solidarity of the networks that connect constituents to their countries and countries to the international community as a whole, while – ideally – financial compensation would take the process one step further by removing the need for retaliation as it is known in the WTO
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On Retaliation and the WTO
today. This is crucial to providing a credible and consistent multilateral platform for trade liberalization, and for transforming and consolidating the global arena on the whole.
Phnom Penh 路 Cambodia 路 Photograph by Stephen Birarda
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Private Military Companies
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Private Military Companies: By Adam McCauley
Private military companies, which
provide
armed
guards for firms working in dangerous places, do not like being confused with mercenaries. The latter are useful for winning civil wars and toppling governments in resourcerich African states... - The Economist
Reconciling Private Means with Humanitarian Ends Given the contemporary demand for efficacious international actors capable of undertaking humanitarian intervention operations – particularly peacekeeping, current scholarship points to a need to (re) evaluate international actors and agents with the potential to provide these services. Thus, this paper introduces the Private Military Company (PMC) as such an agent, illustrating how their exclusion from the international debate on these issues is due to the improper fusion of the PMCs identity with those groups traditionally defined as mercenaries. This work focuses on demonstrating the differences between mercenaries and today’s corporate military firms in an effort to establish definitional clarity and to disprove the rationale upon which their exclusion is based. The paper then illustrates PMC’s strengths including qualities such as reduced deployment timeframes, increased efficiency (both economically and in terms of human capital), reduced vulnerability to political variability and clearer command structures as characteristics that might enable them to operate more effectively in theatres of conflict when compared to current agents in the field. While the use of PMCs for humanitarian purposes might incur particularly nefarious risks and consequences, the acknowledgement that PMCs have gone largely unexamined within an international system marred by the inefficacies of traditional, multilateral forces, should necessitate that private military companies, and their untapped potential, be given due consideration.
I
n light of the international condemnation of the insufficient United Nations’ action in Somalia (1992), irrefutable failure with incredible human costs in Rwanda (1994) and the inappropriate, oft-criticized, response to the humanitarian situation in Bosnia (1995), scholars, policymakers and security officials should seek to investigate all potential alternatives for improved humanitarian intervention practices and procedures. One such alternative is the provision of a “tightly organized compan[y] that exchange[s] military services … for payment, for states or other actors,”1 otherwise known as a Private Military Company (PMC). Despite the growing international need for efficacious agents capable of undertaking humanitarian intervention, the debate, which surrounds the use of PMCs in theatres of conflict, has been co-opted by anti-mercenary rhetoric. This cooptation has led to the opposition of PMCs
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Private Military Companies
based, not on informed decisions derived from objective investigation or empirical evidence, but rather on a pre-emptive rejection of PMCs use rooted in the improper fusion of PMCs and mercenary-group identities. The purpose of this paper is to transcend the above noted preemptive opposition to PMCs in order to explore their potential benefits and limitations in a more objective light. In doing so, this paper will first discuss the reasons for, and implications of, the conflation of PMCs with mercenary groups. Second, this paper will refute the association of PMCs with mercenary groups by highlighting several key differences that exist between these actors. Finally, this paper will argue that PMCs, while not immune from all criticism leveled at mercenary groups, possess a number of advantages over both archetypal mercenary groups, as well as ‘traditional’i United Nations intervention forces. On this basis, it will be concluded that while PMCs are not infallible, they are of strategic value in today’s conflict landscape, and opposition more appropriately directed at mercenary groups should not supersede careful analysis of PMC utility. Their potential for future humanitarian intervention efforts should therefore be judged according to their own merit.
PMCs have been addressed through mercenary protocols, rendering their preception negative from the start.
Recent scholarship has suggested that, due to the lack of investigation into their structure and fundamental characteristics, PMCs have been addressed through mercenary protocols, rendering their perception negative from the start.2 For this reason, it is critical to consider why, as suggested above, PMCs and mercenary groups are so often considered interchangeable. For many scholars, several fundamental qualities are shared by PMCs and mercenary groups which ensure their continued association.ii First, PMCs and mercenary groups have been simplistically defined as agents motivated primarily by financial gains. As each group is assumed i “Traditional” in this sense infers to the prototypical United Nations force assembled from contributed troops from a collection of willing member states for humanitarian operations. ii It should be noted that this list of concerns is not exhaustive but merely indicative of the realm of opposition that applies to the use of PMC companies and mercenaries in kind. Some authors, notably Sarah Percy, have streamlined analysis along the normative vector discussing the immorality of the use of force without legitimate authority and the morally problematic dimensions of force when used for selfish/ personal gain. Others, such as Peter Singer, have outlined a multitude of substantive concerns regarding the employment of private forces from the practical perspective. While valid and critical to the contribution, due to the constraints of this paper, only a sample of these issues will be discussed.
21
Private Military Companies
Scholars are quick to assert that mercenaries and PMCs are virtually the same actors, albeit with different titles, and are therefore loath to be trusted.
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to fight for profit instead of for their own freedom, security, or national interest (presumably the case for national or rebel military groups), they are seen as morally problematic.3 Most famously, former UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Enrique Ballesteros, claimed that although the activities of mercenaries may change over time, “that does not change the mercenary status of those who take part in illicit acts, offering and selling their professional services for pay.”4 The moral critique rests on the assumption that the use of force must be deemed legitimate within some larger system or theory of justice, and that the use of force for a price falls “outside any licit or ethically permissible context.”5 Thus, as PMCs and mercenaries are seen as falling outside this ‘legitimate framework’, this moral aversion to the former (mercenaries) has been transposed onto the latter (PMCs) with little reflection. That said, some scholars have pointed out that the employees of a PMC group, Executive Outcomes, served on both sides of a particular conflict. Specifically, various factions in Sierra Leone employed former Executive Outcomes’ employees after their initial contract was completed. However, this perceived ‘switching of sides’ suggested an intrinsic willingness on the part of the PMC operative to ‘go where the money is’.6 This willingness to switch loyalties for financial gain was a common occurrence with traditional mercenaries. The paradigmatic case involving mercenaries was Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko’s employment of a mercenary group headed by ‘Mad Dog’ Mike Hoare and Jacques Shramme to defend his administration against a coup in 1966, only to have Shramme, then leading an opposing rebel group, launch a coup of their own the following year.7 With these examples, scholars are quick to assert that mercenaries and PMCs are virtually the same actors, albeit with different titles, and are therefore loath to be trusted. The second reason mercenaries and PMCs are routinely equated is derived from the common perception that they share an institutional need to perpetuate conflict. As both PMCs and mercenary groups have historically been in highest demand within conflict environments, many argue that the mercenary groups and PMCs prefer continuing instability.8 This assertion suggests that both PMCs and mercenaries have an incentive to perpetuate the type of insecurity because the profit-maximizing logic
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of their work necessarily conflicts with the tasks that such groups are contracted to complete: establishing stability is likely to ensure the group’s contractual end-point. Moreover, as mercenaries and PMCs work in areas of great instability, often without a strong central or governmental authority, the susceptibility for protracted violence within these regions could potentially create a situation in which the PMC or mercenary groups, working ingenuously, could ensure their perpetual demand. In this formulation, PMCs – like mercenaries – were part of the problem, not the solution. A third reason PMCs are often associated with mercenary groups is that both groups are seen as neocolonial actors. Careful study of the history of mercenaries during the African independence movement reveals that mercenary groups frequently participated on the side of the colonial state against the popular struggle for self-determination.9 When combined with recent criticism of PMCs from wealthy western nations providing services in return for contractually guaranteed natural resources such as diamonds, minerals and oil, many scholars perceive both PMCs and mercenary groups to be exploitative agents of the West operating in the third world theatre.10 Further, scholars assert that PMCs’ inferred partiality to western powers is strengthened by the fact that the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom serve as home to most of the world’s PMCs.11 The assumption is that the location of a PMC’s headquarters belays some greater ties to the host state’s political order insinuating an inappropriate relationship between PMCs and dominant western states’ national interest.12 The conception of PMCs as neocolonial actors is corroborated by scholars who believe that the stability PMCs and mercenaries provide serves merely to create investment opportunities for external corporations.13 This process serves as the first step for capital-intensive resource extraction, or what David Harvey refers to as “accumulation by dispossession.”14 Recalling that one of the most memorable mercenary operations in the last 60 years was Mike Hoare’s “4 Commando” mission, which sought to wrestle control of the resource wealthy Katanga province of Congo away from the Congolese and Soviets on behalf of the Western Bloc, these instances throw long shadows that darken the perceptions
As
mercenaries
and
PMCs work in areas of great
instability,
often
without a strong central or governmental authority, the susceptibility for protracted violence within these regions could potentially create a situation in which the PMC or
mercenary
groups...
could ensure their perpetual demand.
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of PMCs. As a result, PMCs are thought of as mercenaries who have undergone a corporate re-branding in an attempt to shroud their exploitative actions in a ‘cloak of legitimacy’.15 PMC’s corporate structure affords the private officer a measure of stability unknown to a traditional mercenary; mercenaries’ largely covert nature and illegality would have left the
mercenary
groups
open to exploitation such as stopped payments or ‘broken promises’.
24
Part 2
While the above discussion has pointed out some prima facie similarities between PMCs and mercenary groups, a deeper examination of the structure and function of PMCs themselves suggests several unique features that distinguish the two entities. First, and most importantly, there is a qualitatively different profit motivation between PMCs and mercenary groups that must be considered. Today, PMCs operate indistinguishable from modern corporations in which services are provided at market value and their efficiency determines their overall costs and profits.16 Rather than the individual or “personal black-market ventures”17 of mercenary groups historically, the corporatized structure of PMCs places an emphasis on the firm’s reputational capital. This reputation is critical for ensuring a ‘marketable’ brand and, collectively, these processes constrain tendencies towards ‘soldier-for-hire’ abuses often perpetrated by mercenary groups. The corporate identity has positive consequences for PMCs regarding loyalty issues. One of the critiques of mercenaries above was the challenge of ensuring loyalty of the group. Specifically, it could be argued that mercenaries’ motivation for profit establishes the propensity for said agent to switch sides if a ‘better deal’ can be procured (for example, the case of Jacques Shramme as discussed above). However, the PMCs’ corporate structure affords the private officer a measure of stability unknown to a traditional mercenary; mercenaries’ largely covert nature and illegality would have left the mercenary groups open to exploitation such as stopped payments or ‘broken promises’. Given this vulnerability combined with the lack of regulation and transparency, mercenaries would feel obliged to act unilaterally and even aggressively towards their contracting parties to guarantee financial restitution. This could be accomplished by threatening to switch sides – or actually doing so – to retain the profits initially promised. However, under the corporate umbrella of today’s PMCs,
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Private Military Companies
payment for services is both more reliable and the corporate damage dealt by switching sides prohibitively costly for a company’s financial viability over time. The net result is diminished inclinations to act in contravention to the responsibilities or tasks demanded of the PMC. Second, it has been argued that PMCs, as corporations, retain a degree of transparency above and beyond the standard of traditional mercenary groups.iii Specifically, Jeffry Herbst and Walter Clarke convincingly argue that as corporate agents, the PMCs’ corporate structure is amenable to accountability protocols (if/when properly created and implemented) which would provide a necessary check on PMC activity. Combined with the PMC’s need for a respectable and marketable corporate reputation, it is realistic to conceptualize the modus operandi for PMCs as one which remains averse to the motivations and potential abuses seen in mercenary groups.18 Additionally, if one is to assume - as this author does - that humanitarian intervention forces are most appropriately dispersed under the auspices of the United Nations, it is conceivable that that PMCs specializing in these services will carefully engage in the theatre of conflict so as to ensure that they withstand the hiring scrutiny of the United Nations.19 While this is not sufficient for ultimate accountability, these incremental steps provide the seeds for future accountability regimes. As Malcolm Patterson observes, there is “nothing natural or permanent” about the present organization of military forces and it seems reasonable to believe if PMC use proves effective strategically, mechanisms to harness private actors more effectively will normalize their practice as well.20 PMCs marketability would only be enhanced by implementing and adhering to a strict standard of operational ethics and could serve as a prerequisite for entry into the international market. Incentivizing regulation – while standing to legitimize PMCS (an action many are weary of) – by offering greater access to the vast market would likely be effective throughout the industry. Therefore, it is not a stretch to assert that as PMCs proliferate in the international security landscape, a stringent and efficacious regulatory system could be created to address potential risk. For example, this could take the form of some type of staged licensing system
Combined with the PMC’s need for a respectable and marketable corporate reputation, it is realistic to conceptualize the modus operandi for PMCs as one which remains averse to the motivations and potential abuses seen in mercenary groups.
iii In fact, one might argue that traditional mercenary groups were more powerful when they remained unknown.
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the primary benefit of PMCs
in which contracts could only be granted to PMCs with the appropriate level of certification regarding their industry’s code of ethics. Recognizing that the history of mercenaries is one defined by erratic or unregulated conduct, the fact that corporate structure and reputation might serve as effective risk-minimizing qualities for PMCs will further distinguish PMCs from mercenary groups of the past.
relative to traditional United
Part 3
From a practical perspective,
Nations forces is the ability of PMCs to assemble and deploy personnel faster than traditional forces at lower political costs...
While the above sections have sought to differentiate PMCs from mercenary groups by illustrating the relative benefits of the former, it is central to the thesis of this work to discuss whether or not PMCs hold any advantages over traditional United Nations forces with regards to humanitarian intervention. Here, the arguments in favour of the use of PMCs are derived from both practical and normative sources.21 From a practical perspective, the primary benefit of PMCs relative to traditional United Nations forces is the ability of PMCs to assemble and deploy personnel faster than traditional forces at lower political costs (especially concerning battlefield deaths).22 While a brief look at the characteristics of PMCs indicate their potential to serve as specialized, organized forces which employ highly trained and equipped military officers to carry out specific mandated tasks at a lower financial cost than traditional United Nations forces, some of the critical benefits of PMCs need to be delineated further. First, given the marketed nature of the security sector, the international persistence of conflict ensures that demand for PMCs – and the services they provide – will continue to exist. In fact, the presence of the security market itself is evidence of the lack of alternative international resources committed to the stabilization of fragile states.23 For this reason, PMCs may well be the only actor consistently willing and able to intervene in an international system – particularly as nation-states remain hesitant to support peace operations with the requisite troops or resources. Second, relating to training, experience and expertise, PMCs (as private companies) are able to recruit from an international roster of former military and paramilitary experts, regardless of their nationality
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Private Military Companies
or citizenship and can thus optimize the forces employed. This recruiting process ensures that the selected agents are not only competent, but also commandable under a formal operational structure.24 The ability to consolidate force command under a central authority is an operational strength often impossible to ensure with UN or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. The struggle with the latter organizations is derived from the fact that troops are typically procured from member states which individually limit their troops operational use. At times this can mean an explicit refusal to place their state forces within critical regions or under foreign military command. Alternatively, the PMCs’ recruitment of tightly organized groups of experienced agents whose limitations are not as determined by extraneous – often political factors – offers PMCs a tactical and strategic edge over traditional United Nations and even NATO – forces. The advantages of PMCs relative to United Nations forces extend beyond the tactical realm of operations, and further into political sphere. If we are to assume that the ability of a member state to contribute troops to United Nations intervention forces is, to an extent, determined by the domestic political costs of their use, then PMCs remain more immune from political complications which can (and have) prematurely end humanitarian missions in the past. Examples such as the United States troop withdrawal after the ill-fated U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992, which resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S Delta Force officers,25 or the tragic murder and subsequent withdrawal of Belgian-national United Nations peacekeepers in Rwanda in 1994, illustrate that traditional UN forces’ susceptibility to politically-motivated withdrawals is exceedingly high. The underlying logic in these examples is that interventions, which are perceived too costly, remain exceedingly susceptible to international retraction, disengagement or stubborn inaction. For PMCs, troops are drawn from a variety of individual countries in the private sphere, and thus there is a diffusion of political cost amongst a greater number of states, and with the effect of reducing susceptibility of troop withdrawal by virtue of force composition.
The ability to consolidate force
command
under
a central authority is an operational strength often impossible to ensure with UN or North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces.
Additionally, despite tectonic shifts in peacekeeping theory, seen in the Brahimi Report and other independent commissions, traditional 27
Private Military Companies
With
many
of
the
employed agents working for PMCs being drawn from international pools of experts, the political costs of casualties sustained in the course of a given mission will be dispersed amongst many international states.
28
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peace intervention operations still require appropriate amendments to the peacekeeper mandates necessary to address the changing dynamics of conflict on the ground – flexibility essential for operational success.26 As Martin Shaw comments, countries such as the United States frequently base their operational strategy on ‘risk-transfer warfare’, which implores US commanders to minimize casualties of their troops and work to eliminate the enemy quickly, efficiently, and discretely. As a result, commanders are unwilling to put their troops in higher risk situations, even if such an action is required to quell instability.27 Thus, the incipient concern for the commander of these interventions is not the consequences of his operational strategy, but rather the threats associated with political risks for the politician(s) that originally supported this course of action (i.e. future electoral success, fundraising etc…). As these political risks weigh heavily on the sustainability of intervention forces over time and the effectiveness in situ, any force that can provide a degree of insulation from these compromising factors would be an improvement over past practices. There are a number of reasons that suggest PMCs enjoy this insulation. First, as mentioned above, with many of the employed agents working for PMCs being drawn from international pools of experts, the political costs of casualties sustained in the course of a given mission will be dispersed amongst many international states. This is critical for public opinion, as a more incongruous geographic region, from which the actors are drawn, undercuts the strength of public opinion within any one of these international states. Thus, fractured public opinion - particularly when isolated within individual states – is less likely to force withdrawal of the PMC, or – given the private corporate dynamic – demand that their nationals abandon the cause.28 Second, due to the voluntary nature of PMC personnel hired on a contract for a specific operation, there is less ‘moral baggage’ attached to PMC employees than traditional military personnel. National troops ordered or obliged to serve under a United Nations mandate by their state are typically selected from the larger pool of standard military troops. This means that their donation to the United Nations, and subsequent deployment to these regions– with the inherent risks – was forced upon
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Private Military Companies
them, instead of personally undertaken. Instead, the officer in a PMC knows, at time of enlistment, exactly what mission their services are needed for, and can simply not ‘sign up’ if they deem the risks too high. As a result, the deaths of traditional military populations are typically viewed more politically tenuous, than the deaths of contractors who decide upon a similar high-risk position. The lower ‘moral cost’ could suggest an opportunity to willingly deploy PMCs into extremely high-risk situations; even if the worst-case military scenario presents itself, the losses would not be attributed to any individual state within the international community. Thus, while companies would likely be unwilling to take considerable losses, the ability of PMCs to absorb losses – if they were to occur – remains superior to that of the United Nations. Some observers might argue that any operational failure would still fall on the United Nations (as the contracting party in the arrangement), however, the United Nations’ 192 members represent a diffusion of responsibility that appears more palatable to the international community – particularly when PMCs are used in lieu of United Nations troops – than our current intervention model which tends to place blame on the principle (state) participants. Thus, PMCs’ ability to avoid the political costs which dissuade member states from accepting the risks of humanitarian intervention, PMCs may offer an effective alternative to the use of traditional UN forces.
While companies would likely be unwilling to take considerable losses, the ability of PMCs to absorb losses – if they were to occur – remains superior to that of the United Nations.
Furthermore, PMCs also enjoy a comparative advantage regarding the financial costs of humanitarian intervention. In a 2002 report authored by the United Kingdom’s Foreign Office, analysts calculated the cost of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) mission at $600 million United States dollars per year, concluding that “if the tasks of UNAMSIL were put out to tender, private companies would be able to do the job more cheaply and effectively.”29 While the Foreign Office was tentative about issuing a long-term prognostication concerning the use of PMCs, their support of the financial logic behind contracting private military agents is suggestive of a general trend that sees PMCs as potential gap-filling agents in instances where “private forces will be cheaper than peacekeeping” forces, particularly in situations where “aid is no longer helpful…and where aggressive peace-enforcement is required.”30 Thus, from an economic perspective, there seems to be significant benefits 29
Private Military Companies
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associated with the use of PMCs relative to traditional United Nations forces. Addressing this issue of capacity specifically, the United Nations has long debated the creation of a standing reaction force with little tangible progress, suggesting the investigation of alternative approaches, such as the use of PMCs, is particularly topical.
It is important to acknowledge that, despite the aforementioned benefits of PMCs, such entities might not be ideal in all situations. In evaluating their true potential, one must consider those situations in which the use of PMCs would be optimal. It is useful here to appeal to lessons learned from prior UN interventions, such as those explored in the 1997 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Harm. The Carnegie Commission sought to analyze how the peacekeeping failure in Rwanda, and ensuing humanitarian disaster, could have been averted. The Commission’s report suggested that the majority of genocidal acts in Rwanda could have been avoided if the peacekeeping force had been “considerably more unified, … able to use offensive tactics” and had been supplied a dynamic “read and react” mandate for operations.31 In addition, discussion in this paper highlighted considerable challenges regarding the use of Belgian peacekeepers, unwilling to accept the risk of losing additional nationals in the war-torn country. Thus, the report called for the United Nations structure to be updated to better address the predominance of intrastate conflict, which they argued the current United Nations framework was ill-equipped to handle.32 Echoing the many scholars cited in this paper, the Commission’s report criticized the United Nations for not moving fast enough to address the Rwandan crisis, and endorsed the need for a standing force of approximately 5000 agents to deal with similar crises that may become present in the international system within a short time period.33 Addressing this issue of capacity specifically, the United Nations has long debated the creation of a standing reaction force with little tangible progress, suggesting the investigation of alternative approaches, such as the use of PMCs, is particularly topical. If one were to take an expansive view of the panel’s conclusions, their recommendations seem to suggest the use, and potential limits, of PMCs under the United Nations umbrella. While the focus of this paper remains limited to the potential benefits of incorporating PMCs into the wider discourse and practice of United Nations humanitarian operations, prescriptive aspects of PMC regulation, conduct and the structures for
30
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Private Military Companies
PMC employment fall outside the scope of this work. However, while PMCs might be useful in a multitude of situations, their benefits are most pronounced (and shortcomings least prominent) when utilized in small, tightly controlled campaigns. Thus, this may be a useful point from which prescriptive scholarship might begin to address the use of private force for humanitarian purposes. Conclusion In discussing the above issues, this paper has demonstrated that PMCs have suffered from a frequent and arguably misguided association with traditional mercenary groups. Due to the emotively charged reading of their basic characteristics, the discourse surrounding PMCs has lacked the intellectual and pragmatic vigour customarily given to viable security alternatives. Further, this paper has illustrated specific characteristics that effectively distinguish PMCs from traditional mercenary groups. In this matter it was shown that fundamental differences do exist between PMCs and mercenary groups further suggesting an unrealized potential for PMCs to be used in a manner beneficial to the practice of humanitarian intervention. Finally, this paper engaged in a discussion of the strengths of PMCs relative to traditional, multi-lateral, state-based United Nations forces illustrating that the political, financial and practical advantages intrinsic to the market-based PMC have been under-appreciated relative to the current international options for humanitarian intervention. Some skeptics would argue that the issues of international inaction or suboptimal performance, in the realm of humanitarian intervention, are structural (based on obstacles at the level of United Nations discourse). However, while this author would agree that structural dynamics are important, they are not unchangeable. For instance, alternative models of intervention alter the terms of these discussions. If adopted, PMC characteristics would impact the degree and extent that political and operational risks would be evaluated by nation states. To take the defeatist structural view, given the current international structure, is to confirm a sense of institutionalized fatalism. This fatalism would leave us with few options.
While this author would agree that structural dynamics are important, they are not unchangeable. For instance, alternative
models
of
intervention alter the terms of these discussions. If adopted, PMC characteristics would impact the degree and extent that political and operational risks would be evaluated by nation states.
Instead, these practical and principled aspects of the debate over the use of PMCs shroud a profound, underlying concern: without 31
Private Military Companies
In sum, if there is a moral case for intervention, not to mention a ‘responsibility to protect’ the vulnerable populations of the world – as this author believes there to be – there must also be a practical force to carry such action forward.
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effective United Nations responses, terms such as peacekeeping or selfdetermination will become “words bandied about by armchair idealists who have no idea how to convert abstracts into action.”34 If this is the stasis that the international community consents to, then the international system will have lost not only the will to intervene in situations of humanitarian crises, but also the normative ground upon which the cause for humanitarian intervention is predicated. In sum, if there is a moral case for intervention, not to mention a ‘responsibility to protect’ the vulnerable populations of the world – as this author believes there to be – there must also be a practical force to carry such action forward. Acknowledging that PMCs have gone largely unexamined in an international system marred by the inefficacies of traditional multilateral forces, one can only hope that private military companies, and their untapped potential, be given due consideration.
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Tehran 路 Iran 路 Photograph by Sam Sarhang Khanlari
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From Westphalia to Tehran
From Westphalia to Tehran:
International Secularism and Iran’s Theocracy The system of International Relations is currently facing a global religious revival. This challenge is perhaps clearest with regards to the international community’s response to the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is important to critically evaluate Westphalian notions of secularism as foundational assumptions that deeply affect conventionally accepted conceptions of international norms, international society, international stability, and perceptions of threat. This paper adopts a constructivist approach to argue that perceptions of theocratic Iran are heavily influenced by a binary tautology imbedded in Westphalian internationalism from its very formation. This view sees international peace and stability as consonant with secularism and dissonant with religion. With regards to Iran, this leads to the reflexive labelling of the theocratic state as threatening. However, while Iran has undeniably flouted international norms in the past, this view largely overlooks the realities of Iranian politics and foreign policy. By presuming that Iran’s theocracy and theocratic leaders inevitably pose a threat to international stability, not only are salient political actors in the Islamic Republic of Iran misapprehended, but barriers to reconciliation and détente between Iran and other states are constructed and maintained.
F
ew countries have drawn more concern than the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), which is frequently regarded as a threat to international stability.1 It is important in the context of global religious revival that we critically evaluate the assumptions that create these perceptions.2 Such reflection has been, for the most part, absent from international relations scholarship.3 In this paper, I take a constructivist approach to argue that anxieties over Iran are largely engendered by a binary tautology inherent in Westphalian internationalism that assumes international peace to be consonant with secularism and dissonant with religion.4 This assumption is faulty for two reasons. First, it is contingent upon a particular occidental and Christian genealogy. This problematizes its own claims to universality.5 Second, as a closer examination of Iranian politics and foreign policy demonstrates, this view’s rigid dualism is largely faulty. Although the IRI has contravened international norms, it is erroneous to see this as a necessary outcome of its theocratic government.6 Rather, Tehran’s foreign policy reflects the pluralism of the regime’s political-theological discourse. Westphalian assumptions promote an ignorance of this pluralism and lead to the incorrect assumption that a theocratic Iran is incompatible with
By: Ryan Morrow
One of the more remarkable features about the endless drumbeat of alarm about Iran is that it pays virtually no attention to Iran’s actual capabilities,
and
rests
on all sorts of worst case assumptions about Iranian behavior. - Foreign Policy
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From Westphalia to Tehran
Tehran’s foreign policy reflects the pluralism of the regime’s political-theological discourse. Westphalian
assumptions
promote an ignorance of this pluralism and lead to the incorrect assumption that a theocratic Iran is incompatible with international stability.
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international stability.7 This viewpoint establishes and maintains barriers to détente and cooperation between Iran and Western state actors.8 This argument is developed through several sections. I first trace the genesis of the Westphalian system in relation to the particular secular tautology this paper addresses. I then examine the pluralism that animates Iranian foreign relations. Finally, I argue that American diplomacy regarding Iran has largely overlooked this pluralism and instead responded to Iran as a prima facie opponent. It is first important, however, to situate the argument made here within international relations theory. The dominant theories of international relations, neo-realism and neo-liberalism, typically take for granted international secularism and hypothesize about patterns of behavior within the international system so defined.9 As such, social constructivism is a theory better suited to the study of the norms that lay at the foundation of the relationship between religion and international relations. As Michael Barnett explains, constructivism “is more broadly concerned with how to conceptualize the relationship between agents and structures.”10 This theory views international order as a sphere of social interaction in which specific intersubjective norms structure relations.11 In the contemporary international order, these norms are largely secular and occidental in origin.12 Westphalian Secularism Secularism may be defined as a social modality whereby religion is excluded from various spheres of social interaction.13 Politically, this is where religion is rejected from spaces of political deliberation.14 Secularism often claims a post-metaphysical neutrality and normative superiority over the non-secular.15 In addition to the connections drawn between secularism and modernity, democracy and capitalism, international, or Westphalian, secularism further claims itself as the foundation of international peace and stability.16 Prior to 1648, political authority in Europe was essentially held concurrently by the Church and feudal lords.17 The contemporary international order came about as a response to the European wars of
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From Westphalia to Tehran
religion, in which combatants’ ostensibly battled apostasy following the Protestant Reformation.18 The 1648 the Peace of Westphalia, which ended these conflicts, established three precepts that still define conventional international relations. First, states became sovereign actors. This was associated with the principle of rex est imprator in regno suo (‘whose the region his the religion’), which asserted that rulers may not intervene in one another’s domestic politics on religious grounds.19 Similarly, the treaty also codified the principle of cujus regio ejus religio (‘the king is supreme in his own realm’), which held that political authority is independent of the metaphysical.20 Finally, the Westphalian Peace formally propounded the separation of church and state between and within states themselves.21 The Peace of Westphalia essentially created a new international order and started excluding the religious. As Hurd explains, the conflicts of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries inverted the dominance of the ecclesiastical over the civil authority through the creation of the modern state, preparing the way for the eventual elimination of the church from the public sphere.22 The Westphalian order was subsequently imposed upon the world through colonialism and even countries like Iran, which were never fully colonized, were forced to conform to these norms.23 The genealogy of Westphalian secularism means that religion is either overlooked in international relations or summarily and uncritically seen as unpredictable, illogical, and menacing.24 As Carlson and Owens state, this formula is particularly dangerous when it is adopted by statespersons, foreign policy experts, political scientists, theorists, and journalists who then find themselves working without an interpretive framework that properly accounts for religious perspectives and their moral influences.25 Essentially, the assumptions associated with Westphalian secularism encourage the belief that states must follow a western trajectory of secularism to ensure international stability.26
Essentially, the assumptions associated with Westphalian secularism encourage the belief that states must follow a western trajectory of secularism to ensure international stability.
Revolutionary Iran The fallacious heuristics engendered by this binary tautology can be seen in the conventional perceptions of Iran and, more generally, political Islam. In the Iranian case, the plurality of opinion regarding the state’s foreign policy tends to be overlooked. Instead, relevant actors 37
From Westphalia to Tehran
It is indicative of the uncritical faith in secularist schemas that, though Khomeini’s movement had been developing since the 1950s, western states did not perceive this religious coalition as a significant political force; this would have violated the teleological assumptions regarding secular modernity.
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are lumped into a theocratic rogues’ gallery of international dissidents.27 In order to understand the dynamics of Iranian theological pluralism, it is first important to understand political Islam and the Iranian state’s origins and structures. Political Islam Islamism supports the union of political and religious authority and seeks to create policy in accordance with religious principles.28 As Saidabadi explains, Islamism is distinct from neo-fundamentalism in that the latter often pursues an isolationist agenda and avoids politics while Islamists view Islam and religious authority as primary, and the state as their instrument. They argue that religious authority should form government and that political authority should form religious authority in society. Adhering to the unity of religion and politics, [political Islamists] believe that the government has to be Islamic and the leadership has to be religious […] Unlike [neo-fundamentalists] they do not want to be isolationists, but believe that Islam has all the requirements ad capacity to manage a government and direct […] its foreign relations.29 Iran is one of the only examples of such a theocratic system in practice.30 The sui generis nature of Iran’s theocracy means that while investigation yields insights into the nature of contemporary international society, these findings may not be generalizable to other states or non-state religious actors. The Iranian Revolution Although Shah Reza Pahlavi’s regime forbade dissent, a diverse coalition solidified around the religious leadership of the exiled Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini.31 It is indicative of the uncritical faith in secularist schemas that, though Khomeini’s movement had been developing since the 1950s, western states did not perceive this religious coalition as a significant political force; this would have violated the teleological assumptions regarding secular modernity.32 In 1977, for instance, President Jimmy Carter stated that Iran was an “island of security,” and American diplomatic and intelligence services had written Khomeini off.33 In 1979, however, the revolutionary coalition was able to depose the Shah and an Islamic state was subsequently established in which the Qur’an and Sunna became constitutionally protected and established as the sole
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legitimate authority.34 This theocracy subsequently marginalized secular members of the revolutionary coalition and established Khomeini in a dominant position.35 Revolutionary Iran is a major vector through which Islam and Westphalian international society have met and this has had seismic implications for Westphalian secularism. Iran is frequently seen to be a dangerous international dissident.36 The inaccuracy of these assumptions, however, is belied by a closer examination of Iran. In fact, the IRI’s foreign policy has fluctuated between challenging international society and conforming to it. These vacillations are the result of theological and doctrinal heterogeneity. Iranian Foreign Policy Structures The most important institution regarding foreign policy is the Iranian Constitution, which formally binds the conduct of diplomacy to the Qur’an and Sunna. It establishes seven principles regarding the conduct of foreign policy. The first principle, Omm-al Qora, is the protection of the Islamic state.37 A related second principle, Nafy Sabil, declares that Iran may not cede its sovereignty to foreign actors.38 For instance, article 152 states, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country.39 Similarly, article 153 states, any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of national life, is forbidden.40 Third, political leaders are officially allowed some latitude within Islamic precepts in the name of expediency.41 Fourth, peaceable relations will be pursued with states that are not hostile to Iran or Islam in general.42 This is stated in Article 152, the foreign policy of the Islamic republic of Iran is… [obliged to] the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all nonbelligerent states.43 The fifth and sixth principles require that Iranian foreign policy serve as a vector of da’wa (‘proselytization’) beyond its borders.44 Finally, the Iranian
Revolutionary Iran is a major vector through which Islam
and
Westphalian
international society have met and this has had seismic implications for Westphalian secularism. Iran is frequently seen to be a dangerous international dissident.
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There are three dominant factions in the Iranian system, each espousing a distinct foreign policy approach: conservatives, pragmatists, and reformers...
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Constitution pledges fealty to all Muslims irrespective of citizenship.45 While the first four principles are consonant with Westphalian norms, the final three are more contentious. However, the relative importance given to these principle and their interpretations has differed markedly depending on who holds specific nodes of power.46 Article 110 gives jurisdiction over foreign policy to the Velayat-e Faqih, or supreme leader (figures 1, 2).47 While it is typically assumed that the IRI’s foreign policy is dictatorial and hierarchically oriented, there are actually numerous nodes in the Iranian foreign policy network which allow factional contenders to influence diplomacy.48 As Adam Tarock points out, there […] are layers of authorities and a certain degree of pluralism, though not necessarily in the western tradition. It is that pluralism, albeit an Islamic version of it, which [Western states] either find difficult or unwilling to come to terms with in the case of Iran.49 The various nodes include, but are not limited to: the Velayat-e Faqih and the Guardianship Council over which he presides; the President and cabinet; the Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the National Security Council; the Majlis (Iran’s Legislature); the Expediency Council (an advisory and intermediary organ); the military and paramilitary Revolutionary Guard; the media, discourse elites, and the general public.50 This institutional pluralism has encouraged the development of doctrinal pluralism and political factions which are loosely bound by compatible political-theologies, as formal political parties are prohibited in the IRI.51 Despite this prohibition, elected officials frequently run on platforms associated with a particular faction.52 There are three dominant factions in the Iranian system, each espousing a distinct foreign policy approach: conservatives, pragmatists, and reformers (figure 3).53 These factions cannot be said to represent a conflict between western-style modernity and religious traditionalism; rather, they are contests oriented around different religious doctrines, trajectories of modernity and tradition, notions of community, and differing concepts of authority which occur within a larger theocratic framework that is generally accepted as legitimate (figure 4).54 Further, it is important to note that these factions reflect schisms within the Iranian population itself: twenty-five to thirty percent are conservative, forty to forty-five percent are floating reformist-pragmatists, ten percent are committed pragmatists, and twenty
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to twenty-five percent are simply apathetic.55 The Conservatives and Iran’s Jacobin Era (1979-1989) The conservatives originally nucleated around Khomeini and reached their zenith of power during the Jacobin decade that followed the revolution. It is important to note that this faction is still central, owing to conservatives’ control of the Guardianship Council.56 Theologically, conservative hardliners support the view that political authority needs to be utilized to regulate social life and impose conformity with the Qur’an and Sunna.57 This faction also adheres to a distinct foreign policy approach. As Saidabadi explains, foreign affairs for this group is, founded on the argument that Iran’s foreign policy makers are duty bound to determine Iran’s foreign policy subject to the fulfillment of Islamic principles, without thought for long term consequences… the conduct of Iran’s foreign policy should not take current realities into account.58 Since Khomeini’s leadership, conservative foreign policy has been based on two such principles: na sharq na gharb (‘neither east not west’) and ‘export of the revolution’.59 Although the former has been, and continued to be, conveyed in religious terms as independence from America (‘the Great Satan’) or the USSR (‘the Lesser Satan’), Iran’s pursuit of political independence from foreign powers is consonant with Westphalian norms and had been a diplomatic objective of pre-revolution Iran.60
The conservatives originally nucleated around Khomeini and reached their zenith of power during the Jacobin decade that followed the revolution.
The latter objective, however, has posed a much greater challenge to Westphalian norms. The goal of exporting the revolution gives primacy to and reflects a specific interpretation of those constitutional principles which see the state as a vector for the conduct of da’wa. This proselytizing mission has been threatening to Westphalian norms because it not only rejects the legitimacy of conventional Westphalian sovereignty, but also because it sees the Velayat-e Faqih as presiding over the entire Umma (Muslim community) as would an Imam.61 As Khomeini stated, we should try hard to export our revolution to the world… because Islam does not regard various Islamic countries as differently and is supporter of all the oppressed… we [shall] confront the world with our ideology.62 41
From Westphalia to Tehran
This form of revolutionary challenge to the international system is not, of course, only seen in theocracies. For instance, a similar diplomatic emphasis on spreading the revolution was also evident following
the
Revolution of 1917.
42
Russian
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In practice, exporting the revolution amounted to a policy of supporting Shi’ite Islamists in other countries.63 This stance threatened many Middle Eastern leaders, whose claims to legitimacy are not ostensibly Islamic. For instance, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia became particularly acrimonious during this period. Not only did Khomeini state that Saudi Arabia’s monarchy was un-Islamic, but also supported Shi’ite protests in Saudi Arabia, most notably during the 1987 Hajj (‘pilgrimage’).64 This is clearly dissonant with notions such as cujus regio ejus religio and rex est imprator in regno suo. Furthermore, this Jacobin attempt to export the revolution clearly inflected international stability, most notably leading to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in which numerous western and Middle Eastern states supported secular Ba’athist Iraq while Iran portrayed the conflict as a Manichean religious struggle.65 This form of revolutionary challenge to the international system is not, of course, only seen in theocracies. For instance, a similar diplomatic emphasis on spreading the revolution was also evident following the Russian Revolution of 1917.66 The Pragmatists and Iran’s Thermidore Period (1989-1997) The pragmatist faction became ascendant under the Presidency of Hojjat Al-Islam Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani during the post-revolutionary thermidore. This was related to three factors. First, Khomeini’s successor, Grand Ayatollah Ali Koseyni Khamenei, lacked Khomeini’s political largess and ability to impose consensus.67 A second factor was the burgeoning of a moderate post-revolutionary generation which has been less interested in perpetual revolutionary struggle.68 Finally, there was a need to reconstruct after the war with Iraq.69 Pragmatists espouse a particular theology which differentiates them from conservatives. Like conservatives, pragmatists see the Qur’an and Sunna as the sole source of legitimate authority. However, unlike conservatives, they prioritize domestic revolutionary consolidation over exportation and argue that in order to achieve this goal, Iran must constructively engage the world. This has to do with an interpretation of Omm-al Qora, which brings the principle closer to Westphalian notions of rational raison d’état.70 For instance, shortly after his inauguration, Rasfanjani sent a communiqué to the European Community that stated, the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to international
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law, opposes interference in the internal affairs of other states, recognizes the observance of domestic laws as a democratic move and denounces the use of force in international relations.71 Although the pragmatists’ foreign policy aimed at rapprochement with other Middle Eastern states, its distinctive agenda is clearest with regard to Central Asia.72 Although the Central Asian states are largely secular, owing to their Soviet history, Tehran has not attempted to export its revolution or displace secular leaders. Instead, its diplomacy is largely based on national interest.73 For instance, Tehran prioritized material interests over religion when mediating the Nargorno-Karbakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Despite Azerbaijan’s Shi’ite majority, Tehran remained neutral and, at times, even supported Christian Armenia so as to deny Turkish influence in the region.74 A similar example is Iran’s effort to arbitrate conflict between Tajikistan’s secular government and Islamist challenger groups.75 Despite the pragmatists’ ascendancy, however, Iran’s multiple nodes of power militate against a decisive shift away from Jacobinism and have created a more complex and contradictory diplomacy following Khomeini’s death. For instance, while Rafsanjani pursued relations with Europe, other elites were carrying out assassinations of dissidents in European countries.76 This incoherence has continued into the reformist Presidency of Hojjat AlIslam Sayyid Mohammad Khatami and beyond. The Reformist Era (1997-2005) The same factors that contributed to the ascendency of the pragmatists subsequently led to reformist dominance under the Khatami Presidency.77 Theologically, reformists are distinct from both the conservatives and pragmatists in that they have sought to decrease the state’s social control and limit the power of the supreme leader by making the theocratic government more accountable to the electorate.78 Western media and scholarship has often portrayed Reformists as secularists; this, however, overlooks their deep commitment to religious values.79 This group is largely concerned with innovation in domestic, rather than foreign, policy. In terms of diplomacy, they tend to see international rapprochement as supportive of this domestic agenda. Khatami essentially continued Rafsanjani’s diplomatic initiatives, especially repairing regional relations. For instance, the IRI’s relationship with Saudi Arabia was closely attended to and has warmed greatly.80 One
Theologically,
reformists
are distinct from both the
conservatives
and
pragmatists in that they have sought to decrease the state’s social control and limit the power of the supreme leader by making the theocratic government more accountable to the electorate.
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important agenda that distinguished reformist from pragmatist foreign policy has been an emphasis on mending fences with the west. The most notable such effort was Khatami’s ‘dialogue of civilizations.’81 This constitutes a major break with the more belligerent conservative notions of na sharq na gharb.82 As Ramazani explains, “perhaps the most important result of Khatami’s conciliatory policy, devoid of ideological baggage, has been Iran’s expanding ties with Europe.”83 Furthermore, the IRI publically denounced the 9/11 attacks and indirectly aided the American intervention in Afghanistan. However, these efforts at reconciliation were greatly undercut by Khamenei who has, with the backing of the Revolutionary Guard, continued to support Islamist groups in such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine.84
From 2004, reformist influence has declined. Khatami has stated the reformists’ defeat owed to the machinations of the hojjateh, a cabal of
hard-line
conservatives.
44
neo-
Importantly, the reformist period also saw the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).85 Under Khatami, Iran developed a relationship with the Karzai administration in Afghanistan.86 In Iraq, the IRI has supported democratization in tandem with the deployment of religious soft-power in order to facilitate the development of a more pliable Shi’ite majority or, at the very least, prevent Iraq from becoming an American or Saudi rump state.87 This has occasionally brought Iran into agreement with America. For instance, Tehran supported the US-backed Iraqi National Congress.88 As with other agendas, Khatami’s involvement in Iraq has been continuously undermined by the conservatives. In this case, Khamenei has portrayed Khatami as a comprador for his congenial attitude toward America.89 Neo-Conservatives and the Jacobin ‘Revival’ (2005-) From 2004, reformist influence has declined.90 Khatami has stated the reformists’ defeat owed to the machinations of the hojjateh, a cabal of hard-line neo-conservatives.91 Khamenei, who is conservative rather than neo-conservative, largely engineered this shift. In 2004, for instance, the Guardianship Council disqualified some 3,600 Majlis candidates who had supported Khatami.92 The election of Ahmadinejad, a hardline neo-conservative, to the presidency in 2005 is a clear reflection of the conservatives’ reclamation of power. In terms of foreign policy, Ahmadinejad has argued that Iran has not gone far enough in exporting the revolution and has claimed authority over the entire Ummah, as Khomeini had also done.93 The contemporary conservative position, however, is more ambiguous
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than in the halcyon days of the revolution. This is because Ahmadinejad actually has relatively little control over diplomacy relative to Khamenei. This ambiguity is also due to Khamenei’s attempts to play the pragmatists and conservatives off each other so as to bolster his own position.94 Ahmadinejad’s radicalism allows Khamenei to appeal to both pragmatists and conservatives by moderating the former.95 On the one hand, when Rafsanjani, who now heads the Expediency Council at Khameini’s pleasure, demanded the removal of Ahmadinejad from office, Khamenei defused this by increasing Rafsanjani’s and his own power. On the other hand, Khamenei has publically blessed some of Ahmadinejad’s more belligerent statements.96 This political dynamic allows Khamenei maximal latitude.97 The dominant diplomatic issues for Iran are currently Iraq, the larger Middle East, and the nuclear program.98 It is unclear that Ahmadinejad dominates any of these issue areas. Iran’s policy toward Iraq will likely continue as it has thus far. Iran and America have even recently had their first official meetings since 1979 over the issue of Iraqi reconstruction.99 Yet, the neo-conservatives may spoil Khamenei and Rafsanjani’s more pragmatic approach. For example, while mainstream Iranian factions have denounced Muqtada al-Sadr, an Iraqi Shi’ite agitator, neo-conservative factions have continued to support him through the Revolutionary Guard.100 However, American diplomatic blunders have meant that both Jacobin and pragmatic approaches to the Middle East are temporarily incompatible. Iran’s increased anti-Israel rhetoric, for example, has not alienated regional allies, even those won during the Khatami period such as Saudi Arabia.101 This is not to say that Iranian conservatism is accepted by all. Egypt’s foreign minister, for instance, publically stated after Ahmadinejad’s election that the Egyptian government would resist any attempt to export revolution into that country.102
Similarly,
Ahmadinejad
has little influence over the nuclear program and no authority to declare war. As in other policy areas, there is a plurality of opinions regarding the nuclear program, few of which share Ahmadinejad’s apparently
apocalyptic
inclinations.
Similarly, Ahmadinejad has little influence over the nuclear program and no authority to declare war. As in other policy areas, there is a plurality of opinions regarding the nuclear program, few of which share Ahmadinejad’s apparently apocalyptic inclinations.103 Yet, his messianic and eschatological statements regarding an impending nuclear war have complicated perennially combative relations with the west and the United States in particular, a relationship that three-quarters of Iranians would like 45
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to see improved.104
America has consequently often
overlooked
the
dynamism at play in Iranian foreign policy and has
instead
summarily
judged the Islamic Republic of Iran as threatening... This perception effectively blinds
Americans
diplomatic for
to
opportunities
engaging
Iranian
pragmatists or reformers in ways that may advance both countries’ diplomatic objectives.
46
American-Iranian Relations Since the revolution and the 1979-1981 hostage crisis, relations between Iran and America have been antipathetic.105 This is surprising considering that, in terms of Westphalian raison d’état, neither country benefits from this conflict. The Iranian economy is greatly harmed by American embargoes while American oil companies lose billions of dollars annually.106 America’s seemingly unshakable enemy image of Iran is strongly beholden to its cultural and normative relationship to the Westphalian system.107 As Hurd explains, the Westphalian assumptions have formed the conceptual apparatus through which Americans framed the revolution… The American laicist perspective on Iran was a consequence of an often unacknowledged intellectual and visceral commitment to a particular formation of secular modernity… More than any single factor, the authoritative forms of secularism […] account for the visceral antipathy vis-à-vis Iran and the Iranian Revolution.108 America has consequently often overlooked the dynamism at play in Iranian foreign policy and has instead summarily judged the IRI as threatening. For instance, the Clinton Administration imposed some of the strongest sanctions upon Iran, such as the ‘dual-containment’ strategy against Iran and Iraq and the Iran-Libya Sanction Act (1996), during its thermidore period. Similarly, President Bush placed Iran on the ‘axis of evil’ during the reformist era.109 Western states appear to have difficulty accepting the dynamism of the Iranian theocracy. Through a tautological lens, it is impossible that Iran should be able to both emulate and oppose western modernity or, as Tarock says, “they can [not] be idealists and pragmatists at the same time.”110 Thus, Washington has continuously pushed for regime change in Tehran.111 This perception effectively blinds Americans to diplomatic opportunities for engaging Iranian pragmatists or reformers in ways that may advance both countries’ diplomatic objectives. Conclusion America’s, and much of the West’s, uncompromising foreign policy stance toward the IRI is closely linked to those norms and assumptions that form the basis of the international order.112 The Iranian case suggests that
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there may be nothing ‘natural’ about the secular international order. Rather, the international order is bound by norms and notions that are inherently intersubjective and contingent on cultural genealogies.113 It is important to critically investigate these assumptions as they form the basis of foreign policy formulation. The tautologies upon which Westphalian secularism is constructed are premised on rigid distinctions between secularism and religion.114 As the Iranian case demonstrates, this Westphalian tautology may be fallacious.115 On the one hand, it is clear that religion, specifically the Christian heritage of the Westphalian system, has influenced international order in ways that contradict its own foundational ideology.116 On the other hand, the result of Westphalian secularism’s occidental genealogy supports the prima facie judgment that religion poses a threat to international stability. This overlooks the pluralism that exists in systems such as the IRI. In this sense, Westphalian assumptions support the related perceptions of such states, or religiously motivated groups, as monolithic and inherently threatening to international peace. Rather, as Iranian diplomatic pluralism demonstrates, there is no inherent or necessary relationship between its theocracy and conflict.117 This analysis is consonant with Hayne’s finding that religion, though it certainly has an impact on diplomacy, has no clearly negative or unidirectional impact on international stability.118 This suggests that contemporary international society will likely have to move beyond those assumptions which informed its own creation if it is to peaceably accommodate the present-day religious revival.119
The tautologies upon which Westphalian secularism is constructed are premised on rigid distinctions between secularism and religion. As the Iranian case demonstrates, this Westphalian tautology may be fallacious.
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APPENDIX Figure 1: the formal power structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1979 revolution.
Source: Eva Patricia Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran: A Study on the Iranian Political Elite from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2009), 33.
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Figure 2: The formal power structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1979 revolution.
Source: Shahram Akbarzedah, “Where is the Islamic Republic of Iran Heading?” in Australia Journal of International Affairs 59, 1 (2005): 28.
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Figure 3: Positions of political-theological factions in the Islamic Republic of Iran by time period and issue area.
Source: Eva Patricia Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran: A Study on the Iranian Political Elite from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2009), 51-52, 54, 56, 61.
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Figure 4: Important factors bearing, questions, and issues bearing upon the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy trajectory, practices and programme.
Source: Eva Patricia Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran: A Study on the Iranian Political Elite from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2009), 23.
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Endnotes
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ENDNOTES The Value of Theories in Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of Essence of Decision 1 Graham T. Allison, Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), 1. 2 Ibid., 167. 3 Ibid., VIII. 4 Ibid., 263.
On Retaliation and the WTO: Problems and Solutions 1 Sacerdoti, Giorgio, Alan Yanovich, and Jan Bohanes. The WTO at Ten: the Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Throughout. Print. 2 Wilson, Bruce. “The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Operation: A Brief Overview of the First Ten Years.” Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement: The First Ten Years. By Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 20. Print. 3 Yerxa, Rufus. “The Power of the WTO Dispute Settlement System.” Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement: The First Ten Years. By Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 4. Print. 4 Wilson, Bruce. “The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Operation: A Brief Overview of the First Ten Years.” Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement: The First Ten Years. By Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 20. Print. 5 Wilson, Bruce. “The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Operation: A Brief Overview of the First Ten Years.” Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement: The First Ten Years. By Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 20. Print. 6 Wilson, Bruce. “The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Operation: A Brief Overview of the First Ten Years.” Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement: The First Ten Years. By Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 20. Print. 7 Lawrence, Robert Z. Crimes & Punishments?: Retaliation under the WTO. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2003.
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37. Print. 8 Davey, William J. “Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement.” Cornell International Law Journal (2009): 119. Web. <www.organizations.lawschool.cornell.edu/ ilj/issues/42.1/CIN105.pdf>. 9 Davey, William J. “Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement.” Cornell International Law Journal (2009): 122. Web. <www.organizations.lawschool.cornell.edu/ ilj/issues/42.1/CIN105.pdf>. 10 “WTO | Legal Texts - Marrakesh Agreement.” World Trade Organization Home Page. Web. <http://www.wto.org/ english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm>. 11 WTO | Legal Texts - Marrakesh Agreement.” World Trade Organization Home Page. Web. <http://www.wto.org/ english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm>. 12 Davey, William J. “Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement.” Cornell International Law Journal (2009): 121. Web. www.organizations.lawschool.cornell.edu/ilj/ issues/42.1/CIN105.pdf 13 To be sure, the Mutually Agreed Solution (settlement) contained no compensation: “WTO | Dispute Settlement - the Disputes DS27.” World Trade Organization - European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas. Web. <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm>. 14 To be sure, the Mutually Agreed Solution (settlement) contained no compensation: “WTO | Dispute Settlement - the Disputes DS27.” World Trade Organization - European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas. Web. <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm>. 15 Jackson, John H. “The Case of the World Trade Organization.” International Affairs 84.3 (2008): 451-53. Web. <http:// onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.14682346.2008.00716.x/pdf>. 16 Jackson, John H. “The Case of the World Trade Organization.” International Affairs 84.3 (2008): 451-53. Web. <http:// onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.14682346.2008.00716.x/pdf>. 17 Magnus, John. “Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions: Is There a Crisis?” Key Issues in WTO Dispute
Settlement: The First Ten Years. By Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 248. Print. 18 Huerta-Goldman, Jorge A. “Is Retaliation Useful? Observations and Analysis of Mexico’s Experience.” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 283. Print. 19 “WTO | Dispute Settlement - the Disputes - DS217.” World Trade Organization - United States — Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. Web. <http://www.wto. org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ ds217_e.htm>. 20 Mavroidis, Petros C., “Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.” The WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement. By Petros C. Mavroidis. Cheltenham [u.a.: Elgar, 2005. 399. Print. 21 Horlick, Gary N., “Problems with the Compliance Structure of the WTO Dispute Resolution Process.” The WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement. By Petros C. Mavroidis. Cheltenham [u.a.: Elgar, 2005. 331. Print. 22 “WTO | About the Organization.” World Trade Organization - Home Page. Web. <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ thewto_e.htm>. 23 Appleton, Arthur E.. “Preliminary Thoughts on WTO Retaliation in the Services Sector.” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 619. Print. 24 “WTO | Development - Who Are the Developing Countries in the WTO?” World Trade Organization - Home Page. Web. <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ devel_e/d1who_e.htm>. 25 “WTO | Ministerial Conferences Cancún 5th Ministerial - Briefing Notes - Dispute Settlement.” World Trade Organization - Home Page. Web. <http:// www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ min03_e/brief_e/brief13_e.htm>. 26 Smith, James McCall. “Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas Dispute.” Negotiating Trade
The Attaché Vol. 1 (2011) Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA. By John S. Odell. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2006. 257-86. Print. 27 Ibid. 28 “WTO | Dispute Settlement - the Disputes - DS27.” World Trade Organization - Home Page. Web. <http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm>. 29 Abbott, Frederick M. “Cross-retaliation in TRIPS: Issues of Law and Practice.” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 536-588. Print. 30 Smith, James McCall. “Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas Dispute.” Negotiating Trade Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA. By John S. Odell. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2006. 271. Print. 31 Smith, James McCall. “Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas Dispute.” Negotiating Trade Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA. By John S. Odell. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2006. 271. Print. 32 Abbott, Frederick M. “Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Options for Developing Countries.” International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development: Programme on Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of International Trade 8 (2009): 1-80. Social Science Research Network. Web. 33 Abbott, Frederick M. “Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Options for Developing Countries.” International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development: Programme on Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of International Trade 8 (2009): 1-80. Social Science Research Network. Web. 34 Abbott, Frederick M. “Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Options for Developing Countries.” International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development: Programme on Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of International Trade 8 (2009): 1-80. Social Science Research Network. Web. 35 Abbott, Frederick M. “Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Options for Developing Countries.” International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development: Programme on Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of International Trade 8 (2009): 1-80. Social Science Research Network. Web. 36 More specifically, the above references
Endnotes category 7: Protection of Undisclosed Information. The six sections preceding it are, in order: 1. Copyrights and Related Rights, 2. Trademarks 3. Geographical Indications 4. Industrial Designs. 5. Patents and, 6. Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits. For more information, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ trips_e/trips_e.html 37 “WTO | Dispute Settlement - the Disputes - DS285.” World Trade Organization – United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Betting and Gambling Services. Web. <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm>. 38 Mendel, Mark “Is Retaliation Useful? Observations and Analysis of Mexico’s Experience.” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 313. Print. 39 “WTO | Dispute Settlement - the Disputes - DS285.” World Trade Organization – United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Betting and Gambling Services. Web. <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm>. 40 Abbott, Frederick M.. “Cross-retaliation in TRIPS: Issues of Law and Practice.” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 536-588. Print. 41 Pauwelyn, Joost. “Introduction” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 4. Print. 42 Charnovitz, Steve. “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions.” The WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement. By Petros C. Mavroidis. Cheltenham [u.a.: Elgar, 2005. 247-87. Print. 43 Charnovitz, Steve. “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions.” The WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement. By Petros C. Mavroidis. Cheltenham [u.a.: Elgar, 2005. 247-87. Print. 44 Anderson, Kym. “Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement.” The WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement. By Petros C. Mavroidis. Cheltenham [u.a.: Elgar, 2005. 241-243. Print. 45 Kaushik, Atul. “Developing Countries and
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO.” CUTS International 1 (2009): 4. Web. 46 McRae, Donald. “MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM.” Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy 3.1 (2008): 1-20. Social Science Research Network. Web. <http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1140452>. 47 Charnovitz, Steve. “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions.” The WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement. By Petros C. Mavroidis. Cheltenham [u.a.: Elgar, 2005. 270. Print. 48 Charnovitz, Steve. “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions.” The WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement. By Petros C. Mavroidis. Cheltenham [u.a.: Elgar, 2005. 270. Print. 49 “WTO | Dispute Settlement - the Disputes - DS26.” World Trade Organization - Home Page. Web. <http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm>. 50 Khabayan, Vasken. “Canada’s Experience and Practice in Suspending WTO Obligations” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 279. Print. 51 Khabayan, Vasken. “Canada’s Experience and Practice in Suspending WTO Obligations” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 279. Print. 52 Mavroidis, Petros C. “Comment on Chapter 16.” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 357-8. Print. 53 Mavroidis, Petros C. “Comment on Chapter 16.” The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. By Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. 357-8. Print. 54 Bagwell, Kyle, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Robert W. Staiger. “The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3314 (2004): 3. Web. 55 Pauwelyn, Joost. “Enforcement and
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Endnotes Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules – Towards a More Collective Approach.” The WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement. By Petros C. Mavroidis. Cheltenham [u.a.: Elgar, 2005. 247-87. Print. 56 Pauwelyn, Joost. “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules – Towards a More Collective Approach.” The WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement. By Petros C. Mavroidis. Cheltenham [u.a.: Elgar, 2005. 247-87. Print. 57 Charnovitz, Steve. “The WTO’s Problematic “Last Resort” Against Noncompliance*.” Aussenwirtschaft Swiss Review of International Economic Relations (2002): 1-28. Steve Charnovitz. Web. <http:// www.charnovitz.org/>. 58 “WTO | Legal Texts - Marrakesh Agreement.” World Trade Organization Home Page. Web. <http://www.wto.org/ english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm>. 59 Limao, Nuno, and Kamal Saggi. “Tariff Retaliation versus financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements.” Journal of International Economics 76 (2008): 52-57. Print. 60 Jackson, John H. “The Case of the World Trade Organization.” International Affairs 84.3 (2008): 451. Web. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley. com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00716.x/ pdf>. 61 Imdad, Asim. “NON-COMPLIANCE AND ULTIMATE REMEDIES UNDER THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM.” Journal of Public and International Affairs 14 (2003): 1-22. Web. Citing: Treaty Establishing the European Community, Article 171. 62 Davey, William J. “Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement.” Cornell International Law Journal (2009): 119-28. Web. <www.organizations.lawschool.cornell. edu/ilj/issues/42.1/CIN105.pdf>. 63 Davey, William J. “Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement.” Cornell International Law Journal (2009): 119-28. Web. <www.organizations.lawschool.cornell. edu/ilj/issues/42.1/CIN105.pdf>.
Private Military Companies: Reconciling Private Means with Humanitarian Ends
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The Attaché Vol. 1 (2011) 1 Percy, Sarah V. “Morality and Regulation.” From Mercenaries to Market: the Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies. By Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 11-28. Print. p. 12. 2 Ibid. 25 and Percy, Sarah V. “The Security Council and the Use of Private Force.” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945. New York: Oxford, 2008. 624-42. Print. p. 632. 3 United Kingdom. Foreign Office. Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation. Comp. Jack Straw. London: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002. Print, p. 7; Steinhoff, Uwe. “What Are Mercenaries?” Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-Military Relations. By Andrew Alexandra, DeanePeter Baker, and Marina Caparini. London: Routledge, 2008. Print, p 21, and; Percy, Security Council., p. 628. 4 Percy Morality, p, 16. 5 Ibid; Response by: Baker, Deane-Peter. “Of Mercenaries and Prostitutes: Can Private Warriors Be Ethical?” Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civilmilitary Relations. By Andrew Alexandra and Marina Caparini. London: Routledge, 2008. 30-42. Print, p. 34. 6 UK Foreign Office, p 17. 7 Percy, Security Council. p. 629. 8 UK Foreign Office,. p 17; Frost, Mervyn. “Regulating Anarchy: The Ethics of PMCs in Global Civil Society.” Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civilmilitary Relations. By Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker, and Marina Caparini. London: Routledge, 2008. 43-55. Print, p. 43 and; Singer, Peter W. “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security.” International Security 26.3 (2002): 186-220. JSTOR. Web. 30 Jan. 2010. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/3092094, p. 197. 9 Percy, Security Council. p. 637. 10 UK Foreign Office p. 17; Percy, Security Council., p. 632 and; Francis, David J. “Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?” Third World Quarterly 20.2 (1999): 319-38. JSTOR. Web. 30 Jan. 2010. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992920. p.319, 322. 11 UK Foreign Office, p. 11. 12 Ibid.
13 Francis, p. 319 14 Harvey, David. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005. Print, p. 45; and Francis, p. 323. 15 Francis, p. 324. 16 Uesseler, Rolf. Servants of War: Private Military Corporations and the Profit of Conflict. Berkeley: Soft Skull Press, 2008. Print, p. 34. 17 Steinoff, p. 25. 18 UK Foreign Office, p. 14; Kinsey, Christopher. “Private Security Companies and Corporate Social Responsibility.” Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-military Relations. By Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker, and Marina Caparini. London: Routledge, 2008. 70-86. Print, p. 71 and; Lehnardt, Chia. “Private Military Companies and State Responsibility.” From Mercenaries to Market: the Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies. By Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 139-57. Print, p. 140. 19 UK Foreign Office, p. 17. 20 Patterson, Malcolm Hugh. Privatizing Peace: A Corporate Adjunct United Nations Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations. Hampshire; Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print, p. 40. 21 For a comprehensive discussion of the moral acceptability of private forces, please see: Baker, Deane-Peter. “Of Mercenaries and Prostitutes: Can Private Warriors Be Ethical?” Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civilmilitary Relations. By Andrew Alexandra and Marina Caparini. London: Routledge, 2008. p. 30-42. 22 Howe, Herbert M. “Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executi328 and; Runzo, Joseph. “Benevolence, Honourable Soldiers and Private Military Companies: Reformulating Just War Theory.” Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-military Relations. By Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker, and Marina Caparini. London: Routledge, 2008. 56-69. Print, p. 60. 23 Chesterman, Simon, and Chia Lehnardt. “Conclusion.” From Mercenaries to Market: the Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 25156. Print, p. 255 and Harding, Jeremy. “The
The Attaché Vol. 1 (2011) Mercenary Business: ‘Executive Outcomes’” Review of African Political Economy 24.71 (1997): 87-97. JSTOR. Web. 30 Jan. 2010. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006397. p. 9697. 24 Howe, p. 308-309 and Barlow, Eeben. Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds. Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 2007. Print, p. 100. 25 Ramsbotham, Oliver and Tom Woodhouse. “Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia”. Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. p. 193-216, p. 212. 26 Feil, Scott R. “Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered”. Report of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISDReport),Vol.III,No.2,April1997.http:// isd.georgetown.edu/ISDreport_Could_5000_ Feil.pdf. p. 2-3. 27 Runzo, p. 61. 28 Percy, Morality. P. 18. 29 UK Foreign Office, p. 20 and Percy, Security Council. p. 638. 30 Percy, Security Council. p. 638. 31 Feil, p. 2-3. 32 Ibid., p. 4. 33 Ibid., p. 5. 34 Barlow, p. 529.
From Westphalia to Tehran: International Secularism and Iran’s Theocracy 1 Jeffery Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 7; Lionel Beehner, “Iran’s Multifaceted Foreign Policy,” [Introduction] (New York and Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/10396/, (accessed April 11, 2010); Mohammed Reza Saidabadi, “Islam and Foreign Policy in the Contemporary Secular World: The Case of Post-Revolutionary Iran,” in Global Change, Peace, and Security 8, 2 (1996): 37; Graham E Fuller, The ‘Center of the Universe’: The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder: The RAND Corporation, 1991), 267 2 Scott M Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-
Endnotes MacMillan, 2005), 33; Ken R Dark, “LargeScale Religious Change and World Politics,” in Religion and International Relations, (ed.) Ken R Dark, pp 55-82 (New York and London: St. Martin’s Press Inc and MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), 63; John D Carlson and Eric C Owens, “Introduction: Reconsidering Westphalia’s Legacy for Religion and International Politics,” in the Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics, (eds.) John D Carlson and Eric C Owens, pp 1-37 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003),1, 9; Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2004), 11-12; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1, 110; Haynes (2007), 3, 19, 33, 39, 97-98, 113, 115 3 Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, “The Return from Exile: An Introduction,” in Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, (eds.) Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, pp 2-20 (New York: PalgraveMacMillan, 2003), 2-3; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations,” in European Journal of International Relations 10, 2 (June, 2004b): 240; Eva Patricia Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran: A Study on The Iranian Political Elite from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad (Lieden: Koninklijke Brill, 2009), xxiv, xxv; Carlson and Owens, 8-9; Thomas (2005), 3; Hurd (2008)15, 23, 33; Haynes (2007), 3, 115 4 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “The International Politics of Secularism: US Foreign Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Alternatives 29, (2004a): 115; Hurd (2008), 1, 16, 33; Haynes (2007), 8, 106; Hurd (2004b), 240; Carlson and Owens, 8 5 Pinar Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR,” in Third World Quartlery 29, 1 (2008): 5, 8; Dark, 50; Adam Tarock, Iran’s Foreign Policy Since 1990: Pragmatism Supersedes Islamic Ideology (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1999), 38 6 Eva Patricia Rakel, “Iranian Foreign Policy Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1979-2006,” in Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 6, 1-3 (2009): 187; Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Intentions, Capabilities, and Impact (Washington, DC: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 67; Shahram Akbarzedah, “Where is the Islamic Republic
of Iran Heading?” in Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, 1 (2005): 25-26, 32; Rakel (2009), xxvii Fuller, 268 7 Christopher M Wyatt, “Islamic Militancies and Disunity in the Middle East,” in in Religion and International Relations, (ed.) Ken R Dark, pp 100-113 (New York and London: St. Martin’s Press Inc and MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000) 101; Haynes (2007), 54, 356; Rakel (2009), 147; Akbarzadeh, 25-26, 31-32 8 Hurd (2008), 118, 122 9 Hurd (2008), 32; Haynes (2007) 35-36; Bilgin, 11; Rakel (2009), 20-21 10 Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, third edition, (eds.) John Baylis and Steve Smith, pp 251-270 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 205), 258 11 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” in International Security 20, 1 (Summer, 1995): 71, 73; Hurd (2004a), 118; Hurd (2008), 14 12 Haynes (2007), 105 13 Haynes (2007), 8; Hatzopoulos and Petito, 2 14 Dark, 53-58 15 Hurd (2004a), 115, 117-118, 131; Hurd (2004b), 236, 238; Rakel (2009), 1; Dark, 53; Fox and Sandler, 11; Hurd (2008), 13, 15; Haynes (2007), 20 16 Hurd (2008), 14-15, 23-25, 30; Carlson and Owens, 7, 9, 15-16; Haynes (2007), 100 17 Carlson and Owens, 13 18 Haynes (2007), 31; Carlson and Owens, 14 19 Robert J Jackson and Patricia Owens, “The Evolution of the International System,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, third edition, (eds.) John Baylis and Steve Smith, pp 46-62 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 54 20 Ibid. 21 Thomas (2005), 33; Carlson and Owens, 16; Haynes (2007), 31-32; Jackson and Owens, 52-53 22 Hurd (2008), 31; Hatzopoulos and Petito, 1-2; Haynes (2007) 31, 108; Jackson and Owens, 53 23 Hurd (2008), 24; Haynes (2007), 6, 31; Scott Thomas, “Religion and International Conflict,” in Religion and International Relations, (ed.) Ken R Dark, pp 1-23 (New York and London: St. Martin’s Press Inc and MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), 18; Bilgin 16-17 24 Haynes (2007), 107; Hatzopoulos and
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Endnotes Petito, 1; Carlson and Owens, 6; Thomas (2000), 14, 18; Dark, 50; Hurd (2004a), 129; Hurd (2004b), 235; Bilgin, 11 25 Carlson and Owens, 8; also see Dark, 52; Bilgin, 10-11; Hurd (2004b) 118. 244-246 26 Hurd (2008), 118, 122 27 Hurd (2004a), 119, 122; 28 Fox and Sandler, 90; Saidabadi, 35-36; Hurd (2008), 87, 117; Wyatt, 104; Saidabadi, 34 29 Saidabadi, 33 30 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, “Iran’s Democracy Debate,” in Middle East Policy 11, 2 (Summer, 2004): 91Fox and Sandler, 4950; R Scott Appleby, “Serving Two Masters? Affirming Religious Belief and Human Rights in a Pluralistic World,” in the Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics, (eds.) John D Carlson and Eric C Owens, pp 170-195 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 16; Jeffrey Haynes, “Religion and Foreign Policy Making in the USA, India, and Iran: Towards a Research Agenda,” in Third World Quarterly 29, 1 (2008): 156-157; Rakel (2009), 3-4; Saidabadi, 37; 31 Hurd (2008), 15; Hurd (2004a), 120-123 32 Thomas (2005), 2 33 Hurd (2004a), 127; Hurd (2008), 106-107; Haynes (2007), 354; Haynes (2008), 156-157; Fox and Sandler, 11-12, 134; Thomas (2005), 1 34 “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” [foreign policy], (Tehran: Irano-British Chamber of Commerce, n.d.), <http://www. ibchamber.org/lawreg/constitution.htm>, (accessed, 15 April 2010) (see article 1); also see Saidabadi, 36-37; Akbarzadeh, 25 35 Haynes (2007) 354-355; Haynes (2008), 156; Hurd (2004a), 122; Rakel (2009), xxiv; Saidabadi, 34, 36; Akbarzadeh, 28 36 Haynes (2007), 356; Hurd (2008), 108 37 Saidabadi, 37; Jerrold D Green, Frederick Wehrey, and Charles Wolf Jr, “Understanding Iran” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 9 38 Saidabadi, 37; Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, 9. 39 “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” (see chapter ten, article 152) 40 “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” (see chapter ten, article 153) 41 Saidabadi, 37 42 Ibid, 38 43 “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” (see chapter ten, article 152) 44 Saidabadi, 38 45 Saidabadi, 38; Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, 9. 46 Haynes (2007), 54, 357; Rakel, xxi
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The Attaché Vol. 1 (2011) 47 ”The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” (see article 110) 48 Rakel (2009), xxii; Haynes (2007), 54; Tarock, 37-39 49 Tarock, 40; also see Rakel (2007), 164 50 Tarock, 37-39; Rakel (2007), 165; Rakel (2009), 149; Haynes (2007), 54; Haynes (2008), 157-158; Beehner [Who sets Iranian Foreign Policy?], [Which other government bodies influence Iran’s foreign policy?] 51 Green, Wehry, and Wolf, 6, 25; Rakel (2009), xxiii-xxiv, 32, 40 52 Rakel (2009). 3, 42, 52 53 Green, Wehry, and Wolf, 25; Rakel (2009), 43 54 Rakel (2009), xxiv, 21-23; Thomas (2005), 11; Hurd (2004), 16-117 55 Tarock, 35; Rakel (2007), 181 56 Saidabadi, 40-41; Green, Wehry, and Wolf, 25-27; Rakel (2007), 166; Rakel (2009), xxi, 46, 52; Gheissari and Nasr, 94 57 Rakel (2009), 51-52; Green, Wehry, and Wolf, 26; Hurd (2004), 126 58 Saidabadi, 40; also see RK Ramazani, “Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” in Middle East Journal 58, 4 (Autumn, 2004): 549, 555; Rakel (2007), 167 59 Rakel (2007), 160, 167; Rakel (2009), 22; Saidabadi, 41; Tarock (1999), 3; Ramazani, 555-556 60 Tarock, 3-4, 60; Rakel (2009), 153, 159-160 61 Ramazani, 555; Fox and Sandler, 50; Tarock, 4; Rakel (2009), 25, 153; Chubin (1994), 121; Saidabadi, 40 62 Tarock, 16; also see Rakel (2009), 153; Ramazani, 556-557 63 Fox and Sandler, 64, 71-72, 89; Thomas (2000), 6, 18-19; Rakel (2009), 154-155 64 Tarock, 16, 19-20; Rakel (2007), 167-170 65 Kamran Taremi, “Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Occupied Iraq, 2003-2005,” in Middle East Policy 12, 4 (Winter, 2005): 31; Shahram Akbarzedah, “Where is the Islamic Republic of Iran Heading?” in Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, 1 (2005): 173-174; Rakel (2007), 165; Tarock, 4, 17; 66 Fuller, 97 67 Tarock, 1; Chubin (1994), 67; Rakel (2009), xxiv, xxvi, 54; Rakel (2007), 157; Gheissari and Nasr, 95; Haynes (2008),157; Akbarzadeh, 27, 33 68 Akbarzadeh, 30; Rakel (2009), 4, 54 69 Haynes (2007), 355; Tarock, 1; Saidabadi, 43 70 Tarock, 1, 4, 38; Saidabadi, 39, 42; Rakel (2007), 166, 170, 177; Rakel (2009), 163;
Gheissari and Nasr, 95; Fuller, 267; Chubin (1994), 67; Ramazani, 556; Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, 26-27 71 Saidabadi, 42 72 Haynes (2007), 5; Tarock, 125; Rakel (2007), 75-76 73 Rakel (2009), 164-168; Tarock, 127-128; Fuller, 97 74 Kaveh Afrasaibi and Abbas Maleki, “Iran’s Foreign Policy After 11 September,” in Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, 2 (Winter/Spring, 2003): 257; Tarock, 132, 135-138; Rakel (2009), 164, 171 75 Tarock, 130-132 76 Rakel (2007), 169 77 Haynes (2007), 355; Rakel (2007), 178; Akbarzadeh, 30; Beehner [introduction] 78 Appleby, 183; Rakel (2009), 56-57; Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, 26 79 Thomas (2005), 3 80 Afrasiabi and Maleki, 258 81 Rakel (2007), 157 82 Rakel (2009), 175-177; Ramazani, 557 83 Ramazani, 558; also see Tarock, 29 84 Rakel (2007), 179; Haynes (2008), 157; Ramazani, 557-558; Akbarzadeh, 34 85 Afrasiabi and Maleki, 255; Rakel (2009), 177 86 Akbarzadeh, 34; Afrasiabi and Maleki, 259 87 Taremi, 32; Haynes (2007), 357-358 88 Akbarzadeh, 35 89 Chubin, 66; Akbarzadeh, 35; Chubin (2009), 175 90 Akbarzadeh, 31-32; Haynes (2007), 356; Rakel (2009), 66; Taremi, 30, 32; Gheissari and Nasr, 102-103 91 Haynes (2007), 357 92 Gheissari and Nast, 104 93 Martin Durham, “The American Right and Iran,” in The Political Quarterly 79, 4 (October-December, 2008): 509; Rakel (2007), 181; Rakel (2009), 22, 57, 66, 187-188; Akbarzadeh, 31; Haynes (2008), 158-159; Chubin (2009), 175; Beehner, [What is the outlook of these government officials] 94 Beehner, [What is the outlook of these government officials], [What is the role of the Iran’s president in foreign relations?]; Haynes (2007), 356-357; Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, 7; Chubin (2009), 175; Rakel (2007), 181 95 Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, 8; Rakel (2007), 182 96 Chubin (2009), 171 97 Rakel (2009),61-63, 67; Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, 10
The Attaché Vol. 1 (2011) 98 Haynes (2008), 157; Rakel (2009), xxv 99 Haynes (2007), 358; Haynes (2008), 159; Rakel (2009), 57. 196; Akbarzadeh, 34 100 Taremi, 37-38 101 Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, 8-9; Chubin (2009), 170, 176; Haynes (2008), 160; Rakel (2009), 190 102 Chubin (2009), 172, 174, 181 103 Rakel (2007), 184-185 104 Rakel (2007), 184; Haynes (2008), 160; Durham, 509; Rakel (2009), 196 105 Hurd (2004), 125; Hurd (2008), 102-103;
Endnotes Tarock, 5, 33, 36, 38; Fox and Sander, 50, 72; Thomas (2000), 3; Rakel (2009), 176; Chubin (2009), 166; Afrasiabi and Maleki, 261; Durham, 508, 512-513; Akbarzedah, 34 106 Tarock, 33 107 Hurd (2008), 103-104 108 Hurd (2008), 107, 110; also see Chubin (2009), 167; Hurd (2004), 120; 128 109 Thomas (2005), 214; Rakel (2009), 172; Tarock, 34 110 Tarock, 35; also see, Beehner, [What is the
outlook of these government officials?] 111 Rakel (2009), 196 112 Hatzopoulos and Petito, 1 113 Haynes (2007), 37 114 Hurd (2008), 16, 33; Carlson and Owens, 9 115 Tarock, 35; Thomas (2005), 10 116 Dark, 50; Tarock, 38; Bilgin, 5, 8 117 Wyatt, 101, 106, 108 118 Haynes (2007), 116, 356 119 Hatzopoulos and Petito, 2; Carlson and Owens, 8; Fox and Sandler, 1
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