Towards a democratic franchise – The Company Vote Part I

Dr Stephen Aranha’s thesis, “Towards a Democratic Franchise”, has opened my eyes to how little I knew about voting in the Bahamas, even though a lot of it took place after I had become old enough to vote – the company vote, for example, is news to me.

Dr Aranha, my son, recently obtained his PhD summa cum laude from the Max Plank Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory in Frankfurt, Germany.

In his thesis, he states that the sources relating to the General Assembly Elections Act of 1946 contain no criticism of, or opposition to, the company vote. The feature’s only mention is found in an attachment to the Acting Attorney General’s legal report. However, that report, too, emphasised the introduction of the secret ballot.

It claimed that “no changes in the qualification of voters” were included in the Act, and towards the end it mentioned that “(a) comparative table with remarks is attached.” That comparative table lists all 102 sections of the new Act, and, where applicable, shows their corresponding provision in the superseded Act.”

One column contains remarks that indicate which provisions, in relation to the previous legislation, were new, which had been retained, and which had been adapted. The remarks further identify, where applicable, what other legislation served as a model for new or adapted provisions.

The Bahamian General Assembly Elections Act of 1946 was, according to that list, indeed largely based on the Bahamian General Assembly Elections Act of 1919, as well as any legislation explicitly amending it or, at least, directly impacting its practical implementation, such as the Voting by Ballot (New Providence) Act of 1939.

Additionally, other Acts, from which provisions had been incorporated, include the United Kingdom’s Ballot Act of 1872, the United Kingdom’s Representation of the People Act 1918, and Bermuda’s Parliamentary Elections Act of 1928. However, for the company vote, the table merely says, “New provision as to voting by Director of a Company otherwise qualified.” The Colonial Office’s own legal advisers, after seeing the Act, had “no comments.”

The Colonial Office’s clerks and legal advisors may not have had prior first-hand knowledge of the company vote at that point, but the Home Office had come across this feature, as an exchange between the two, many years later, would reveal, for it existed – with variations – in Northern Ireland, too.

The possibility of enfranchising companies had been discussed in Northern Ireland since 1928.

Nonetheless, up until the end of World War II, elections in Northern Ireland had been conducted under laws passed at Westminster, which predated the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, that had created so-called home rule for Northern Ireland.

However, when, in the aftermath of the war, the Imperial Parliament, and its Labour majority, further democratised the franchise in Britain, the Ulster Unionist government of Northern Ireland decided to pass its own legislation, which would apply to both the elections to the Northern Irish Parliament, at

Stormont, as well as to local government elections in the six counties of Northern Ireland.

This resulted in the Elections and Franchise (Northern Ireland) Act, which was enacted on February 28, 1946.

The Northern Irish opposition parties had expected the development of the franchise in Northern Ireland to follow Westminster’s lead and, thus, had hoped for a more democratic franchise… They would be disappointed. Instead, the new law disenfranchised some persons who had had the vote since 1918, and it now included the company vote at local government elections.

The measure was designed to “further increase the unionist advantage.”

During the parliamentary debates, one Member for the Ulster Unionists, Lancelot Curran, even admitted this, albeit indirectly, when he said, “that if universal suffrage is given in local elections, there will be Nationalist control in the three Border counties.”

In 1946, however, universal suffrage was not yet universally accepted, as a condition sine qua non for a democratic constitution, as Curran also hinted at when he claimed that these “people . . . have no stake in the country,” referring mainly to the supporters of the Nationalist party.

To the Ulster Unionists, to have a stake in the country meant to be a ratepayer, and thus, in their understanding of democracy, “the underlying principle of local government should be that the man who pays the piper is entitled to call the tune.”

Such arguments possess a remarkable longevity, even in democratic societies, as similar features made reappearances.