Sir TT 2016 by Oxford International Relations Society

Editorial Team EDITORS Harriet Goldstaub Taylor Yu

Will Britain Emerge from "Brexit" a winner or a loser? Winner | Sam Slater Loser | Jack Ford

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Haley Lemieux

Zero-sum games with national sovereignty? Russia and the EU in Eastern Europe | Thomas Stevens

DEPUTY EDITOR Oliver Ramsay Gray

Down but not out: Ukraine since the Euromaidan | James Barnett

Social justice and injustice in Latin America | Leo House

Winners and losers in digital diplomacy: Interview with Tom Fletcher CMG | Oliver Ramsay Gray

Who does the Kohinoor Diamond belong to? | Ankita Saxena

Islam in China | Rory Weaver

Is China trying to recolonize Africa? | William Gardner

The EU needs to re-find its moral and political compass: Thoughts on the refugee crisis | Rose Vennin

The Kurds and their Syrian Utopia | Patrick Kenny

SUB-EDITORS Hubert Cruz Sophie Dowle Leo House GRAPHIC DESIGN Thai Dang SPONSORSHIP Christian Amos COVER PHOTOGRAPHY Bruce Lemieux All images without credits are licensed as Creative Commons Zero - Thank you to our sponsors -

Table of Contents

SYMPOSIUM: ALLIANCES When a special relationship goes sour | Ellie Gomes Strategic Partnership, Middle Power and Multilateral Institutions in Asia | Lina Lee Profile: United OxMak | Alex Farley Intergovernmental cooperation on refugee flows | Fergus Peace

44 47 49 50

EDITORS' FOREWORD

e inhabit a globe in constant flux. To look at the beginnings of academic international relations and the world surrounding the first theorists, the huge transitions caused by major twentieth century events, such as the World Wars and the Cold War, could hardly have been anticipated. This shows us that the study of global affairs must constantly take the time to adapt and reassess current international dynamics, to take into account changes in players’ positions, to understand those who are prosperous and those who are falling behind. The rapid globalisation that took place after the devastation of the Second World War has proved to be a double-edged sword. As Martin Mayer and Mathias Thoenig argued in their 2008 essay, “Make Trade not War?”, the globalisation of trade and politics has changed the nature of international relations by reducing the probability of global conflicts, yet increasing the probability of bilateral confrontation. Prior to 2010, it seemed difficult to disagree with Mayer and Thoenig, but the examples of Yemen, Syria and Ukraine - where today’s crises stem from internal divisions and civil conflict - have seriously undermined the idea that bilateral wars are more likely. Additionally, the meteoric rise of advanced technology and the facilitation of multinational connections could very much call into question whether the concept of “bilateral war” is even relevant in an age when everything 4

and everyone seems to be interconnected. One only has to look to the refugee crisis to see how international relations has become far more complex and significant than simple efforts to satisfy the needs and desires of states that are directly involved. To this end, Sir offers a critique of the EU’s current handling of the crisis. Scars from past international policies, such as colonialism, have also become all the more visible in the postcolonial world. Having left colonised nations in a weakened position, the instability of regimes in states such as those in South Sudan and Libya suggests that colonialists hold an old debt that needs to be paid. This seems particularly true when considering the ethnic configuration of regions: conflict between different cultures is still very much apparent. One only needs to look at the Kurds in Syria, Iraq and Turkey to understand this, and we offer an article on the prospects of an independent Kurdish state. Furthermore, the Middle East and Africa have arguably been negatively affected by western intervention in their confrontations, considering that little is then done by the powers intervening to assist with the rehabilitation once such difficulties have died down. Changing power balances in the region are considered by an article on differing perspectives of China’s economic investment in Africa. Moreover, the worldwide financial meltdown has arguably resulted in the adoption of more aggressive policies by

particular players in order to distract from perceived economic decline. Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 and subsequent suspected military involvement in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine can be viewed as an extension of this more assertive trend of trading peace for sovereign gain. Such actions inevitably impact on the surrounding regions, demonstrating how one state’s win can be others’ loss. Sir explores this in pieces on the impact of Russian-EU relations for Eastern Europe, and the consequences of the Euromaidan revolution on the country of Ukraine as a whole. In a sense, international relations in our day and age is a free-for-all, zero-sum game, and this has led to the relegation of some players and the ascendancy of others. Is international relations about winners and losers? Should governments seek to eliminate this dynamic, or could it be seen in a more positive light? Does the concept of “winning and losing” apply to spheres beyond the interaction of states in the political arena? These are the questions that Sir seeks to answer in this issue, bringing together diverse views on these points from writers across Oxford, focussing on both specific regions or states, as well as on the globe as a whole. In terms of the immediate future, we look at the possible implications of “Brexit” vs. “Bremain” in a debate piece that aims to present a concise summary of both sides in the run-up to the upcoming

referendum. Beyond this, the journal offers articles that delve into a spectrum of issues. Some, like the refugee crisis and ongoing tensions in Eastern Europe, have dominated headlines for quite some time, whilst others, such as the issues surrounding the return of the Kohinoor diamond and China’s involvement in Africa, have flown under the radar. The interview with Thomas Fletcher, in which he discusses the pros and cons of digital diplomacy, is a particular highlight, illuminating the impact of modern technology on diplomatic efforts. On a more local level, our spotlight on United OxMak zooms in on efforts at multilateral cooperation happening at our university. Last but not least, our symposium on “Alliances” examines some of the uneasy bedfellows created by the developing dynamics in Europe, Asia and North America. Understanding the dynamics at play between nations is key to creating a more egalitarian version of international interactions. By confronting the issue of winners and losers in a thoughtful and analytic manner, we hope to contribute to such knowledge and spark new interests in the wide and variegated picture of international relations today. Harriet Goldstaub Taylor Yu Trinity 2016

Will Britain Emerge from "Brexit" a

WINNER or a

LOSER?

Image: Nathaniel Hunt

Winner - Sam Slater -

n the 24th June it will become clear that one side in this referendum will emerge as winners and the other side as bruised losers. Whilst the country considers this decision, many have started to become irritated by the tone of the debate. It is all speculation, they say. We can dismiss some of the more ridiculous conjecture: if we leave, Europe is not going to descend into war. But what of the economy? Will jobs be lost? Will we experience a boom? Both sides can speculate, but those supporting Brexit can most definitely point to examples of where the European Union has already made some people winners, and others very much losers. “The Union shall not be liable for, or assume the commitments of, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities… or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.” So reads Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty. This document can tell you all you need to know about the sheer contempt the European Union has for democracy, the rights of its member states, and the rule of law itself. When the European Union approved

the Greek bailouts, which despite earlier promises the UK ended up paying into anyway, it was breaching its own treaties and breaking its own laws. About this, there is no controversy: the Eurocrats admit it themselves. Christine Lagarde, who was French finance minister at the time, boasted, “we violated all the rules because we wanted to close ranks and really rescue the Eurozone. The Treaty of Lisbon was very straightforward. No bailouts.” When the EU is prepared to break its own laws and breach its own treaties, democracy stands out as a loser. The disregard for democracy exhibited by those who run these institutions is no surprise when the institutions themselves are so undemocratic. The entire framework of democracy in the European Union is doomed to fail – there is no European Demos, so there can be no European democracy. “But no matter – we can reform the EU from the inside!”, the Remain camp tells us. They may perhaps suggest that we can be winners here, and lead Europe to fundamental reform. But Britain is the single most marginalised country in the European Union; we sit not just geographically and culturally on the fringes of Europe,

but politically too. Despite making up around 13% of the population of the EU, we hold just 9.5% of seats in the Parliament and 8% of votes in the Council of Ministers. More than that, only three and a half percent of people working in the Commission are British nationals. Our voice is tiny. It’s true that when we leave and want to trade with Europe, we will have to accept some rules on those parts of our economy that trade with them. Currently, however, such rules apply to our entire economy. If we were to leave the EU, they would only impact about 10% of it. Furthermore, just because we’ve got a seat at the table where the rules are made, it doesn’t mean that we’re winning. The English Football Association wrote the rules to that game, yet we haven’t won the World Cup since 1966. Likewise, the UK has voted against 72 proposals in the European Council - more than any other nation - and all 72 votes have been defeated. 72-0 is not a good score to lose by, in football or in politics. If our measly number of MEPs, Council votes, and the score of 72-0 isn’t enough to convince you that Britain stands marginalised in Europe, remember this: David Cameron threatened to leave the EU if he didn’t get what he wanted in the renegotiation, and came back with his “very thin gruel”. Indeed, in the end, what he really achieved was and remains a joke: a socalled emergency brake which is never going to be used; a vague promise on integration; and a red-card system which is actively harmful, as it relegates national parliaments to a sub-unit of a larger polity for the first time. This is the best deal we could get when we had what should have been ultimate bargaining power – should 8

we vote to Remain, how can we expect to win in the EU when we’re already so marginalised? And now EU integration must roll on, and it’s clear that our voices calling it to slow down will not be heard. A vote to Remain on the 23rd of June is not a vote to stay in the same place; a vote to Remain is a vote to stay on the bus that’s heading towards deeper European integration and we’re most definitely not in the driver’s seat. Britain is big enough, proud enough, and strong enough to set its own direction and make its own laws. We can stand on our own two feet. Our language is the most widely spoken in the world; in terms of soft power – a concept developed by Joseph Nye, a distinguished alumnus of Exeter College – we are the most powerful nation on the planet. Why, then, are the Remain camp suggesting we need to pool sovereignty with the likes of France and Latvia and Greece and Germany to somehow stay relevant? To draw on Shakespeare’s Richard II, if you want “this precious stone set in the silver sea” to once again be free to make its own laws in its own interests and, “against the envy of less happier lands”, stand up again and join the world, then Vote Leave on the 23rd of June to do your part in ensuring that Britain emerges from the referendum as a winner.

Loser - Jack Ford -

n the white heat of the referendum campaign, accusations are flying in both directions that the other side is unpatriotic or dominated by mavericks, and increasingly implausible apocalyptic scenarios as a result of either leaving or staying are currently making the rounds. Whilst it is not going to be the internationalist, Europhile argument that will swing the result in favour of “Bremain”, it is vital to emphasise that there is a genuinely positive case to be made that both sides - Britain and the European Union - are winners as a result of our continued membership. No doubt we should keep raising vital questions about what Britain’s relationship with Europe would look like post-Brexit. Just look at the alternatives. Norway makes an annual net contribution per capita to the EU budget of about €107 compared to €139 in the UK, as well as keeping its borders open for EU migrants. At the same time, the country does not enjoy full voting rights in EU institutions, so that it is unable to exercise influence over the policies it is bound by. Switzerland and Iceland face similar predicaments. All are clear losers, which they would not be if they were full EU member states. Moreover, there is no reason to think that Britain would be any different. Eurosceptics typically argue in response that Britain won’t be like Norway or Switzerland, for we are large and powerful and have a gaping trade deficit with other EU countries. One reason to doubt this

argument is the dangerous precedent a British “special relationship” would set, giving an added boost to Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen. But even if we leave that issue aside, why is it that this brazen optimism is applied in the case of a fantasy “special relationship”, but not in the case of Britain’s ability to influence the European Union from the inside? There is a certain paranoid logic here: other EU member states and “bureaucrats” are depicted as implacably opposed to Britain’s interests. The truth is, however, rather less attractive: many years of British diplomatic ineptitude when it comes to properly engaging with the European Union. Yet it is estimated that by 2030 the UK will have the largest population and economy of the entire EU, and we already have the largest military and unique transatlantic ties, whilst London is the EU’s largest financial centre. There is no real reason why Britain should not emerge as the leader of the pack, helping drive a consensus for greater openness to the outside world and expanding free trade to services and the digital economy in which Britain so excels. This brings us to the question of sovereignty, which is often enthusiastically pedalled by Brexiters but little understood. Of course, it is important for Britain to retain democratic control of the nature of its relationship with Europe, and removing the phrase “ever closer union” and recognising the special status of non-Eurozone 9

states has helped ensure this. But it is equally vital to recognise that sovereignty only makes sense when it is balanced with power to act and to implement policy. This is why ideas of sharing risk and combining strengths were at the heart of the case for Scotland remaining in the UK. Consider the problem of tax avoidance by multinational corporations and wealthy individuals. National governments acting alone find themselves impotent in dealing with this, but by acting together we can work to share information, eliminate loopholes and prevent a race to the bottom in tax rates, as seen in the EU’s historic deal with Switzerland last year. The same applies to climate change: whilst actions taken by an individual state can put it at a competitive disadvantage in relation to its neighbours, these risks are mitigated when sovereignty is pooled. The EU also offers an unrivalled platform for information-sharing and cooperation, which can help counter issues like terrorism and the refugee crisis, as well as Russian expansionism. Whilst it is not faultless, the EU provides us with an unparalleled capacity to maintain continuous dialogue and to work with the rest of Europe far more closely than we do with other individual countries. Moreover, Britain is in a prime position to lead in shaping the future of the continent to which we are so intimately bound. Yes, we would have a lot to lose from Brexit, but this is precisely because if we take full advantage of the leverage membership brings us we will emerge clear winners, able both to counter the threats that we face and seize the opportunities of the future.

ZERO-SUM GAMES WITH NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY?

Russia and the EU in Eastern Europe Thomas Stevens discusses the consequences of the rupture between Russia and the EU on Eastern Europe

he honeymoon period is long gone, and for two decades the marriage never quite fit; now in a messy divorce, Russia and the EU hurl accusations of unfaithfulness at each other and fight for custody over their hapless children. For 20 years, before the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, diplomats painstakingly directed a tentative EU-Russian integration - an uneasy marriage which saw Russia sign the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), join the Council of Europe and adopt a “common strategy” to promote pluralist democracies in the post-Soviet space. Even in 2013, Russian minister Sergey Lavrov optimistically advocated the ideal of “synergy and

partnership in the Eastern neighbourhood” - a far cry from Kremlin diplomat Andrey Kelin’s claim in March that EU-Russia relations are “near to zero.” Indeed, Eastern Europe’s nation-states are embroiled in a zero-sum game between opposing blocs that compete over national and territorial sovereignty. Western rhetoric portrays Putin’s actions in Ukraine as the sole cause of this. However, the recent escalation in EU-Russian tensions tells a story far more nuanced than this dominant Western geopolitical narrative. How exactly has this unhappy matrimony broken down? The EU and Russia’s contrasting rationalities on the legitimate use of force are 11

clear – the Kremlin sees military power as a daily occurrence in world politics, while Brussels sees it only as an emergency measure. Today, Russian submarines disrupt Eastern European undersea fibre-optic communication lines and infrastructure, and Putin’s Compatriot Policy has evolved to justify the protection of all ethnic Russians through intervention, so clearly displayed by the use of coercive diplomacy in discouraging Ukraine to sign the EU’s Association Agreements (AA) in 2014. Diplomatic alignments, most prominently the EU’s 2014 “Eastern Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP), have solidified the divide in Eastern Europe. Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova have all signed up, much to Putin’s displeasure, in an effort to stop the conflict in the Donbass region. Russia’s policy of “divide and conquer” towards the EU, traditionally confined to its energy policy, is now being applied at an interstate level; in June 2015, a new faction called the “Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENF)” was set up by the leader of France’s Front Nationale Marine Le Pen, whose 39 members have voted in support of Russia’s interests 93% of the time, including a refusal to condemn

the murder of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and the Crimean annexation. Le Pen herself received a €9 million loan from Moscow-based First Czech-Russian bank last November. Within the nations of Eastern Europe themselves, the choice of orientation towards Europe or Russia can be seen in domestic politics. During Moldova’s November 2014 parliamentary elections, viewed by international observers as a battle between pro-Europe and pro-Russian parties, Putin banned crucial food imports, stepped up information warfare and funded favourable candidates as well as violent “street protesters”. Organisations like Russkii Mir, which implements Russia’s Compatriot Policy, receive over $100 million annually to fund the pedalling of a narrative presenting the Soviet Union as the liberator of Eastern Europe in the Second World War. The unsuccessful 2012 Latvia referendum that proposed mandating Russian as the official second language came into existence only through the pressure of over 100 well-funded Russkii Mir lobbyists who insist that the 26% Russian minority in Latvia are being oppressed by the Riga government.

Competition over energy and trade has been a hallmark of EU-Russian tensions since 1990, but economic treaties have recently become politicised to an unprecedented level. In response to the EU’s establishment of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) including Ukraine and Moldova, Moscow set up the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), the codes of which Brussels have labelled “incompatible”, thereby politicising EU-Russian economic relations. The Russian parliament – the Duma – refuses to ratify the ECT and Putin expressed his distrust of its terms in 2015, decrying the “discrimination and double standards” that benefit Eastern European consumers over Russian producers. Eastern Europe’s reliance on Russian gas has decreased by 35% over the past decade, weakening the monopoly previously enjoyed by Gazprom. Furthermore, many countries have struck deals with the EU’s United Energy firm that was created in 2015 as a direct and unambiguous challenge to Gazprom’s hegemony over gas infrastructure. All these elements are tied together with an overarching, bipolar, “us or them” narrative that both sides are culpable of

promulgating. The desire of Federica Mogherini, the current EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to build a policy of “cohabitation” in Eastern Europe is a lonely voice indeed. The declaration of the two trading areas as entirely dichotomous was accompanied by phrases such as “choice of allegiance” and loud complaints about the EU enforcing compliance to its regulations. The overlapping and conflicting grand visions for Eastern European integration that the EU and Russia promote in reality descend into a tug-of-war partnership for regional modernisation. Russian media outlets and the Orthodox church at best disseminate messages that are opposed to the EU’s technocratic empire and “Western betrayal”, and at worst depict European leaders as neo-Nazis. This story-line is a gross-oversimplification that treats the local actors as pawns on an international chess-board. The Western and Russian narratives overlook the distinct preferences and calculations of Eastern European leaders, denying the need for a “trialogue” and dismissing the region’s complexity as irrelevant. This lack Image: Nathaniel Hunt

of “Othering” – that is, the acknowledgement of each state’s individuality – was blatant in the early stages of the Ukraine crisis, as ex-President Yanukovich played the two regional actors against each other to maximise his own geopolitical rent without implementing any actual domestic reform. Most importantly, this blinkered pursuit of either EU technocratic or Russian politico-military governance fails to understand the region’s historical urge for complementarity rather than a dichotomous choice between two parallel competing groups. In 2014, a healthy plurality of 43% of Belarusians and Moldovans indicated their attraction to cohabitation within both regional projects, yet the EU approach remained unaltered, negotiating the divisive AA/DCFTA with Ukraine and holding separate talks with Russia later on. The EU-Russia divorce and custody saga has placed its children in a difficult position. The imposition of a binary choice between each parent on Eastern European nations that have their own individual norms of behaviour and aspirations has not only led to a zero-sum game that is suffocating national sovereignty, but has also placed the states in the region in the dangerous position of having to choose between two giants. For peace, stability and concertation in Eastern Europe to be maintained in the long-term, Russia and the EU desperately need to forge a revamped strategic partnership that moves away from pure symbolism and demarcates precise areas of cooperation. As with all broken marriages, honesty and clarity in communication will be the key to improved relations.

Image: Peter Hudston

UKRAINE SINCE THE EUROMAIDAN: Down but not Out James Barnett examines the consequences of Ukraine’s Euromaidan movement

t has now been over two years since the momentous events of February 2014: the climax of the Euromaidan, a protest-turned-revolution that forced the sitting president, Viktor Yanukovich, out of the country. These two years have been filled with unprecedented change and turmoil for Ukraine, and the consequences are felt not just by the nation, but by the entire region. Despite the shaky truce enforced by the Minsk II accords, the future remains uncertain, the dust is still settling from the biggest armed conflict in Europe since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. From revolution to civil war to make-shift peace, Ukraine has undergone serious trauma - but has this change been positive, or negative for the wider region? Is there a light at the end of the tunnel?

A cursory overview of the events that have unfolded might lead us to a dire conclusion. Those who started the Euromaidan movement couldn’t have had any idea of what was to come. Protests began in Autumn 2013, in response to President Yanukovich’s surprise abandonment of plans to strengthen association with the EU, but right up until Yanukovych’s flight from the country on 22nd February 2014, most observers viewed events as a mere repetition of the 2004 Orange Revolution. They expected that, just as after that revolution, a change of government would be accompanied by little substantial change in domestic policy and day-to-day life. Two factors were not entirely foreseeable at the time: how deeply divisive the outcome of the Euromaidan would be in Eastern Ukraine, and how Russia would 15

respond. Russia reacted with an iron fist. Putin feared the new government would resume Ukraine’s drift towards Europe and Russia's interests in the country - particularly its lease of the Sevastopol naval base in Crimea - would be threatened. Consequently, Russia dispatched 20,000 troops to occupy the Crimean Peninsula in an operation that stunned both Ukrainians and the international community. The population - 65% Russian, 15% Ukrainian and 12% Crimean Tartar - were powerless to resist, particularly as the Ukrainian Armed Forces were bitterly divided as to whether to recognise the new Kiev government or defect to the Russians.

"Some still question whether or not the Euromaidan was legitimate and, as a result, whether the new government is." Another body blow fell when pro-Russian separatists, with Russian support, rose up in the Donbass - Ukraine’s easternmost provinces - alongside riots in Kharkov, Odessa and other eastern cities. This rebellion would spark, in effect, a civil war, with the Ukrainian Army, supplemented by volunteer brigades, facing off against rebel insurgents with heavy Russian aid. The subsequent conflict has ravaged the

former industrial hub, with vast property and personal damage alongside 9,000 total casualties. The consequences of these post-Euromaidan developments have been immense. The loss of Crimea has left Ukraine bereft of much of its strategic position in the Black Sea. This, combined with the loss of the Donbass, has resulted in a vast refugee problem - 1.4 million people have fled Eastern Ukraine, forced out of homes and jobs by the conflict. The severance of ties with Russia, once Ukraine’s principal trading partner, has also hit the Ukrainian economy hard, with 43% inflation last year, not to mention the inestimable costs of the war itself. The weakening of Ukraine’s economic and international standing has widened the continued political rift across the country. Some still question whether or not the Euromaidan was legitimate and, as a result, whether the new government is. Ukraine remains a divided and battered country. Yet there are some silver linings to this cloud. The new Poroshenko government, unlike Yanukovich’s, is committed to reform and to the eradication of corruption. Lead principally by Europhiles and reformers, it is also committed to further integration with the EU, a process that could replace the gaping economic hole left by Russia and Ukraine’s mutual trade embargoes. Moreover, Russia’s aggression has redoubled Eastern European unity and popular sympathy for NATO and the West, an encouraging prospect for the future of the region. For all of Ukraine’s recent troubles, therefore, Ukraine is down but not out.

Social Justice and Injustice in Latin America Leo House explains why it’s not all fun and games in Latin America

rading in stereotypes is a risky business. Stereotypes convey a quick, but crudely abbreviated, understanding of another society. They function as a sort of cultural shortcut. But when you take shortcuts, you cut corners, and when you cut corners, you step on people’s toes. The unfortunate truth is that most people don’t have the time or energy to understand the nuances of each new culture they encounter. Brazil, for example, makes billions by exporting a very attractive stereotype. 2010-2020 is already being called a golden decade for the Brazilian tourism industry. 5.7 million foreign visitors and $6.8bn tourism revenue in 2012 grew to 6.4 million foreign visitors and $7.4bn tourism revenue in 2014 – a similar increase is projected for the end of 2016. Brazil is a hugely popular tourist destination for its white sandy beaches but also for its stereotypes: laid-back, friendly people, who play beach volleyball under the baking sun with "The Girl from Ipanema" playing in the background, hitting the streets at night to sip caipirinhas and dance samba at colourful carnival parties. This is what brings millions to Brazil each year, for everything from gap years to family holidays. The 2014 World Cup and the 2016

Rio Olympics are surely the prize jewels for Brazil in this golden decade. Both are marketed as sporting carnivals - international parties where the Brazilian love of ball-sport meets its affinity for good-natured hospitality. The signature jingle to the ITV world cup coverage – a soft bossa nova guitar riff, with singer cooing “Braaziill” over images of children at play on the beach – surely pedalled this same narrative. Every country exports its national identity in a simplified and palatable form. Here in the UK, tourists buy red phone-box keychains or William and Kate tea-towels by the dozen. Indeed the monarchy - that great British brand and symbol of traditional British sensibilities – has been one of the UK’s most profitable exports, from when it was forced onto other nations in colonial times, to when it brought in just over £1bn in net contribution to the economy last year. But for some countries, exporting stereotypes incurs hidden costs. In the run-up to the World Cup, the military police carried out a brutal cleanup operation and were not afraid to get their hands dirty. The glamorous image of Brazil that had been marketed most certainly did not feature gun-toting drug 17

barons and homeless drug addicts. The shady unit of elite favela-pacifiers, BOPE, staged a full-scale invasion of certain Rio de Janeiro favelas, such as the Rocinha. Approximately 3,000 of the shock troops were deployed, alongside 7 helicopters and 18 heavy armoured vehicles, and the number of registered “disappearances” in Rio rocketed up to 6,004 in that year. Amnesty International spokesman Alexandre Ciconello said, “The government is trying to paint a pretty picture for the world, saying things have been cleaned up and that Brazil is safe for tourists. But the reality is far darker.” Once again, the nation has to put on a brave face and sweep its problems under the carpet before the entire world arrives at Rio de Janeiro for the Olympics this August. This time it may be a little harder for Brazilians to sip caipirinhas and dance samba, considering the weight of a titanic political scandal hanging heavy on their shoulders. The dramatic use of impeachment (which has forced President Dilma

to step down pending trial), the blatant plotting of Vice President Michel Temer to replace her, and the sprawling Petrobras scandal all seem like something from a Brazilian spin-off of House of Cards. Brazil’s adolescent democracy is experiencing growing pains, which could prove a major killjoy this summer. It’s certainly not all doom and gloom on the continent. Brazil’s positivist mantra of “Ordem e Progresso” (Order and Progress) may be faltering, but other Latin American nations seem to have taken it up and are leading the way in certain fields. LGBTQ+ rights are a notable example. Argentina’s 2010 Civil Marriage Law provided equal civil status and legal protection for both homosexual and heterosexual marriages, including adoption rights and pension benefits. In 2012, Argentina was also responsible for the landmark Gender Identity Law, which enables citizens over 18 to undergo gender reassignment without lengthy judicial and medical check-up processes. It also includes hormonal and

surgical reassignment procedures under public and private health insurance coverage. In this respect they’ve set the bar - Brazil and Uruguay followed suit and legalised same-sex marriage in 2013, and Colombia has kept the momentum going by doing the same in April of this year. In Mexico City, and various other Mexican states, same-sex marriage is performed without restriction, whilst prohibition of gay marriage has been forbidden since 2015 and the incumbent president has recently called for extending the legality of same-sex marriages to the entirety of the country. The tide of LGBTQ+ rights has had a much quicker and stronger pull in Latin America – the UK and US only caught up in March 2014 and June 2015 respectively. From an economic perspective, one could argue that the party is coming to a close. There is plenty to suggest that the commodities boom of the last decade in Latin America is faltering, and social progress with it. Yet this should not detract

from the progress that the continent has made over the past decade. Between 2002 and 2012, the poorest Latin American countries saw their incomes grow by 7% each year, and the number of people living on less than $1.90 a day has halved. This has fed redistribution of wealth, as shown by Venezuela’s astonishing plan to build 3 million homes with public funds, and Brazil’s “Bolsa Familia”, which provides income support to 11 million families, provided parents ensure full school attendance and frequent medical check-ups for their children. The truth lies somewhere in between the two stereotypes of a laid-back party continent and a hotbed of corruption, incompetent infrastructure and faltering economies. Latin America has made great socio-economic and geo-political progress in the last decade, and this should not be marred by either of these clichés.

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INTERVIEW WITH TOM FLETCHER CMG

- Oliver Ramsay Gray -

om Fletcher was Downing Street foreign policy adviser to three Prime Ministers before being appointed British Ambassador to Lebanon in 2011 at the age of 36, the youngest senior British ambassador in 200 years. Fletcher became a social media pioneer of the Foreign Office, sending 10,000 tweets during his time as ambassador and becoming the first western diplomat to be retweeted by the President of Iran. He has just published Naked Diplomacy, a book examining power and statecraft in the digital age, and it is available through his website (www. tomfletcher.global) and on Amazon. I spoke with him to learn more about what he means by digital diplomacy, and to find out the winners and losers under this wave of digital transformation.

Oliver Ramsay Gray: You are often quite candid when you are on social media. When you stepped down as ambassador, you joked in your final blog post that “unlike [Lebanese] politicians I can’t extend my own term”. How important is honesty and openness on social media?

issues by themselves. We need more people to be engaged, and act as “citizen diplomats”.

her connections. I believe future diplomats will continue to find new ways to communicate.

ORG: How can diplomats engage with the public, home and abroad, in real life as well as online?

Tom Fletcher: It is very important! People on social media want a personal connection and if you offer standard lines of answers, they can quickly sense them. Openness is much more important for social media than any other forms of communication. However, my approach in Lebanon was very particular. One would not get away with such a candid note everywhere.

TF: Diplomats are best when they are out and meeting with people. Social media is a great help as it enables us to connect with people on a massive scale. That is, of course, no substitute for physical interaction. For example, when I was in Lebanon, I made sure I got on the final of their version of X-Factor. It is important to build an audience and engage with different people, including those who are not always engaged, in order to share our key messages.

ORG: We have talked about the positives of engaging with the public through social media, but what are the potential pitfalls and risks?

ORG: In what way could social media engage with those who are not involved or disillusioned with international affairs and diplomacy? TF: Many people are turned off from international affairs due to the way we communicate with them, such as the frequent use of platitudes and arcane language in diplomacy. We should communicate with people straightforwardly, and I think this is gradually happening. Social media allows us to break down these barriers and connect with people in different ways. Most importantly, we need to convince people that governments cannot solve global

ORG: You were very influential in Lebanon with your blog, particularly with your last post “So… Yalla, Bye”. How important was your role as a social media pioneer and the first to break the mould? TF: I was very lucky to be doing it five years ago. When I replied to people’s tweets, it was seen as revolutionary. Every generation of diplomats will find their way of communication though. My predecessor also had a very popular blog and people used to ask how I would maintain

TF: The tweets by the US embassy in Cairo on the Arab Spring and the Benghazi attack show how real problems could arise from using social media. These risks can be managed though. I tend to leave the draft of a tweet for 20 minutes before sending it to allow me some time to think about what I'm saying. It is true that there is a very live risk attached to social media, but we have no choice but to pile in. The biggest risk is to be not on social media and leave it open to our opponents. ORG: You mentioned that new digital tools could be used by terrorists and other dangerous organisations. Is that a big risk for diplomacy? TF: It is a big risk. People are being radicalised by ISIL while playing on an Xbox. Terrorists are sophisticated which means we have to be equally sophisticated, and master the digital tools available. However, people have little trust in authority nowadays, which is disadvantageous for us since we come from a position of

government. Therefore, we need people to become "citizen diplomats" and take on these arguments as they command more credibility. ORG: Does the idea of digital diplomacy only give an illusion of power, offering hopes of change but perhaps not quite delivering? TF: Indeed – we could eventually find the emperor has no clothes. As states become weaker in the digital age, diplomacy loses influence as a consequence. There is a risk of overestimating the impact we can have, both by ourselves and the general public. In addition, people may not take diplomats as seriously if they perceive a decline in our powers, but I hope this would open up the conversation further, and part of that means demystifying diplomacy so that people can engage with it. ORG: How do you cope with the staggering amount of information in this new online world? TF: There is no doubt that it is very tricky, and many of my colleagues say they could not go on social media since they are already swamped with information. As for me, part of the answer is social media. I use Twitter to curate all that data because there are 30 or 40 people who will help me distil the information so that I can pick out

the best bits. These people will become much more powerful in the future. ORG: Big data also poses risk to privacy. How do you think big data relates to winning and losing in international relations? TF: Big data should allow diplomats and others to provide more intuitive and effective services. Nevertheless, it will be difficult to deal with such an enormous amount of information, especially when it can empower your rivalsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; sources of information. As always, we have to be vigilant and keep an eye on the new emperors: the Facebooks, the Googles, etc. Their values will not always align with those of the general public so we must not be too bewitched by them.

claims to the stone:

The Issue of the Kohinoor Diamond Ankita Saxena discusses the cultural and political significance of the Kohinoor Diamond dispute

ORG: On a final note, what were your most human or intimate moments as ambassador and private secretary? TF: That is a good question. As an ambassador, they would be moments when I travelled around to meet people beyond the elites and leaders. For example, before I left Lebanon, I did a four day walk along the coast from Hamat to Beirut, and spent a lot of time with locals in these towns which I came to know and love. My time in Lebanon was not all about social media. This was about connecting with people on a human level. In Downing Street, the thing that would surprise people is the humour and banter. In between stress and pressure, there was plenty of mucking around and laughs that I will always remember.

Image: Peter Hudston

hat happens when a country defeats another in a war or colonial enterprise? It gains land, large sums of money and, in some occasions, a heightened status on the international stage. Even centuries after battles have been concluded and empires dissolved, the spoils of past victories remain locked up in museums and exhibits for public enjoyment. Yet, in recent years, the losing side of international conflicts have started to speak out. Countries previously subjugated, defeated or weakened have begun to reclaim prized items of cultural and economic significance. In 2009, the British Parliament passed the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act to sanction the restoration of items taken unlawfully during the Nazi era. In the last few years the Toledo Museum in Ohio has been embroiled in the process of returning items taken from Germany, Italy and India. And earlier this year, UNESCO held its first global convention on the international market of “stolen” art as part of a drive for the protection of cultural heritage. What happens, instead, when several countries vie for a single item? When contemporary judgements cloud historical fact? When shifting national borders create new winners and losers? Such is the case of the Kohinoor diamond. This 105 carat, colourless stone of

striking beauty was first discovered nearly 700 years ago in the mines of Golconda, Southern India. Once believed to be the largest diamond in the world, it has passed between the hands of Mughal emperors, Iranian warriors and Punjabi princes alike and it last caught the public eye parading the streets of modern day London mounted on the Queen Mother’s coffin. The issue with the Kohinoor is that there are many claims to this stone. At the turn of the millennium the Taliban argued that the diamond was the “legitimate property” of Afghanistan. A few years later, a Pakistani barrister wrote hundreds of letters to the Queen formulating his nation’s claims. India has been making its case for decades. After extensive questioning by Indian television channels in 2010, David Cameron stated that Britain would not surrender the stone for fear that saying “yes to one” would soon result in the British Museum lying “empty”. Last year, a consortium of Mumbai’s elite of Bollywood actors and businessmen finally sanctioned a court case to determine whether the Kohinoor Diamond could be lawfully returned to India. In April 2016, the case concluded with a striking and controversial judgement: the diamond was “neither stolen nor forcibly taken away”. Rather, it was “given

voluntarily” by the Punjabi Maharaj to the British. Two days later, the Indian cultural ministry dismissed the Supreme Court, arguing that they would make their best efforts to retrieve the stone. The fact that the court came to such a conclusion is surprising to say the very least. It is very much evident from the tumultuous history behind the exchange that the diamond was neither illegally looted, nor voluntarily handed over. It was won by the British in their conquest of Punjab. In the early 1840s, the Sikh empire rivalled the British in the Indian subcontinent. In the stable and impressive kingdom of the Maharaj Ranjit Singh, the Kohinoor diamond became an object of royal pride, displayed to foreign emissaries and traders and encrusted at various times on the king’s turban and his favourite horse’s bridle. After his death, factions begun to grow in the state. Conflicts emerged between the Hindus and the Sikhs. When the Hindus successfully implanted the king’s son Sher Singh onto the throne, he was assassinated a few years later by a member of the Sikh army. During the reign of his younger brother, the child king Duleep Singh, the separation of the army and state was complete. The Prime Minister of Lahore, Khan Singh, was killed in 1844 and his head heralded on

the tip of the Sikh warrior lances. What followed were the brutal Anglo-Sikh wars, a long drawn out conflict which led to the British army being seriously challenged by the Sikh warriors. The truce at the end of these wars inevitably concluded in a peace treaty. The decision was final: “all property of the State of whatever description and wheresoever found” was to be “confiscated to

"For India, the Kohinoor Diamond is symbolic not only of cultural loss but of political loss. As long it remains lodged in the British crown, a part of India remains with it." the Honourable East India Company in part payment of the debt due by the State of Lahore to the British Government and of the expenses of the war.” Thus, India lost its diamond. With the seizing of the stone, came the annexation of Punjab to the East India Company and the disintegration of the Sikh Empire.

Hence, for India, the Kohinoor Diamond is symbolic not only of cultural loss but of political loss. As long it remains lodged in the British crown, a part of India remains with it. The question remains: who is the rightful owner of the Kohinoor? If the British won the diamond when they gained control of Punjab, then surely the Indian Independence of 1947 ought to have revoked the British claim? Then again, the India of 1849 was very different, both geographically and politically, from the India that exists in 2016. Whether in shame, anger or pride, most people consider the British Empire to be a thing of the past. They conjure up images of exploited African slaves tilling tobacco plantations in the West Indies; of General Dyer shooting down thousands of innocent protesters in Amritsar; of steam engines, railway lines and factories. The empire is only ever discussed at length in theoretical textbooks and historical fiction, only ever considered a “legacy”. Yet, even as the country tries to shrug off its colonial past, one of the most coveted spoils of the British Empire remains locked in the Tower of London. This court case, and indeed the decades of disputed claims to the Kohinoor Diamond, are stark reminders that the empire is not dead, nor a thing of the past, but desperately relevant in the modern day.

ISLAM IN CHINA Rory Weaver examines China’s tumultuous relationship with Islam

lthough Islam and China are rarely heard together in the same sentence, the interaction between the People’s Republic and the world’s second-largest religion has regional and global importance. China is home to over 20 million Muslims, many of whom belong to communities that have lived in China for centuries. The vast majority of this population is concentrated in China’s northwest, with some 10 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang alone, but there are also longstanding Muslim communities and populations of Muslim migrant workers in cities across the east and south of the country.

The Chinese state has a bifurcated relationship with its Muslim population. In Xinjiang province, the overwhelmingly Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghurs, whose language and culture are more Central Asian than Chinese, have become a minority in their own homeland after decades of state-sponsored Han migration. Fears of ethnic resistance to Communist rule means that any unrest or dissent is met with heavy repression, most recently after riots in 2009 followed by a spate of attacks across China in 2013-2014. Elsewhere in China, Muslim populations are considered less threatening and there is more pragmatism and cooperation with

Image: Peter Hudston

community leaders. However, this is often uneasy and mediators who overstep the mark face fines or imprisonment. The state-affiliated China Islamic Association was established to act as an intermediary between the state and China’s Muslim minorities, as well as overseeing Islamic education, the training of clerics, and the logistics of organising the Hajj, in which thousands of Chinese Muslims take part every year. With regards to foreign policy, China has also made a determined effort to establish links with the Muslim world. Since 2013, China has announced projects directed towards its western borders and beyond as part of its “Belt and Road” foreign policy framework, born out of a dual need to secure energy supplies and to export excess construction capacity as its economy begins to slow. Xi Jinping’s tour of Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia in January, which secured 52 investment and infrastructure agreements and upgraded China’s relationship with Iran and Saudi Arabia, can be seen as a response to this. China’s most

important link to the Muslim world, however, is its strategic relationship with Pakistan, referred to by one Chinese general as “China’s Israel”. Cooperation in border disputes with India in the 1950s and 60s and extensive Chinese assistance in Pakistan’s nuclear program in the 1990s mean that China’s approval rating in Pakistan is astonishingly high. Although government instability in Pakistan and geographical constraints have limited economic cooperation, Xi Jinping nonetheless promised $46 billion in infrastructure and energy investment during his visit to Pakistan last April. These large scale investments between China and its Middle Eastern and Central Asian partners seems to promise a golden period between China and Islam outside its borders, even if not all the projects come to fruition. Whether China’s Muslim population, focused in economically marginalised regions, will likewise see more harmonious times ahead is much less certain.

RECOLONIZING AFRICA?

China's New Scramble for Africa

William Gardner analyses the dangers of the West’s presentation of Chinese investment in Africa

n 2011, many in Europe – including Germany’s Africa Policy Coordinator Günter Nooke - were quick to blame the East Africa drought that killed over 260,000 people on “states such as China” who “carry out industrial agriculture” that puts unnecessary strain on vital water resources. Last year, an Economist article reported that a million Chinese economic migrants are labouring in Africa, repatriating the profits of African resources to China. Another claimed China’s direct dealings with African governments were “fuelling corruption” amongst officials and big business. Chinese investment is ostensibly a win for Chinese business, but a loss for African nations. These are all powerful narratives. They’re also all lies. Western media’s xenophobic demonisation of Chinese investment in Africa is astonishing. It alludes to the existence of some monolithic exploitative corporation – “China, Inc.” as Deborah Brautigam, Professor of International Political Economy in Washington, D.C., ironically quips. It’s as if the West believes the Beijing bogeyman has a master plan for economically carving up the African continent, when it was really the Europeans who were most culpable for this. The great Chinese grab of Africa’s land and natural resources is fictional. It is the EU and US who secure 32.5% of their oil from Africa, not the Chinese, who source only 9% from the continent. In fact, 65% of the international oil companies present in Africa are Western. When CBS News reported the Chinese acquisition of “half the farm land under cultivation” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – elsewhere reported to be 3,000,000 hectares (ha) of land - the truth was a private investment by ZTE Agribusiness in 60,000 ha of land. Overall, Western media claims China has acquired some 5,596,960 ha of land in Africa. The real figure is 88,837 ha. 32

This political rhetoric is not only inaccurate, but dangerous. It suggests that Africa is the loser and China the winner. It misinforms collective understanding, and perpetuates regressive neo-colonial paternalistic discourse of an Africa in need of help from the West, incorrectly victimising African people and blaming “China, Inc.” as the perpetrator. This affects every echelon of thinking: people’s everyday attitudes towards China and Africa, but more crucially policy-makers’ perceptions

"The Western perspective on SinoAfrican relations is a loss for all involved as its offensive portrayal not only worsens diplomatic ties, but also harms Africa’s development." of the relationship. The continuance of this stereotyped version of Sino-African relations stymies Western investment with misinformation, making investments poorly targeted. The Western perspective on Sino-African relations is a loss for all involved as its offensive portrayal not only worsens diplomatic ties, but also harms Africa’s development. In many ways, Chinese investment profits African nations. Rather than

allocating huge sums of unguided money, as is the strategy of Western aid and investment budgets, Chinese developments are focused on strengthening physical infrastructure, industry, the commodities market, and agriculture. Western investment refuses such projects – since the late 1970s, USAID has helped no infrastructural development. Chinese investments focus on real-world improvements and profiting people at a social level. In Dakar, China’s investments have helped to revitalise the city. For instance, the Chinese-funded Black Civilisation Museum, Grand National Theatre, and transport link improvements have all contributed to the city’s business boom in recent years. Shoe-seller Bass Cisse credits Chinese investors with the success, claiming, “it’s a good thing the Chinese are here, because look at how many are going to work to earn something.” In contrast, former president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, described Western investment and aid as “patronising” and “post-colonial”. Western loans and investments by the IMF and World Bank are loaded with economic and political caveats intended to mould African nations into Westernised political and economic systems. This neo-colonial foisting of administrative power degrades African nations’ rights to self-determination by imposing Western administrative ideas. Chinese investments, however, come with “no strings attached”, and empower African nations with the right to political and economic self-determination, encouraging African political autonomy, not dependence. Not only are Chinese investments a victory for economic development, but they represent successes for diplomacy over imposition. Investments have also focused on the transfer of skills. Between 2000 and 2012, 33

Chinese companies trained 36,000 technical professionals throughout Africa. In the same period, nearly 79,000 African students studied in China. Looking to the future, President Xi Jinping promised the construction of universities and technical colleges with a capacity for 200,000 students across the continent. Chinese investments have not only profited African nations in the short term, but also promise independent multiplicative future development. But, as with all investments between stronger and weaker economic groups, there must be caution. In 2003, the Zambian government was forced to repossess the Chinese-owned Nkana Mine Hospital due to the lack of qualified personnel and equipment. Chinese management of the hospital was part of a deal to grant Chinese companies access to the copper mines in Kitwe, Zambia’s second city. Zambian leaders agreed to these deals on the basis of their excellent political capital, but without fully considering the economic liabilities of such projects. A product of China’s egalitarian approach to Sino-African relations has been the lessening of these exploitative win-lose deals. In the thirteen years since 2003, no Chinese-run hospitals have been repossessed. As nations have gained experience in the brokering of agreements between governments, a more confident and assertive Africa has emerged. The 1994 “Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community” acts as a guideline to protect the continent’s natural resources, commodities market, and labour forces. Its success is gradual, but ongoing. As recently as the end of April 2016, the Federation of Ugandan Employers gave a seminar to Chinese companies operating in Uganda 34

about national labour laws, rights, and contracts. The rights of some 20,000 Chinese-employed Ugandan workers will now be further protected. Chinese investments focusing on political self-determination are profiting African governments’ political maturation as well as protecting workers’ rights. It is under these circumstances, of Chinese developers and African investees working together towards a common goal, that former president of the African Development Bank, Donald Kaberuka, said Sino-African relations could be a “win-win situation.” If the West changes its perspective and joins this partnership, then perhaps in the future a “win-win-win” relationship is possible as well.

THE EU NEEDS TO RE-FIND ITS MORAL AND POLITICAL COMPASS Rose Vennin condemns the EU’s policy in dealing with the refugee crisis

21% of EU oil is extracted from African countries

9% of Chinese oil is extracted from African countries

Image: Rose Vennin

few kilometers away from the port of Mytilini on the island of Lesbos, the European Union’s March 2016 deal with Turkey regarding refugees has a visible and daunting face: the Moria camp. A pre-removal closed detention center, it is overcrowded, dusty, and, paradoxically, used to be a Greek prison. It represents all that is wrong with the EU’s response to the refugee crisis. Moria is a grim camp, surrounded by barbed wire and high fences, with grey containers inside. Men, women, children and babies are all crowded together, with some sleeping outside because tents are in short supply. Here, in this panoramic valley dotted with olive trees and wild flowers, the EU appears to have lost its morality and humanity. Indeed, if the EU continues down the path it has followed so far, implementing hypocritical and morally questionable

policies, it stands to lose its credibility as a “human rights champion”. Its course of action would overshadow the Union’s lasting commitment to promote rights and dignity thus far, having signed the European Convention on Human Rights in 1953 to develop a regional system of protection, and more recently the 2009 Charter of Fundamental Rights. Priding itself for putting this matter at the heart of relations with other countries – all agreements with non-EU countries include a human rights clause – it appears that when it comes to acting upon matters directly affecting the continent, this commitment is not nearly as influential. The aforementioned EU-Turkey deal, which sees Greece returning all new irregular migrants to Turkey, is one example of such double-standards. It hinges upon Turkey being designated as a “safe third country”, a decision strongly contested by most rights groups. Turkey

maintains a “geographical limitation” to the 1951 Refugee Convention, denying refugees from non-European countries of origin the prospect of long-term legal integration in the country. Although it modified this provision in 2014 for Syrians by granting them a “temporary protection regime”, others fleeing war remain unable to apply for asylum in Turkey. More worryingly from a human rights perspective, the country has a continuing history of refoulement – pushing people back into danger. In April this year, reports from Amnesty International denounced the deportation of around 100 Syrians on a near-daily basis since mid-January. For the 54,000 who remain trapped in mainland Greece, the EU is also unable to pride itself in championing their human rights. Volunteering in the port of Athens in April, I witnessed the worrying lack of adequate asylum-processing

structures. There were few government and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) officials informing the 5000 individuals of their rights. A mere three hours per week, per language, were allocated to mandatory Skype interviews in every Greek Regional Asylum office. In imposing such a state of limbo on these individuals, the EU appears inconsistent; it is defying the humanitarian principles it demands that its trading partner countries implement. In this refugee crisis, moral standards are far from the only thing the EU is losing in following its current strategy. Politically, it is further harming its already-damaged image of a supranational body capable of acting in a coordinated and united fashion. As with the Euro crisis, the ongoing refugee crisis has highlighted political and structural flaws in the EU’s response to challenges it faces. Its current system

of governing migration through parallel competences – allowing member states to pursue their own policies alongside EU policy – limits the possibility of a comprehensive and coherent approach. The domino effect of member states establishing border barriers one after another in 2015 was an illustration of the power of discordance among EU states. This left Greece a “warehouse of souls”, in the words of Prime Minister Tsipras. The paralysis displayed is not only damaging for the EU’s international image, but also for its durability as an entity rather than just a forum for 28 states, each acting solely in its own interest. “Fortress Europe” is at a loss; porous and dependent upon neighboring countries to control migration. The policy itself – that of implementing restrictive immigration and asylum regulations to stem migration flows – is deeply hypocritical given that the European Community has been organized around the economic – if not social – advantages of the free movement of people. Regardless of this, it is a failing policy, given that migrants still cross the Mediterranean in thousands in the hope of reaching the continent. Even more problematic for the EU, are the criticisms of encouraging “unsafe passage”. 3,771 migrants died or went missing trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2015, and the trend has not ebbed this year. The EU-Turkey deal, with its increased Turkish surveillance of the Eastern Mediterranean route, is no miracle solution, with reports of higher numbers of arrivals to Italy from Libya and warnings of the development of even more dangerous routes. Reliance on neighboring countries 38

is part of a broader European strategy to outsource the issue by delocalizing its borders. From a political standpoint, this makes for a weaker Europe; its capacity to stem migration flows depends on the will, capacity and interests of countries such as Turkey. The EU is now vulnerable to its dependence being exploited, entailing both political and moral concessions. In 2009, Gaddafi used this leverage, threatening to turn Europe “black” unless the EU paid Libya €5 billion per year. The EU obliged. In a telling demonstration of humanitarian double-standards and weakness, it turned a blind eye to the regime’s inhumane treatment of migrants and promised a total of €50 million over three years. More recently, in exchange for Turkish cooperation, the March deal promised Turks visa-free travel to Europe and the rekindling of accession talks. This strategy of outsourcing is not a “winning” nor a long-term one, as it merely displaces the issue to an already-overwhelmed region. If the EU – a rich continent – cannot take on tens of thousands of refugees, then how can it expect a country like Lebanon, with a population of 4.5 million, to sustainably provide for an equivalent of 20% of its population in refugees, as it does currently? Although this may seem like the easiest solution for Europe today, it is a dangerous strategy in the long-term, only exacerbating Middle Eastern instability. In pursuing its current strategy – implementing morally inconsistent and politically damaging policies – the EU stands to lose both its credibility and its stature in the international arena. It will lose much more if it continues to prove itself unable to build a coherent refugee policy.

THE KURDS

& their Syrian Utopia

Patrick Kenny discusses the foundation and possible trajectory of the Kurdish state of Rojava

Image: Peter Hudston

here is an air of repetition to the history of Kurdish nationalism. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I first gave the Kurdish people the opportunity to form their own state. But despite the Treaty of Sevres’ guarantees, Turkey, not for the last time, denied its emergence. Seventy years later, the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in the 1990s and Iraq War of the early 2000s led to greater autonomy for Iraqi Kurds. Today, amidst the chaos in Syria and the weakening of its government, Syrian Kurds have begun their own attempt at independence. Their efforts to create the autonomous region known as Rojava can be understood in a number of ways: part war of independence, part fight for survival, and part social revolution. Kurdish nationalism has long been a force in the Middle East, and often a problem for those who have ruled over

Image: Peter Hudston

the Kurds. The 1990s saw brutal guerrilla warfare and persecution between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), while Iraq witnessed long periods of civil war between Kurds and the government. In Northern Syria there were frequent bans on the Kurdish language, and 300,000 Kurds were refused citizenship, denying them social rights and violating international law. In 2004 and 2007 there were demonstrations against the government and, despite suffering persecution, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD – affiliated with the PKK) began establishing alternative civil institutions. In 2012, with civil war raging and in spite of internal political tensions, the PYD and the Kurdish National Council formed the Kurdish Supreme Committee. This body took increasing control of northern parts of Syria, forcing the regime back and resulting in the establishment of the autonomous region of Rojava.

The maelstrom of violence which engulfed Syria gave the Kurds a chance for greater autonomy, but it also forced them into a battle for survival. The Kurds have found themselves fighting against Assad, various opposition groups, and ISIS. They are served by the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), whose most notable struggle was over the city of Kobanî (it even had its own Facebook profile picture trend); ISIS captured numerous Kurdish towns and villages before besieging the city itself in 2014. A combination of YPG, Peshmerga forces from Iraqi Kurdistan, Free Syrian Army troops and US-led airstrikes forced ISIS to withdraw from the city in January 2015, leading to further retreat from the surrounding areas. Throughout, Turkey has increased pressure on Kurds inside its borders and placed an embargo on Rojava. Originally, this was also enforced by the Iraqi Kurdish government

who support the PYD’s political rivals and have a very different ideology. As a Western-leaning oil rentier state and parliamentary democracy frequently criticised for corruption, they have little in common with the commune-based “Democratic Confederalism” of Rojava. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Rojavan attempt at Kurdish liberation is this ideological revolution. The late 20th century Kurdish struggle for self-determination in Turkey was based on Marxist-Leninism. Some darker aspects of previous Marxist-Leninist politics were also present: a lack of democracy, murder of civilians, and purges of those who opposed the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Despite this strong political leaning, for which many had died, Öcalan and his party dramatically changed their ideological outlook. While serving his life sentence in Turkey, Öcalan became influenced by Murray Bookchin, an American anarchist,

whose ideas led Öcalan to found “Democratic Confederalism”. While practiced to some extent in south-eastern Turkey, his vision has become most clearly manifest in Syria. As enshrined in Rojava’s “Social Contract” (avoiding the statist term “constitution”) each neighbourhood commune sends delegates to represent them in higher assemblies. Each assembly has quotas for those from minority groups such as the Arab or Christian Syriac communities, and women are mandated to make up at least 40% of representation at each level. Economically, Rojava depends on agricultural cooperatives and price controls are decided democratically. Not everyone is convinced they are living in an egalitarian utopia: critics point to the YPG’s use of child soldiers, to press control, and to political disappearances. While minorities have some protections, there are also stories of persecution of Arabs in towns that the YPG seize. Perhaps these are symptoms of war, but Kurdish activists have more broadly criticised the one party rule of the PYD and their control over the parliaments and judiciary. Are the Syrian Kurds winners in this conflict? Certainly they have seized their opportunity and have greater independence than before the war. Certainly too, women, who have long been marginalised and disenfranchised, have a greater voice than ever before: in addition to political quotas, there are more women in every sector of society, from the police to judiciary. But it is unclear what the future holds. While YPG and YPJ fighters have been successful in defending Rojava

and its institutions, the road ahead will not be easy. The Syrian Kurdish project is opposed by Turkey, a NATO member, who sees it as a worrying example to its own Kurdish minority, and an obstacle to its regional influence. Furthermore, Rojavan political ideas, and particularly its insistence that resources remain collective property, mean there is little value to the US in supporting Rojava in the long term. Even the Iraqi Kurdistan National Government mistrusts its Syrian Kurdish counterpart. In negotiations between them during the Kobanî crisis, compromises to Rojava’s political structure were considered a necessary step before provision of aid. Just how far the Rojavan Revolution will have to concede principles in return for help in its survival is unclear. On the one hand, Rojava represents

A Symposium:

ALLIANCES

"Rojava has a very different sort of Kurdish nationalism." another instance of an oppressed Kurdish minority taking advantage of war to seize greater autonomy. But Rojava has a very different sort of Kurdish nationalism: one that de-emphasises both its Kurdishness and its nationalism, opting instead to focus on its own ideas of a directly democratic cosmopolitan society. Whether it will lose its current autonomy – as after World War I – or maintain its independence – as in Iraq – remains to be seen.

Image: Peter Hudston

Image: Nathaniel Hunt

WHEN A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" TURNS SOUR Ellie Gomes ponders what Trump’s ascension would mean for the once "special" British-American relationship "Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States,” proclaimed Winston Churchill in 1946. Britain’s alliance with the US is publicly glorified whenever possible. Whether it’s a photo of Obama shaking the hand of a dressing-gown-clad Prince George or David Cameron enlisting the President’s support for the “Bremain” campaign, the “special relationship” is as prominent as ever at the moment. One of the key articles underpinning the alliance is the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, which binds Britain’s security and defence to the US, encompassing “classified atomic weapons” and the exchange of “material and equipment for the development of defence plans”. In addition, the US plays an important role in our economy as our largest single trading partner, taking 17% of our total exports in 2012. 44

The alliance is thus clearly crucial to our position in the international community, which means that the rise of Donald Trump could have significant and far-reaching complications for Britain given his unorthodox stand on foreign policy. Trump has caused a stir since his decision to run for president last year with his radical and frankly xenophobic outlook on immigration and has consequently created international outrage. Despite this, Trump has been increasingly successful in the primaries and has secured the Republican Party nomination. The reality is that he very well could win. If this were the case, how would the “special relationship” fare under Trump, especially given some of his recent comments on foreign policy? From the few statements Trump has made regarding foreign policy, his US-centric rhetoric gives us an idea of the direction he would take. In his speeches, Trump has condemned the country’s allies who have failed to share the burden of security that the US provides, claiming America has been “ripped off” by such nations. Whilst this is not an exclusive

reference to Britain, we can infer the hard-line approach a Trump government would have towards its allies. Britain’s response to Trump’s campaign has been highly negative so far; outrage against his anti-Islamic generalisations even led to a petition to ban him from entering the country. In December 2015, Trump similarly made comments claiming London has been “so radicalised” that the city’s police officers are “afraid for their own lives”. Upon the recent election of Muslim Sadiq Khan as London mayor, Trump was forced to compromise on the ban, stating that Khan could be “an exception” to his rule – a statement that Khan subsequently rejected. One can begin to identify a deterioration in the relationship between top politicians from both countries as well as a wider alienation of the British public from the US, suggesting that our alliance could undergo substantial changes if Trump were elected. However, despite the fact we would like to see Britain take the moral high ground, the reality is that we have a history of catering to nations with questionable regimes in order to secure our own interests. In 2015, the effusive royal reception for the Chinese president Xi Jinping caused public protests at the acceptance of the various human rights abuses in China. Similarly, the Al-Yamamah arms deal with Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and the shutdown of the Serious Fraud Office Investigation into allegations of serious corruption in 2010 shed light on Britain’s willingness to disregard the reality of uncomfortable situations for the sake of maintaining a pragmatic approach to international relations so as to further our own interests. It can be argued that the cultural links that currently underpin the alliance

between Britain and the US have much greater endurance than Britain’s current alienation with Trump. Churchill spoke of “the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples” and indeed our shared language is a powerful bond that helps sustain a wider cultural interchange through film, TV, music, theatre and literature. We are also bound by shared ideals – freedom of speech, of press, of religion and of political assembly – that we like to imagine and use to define our collective identity. Yet this cultural basis to the UK-US alliance may be in jeopardy as well. Trump is promising to support radically conservative social and cultural policies – he is staunchly pro-life with regards to abortion and has recently vowed to end gunfree zones, including in schools. Perhaps more importantly, success for Trump in the presidential election would indicate significant support among the American public for his divisive rhetoric and policies. Trump’s election would thus be both an indicator of deeper cultural change in the US as well as ushering in four years of radical politics. If Britain’s alliance were to continue with America under Trump, could we begin to see similar shifts occurring in Britain? Thus, whilst one would like to believe in Britain’s integrity, it is highly doubtful that Britain would sever our ties to the US if Trump were to be elected; we are quite simply too reliant on the US. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that the “special relationship” that exists between the US and Britain may prove to be problematic, serving as a gateway for divisive and radical politics to further permeate public opinion on this side of the pond.

ALLIANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, MIDDLE POWER AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA Lina Lee looks into the emergence of multilateral alliances in Asia

ince the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, alliances have been significantly altered around the world. The emergence of new actors and the increased role of multilateral institutions have forced states to renew their foreign policies in order to adapt to the new international environment. The subsequent changes to both the domestic and international system have resulted in the transformation of the military alliance system, which has historically underpinned states’ security interests, into a more cooperative mechanism. Asia in particular is a region where new forms of alliance and multilateral institutions are shaping the security architecture of the region. In recent years, China’s increasing willingness to assert itself has contributed to it being viewed as a threat in the eyes of many Asian countries. This has led some to align with one another in a more strategic manner, which has consequently altered the traditional alliance systems that previously dominated the continent. Thus, international relations in Asia 46

are no longer solely based on military treaties, but are also built upon cooperation and common interests. Even the United States, which had established strong alliances with many Asian countries, has had to adjust its alliance policy to maintain its pre-eminence in Asia. Asian nations whose power and material capabilities are weaker than those of the United States and China are adopting new foreign policies to secure their positions. For instance, India is continuing its non-alignment policy by forging what it calls ‘strategic partnerships’ with other countries, hoping to create a political environment that would allow it to take advantage of its economic potential and rich human and natural resources and build upon its rising international status. Similarly, Asian allies of the United States have adopted foreign policies that have attempted to secure their autonomy in international affairs without jeopardizing their respective relationships with the United States. South Korea, for example, continues to follow its "middle power policy", which seeks to increase its role and

legitimacy within international institutions as an intermediator. Furthermore, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are using their multilateral institutions to integrate and cooperate as well as drawing great powers into their own institutional framework. This emerging variety in foreign policies stems from the key aims of the so-called "smaller powers": to prevent traditional powers from undermining their own sovereignty and to protect themselves from any potential conflict between great powers. The use of multilateral forums by Asian countries to cooperate and tackle common issues is arguably the most significant development in the region. ASEAN, the East Asian Summit and the East Asian Community are platforms where Asian countries gather and discuss regional and global agendas together as well as to project a unified voice to the world. It is through multilateral institutions that Asian nations are both deepening and expanding their ties by negotiating agreements between

member states whilst also reaching out to encompass the wider region. The interaction among Asian states in the 21st century has been changed dramatically. Relationships have shifted from traditional military alliances to those based on strategic and common interests. Through these evolved alliances, states are beginning to follow their own foreign policies in order to protect their national interests and autonomy more thoroughly. Moreover, the creation of multilateral forums has allowed states to express their opinions whilst also expanding the scope of cooperation. Whether this development will really lead to a new state of affairs in Asia, however, is up for debate. Given the ongoing regional disputes, including the notorious controversy surrounding control over the South China Sea, breakdowns in multilateral forums and these new forms of alliances may very well take place, leading to conflict and war in the worst case scenario.

Image: Nathaniel Hunt

Profile: United OxMak Development Projects - Alex Farley -

nited OxMak is a development organisation that partners Oxford University students with students at Makerere University, Kampala. Members work together in close-knit teams on grassroots social action projects to challenge the winner-loser dynamic of international relations. By volunteering via social media and on university exchanges, the organisation aims to develop a sense of global citizenship amongst students whilst encouraging effective cooperation, responsible and sustainable social action. Keep a Girl Child in School â&#x20AC;&#x153;Keep A Girl Child in Schoolâ&#x20AC;? was started by a group of Makerere students who provide menstrual pads produced by local women to rural school menstruators. Alongside distribution, the project aims to educate those who menstruate on menstrual and reproductive health, helping them to challenge the stigma surrounding the matter and to redress this power imbalance. Recent statistics show that those who menstruate in rural Uganda are missing up to 11% of the school year due to the lack of resources and knowledge surrounding period hygiene management. 48

Without appropriate materials and facilities, menstruators struggle to attend school during their periods, which causes them to fall behind academically and consequently raises dropout rates. Oxford students work closely with this group to help develop sustainable business models, project proposals and education programmes.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION ON REFUGEE FLOWS Fergus Peace considers the results of international alliances in combatting the refugee crisis

Gro-Ganda Slum Farming Over 60% of Kampalaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s population live in slums. With high food prices and unemployment, it is a challenge to ensure adequate food provision whilst maintaining a balanced diet. Gro-Ganda is a student-run slum farming initiative in Kampala that aims to provide families living in slums with the skills and equipment to grow food in their homes. The initiative capitalizes on the small tracts of land as an opportunity for improved nutrition through subsistence farming and supplementing incomes. This team of Oxford and Ugandan students have worked together to develop sustainable logistical and financial models in which families are able to farm for themselves and contribute to the continued growth of this slum farming initiative. 49

n 2015, 1.2 million asylum claims were lodged in the EU and, according to the UN High Commission for Refugees, there were 19.5 million refugees the world. Flows of displaced people haven’t been seen on this scale for decades. As the world scrambles for solutions, some strange bedfellows are emerging – Western countries’ panic about the refugee influx gives some of their poorer neighbours an unusual degree of bargaining power. In Europe, Germany and Greece have been at loggerheads over sovereign debt bailouts for years. But as two of the countries bearing the brunt of the crisis, they are now united in calling for a continent-wide policy response while countries like Austria and Hungary are content to close their own borders and shift the burden. Even more striking is the EU’s renewed cooperation with Turkey. With an undoubtedly mixed bag of motives – to discourage refugees from undertaking dangerous journeys across the Aegean and through the Balkans; to stop the panic-inducing spectacle of huge numbers of refugees breaking through European borders; to head off the nationalist challenges of everyone from the Hungarian government to the far-right Alternative for Germany party – Europe and Turkey are now allied, working together to break up networks of migrant smugglers and block

off the migration routes they make a living from. On the other side of the world, the challenge is not so new. Australia has had fierce debates over refugees since the late 1990s. After an election in 2001, the country settled on the “Pacific Solution”- a policy in which refugees were either turned back to their last port or sent to a detention centre on the tiny island nation of Nauru. Since then, the details have occasionally changed – refugees have at times been sent to Malaysia or Papua New Guinea, as well as Nauru, for instance – but the heart of the approach has stayed in place. Refugees are kept away from Australia by any means possible. More recently, Australia has cooperated with the governments of Sri Lanka and Iran to send boat arrivals back to the countries they fled and even bargained with people smugglers: buying their boats and, in one instance, directly paying a crew to turn back to Indonesia. These unlikely-sounding partnerships have, thanks to the politics of refugee flows, become widely accepted in Australian politics. In Europe, the new alliance is an extraordinary step in a crisis; in Australia, these arrangements have become a regular, and depressingly bipartisan, feature of the immigration regime. But they have the same fundamental structure. Rich

countries in the region face a problem in the arrival of many more refugees than their voters are willing to accept. They thus seek the help of other regional players to stem the migration flow through a combination of law enforcement, deportation and resettlement, and (occasionally) the expansion of legal settlement programmes. For wealthy nations, much is seen to be at stake in securing this cooperation, so the otherwise poorer and less empowered regional actors take the opportunity to demand significant concessions in return. They usually get them. In many cases, this has led to a reversal in the traditional balance of power in international relations. Cambodia has taken nearly £30 million in exchange for the resettlement of just five refugees, while much of Nauru’s economic activity is generated by the detention centres and its government is largely funded by Australian money. The EU is sanctioning Poland’s new government for undermining the rule of law, but Turkish President Erdogan’s stifling of the press and consolidation of his personal power are seemingly no obstacle to putting visa liberalisation and EU accession back on the agenda. Certain geographically fortunate countries are finding that the refugee crisis – and the pressure on rich countries that it’s generating – is

giving them much greater international leverage than they’d otherwise enjoy. The rich countries, too, are mostly getting what they want. Pressure on Angela Merkel in Germany is showing signs of easing, while the most vicious and solidarity-threatening fights among EU states over refugees and Schengen look to have subsided. Conservative governments in Australia have reaped political rewards from their success at stopping refugee boats: before one arrival a few weeks ago, which was promptly returned to Sri Lanka, none had made the journey for nearly two years. Taken in the broader context of their respective regions, these partnerships, in which wealthier states cut generous deals with poorer states that typically have very poor human rights records, look difficult to comprehend. But they are generally working: both parties are getting what they want. If that pattern continues, and Australia’s experience suggests it could well, then we have a gold standard of positive-sum international cooperation on our hands. There are no losers – among governments, at least. But empowering authoritarian governments like Erdogan’s has its costs, even if the victims are far removed from the arena of international power politics. And then, of course, there are the refugees.