Sir TT 2014 by Oxford International Relations Society

SIR

Authority As this editorial is being written Turkish riot police in Istanbul and Ankara are employing tear gas to disperse anti-government protests commemorating the one-year anniversary of similar rallies last year that resulted in thousands of casualties. The ongoing turbulence in Turkey has as its epicentre the increasing totalitarianism of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and forms just one part of a global crisis of authority. The collapse of traditional political systems across the Arab world, the attacks on sovereignty in the South China Sea as much as in Ukraine - all of this reflects the fracturing of western, democratic power in the world, a worrying trend evident as much in internal politics as foreign affairs. The result of this is widespread uncertainty as to the form and location of authority. Of course, these questions are not new, but now is an especially pertinent time to ask questions on the theme of authority. All of the recent turmoil in the world, of which only a few examples were outlined above, illustrate that this is an issue that has not been resolved and requires more attention, more work, more thought. We are confident that the pages of this journal will contribute to this process, and thank all our authors for their hard work. Finally, a few words must be said of our authority. We tried as hard as we could to retain the style of each of our writers. We attempted to wield the blue pencil so as to resemble a tyrant as little as possible, and we hope that the results of our efforts will be evident in the diverse articles contained in these pages. Similarly, both of us have tried to avoid the position of dictator, and any success that may be ascribed to this issue rests on the shoulders of our patient, diligent and outstanding team. Josh Dolphin, Mina Pollman, Becky Knott, Camille White, we are in your debt. Isaac and Fergus

SIR TT14

Contents KONY: THE WARLORD AND THE CHARISMA QUESTION ELEANOR BEEVOR // 6

TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH AFRICA RICHARD MCLAVERTY // 12

SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE & AUTHORITY NATAN BRAM // 18

AN AUDIENCE WITH HM AMBASSADOR TO UKRAINE MOLLY MCPARLAND // 22

AUTHORITY AFTER THE EXPENSES SCANDAL GABRIEL LAWSON // 28

CONSTRUCTING AUTHORITY IN FAILED STATES NICHOLAS TAN // 32

A BASELESS JIHAD: ISLAMISM AFTER BIN LADEN EMMA BRAND // 40

SOUTH AFRICAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;S DECLINING AUTHORITY KAMEEL PREMHID // 47

EDITORS: ISAAC GREENWOOD & FERGUS PEACE DEPUTY EDITORS: JOSH DOLPHIN & MINA POLLMAN COPY EDITOR: BECKY KNOTT PUBLICITY & SPONSORSHIP: CAMILLE WHITE 3

Unleash your potential at WBS WBS accepts the brightest students from all disciplines to our generalist Masters courses in Business or Management, as well as those with specific backgrounds to our specialist courses. Over ÂŁ2m of WBS Scholarships are open to students of all nationalities. For 2014 entry, applicants from European countries are currently under-represented, and scholarships remain available. Generalist courses h

MSc Business (Business Consulting)

MSc Business (Organization Science)

MSc Business (Finance & Accounting)

MSc Management

MSc Business (Marketing)

Finance courses h

MSc Accounting & Finance

MSc Behavioural Finance

MSc Finance

MSc Financial Mathematics

MSc Finance & Economics

Specialist courses h

MSc Business Analytics

MSc Human Resource Management & Employment Relations

MSc Information Systems Management & Innovation

MSc Marketing & Strategy

@warwickbschool

T (0)24 7615 0333 E masters@wbs.ac.uk W wbs.ac.uk/go/oxford1

SIR TT14

COMPETITION Bill Emmott, former editor-in-chief of The Economist and honorary fellow of Magdalen College, is developing a new statistical indicator of how well western countries are prepared for the sort of world we can expect in 2050. The 2050 Vitality Index will offer a ranking of countries according to how well they are shaping up. He invites you to submit proposals, of between 500 and 1,000 words, for measures that would be sustainable across countries and time, and would offer striking indications of future vitality. It is said we are in a “knowledge society”: but how best to define and measure that? Or innovativeness? Or how well we are adjusting to our changing demographies? Or climate change? Or the quality of our rule of law, the working of our democracies… Or, rather, what you think matters. The best entries will be published on his non-profit’s website, www.wakeupfoundation.eu, and rewarded with bottles of champagne—a measure of a certain sort of vitality. Applications should be sent to bill@wakeupfoundation.eu There is no closing date, but the sooner the better. 5

THE WA

AND THE CHARI eleanor beevor

You’d be forgiven for thinking the world doesn’t want to hear any more about Joseph Kony. The Ugandan warlord catapulted to viral video fame two years ago by the ‘Kony 2012’ video campaign and became the internet’s epitome of evil for his Lord Resistance Army’s (LRA) mass conscription of child soldiers. Before long, though, Kony’s grotesque outline had vanished from our screens, almost as conspicuously as it had appeared. We were left aware of Kony, as the campaign intended us to be, but not all that knowledgeable. Yet aspects of the campaign itself are oddly telling about its enigmatic subject. For a video to get away with a narrative that one critic described as “a blend of Heart of Darkness and Glee”, it had to have an exception6

ally seductive capacity to make stopping Kony seem so wonderfully easy, practically and morally. Though this brand of clickbait was never meant to capture the true nature of the LRA, it is interesting that Kong is the only figure on whom it could work at all. Some of his high commanders were abducted too young to be relegated so easily to the “evil” binary. Other rebel groups, such as the militias of eastern Congo, are too political to receive this treatment. Why, then, can Kony? There’s a word that seems to follow Kony around, sometimes, but not always, linked to the talk of spirit possession that surrounds him: his “charisma”. Do a Google search for “Joseph Kony charisma”, and you’ll find tens of pages of news articles describing

SIR TT14

ARLORD

ISMA QUESTION his power as such. It infiltrates academic literature too. One of the most widely cited articles on the LRA describes Kony as “possessed of a charisma bordering on the prophetic…”, and it’s far from the only one. There’s several problems with this statement. Firstly, it isn’t really an answer, but a fig leaf for a lack of one. It’s often then used as a springboard for allusions to “exotic” African mysticism. But most glaringly of all, applying the term “charisma” to Joseph Kony is sheer contradiction in terms. When Max Weber coined the term, he described it as “a certain quality of an individual personality […] regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, […] recognition is a matter of complete personal devotion to the possessor of the quality”. Kony’s LRA is exception-

al among guerrilla movements for its overwhelming reliance on abduction to fill its ranks. Why, then, is he constantly described akin to the kind of leader who inspires a voluntary following? In fact, those who describe him as “charismatic” are absolutely right, and Kony can teach us how this kind of authority works because of this contradiction. He is forced to construct, in the most extreme fashion, an effect, which brings to life the kind of “quality” Weber described; in this case, a direct link to the divine. Because it is so coerced, the lynchpins of this effect are exposed. What they reveal is the point at which a person embodies their own legitimacy, and so it is they, rather than a message or ideology, that peo7

ple are following. There’s a fine line between populists, or politicians described as charismatic, and those who make themselves indispensable to their own vision, and thus independent of institutions and procedures. It’s a line worth identifying at a time where the institutions we believed would eventually rule the world seem to be eroding under a furore of emotive, nationalist politics. The charismatic may become independent of institutions, but not

the most notorious of which was fronted by Kony’s cousin. Alice “Lakwena” was named after the Christian “holy” spirit that she claimed possessed her, gave her a notorious healing power, and later instructed her to form an army to fight Museveni. Her healing power was a potent trait after decades of Acholi involvement in battles for power. In Acholi cosmology, the spirit of a person who died violently, or cen, haunts the killer, bringing sickness and

“The process of abduction is strategic, designed to spread fear among civilians, and terrify the abductees into compliance.” circumstance; historical context is crucial. Kony is an Acholi, a northern Ugandan ethnic group which has been economically marginalised since the colonial period. This regional rift swayed post-colonial power struggles, and came to a head in 1986, when the current President Yoweri Museveni’s rebel army ousted two Acholi military officers, who had recently taken power in a coup. Fearing reprisals, the Acholi fled north and began several insurgency campaigns, 8

misfortune to them and their neighbours. Such beliefs blended well with Christian idioms of “purity”, rebirth and the cleansing of sins. Her soldiers were ritually “purified”, and told, as a result, that they were bulletproof, and could throw rocks which would explode like bombs, provided they obeyed a list of rules known as the “Holy Spirit Precautions”. Though she gathered thousands of followers, she was eventually defeated, and claimed the spir-

SIR TT14 it had left her. Kony seized his chance to borrow her fame, and claimed that the spirit now possessed him. With a small band of followers, the LRA was born. Kony’s personal motivations are dubious, though seem to be at least part theocratic. A former senior commander told me Kony envisioned himself as a prophet, who would one day theologically direct the national president. Another former abductee told me Kony abducted and killed his own people because he saw himself as a “rod” with which to discipline the sinful Acholi; his violence was a form of purification. These answers are vague at best, and, interestingly, such justifications aren’t greatly discussed by analysts, nor found in their records of former abductee testimonies. Kony’s charisma obviously didn’t depend on justifying his actions. To understand his power, we have to begin with the most common point of entry to the LRA. The process of abduction is strategic, designed to spread fear among civilians, and terrify the abductees into compliance. They are often made to walk for hours to rebel camps, but will be killed if they collapse from exhaustion.

Violence tends to be a feature of abduction; usually beatings, but sometimes they are forced to take part in killings or mutilations of their fellows. Some are released, and the stories they tell once home spread intense fear. These acts of violence are a demonstration of Kony’s cosmological power, as well as engines of fear. If his soldiers can kill freely, without fear of haunting by the victim’s cen, they have an even more powerful spiritual force on their side. Abductees are then rit9

ually anointed with shea nut oil, which they are told will purify them of their sins, and also allows Kony to read their minds. To be told Kony can read minds and to believe it are different things, yet the majority of returned fighters did believe Kony had this supernatural ability, amongst others. One of my informants, the abducted “wife” of a high commander, described what happened when Kony’s “rules”, similar to Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Precautions, such as food and sex taboos, were broken. “there would be times that he would tell them… that the god in him is telling them to fast… When they were fasting, those who would sneak and eat, every time they were in battle they would get shot in the mouth… but somehow they would not die. They become living testimonies of Kony’s greatness.” It is the flexibility of these rules that concentrates power in Kony’s hands, since he is the only one possessed by the spirit, and the rules change according to the spirit’s diktats. Certain taboos are imposed at certain 10

times, and sometimes the taboos change. It is adherence to these rules that, according to Kony, keeps you alive in a climate of constant terror and violence. Researcher Ben Mergelsberg recalls the words of one abductee: “The rules strengthened me a lot. Because I saw that if I follow the things, there was nothing. I would stay alive, be safe… It kept me living with no fear.” Kony could maintain absolute power, so long as he was the only one with access to information about how to protect them. This is why the inherent ambiguity and change in the rules is so important. If they could be learned as a fixed set of codes, he would be replaceable, and susceptible to internal power struggles. By creating intense fear through abduction, and ritually incorporating the abductees in accordance with both Acholi and Christian cosmology, he made himself a quasi-divine presence. This ambiguity of doctrine is the tipping point that makes the charismatic authoritarian. When their ideology is sufficiently vague that it cannot be interpreted or enacted

SIR TT14 without their presence, they can operate independently of institution and procedure, and of fear for their monopoly on authority. In a world where institutions donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t seem to have the ideological grip they once did, it is a point we should watch out for. Kony may not be the most dangerous force in central Africa any more, but we should not dismiss what he can tell us about power as easily as we did him from our screens.

TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN richard mclaverty SOUTH AFRICA Before 1994, having an apartheid Security Branch member in your home signalled one of two things: either you were in trouble with the law and about to be arrested, or you held sufficiently important information that warranted a visit. Fast-forward 20 years, apartheid is over and the Security Branch is dismantled. I’ve gone back to South Africa to conduct some research for my master’s dissertation. The intercom goes off signalling the 12

arrival of my guest and I rush to welcome Brian Mitchell in. Over tea we sit down and begin to chat about his time in the South African Police Force. At 57, Mitchell is far from what I imagined the typical policeman to be like. He’s short, quiet and speaks softly. His voice almost has a tranquil calm about it. In fact, the first sense I get of his policing background is after I apologise profusely for the noisy disturbance coming from the neighbours. “Call the

SIR TT14

“In order to build a better, consolidated, future South Africa would need to better manage its past. Reconciliation, not revenge, would be the ideals guiding the way forward.” police,” he says. But Mitchell, in some aspects, is not your typical pre-1994 policeman. His personal story is unique and reflects, in large part, the transition of South Africa, generally, and its security services, in particular. It is his story, and the reflection it offers into our past that still has me questioning how far we have actually come. Mitchell, after all, was the first serving policeman to be charged with, and convicted of, carrying out a politically motivated murder during apartheid. How Mitchell comes to be here, then, sitting in my parents’ home, in most respects a free man, requires some explanation. It starts in a small farming community outside the picturesque area of New Hanover, KwaZulu Natal. There, a little-known village called Trust Feed hidden among the sugarcane has become an important case study in South Africa’s recent history. On December

3rd 1988, at about 3am, a group of policemen opened fire on a house, shooting and killing eleven people at point-blank range. The demographics of the dead convey the devastation caused by the policemen’s actions: three men, six women and two children – one of whom was just four years old – died that day. The police, the courts were later told, were acting on orders. Their task was to stabilize a volatile area that had been torn apart by violence between the Zulu-dominated Inkatha and the rival United Democratic Front (UDF). But instead of hitting a house where so-called “terrorists” were being harboured, the police wrongly attacked another home where a family was holding a funeral wake. Captain Brian Mitchell, then Station Commander of the New Hanover district, insisted that although he had given the order to kill, he hadn’t pulled the trigger himself. After a lengthy 13

trial, Mitchell and four other special constables were found guilty on eleven counts of murder and two of attempted murder. Mitchell, despite ‘not having pulled the trigger,’ was sentenced to death by hanging. His sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. “Yes, I ordered the special constables to attack the UDF… I knew they were going to kill people; my decision to use special constables was taken that night. I did not expect the specials to shoot up a house indiscriminately and I did not seek the death of women and children. I saw myself in the midst of a civil war involving Inkatha and the UDF. I saw myself on the side of the government and I sympathized with Inkatha at the time,” Mitchell tells me. In 1996, Mitchell was released from prison after being granted amnesty by South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. South Africans had negotiated a difficult political journey and, as part of the deal, both sides (the liberation movements and the apartheid state) agreed that reconciliation would best be achieved by learning to forgive each other for acts carried out 14

in the name of liberation and apartheid, respectively. Both the merit of this process and, indeed, whether the lack of closure for the victims made it worth it in the end, are questionable. The logic, however, is clear. In order to build a better, consolidated, future South Africa would need to

better manage its past. Reconciliation, not revenge, would be the ideals guiding the way forward. A few months after his release, Mitchell met the families of his victims. He has returned to Trust Feeds every year since. Leaders from across the political divide,

SIR TT14 including President Jacob Zuma, have praised Mitchell as an exemplar of genuine reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa. Mitchellâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s dedication to reconciliation is unique but his role in state-sponsored violence against liberation movements is not. The

police under the then ruling National Party were regarded as a political instrument to be used against the liberation movements. On February 2nd 1990, when President F. W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and others, including the

Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), not only did it signal a new era in South Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s history but also it signalled significant changes for the police. Up until that point, the South African Police had been involved in an armed conflict with the liberation movements. The understanding among commentators, and de Klerk himself, was that the police would be resistant to change. Prior to 1994, the police had consistently been a political tool used to suppress liberation movements and act against the spread of communism. This coupled with a legacy of colonial era policing and the counter-insurgency role that it played had resulted in an authoritarian police force that brutalised the majority of South Africans. The senior and middle ranks of the police predominantly consisted of white and Afrikaans men who were far removed from the lives of those whom they policed. The very nature of policing was deeply embedded in a racist ideology of domination and control. In a series of events, police officials were informed that change was inevitable and that they would need 15

to accommodate the new emerging political order. While many officers stayed on, some senior officials were removed and others opted for retirement packages. For years the police officers had engaged in a war with the ANC, but now they would have to work for them. For the future of South Africa enemies would now have to work alongside each other. Change was required, but how would that be possible in a politically fragile country where institutional memory ran so deep? In the transition to democracy significant changes began to take place. The most immediate aim was to demonstrate that the police needed to be built on the foundations of human rights. In 1991, for example, the Security Branch was disbanded and absorbed into the Detective Service. A new name was given to it – the Crime Information Service – that attempted to go beyond rebranding. It marked a shift in the role the branch played. The subjection of intelligence services to the rule of law underpinned by a constitutional order which valued de-politicisation and independence was another example of this kind of epoch16

al change. The police’s military rank structure was abolished and the name “force” was replaced with “service.” A new badge and logo were adopted, along with new colours, image and symbols. Despite the violent institutional history of the police force and the continued hostility police officers faced in black townships, the initial response to change from both the police and South Africans seemed overwhelmingly positive. Whether as an act of self preservation or a genuine attempt at reconciliation the police seemed to be taking steps in the right direction. However, recent events bring into question whether the police have actually changed. For many South Africans the regrettable events at Marikana in August 2012, when 44 people died – 34 at the hands of the police – in a single day, were reminiscent of the dark days of policing during apartheid. So to was the killing of Andries Tatane, who was shot dead on live television by the police during a service delivery protest. Or again, the case of Mozambican national Mido Macia who died of head injuries after being dragged along the street handcuffed to the back of a police

SIR TT14

â&#x20AC;&#x153;In the past, political lines defined the role the police played but today, despite the political commitment to human rights, the authoritarian culture persists and police officers are facing a crisis of identity.â&#x20AC;? van. All of these incidents illustrate to some degree similarities between the current police force and National Party rule during apartheid. Why then despite the promise to reconcile has there been a return to a militarized and authoritarian police force? These issues and many others have resulted in the South African police force facing a crisis of confidence and trust as they did at the time of the transition. In the past, political lines defined the role the police played but today,

despite the political commitment to human rights, the authoritarian culture persists and police officers are facing a crisis of identity. After speaking to Mitchell that day, I was left with a deep sense of ambivalence with regards to the future of the police in South Africa. While so much progress has indeed been made, so much still needs to change. Whether South Africa possesses the political leadership to bring about such change is a different question altogether.

SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE: WHOSE AUTHORITY? natan bram Last term Oxford Lawyers without Borders organised a talk entitled â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;What can Scotland learn from South Sudan?â&#x20AC;&#x2122; It turns out that is more than you would expect. Jure Vidmar, an expert on international law and correspondents for The Independent (James Cusick) and The Guardian (Simon Tisdall) discussed the international precedents of territories seceding and forming new entities. In 2011 over 98% of South Sudanese voted in favour 18

of independence from the rest of Sudan, with a turnout of over 97%. The best the Yes campaign in Scotland can hope for in September, given their continued deficit in the polls, is a slender victory on a significantly lower turnout. Though this would not invalidate Scottish independence, the panellists raised the point that it would certainly raise questions of legitimacy for the newly created state. If a slim majority vote for Scottish independence, even with a high turnout of 70 or 80%, only a mi-

nority of eligible voters would have approved of the monumental decision to secede. The South Sudanese state, despite facing many extremely serious problems, at least came into existence with the overwhelming support of its citizens. However South Sudan is no longer the new kid on the secession block. In March 2014, Crimea seceded from Ukraine and then acceded to the Russian Federation. Which begs the question: what can Scotland learn from Crimea?

SIR TT14 There are many important differences between the processes by which Scotland seeks to become independent and Crimea joined Russia. The climate of violence and intimidation which surrounded the referendum in Crimea is absent in Scotland. And while the international community would undoubtedly

the time it is expected to take for the same transfer of authority and sovereignty from the United Kingdom to Scotland. The referendum in Crimea took place on March 16th and by March 21st it was formally part of Russia. The swiftness of this transition has left no doubt about who is in control in Crimea, regardless of

teen months. Much has been written about what will need to be discussed between the Westminster Parliament and Holyrood between a Yes vote and Independence Day, from the national debt to Trident to a currency union. But there has been little discussion about who will have the authority to make decisions in this

â&#x20AC;&#x153;The South Sudanese state, despite facing many extremely serious problems, at least came into existence with the overwhelming support of its citizens.â&#x20AC;? recognize Scotlandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s independence (should it choose to secede), there is no international recognition of Crimea joining the Russian Federation. However, the most interesting difference between the two processes is the time it took for authority and sovereignty in Crimea to be transferred from Ukraine to Russia and

the opinion of the international community. By stark contrast, if Scotland votes Yes in September, the Scottish government hopes Scotland will become an independent country in March 2016. This leaves a great unsolved question about who has authority over Scotland for the intervening period of eigh-

switch over period. Legally, nothing changes if Scotland votes Yes on the 18th of September: the vote just gives the Scottish government a mandate to negotiate with the Westminster government to secede. The Westminster government would retain all the powers it currently holds in the existing constitutional set up. 19

However, exploring a couple of hypothetical situations highlights the potential problems with this arrangement. If Britain were to deploy troops abroad during this interregnum, and this mission stretched into 2017 or beyond, should Scottish troops join the mission? If they do, these troops would then come under the command of a foreign nation in the middle of the mission. On the domestic front, if a Scottish bank collapses and requires a bail out, this could have seismic economic consequences for the Scottish economy. What happens if the Scottish government wants to take a different course on this matter than the Westminster one? The Westminster government could legally take decisions in 2014 and

2015 that have a sizeable impact on the medium and long term future of Scotland â&#x20AC;&#x201C; after the Scottish people democratically decided to free themselves from decisions made by Westminster. However, if the Westminster government refrains from making any major decisions concerning Scotland during the transition period this would leave Scotland without a proper government for over a year. The Scottish Parliament would only have the powers devolved to it in 1998 (and in the subsequent Scotland Act 2012). For nearly a year and a half, no entity would have the authority to tackle Scotlandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most sensitive and important political issues.

SIR TT14

“A Yes vote in September could leave Scotland lacking a fully effective government for over a year and a half.” This may not be a problem at all. In the United States, a new president does not take office for more than 2 months after being elected. The incumbent president continues to govern as a so-called ‘lame duck.’ The incumbent president, though legally retaining all the powers of the presidency during the lame duck period, does not have the authority to take major decisions because of the lack of mandate. However this two-month period of lame duck pres-

idency is significantly shorter than what Scotland may have to face after September. A Yes vote in September could leave the Scottish lacking a fully effective government for over a year and a half. Effective cooperation and communication between the authorities in Edinburgh and Westminster with mechanisms in place for joint decision-making would make for a smooth transition with minimal disruption to the governing of Scotland.

But with no precedent in place for how this cooperation would work, there is no model to follow, nor any guarantee that such cooperation could produce desired results. If a crisis strikes and decisive action is needed, these decisions may simply be avoided or made unilaterally by a government that the majority of Scottish electorate have voted to abandon. Neither of these scenarios signals an auspicious start for independent Scotland.

UKRAINE a new Cold War?

AN AUDIENCE WITH SIMON SMITH, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO UKRAINE Since 2012, Simon Smith has been the British Ambassador to Ukraine in Kyiv, and in that time has witnessed some of the most dramatic political upheaval in the modern Ukrainian state since it achieved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Political turbulence in modern Ukraine is not unprecedented; the most memorable case of which being the Orange Revolution in 20042005 where protests over electoral malpractice in the 2004 Presidential elections saw Yanukovych forced by the Ukrainian Supreme Court to submit to a re-vote, eventually losing by a considerable margin to the pro-Western Yushchenko. The events of the last year, however, have been considerably more dramatic. Not only has Yanukovych been overthrown, this time through distinctly less democratic channels, but over the last 7 months the 22

world molly mcparland has borne witness to an outright, public, and bloody battle over competing visions of the future of Ukraine. As Ambassador Smith believes, events in Kyiv mark a fundamental shift, not only internally within the political system of Ukraine, but in international relations; as a result of the crisis, relationships between the West and Russia will be fundamentally different. Though he, unlike some analysts, does not believe that we are necessarily entering a new Cold War, he admits that in the current climate of mistrust the Westâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s relationship with Russia is deteriorating rapidly. The situation is much more complicated than, as some have presented it, a battle between a European and a Russian Ukraine. For those who occupied the streets and squares across the country,

SIR TT14 particularly in the early days of the Maidan, it was a protest in support of reform. The protestors saw their country, with its huge reserves of industrial, agricultural and human resources, as being brought to its knees by corruption and poor institutional design. Ambassador Smith notes that the first crunch point experienced by Ukraine was not an identity dispute, but rather an economic crisis. Ukraine currently only has the liquid reserves to cover a few weeks of imports, necessary economic reforms have not been enacted and the Ukrainian shadow economy is one of the biggest in the world—at around 50% of GDP. Taxes in Ukraine are therefore often not collected or even properly institutionalised in the first place. Additionally, it is now estimated that $37 billion had gone missing from state finances during Yanukovych’s rule: evidence of blatant state corruption further decimating an already beleaguered economy. This economic crisis exacerbated the second crisis identified by Ambassador Smith – that of a collapse of the confidence in political parties and their representatives. Political institutions

had not performed effectively: parties were fragmented, rule of law was weak, and people did not believe that they were being properly represented or protected. The initial protestors that stormed Independence Square were calling for institutional reform – for removing corruption and implementing a universal rule of law. As Ambassador Smith commented, “it was about a recipe of success for Ukraine”. However, this initial idea of a “recipe of success” has been subsumed as peaceful protests have been overrun by violence. Ambassador Smith places much of the onus here on the actions of the Russian Government. Perceiving pro-democratic reforms 23

and pro-Western cooperation as a threat to Russia and Russian interests in the region, Putin has exploited an already tense situation by employing systematic attempts to destabilize parts of Ukraine. It is understandable that Russia feels threatened by any Ukrainian attempts to move away from the Russian sphere of influence. Russian identity is still steeped in ideas of imperialism and the concept of the Greater Russia expanding past the borders of the contemporary Federation. An integral part of Rus-

Ukrainians and Eastern, Russian Ukrainians. However, as Ambassador Smith has found throughout his time in Russia, it is extremely difficult to establish any clear divide between the two. In his experience, the vast majority of people speak both Ukrainian and Russian and seem prepared to speak any language in which they can communicate. Even in Crimea Smith believes that pro-Russian separatism has been hugely manufactured. Just weeks before the referendum on a union with Russia took place, only 41%

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Russian identity is still steeped in ideas of imperialism and ders of the contemporary Federation. An integral part of R Russian identity would find th sian history and culture, many scholars have agreed that Russian identity would find the loss of Ukraine intolerable. Despite this, the strength of the Russian reaction has still been a shock, resulting in what Ambassador Smith has determined as the third and fourth crises facing Ukraine: those of national identity and, following the illegal annexation of Crimea, of territorial integrity. Reports of the Ukrainian crisis have increasingly been characterized as a clash between Western 24

of those polled had voted to join Russia. Though this suggests that many of the population did feel a strong attachment to Russia, it also casts doubt on the idea that 41% could have translated to over 70% in just a few weeks. Ambassador Smith suggests that the 30,000 armed militants belonging to units of the Russian armed forces, deployed into the region in the interim, may have played a role in the disparity of results. The 40,000 Russian troops that Russia has been maintaining on the border with Ukraine, combined

SIR TT14 with excessive amounts of propaganda regarding the nationalist nature of the new government in Kyiv, have served to further destabilize Eastern Ukraine – a situation that some have warned could deteriorate into civil war. Other regional experts have been more reluctant to place so much blame on Russia and Putin, however. Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of Politics and former Director of the Russian and East European Centre at the University of Oxford, believes that West-

Smith does agree that the government in Kyiv is not blameless in the current crisis. Policies such as initially revoking the status of the Russian language are now widely seen as a mistake, and opportunities to make politics more inclusive, reaching out to more distant parts of the country, have been missed. However, Smith believes that he cannot find in Kyiv’s new government any evidence of the fascism or extremism from which the Russians claim to be protecting their citizens. Instead, he says, politicians are merely faced with

d the concept of the Greater Russia expanding past the borRussian history and culture, many scholars have agreed that he loss of Ukraine intolerable.” ern actions have also served to polarize and inflame ethnic tensions. He argues that the West should have known that any attempts to incorporate Ukraine into the Western sphere of influence would be intolerable to the leadership in Russia, resulting in a feeling of a hostile encroachment into the Russian heartlands. The revolutions in Kyiv, he notes, were non-constitutional (in the way that revolutions by definition are), and therefore risk merely replacing one authoritarian government with another. Ambassador

the difficult dilemma of dealing with Yanukovych’s ex-cronies quickly enough to appease the protesters and reformers, while not enacting any policies that would alienate people, particularly in the East of the country. It will be a difficult tightrope to walk, but Ambassador Smith is confident that there is the political will in Kyiv to build a democratic and prosperous Ukraine. As to what can be done, Ambassador Smith believes that, internationally, the onus is on Russia 25

to take positive moves to calm the situation. European sanctions may take some time to be effective, but are important in demonstrating to Russia that there will be increasing costs if they continue to be uncooperative. These sanctions are particularly significant to the leaders of industry within the Russian Federation – it is the businessmen

term Smith believes they could be effective in convincing Russia of the benefits of reform. It will by no means be smooth sailing, however, as adapting the Russian economy to be in line with the European Single Market, though economically beneficial, would mean devolving extensive amounts of power and decision-making to independent bod-

ize power away from Kyiv into regions more amenable to Moscow’s influence, there has been an increasing acceptance by the international community that federalism may be the only feasible option. As Ambassador Smith points out, within Ukraine Federalism is a deeply mistrusted system, and Ukrainians themselves have repeatedly shown

who truly understand just how much their country has to lose if they can no longer work with the EU. Though the process of economic sanctions will take time – as European countries establish how to separate themselves from their energy dependence on Russia – in the long

ies and actors outside of the Kremlin – a proposition that will hardly appeal to Putin.

little support for a Federalized state. However, he believes that in concept decentralization in workable, and could be wholly beneficial to stabilizing Ukraine and improving its democratic culture. As Archie Brown adds, there is no reason to suppose that asymmetrical

Within Ukraine, there are rising calls that the state can only be maintained under a federal system. Supported by Russia, in what many assume to be an attempt to institutional-

SIR TT14 devolution could not work in Ukraine. It works in far more established democracies such as the UK and Spain. The process is still going to need some very convincing selling to a wary population however – which is currently impeded by the presence of militias. If the government in Kyiv could successfully convey to the population that it

transferred from Kiev to Luhansk, when you’ve got guys with balaclavas and guns in the Eastern cities scaring everyone”.

wants to let people in the regions make local and financial decisions but that state unity will be maintained, federalism could be a viable option for, at the very least, further discussion. However, as Smith underlines, “it is difficult to focus on what exact budgetary powers should be

therefore, some reason to be hopeful that a worst-case scenario may be avoided. As to his original question of whether the Ukrainian crisis (or any of the four separate crises that he identifies) marks the beginning of a new Cold War, Smith believes that this can be

In the last few weeks there have been the first signs from within Moscow that some Russian elites may be beginning to think again with regards to Russian action in Ukraine. There is,

avoided through the strengthening of diplomatic efforts. The important thing, he argues, is to avoid confrontation with Russia, and to encourage cooperation through organizations such as the OSCE. Crimea has created a dangerous precedent for the Russian destabilization of breakaway regions and possibly entire countries, creating a

climate of mistrust. Increasing both the carrots and the sticks, through diplomatic efforts and sanctions, may help to convince Russia to cooperate with the West before the situation deteriorates any further.

DUCK HOUSES & DIRTY MOVIES

political and moral authority after the expenses scandal gabriel lawson

Confidence in UK politicians seems to plumb new depths every year - the public’s faith in an increasingly distant and out of touch political class is at an all-time low, with a majority of people polled in a BES study believing ‘Most MPs are corrupt’. Despite the fact that news on MPs’ expenses first broke in May 2009, the scandal appears to have left a deep scar on British politics, as seen with the resignation of Maria Mille in April 2014. At the same time, the prosecution of Nigel Evans has revealed what some newspapers describe as a ‘hard-drinking culture’ in Parliament, with research claiming that one third of parliamentary workers have

been sexually harassed. What exactly does this apparent exposure of widespread sleaze among our political elite mean, and how will it affect us in the near future? The expenses scandal was a major event in recent political history, at least from the public’s point of view. Politicians often overestimate the public’s awareness and interest in issues, but by the end of 2009 over 95% of those surveyed were aware of the abuse of MPs’ expenses, and 91% were ‘very angry’ at this, both incredibly high numbers. This indignation appeared to translate into action, with several of the worst offenders prosecuted and convicted of fraud or false accounting, and all those found to

SIR TT14

“What all this evidence reveals is a widespread belief that MPs are morally dubious and that politicians are generally acting in their own interests rather than those they have been elected to serve.” have falsely claimed were required to pay back what they had taken from the public purse. The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) was set up as a watchdog in order to prevent abuses of this kind occurring again. However in the long run public anger faded and very little seems to have been actually achieved. Peers such as Baron Hanningfield, who was convicted of false accounting and sentenced to nine months imprisonment, were allowed to drift back into the chamber after their suspensions were up, not subject to election as MPs are. In 2012/13 the total amount claimed by MPs under

the new regime was actually an increase on that claimed in 2008/09, £98 million as opposed to £95.4 million. IPSA has continued to allow MPs to employ family members, something which 155 MPs take advantage of, possibly explaining the rise in staffing costs in recent years. Meanwhile the trial of Nigel Evans has revealed what appears to be a worrying culture in which sexual harassment is widely permitted. Voters do seem to be aware of all this, with only two in ten agreeing that politicians are ‘behaving in a more professional manner than they were a few years ago’. Surveys taken yearly since 2010 reveal that a majority of the public are

sceptical of the reasons people go into politics, and over 75% desire MPs to act according to a set of guidelines regarding their behaviour and should have to undertake ethics and standards training. What all this evidence reveals is a widespread belief that MPs are morally dubious and that politicians are generally acting in their own interests rather than those they have been elected to serve. This is neatly encapsulated by the fact that a focus group asked to name an animal whose attributes they thought best typified those of MPs came up with, among others, a sloth, a pig and a weasel.

Most striking here is the increase in public apathy; already only 65% of people bother to vote, down from 84% in 1950, and in the immediate aftermath of the revealing of fraudulent expenses in 2009 a poll showed that only 45% of people were committed to voting in the next general election. It may be suggested that the public’s opinion of politicians has changed drastically, with expectations lowered and competence now the major factor in accruing support, rather than conviction or any form of morality.

rent free by the party. It seems that those outside of the three largest parties are not immune to the impulse to claim as much as possible. However, UKIP’s increasing success may have ramifications in that protest votes are still votes, and giving seats to a party that seems unable to properly vet its candidates (who seem to produce a new gaffe weekly) does not appear to be wise. It is therefore a Catch-22 in British politics that the only parties possessing the money and ma-

“What we face here is a situation in which political authority is vested in a select group which has shown itself to be corrupt.” Many commentators also suggest that UKIP, unsullied due to its lack of MPs and seen as more representative of ‘ordinary people’, will reap the rewards at the polls. UKIP recently reached a high of 14%, something that is unlikely to win it any MPs but large enough to demonstrate political disaffection on a large scale. This is despite the fact that UKIP leader Nigel Farage was recently accused of claiming £15,500 a year to run an office given to him 30

chinery to promote capable candidates are the three major parties which have maintained a stranglehold on power for decades and arguably no longer represent public opinion, barring regional parties such as the SNP or Plaid Cymru which could never hope to win a general election. First past the post makes it unlikely that any new party could compete with the machinery already in place and win a large number of MPs, even if its policies did man-

SIR TT14

age to attract a significant number of votes. In addition, although public dissatisfaction with the major parties is at an all-time high, their success is something of a self-fulfilling prophecy in that many people see smaller parties as a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;wasted voteâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and therefore are unlikely to choose their candidate over one selected by the major

parties who is seen itself to politiciansâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; as actually electable. attempts to cheat the system rather than atWhat we face here is a tempting to improve situation in which po- upon that system. litical authority is vest- How this state of afed in a select group fairs is to be ended is which has shown it- unclear, but it seems self to be corrupt. The unlikely to stop unsystem makes change til voters take definidifficult to accomplish tive action and begin and, more strikingly, to elect those who the public appears to they actually want be unwilling to force to represent them. change, accustoming 31

Authority in Failed States The latest failing nicholas tan state has arguably commanded more attention than Somalia ever did; the world now watches, helpless, as Russia continues to destabilize and delegitimize Ukraine’s control of Crimea, sowing the seeds for a prolonged civil war that threatens to undermine Kiev’s ability to govern in the east. While nowhere near the level of violence in places such as South Sudan, Ukraine edges closer than ever to the plight that already beleaguers too many nations in the developing world. What has been the world’s response to the Ukraines and South Sudans in the past decade? The old, tired refrain – that ‘some32

thing must be done’ – and subsequent inaction has unfortunately characterized the phenomenon of failed states. Shockingly little has been done for a problem that should have commanded global attention since the collapse of Somalia in 1991. If there has been help, it has been inconsistent, conditional, and usually inept. Yet this is a problem that represents a genuine security threat to the international community, even if it is not always viewed as a significant geostrategic concern. Failed states from Yemen to Syria have recently become breeding grounds for Al Qaeda affiliates, shipment points for illicit drugs, and transit points for the proliferation of weapons of

SIR TT14 mass destruction. If it took the steady slide of Ukraine for us to notice these harms, we are long overdue. Enough ink has been spilt on the dangers to security posed by failed states. It is time we turned our attention to what means, if any, are available to reestablish authority in failed and failing states. Some of these states, including Ukraine and South Sudan, may be fortunate enough to escape war and conflict in the near future. They will be in need of a long-term plan to restore authority and governance, and the international community should start considering how to give them one. The fundamental cause behind much of state failure is the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s loss of legitimacy, which fuels the vast array of

problems that emerge afterward. Citizens depend on the state and central government to protect their persons and property, and provide a sense of security from aggressors, both without and within. In most failed states, however, this protection is absent. The state is either party to the violence that plagues its citizens (Sudan), or is simply helpless to intervene (Somalia), having lost what Weber describes as a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;monopoly on forceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. In such circumstances, security forces may have already lost

the trust of the citizenry, leaving the state unable to enforce its mandate. This is currently the situation in Ukraine, where police are now frightened to patrol the streets, having lost the trust of the people after their role in cracking down on protests against former president Yanukovych. In the vacuum created, armed militias and warlords are often able to roam freely and carve out their own fiefdoms, with often disastrous and deadly results. These circumstances often lead to the mistaken belief by intervening countries that a failed state has effectively lost all control, and feeds the mentality that an imposition of a new brand of authority is necessary to wipe the slate clean. Yet most commenters such as Lyons have indicated that this is 33

far from feasible – because while failed states do indeed suffer from a crisis of governance, they are not completely ungoverned spaces. With few exceptions, many failed states retain either nominal or limited authority. Their existence, along with the complex factors behind the state’s original failure (such as ethno-religious divisions), warrants a more incisive approach. Intervention and reconstruction initiatives cannot afford to ignore this, but must instead consider an adaptive model which builds on the governmental

1970s-80s were any indication, these foreign programmes have rarely addressed the root causes of economic malaise, leaving them doomed to fail. The programmes attempted to liberalise the local economies by embarking on a campaign of tariff elimination and privatization of state subsidies. Although some profited from this, the programmes nonetheless led to deleterious effects in developing economies, whose primary industries were dictated by volatile commodity markets. The consequence of

“It may perhaps be anathema to Western observers to accept that political structures best-suited for reconstructing authority may be less than democratic.” and economic systems that have survived the failure of authority. The reason why economic assistance so often fails, despite the generous amounts of aid offered, is because it is often conditional. Failing states with weak governments can hardly afford to refuse their benefactors, and are thus forced to reconstruct their economies along the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). If the IMF’s failed Structural Adjustment Programmes in Uganda and Zambia in the 34

this neglect was the collapse of local industries, and consumer prices reaching unaffordable levels. Likewise, in Sierra Leone, an annual United Nations (UN) and Department for International Development expenditure of $16.4 billion (between 1999 and 2004) did not salvage the country. Citizens simply did not trust the direction of funds toward the reconstruction of a despotic state that had been responsible for repression and corruption in the pre-war period. IMF spending caps were also responsible for sti-

SIR TT14 fling increased spending on crucial sources of state legitimacy, such as education and government salaries. It is difficult to envision how the state can ever regain the loyalty of its citizens, while tied to the whims of foreign powers with little interest in local welfare. Conditional aid might sometimes be necessary (consider how Ghana reneged on the terms of IMF assistance), but when tied to unrealistic expectations of overhaul and reform from foreign parties, it is clearly not going to succeed. So what kind of economic assistance do these countries need? Well-meaning international organizations need to accord more respect for the unique socio-economic conditions of these states, as research has shown that there are functioning informal en-

tities that still retain some level of legitimacy. The private sector is a notable example, with financial services having endured despite the absence of authority in some countries. In Somalia the hawala (transfer) system sustains foreign remittances that provide crucial income in to impoverished citizens. Likewise, in nominally-communist North Korea, the underground market economy provides many of the necessities which the government has failed to deliver (and is nurturing opposition to the regime in the process). Even in Nigeria, informal sector employment covers close to 70% of the workforce. Technocratic assistance should (where possible) explore how to build on these systems in the interim, many of which have been a source of sustenance,

and thus legitimacy, for the populations of failing states. They are hardly enduring models of growth and will almost certainly need to be replaced when genuine reform occurs (as is occurring in Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s shadow banking system), but in the interim, they are important and easy sources of stability when the state has lost popular legitimacy. In the long term, these countries will also need to emphasize basic service delivery to build on and eventually replace the informal systems, a fact which the international community has helpfully noticed. The World Bankâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s assistance in rebuilding Liberia appears to have succeeded in this regard, by funding a twostage Poverty Reduction Strategy between 2008 and 2011 that focused on expanding 35

basic infrastructure such as roads, and other amenities such as education and employment. A helpful emphasis on reconstructing the civil service – by establishing training schools for human resources and financial management and attracting Liberian expatriates back to the country – was also vital. These reforms, targeted at restoring the basic elements of a state and its responsibilities, increased the prominence of the Liberian state in the eyes of its citizens and rectified many of the causes of failure. It is a work in progress, and perhaps a model for long-term economic reform in failed states seeking a way back from the brink. But let’s not kid ourselves – blind technocratic assistance of the UN and IMF brand will not solve their problems, and slavish de36

votion to standard economic models and the rule of law will not earn a state the trust it needs to survive. An adaptive, needs-based economic reform model might well be the answer these countries need to restore their legitimacy. The most crucial reform is of government. It may perhaps be anathema to Western observers to accept that political structures best-suited for reconstructing authority may be less than democratic. But the priority in renewing political structures should be on the key problems that led to state collapse (such as ethnicity), even if this means accepting alternative structures that fail to meet the standards of a liberal democracy. Winning the loyalty of citizens, who are often more aligned with ethnic

or clan identities, is crucial if the state is to survive in the long term. Nowhere is this truer than in places like Ukraine, where the divide between Ukrainian-speaking Westerners and Russian-speaking East-

erners has been an easy source of conflict for Russia to exploit. Likewise, the South Sudanese divisions between Dinka and Nuer have added an unfortunate ethnic dimension to a continuing political conflict

SIR TT14 between the elites of the ruling Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). No one wants to see the restoration of the old state, but neither do citizens want a foreign-imposed gov-

ernment tied to solely majoritarian interests or external parties. It is difficult to envision how Russian-speaking Ukrainians can ever trust a government in Kiev that refuses to place Russian-speakers in positions of

authority, and which continues to receive Western aid, advice and assistance. But if so, what kind of model will help a failed state transcend its ethnic and civil divisions? Liberal democracy is not the only model – Coyne, in an analysis of US-led reconstruction efforts, has calculated a disappointing 26% success rate for the imposition of this model in the past century. Rotberg likewise notes that Somalia’s earliest governments, while democratic, failed to create a national identity that might have led to a more credible and sustainable state. These failures have made the issue clear – the key to legitimacy is not the blunt imposition of a fractionalized democratic system that pays lip-service to diversity. What is perhaps needed is a model of consociational gov-

ernance that emphasizes proportionality in government posts and segmental autonomy, similar to the Belgian or Lebanese experiences. Such a system must be firmly committed to representing the competing interests of multiple stakeholders, despite the challenge it poses to our conception of majoritarian democracy. But even this is not a panacea, if the state allows the system to widen ethnic cleavages, rather than serve as a means for elite bargaining and re-legitimization of state institutions. The collapse of Lebanon’s government in 2013, and Belgium’s political deadlock in 201011 are all testament to the wasted potential of this framework, if political leaders fail to use its representative structure to tackle the underlying causes of ethnic division. 37

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Both local and foreign actors have betrayed a deli deplorable state of affairs only reinforces the need approaches before they turn into a Given the ambitious reach of this eventual system, a functioning, autonomous government is required in the interim, to stave off terrorists and ambitious military leaders, or the kind of insurgencies that now plague Ukraine. Yoo, in the Berkeley Law Review, has posited that, without any expertise in governance or sufficient trust in the state, temporary forms of joint sovereignty should be explored â&#x20AC;&#x201C; like the model of joint UN trusteeship and local government that currently keeps Kosovo (and Cambodia before it) afloat. But this model is not universally applicable; a NATO-supported government in Kiev will not assuage fears in the eastern regions of the country of Western dominance. This is why foreign (and even international organization) intervention must be applied cautiously in the wake of reconstruction, taking into consideration the sensitivities of ethnic tensions in the region. Sovereignty remains the centre of the nation-state philosophy, and a trustee authority must be care38

ful to involve local elements in reconstruction, preferably along the consociational model, and eventually transit to a supervisory role when viable local administrative bodies (such as police and courts) are reestablished. However, this is still a temporary solution. A longer-term approach must also ensure that new governments root out the key problems that delegitimize their credibility among the citizen population, chief of which is the plague of corruption. It flourishes in failed states and weak governments, causing massive amounts of funding to be diverted away from useful projects (such as roads and infrastructure) to figures such as military officers and government officials. This occurred on a tremendous scale in Angola between 1998 and 2002, when the Angolan government and military brass siphoned off state expenditure in the absence of any need for accountability. To guard against such a damaging force, it is crucial for assistance to

SIR TT14

iberate ignorance of local conflicts and needs. This to shore up failing states with more incisive policy an international security dilemma.â&#x20AC;? help reconstruct an honest, audited civil service, while rebuilding a non-partisan judicial system that is able to act as a check on any interim government, especially when it starts to make crucial appointments to the military or the upper echelons of the ruling class. A flawed judicial system (such as the one in Sierra Leone, which is beleaguered by extortion and bribery) only reinforces distrust in government and its capacity to deliver on its promises, allowing the state to deteriorate further, and its legitimacy to crumble away. When citizens are confident that there are checks on a state with a legacy of failure, it is easier to persuade citizens to invest trust in and embark on the deep reforms that are required for long term development. As such, checking such destabilizing forces is instrumental in forming a more enduring model of legitimacy that is likely to outlast a temporary trustee government. The failed state poses many difficult questions for diplomats and

development experts alike. But the incentive for both local and foreign actors to reconstruct the former state, or rely on triedand-tested methods has betrayed a deliberate ignorance of local conflicts and needs. This deplorable state of affairs only reinforces the need to shore up failing states with more incisive policy approaches before they turn into an international security dilemma. Even a resurgent Russia might not have threatened Kiev if the Ukrainian government had been a stable and inclusive authority, and seen as credible and legitimate by the eastern population. Former President Bushâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s 2002 National Security Strategy confessed that failing states have become greater threats than expansionist ones, being incubators for terrorism, drugs, and weapons. Acknowledging this threat will require us to offer some hard answers â&#x20AC;&#x201C; rather than letting the failures sink into further malaise, at our own expense and risk.

A Baseless Jihad

The fragmentation of post-Bin Laden Islamism In September 2013, at least sixty seven people died during the siege of a Nairobi shopping mall reportedly carried out by members of al-Shabaab, a militant group based in Somalia, with connections across the East coast of Africa. In April this year, over two hundred Nigerian schoolgirls were abducted by the radical Islamist group Boko Haram. 40

emma brand

Elements of the Western press are quick to allude to links between these acts of terror and these terrorists groups, and the transnational movement known as al-Qaeda. They have inadvertently constructed an image of al-Qaeda as a powerful overarching body that controls all the smaller insurgency groups around the world. This image is a myth.

SIR TT14 Although al-Qaeda still has transnational bases, the emphasis that the Western media places on the involvement of al-Qaeda in local terror plots is misguided. Despite the perception that al-Qaeda is a global organisation with decentralised cells across the world, this is not the case; these “decentralised cells” are in fact disparate movements, who do not report to the leaders of the now diminished movement for global jihad. Al-Qaeda no longer has global authority, and perhaps it never did. George W. Bush created this myth of al-Qaeda as a global power. He correctly identified the group as the perpetrators of September 11th, the most severe terrorist attack that homeland America has ever experienced, but then estab-

lished the far-reaching “War on Terror”, the international military response to that tragedy, intended to wipe out al-Qaeda. In the process, he conflated al-Qaeda with the Taliban, hostile Arab regimes, and angry young Muslims in general, rendering the “War on Terror” a war between the West and Islam. Al-Qaeda rapidly became a rallying point for radical Muslims all over the world, who could claim to be acting as part of a recognised global jihad. Had the “War on Terror” been less broad, and not included the invasion of Iraq, al-Qaeda might have drowned amidst the wave of revulsion that poured out across the board, from localized jihadist groups to Western diplomats, in the wake of 9/11. By launching the “War

on Terror”, Bush gave the name of al-Qaeda global authority, and as long as it had its all-important figurehead, it retained that perceived authority. But al-Qaeda undoubtedly peaked at 9/11. It was at this point that bin Laden genuinely was the head of a transnational movement based in Afghanistan, comprising around three thousand fighters, largely Saudi and Yemenite. Despite speculation that it had been active since the 1980s, in 2001 the group had only existed for five years. Before that, bin Laden had been financing the localised terror plots of Saudi and Yemenite exiles, fighting the regimes in their home countries deemed “renegade”. The idea of al-Qaeda as a well-established movement, strongly ingrained 41

into the Arab psyche and therefore able to control the Muslim world is clearly flawed.

bin Laden; the groups tend to be funded through their own crimes, and are almost entirely inward-looking. They do not have transnational authority, but they also do not view larger bodies as having authority over them.

The hysteria of the Western media created the illusion of a much more powerful threat. Although al-Qaeda did not immediately relapse into local groupings, it was This is particularly true of Boko undoubtedly weakened by the Haram, a group largely funded negative response to 9/11 and by through bank robberies, foundthe loss of its base in Afghanistan. ed in 2002 by Mohummed YuWith bin Laden in hiding, the suf with the aim of creating an thousands of young Muslims who independent state under Shari’a flocked to avenge the “War on law in northern Nigeria. From Terror” and the its inception the “Al-Qaeda no longer group has takmillions more who donated to en advantage of has global authorthe movement the poverty and ity, and perhaps it were joining an corruption rife never did. ” al-Qaeda that, in Nigeria, givwithout visible en the lack of leadership, was on the wane. The authority held by the elected govfinal blow came in May 2011 with ernment. The group is responsithe assassination of bin Laden, ble for hundreds of deaths a year which revealed the power vacuum in Nigeria and its neighbouring that his persona had concealed. countries, but while ideologically opposed to “Westernisation”, it Thus, in spite a brief transnahas never tried to attack the West tional period, the situation of outside of its zone of influence. the early 1990s has resurfaced, It has been reported that Boko where extremists are carrying Haram is connected to al-Qaeda out jihad against their native in the Islamic Magreb, but firstly, governments rather than achievthey do not seem to have received ing global reach. This time, there any material benefit, military or isn’t a sole funding figure like financial, from outsiders, and 42

SIR TT14 secondly, partaking in global jihad would conflict with their doctrine of avoiding interaction with the West. Boko Haram is using similar tactics to al-Qaeda, but it has a different aim and exists on a smaller scale. It could not take direction from the umbrella movement. The case of al-Shabaab is more complex given that it has a larger number of splinter groups than Boko Haram. One such splinter group, Hisbul Islam, at one point identified Osama bin Laden as its leader, and in February

2012 al-Shabaab itself declared a merger with al-Qaeda. These facts undermine the notion of al-Qaeda’s increasing irrelevance, and of al-Shabaab’s pursuing purely localised terror. However, when in December 2010 al-Qaeda tried to force a change of leadership upon al-Shabaab, they retained Moktar Ali Zubeyre (“Godane”) as their Emir. Al-Qaeda was undoubtedly weak from nearly ten years of sporadic leadership, yet even the formal merger in 2012 was hardly a sign of strength on either side. They appear to

have banded together due to declining membership and strategic limitations caused by opposition forces. In recent years, al-Shabaab has experienced setbacks, defeats and defections – it no longer possesses national authority, let alone transnational. Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are definitely linked, but whether this link is forged through a chain of command deriving from global jihad remains in doubt.

“The final blow came in May 2011 with the assassination of bin Laden, which exposed the power vacuum which his persona had concealed.” Numerous other groups around the world claim kinship with al-Qaeda. But these groups tend to exist either where government is weak, or where the more radical elements of society feel disenfranchised by their leaders, perceiving them to be Westernised tyrants. Rather than having far-reaching power, al-Qaeda can only thrive where there is no other form of authority to threaten it. The Al-Nusra Front (ANF), perhaps the most aggressive of all the Syrian rebel fighters, typifies these factors. The leader of the ANF has declared his allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, and kinship with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also tied to al-Qaeda. The ANF is in some ways no different to the thousands of angry young Muslims who came to fill al-Qaeda’s ranks after 9/11, using the powerful name as a base to support and justify their actions. The ANF, like Boko Haram, is against involvement in attacks against the United States. It instead desires to rid Syria of Western influence and 44

to establish a Pan-Islamic state in Syria subject to Shari’a law. Although this is of course, no benign prospect to the West, it still differs vastly from the conception of a small, militant cell of a more threatening umbrella movement aiming for the destruction of Western civilization. Once again, we see al-Qaeda invoked as an authority in name alone, with no real power to influence global jihad. The word “jihad” has two meanings. Most familiar to Westerners is the idea of Holy War – the crusade against “unbelievers”; those who do not accept the teachings of the Qu’ran and the prophet Mohammed as divine truth. Jihad’s less-reported meaning is that of the “inner struggle”. Though this second meaning usually implies a personal spiritual struggle, on a macrocosmic scale we might equate it with civil conflict. This is particularly apt given that the group waging such a jihad strives to project its Islamist identity onto its native coun-

SIR TT14 try, and to maintain that Islamism where it has been established. Rather than being at war with the outer world, these groups ignite struggles within their own countries – struggles which have implications for the wider world, but which can still constitute a battle between discordant elements of the same body politic. It might have appeared under a foreign name, but such national insurgency is not unknown. The IRA, the PLO, the Tamil Tigers – all of these now more or less defunct groups fought national terrorist campaigns along religious lines within their own states. They did not aspire to global authority; instead, they sought power within their homelands – they waged an inner jihad.

the nationalist struggles taking place on a daily basis in much of Africa and the Middle East.

As we have seen from the example of al-Qaeda, to aspire to more is pure hubris. As a transnational group, it was dangerously powerful for a short time around the turn of the century, but it was never able to control a global army. Though that group still exists in name today, it has considerably less control over its proxies now than it did in its more flamboyant youth. In reality it has very little at all to do with

Abu al-Walid, accused in his lifetime of being both a terrorist affiliated to al-Qaeda and a member of the Saudi intelligence, was fiercely critical of the way in which bin Laden led al-Qaeda. He claimed that “absolute individual authority is a hopelessly defective form of leadership, an obsolete way of organisation that will end in nothing but defeat.” Al-Walid was careful not to openly accuse bin Laden of 45

poor leadership, merely stating that the autocratic model he employed was out-dated and flawed. Whether or not we view bin Laden as a strong leader, it is clear from the decline of the movement following his disappearance and death that, by having such “absolute individual authority”, he created an anaemic movement, unable to support itself, let alone the plethora of different factions claiming to be associated with it. While the name al-Qaeda continues to evoke strong emotions, positive or negative, it cannot be called obsolete, even if has little power beyond that name. It is time to stop giving credence to smaller groups’ claims of alignment with al-Qaeda, and to stop inventing associations that perpetuate a myth. Even if these groups really are affiliated to what they perceive to be a global power with the ability to enact a worldwide jihad that is not what matters. In fixating on the threat of al-Qaeda, we ignore the real dangers of the spread of extremism in Africa, and the damage that is being done, not to the west, but to Africa itself. The kidnapping of schoolgirls in Nigeria deserves our attention in its own 46

right. In choosing to view al-Qaeda as the umbrella organisation behind the attack, we distract ourselves from the main story, and allow the myth of al-Qaeda’s global authority to flourish.

SIR TT14

SOUTH AFRICA’S DECLINING AUTHORITY

kameel premhid

isolation to freedom Although this trageThe South African and global inclusion. dy resulted in a short period of heightened electorate recently Thankfully, though, interest in foreign polhanded Jacob Zuma and his African Na- for Mr Zuma and the icy, it was neither sustional Congress ANC, South Africans tained nor particularly (ANC) another victo- seem to be more con- insightful. It respondry at the polls. Though cerned with econom- ed and reacted to imthe ANC’s majority is ic issues rather than mediate short-term reduced, and predict- foreign policy ones. issues, failing to quesed to decline further Indeed, foreign policy tion South Africa’s still, the party com- issues receive little or larger role in Africa. mands a potent histor- no critical comment ical legacy that makes at all. The exception Considering the high it a significant force on to this is on the rare levels of inequality in the domestic political occasion when South the country and the stage. With the pass- African troops are en- significant macro-ecoing of Nelson Mandela gaged in active combat nomic challenges that South Africans, and and loss of like occurs. it faces, this should people of the world, The recent loss of life come as no surprise. were reminded of the in the Central Afri- However, as The Econcountry’s miracle: a can Republic (CAR), omist has recently ar(relatively) peaceful and why troops were gued, South Africa’s transition from op- even there in the first policy priorities can pression and global place, comes to mind. best be described as 47

In an article for The Atlantic Monthly Ronald Steel, the distinguished writer and Professor of International Relations, argued as much. In The Domestic Core of Foreign Policy, Steel suggests that inward-looking isolationism would be to the detriment of the modern state. Domestic problems may, if untreated, have a global impact. They may also have an international solution. The reverse is also true. being â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;back-to-front.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; Though the country has made significant gains since the formal end of Apartheid in 1994, the pernicious economic legacy of the system continues. The progress of society is skewed: whites and educated non-whites have done well but the majority still suffer. This is, understandably, a strong temptation to make policy-makers, the media and the electorate focus internally only. The danger of which, however, is that by maintaining a singular internal focus South Africa fails to adequately appreciate the role that foreign policy can play for maximising its national self-interest (on issues at home and abroad). 48

It is a curious thing, then, that Zumaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s first term of office should be marked by a foreign policy that can, at best, be described as being schizophrenic. While decision-makers, the world over, are aggressively pursuing international agendas to advance domestic causes, Zuma can hardly be said to be doing the same. Even though South Africa can be credited for leading the breakthrough at the Durban Climate Change Conference; joining the powerful BRIC-group of emerging nations; and playing a more prominent role within the African Union (AU), its foreign policy successes have been neutered by its mistakes.

SIR TT14 Some of the examples include the significant damage done within the AU in the aftermath of a Zuma-ally to the chairmanship of the AU Commission; South Africa’s fractious relationship with, for example, the CAR and Malawi; and, most worryingly, South Africa’s deathly silence when the SADC Tribunal was shut down. South Africa’s contradictory and, often irrational, positions on Zimbabwe, Libya and Syria (with respect to its

were respectively characterised by the Rainbow Nation and African Renaissance doctrines. That is not to say that neither the Mandela nor the Mbeki administrations would have faced foreign policy set-backs. They did. In the absence of absolute hegemonic power within the region, and internationally, South Africa could not have hoped to achieve all its foreign policy interests. However, what distinguishes those periods

“The progress of society is skewed: whites and educated non-whites have done well but the majority still suffer.” commitment to human rights in each) also makes matters worse. Some may seek to explain away South Africa’s misfortunes as a result of the uncertain and anarchical nature of the international community. Others would suggest that South Africa’s inability to navigate these omnipresent difficulties is as a result of a foreign policy ‘drift’ that has occurred under Zuma’s watch. This is in direct contradiction to the presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki which

from this one is that South Africa’s could rationally be tied to a clearly defined agenda, whatever its merits. The same cannot be said now. This is more than a signalling issue too. The entire conduct of South Africa’s foreign policy, as for any nation, depends on a coherent set of principles that serve as the basis of its decisions. The danger of not understanding its purpose abroad, especially when considered in light of domestic policy questions, is that decisions are made in an incoherent, 49

ad hoc and defragmented manner. The lack of policy certainty and dependability not only hurts South Africa’s reliability to its international partners abroad but also undermines South Africa’s long-term ambitions of becoming more of a global player. The impact of the absence of these clear hallmarks of a strong foreign policy is evident in how South Africa deals with particularly tricky issues that crop up within the region. This is perfectly encapsulated by its response to Uganda’s anti-gay laws.

strong equal protection provisions, the fact that it has equivocated on issues that are, supposedly, fundamental to it illustrates just how weak its ability to act as a regional authority actually is. That it could maintain this as the official line and also suggest

When faced with an opportunity to condemn the laws, the South African Government not only failed to do so, its explanation of its own failure betrayed its understanding of its role in the world. The government, through the Home Affairs Minister, stated that it was the position of the South African Government to not comment on the intrnal affairs of other states.

that it should hold a permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council (UNSC) is laughable.

Even though the Government did emphasise, however, that creeping institutionalised homophobia would not be replicated in South Africa, given the country’s

Firstly, UNSC Members are inclined to comment on and be concerned with affairs of other states – even where their interest is indirect at best. That is ow-

SIR TT14 ing to the nature of the work the UNSC undertakes: seeking to protect and maintain world order. While Uganda’s persecution of homosexuals has not escalated to an international security crisis, the initial observation of how the state is targeting (allegedly) gay people is cause for concern.

If South Africa cannot speak out in an ‘easy’ case involving a violation of human rights, how can it legitimately aspire to more? Secondly, the fact that South Africa has failed to push a human rights agenda as part of its foreign policy is telling. In the first

case, it shows a questionable commitment to human rights. In the second instance, it shows that for all South Africa’s rhetoric as to its power within the region, its ability to exert that power and influence other regional powers is rather limited. This makes it questionable whether South Africa should be the beneficiary of UNSC reform. It’s inability to influence actors within its ambit of influence robs it of the legitimacy that other UNSC members have for their ability to do the same. Third, hiding behind sovereignty, especially in South Africa’s case, is deeply ironic. For let’s not forget that during Apartheid, frontier states were praised for making South Africa’s internal issue of ‘separate development’ very much their concern. And the ANC had no shortage of harsh words for the UK and the USA’s respective leaders, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Regan, and their supposed failure to [do the same]. It is deeply disappointing that a party who advocated for, and relied on, international support to overcome racial segregation at home cannot lend their voice in support to those who face similar denigration abroad. At worst it is callous negligence 51

and at best it is rank hypocrisy. The Zuma administration continues to do itself no favours by failing to adopt a comprehensive foreign policy agenda. Even if that agenda were to be more classically realist and avert any discussion of human rights altogether it would be better than operating in a policy vacuum. The longer it fails to concretise

its position on world affairs, the more its authority â&#x20AC;&#x201C; real and perceived â&#x20AC;&#x201C; will diminish. As a pretender to the role of regional hegemon, South Africa would greatly increase its standing by defining that policy and acting in accordance with it, even where that involves difficult decisions like commenting on the internal affairs of other states. To drift as it is, is merely asking for trouble.

SIR TT14

Sir is the termly magazine of Oxford’s International Relations Society. You can find us at irsoc.org/?page_id=890, as well as at sirmagazine.wordpress.com. With thanks to: Mansfield College JCR, Magdalen College JCR, Bill Emmott, Jack Barber, & Hebe Foster.

Image Attribution Cover - https://flic.kr/p/3HSrUG - Luca Savettiere

Ukraine protestors - http://mstyslavchernov.com/ - Mstyslav Chernov

Back cover - https://flic.kr/p/aDZyQK - Alexandre Dulaunoy

Parliament header - https://flic.kr/p/4QELxi Davide Simonetti

Kony header - http://www.flickr.com/photos/ tian2992/7390215142/ - tian2992

Parliament sign - https://flic.kr/p/6tZqSc - secretlondon123

Kony stencil - http://www.flickr.com/photos/ whoshotya/6997369741/ - Nic Adler

Failed states header - https://flic.kr/p/63xmUF Arsenie Coseac

Kony child soldiers - http://gemini.info.usaid.gov/ photos/displayimage.php?pos=-1223 – L. Rose

Failed states Lagarde - https://flic.kr/p/yANjQ World Economic Forum

S.Afr Police header - https://flic.kr/p/83zEKM ER24 EMS

Failed states UNHCR tent - https://flic.kr/p/i32oyJ - Oxfam International

SA police dog - https://www.flickr.com/photos/28646916@N06/11330901873 - FuTurXTV

Terrorism header - https://flic.kr/p/9U7N4f Andres Perez

Scotland header - https://flic.kr/p/82am8w Number 10

Terrorism Boko Haram - https://flic.kr/p/nvpC1J - Michael Fleshman

Scotland Putin - https://flic.kr/p/mmbp98 Isriya Paireeparit

Terrorism twin towers - https://flic.kr/p/6XByfm Marc AuMarc

Ukraine Simon Smith – http://www.kyivpost. com/content/politics/simon-smith-uk-ambassador-hopes-for-proper-investigation-into-beatingof-journalists-in-kyiv-on-may-18-324629.html - courtesy of Kyiv Post

S.Afr Decline Zuma - https://flic.kr/p/e1tsUT GovernmentZA S.Afr protest - https://flic.kr/p/8NzhuY - Avaaz