INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS- AN ANALYSIS IN OIL INDIA LTD. DULIAJAN SINCE 1991TO 2000

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS - AN ANALYSIS IN OIL INDIA LTD. DULIAJAN SINCE 1991 TO 2000

Dr.RomenKalita Dept.ofEconomics,DikhowmukhCollege

ABSTRACT

Theslowdowninproductivitygrowthandsluggishmacroeconomicperformanceinrecentyearshasdrawnincreasingattentiontothesystemofindustrialrelations and various strategies for improving its performance.This is leading to a new era of experimentation at the organizational level with various worker participation programs, new local collective bargaining agreements, and changes in other employment practices that are designed to both improve industrial relations and organizational effectiveness. These pressures are also producing a new emphasis within management on applying strategic planning techniques to the industrial relations function as firms and unions begin to recognize the interdependence among broad business policy decisions and industrial relations performance at the workplace level. Consequently, industrial relations professionals within both management and unions are being called upon to critically examine their prevailing practicesandtoassessalternativestrategiesthatsatisfyorganizationalandworkergoals.OilIndiaLtd.DulijanamajorpublicsectorindustryofAssam,declaredas 'MiniRatna'isthemajorconcernofthepaper Thepresentstudyisanefforttostudyquantitativeassessmentofindustrialrelationspracticesandperformance.This paperisanattempttoanalyzeindustrialrelationpracticesofOILIndiaLtd.Duliajananditssomeeconomicaspects.Unlikealleconomicorganisationsapartfromthe qualityandquantityofmaterialinput,itisrecognizedonallsidesthatqualityofhumaninputiscrucialfactorinpromotingproductionandproductivity,consequently ingrowthanddevelopmentofOilIndiaLtd.Dulijanalso.InthiscontextqualityofhumaninputisfoundhighlyinfluencedbygoodIndustrialRelations.Agoodand strongIndustrialRelationsisfoundtoincreasetheeffectivenessofhumanlabourandensurescontinuityinproductionandenhancesproductivity

KEYWORDS:IndustrialRelations,organizationaleffectiveness,quantitativeassessmentofindustrialrelationspracticesandperformance. Managementstrategies andworkergoal.

The central questions to be addressed by a theoretical framework that assesses the effects of industrial relations on the goals of the firm and workers are: (1) whatarethecriticaldimensionsofplantlevelindustrialrelationsperformance, (2)howdotheseinfluenceworkerandorganizationalgoals.Theindustrialrelationssystemanditsperformanceattheplantlevelareseenasbeinginfluencedby avarietyofexternalenvironment,demographic,organization,andhistoricalfactors.Forthepurposesofthiscase,wearelessinterestedinthehistoricalandenvironmentalcausesofvariationinthepropertiesoftheindustrialrelationssystem thaninidentifyingtheeffectsofvariationsinthesepropertiesonorganizational effectivenessandworkergoals.

Theperformanceoftheindustrialrelationssystemisexpectedtoinfluenceorganizational performance primarily through its effects on labour efficiency and productquality QualityofWorkLifeeffortsandrelatedinterventionsareseenas strategiesforchangingtheworkorganizationandrelationshipsamongworkers, supervisors,managers,andunionleaderssoastoproduceimprovementsinthe industrialrelationssystemanditsoutcomes(Goodman,1979).Itisrecognized, however,thatnotallofthegoalsofthefirmandworkersarecommonorcompatible.Rathertheemploymentrelationshipismixedmotiveinnature--somegoals areshared,andthroughimprovedproblemsolving,integrative(joingain)solutions can be identified while other goals are inherently distributive and require bargainingortrade-offdecisions(WaltonandMcKersie,1965).

TheIndustrialRelationsSystemanditsPerformance:

Thedimensionsoftheindustrialrelationssystemanditsperformanceattheplant levelarenotwellspecifiedinthetheoreticalorempiricalliterature.Inthispaper, wewanttostudytheindustrialrelationssystemattheplantlevelinfluencedeconomicperformancethroughthreeinterrelatedroutes:(1)theeffectivenessofthe managementofconflictintheunion-managementrelationship,(2)themotivation,commitment,andbehaviourofindividualworkersandworkgroups,and(3) the rules and practices governing the allocation and use of human resources. Theseemergedastentativehypothesesforexplainingtheempiricalrelationships observedbetweenmeasuresofindustrialrelationsperformance(grievancerates, discipline rates, absenteeism, and labour-management climate) and economic performance(productquality,labourefficiencyetc).Inthissectionwespellout morefullythelinksexpectedbetweentheseaspectsofplantlevelindustrialrelationsandorganizationaleffectiveness.

Onecriticalfunctionofanindustrialrelationssystemistoestablishprocedures and processes for addressing and resolving conflicts or problems that arise between employees and management. In Oil India Ltd, unions and employers rely heavily on formal contract negotiations and grievance procedures for this purpose. The effectiveness of these formal negotiation and conflict resolution mechanismsaredirectlyrelatedtoorganizationaleffectivenessforatleastthree reasons.First,becausetheseareformalrepresentativeprocedurestheyrequirea considerableamountoftime,people,andresourcestomanage.Thus,thesheer volumeofgrievancesandbargainingdemandsthatariseinaplantwillhavean

effectonthecostsofmanagingaplant.Totheextentthatmanagementandunion resources (time and people) are devoted to managing these formal adversarial procedures,fewerresourcesareavailablefortraining,problemsolving,communicationsandotherproductivity,humanresourcemanagement,ororganizational developmentactivities.Thismightbedescribedasthedisplacementeffect(Katz, Kochan,andGobeille,inpress).Second,thevolumeofgrievancesandbargainingdemandscanbesymptomaticofthesuccessorfailureofthepartiestoresolve differencesonamoreinformalbasisoratearlystepsoftheformalprocedures. Thus,thenumberofgrievancesorbargainingdemands,andtheinabilityofthe partiestosettleissueswithoutfrequentthreatenedoractualworkstoppagesmost likelysignaldeeperseatedproblemsintheconflictresolution/problemsolving systemsintheplant.Thuswecanexpectthatplantlevelmeasuresofgrievance rates, the number of bargaining demands, the length of negotiations, strike threatsandstrikeoccurrenceshouldbesystematicallyrelatedtoothermeasures of industrial relations performance. A good deal of previous research on the determinants of grievance rates is consistent with this argument (Peach and Livernash,1974;ThomsonandMurray,1976;Knight,1978;Katz,Kochan,and Gobeille, in press). Third, because the formal grievance and bargaining processesfocusondistributiveissues,theyinherentlyentailsomedegreeofpolitical and tactical posturing, gamesmanship, bluffing, and commitment building tactics(WaltcnandMcKersie,1965;Schelling,1960).Totheextentthatthesepolitical or distributive bargaining tactics escalate, get perpetuated over time, and spread across the entire range of issues that the parties deal with, a high conflict/low trust syndrome (Fox, 1974) or what Boulding (1962) described as a "conflicttrap"cansetin.Thatis,thedistributiveorinherentlyconflictfullpatternsmaydriveoutthepotentialforintegrativebargainingorcooperationeven on those issues over which the parties share common interests. The belief that thisisacommonfeatureofcurrentindustrialrelationsiswhatgivesrisetothecriticism that our system is "too adversarial" (Barbash, 1980). For these three reasons,itcanbesaidthatindicatorsofgreaterconflictbetweenlabourandmanagementattheshopfloorlevelwillbeassociatedwithlowerefficiency,poorerqualityandgenerally,poorerplantlevelorganizationalperformance.Secondly,there mayexiststronginterrelationshipsbetweenthevariousindicatorsofplantlevel industrialrelationsperformance.

Itshouldbenotedthatwearenotimplyingherethattheseconflictresolutionsystems do not serve important and useful functions for labour and management. Theyarenaturalandnecessaryproceduresthathaveenduredthetestoftimefor resolvingconflictsthatareboundtoariseinanyemploymentrelationshipandfor protectingtheindividualrightsofemployees.Itisnottheirexistencepersebut theirpoorperformancethatisexpectedtoleadtolowerlevelsoforganizational effectiveness.

Whiletheconflictresolutionsystemreflectsthebroadinstitutionalfeaturesofan industrialrelationssystem,itisclearthatthemotivation,attitudes,andbehaviour ofindividualsandinformalworkgroupscanexertanindependenteffectonorganizationalperformanceaswell.Yet,therehasbeenalongstanding(Brayfieldand

Crockett,1955;Herzberg,etal.,1959;SchwabandCummings,1970)andtodate unresolved(DyerandSchwab,1982)debateonthedirectionandstrengthofthe causalrelationshipsbetweentheseindividualattitudinalandbehaviouralcharacteristics,andorganizationalperformance.Ontheonehand,thereisabundantevidencetosuggestthatthereisnoconsistentorsimplecausalrelationshipbetween individualworkersatisfactionandindividualworkerperformance(Schwaband Cummings,1970).Ontheotherhand,awiderangeoftheoreticalargumentssuggest that individual worker ability, motivation, and participation in job related decision-making will affect both organizational effectiveness and individual worker satisfaction (Hackman and Oldham, 1976; Goodman, 1979; Walton, 1980;LawlerandLedford,1981-82;Mowday,Porter,andSteers,1982).Tothe extentthatworkershavetheabilityandwillingnesstomakesuggestionsandto participateinthesearchforwaystoimprovejobperformance,andtotheextent theseeffortscanbemaintainedovertime,highlevelsofindividualworkermotivation/commitment participation shoul lead to improved organizational effectivenessandworkersatisfaction.Thesepotentiallypositivelinksbetweenindividual 0attitudes and behaviour and organizational effectiveness can only be maintainedovertimeifthelargereconomicandinstitutionalenvironmentmaintainssupportforhighlevelsofindividualinvolvementandlabourmanagement cooperation (Walton, 1980; Kochan and Dyer, 1976). Unless the larger unionmanagementrelationshipandmanagementsystemsremainsupportiveandworkersexperiencetangiblerewardsfromtheirinvolvement,highlevelsofcommitment are likely to either gradually atrophy (Walton, 1975) or end abruptly in responsetosomevisibleconflict(Goodman,1979).Anotheraspectofindividual behaviourthatisexpectedtoberelatedtootherindustrialrelationsoutcomesis theabsenteeismrateintheplant.Whiletheevidenceonthestrengthoftherelationshipbetweenjobsatisfactionandthefrequencythatanindividualworkeris absent is mixed (Dyer and Schwab, 1982), it has been argued that voluntary absenteeism should be related to employee motivation (Steers and Rhodes, 1978).Othershavesuggestedthattherelationshipsbetweentheaggregateplantwiderateofabsenteeismandworkerattitudes,commitmentandotheraspectsof industrialrelationsshouldbestrongerthantherelationshipbetweenindividual worker attitudes and absenteeism (Nicholson, Brown, and Chadwick-Jones, 1976).Inanyevent,thecostsimposedbyhighratesofabsenteeismshouldexert an independent effect on organizational performance (Hackman and Lawler, 1971) regardless of the relationship between absenteeism and other industrial relationsoutcomes.

Wethereforeexpectthatmeasuresofemployeeparticipationinsuggestionprograms,attitudes,andabsenteeratestoberelatedtootherindustrialrelationsperformance measures and to measures of organizational performance. The substantiverulesandpracticesgoverningtheorganizationofwork,theallocationof workers,thecompensationsystem,andtheadaptabilitytochangeserveasathird important channel through which the industrial relations system of a plant will influenceorganizationaleffectivenessandemployeegoals.Workrulesandtheir administrationandmodificationhistoricallyhavebeenrecognizedasimportant factorsinfluencinglaborcostsandproductivity(Slichter,1941;Slichter,Healy, andLivernash,1960;Hartman,1973;McKersieandHunter,1973).Theserules and practices develop over time both explicitly through collective bargaining agreement provisions and informally (Roy, 1952; Dalton, 1959; Kuhn, 1961; Sayles,1958;McKersieandKlein,1982)inbothunionandnon-unionsituations. Rulesarenecessarytobringaboutstabilityandequityinworkpracticesandto protecttherightsandresponsibilitiesofbothworkersandtheiremployers.Over time,however,workpracticesandrulescanaccumulate,andbecomeoutmoded becauseoftechnologicalorotherchangesintheplantortheproduct.Yet,they alsobecomedifficulttochangesincechangeoftenthreatensworkerjobsecurity byaffectingthejurisdictionofwork,seniorityandtransferrights,thenumberof workersrequiredtoperformthegivenvolumeofwork,etc.Thus,workpractices discussionsareinherentlymixedmotiveinnature--allpartiesshareaninterestin eliminating wasteful work practices that add to costs, yet changes in practices mayrequirechangeswhichthreatenthejobsecurityoralterthepromotionprospectsofindividualworkers.Thus,theflexibilitywithwhichtheindustrialrelationssystemmanagesworkrulesandworkpracticesattheplantlevelwillinfluenceorganizationaleffectivenessandworkerobjectives.

Aswiththebargainingprocessandgrievanceprocedures,establishingpolicies andrulesgoverningtheorganizationanddistributionofworkopportunitiesisa necessary and essential function of the industrial relations system (Dunlop, 1958).Yet the build up of rules and the inability to modify work practices can reduceorganizationaleffectiveness.Thus,againitistheabilityofthepartiesto manageandadjustworkpracticestomeettheproductivityneedsofthefirmand theinterestsoftheworkforcethatiscritical,anditisnotthepresenceofrulesper sethatinfluencesorganizationaleffectiveness.Insummarythen,weareproposingthatthedegreeofconflictresolution,individualworkerattitudesandbehaviour,andtheflexibilitywithinsubstantiveworkrulesarethreekeydimensionsof anindustrialrelationssystemthatwillhaveimportanteffectsonorganizational effectiveness.Overtimethesedimensionsbecomeinterrelatedinareinforcing cycle.Workerdissatisfactionorlackoftrustmayleadtohigherlevelsofgrievances and bargaining demands and to a more adversarial relationship between workers and management. Inability to effectively resolve conflicts is, in turn, likelytoleadtogreateremphasisonlegalisticrulesandstrictenforcementofcontracttermsandthefurtherbuild-upofworkrulesthatoneorbothoftheparties willresistchanging.Thehighconflict/lowtrustcyclewillthenspillovertoreinforcesupervisors'beliefsintheneedforrigid/authoritarianstylesofsupervision,

andemployeemotivation,jobperformanceandcommitmenttotheorganization will decline. To the extent these efforts are successful in increasing trust, employee involvement, and problem solving in the short run, they can be expectedtoleadtoshortrunimprovementsinbothworkersatisfactionandorganizational effectiveness. Improved trust and problem solving and a more participative managerial style may also lead to lower grievance rates or settlements at lower levels of the grievance procedure.At an advanced stage, QWL efforts may also lead to more flexibility in work rules.To the extent that these QWLeffortscancoexistwiththeon-goingdistributiveaspectsofthebargaining relationship and survive political and economic pressures that challenge these effortsovertime,theycanbeexpectedtohelporganizationsmaintainhigherlevelsoforganizationaleffectiveness.

Theabovediscussionprovidesthetheoreticalframeworkthatthecollectionand analysisofdatadesignedtoassesstheeffectsofanindustrialrelationssystemon organizational effectiveness and worker goals, and to track and evaluate the effects of QWLor other intervention strategies. Because of the importance we attach to the effects of the larger contexts (economic environment, distributive bargaining,organizationalpolicies,union-managementclimate,etc.)alongitudinalresearchdesignthatissensitivetothecycleofactivitiesthatoccurinanormal bargaining relationship is critical to an evaluation framework. Short run improvements in worker attitudes, motivation, grievance rates, and even measures of economic performance are necessary but not sufficient tests of the effects of QWLefforts. The more telling test is whether the short run positive effectscanbemaintainedthroughacompletecycleofcontractnegotiations,the negotiationofchangesinlocalworkrules,turnoverofkeymanagementorunion decision-makers,andinanevenbroadersense,theengagementofmanagement andunionofficialsinmajorbargainsoverstrategicissuessuchastheorganizationofnewplantsorthereinvestmentofresourcesinexistingplants.Weobviously cannot build all of these tests into the empirical analysis to follow, nor would we expect any single study in the future to do so.These comprehensive designcriteriaarespelledoutheretoputourownworkandfutureworkinperspective.

Theindustrialrelationsperformancemeasures:Thefollowingcanbeusedinthe analysisandtheirrespectivevariablenamesare:

1. Thenumberofgrievancesfiledper100workerswhicharepotentialtodisturbIndustrialRelations.(Grievance)

2. The number of disciplinary actions per 100 workers, actions which involveasuspensionorsomemoreseverepenalty (Discipline)

3. Thenumberofdemandssubmittedbytheunionincontractnegotiations. (Demands)

4. Thenumberofdaysittooktoreachasettlement.(Negtime)

5. Thenumberofstrikeintentlettersissuedbytheunion.(Strikelet)

6. Thenumberofsuggestionssubmittedperemployeeinthecompany'ssuggestionprogram.(Sugphw)

EconomicPerformanceMeasures/OrganisationalEffectivenessMeasures: The organizational effectiveness measure primarily captures a number of key dimensionsoftheeconomicperformanceofeachplant.Economicperformance ofeachplantcanbemeasuredwithvariablesthatmeasurethecostsofworkers' compensation,accidentsandillnesses,thenumberofillnessesandaccidents,and withmeasuresofthedirectlabourefficiencyandproductqualityineachplant. These measures are to be treated separately because, although the presence of higheraccidentorillnessratesinaplantmayindirectlyaffectdirectlabourefficiencyandproductquality Adetaileddescriptionofthesevariablesfollows.

1. Thenumbersofworkersbenefitsduetocollectivebargainingagreement inperhundredworkers.(Brate)

2. Thenumberofinjuriesrequiringmorethanminorfirstaidinperhundred workers.(Irate)

3. The number of accidents producing an injury which prevented an employeefromperforminghisorhernormaljobinperhundredworkers. (Arate)

4. Aqualityindexderivedfromacountofthenumberoffaultsand"demerits"thatappearininspectionsoftheproductcalculatedbythecompany's industrialengineers. Ahigherqualityscoreisassociatedwithbetterproductquality (PQuality)

5. Adirectlabourefficiencyindexwhichcomparestheactualhoursofdirect labourinputtostandardizedhourscalculatedbythecompany'sindustrial engineers. A higher direct labour index is associated with higher efficiencyandlowercosts.(Dlef)

DISCUSSION:

ThedescriptivestatisticsprovidedinTable3illustratetheimportanceofexaminingthediversityofoutcomesthatareproducedbycollectivebargainingindifferent bargaining relationships. Despite the common technology, union, and employerfromwhichthesedataaredrawn,thereisawidevariationingrievance rates,disciplinerates,absenteeism,andotherindustrialrelationsandeconomic performance measures in Oil India Ltd. Note, for example, that grievances per onehundredworkersvariedfromalowof8intheplanttoahighof32inanother year Absenteeism varied between 2 to 14. The number of contract demands introducedinthelocalnegotiationsagreementvariedfromalowof12toahigh of21andsoon.

Thecorrelationsamongthemeasuresofindustrialrelationsperformanceinthe industry is presented in Table 4. The table reveals a high degree of intercorrelationamongthevariousmeasuresofindustrialrelationsperformancethus supportingthehypothesisregardingtheinter-connectednatureoftheindustrial relationssystem.Thehigherthegrievancerateintheindustry,themoredemands introducedintolocalnegotiations(.466)andlongerthedaystosolveit(.421.The correlation with strike number, all of these correlations are statistically significantatthe1%level (.599).

The connection between individual behavior and the level of conflict also is revealedintheassociationsthatabsenteeratesandemployeeparticipationinsuggestion programs have with grievance rates, discipline rates, the number of demands,negotiationtime,andtheissuanceofstrikeletters.

RelationshipsbetweenIndustrialRelationsandEconomicPerformance:CorrelationsbetweenmeasuresofeconomicperformanceandanumberoftheindustrialrelationsperformancemeasuresarepresentedinTable5.Thesecorrelations provide strong supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the level of conflict andindividualbehaviourcanaffectorganizationaleffectiveness.

Higher grievance rates are associated in a statistically significant manner with lowerdirectlaborefficiency(r=-.175),poorerproductquality(r=-.464),and more injuries (r=.365) and more accident rate (r=.250) The issuance of more strikelettersinaindustryis associatedwithlowerdirectlaborefficiency(r =.123),poorerproductquality(r=-.58),lowerinjures(r=-.509)andloweraccidentrate(r=.069).Thesecorrelationsarestatisticallysignificantatthe1%level. Absenteeismissignificantlyrelatedlowerlabourefficiency(r=-.539)andpoorer productquality(r=-.846).

Correlationsbetweenthevariousindustrialrelationsperformancemeasuressupport the hypotheses regarding the inter-connected nature of the industrial relationssystemandeconomicperformance.Wefindevidencethatconflictcarries overfromthegrievancefunction,tolocalbargaining,andintostrikethreatsand

strikeoccurrence.Wealsofindevidencethatindividualattitudesandbehaviour (asmeasuredbyabsenteerates,strikesandparticipationinsuggestionprograms) arestronglyrelatedtomeasuresofplantlevelconflictintensity Wefindstrong evidence of an association between measures of industrial relations and economic performance, where the latter is measured by direct labour efficiency, product quality, and sickness and accident rates. Here, we find support for our viewthatanindividualbehaviourchannelintheassociationbetweenindustrial relationsandeconomicperformance.

Conclusion:Acorethemethatemergesfromtheabovediscussionisthatthereis astronginterrelationamongIndustrialRelationsParametersinOilIndialtd. The numbersofdemandandgrievancesarenotsolargewithcomparetosomeother industryinspiteofbeinga“Miniratna”company CompanyiscapableofmaintainingbetterindustrialRelationsforitssustainability Itcanalsobeconcluded thatIndustrialRelationscanplayasignificantroleinProductivityandproduct qualityandcostofmanagement.InOilIndiaLtd.Duliajanthelabourefficiency intermsofIndustrialRelationsisquitesatisfactory

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Table1:IndustrialRelationsPerformanceIndicators

Year Grievances NosofDays Absenteeism DisciplineRate Nos ofDemand Strike Suggestion

1991/92 18 12 8 1 15 2 15 1992/93 22 14 14 2 11 3 12 1993/94 32 20 7 1 16 4 21 1994/95 27 9 11 2 15 2 15 1995/96 18 12 2 00 11 3 16 1996/97 19 11 8 1 14 1 19 1997/98 12 9 3 .00 9 2 09 1998/99 32 16 12 2 25 3 10 1999/00 17 12 11 1 9 2 13 2000/001 11 11 11 3 11 2 15 2001/002 11 9 9 .00 10 3 16 2002/03 17 10 6 .00 9 2 19 2003/04 12 9 7 1 12 4 20 2004/05 10 9 11 3 14 3 21 2005/06 11 11 9 1 15 4 14 2006/07 10 7 6 2 11 2 15 20007/08 11 9 2 3 15 3 06 2008/09 8 7 3 1 10 1 07 2009/10 11 9 2 2 9 1 10 2010/2011 9 7 4 2 12 2 14

Source:OfficeoftheLearningandDevelopment,OilIndialtd.

:

Table3:Mean,Maximum,Minimumvalueandstandarddeviationsoftheparameters

Year BRate IRate ARate PQuality DLef 1991 12 05 03 - -

1992 18 15 04 -1993 07 14 02 -1994 18 11 07 -1995 19 06 08 -1996 06 14 01 -1997 09 11 07 -1998 14 09 06 -1999 13 08 03 -2000 11 10 05 08 2001 21 12 04 109 14 2002 17 08 07 118 16 2003 16 09 09 97 12 2004 15 07 0 99 18 2005 14 05 0 78 19 2006 13 08 01 100 17 2007 22 09 02 109 20 2008 11 07 03 112 14 2009 13 11 04 117 22 2010 12 10 01 118 25

Table4:CorrelationamongIRPerformance Grvn Demand Negtime Strike Grvn 000 .466 .421 .620 Demand .466 000 .242 .321

Calculatedbyresearchers

Table5:CorrelationbetweenIRPerformanceandEconomicPerformance (measuredbysimplecorrelation coefficient)

DirectLabef PQuality Brate Irate Arate

Grv -.175 -.464 -.108 .365 .250 Abst -.539 -.846 .38 .208 -.073 Disp .155 .196 .069 .063 -.382 Demand -.365 -.505 -.229 .306 .048 Negtime .240 -.171 .444 .-043 -.108 Strike -.123 .583 .334 -.059 .068 Sug -.278 -.748 -.151 .087 -.009

Calculatedbyresearchers