Sir HT 2016 by Oxford International Relations Society

CHANGING PLAYERS, CHANGING GAME?

EDITORIAL TEAM EDITORS Amelia Cooper Rose Vennin DEPUTY EDITOR Alexandra Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Keefe SUB-EDITORS Hubert Cruz Harriet Goldstaub Allen Schaidle GRAPHIC DESIGN Thai Dang SPONSORSHIP TEAM Beth Davies-Kumadiro Christian Amos Edward Howell PHOTO CREDITS Cover: Ollie Baker Special thanks to Dom Oliver for lending a hand to the cover image Thai Dang Peter Hudston Sacha Mehta Magali Vennin Will Yeldham

TABLE OF CONTENTS Using Military Force to Counter Transnational Terrorism

A Poisonous Smokescreen: Isis in Kyrgyzstan

Terrorists or Terrorism?

Deciphering Recent Trends in Transnational Terrorism

Cuius regio, cuius religio? Whose realm, whose religion?

Public-private Partnerships: the Puzzle of State Engagement

The International Monetary Fund: A Profile

A Shadow of Uncertainty over International Finance

A reassessment of the Arab League’s political and diplomatic power in the Middle East

Twenty eight European states or one European Union? The Role of the EU as a Diplomatic Actor

A Symposium on the Refugee Crisis  Turkey, Syria and the EU  An Appraisal of the UK Government’s response to the Migrant Crisis  Fear Mongering and the Responses to the Refugee Crisis among Republican Presidential Candidates

42 45 47 49

EDITORS' FOREWORD

raditional theories of international relations have centralized state-to-state interaction, seeking to identify the underlying motives of their behaviour. However, significant changes have taken place since the mid-twentieth century which challenge this analysis: states are no longer the only players in the international game (though many would argue that they are the only ones who matter). The diverse range of newly influential associations can loosely be classed as â&#x20AC;&#x153;non-state actorsâ&#x20AC;?: individuals or groups that pursue aims affecting state interests, while maintaining their independence from a specific country or government. They pose a challenge to the dominant paradigms of interstate relations and claim a role on the international stage; as such, they demand our attention. This edition of Sir attempts to explore several types of contemporary non-state actors, situating unfolding phenomena within a broader framework of changing international affairs. Violent non-state actors have threatened national security and sovereignty throughout history, with

a continuum ranging from internal lawbreakers, to criminal-soldiers or terrorist groups. The former are parasitic within the state; the latter posit themselves as successors to the state. Newly emerged transnational terrorist networks represent a hybrid case: the emergence and advance of the so-called Islamic State, also known as Isis, has directly challenged the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states in the region, as well as organizing individual attacks further afield. It therefore occupies a unique position as both a transnational parasite and a regional successor state, having established the hallmarks of territorial control, parallel administration, and the control of an army. A successful response must reflect the nuances and complexities inherent in such an organization. The first articles of this issue are grouped by their focus on several core features of (counter-) terrorism: the inadequacy of military force in combating ideologically motivated groups; the political necessity of separating the individual from the activity; and the challenges posed by the globalization of terror networks. The latter feeds in to a discussion of the changes precipitated

by the very existence of such groups, embodied by the repression of civil liberties in the name of security. However, the majority of nonstate actors seek to influence state behaviour through peaceful means and institutional processes. Various supranational organizations, such as the United Nations, have been created with the hope of developing an international framework that monitors and constrains the actions of nation states. In this edition, we look at their role in developing policies that respond to issues that vary from persecution based on religion or belief, to the risks entailed by the emergent shadow banking sector. Yet their success is often limited by diverging state interests and a lack of political will: at the regional level, institutions like the European Union and the Arab League have often struggled in their attempts to solidify their status as unitary actors. The divisions that have emerged among EU member states with regard to the refugee crisis exemplify this issue. The failure to resolve this political deadlock and create a coherent policy has resulted in an inhumane response

to the arriving migrant. It has been left to civil society organizations to bridge this gap, and provide a humanitarian response. Developing a coherent, international policy to alleviate the plight of refugees and asylum seekers must be at the forefront of the global agenda: while non-state actors can provide assistance on the ground and influence political debate, it seems that a long-term solution remains in state hands. It is in this dilemma that we return to the question of state primacy in international relations: non-state actors may appear to have changed the playing field, but does the game itself remain the same? In building this issue, we hope to have shed some light upon the complex dynamics that exist between state and non-state actors. While the extent of the latterâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s influence will remain the subject of much debate, it is clear that they are staking an unprecedented claim both on the international stage and within domestic affairs. Amelia Cooper Rose Vennin Hilary 2016

Using Military Force to Counter Transnational Terrorism:

Short-Term Gains in a Long-Term Struggle To what extent is the use of military operations by states beneficial in counteracting transnational terrorism? - Katharine Weatherhead -

hat is the difference between terrorist networks and state armies? Although this question sounds like the beginning of a controversial joke, its answer has important implications for international relations. Unlike traditional interstate conflicts, armed conflicts between states and transnational terrorists are often labelled “asymmetrical”, given that they involve broad differences in structure, status, and power between the implicated parties. Considering this asymmetry between military forces and more loosely organised terrorist networks leads to the following question: to what extent is the use of military operations by states beneficial in counteracting transnational terrorism? This article focuses on the distinction between short-term and longterm counterterrorism, a distinction overlooked in the debate over whether military force can effectively respond to transnational terrorist threats. I argue that

military operations can disrupt the shortterm capacity of transnational terrorists to conduct attacks, yet there are significant limits to the long-term effectiveness of armed violence as a counterterrorism tool. Although the definition of terrorism is contested, it traditionally denotes violence with a political aim whose methods focus on generating terror in a population. The “transnational” element arises when the terrorism in question involves participants or targets of multiple countries. Nonetheless, the complexities created by this transnationalism did not prevent Western nations, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, from declaring a “war on terror” over a decade ago. Such a “war” involves employing military force, i.e. armed might, as a tool of counterterrorism. In this context, it is important to note that terrorism is often viewed as an act, or a tactic, rather than an identifiable enemy

While military force is useful to the extent that it can disrupt terrorist capacity in the short-term, there are greater limitations to its long-term utility as fought against in traditional warfare. Accordingly, academic commentators contend that it is illogical to declare war on a “tactic”. However, this view overlooks that identifiable groups conduct transnational terrorism, and it is these groups that constitute the target. For example, the U.S. capturing Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011 highlighted how pursuing individual members of terrorist groups can combat terrorism: when information on targets exists, military operations can limit the human capital of terrorist networks. Military force can similarly diminish the material resources of terrorists, such as training camps and meeting places. For instance, the American army employed strength to destroy Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, minimising their operational infrastructure. One challenge is that because of dense terrain, such operations are harder to conduct within built-up cities. Yet urban operations are not impossible for militaries to adapt to, and “precision” strikes have been developed for their purpose. Although there are copious 8

civilian casualties following operations in these areas, these casualties indicate problematic political choices, rather than a lack of adaption by the military to new combat zones. Indeed, it was revealed in 2012 that the U.S. army considers all male adults killed in drone strikes to be “combatants” unless there is evidence suggesting the opposite, an inherently political decision increasing the potential for civilian deaths. Military action can also disrupt transnational terrorist networks by deterring state sponsors: in 1998, Syria stopped harbouring the leader of the Kurdish Worker’s Party following Turkey’s militarisation along shared borders. Thus while conflict between states and terrorists is “asymmetrical” in nature, counterterrorism can take be comprised of traditional interstate contact. Undeniably, military force does not always deter state support, with Qadhafi continuing to involve Libya in terrorism even after the 1986 American air strikes. Yet the threat of force does hold the potential to dissuade state sponsors, arguably more so since the political resolve to use force was illustrated in 2001, when American and British armed forces joined to remove the Afghan Taliban government to prevent future assistance to Al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, while military force is useful to the extent that it can disrupt terrorist capacity in the short-term, there are greater limitations to its long-term utility. The risk of conflict escalation is particularly problematic in leading to additional threats for the military to

address, alongside the counterterrorism task. For instance, counterterrorism commando raids and aerial strikes can all too rapidly escalate into operations which have a greater range of targets and begin resembling the separate but related task of counterinsurgency. The greater intensity of conflict and any related operations can, in this way, decrease strategic clarity—and thereby strategic effectiveness—in countering transnational terrorism. Conflict escalation further hinders long-term cooperation in combating transnational terrorism by inciting resentment. A 2012 Pew Research Center study found that in 2009, 64% of Pakistanis living in areas subject to American drone attacks felt the U.S. was an enemy, with the figure increasing to 74% in 2012. Notably, the same study found that support for terrorist groups also decreased over this period: whereas 25% of those surveyed had a favourable view of Al-Qaeda in 2008, they were only 13% in 2012. It seems, then, that terrorists and ‘counterterrorists’ do not clearly compete in a zero-sum game for the support of populations. Instead, while resentment does not automatically broaden the terrorist threat, it does jeopardise cooperation in combating it. The aforementioned American raid killing Bin Laden was conducted without Pakistani consent, leading to a two-day communication shut down between Pakistan’s military and the NATO and U.S. forces within Afghanistan. Thus, over time, these kinds of operations risk isolating actors who might otherwise

cooperate in campaigns combatting terrorism.

aimed

Maintaining cooperation is valuable considering transnational terrorism cannot be eliminated. Terrorism exists and will likely endure in time and in the extensiveness of target areas, as exemplified by the widespread attacks from Madrid in 2004 to Mumbai in 2008. Using force to eliminate all potential terrorists conducting attacks across the globe is self-evidently unfeasible. Therefore, although military force can reduce terrorists’ capacity to attack, it cannot eliminate that capacity, with the risk of intense conflict and the endurance of transnational terrorism further limiting its long-term utility. Overall, it is too simplistic to say that military operations either can or cannot counter transnational terrorism. Although the conflict is asymmetrical, armed forces can counter transnational terrorism in the short term by disrupting the capacity of terrorists to orchestrate attacks. However, the long-term usefulness of military forces is limited by the risk that operations escalate in intensity and jeopardise cooperation with others in counterterrorism. In any case, transnational terrorism cannot be fully eliminated, and so military operations can only put a lid on identifiable threats. Given this endurance, a more crucial question is whether transnational terrorism merits a military response. This wider political and moral question requires careful attention.

A Poisonous Smokescreen:

Isis in Kyrgyzstan Central Asian governments suppress liberties in the disguise of anti-extremism

- Katherine Crofts-Gibbons -

n 16 July 2015, special forces stormed a house in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, killing four men, and arresting seven. The house was flattened. According to the official account, the men were part of a cell of the so-called Islamic State, also known as Isis. Little information has been released by the security services and the Isis presence has not been independently verified. The raid seems instead to be a crackdown on criminal networks that have plagued Kyrgyzstan since independence.

region are ramping up repression under the name of fighting against Isis. While there is a threat from radical Islam in Kyrgyzstan, the greatest threat comes not from the Islamists, but from actions that are taken in their name. Last October, Kyrgyzstan held the most transparent and competitive elections in its history. These fragile attempts of pluralism and democracy have little chance of taking root if the government continues to pursue authoritarian paths under the veil of anti-terrorism.

The raid was a manifestation of a trend across Central Asia. Governments in the

The case of Imam Rashot Kamalov is perhaps the most egregious example.

Following a trial plagued by irregularities, Kamalov was sentenced to five years in prison for “inciting religious hatred” and “possessing extremist materials”. The GKNB, the Kyrgyz security police, alleged that Kamalov supported Isis. Their case rested on a sermon entitled “On the Caliphate”, yet Kamalov’s lawyers said that the sermon was canonical and had nothing to do with Isis. The prosecution relied heavily on the expert testimony of a psychologist who speaks neither of the languages used in the sermon, but claimed that the Imam’s body language demonstrated that he was “brainwashing” his congregation with “hidden meaning of an extremist nature”. Kamalov’s supporters claim that the Imam was arrested because he criticised the GKNB. A few weeks before his arrest, Kamalov took part in a public roundtable to discuss the reasons that Kyrgyz people leave to join Isis. He blamed the GKNB’s heavy handed methods and corruption for driving people into the arms of extremists.

He also alleged that the GKNB use the threat of extremism charges to extort money. The GKNB have used extremism charges not only to silence Kamalov, but to silence discussion of his case. An American journalist researching the case was detained, threatened with extremism charges, and deported. Umar Farooq, who writes for the Diplomat, was arrested and claims that police in Osh planted DVDs of Kamalov’s sermons on him. Using extremism charges to curtail opposition activities and discourse has become a common practice. Kamalov’s lawyer said that the definition of extremism “under the law is extremely broad” and “gives powers that are too broad to law enforcement officials”. The authorities have made full, and often creative, use of these powers. In June last year, the GKNB threatened a journalist with extremism charges for publicly denouncing a nationalist for racist comments. Lawyers defending suspected Isis members have faced charges of possessing extremist materials for holding documents directly

related to their cases, including witness testimonies and recordings of their clients. It is true that central Asians are travelling to Syria to join Isis. Although there is no single profile of an Isis recruit, they seem to be driven primarily by poverty and lack of opportunity at home. The pull of promises of a better life in Syria will only get stronger as economic troubles spilling over from Russia hit the Kyrgyz economy and remittances. In 2014, the

latter constituted 30% of Kyrgyz GDP. In the first six months of 2015, the value of remittances fell by about 50%. Although most returning fighters are disillusioned by the realities of life under Isis, some may come back to wage jihad at home. Tatyana Dronzina, a terrorism expert, argues that returning militants pose a particular threat in Central Asia because governments lack programmes to tackle the issue. Given the permeability of their borders, there is little they can do to prevent their return or monitor them. Central Asia is low on Isisâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; agenda. The central command rarely mentions the region, with a report by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) finding that the organisation simply lacks

interest in it. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s declaration of support to Isis in September 2014 was largely ignored. However, Kyrgyzstan is on Isis’ radar. A video in Kyrgyz released over the summer bears the Isis logo, but John Heathershaw, of George Washington University’s Central Asia Programme, argues that its low production quality suggests it was probably created by Kyrgyz radicals, rather than under the direction of the direction of Isis, indicating a limited interest in Kyrgyzstan. There is little, if any, indication of widespread radicalisation. John Heathershaw argues that little is known about radicalisation in Central Asia, “but what we do know suggests that a widespread process of societal radicalisation […] is not happening.” Various extremist groups have been active for many years, but have lacked a wide base of support. The call to fight in Afghanistan in the 1990s and 2000s had few takers, and there is little reason to suspect that this has changed radically now.

In late October, Alexander Bortnikov, the FSB chief, said that there was an increasing threat of the Taliban, in alliance with Isis, invading Central Asia from Afghanistan. This is indeed a possibility, but it seems somewhat distant. Nonetheless, Valdimir Putin, the Russian President, has been using the threat of radical Islam and Russia’s security capabilities as leverage to pursue stronger ties with Central Asia. And it is working. Kyrgyzstan has accelerated its move into Russia’s orbit in recent months with its accession to the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia’s authoritarian pull has undoubtedly strengthened authoritarian trends in Kyrgyzstan. Isis receives little support in Central Asia, and Central Asia receives little attention from Isis. Returning fighters from Syria and the situation in Afghanistan pose security threats but, for the people of Central Asia, overreaction is just as threatening. The October parliamentary election raised hopes that Kyrgyzstan might become a functioning democracy, but it could be pulled into authoritarianism under the cover of defence against radical Islam.

TERRORISTS OR TERRORISM? The political importance of differentiating between the individuals & the activity - Kohei Kuno and Wren Nishina -

hile the popular imagination and political rhetoric has tended to focus on the mythical, evil figure of “the terrorist”, the domain of law has moved towards a definition of terrorism as primarily an activity, and only derivatively as a category of individuals or groups. The legal question is not, “who is a terrorist, and what does he do”; rather, “what constitutes terrorist activity”, and from that, “who is said to practise such activity”. The distinction is not mere pedantry: a careful analysis of the strategies employed by the leaders of the so-called Islamic State, also known as Isis, reveals that they are not only aware of the ubiquity of the former perspective, but have developed a macabre method to exploit it for their own ends.

One of the great mysteries of the present conflict in the Middle East is how Isis was able to transform from a minor ex-faction of al-Qaeda to the hegemonic force in the region. In particular, the eclipse of Jabhat al-Nusra (henceforth simply JaN) by Isis is a peripeteia in urgent need of explanation. For in the early months of 2013, JaN was ahead of Isis in every conceivable way: size of forces, the training and organisation of forces, control over essential supply routes, and local popularity. The latter is largely attributable to the writings of Abu Musab al-Suri, a progressive jihadi theorist critical of traditional methodologies (typified by the tactics of al-Qaeda). AlSuri preached the necessity of a “third generation of jihad”, avoiding extremism, providing infrastructural services to those

they rule over, and establishing strong It was in the same speech, delivered in local ties. JaN put this theory into practice: April 2013, that he overturned every in Raqqah, they took charge of dawa’a existing theory of who the principal players (religious outreach), distributing free and their relative power in the conflict. water, gas and healthcare, and subsidizing His announcement that, “Jabhat al-Nusra loaves for those in need. Maintaining close is only an expansion for the Islamic State connections with the local tribal oil barons, of Iraq and part of it” proved more JaN boasted a formidable military and effective than any military campaign: JaN popular powerbase. The transformation and Isis, always seen as one in the eyes of of Raqqah, from the law, would now JaN’s model and neoofficially reunite. The legal question is A l - B a g h d a d i ’ s socialist prototype, to the capital of Isis, not, “who is a terrorist, a n n o u n c e m e n t cannot be explained was a move of exclusively by and what does he do”; strategic genius: not reference to military rather, “what constitutes only was he able strength or strategy. claim loyalty to terrorist activity”, and to The explanation must JaN as synonymous from that, “who is said with that to Isis, he rather be sought on the level of ideological to practise such activity” forced every ally of and rhetorical JaN to “weigh the superiority. consequences to its supply chain, once Isis tactics demonstrate that they have donors got wind they had been working been studying the power of brand names with al-Qaeda all along”. With its support for some time. This is no great secret: Abu base withdrawn from under its feet, and Bakr al-Baghdadi, the “Invisible Sheikh” the allegiance of its members thrown of Isis, declared, into deep confusion, it was inevitable that mass defections to the newly created Isis “The names of the Jihadi tribes aren’t would take place (by some estimates, JaN names revealed from the sky or names of lost 65% of its fighting force). By the time tribes or clans…they are names that were the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri founded due to legitimate necessity.” publicly disowned Isis six months later, the

transfer of power was all but complete. The decisive military victories at Deir ezZour and Mosul were contingent on alBaghdadi’s rhetorical victory. In effect, Isis subsumed JaN simply by proclamation. The success of al-Baghdadi’s rhetorical war depends on the effect that the name of al-Qaeda, the popular imagination’s paradigmatic terrorist organisation, has on the rest of the world. It is now undeniable that JaN had foundational links to al-Qaeda; however, the actual facts of JaN activity disallow any simplistic equivalence with the brutal and “spectacular” tactics of Isis. If JaN were judged tt solely on their actions, there is limited justification (especially given the volatility and instability of the situation on the ground in Syria) for them to be classed under the same category as al-Qaeda and Isis. However, the force of al-Qaeda’s name is enough to overturn all evidence to the contrary, and (re)brand any individual or group as uncontestably evil. The rest is certainly not history, for we are still paying the price with irreplaceable human lives. Having lost external support, JaN was overrun by Isis gunpower, and what could have been a significant bulwark against the expansion of Isis was reduced to a disarray of rebel fighters. The blunt truth is that we are queasy when it comes to terrorism. The slightest mention of the label is able to overturn our opinions completely, which is not only irrational, but plays directly into the hands of the terrorists themselves. Groups such as Isis have clearly learnt how to exploit the way we dispense with all nuance and subtlety when the word “terrorist” is involved.

We must thus turn to international law for a more viable definition, which in turn will inform counter-terror strategies. The exemplary case study is the International Court of Justice’s 1986 ruling on Nicaragua v. United States. The latter’s intervention in Nicaragua fell outside the realm of justified self-defence, because the extent of Nicaraguan support for other South American dissident groups was found to be limited. That is to say, the question of whether some agent is a terrorist was shown to be secondary to the actual actions undertaken, whose severity and extremity alone were considered as meaningful criteria in determining whether the retaliation was justified. The question of who is a terrorist was subordinated to what terrorist activity constitutes. Under this definition, there is little scope for interpreting JaN as a terrorist organisation, strong links to al-Qaeda notwithstanding. The advantage of this austere approach over popular opinion in combatting the strategists of Isis is self-evident. Terrorism is not an essential attribute of certain groups and individuals, but first and foremost an activity with infinite shades of complexity. There is nothing to be gained from simplifying the problem into civilization versus barbarism, good and evil, us and them. It is actions that are or are not terrorist; the question of who is secondary, and entirely dependent on how we classify the relevant activity. Counterterrorism needs to be awoken from the hypnotic entrancement of the word, towards the rigorous daylight of the act.

Deciphering Recent Trends in Transnational Terrorism: An Interview with Professor Fiona de Londras The roots, challenges and ramifications of modern terror tactics - Hubert Cruz -

ourteen years since President George W. Bush launched the â&#x20AC;&#x153;War on Terrorâ&#x20AC;?, terrorist activities around the world are far from being subdued. The threat of terrorism is more visible and pertinent than ever. With the advent of social media, the so-called Islamic State, also known as Isis, has been able to widen its message outreach, and shock the world with videos of its brutality. Its professionally designed propaganda has successfully recruited many youngsters from Western countries to become foreign terrorist fighters in Syria. The aftermath of past military interventions in the Middle East continues to pose serious regional security challenges. State institutions that were propped up by international powers are marred with inefficiencies and corruption, which provided ample opportunity for terrorist groups to exploit the political vacuum. The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the rapid expansion of Isis in Iraq suggest the need to rethink strategy for combating terrorism in the long term. As the world gradually responds to new patterns of terrorism, governments in many countries have unravelled extensive measures to stamp out extremist views before they could take root in societies. Some of them have been criticised as affronts to individual liberty, and questions have been raised as to whether these measures will further alienate minority groups, and make them more prone to falling for radical ideologies. I spoke with Professor Fiona de Londras, Chair of Global Legal Studies at the Birmingham Law School and an expert in transnational terrorism, to learn about her views on the recent developments of terrorist groups. Professor de Londras also shared her opinion on the radicalisation of foreign fighters, and anti-extremism policies that are implemented in the UK.

HC: In recent years, prominent terrorist groups have made use of social media to reach a wider audience. How has this affected the spread of extremism in our society?

Isis’s entanglement with the Syrian civil war, which has been manifested through the ongoing refugee crisis, also draws the media to report on the group’s brutalities.

FdL: It is not a new phenomenon that terrorist groups use social media as a part of their operations. This has been the case since the start of the Internet. In the past, they would use online forums and bulletin boards to communicate their extremist ideas. As social media evolves to become more interactive in nature, so do the recruitment efforts and propaganda of terrorist groups. This does pose a challenge to counterterrorism efforts, but the authorities have also adapted by using social media to communicate anti-extremist narratives, and conducting sentiment and linguistic analysis to identify suspicious patterns on social media.

HC: Another aspect of Isis that has garnered much international attention is its radicalisation of hundreds of foreign terrorist fighters in Western countries. Why do you think so many young people would leave their homes for combat in a distant part of the world?

HC: From media reports, we have seen extremely ruthless acts committed by terrorist groups (such as Isis’s execution videos and details of Boko Haram recruiting child suicide bombers). Do you see any escalating trends of violence in the actions of terrorist groups? FdL: These actions do not necessarily indicate a change in behaviour of terrorist groups, but rather an increase in the scale of operations. The nature of their actions, such as the type of violence committed, the intolerance towards other religions, abuse of women, etc. are largely in line with what we have observed in the past. They have become more visible as photographic and video evidence of these perpetrations can now be easily circulated across the media.

FdL: Any answer to this risks simplification, but bearing that in mind, we know that research reveals a consistent pattern of alienation amongst radicalised individuals. Here alienation refers not just to a kind of socio-economic marginalisation (such as a lack of education, language skills or integration), but also a sense of not being respected by or belonging to the state, which can be experienced regardless of socio-economic status. It is quite possible that many people who travel to engage in these hostilities feel demonised and marginalised for being perceived as security risks in the first place. For example, there have been complaints that community officers in the Prevent programme appeared to be conducting surveillance instead of providing social support. As their esteem for the political system gradually breaks down, these young people, who are already viewed as ‘other’ by mainstream society, may well conclude that conventional political participation is insufficient to gain recognition, and thus become engaged in extremist beliefs and actions.

HC: In Iraq and Afghanistan, the two major battlegrounds of the War on Terror, the governments set up by the international community are unable to stop the resurgence of the Taliban and the surge of Isis. Why have terrorist groups remained in both countries after military interventions? FdL: The international community has failed to plan for post-conflict transitions in both countries. With competing power bases, it is unsurprising that terrorist groups take advantage of the power vacuum and establish control. It is important that the international community understands that military intervention alone cannot address inherent state weaknesses. A longterm approach which focuses on capacity building and the institutionalisation of the rule of law is needed. Only with a workable regime can the state enlist allegiance from the people, and stop them from turning to the alternative of terrorist groups. HC: The UK government has implemented various policies to stem the rise of extremism, ranging from increasing surveillance to

interventions at the community level. What are your views over these programmes? FdL: It is worrying that some of these programmes appear to be targeting particular groups in society. For example, the Prime Ministerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s call for Muslim mothers in particular to learn English seems to be based on an unfounded conjecture between Muslim women and extremism. Such an approach may undermine social cohesion and further alienate minority groups, who already feel they have low societal acceptance. The ever-expanding mass surveillance programme also places individual liberties at risk. People have become more accustomed to state intrusions due to the unpredictable nature of terrorist threats. Sometimes it seems that we do not realise that when we are asked to give up our own liberty in exchange for some unattainable promise of absolute security, we are, at the same time, giving up the liberty of a great many others.

CUIUS REGIO, CUIUS RELIGIO? Whose realm, whose religion? - Gabe Rusk Gabe Rusk, in conversation with UN Special Rapporteur Heiner Bielefeldt and Dr. Robert George, Chairman of the United State Commission on International Religious Freedom, discusses the influence of non-state actors on the shifting international defenses of freedom of religion or belief

n February 3rd 2016, the European Parliament unanimously passed a resolution that recognized the systematic killing and persecution of religious minorities by the so-called Islamic state, also known as Isis, as genocide. It condemned the tens of thousands of religious minorities who have been displaced, forcibly converted, trafficked, and executed, and consequently recommended the EU establish a permanent Special Representative for Freedom of Religion and Belief. The Special Representative, if appointed, will

face a Sisyphean struggle in curbing the behavior of non-state actors. Two current entities charged with the international defense of freedom of conscience are the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), and the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (SR). Both actors issue annual reports, make country visits, and serve policy recommendations as related to their mandates. While different in scope and responsibilities, both the SR and USCIRF are only as effective as their direct or

indirect permit.

enforcement

mechanisms

The SR, a pro bono post derivative of the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, has a complaint and allegation system that can be used by individuals and groups alike. However, this tool has seemingly little effect in changing the behavior of non-state actors. In February 2001, for example, the standing Rapporteur sent an urgent appeal to Taliban representatives, requesting that they halt a plan to destroy the Buddhist statutes of Bamayan in Afghanistan. However, the Afghani government was unable to take sufficient protective action, there was no response from the Taliban, and the destruction went ahead as planned. The SR’s allegations and threats of possible criminal sanction fell on deaf ears. Professor Heiner Bielefeldt has helmed the office of UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief since August 2010: he considers his role as that of a conceptual expert, rather than

being the captain of a coordinated diplomatic effort. When pressed during our interview on the enforcement mechanisms at his disposal, Bielefeldt was quick to respond that he had “none.” The SR’s success is dependent on his or her ability to provide compelling conceptual and policy arguments, which will in turn strengthen the body of international law surrounding freedom of religion or belief. Non-state actors, which the SR admits are “increasingly dangerous”, seem less likely to respond to local, regional, and international exertions of power, often due to their extralegal position. Indeed, the SR dedicated an entire page of his 2014 annual report to the obligation of non-state actors to follow international law. However, this legal condemnation neglects the reality that non-state actors often rise in failed states and flourish due to intersectional forces that exist outside the scope of the law. The SR notes that such actors are influenced by land grabs, water and food scarcity, ethnic conflict, and poverty. As such, the SR and USCIRF must develop tools and advocacies that are specifically directed

towards the particularities of non-state actors. USCIRF and the International Religious Freedom Office, created by the 1998 US International Religious Freedom Act, have a unique ability to recommend or place countries on what is called a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ (CPC) list. Countries are designated as CPCs if they are routinely hostile to certain religions or beliefs, or fail to protect minorities and prevent widespread persecution. In 2015, for example, USCIRF proposed CPC designation for 17 countries, including Myanmar, China, Iraq, and Sudan. USCIRF has suggested the extension of CPC status to non-state actors, particularly when occupying territories with limited governmental control, such as the Central African Republic (CAR) and parts of Syria and Iraq. Dr. Robert George, Chairman of USCIRF, observed that designations for non-state actors and regions challenge the CPC paradigm because the status quo generally “presumes governmental perpetration or toleration

of violations.” However, using the CPC tactic cannot assume different types of actors have identical reactions: In response to my concern, Dr. George emphasized that USCIRF is “under no illusion that a CPC designation would influence groups like ISIL or militias in CAR.” CPC status rather reflects “the reality in which the egregious violations are taking place” and may “play an important symbolic role and help galvanize public opinion.” Dr. George argued that CPC designation acts as a statement to “an offending nation”, and can consequently “create political will for reform where none would otherwise exist.” This political capital forms an “anchor” for the promotion of human rights and domestic activism, and can create patterns of discussion that mirror the interreligious dialogue and community stakeholder consultations exalted by the SR. Nonetheless, these strategies reinforce that the state is the primary point of leverage when initiating change. As per their mandates, USCIRF and the SR are cautious in circumventing the state, both in policy and advocacy: they depend on it for action and implementation.

In recent reports, USCIRF has emphasized the urgent need to develop effective responses to non-state actors entering theatres of religious tyranny. USCIRF, like so many other transnational organizations, was originally charged with international engagement through a stateto-state paradigm, However, the reports note that this has failed to “adequately address one of the 21st century’s major challenges to freedom of religion or belief: the actions of non-state actors in failing or failed states.” Dr. Robert George observed that while “non-state actors have been abusing religious freedom for many years, what has changed is the alarming reach and power of some of these groups.” The increased scope and threat of non-state actors like Isis are reorienting the traditional axes of protection and prevention for religious and belief minorities.

The SR and USCIRF recognize that the changing specter of non-state actors requires a shift of resources, energies, and specific policy toolkits. Contemporary dangers demand that both a domestic and international defence of liberty of conscience must attune their state oriented modus operandi. A future EU Special Representative for Freedom of Religion and Belief will be confronted with a chaotic and carnal triage. This diplomatic emergency room requires a discerning, fast-acting, and surgical hand. The human stakes require nothing less.

public-private partnership:

The Puzzle of Engagement

An examination of multistakeholder partnerships and the reasons for their proliferation

- Lydia Jones -

ublic private partnerships (PPPs) are intriguing; they have spread across the globe at an unprecedented rate, yet we still know very little about why states choose to engage in them, and why they do not. According to the UK government, which was the first to develop the concept, PPPs are any collaboration between public bodies and private companies that enable the delivery of cost-effective and efficient public services. This allows the private sector to pay for the construction and sometimes the maintenance of hospitals, schools and other infrastructures. The public sector makes an annual payment to these private companies, without taking on any of the financial risk. One example is the £1.2 billion contract that enabled the completion of St Bartholomew’s hospital, or the management of some lines of London Underground until 2010.

Yet while PPPs complement classic state functions in developed nations such as the UK, they have become a substitute for state weaknesses in areas of incapacitated statehood. They no longer fit with the UK government’s functional definition of collaborations between public bodies and private companies as outlined above: they form a “third” government, bringing representatives of the private sector and civil society into the governmental decision-making processes. They can aid economic growth, replacing Westphalian governance to make up for the huge gaps in infrastructure across the developing world. PPPs have become particularly instrumental in the implementation of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with the UN noting that private sector involvement is instrumental for the “success of any largescale development strategy”. 25

But if PPPs are heralded as instrumental to poverty-reducing development objectives, why are there such disparities in their take-up between different countries? And what international relations theories, if any, can we use to explain state engagement? Functionalists judge states by their actions. According to this perspective, states with low domestic institutional capacity use PPPs to fill the large gaps in the provision of collective goods and address challenges like rapid economic growth, climate change and global pandemics such as HIV/AIDS. For example, Coca-Cola has one of the largest distribution networks in the world, with its products consumed everywhere from remote parts of Zambia to autarkic North Korea. Meanwhile, in rural Tanzania, vital medicines and vaccinations cannot reach their patients. If Coca-Cola can reach all corners of the globe, then why not medicine? Enter the Global Fund, a partnership that brings together governments, civil society and private firms such as Coca-Cola to invest nearly $4 billion a year to support programs like the distribution of medicine. Realist theorists also judge states by their actions, but in relation to a world of anarchy, self-interest, and survival. They contest the functional argument by showing that, over the past two decades, only four percent of infrastructure projects took place in low-income developing countries. PPPs established during the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) are not found in areas where institutional failures are especially pronounced. They 26

have been seen as a strategy of donor states to reduce intergovernmental aid and weaken recipient control over sustainable development assistance. The realist suggests that powerful states are more likely to participate in order to rearticulate and reassert their power over the global South and spread the norms of the global North. Constructivist theorists look at norms and standards in order to decipher state actions. The constructivists highlight the role of the UN in affecting state engagement in PPPs, particularly weaker states, and identify it as the greatest driver of normative change. The UN has started multiple initiatives such as the Global Compact and published reports all emphasizing the importance of PPPs, or what it refers to as â&#x20AC;&#x153;multistakeholder partnerships.â&#x20AC;? Examples of the UN calling for a participatory approach across states and non-state actors are numerous, and participation in PPPs is no longer optional for states if they wish to tap into funds and appear legitimate. As with many new global governance approaches such as PPPs, scholars face a dilemma in deciding whether to conceptually stretch the classical (and arguably outdated) paradigms of international relations, or to come up with a new and interactive approach. All of the previous theories remain static: they take state engagement as a given due to a binding discourse, rather than assessing specific circumstances across a variety of actors that allow certain PPPs to thrive.

In order to develop the argument further, scholars need to discuss not only singular institutional settings in which PPPs operate but also the confluence of actor agendas and interests. A PPP will take place when the interests of the states, private sector and civil society organizations overlap. If the interests do not overlap, the PPP will not be maintained. PPPs are not created just to fill governance gaps, as the functionalist would suggest, but are institutions through which actors can access resources that they would not have otherwise. For example, businesses such as MetroNet and Tube Lines, which formed the London Underground PPP, can obtain public tenders and subsidies. Corporations can also increase their reputational clout and social responsibility profile, such as Coca-Cola in the case of the Global Fund. Civil society members can increase their public profiles and influence both corporate and state decisions, as with the multiple NGOs involved in the UN’s multi-stakeholder partnerships such as Plan International. Governments can gain greater control over policy implementation through utilizing private actors with expertise in a specific area, much like the UK government attempted to do with the Underground example. The interaction and overlap between different interests should be seen as a vital condition for the creation of PPPs. From the strikingly different examples expressed so far – the London Underground, Coca-Cola’s distribution networks, and the UN’s Global Compact – it is evident that there is not a single overarching idea that can explain

participation in PPPs. Opportunities clearly differ across regions and time, which in turn are related to varying actors’ interests across the public, private and non-profit sector. The puzzling nature of why some states choose to participate in PPPs lies not in the aggrandizing international relations theories, but in the interactive, “one size does not fit all” approach. Building frameworks that explain participation in multi-level governance structures such as PPPs has been hailed as one of the greatest challenges facing the domestic political research agenda. It appears that the nuanced, intersecting interests of states will vary across time, regional and international domains.

The International Monetary Fund:

A Profile - David Hageboelling-

ince the end of the Second World War, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been charged with maintaining global financial cooperation. Born during a defining moment in the history of international relations, it has proven itself resilient and adaptable. Today, it faces challenges from rapid processes of globalisation and demands from emerging international players. Quick facts Formation: 27 December 1945 Headquarters: Washington, D.C. Members: 188 countries Current Managing Director: Christine Lagarde (France) Staff: 2,400 A Short History The IMF was created alongside the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) during the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. This conference brought together delegates from the 44 Allied nations to discuss international monetary and financial regulation. Primarily negotiated between the United Kingdom (represented by John Maynard 28

Keynes) and the United States (represented by Harry Dexter White), it established the post-war financial system. Its design was informed by the experiences of unilateral economic policies and competitive currency devaluations that occurred during the interwar Great Depression. Politically, it reflected the United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; break with isolationist policy and emergence as the dominant global power. With the breakdown of the gold dollar standard in the early 1970s and the globalisation of financial markets, the IMFâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role has been subject to redefinition, and has increasingly focussed on the developing world. Structure and Functions Membership and Voting Power: The IMF is funded by its member countries (188 as of 2016). Each member is assigned a quota that reflects its size within the world economy and determines its financial commitment to the organisation. It is denoted in the IMFâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s unit of account, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and voting power is largely linked to this quota. Leadership: The organisation is governed by a Board of Governors that meets on

an annual basis. In practice, much decision-making is delegated to IMF’s Executive Board, which is composed of twenty-four executive directors representing groups of countries. Five of the largest economies are assigned their own executive director: the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. In addition, single country constituencies have been created for China, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Functions: The IMF’s principal task is to foster economic cooperation, prevent financial crises and assist countries encountering balance of payment difficulties, that is, when a country lacks sufficient financing to meet international payment obligations. For example, when a country faces a sudden disruptive loss of market confidence - that is, no lender is willing to provide sufficient liquidity - the IMF has the possibility to step in as a lender of last resort. It does so on the condition that the country concerned can be reasonably expected to implement market-oriented structural adjustment policies (SAPs). Usually this involves extensive privatisation, austerity measures and a welcoming of international goods and capital. A prominent criticism is that SAPs often cause the economic situations in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to deteriorate and undermine important social programmes.

A New Century: Challenges and Challengers The beginning of the 21st century has been a turbulent one for the IMF and, in public discourse, it continues to be a focal point for critics of globalisation. In conjunction with the European Commission and the European Central Bank, it launched its largest bailout programme to date to ensure Greece’s ability to service its debt and avert sovereign default. The environment for international monetary cooperation has also undergone important changes. As an international organisation, the IMF is an arena for competing state interests and power shifts. The United States’ successful establishment of the dollar as reserve currency reflects the dollar’s primacy and American reluctance to cede sovereignty over monetary policy. Today, rising powers push for more influence and changes to the quota system. One concession in this vein was the appointment of Chinese economist Zhu Min as Deputy Managing Director of the IMF in 2011. As a result of financial globalisation, states are now more limited in their ability to control capital flows. In this context, the intensified trade-off between predictable, fixed exchange rates and national policy autonomy is likely to remain salient. Overall, the parameters of cooperation are far from fixed. 29

a shadow of uncertainty over international finance Unregulated banking in a global market & the need for international cooperation - Daniel Sutton -

erhaps unsurprisingly, shadow banking is difficult to define. Most formal definitions speak of organisations which provide banking services, but exist outside the traditional banking framework of regulation and state-backed deposits; what they fail to capture is the sheer variety of institutions in play. Non-registered arms of investment banks, web giants such as Alibaba and the scandal-prone Bitcoin have all been variously described as part of this system, tied together only by what they are not. The size of the shadow banking network has proved even harder to pin down, with Bloomberg reporting a global total of $67 trillion in 2012, only to claim within months it had more likely been around $100 trillion. The most recent estimates by the Financial Stability Board, the international regulator tasked with keeping an eye on this hydra, suggest shadow banking accounts for up to 30% of the global financial system. 30

This proliferation is not necessarily a bad thing. Before 2008, there were plenty who thought shadow banking made the global system safer: in 2006, the IMF, in one of its less prescient announcements, claimed that “there is growing recognition that the dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader and more diverse group of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on their balance sheets, has helped make banking and the overall financial system more resilient.” Even as recently as 2012, a senior US regulator is on record as saying “securitisation is a good thing. If everything was on bank balance sheets there wouldn’t be enough credit.” For many businesses, more stringent lending regulation has meant shadow banks are all that have kept them afloat in recent years, particularly those in need of longterm loans to maintain liquidity. The primary difficulty that shadow banking poses is its sheer growth. Although

the exact rate at which it is proliferating is unknown, most research estimates that the total size has doubled since the 2008 crash, and at least quadrupled since 2002. This expansion creates difficulties in knowing the risk to which markets would be exposed to if there was widespread default in the shadow banking sector (as happened in 2008), a particular problem given the high credit-to-deposit ratio. Shadow banks also tend to have much longer chains of deals linking groups together (often taking bits of risk others don’t want and putting them together in ‘tranches’), meaning that if one link fails, there is a risk of the entire chain collapsing. The Chinese economy is a good casestudy for this risk. Shadow banking has ballooned spectacularly in China, with trusts alone trebling in size over the last six years, contributing perhaps 20% of gross domestic product (GDP). There have been positive effects: over half of China’s credit growth in 2014 came from shadow banks, and many struggling coal and steel industries, who couldn’t get support from state banks, have been able to take loans and stay afloat. But every time the Chinese government tries to evaluate the risks of a financial policy towards one of its major banks, it is required to account for trillions of yen worth of off-the-sheet operations. Moreover, every time there is any risk of a dip in the Chinese economy - credit provider to many internationally - investors, multinationals and central banks have to add the unquantifiable risk of millions of unrecorded loans being defaulted. 31

This uncertainty raises further foreign policy questions. In an interconnected global market, having huge risk drivers which are defined purely on national terms (i.e. outside a given country’s regulations) and are left at arm’s length by the country in question leaves other nations’ economies exposed. With few of the financial products offered by shadow banks conventionally risk-graded, the overall information given to central banks about a national economy’s resilience in a crisis has greater margin for error. Furthermore, the movement of many shadow banking organisations to the internet (at least 2000 in China alone) means that shadow banks may operate in different countries simultaneously, which increases the complexity of risk and can cause conflict of jurisdiction. It would seem, therefore, that cooperative regulation is needed. Currently, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has a mandate to monitor shadow banking developments and coordinate policies mitigating the risks discussed above. The difficulty is that it has no authority or bargaining power with which to achieve these ends, some of which potentially conflict with national interest: it’s hard to believe, given the extent of credit growth described above, China would like help, in the words of the FSB, “Mitigating the spill-over effect between the regular banking system and the shadow banking system.” A leading member of the FSB described its work as like “Painting the Forth Bridge”: thankless and never-ending.

This article proposes that for a set of risks as great and as interconnected as shadow banking, the current amount of cooperation is inadequate: two developments are needed. States need to not only collect and share advice, as the FSB does, but also information. The statistics referenced above show the extent of guesswork taking place even at the highest level of international research, but it does not need to be so: in the majority of markets, the largest shadow banking operations are run as subsidiary vehicles of major investment banks, normally with tacit approval from the state. Even if the government does not wish to regulate these activities, it should at least demand information regarding the extent of their operations; provided such vehicles make up enough of the shadow banking market, and the legal consequences of not abiding are severe enough, then estimates of risk should become far more precise, and policy better informed. Furthermore, it is in the interests of most major economies to do ensure this data is shared on an international level, given that the risks of a global shadow banking collapse weigh heavily on fiscal policy. In the case of those unwilling to collect or share it, this is a matter of sufficient economic importance that it should be placed on the bargaining table at international meetings. The global economy is integrating, and the shadow sector with it. Unless states wish to be exposed to vast risks they cannot quantify, economic information sharing needs to become part of a traditional foreign policy dialogue.

in the 21st century china is core curriculum schwarzmanschol ars .org

33 Masterâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s program at Tsinghua University in Beijing Schwarzman Scholars is a highly selective, one-year that is designed to prepare the next generation of global leaders for the challenges of the future.

THE ARAB LEAGUE: A PROFILE - Oliver Ramsay Gray -

he Arab League, formally titled The League of Arab States, was established in Cairo on March 22nd 1945. It currently consists of 22 member states, and a population of 320 million, with its GDP figure standing at $3.34 trillion (2014). The League was founded on the ideology of pan-Arabism, which aims to draw the Arab people into a nation characterised by a common culture, language and history. The Arab League is bound not only by geographic proximity, but also by the consensus that there is a need to resist external interference, foster economic development and celebrate Arab culture and heritage. It has a number of underlying aims stemming from pan-Arab principles. In general, the League acts as a facilitator to enhance cooperation between different Arab countries, with areas of cooperation including education, finance, security, social affairs and trade promotion. In addition, the League seeks to resist external interference by presenting a united political and military front. As such, it has tried to establish mutual defence agreements, such as the 1950 Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty. The League has also dedicated itself to conflict resolution in order to maintain harmonious relations between member states, but has often struggled to reconcile diverging interests between them.

A REASSESSMENT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE'S POLITICAL & DIPLOMATIC POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST The Arab League’s power remains tightly under the leash of Saudi Arabia & Egypt - Oliver Ramsay Gray -

he Arab League is often portrayed in a negative light. It is widely regarded as an ineffectual organisation, riven with political rivalries and unable to assert authority over its member states. In some ways, this reflects the ongoing tensions between Arab states which, although once desirous for Arab unity, are now reluctant to comply with decisions of supra-national organisations like the League in the wake of stronger nationalist interests and Arab separatism. However, recent research suggests a reassessment of the Arab League is perhaps needed. A report by Marco Pinfari, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the American University of Cairo, concluded that past studies

were too critical of the League. Indeed, the latter has displayed effectiveness in resolving minor conflicts, such as the 1958 Lebanese crisis and 1961-63 IraqKuwait dispute after the UN refused to intervene. Pinfari also notes the League’s contribution to the successful resolution of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and Syria’s 1961 secession from the United Arab Republic. These suggest the organisation’s poor reputation is perhaps undeserved. In recent years, the Arab League has also become more proactive in regional conflicts, sometimes even acting against its own member states. Its call for a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011 was an unprecedented step in welcoming external military involvement in an Arab conflict.

Furthermore, at last year’s summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, it agreed to principle of forming a collective rapid deployment force, potentially enabling it to gain significant military power within the region. Nonetheless, there remain reasons to be cautious on the Arab League’s future. Structural limitations still constrain its ability to act effectively: decision making powers are still held by individual member states, leaving the League with little agency of its own. Furthermore, the need for unanimity in League Council decisions means the League is often locked in impasse. Its most powerful members, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, also manipulate the organisation for their own national interests instead of forging a united front of Arab states. Thus, these structural weaknesses are likely to continue hindering the League’s diplomatic and political power. And there is another aspect to consider: Saudi Arabia’s expanding role within the region. In the ongoing Yemeni civil war, Saudi Arabia has displayed its remarkable military capacity, ready to exert force when necessary. It has successfully sustained a protracted air campaign, established a layered defence along its southern borders, absorbed a high number of casualties and launched numerous operational expeditions into Yemen – all conducted with limited Western military support. It seems clear that Saudi Arabia is prepared to play a more proactive regional role given the perceived withdrawal of US protection and growing challenges from adversaries, such as Iran.

Hence, even if the League were to develop a military force based on the Sharm elSheikh agreement, it would remain tightly linked to Saudi and Egyptian ambitions. Indeed, these two countries would constitute most of the strength of this force: Saudi Arabian military spending is at least four times as great as that of any other member state, while Egyptian armed forces are pre-eminent due to their overwhelming size and expertise. In this context, the Arab League provides a useful political cover for Saudi and Egyptiandriven military campaigns to avoid criticisms of unilateral military actions. This would bear similarities to the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1976, disguised as the “Arab Deterrent Force”. Thus, if eventually formed, the strike force, rather than being a meaningful expansion of the League’s internal power, would represent an additional means for Saudi Arabia to influence the region. Pinfari’s report does prompt a need to reconsider the Arab League’s historical records and contemporary power. However, without substantial structural reform enabling the League Council to gain greater independence, the League’s military and political role will remain driven by individual state interests. While the its power may expand in coming years under Saudi and Egyptian influence, this would only be a nominal expansion in which the League would act more frequently on the demands of its leading members, instead of being the region’s leading supra-national organisation that its founders once conceived.

TWENTY-EIGHT EUROPEAN STATES OR ONE EUROPEAN UNION?

The role of the EU as a diplomatic actor The evolution of the EU has resulted in a more active role in the global diplomatic context for the multinational player

- Pietro Gagliardi -

n recent years, a vast array of events - from the waves of refugee immigration to the unresolved Ukrainian crisis - has destabilized the European neighbourhood calling for an assessment of the role of the European Union. The question is whether it has been a diplomatic actor itself, or merely

a forum of cooperation between twentyeight states, each pursuing their own independent foreign policies. If the EU is indeed a diplomatic actor, how has it become such and in which contexts has it proven to be valuable? What form does this role take? What are its main constraints?

The idea of a coordinated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in Europe was first formally expressed with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. The latter established the CFSP as one of the three pillars of the newly founded EU, together with the European Community, and Police and Judicial Cooperation. However, this was far from autonomous conduction of CFSP by the EU as unitary actor, as the CFSP was formulated in intergovernmentalist

terms: the states signing the treaty simply agreed to coordinate some aspects of their independent foreign policies. At this point, the EU was solely regarded as a forum for cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 fundamentally changed the status quo through the establishment of the role of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). The HR chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, represents the EU in the international sphere, and heads the European Union External Action Service (EEAS). The

latter, also created by the Lisbon Treaty, is the Union’s diplomatic service, supporting the HR in carrying out the CFSP. The creation of the HR and the EEAS was not only the realization of the founding principle of an “ever closer Union”, but also an attempt to tackle the issues encountered in carrying out CFSP thus far: namely that, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, there was no continuity in the EU’s foreign policy and little coordination of national foreign policies. The years following the creation of these two new institutions - the HR and the EEAS - were marked by indifference, pessimism, and even scepticism. Political élites and the press were highly sceptical of the first High Representative - the little-known Baroness Catherine Ashton - given her lack of diplomatic experience and expertise. Furthermore, because these institutions arose with no previous foundations, the first years were mainly devoted to their complex set-up, rather than to solving external matters. This kept the HR low in profile and noticeably absent in the international sphere during major crises, such as during the 2011 “Arab Spring” when Baroness Ashton, and the EU as a diplomatic agent, responded particularly slowly and weakly. Most significantly, the HR and the EEAS had twenty-eight different masters, mostly reluctant to forego their own national foreign policies. 2013 saw a turning point with respect to the role of the EU as a diplomatic actor. Following 10 rounds of negotiations led by Baroness Ashton, the governments of Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement to normalise their relations in April 2013. In November of the same year, the Joint

Plan of Action - an interim agreement to freeze Iran’s nuclear programme - was signed between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany. Baroness Ashton was central to negotiations, acting as the representative of the major powers in talks with Iran and being the only actor the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, wanted negotiate with. The EU’s role as a diplomatic agent thus began to be recognized. Today, even in the United Nations, not only does the Union enjoy an observer status, but it also has special rights of participation, allowing its representatives to present EU-agreed common positions, make interventions, present proposals and circulate communications as official documents in the General Assembly. How did such a fundamental transformation of the EU occur at such a rapid pace? Firstly, the EU’s capacity to carry out the CFSP has increased, proving that the initial focus on carefully building the EEAS was worthwhile, with the latter providing fundamental expertise and structural support to the HR. Secondly, the HR has increasingly succeeded in claiming independent authority from member states. Finally, the EU’s role in solving important international crises has established it as a valuable diplomatic actor in the eyes of both EU member states and major external powers. It would thus seem that the Union has achieved great independence from its member states with respect to foreign policy, even though it has yet to fully achieve autonomy. As a diplomatic actor, its key aims - as outlined in its CFSP - are 39

stability, the promotion of human rights and democracy, the spread of prosperity, and support for the rule of law and good governance. Initially, the EU’s approach to international affairs was a minimal one, carrying out negotiations between rival parties and using moral suasion, with the HR enjoying the privileged role of mediator. However, the Union’s has become more active in recent years, undertaking a leading role in climate change negotiations and enabling the High Representative to increasingly participate in the formulation and management of foreign policy. The EU has also taken a harder stance in dealing with crises. Since 2010, there has been a notable increase in the size and number of sanctions in order to force parties to the negotiating table, as with negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme in which the Union played a crucial role in shaping and implementing the final agreement between parties, the

latter being widely regarded as a successful one. While the EU has clearly gained a semiindependent role in the international context, it still faces several constraints. Indeed, the HR is also one of the VicePresidents of the European Commission, overloading this role with tasks that lie outside foreign affairs policy. Moreover, the EU does not have a unique set of military forces, limiting its potential to act in a similar fashion to traditional actors of the international system. Above all, a very large majority of its member states’ governments strongly oppose the idea of any further integration in terms of foreign and security policies. It nevertheless still appears fitting to be cautiously optimistic about the status of the EU as a unitary actor, rather than the Union just existing a forum for twenty-eight states to coordinate and cooperate.

A SYMPOSIUM ON THE REFUGEE CRISIS

People run away from war. Sometimes we get away. Sometimes we don’t. Sometimes we’re helped. Sometimes we aren’t. ‘People Run’, Michael Rosen

he migrant crisis has reached unprecedented levels: there are more displaced people and refugees now than at any other time in recorded history, with estimates of approximately 60 million people having been forced from their homes. They are the human embodiment of failed states, intractable conflicts, and international devastation. Their plight requires a global response, from both states and non-state actors alike. The following symposium, though only a brief insight into a multifaceted issue, discusses some of the action that has been taken thus far. It highlights the inadequacies of certain Western governmental responses, and the challenges that remain. It should serve to remind us all that the crisis continues to rage, and that the human cost is only increasing.

No one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark  you only run for the border  when you see the whole city running as well ‘Home’, Warsan Shire

TURKEY, SYRIA AND THE EU - Charles Reuben Brook -

urkey’s border with Syria has put the country in a unique position as a crucial gateway for Syrians fleeing the conflict, many of whom see it as a gateway to Europe. The EU estimates that Turkey is currently hosting over 2.5 million registered refugees (although the number including unregistered and undocumented asylum seekers has the potential to be far higher), and has spent over €7 billion since the beginning of the crisis. Indeed, according to the Migration Policy Institute, Turkey now hosts the world’s largest community of Syrians displaced by the ongoing conflict. For some, Turkey is merely the transit point into Europe; for many others, home has become the refugee camps on the SyrianTurkish border, or cities and towns across Turkey. During the initial years of Syria’s civil war, Turkey adopted an open-door policy to refugees fleeing the conflict. However, since February this year, Turkey’s border has been resolutely shut: Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş declared that Turkey has reached its “capacity”, and could not “absorb” any more refugees. In a report for the Migration Policy

Institute, Ahmet İçduygu, Director of the Migration Research Centre at Koç University in Istanbul, noted that Turkey’s preliminary refugee policies were based on the assumption that the conflict would come to a swift conclusion. The perhaps unforeseen length of the conflict has highlighted the need for a shift in policy in order to provide long-term solutions. At first, the vast majority of Syrian refugees, who were referred to by Turkey as their “guests”, were housed in camps on the border. The conditions within these camps have been described by a number of international organisations, including the UNHCR, as “significantly more comfortable, standardized and controlled than those in other neighbouring countries.” However, by late 2015, statistics from the European Commission suggest that 90% of the refugees were not housed in such camps, but were instead living in urban and rural areas across Turkey. Life for Syrians living outside the camps is reportedly much more difficult, with issues concerning housing, education and finding employment becoming fundamental matters for concern. 45

Brussels has been forced to take action due to the sheer number of people seeking refuge in Turkey; however, perhaps more significant for European policy is the subsequent journey, made by a large number of refugees, into EU member states. The EU is still attempting to deal with the number of refugees traversing the borders of the Schengen area, often to reach Germany or Sweden. It is struggling to contain the further movement of people (and the high level of ensuing fatalities) making the dangerous journey across the Aegean from Turkey to Greece. Turkey has become the key gateway not only to safety but also into Europe, and the socalled “fortress” is keen to close this door. An EU action plan was launched in late 2015, the aims of which were described by Jean-Claude Junker, President of the European Commission, as keeping two million Syrian refugees in Turkey and preventing them from travelling on into the EU. The deal offered Turkey up to €3 billion to assist with settled and newly arriving refugees, as well as the potential for visa free travel within the Schengen area for Turkish citizens. The EU further offered the possibility of reopening Turkey’s frozen membership negotiations, which began in 1987. The Turkish response to the deal has been frosty, with President Erdoğan criticising EU policy regarding the refugee crisis. The proposal does indeed seem to work in the best interests of Europe: while the money may assist in relieving Turkey of some of the financial pressures brought by the influx of refugees, the EU’s closed-door policy will push Turkey to take a greater, and less

supported, role in handling a refugee crisis of staggering proportions. The ostensible purpose of the deal is to help the Syrian refugees in Turkey; however, it appears to serve as a means to prevent large numbers of refugees from crossing the border to reach EU member states. The Turkish government has already stated their belief that Turkey does not have the capacity to house any more refugees. Currently, the border with Syria remains closed and only last week President Erdoğan reportedly reminded Europe that Turkey can at anytime “open the doors and say goodbye to the migrants.” It is clear that Europe must take greater responsibility regarding the crisis on its doorstep. Whilst certain EU member states have received large numbers of refugees, those outside the Union, such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, are host to by far the greatest numbers. A longterm solution needs to be negotiated, in which the international community fairly and responsibly agrees to take their part in receiving and protecting those fleeing from war, hunger and fear in Syria.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE UK GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE MIGRANT CRISIS - Lucinda Chamberlain -

he response of the UK Government to the growing migrant crisis has been at best woefully inadequate, and at worst an abhorrent display of xenophobia and discrimination. We seem unwilling to accept our role as a central actor in the international community, and even less willing to admit wrong-doing in previous foreign policy designs that have contributed to the instability of the Middle East. Under international law states have a duty to provide protection to refugees; however, many countries in the European Union (EU), including Britain, have made it impossible for people to access these rights by limiting their means of travel. While it is pleasing to hear that Britain will be accepting an additional 20,000 refugees, more needs to be done, both in terms of opening our borders to those in need, and providing additional resources to the growing numbers of refugee camps around Europe. It is unacceptable that

Britain has agreed to take only 4,000 Syrian refugees every year over the next five years, given that this is the number of refugees arriving on the Greek island of Lesbos every day. As Oxfam, the International Rescue Committee and Amnesty International stated in a letter to David Cameron, Cameron’s acceptance of additional refugees is a “welcome first step”, although we have failed to take sufficient responsibility in dealing with the crisis on Europe’s doorstep: our treatment of refugees has been “too slow, too low and too narrow”. Equally appalling is the shocking portrayal of refugees by both the Government and the media, such as Sir Bill Cash’s condemnation of refugees as a “tsunami” that could “swamp Britain”, or Theresa May, Conservative Home Secretary, saying that mass immigration is damaging British society. Too often are the terms “asylum seekers” and “illegal 47

immigrants” used interchangeably, as an attempt to homogenise refugees and other migrants as a negative and demonised category of people. It should not have taken dead bodies washing up on the shores of Europe for us to realise the atrocities occurring in this humanitarian crisis. These expectations of the Government are not unreasonable or unattainable. We, as a nation, have the resources and ability to meet our responsibility and do more: it is estimated that we could take 25,000 refugees every year. In the same letter to David Cameron, twenty-seven charities, including Oxfam and Amnesty International, wrote that “the UK can and should be doing much more to ensure that refugees are not compelled to take life-threatening journeys or forced into smugglers’ hands”. It is easy to look at the refugee camps and judge their inhabitants based on the impact they are having on our communities, whilst forgetting the repugnant circumstances these people are fleeing from¸ often with only the clothes on their back. The government must continue its efforts to take a fair and proportionate share of the refugees, whilst providing safe and legal routes to the UK to prevent further exploitation of these vulnerable people. In the words of the Refugee Council chief executive Maurice Wren, “There are no easy answers to a humanitarian crisis of this magnitude. However, the solution must not be to spend another year impassively watching on while desperate people drown or are forced to endure a march of misery across the continent as they try to find a safe haven or to be reunited with their loved ones.” 48

FEAR MONGERING AND THE RESPONSES TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS AMONG REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES - Paige Fernandez -

n September 2015, Barack Obama announced his decision to allow 10,000 Syrian refugees to resettle in the United States. This decision echoed throughout the U.S. presidential campaign and was the source of heated debates, many within the Republican Party. Donald Trump was quick to criticize Obama’s decision, while other candidates, such as Jeb Bush, offered tentative support, though claiming that the U.S. should focus on helping more Syrian Christian refugees. However, following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November, the climate of the Republican party quickly changed. Almost every Republican candidate has since made highly objectionable statements and espoused virulent antirefugee rhetoric. The pernicious nature of such language has had a significant impact on the political climate of both the U.S. and Europe. Donald Trump, unsurprisingly, took the lead in fear-mongering: he has taken

the most strident positions, and made some of the most heinous comments. In November, Trump told a New Hampshire rally: “I hear we want to we want to take in 200,000 Syrians. And they could be listen, they could be [members of the so-called Islamic State, also known as] Isis.” He further described the refugees as a “200,000 man army,” later adding, “[those who] are coming here from Syria as a part of this mass migration…if I win, if I win, they’re going back.” The three other top Republican candidates (Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Ben Carson) soon followed suit making similar xenophobic comments that played off of American fears. Ted Cruz has stated that allowing Syrian refugees into the U.S. would be “nothing short of crazy,” further warning that terrorists associated with Isis could be among those entering the country. Carson has made similar statements, claiming “if I were one of the leaders of the global jihadist movement and I didn’t infiltrate that group of people [referring to the 49

refugees] with my people, that would be almost malpractice.” Perhaps the least offensive statement came from Marco Rubio who claimed that the United States “won’t be able to take more refugees… it’s not that we don’t want to, it’s that we can’t.” These Republican frontrunners have attempted, and in many cases succeeded, to persuade voters who are vulnerable and shaken by the events abroad that the greatest threat is actually within the U.S. These candidates have turned the devastating civil war in Syria and the tragic events abroad into an extension of many of their extreme immigration policies. They have exploited the hardships of the Syrian refugees to garner support from the American public, many of whom remain unsettled by terrorist attacks abroad and at home. The leading Republican candidates for the presidential nomination have all made wild claims playing off of the fears of many Americans. They have systematically failed to mention that the U.S. has one of the most rigorous vetting processes for refugees, which often takes nine to twelve months to before resettlement in the U.S can begin, and instead have focused on making irrational and unfounded claims. It is quite frankly preposterous, not to mention terrifying, that these four candidates, all serious contenders for the presidency of the United States, would bar war refugees from entering the U.S. based on their religion and ethnicity. Furthermore, the claims that a terrorist might slip through the net and enter the U.S. is an emotional and ill-conceived overreaction. 50

This hateful rhetoric does not only pose potential threats to the resettlement project initiated by Obama, but also threatens to implicate global initiatives regarding refugees. If other politicians succumb to the polarizing language and fear-mongering that has been accepted in to mainstream U.S. politics, the dangers posed to refugees can only rise: they will be left to fend for themselves in an extremely hostile political climate, both at home and overseas. It must also be noted that such rhetoric fuels terrorist recruitment tactics. Creating a culture of Islamophobia and intolerance can easily be exploited by terrorist movements, such as Isis, and feeds in to the portrayal of a clash of civilizations. The danger of the Republican presidential candidates’ rhetoric, therefore, is multifaceted: while it has the potential to have devastating effects on policy decisions, the real threat lies in the effects that it will have on the lives of vulnerable refugees across the world.

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