SI R, International Relations Society
Editorial
Welcome to the newest addition to the International Relations Society brand: Sir, a journal. The name is odd. But made you curious enough to open up the magazine. Plus it has IR in the name, which is a nice nod to the guys that fund us. Sir, is also the standard opening line of letters written to the Economist, a slightly more well known publication. You can consider these articles personal letters written to you by friends, friends who are very concerned about improving your international affairs awareness. It might take awhile for you to trust us with providing you with your current affairs knowledge. To build trust I’ll let you on to a little secret: this journal almost did not happen. Haydon Croker, the current President of IRSoc, originally wanted to do away with the publication. He originally thought it was nothing but a money drain. However, being a reasonable man, and even more so after a good drink, Haydon let me persuade him to keep the publication—provided that I do all the work. I did not do all of the work, not my nature really. My deputy editor, Claire, and the copy-editors have worked very hard to bringy you this journal and I cannot thank them enough for their help--and patience.
Here is what you can expect from Sir,. We are different from other International Relations journals—we’re prettier. We are also interesting. There is a lot to write about within the field of International Relations, and a lot of it has already been written about over and over again. Our goal is to bring you a collection of stimulating articles within the field of International Relations. We want to reward original ideas and unique topics. This edition includes a first-hand account of a student’s visit to North Korea, and interview with a Brahin Moraccan, and an in-depth look at Russia’s invovlement with APEC. We hope you learn something. MASHA
President's Address Dear Sir, It's been a busy and exciting term for IRsoc. We had a fantastic start to our speaker events, with Annie Machon pulling in a crowd that was too large for the Christchurch lecture theatre. Perhaps the most daunting part of the term was the U.S. Embassy-organised event on U.S. foreign policy. Due to my lack of direct contact with the speakers I was unsure of the format the debate would take. Five minutes before the event was due to start it became apparent that I was expected to moderate and lead the discussion. I quickly thought up some questions and spent the next hour «umm»-ing and «ahh»-ing about when it was polite to intervene and move the discussion on. I'll let those who came be the judge of whether I pulled it off! Of course none of the events this term would have been possible without a great committee. I cannot thank them all individually here, but I think it has been a great effort from everyone and I hope you have all enjoyed it! Perhaps the biggest innovation of this term is this, the Sir, journal. To be honest, due to the cost of the journal in previous terms I was considering scrapping the project. But Masha convinced me to give it one last go, and I am very glad she did. I think you will agree that Masha, Claire and the other copy-editors have done a fantastic job and set the journal up to become success for many future terms. Best wishes, Haydon
Team Editor Masha Gindler Deputy Editor Claire Dumbil Copy Editors Helen Reid, Iona Richards, James Horton Cover Photo Peter M. Hrtanek
Debriefing Chronicle: Caucasus confilct Page 15
Israeli airstrikes on Iran Page 13
Bulletin: The Faulkland Dispute Page 5
Nigeria: Boko Haram Page 10
The Great Persian Firewall Page 7
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Bulletin: The Falklands Dispute
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he thirtieth anniversary of the war government is much the same as it was in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) was thirty years ago. marked by renewed regional and global The diplomatic route to Argentensions surrounding the proper owner- ship of the islands, which have been Brit- tine annexation does not seem much easier; although 61% of Arish-administered since gentine citizens support 1833. In particular, the Argentina Argentine government The first country to adopt finger- their country’s claim, the of Cristina Kirchner printing as a method of identifica- forthcoming referendum in the Falklands themtion. took the opportunity to selves expected to show remind the world of its that more than 95% of Capital continuing unhappiness the islanders are in favour Buenos Aires with the status quo in Official Language of continued union with the islands, thirty years Spanish Britain. Consequently, after those same feelings Most Popular Religion forcing Britain to negotiprompted Argentina to Roman Catholic (97%) ate – when it has nothing invade and briefly annex Military Expenditure to gain but everything to them before they were 0.8% of GDP (50th lowest in the lose – is likely to prove recaptured by British world) impossible. This is despite special forces. With a Airports UN Assembly resolution number of other island 1,149 (UK - 462) 37/9, which called on the disputes also in the UK to negotiate a settlenews, it is worth taking ment with Argentina. a moment to reflect on what Argentina seeks to gain from its present agitation. The islands themselves are an unlikely target. Certainly, a renewed military struggle looks wholly improbable: the islands’ defences are far better now than they were in 1982, while the range of offensive options available to the Argentine
Kirchner is aware of these limitations, if one is to believe the frequent purported leaks from her office. By contrast, the indications are that Kirchner enjoys agitating over the Falklands precisely because she knows it will bcecome a simple case of being cold-shouldered by
Sir, MT12 “colonialist� Britain, with each rejection boosting poll ratings and relations with other South American countries, at least temporarily. These seem like far more important ends for the Kirchner government, which is struggling with slowing economic growth and widespread allegations of corruption. The rhetoric not only distracts from these issues, but it also increases support for the administration among the many Argentines who feel that their country should stand up to Europe more regularly – an issue characterised by the recent forced nationalisation of oil giant YPF from its Iberian owners, much to the anger of the Spanish government. If Argentina is to continue its hard-line approach on such issues, it
will need local allies, and there too the Falklands issue seems to be helping. By highlighting its common ground with other former colonies in South America, Argentina has bolstered a new array of political alliances, winning the support of countries as diverse as Chile, Brazil and Venezuela over the question of the Falklands. Consequently, the Kirchner government, however long it may last, will undoubtedly continue to agitate over the Falklands on both the regional and international levels. Britain would do well to avoid trivialising these feelings, however artificial they appear to an outsider. If it does not, it risks badly damaging its relations with the rest of the Americas; and if there is one lesson from the Falklands it is that when time heals, it does so only slowly.
Harry Burt
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The Great Persian Firewall T
wo of the ‘w’s in the ‘World Wide Web’ might be concerned with the globalism of the internet, but recent events in Iran are a blunt reminder that state control of electrons is as stringent as through the physical ‘iron curtains’ and closed borders of the past. Our lives are caught in this enveloping web of threads that seem impossible to cut. But on 23 September, Iran turned off Google.
Internet censorship is a strange beast where deliberately vague terms like ‘offensive material’ can mean a jail sentence. Some are happy for the internet to surge away – Estonia is rated as having the most internet freedom – but virtual walls have gone up particularly across Asia and South America. Cuba keeps its populace in the dark by relying on the fact that though the average salary is $16 a month, computers routinely costs $722. There are different sore
points: in Thailand 77% of blocked content is unflattering material about the King whereas in Pakistan, sites like Flickr or Facebook are usually banned for religious reasons. The United States of America’s federal agencies play electronic cat and mouse with repressive governments, deploying free shielding software or moving dissenting web pages to temporary addresses where they can hide and stay live for a few more days. This plays into America’s self-crafted image as the shining knight of freedoms. On the other hand, the Wikileaks scandal saw the U.S. Air Force ban the websites of prominent media publications like The Guardian or NY Times; and Obama’s ban on federal employees reading the documents was like using chewing gum to fill holes in a dam. Iran’s recent blockade has been tied to Google’s failure to delete an online video mocking the prophet Muhammad. Official statements said their actions were ‘due to the repeated demands of the people,’ but the proposition that this ban was for the benefit of the general populace is to be viewed with scepticism. The last major slate of banned internet content was composed of sites used to rally mass anti-government protests after the disputed re-election of President Ahmadinejad in
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2009, like Facebook and YouTube. Tehran turned bandwidth into a dribble, making it almost impossible for the average citizen to even share a video, and last year they announced the creation of a ‘cyber police’ force, which banned any content deemed ‘insulting’. In January 2012 the cyber-police arrested two men and two women for constructing a Facebook page where viewers could vote on the attractiveness of people’s photos. 17 million Iranians still manage to have Facebook accounts and countless newsfeeds have seen comments in protest over this most recent censorship. Access to more than 5 million websites is filtered in Iran, including those of western media organisations like the BBC, CNN and the Guardian. Many Iranians access blocked addresses with help from proxy servers or VPN services which fool the regulators into thinking the computer is
in another country, and have spent a total of $4.5 million on proxy services to reach blocked sites during September 2012. The recent ‘anti-Muslim’ video was the boiling point after a year of heated exchanges between the state and the giant search engine, during which the Iranian chief of police derided Google as a tool of western espionage. Google Maps found itself in more hot water when they failed to name the expanse of water that Iran calls the Persian Gulf. The Iranian Foreign Minister threatened legal action; unsurprising, as in 2012 airlines using the term Arabian Gulf on in-flight monitors were barred from Iranian airspace. Officials are now saying that the Google block was a just an unintended consequence of an attempt to reinforce the block on YouTube, despite such a history of animosity and a public announcement to Iranians that Gmail would be blocked.
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Currently, Google is once again accessible in Iran, but this u-turn aside, the incident suggests that government’s plans to wall off a corner of cyberspace for a ‘national Internet’ might be gaining momentum. Iran announced in 2011 that it was developing a domestic alternative to Google, dubbed ‘Yahaq’, or ‘Oh Lord’ in Farsi. This would push Iranians towards more closely monitored channels into the Web, where dissent can be more easily tracked. With presidential elections coming up this year, it is unsurprising that the screws are being tightened. An Iranian IT expert with close knowledge of this project told the Guardian that ‘Iran has fears of an outside cyberattack like that of Stuxnet’, a computer worm which hit specific nuclear facilities in 2010 and was described as a ‘marksman job’. The knee-jerk response seems much broader: the plan to build an internal internet, isolated from the outside world and spun as a moral effort to build ‘a genuinely halal (lawful) network’. The government claimed that 60% of all Iranian internet users were already using the system and that it intended the rest
to join within the next two years. The first year is nearly up. The official Islamic Republic News Agency has said ‘the Internet must not be given the authority to challenge national and ethical principles’, but others have tamped down fears, suggesting that cutting Iran off would be impossible. The obvious difficulties that Iran would face might, however, be sidelined by the temptation to bolster its image as the Muslim world’s scientific pioneer that sends satellites into orbit, faces down the West over its nuclear program and has claimed advances in cloning and stem-cell research. Google CEO Eric Schmidt once said that the decision to engage with China was based on the idea that once the Chinese experienced a taste of Google, the government would never be able to take it away. The world will watch to see whether this infamous failure will repeat itself in countries like Iran, and whether the World Wide Web is a misleading name.
Elizabeth Culliford
Nigeria:
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Boko Haram
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ince 2009, Boko Haram, a militant group demanding the implementation of extreme sharia law in Nigeria, have become ever more violent and capable of destruction against a Nigerian government they see as lacking legitimacy and promoting Western ideas and lifestyle. More than 1,000 people have been killed this year as a result of their actions, and as the government and military struggle to effectively respond, the international community looks on, fearful of just what Boko Haram could evolve into as their struggle for supremacy continues in one of the most powerful nations in Western Africa. In a US-congressional report in November 2011, it was warned that Boko Haram was an “emerging threat” to the U.S. and its interests. But this group was not always the international threat that the U.S. now perceive. In 2002, Boko Haram was born as men in Nigeria’s northern state of Borno began listening to the sermons of Muhammad Yusuf, an eccentric and conservative but non-violent imam who, amongst other things, demanded strict adherence to the
Koran, rejected the theory of evolution and taught that the earth is flat. As the sermons grew in popularity, government response resulted in the death of hundreds of both Boko Haram members and innocent bystanders. The expected destruction of a perceived threat to the government’s omnipotence transformed instead into a Boko Haram that was quickly radicalising . By 2009, the presence of security forces had increased. Their actions had killed hundreds with many more held without trial. Muhammad Yusuf was captured by government forces and later killed. Yet the government’s violent tactics were failing to have the desired effect. Yusuf became a martyr in the transformation of Boko Haram into an effective insurgency of Islamic extremist militants headed by a younger, more extreme leader, Abubakar Shekau. Returning from exile in neighbouring countries came men with links to the growing extremist sects in Mali and Niger, and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). Their methods and capabilities developed from shootings from the back of motorbikes to suicide attacks and the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja, killing 23 people in August 2011.
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Sir, MT12 By 2010, Boko Haram had evolved into a serious force to be reckoned with, and eight years of state sponsored military action had only exacerbated the situation. At local and central level, government response reached two ends of a spectrum of inefficacy. At state level the governor remains intentionally ignorant of the devastating effects of the chaos that surrounds him. Whilst at a central level, men like Major-General Sarkin-Yaki believe that Boko Haram can and must be crushed militarily. These methods only vindicate the words of Brazilian guerrilla leader, Carlos Marighela, “It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things.” In the decade since Boko Haram was first confronted, the bloodiest hands remain those of Nigerian security forces. According to the NGO Open Society Foundation, the Nigerian police kill 2500 people a year. After Boko Haram attacks, most males in the surrounding area are rounded up by security forces, many of them killed. The alienation of the population of northern Nigeria is increased further by actions such as the imprisonment of suspected Boko Haram members’ families and the humiliation of citizens at military checkpoints who are deemed to be rude. In a choice between an abusive government and seemingly effective extremist group many people are choosing the latter.
History has taught us that insurgencies are notoriously difficult to defeat. From the British involvement in Malaya through to Northern Ireland and more recently Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear that the hardest thing for both governments and modern security forces to do is adapt effectively from symmetrical to asymmetrical warfare. In recent years, President Goodluck Jonathan’s advisory body has been dominated by military men. However, with the arrival of a new national security advisor, Sanvi Dasuki, comes the suggestion of constructive talks with Boko Haram leaders; the missing piece of the puzzle in Nigeria’s fight against this dangerous organisation. There is recognition by many that Boko Haram is not simply one homogenous group of extremists with agreed set aims. Abubakar Shekau may largely dictate the group’s actions with regular meetings of a 32 man shura council, but the varying groups that constitute many of those affiliated to Boko Haram (those sick of corruption, those scared of the military, opportunistic criminals etc.) paint a picture of a group as a whole that is more a disgruntled social conglomerate than effective insurgency. That is not to say that the extremist sect of Boko Haram is a negligible threat, but that much of its base support lies in a potentially moderate group who through non-violent political means could be removed from Boko Haram influence.The responsibility for this action however lies with the government and its security forces. Many of those who
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have turned to Boko Haram through a combination of frustration and desperation will not be prepared to forgo their allegiance unless the government reforms and the detrimental and arbitrary response of security forces ceases. If the necessary process to effect these changes at least begins there is likely to be a decrease in support for Boko Haram as the negative actions of the government, which have blinded an impoverished population to the horrors of Boko Haram’s actions, are removed. In tandem with this vital change must come an increased precision in military response. Although Nigeria has one of Africa’s better armies it does not have the necessary training or experience to fight an insurgency. In some of the most conflict heavy areas police have been retrained and intelligence and army units have finally been brought
under a unified command. However, the necessary skills Nigerian forces capable of tackling this growing threat have not yet fully developed and it may well be that Western military advisers are required, if not already present, if the U.S. seriously recognises Boko Haram as a danger to its interests. When this capability is realised, security forces should hopefully be able to move away from current arbitrary actions and build up a useful intelligence picture to eliminate the leadership and subsequently lower the threat the group poses. In many eyes, and rightly so, this plan seems far more simple in theory than reality. However, in spite of its difficulty it is the most plausible and effective strategy the Nigerian government could implement as its northern crisis continues to intensify and becomes very much a national one.
Samuel Rodrigues
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Israeli Airstrikes On Iran What is in Israel’s Best Interests?
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ountries in the United Nations, for the sake of order and equality, are ordered in English alphabetical order – A to Z. Separating the delegates of Israel and Iran however, is a conveniently placed Irish diplomat – one can only imagine the tenseness of his position. Iran and Israel are also separated geographically by thousands of kilometers – Tehran and Tel Aviv are hardly neighbours in the more traditional sense. So what makes these nations tick, and why are they positioning themselves in a war of choice and not necessity? Well, for starters, it doesn’t help that Iran uses language of elimination consistently in the same breath as ‘Israel’, (‘the Zionist regime’ is another popular turn of phrase). The precipitation of confrontation has, therefore, been a long time coming. Every day the two countries seem to inch ever closer to war, with Iran’s
highest military general describing military action as “inevitable” and Netanyahu demanding for a “red line” to be drawn – even going so far as to produce a diagram to make his point to the General Assembly this September. But with the certainty of some kind of military action increasing, the actual chance of ending the Iranian nuclear programme is diminishing. The rhetoric of conflict has become the main medium of dialogue between these two diametric states. Regardless of whether Israel is justified in launching a preemptive strike, the question has to be asked: will it do anything? While such a strike would perhaps hinder nuclear proliferation, it would at the same time further convince Iran of the need for a deterrent. The entire purpose of disabling the nuclear programme becomes obsolete if the airstrikes are only going to strengthen Tehran’s resolve to develop the bomb. So what is Israel thinking? Sen-
n ior military strategists have been debating and planning for months now, with a variety of leaks revealing both strategies and hypothetical casualty counts from the heart of government. The answer, it seems, lies not with the attitudes in Jerusalem but of those in Washington. Any Israeli strike on Iran would be redundant without unilateral American support. Israel certainly has the military might to take a chunk out of the nuclear project, but not enough to deliver the fatal blow. For this, the United States would be needed to back up military threats and commit to action to dissuade Tehran’s obsession. But it’s clear to see that there is barely any appetite across the Atlantic to begin to talk about any kind of military action – especially in an election year. The Obama administration, for now, is committed to sanctions and tough talk, but reticent to set down a ‘red line’, as Netanyahu has asked for time after time. Even if this administration were as gun-ho as many in the Israeli government would like, the actual chances of succeeding in permanently disabling Iran’s nuclear programme looks slim. While Israel has indeed launched similar attacks in the past, against Syria and Iraq, this time the logistics are much more complicated.
For instance, Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s al-Kibar complex in 2007 were both single-strike missions within relatively easy range of Israel. Attacks on Iran, on the other hand, would require circumnavigation over a variety of hostile countries (one of the likely routes is Saudi Arabia) and even then there are over a dozen supposedly well-defended sites involved in nuclear proliferation. Netanyahu and his government know that strikes now would only elicit a half-hearted response. So they wait, and hope the exigencies of an increasingly belligerent Iran will provoke the West into another Middle Eastern conflict without thinking about the consequences. Certainly Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, and Israel does indeed have the right to defend itself. But if war comes at an even greater cost than the value of the assigned objective, then it must be questioned whether conflict is indeed in Israel’s interests, and if another less confrontational solution can be found.
Tyrone Steele
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Chronicle: Caucasus conflict
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t the southern end of the Caucuses, about two hundred kilometres west of the Caspian Sea, endless mountains carpeted in dense, dark-green forest spread out in every direction. According to myth, hidden somewhere in these highlands is mount Ararat, where Noah set down his ark and received god’s promise to never again lay waste to the world. To someone unaware of
“ Karabakh is an enclave in modern-day Azerbaijan, once part of the ancient Kingdom of Armenia � its history, this broad and quiet landscape might appear a fitting setting for this covenant of peace. However, over the centuries it has been trampled underfoot by everyone from the Romans to the Soviets. Today it is subject to an on-going and often violent ownership dispute. This region is called Nagorno-Karabakh. Karabakh is an enclave in modern-day Azerbaijan, although its population is predominantly
Armenian and Orthodox Christian (Azeris by contrast are almost exclusively Muslim), and it was once part of the ancient Kingdom of Armenia. However, since the end of an ethnically driven war from May 1988 to February 1994, the Nagorno-Karabakh region has been under effective Armenian control. And it remains a flashpoint for violence. In September the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulting from the disagreements over this territory came to the attention of the international media. RamilSafarov, an Azeri lieutenant who had decapitated an Armenian citizen whilst he slept at a peace training course in Hungary in 2004 was pardoned, promoted, and treated like a national hero upon his return to Azerbaijan. The conflict is mired in ancient history. Having both been subject to intermittent imperial hegemony for the better part of two millennia, the borders between the Azeri and Armenian lands grew to be very complex.
Sir, MT12 Since antiquity, many Armenians have lived in small enclaves within present-day Azerbaijan and Azeris within present day Armenia. The Azeri-dominated region of Nakhchivan lies in south-west of Armenia, bordering Iran and totally separated from Azerbaijan by the Syunik province. The chaos of the Russian revolution in 1905 saw outbreaks of ethnic violence in these areas. And then, when the Bolsheviks overthrew Russia’s provisional government in the October revolution, both Armenia and Azerbaijan were briefly freed from rule by the Russian empire. It did not take long for the shortlived republics that emerged to start fighting over these areas. The Armenians, with the tacit support of the Bolsheviks, began to massacre Azeri Muslims in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku. Turkish intervention to defend the Azeri Muslims quickly followed. This solidified the Azerbaijani position, allowing them to capture Nagorno-Karabakh, although the N-K leadershipdid not recognise the Azeri rule. By 1920 tensions had risen again, with a revolt in Karabakh leading to the outbreak of war. This time it was the Azerbaijanis’ turn to partake in senseless slaughter.Vast swathes of men,
women and children were killed and their homes burnt as Azerbaijan proceeded to obliterate the rebel town of Shusha. However, a powerful Armenian offensive pushed back the Azeris and won Karabakh for the Armenians.
“ This time it was the Azerbaijanis’ turn to partake in senseless slaughter “ Then in in mid-1920, before homes could be rebuilt and tensions relieved, the Bolsheviks quickly seized control of both states and removed NagornoKarabakh from Armenian authority. Nakhchivan and Karabakh were given the status of autonomous oblasts and the Armenian and Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republics were put under careful supervision. This put a lid on tensions that would remain for sixty years. Towards 1988 nationalist sentiments began to rise. With the increased freedom of expression under the late Soviet policy Glasnost, the N-K Armenians were free to protest the cultural suppression in place under Soviet rule.
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Armenian was not taught in schools, nor was Armenian language television allowed in Karabakh. When their demands were not met, the calls got louder and turned towards independence. Ethnic clashes sparked up one again between Armenians and Azeris in Karabakh. In February 1988 Azerbaijani media reported that two Azeri girls had been raped in a hospital by Armenians. The Azeris responded with a pogrom against Armenians in the Azeri capital of Baku. Waves of ethnic mass murders spread across Armenia and Azerbaijan in response to reports of similar actions by the other side. An endless tit-for-tat of increasing severity emerged that the Soviets were powerless to stop. By this point head of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev’s offers to concede to the original N-K demands were all but ignored.
“ When the Soviets finally withdrew, they left a gigantic cache of heavy weaponry behind “ The Azerbaijan Popular Front mixed efforts against Armenia with resistance to Soviet rule.
In 1989 they successfully forced a rail blockade on Armenia. The period of escalating violence that followed became known as Black January. The Soviets responded to the crisis with an operation aimed at disarming the Armenians in Karabakh. Named Operation Ring it achieved little success and served to stir up further anger amongst the Armenians. When the Soviets finally withdrew in December of 1991 they left a gigantic cache of heavy weaponry behind, which fell into the hands of both Armenians and Azeris. An all-out war soon followed. Armenia pushed to capture the Lachin Corridor, a stretch of land linking Armenia with N-K, whose soldiers left atrocities in their wake. Eventually as the war progressed they began to incur into unambiguously Azerbaijani territory to the north and south of the corridor to create a buffer connecting Armenia with Karabakh, to much international outcry. Eventually, by 1994 fighting had settled down, with N-K and the Azerbaijani territory to
Sir, MT12 its west under Armenian control. After six years of immense suffering and bloodshed a ceasefire was finally agreed. The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute was disastrous for the populations of both countries. For Armenia it was utterly devastating. Azerbaijan’s trade blockade, which is still in place, the damage to an already fragile infrastructure and a barely affordable war effort left the Armenian economy in tatters. The bitterly cold winter of 1992 followed the close of the Metsamor nuclear plant and brought urgent power and food shortages in its wake. Meanwhile, as the war progressed Azerbaijan faced a growing refugee crisis: countless displaced Azeris were left in crowded camps handled by Azerbaijan and Iran. Civilian massacres on one side were met with civilian massacres on the other. The eyefor-an-eye violence that had proliferated at the war’s inception was leaving both states blind. Armenia in particular, seemed to be fighting for gains that could not possibly outweigh the tremendous costs to its suffering population. But this was not just a war for territory, nor was it simply a war for self-determination. It was a war for pride. Azerbaijan was Tur-
kic and Muslim and, in response to domestic pressure, the Turks had begun to aid the Azerbaijani war effort. Armenia had suffered centuries of Ottoman oppression as well as the periodic suppression of its proud and ancient strain of orthodox Christianity. The brutal and revolting treatment it had received at the hands of the Turks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries had culminated in the massacre which literally defined the term genocide. Seen before this background the intense, pugnacious anger of the Armenians no longer seems surprising.
“ But this was not just a war for territory, nor was it simply a war for selfdetermination. It was a war for pride. “ The murder of at least 32 Armenians (the official estimate, in reality probably many more) and the rape and violence against many others in the Azerbaijani seaside town of Sumgait during the ethnic clashes of the late 80s, had been reminiscent of the Armenian massacre. In the brief period before Soviet annexation, the Azerbaijani leaders in NagornoKarabakh had been accused of pan-Turkism.
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Sir, MT12 The Azeris had, in part, become a proxy for Armenian anger towards their former Turkish oppressors. Territorial gain was not the primary motivational factor here. The adherence to a strong national myth; memories of grandeur and the once great Kingdom of Armenia that spread across the Caucuses; and the ever-present and seething anger at their treatment under Muslim rule: these were the root causes of the chaotic ethnic violence that broke out. Nagorno-Karabakh was the birthplace of the Armenian alphabet, a landlocked shrine to a once more extensive and powerful Armenia. Its return to Armenian hands meant the restoration of dignity. It meant the wrongs of the past could be put right. To fail to protect the rights of its nationals there would be unthinkable. And so, like the abused bully that takes the lessons he has learnt from his violent upbringing into the playground, Armenia has grown up to commit the atrocities that it once suffered at the hands of another state. And then, the Azeris met violence with violence. This was a war built on hatred and frustration, and one that emerged from centuries of
oppression. This is the reason for its brutal character and hence the reason for the intense enmity that has remained almost two decades after the ceasefire was brokered. At present there seems little reason to presume that the ceasefire will not hold, but as the conflict makes very plain: this is a region where historical grudges are seldom forgotten soon. Perhaps a more stable peace could be achieved if Azerbaijan finally agreed to negotiate on the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence, but considering the emotions involved it seems unlikely that this will happen in the near future. And, given that the west is slow to condemn Azerbaijan, their oil-rich and strategically invaluable ally in the Middle East, there is little hope that international pressure could force such a move. It is a sad fact that the brutality of the past continues to fuel the brutality of the future.
Ben Deaner
INDIA:
a perspective
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India is changing rapidly. Whilst it is the tenth largest economy in the world and is currently developing its own technology for space travel, India is rife with absolute poverty and still clings on to the infamous caste system. In this series of photos I have tried to convey the variety of perspectives to which India lends itself. From the black and white photographs of what seems like India under British rule to the sepia tone of the Keralan man rowing a houseboat, I have hoped to emphasise the dynamic relationship between past and present, rich and poor and traditional and modern. Although India may be fast-moving, and slowly Westernising, it is not losing any of its wonderful idiosyncrasy. Katie Ebner-Landy
FEATURES
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“We Aren’t Arab” p.26
Russia and APEC p.30 APEC p.30
North Korea p.33
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“We Aren’t Arab”
Interview with a Morrocan Activist
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ew people nowadays would have any difficulty including Morocco and indeed the whole of the Maghreb region as part of the Arab world: these countries are part of the Arab League, their official language and religion shared by every country to the east as far as Iraq and Saudi Arabia. People who have studied the country in a little detail might have heard or read about the indigenous ethnic group, known as the Berbers, and are lead to believe they make up a significant minority. The Berber identity can be traced further back in Moroccan history than that of the Arabs who (we assume because this is what most Moroccan guidebooks tell us) are now in the majority, having taken over during the Arab conquest in the 7th century. This Berber “minority” is fighting to preserve its culture and languages in modern day Morocco. Such was my view when
Brahim and his Berber colleagues, who ran the youth hostel I stayed in, sat me down with a mint tea to tell me their version of the truth about the Berbers in Morocco. Brahim and his collegues are all originally from Berber villages and moved to Marrakesh for university and then work in the tourism industry. Like most Moroccans, Brahim they are comfortably multilingual. They grew up speaking their own Berber dialects, spoke darija (Moroccan Arabic) to some of their classmates, studied in classical Arabic - which is drastically different from Moroccan darija - went to university in French and then learnt English and Spanish to work in the tourist industry. Like many Moroccans they are Muslim, but uninterested in having an Islamic government and seem repulsed by extremism, telling me how disconcerted they are about the rising numbers of women they have seen wearing burkas in the streets. Political activism is still a risky business in Morocco but today Brahim wanted to explain why the Berber issue is at the root of so many of Morocco’s social and political
Sir, MT12 problems. As Braham explained, the Berbers are a suppressed culture. But I had to understand that all Moroccans, though perhaps unwilling to admit it, are Berber. “There are many Moroccans – perhaps %30-20 - who consider themselves Arab and not Berber,” Brahim explains, “But the roots of all Moroccans are Berber. There are people who speak Arabic, listen to Arab music and imitate the traditions of the east in places like Syria and Lebanon. They walk and talk like Arabs - they have become like a colony of the East! But their roots are Berber - they have been Arabized.” It was the first time I had heard this word used in a negative sense. Normally, it refers to the anti-colonial efforts of Arabs to reinstate their language and culture in their countries after years of foreign rule. But to the Berbers of Morocco it means the imposition of yet another foreign culture and language. Genetically speaking, almost the whole of Morocco is Berber . Culturally speaking, some Moroccan consider themselves Arab and speak Arabic, some claim joint Arab/Berber heritage and many straightforwardly consider themselves Berber. Brahim makes a point of emphasising the divide between people who consider themselves Berber and those who consider themselves Arab in terms of culture, language and way of life. The difference between the
Tamazight, the main Berber dialect, and Arabic is clear. Tamazight is written from left to right in the tifinagh alphabet which bears no resemblance to the Arabic script. Generally, Arabic speakers are from richer families who have been living in the cities for generations. The Arab heritage they claim is a point of pride – it makes them part of a great, ancient civilization. Brahim is indignant: he sees no reason to maintain such a pretence when the Berbers have a civilization with a fascinating history of its own. “Arabization is a subtle ideology based on the idea of there being one Islamic homeland from the Gulf to the North West of Africa, with one united culture,” Brahim counters. It has both secular and religious undercurrents. “The first issue in the way of this cultural unity is the Berbers: if there is to be a united Arab Islamic homeland the Berber culture and language must be removed. Many Moroccans have not spoken Berber for generations, proudly calling themselves Arab and refusing to be associated with Berber culture and language.” This is noticeable if you bring up the issue of Berber activism among university students. Student protests are have been common in Morocco over the past year but clashes have arisen between Berber activists and other groups, who claim they are undermining Islamic unity and/or Pan-Arabism by trying to dissociate from the Arab world. This, Brahim told me, is the effect of Arabization on the Moroccan population.
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“Islam came carrying the Arab culture with it, along with a mistaken belief that if you want to be a Muslim, then you must also become “We can divide Arabization into two stages. The first stage began with the arrival of Islam in North Africa via trade with countries further east.” Brahim is again referring to the spread of Islam in the late 7th century. “Berber traders welcomed this religion: they and others adopted it willingly. But Islam came carrying the Arab culture with it, along with a mistaken belief that if you want to be a Muslim, then you must also become Arab.” This is where Brahim takes issue with the conventional Moroccan view of their history, that the Islamization of the Maghreb would naturally lead to its Arabization: “Iran is an Islamic Republic, so are Pakistan and Afghanistan. Do they speak Arabic or call themselves Arab? No. The biggest Muslim population in the world is in Malaysia. If they didn’t Arabize, why then must Moroccans try to be Arab to prove we are Muslim? But for some reason people feel this need. They justify themselves by saying that Arabs came from the East to North Africa and we are therefore their descendents. They do not
seem to realise the Arabs who came were very few in comparison to the Berbers already living in Morocco: they can’t have changed the gene pool much.” “This is the first phase. The second phase was more deliberate and started with the foundation of the modern government in Morocco – after colonisation.” After the independence from the French the Moroccan government set about Arabizing administration and education to erase the traces of French influence – “They set up the media, in schools and education in a way that suppressed the Berber communities, replacing the Berber language and Moroccan culture with Arabic. The government adopted the idea of pan-Arabism and Moroccans felt they were joining the Arab world in throwing off the chains of colonisation. In this phase separating the Berber people and
Sir, MT12 the Arabization of the country began – the Berber language was banned, everything was in Arabic.” Brahim assures me that Berber culture has been affected significantly by Arabization: “Women, for example. In Berber culture they have a great respect for women. Things vary a bit from tribe to tribe regarding marriage and whether a woman or a man is head of the family but in general in Berber society the woman is like a man – there is equality. The word woman in Berber is ‘tam art’ which means a “freewoman”: the woman is her own judge. But after Arabization, Berbers have begun to think that women are just for sex. In the Arab mind the woman is thought about only in terms of her body and sex and now this attitude has gotten into Berber culture and this isn’t how things should be. Berbers should think of woman as a person and not as a body. This is just one
example of the difference between Berber and Arab cultures.” There are other parts of the status quo that are heavily influenced by Arabization. Because being Arab is so closely associated with being Muslim, activists who would prefer an Islamic form of governance are more inclined to link Morocco with the rest of the Arab-Muslim world. But as Pan-Arabism also has significant secular and communist movements, it is also a useful ideology for left wing groups to associate with. King Muhammad VI of Morocco legitimises his rule by claiming that he is a direct descendent of the Prophet Muhammad. If his Berber identity conflicted with this he might lose his legitimacy; or indeed if the country were to dissociate from the rest of the Muslim world, then his religious claim to rule would lose its legitimacy regardless.
“The word woman in Ber- ber is ‘tam art’ which means a “freewoman”:
Yet the protests of Brahim and his fellow activists have not gone unheard. “Didn’t Berber become an official language of Morocco last year?”, I asked. “Yes,” he replies, “Before, it was written in the constitution that Arabic was the only official language and that Morocco was an Arab country, referred to in Arabic as the Arab
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Sir, MT12 Kingdom of Morocco. It was a racist constitution that suppressed the Berber people: the native people of the country and the majority – we aren’t a minority, as our Arabized government would have people believe - the majority of the people. After many demonstrations and protests we managed to obtain our right to have Berber as an official language next to Arabic. So what is our next aim? We need Berber in education, in the media, administration and ministries and in commerce and advertising – it’s our mother tongue, we need it in everything.” There are three main dialects of Berber in Morocco of which Tamazight is the most widely spoken and all dialects, I am assured, are mutually understandable. Making Berber an official language in practice as well as in theory is possible, and could be the
next step along the road to freeing Morocco from the effects of Arabization. “And finally we want to change outsider perceptions of Morocco. Morocco is a country of many cultures; we aren’t like part of Saudi,” he says with a shudder, as if nothing could be worse to the liberal Moroccan mindset than the Islamic Arab Monarchy that is Saudi Arabia, “We will never be like Saudi. My message to the West, to Europe and America who mistake us for Arabs is this: “We aren’t Arab and don’t want to be viewed as Arab by the West, or by anyone.”
Alice Crocker
his September, as panic returned to Europe after a quiet August, the leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathered for their 24th annual summit, held on a tiny island nearly 1,000 km east of Moscow. APEC, a forum founded in 1989, consists of 21 Pacific Rim countries and, according to its mission statement, aims to “support sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region”, promoting policies encouraging free trade and investment, regional economic integration and cooperation to achieve this aim. In many ways APEC’s creation was incentivised by globalization, increasing interdependence of regional economies and – with the image of European integration in mind – the rise of regional trade blocs. Russia joined APEC in 1998, presumably signalling its interest in reinstating its role in the region. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Russian attention has turned away from the East; its focus has been predominately on the West. This stood in contrast to Russia’s state emblem of a double-headed eagle, with each heads facing simultaneously in opposite directions. Currently, the European Union (EU) is Russia’s largest trading partner – accounting for just over %50 of total trade – while Russia’s share in APEC members’ foreign trade is just %1. Russia’s domestic situation reiterates this inequality: most Russians now live west of the Ural Mountains, while the east remains sparsely populated and underdeveloped.
The idea of redirecting Russia’s focus towards Asia was picked up by Putin when he came to power in 2000, though little progress was made on this issue until 2007, when a program for the development of Russia’s eastern region was generated. More recently, the country has reiterated its intention to refocus on the Asia-Pacific region when it agreed to host the APEC summit for the first time and chose the Far Eastern city of Vladivostok as the venue. In many ways, moving east is a necessity for Russia due to mounting strains in its relations with the West. The first of the recent serious tensions surfaced in 2008: the controversy of the Russian-Georgian war heightened criticism of the country abroad, while the financial crisis led to the current European sovereign-debt crisis which is impacting Russia’s exports. More recently, Putin’s disputed return to power, the Pussy Riot affair and the antitrust investigation of Gazprom have exacerbated tensions. The result is that Russia now needs new partners for trade, development and modernization. It needs to open up new markets for energy export, and at the same time attract more investment for its domestic projects. Heightened engagement with the Asia-Pacific therefore seems like a perfect solution to Russia’s problems. Indeed, the region has much to offer.
Russia seeks new friends
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Sir, MT12 The geopolitics of energy are moving east and Asia in particular is showing promising growth in primary energy demand, furthering its appeal to Russia. China is at the moment the primary customer though there is great potential in Japan too, especially after an increase in its energy imports following the Fukushima disaster of 2011. Though Russia’s involvement in APEC is undoubtedly beneficial for the forum as a whole, the country’s desire to encourage trade and investment in the region has undermined the very purpose of the summit. The priorities set by Russia for this year were not particularly extraordinary; in Putin’s own words, Russia suggested that the dialogue should “focus on freeing up trade and investment”. Despite an added focus on food security this agenda seemed nothing more than standard in that no new, substantial issues were brought forward. It does not come as a surprise that furthering dialogue was not high on the country’s list of priorities. For Russia this meeting had far greater significance than previous summits: it was supposed to be a turning point, one at which the country would again be recognized as one of the leading powers in the region; a reminder to the world that two thirds of Russia is in Asia and that it can act as a bridge between Europe and this region. Moreover, the government was desperate to show the great potential for development and economic growth in its far eastern corner. Russia definitely worked hard in order to please. In preparation for the
summit, reportedly around 21$ billion – that’s 5$ billion more than the price tag of the London Olympics – was spent on the development of infrastructure and on construction in and around Vladivostok. Particularly stunning was what had become the symbol of the summit: a bridge linking Russky Island where the meeting was held, and mainland Russia. At a cost of 1$ billion, it is now the longest cable suspension bridge in the world; yet this structure has faced much criticism and ridicule. The grandiose bridge connects mainland to an island inhabited by just 5,000 people; mockingly, a Foreign Policy article has dubbed it a “bridge to nowhere”. More embarrassingly, during the construction this bridge actually caught fire, while elsewhere in the region a newly build road collapsed during severe rainfall and the construction of two luxury hotels was not even completed in time for the summit. Though these failures may seem relatively minor, they illustrate the domestic problems Russia faces which undermine its position on the international stage. There is a certain Russian mentality in which foreign countries are perceived as inherently hostile, leading people to a conclusion that in order to fulfil its objectives, it is abroad that Russia has to work to mend relations and achieve its goals. Yet the source of many of Russia’s problems lies inside, not outside it. Russia aspires to be perceived as an advanced, developed country, yet reality is that Russia has not completed state building; it is not a consolidated state. Corruption, mismanagement and a lack of rule of law have become a part of life. A director of a local policy think tank estimates that at least half of Moscow’s
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money spent on the preparation for the summit was stolen . Ironically, Russia’s Far East is in fact very representative of these problems: geographically removed from the central government, this area has been practicing independent politics, with numerous instances of corruption for years. There had been no significant development or investment from the government in this neglected region until the run-up to the APEC meeting. These issues of corruption, red tape and bad infrastructure are likely, if left unresolved, to result in Russia missing out on the booming markets of the Pacific Rim.
once again no revolutionary propositions, let alone decisions, were made. On the other hand, in much of Russian media APEC has been claimed to have been a great success, at least for Putin himself. At first glance, Russia has indeed come through, impressing foreign leaders and businessmen, proving that it can modernise and develop regions even seven time zones away from Moscow.Yet pouring billions into a scarcely populated part of Russia without much agenda for proper reform does not constitute sustainable development in the Far East, nor will it immediately ameliorate relations with its Eastern neighbours.
The outcomes of the summit itself are not disappointing, but not impressive either. Russia is not entirely to blame for this: despite claiming that APEC’s initiatives turn “policy goals into concrete results and agreements into tangible benefits”, it is a mechanism governed by consensus and as a result is not known for generating any substantial policy breakthroughs. The outcome of the summit was predominantly a reaffirmation of previous resolutions for freer trade, eradication of corruption and enabling the fluctuation of exchange rates. Food security has also been touched on, with Putin remarking that it is “one of the most acute problems of our time”;
Russia is right to turn its attention to the East: this is something that should have been done years earlier. Yet it is important to understand that the very same issues that are currently causing tensions between Russia and the West – issues that often stem from domestic factors – have the capacity to cause the same tensions for Russia’s relations with the Asia-Pacific.Thus in trying to reposition itself internationally, it is the domestic situation that most desperately needs reworking before new partnerships can be built. In the Asia-Pacific Russia will face new challenges, particularly in the light of the re-merging territorial disputes in the region, but this does not mean that the old ones will not come back to haunt it.
Anna Brezhneva
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A Visit to North Korea A lmost everyone (except perhaps a few nostalgic Russians and East Germans) agrees that being a North Korean would not be ideal. For centuries merely the location of the Korean peninsula was a problem for those living there; squashed between the Empires of China and Japan, Korea has been fought over, occupied, and systematically plundered more than almost any other nation, most recently by Japan who invaded, occupied, and annexed Korea in 1910. At the end of the Second World War the Japanese were forced out of Korea, but the problems were only just beginning for those living north of the 38th parallel. As part of the Japanese Empire, the Korean peninsula was divided between the victorious nations - Soviets in the North and the rest in the South. Stalin was quick to install a leader who he approved of in Korea and settled on the Korean nationalist Kim Il-Sung. This was the start of North Korea’s current problems. Despite the fact that almost all of the industry in the Korean peninsula was located in the north at the time of division, Kim Il-Sung’s national philosophy of Juche
(“self-reliance”) and his son Kim Jongil’s policy of Songun (“military first”) have driven the North Korean economy into the ground. While Seoul has enough neon-lit signs to make Tokyo cringe, their neighbours 60km to the north don’t have enough electricity to light their major city streets at night. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (as they prefer to call themselves) is now the most isolated country in the world. I was lucky enough to visit the country in April 2012, during the 100th birthday celebrations for the Eternal President of the Republic, Kim Il Sung. Visiting the country is surprisingly easy but can only be done through the North Korean government as there is next to no private enterprise and certainly no booming tourist industry. Our tour group, like all tourists in the DPRK, was assigned guides by the government who met us before we even left the border entry checkpoint and were not more than ten metres from us until we passed the border on our way out; though not before checking our cameras to make sure all our holiday snaps por-
Sir, MT12 trayed North Korea as a socialist paradise. Everything that any foreigner ever sees or does while there is approved by the government: the closest any tourist can get to the real life of a citizen of this country is a quick look down a street that you aren’t allowed to walk down, or a glimpse of a country village as you speed down the empty motorway to the next site dedicated to glorifying the Kim family and their exploits. For us, like all trips to the DPRK, most nights were spent in one of the hotels in the capital, Pyongyang, a city of wide spotless avenues and impressive Soviet-era architecture; but we were not allowed to pass the hotel guards on the door without our guides. There is a reason for this. Though Pyongyang’s buildings are impressive examples of 1960s construction, Pyongyang is a mask. While it serves to house the few visitors to the country, its primary function seems to be as propaganda for the Korean people. To be a Pyongyanger you must have shown your allegiance to the ruling party: the Worker’s Party of Korea. For the 18 million North Koreans who don’t live in the city, Pyongyang is the dream, the pinnacle of all that the great workers of Korea have accomplished having thrown off the chains of the Japanese and US Imperialists. Pyongyang is full of museums, monuments and bizarre districts such as the sports district containing nothing but stadiums and training facilities for
sports from taekwondo to football. Of all the museums in Pyongyang - and we were shepherded through many during our stay - the Victorious Fatherland Liberation (what the west would call the Korean war) Museum deserves a special mention. In all museums in the country the government employs someone to take a guided tour leading you through the endless halls of
Though Pyongyang’s buildings are impressive examples of 1960s construction, Pyongyang is a mask. weapons, tanks, planes, and maps showing the movement of the Korean People’s Army. When a woman dressed in military uniform constantly told us how the US Imperialists started the Korean war, how General MacArthur’s incredible marine landings at Incheon and Busan were, in fact, a tactical retreat by the military genius Kim Il Sung and how the Korean people alone fought off the Americans, it was difficult not to notice that every gun, tank and aeroplane is Soviet made. The willingness of the guides to lie constantly and outright was striking. Upon asking one of our guides - all of whom are Pyongyangers - how long the 105-story pyramidal Ryugyong hotel, unmissable from almost anywhere in Pyongyang, took to build,
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I got an answer of “about 5 years”. A quick google search (which of course is not possible in the only country in the world with no internet) will show that construction on the Ryugyong hotel was started in 1987. Anyone who lived in Pyongyang during the 1990s would have frequently seen this iconic structure on an almost daily basis and yet the lies keep coming. Strangely, propaganda is not based on how fantastic North Korea is, but on how terrible the rest of the world is - a “best of a bad bunch” argument. According to them, Maoist China is in devastating famine from failed communism (making sure to add that that they are socialist, not communist), the Soviet Union had similar problems which Russia has inherited and corruption is running rampant, and Afghanistan is being flattened by the Americans. The other key part of the brainwashing of the nation is the cult of personality around the Kim family. While the population is told from childhood that they have “nothing to envy” about the rest of the world, everything that makes North Korea the best country in the world is directly attributed to one of the Kims, or occasionally all three. At one point we were told that photos of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong
Il, and Kim Jong Un all “have the same meaning”. Later, my guide told me that as part of the celebrations for the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, that the government had given her family two cartons of juice and some pork, and that she was grateful to the Supreme Leader for this. It was evident that these were not everyday foodstuffs, even for a Pyongyanger. In every town that we visited the statues and murals of the Kim family were simultaneously spotless and being cleaned while just a street away children would be sifting through rubbish filled rivers just to find a tiny bit of food or picking weeds by the roadside just to have something to stave off the hunger that is quite literally eating them from the inside. As a result of this kind of propaganda, most North Koreans really do believe that they live in the most prosperous country in the world and that they are justifiably grateful to the Kims for making the DPRK such a great nation, which needs no assistance and is always ready to defend itself. The paranoia and xenophobia are so deeply ingrained into every North Korean I saw and met, that they were all very hesitant to look at me, let alone speak to me.
Sir, MT12 Despite their isolationist mindset, we were taken around the International Friendship Exhibition, a vault cut deep into a mountain with vast marble atriums and lavishly decorated corridors. The exhibition was supposed to demonstrate how loved and admired the Kim dynasty was by other world leaders, but far from improve the respectability of the Kim family, the halls upon halls of gifts from the likes of Stalin, Mao, Ceausescu, Gaddafi, Mugabe, and Assad only made me think even less of the Kims than before. By far the strangest room of the museum contained a lifesize, picture-perfect waxwork of Kim Il Sung which we were instructed to bow to and not to turn our back on, even when exiting the room. Bowing to a waxwork of a diminutive long dead Korean man, was so surreal that many of my group, myself included, had to stifle a laugh which may well have got us deported. In the west, we see North Korea as a breakaway, ultra radical and hypersensitive nation of brainwashed masses and mysterious unknown leaders. While these ideas certainly have an element of truth to them, we often forget that the people who live in this shut off world are more like us than we would like to think. It’s not all sombre faced military groups; people laugh, joke, play
Propaganda is based not on how fantastic North Korea is, but on how terrible the rest of the world is - a “best of a bad bunch” argument. and love despite their unfortunate place in the world. There are two reasons that most of us hear about the North Korean regime, either as a threat to us or as a threat to its own citizens. Travelling to the country made me think that branding them as part of the axis of evil was unfair; it is not a threat to anyone else, it is simply a paranoid cult of personality. However, the regime is extremely dangerous for those that live under it, even on an intensely guided tour, they could not keep from us the reality of life in this starving Stalinist state. There really is nothing to envy in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
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