Benchmarking Police Integrity Programmes

The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) BENCHMARKING POLICE INTEGRITY PROGRAMMES Published 22 January 2013

May 2012, Final Report

Confidential to ACPO

Transparency International UK Submitted to ACPO May 2012 Published by ACPO January 2013

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Transparency International (TI) is the world’s leading non-governmental anti-corruption organisation. With more than 90 chapters worldwide, and an international secretariat based in Berlin, TI has global influence and extensive expertise.

Transparency International UK (TI-UK) is the UK chapter of Transparency International and is dedicated to combating corruption in the public and private sectors. It builds constructive partnerships with the public and private sectors and develops practical tools to tackle corruption.

Through its Training and Advisory Services Programme it provides anti-corruption training, benchmarking and advisory services to organisations.

Author: Peter Wilkinson Researcher for the reporting survey: Matt Boardman Co-ordination: Peter van Veen, Managing Director, TI-UK Training and Advisory Services.

Acknowledgements: TI-UK would like to thank the representatives of ACPO and its member Forces who were interviewed for this.

Disclaimer: Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information is believed to be correct as of May 2012. TI-UK cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use. Policy recommendations and best practice guidance reflect the opinion of TI-UK.

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CONTENTS 1

SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 4

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INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 7

3

THE CONTEXT FOR POLICE INTEGRITY ............................................................................. 9

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MANAGING INTEGRITY: A GOOD PRACTICE INTEGRITY PROGRAMME ...................... 14 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8

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COMMITMENT .............................................................................................................. 16 GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT .............................................................................. 16 INTEGRITY RISK ASSESSMENT................................................................................. 24 INFLUENCES FOR CORRUPTION .............................................................................. 25 FORMS OF CORRUPTION RISK ................................................................................. 27 COMMUNICATION AND TRAINING ............................................................................. 35 SANCTIONS AND DISCIPLINE .................................................................................... 35 MONITORING, AUDITING AND REVIEW .................................................................... 36

PUBLIC REPORTING ............................................................................................................ 38 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 38 METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 39 FINDINGS ..................................................................................................................... 40 RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. 42

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REVIEW OF THE ACPO REPORT ........................................................................................ 45

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APPENDIX: REPORTING SURVEY – CHARTS OF SCORES ............................................. 49

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1 SUMMARY Despite numerous reports and efforts by ACPO and Forces to embed good integrity practices in policing, high profile scandals and corruption incidents continue to occur.1 The Leveson inquiry has highlighted some of the key areas of concern.

The context for police integrity is one of Forces being subject to continuing public scrutiny and criticism when weaknesses in integrity systems are exposed. The police tend to operate in a responsive role, which requires them to continually defend the adequacy of their integrity programmes, to undergo inquiries into perceived or actual failings and violations and to rigorously review working methods. This TI-UK report suggests ways to assist Forces to move from a reactive position to one that is proactive and adequately supports the fundamental role of the police – one of public service. The police should be perceived as a bulwark for integrity in society.

The core finding identified in this report is that ACPO needs to ensure that common standards, that are robust, clear and consistent, are embedded across Forces and that those standards should be characterised by clarity and consistency.

This review uses the term ‘integrity programme’ to describe the organisational system for integrity, the entirety of a Force’s approach to managing integrity, including anti-corruption policies and procedures.

Clarity and consistency Clarity and consistency are themes running throughout this review as these need to be applied across the whole of integrity management, from organisational values to governance by Police and Crime Commissioners. All those who manage integrity programmes or are governed by them should be able easily to understand their roles, obligations, procedures and rights. The integrity programmes should also be clear to the public and other stakeholders.

Positive integrity management Recent scandals and other negative incidents are placing the Forces in a reactive mode rather than that of managing integrity proactively. As such, the integrity approaches and resources are diverted by repeated reviews, investigation and disciplinary procedures. Leadership, management and supervisors should move to a stance of active promotion of integrity, based on the principle of zero tolerance of corruption, rather than continuing fire fighting crisis upon crisis. To achieve this goal, ACPO will need to develop and implement a comprehensive integrity programme consistent across Forces that builds on and consolidates the extensive work already in place. Positive integrity management also means encouraging, identifying and recognising good performance by officers and staff.

The 43 police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland covered by ACPO, termed ‘Forces’ in this report.

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Common systems Forces should institute robust systems to ensure risks are identified, monitored and managed including risks from information disclosure, gratuities, hospitality, contracting and secondary employment. These systems supported by guidance and tools should be based on national standards and public expectations – there should be no geographical variables when it comes to integrity systems and there should not be local differences in standards. This work on national standards should be encouraged by the Home Office and be required for Forces locally.

Adequate governance and independent oversight New challenges are presented by the coming into being in November 2012 of Police and Crime Commissioners and Police and Crime Panels which will change fundamentally how police relate to their communities and carry out their work.

It is unclear how the governance of integrity will be carried out under this new system. The PCCs will be responsible for oversight of Forces, but they will also have executive roles for the strategy and budgets of Forces. This combination of roles does not appear to allow for a necessary structure for governance and oversight that is adequate for effective integrity management.

Consideration is required to identify how necessary independent oversight can be brought into and embedded within the governance process.

Model integrity code and tools A police integrity code should be developed for integrity management that would match generally accepted anti-corruption codes and systems. ACPO covers 43 Forces and although there is a move to develop common codes and practices (e.g., as shown by the National Decision Model (NDM) and Statement of Mission and Values (SOMAV), there are numerous different functional structures, procedures, models and reporting requirements. The NDM and SOMAV need to be implemented in a consistent manner across Forces through model transparent policies and procedures. Only in this way can integrity management readily be understood and be accountable to the public. The implementation of a Force-wide integrity code should be supported by the use of model tools such as a typology of corruption and risks, analysis and monitoring procedures, selfassessment guidelines and a framework for public reporting.

Comprehensive and continuous approach to risk assessment The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) identifies key risks for integrity threats and ACPO has created processes to monitor emerging risks. Nevertheless, this TI-UK report considers that the risk assessment process should be reviewed and strengthened to ensure that the process is robust, comprehensive and up-to-date in capturing emerging or changing risks.

For instance, growing risks of corruption in procurement were not covered in the reports seen nor were facilitation payments. The most recent guide to social media was dated 2009 and it did not cover major recent developments such as Facebook and Twitter. The HMIC report ‘Without Fear or Favour’ identified a concern about the risks left unaddressed in the current risk assessment process when it stated: ‘Although all forces have an anti-corruption control strategy, there is no evidence that gifts and hospitality, associations, business interests and procurement are considered together as a risk.’

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Zero tolerance and The Police Conduct Arrangements Disciplinary measures present a challenge as a good practice integrity programme should be founded on a zero tolerance approach which addresses any integrity violations.

The Police (Conduct) Arrangements introduced in 2008 divide violations into misconduct and gross misconduct wherein ‘gross misconduct’ means a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour so serious that dismissal would be justified.2 It is a danger to a robust integrity programme to categorise some breaches of integrity as misconduct. This can communicate that there is the potential for relaxation of disciplinary sanctions for officers and staff for certain breaches of integrity and as such detracts from achieving a zero tolerance policy. Violations of integrity, however small, can undermine an integrity programme if adequate discipline is not applied consistently. If a serious breach of integrity results in an officer remaining in post or resigning with a minor penalty, this risks sending a wrong message. When deciding whether some breaches are to be treated as misconduct, the police authorities will need to be mindful of the risk of undermining the zero tolerance approach. This is a complex topic and this report cannot do more than highlight how a policy of relaxation of disciplinary measures could undermine an effective integrity programme.

Transparency and public reporting This report surveyed the public reporting on integrity programmes by a small number of UK and international Forces using indicators derived from the methodology of surveys of corporate reporting undertaken by Transparency International. Generally, reporting was at a low level. Thus, it is recommended that ACPO take on a leadership role in the development of a common nationwide standard for public reporting by the ACPO Forces. This would contribute to better understanding among individual communities of their Force’s commitment to integrity and also recognition by the general public as well as officers and staff of overall police integrity management. Public reporting also allows measurement, peer benchmarking and tracking of improvements.

2 Police, England and Wales The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008 (Home Office 2008) p.4

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2 INTRODUCTION In July 2011, the Home Secretary commissioned Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) to review police integrity in the wake of the phone hacking scandal. Part I of the IPCC Report was published in August 2011 and the HMIC report ‘Without Fear or Favour’ was published in December 2011. The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO) also published a report in December 2011 setting out the ACPO approach to managing police integrity as a contribution to the debate about police integrity which was to be considered alongside the HMIC and IPCC reviews.3

The underlying structures of integrity programmes are consistent and universal.

ACPO commissioning of TI-UK ACPO has commissioned TI-UK to review the ACPO approach to managing integrity against current good practice for organisational programmes dealing with integrity and anti-corruption. This TI-UK report also refers to the HMIC report issued in December 2011.4

TI-UK brings to this review its extensive experience of countering corruption and, in particular, working with the private sector on anti-bribery standards and practical approaches for implementation and monitoring. Organisational systems for integrity (called ‘integrity programmes’ in this report) follow the same systems structure whether for the private or public sector and the differences for organisations or sectors lie only in the forms and degree of corruption risks and the scope and nature of anti-corruption policies and procedures designed and implemented to counter those risks. The underlying structures of integrity programmes are consistent and universal.

Structure of this report The structure of this report is as follows. Section 3 looks at the current context for police integrity; Section 4 sets out a framework for a good practice integrity programme and examines some of the essential components, in particular, governance; Section 5, a key part of this report, surveys public reporting on integrity programmes by a sample of ACPO and international Forces and finally, Section 6 reviews the ACPO report in light of the conclusions drawn in this TI-UK report.

Methodology This report is based on a review of key recent reports, a general literature review and seven interviews, including those with Chief and Deputy Chief Constables and representatives of Professional Standards, Human Resources and Procurement. The methodology for the survey of public reporting is described in Section 5.

Aim of the report This TI-UK report aims to comment on ACPO’s approach to building integrity and to suggest further areas to be considered by ACPO by benchmarking against good practice for integrity programmes and observations resulting from interviews with officers and a study of reports.

3 Managing Police Integrity: ACPO Approach 2011 (Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, December 2011).

4 Without Fear of Favour (HMIC December 2011).

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Standards of integrity can only be achieved in organisations that are committed to integrity and have embedded an integrity culture, have strong governance and oversight, understand the risks and opportunities and have appropriate measures to counter risks. Much work on integrity has been carried out by police. However, the continuing scandals have revealed vulnerabilities that have not been addressed and the police need to understand why lapses continue to occur and how to strengthen their integrity programmes to prevent reoccurrence. This means that Forces need clarity and consistency about what constitutes integrity and how this is to be instilled in their activities. This should be supported by constant vigilance and questioning and consistency in discipline where infractions occur.

Police as public servants whose mandate it is to uphold law and order are awarded a particular trust by the public. When that trust is abused it brings doubt in the mind of the public and seriously impairs a positive relationship with the community that is essential to effective police work.

Corruption is defined by Transparency International as ‘The abuse of entrusted power for private gain’. This report is about how police integrity can be protected through countering risks of corruption.

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3 THE CONTEXT FOR POLICE INTEGRITY This section looks at the factors shaping management of police integrity. Managing integrity in policing is highly complex as there are many pressures and factors that can act on the Forces, some contradictory in their nature.

Public loss of confidence in police integrity The public’s confidence in the police has been shaken by recent scandals. Until recently police corruption in the UK was regarded as low, with systemic corruption removed and any corruption confined to the activities of individuals. This was confirmed by a TI-UK survey of corruption in the UK published in 2010 which indicated that the police were perceived by the public to be one of the less corrupt sectors in UK life.5 However, the public perception may have deteriorated. A 2012 EU Report based on interviews with around 1,300 people across the UK, found that a third of UK citizens now think that bribery or abuse of power is widespread among the police.6 This is unsurprising in view of the major scandals of recent years involving hacking, alleged bribery by media, cronyism and nepotism as well as other incidents of improper police behaviour.

‘Corruption in the police service in the United Kingdom has come under increasing public and official scrutiny in the past 12 months. A series of public scandals, albeit apparently involving a small number of officers, has caused concern about the standard of ethics and integrity within the police service. In response, the police service is putting in place a range of short and longer term reforms to tackle malpractice and misconduct within its ranks.’

Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons from the literature, Police Research Series Paper 110 (Tim Newburn, Home Office 1999)

Serious integrity issues remain despite numerous reviews The above 1999 quotation could have been written this year. Policing in the UK has been subject to numerous reviews by government, ACPO, HMIC, IPCC as well as academic studies and these have all resulted in recommendations for good practice. How is it then that despite all the recommendations, scandals continue to take place? The consequence is that the police remain constantly having to defend their integrity performance while they become embroiled in yet further reviews. There needs to be a breaking of the cycle so that police integrity becomes a proactive approach rather than one of response.

Service to the community does not always sit easily with the intrusive nature of policing Policing is for the public. Theresa May, in a speech of 16 August 2011, said: ‘As Home Secretary, I've been clear from the beginning that the test of the effectiveness of the police, the sole objective 5 Corruption in the UK Part 2 (Transparency International UK 2011), p.19.

6 Special Eurobarometer 374, Corruption (Directorate-General Home Affairs, European Commission).

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against which they will be judged, the way in which communities should be able to hold them to account, is their success in cutting crime’. The Home Secretary’s statement goes back to the roots of policing for, in the words of the first of the Nine Principles of Policing, 1829 ‘the task of police is to prevent crime and disorder’.

The Nine Principles of Policing, General Instructions, Metropolitan Police, 1829 1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.

2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.

3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.

4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.

5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly 6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation; to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.

7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.

8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.

9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

Police work by its nature is often intrusive on communities and individuals – involving investigative work, searching premises, stopping suspects, controlling demonstrations. ACPO Forces have spent considerable effort on improving communication with the public, engaging with communities and community policing. Even so these efforts are seen by many as insufficient and, as a result, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 was introduced to strengthen local

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accountability for policing by establishing a directly elected individual at Force level, the Police and Crime Commissioner.

Police are in a gold fish bowl The police have to manage all police issues including integrity while knowing that errors or failings loom large in the eyes of the public, media and politicians. Despite efforts to promote positively the work of the police through community interaction and media relations, recurring scandals related to integrity have meant that police integrity management has remained not only reactive but also inadequate. The police have to find a way in which they can be proactive in improving integrity management and building more positive relationships with stakeholders by reporting measurable change.

Media relations: riding the tiger An outcome of the negative public perception of the police has been that Forces saw the media as a powerful tool to communicate the value of police work and as a means by which accountability could be demonstrated. Unfortunately, this led to increasingly close relations with editors and reporters. As shown in results from the Leveson inquiry, the police found it difficult to draw the line and relationships between the police and media strayed into conflicts of interest and other forms of unethical behaviour.

Discretion for officers but risks come too Increasing freedom and discretion has been given to officers such as anti-social behaviour orders stipulated in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the extension to Fixed Penalty Notices and the introduction of Penalty Notices for Disorder. However, with enhanced discretion come greater integrity risks. Unlike activities such as financial transactions which lend themselves to checks, controls and audit trails, controls cannot be built easily into discretionary policing. Police must rely on embedding integrity into the service to a degree that officers know what kind of action is permissible. Clarity in this area should then be supported by adequate processes of intelligence, investigation and disciplinary action.

Systemic bribery is no longer present Corruption in an organisation can be systemic or the result of actions of individuals. Evidence points to a reduction in systemic corruption in the UK police service according to the 2010 TI-UK report on Corruption in the UK.7 However, in terms of risk assessment, even if corruption is not systemic, a pattern of individual corruption such as alleged bribery of the media indicate an underlying weakness in approach and can lead to a public perception of systemic corruption.

Proportionate disciplinary actions Sanctions applied on a consistent basis form an important part of any integrity programme.

However, the Taylor review8 introduced a proportionate approach to sanctions and this could detract from a programme which purports to have zero tolerance of corruption. Officers who commit integrity breaches and are allowed to remain in post or to resign without sanctions imposed upon them give contradictory messages to officer and staff as wells as the public about the commitment of the service to countering corruption.

7 Corruption in the UK Part 2 (Transparency International UK 2011), p.19.

8 The Taylor Reforms - police conduct, performance and associated regulations (Home Office 2005).

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Sanctions can dominate the integrity approach Because of the discretion allowed to officers, sanctions, along with the embedding of an integrity culture, are necessary to ensure compliance with integrity policies but a consequence is that integrity programmes can become skewed to intelligence, investigation and disciplinary action.

This can detract from the positive aspects of embedding integrity such as the recognition of standards of excellence, including integrity, as part of the appraisal process and can hinder generally incentivising officers to maintain high ethical standards.

Despite attempts to harmonise, standards continue to vary considerably Despite efforts by ACPO, practices for police integrity programmes still vary across Forces. In the HMIC review ‘Without Fear or Favour’, Inspector Roger Baker, who led the review, said: ‘While we found no evidence of endemic corruption in police service relationships, we did find significant variations between Forces and Authorities in how they defined what is acceptable and what is not.’

The report also said that understanding of boundaries, checking mechanisms, governance and oversight in police relationships with others (including the media) varies hugely across the service.

Budget reductions and hiring freezes Forces are subject to heavy budget reductions. By 2014, Forces face a 20 per cent reduction in real terms in their budgets. This freeze on budgets and reduced headcount could present difficulties in ensuring the supervision and resources needed for managing integrity programmes effectively.

Financial pressures on officers and staff Despite increased remuneration in recent years, the poor economic environment is increasing financial pressures on officers and reviews in train will lead to further changes in remuneration with varying effects upon officers and support staff. These financial pressures increase the vulnerability of some officers to approaches from corruptors and/or to engage in inappropriate secondary employment.

Growth in outsourcing gives new risks The budget cuts on Forces will increase the trend to outsource police functions. This could present increased integrity risks not only in the procurement functions but additional risks may occur because police will be reliant on the commitment of and ability of associated parties to observe integrity standards. Also, attention will be needed to address the procedures for managing conflicts of interest when senior officers become employees of suppliers (‘revolving doors’).

Legislative changes will shape integrity programmes The concern about corruption driven by the phone hacking scandal and issues exposed by the Leveson inquiry have emerged coincidently at a time of great change within police governance and management. In 2011 the Government passed the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 which created Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and replaces the Local Police Authorities with local Police and Crime Panels. The intent behind the Act is to bring police closer to their communities but at the same time it will change the way in which police integrity is to be governed and managed as the PCCs will have extensive powers.

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Another significant legal change for policing and anti-corruption is the UK Bribery Act 2010, which came into force in 2011. The Act has strict provisions covering bribery by individuals and companies. Although much of the debate on its drafting related to companies, the first conviction under the Act was not for corporate bribery but a bribery offence committed by a magistrates’ clerk, who received a six-year sentence, three of which were for the bribery offence. Although this would have been an offence under the previous legislation, this sentence was significant as a clear signal to individuals, including those in public service, that bribery offences will be met with custodial sentences. It is indicative of the courts’ willingness to take full advantage of the sentencing powers handed down by the Bribery Act, which allows up to ten years’ imprisonment.

On 28 November 2011 Munir Patel, an administration clerk at an Essex magistrates' court, became the first person to be convicted under the new Bribery Act. He was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment (which included three years for the bribery offence) after pleading guilty to a bribery offence and misconduct in a public office. Patel, a clerk at Redbridge Magistrates’ Court, Ilford, accepted £500 to avoid putting details of a traffic summons on a court database. Whilst he pleaded guilty to one count of bribery, prosecutors believe that he helped at least 53 individuals, earning up to £20,000. In sentencing Patel, Judge Alistair McCreath made clear that the defendant’s actions amounted to a very serious offence and a very substantial breach of trust, saying: ‘...a justice system in which officials are prepared to take bribes in order to allow offenders to escape the proper consequences of their offending is inherently corrupt and is one which deserves no public respect and which will attract none.’

Apart from its message to individuals, the UK Bribery Act is raising the standards of organisational anti-bribery practice through its provision which allows for of a defence for commercial organisations found guilty of paying a bribe to be entered if the organisation had adequate procedures for countering bribery.

Pressure for corruption The threats from external corruptors are high and widespread. Examples include organised crime, drug dealers and syndicates, media who pressure to gain access to information, criminals trying to influence the outcomes of investigations and those who engage in criminal activity such as steroid dealing. The vulnerability of individual police officers to approaches from external corruptors is expanding with risks such as the pressure of personal financial issues, conflicts of interest from second jobs, explosion in the use of social media and activities such as bodybuilding and weightlifting, which offer potential inappropriate associations.

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4 MANAGING INTEGRITY: A GOOD PRACTICE INTEGRITY PROGRAMME The global approach to anti-corruption programmes Building integrity and countering corruption are achieved by designing and implementing an effective organisational system of policies and procedures called in this report ‘the integrity programme’.

An organisational integrity management system follows a generally accepted continuous improvement cycle used for processes of commitment, assessment, design and implementation, monitoring and reporting covering all aspects of an organisation’s activities. The ACPO National Decision Model aligns to this approach.

The integrity cycle used by Transparency International is illustrated below:

This report benchmarks police integrity management using the approach of the Business Principles for Countering Bribery.

There is now global agreement that this approach forms the basis for a good practice integrity or anti-corruption programme. It is used in guidance such as the Global Compact-Transparency International Reporting Guidance on the United Nations 10th Principle Against Corruption, the OECD Good practice guidelines for anti-bribery, the UK Ministry of Justice Guidance to the Bribery Act 2010 and the US Department of Justice Guidance on corporate anti-bribery compliance programs. The Business Principles for Countering Bribery developed by Transparency International through a multi-stakeholder process have helped create this convergence in approach and have been a benchmark standard for development of many codes.

This TI-UK report benchmarks a model police integrity programme structured on the approach of the Business Principles for Countering Bribery. The recommended components of a

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police integrity programme are shown in the box below and then considered in turn in the sections below. They are also used in Section 6 for the review of the ACPO report.

A good practice police integrity programme Commit

  

Publicly communicated integrity values and zero tolerance of corruption Commitment to implement an integrity programme Definition of scope

Assess



Risk assessment

 

Organisation and responsibilities Design of detailed policies and procedures

Plan

Implement

             

Governance Leadership and oversight Policies and procedures implemented Management of key forms of integrity risk Associates Internal communication Training on the programme Human resources alignment to the programme Help and complaints (whistleblowing) channels External communication Public reporting Stakeholder engagement Collaborative working Sanctions

Monitoring, review and improvement

  

Internal controls Self-assessment and monitoring Audit – internal and external

Reporting



Public reporting on aspects material to stakeholders

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The ACPO report contains key elements necessary to an integrity programme but there is room for succinct guidance The ACPO report incorporates key elements of a good practice integrity programme but differs in some respects from the model shown above. The content of the ACPO report will be addressed in Section 6 of this report but structurally the ACPO report should have provided a succinct outline of an ACPO integrity programme. The National Decision Model aligns in part to the good practice system in the Business Principles for Countering Bribery but does not appear until page 46 of the ACPO report. The NDM could be adapted by ACPO to align to the Business Principles for Countering Bribery and provide a model integrity system for use by Forces.

The ACPO report does not cover some aspects of a good practice integrity programme including sanctions, external communication and public reporting but this may be because the report was a response to recent incidents and reports and therefore focused on what were felt to be the key elements relating to those specific matters.

The HMIC report ‘Without Fear or Favour’ alludes to the need for a more comprehensive integrity programme when it states: ‘Chief Officer oversight of integrity issues is almost exclusively confined to those reactive investigations ongoing in the force. There is little evidence of an understanding of force vulnerability and structured planning to prevent corruption.’9 A systematic approach applying a clearly articulated good practice integrity programme would ensure a comprehensive and holistic approach to integrity, reduce the risk of integrity incidents and enable Forces to have a proactive approach to integrity.

4.1

COMMITMENT

Commitment to integrity is inherent to policing. The police are enshrined with public trust. Integrity stands alongside Forces’ commitment to public service. As stated in the Nine Principles of Policing, General Instructions, Metropolitan Police, 1829, ‘Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police’. Without consistency in commitment to values there can be no point of reference for an integrity programme. This commitment to integrity should be stated publicly. However, our survey of public reporting (see Section 5 and the charts in the Appendix) showed that only one Force had published an explicit anti-corruption statement.

4.2

GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT

The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners raises questions about how the governance and oversight of integrity programmes will be carried out. This section first defines the functions of PCCs, Chief Constables and the Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. Next, it examines the role of governance and oversight in good practice integrity programmes, followed by a review of the implications for governance of the new structure for PCCs and PCPs. The section concludes by suggesting ways in which integrity in governance and oversight procedures could be strengthened.

9 Without Fear or Favour A review of police relationships (HMIC December 2011), p.15.

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4.2.1

Functions of PCCs, Chief Constables and Police and Crime Panels

This section describes the respective responsibilities and functional relationships of PCCs, Chief Constables and Police and Crime Panels as provided in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and draws largely on a draft protocol published by the Government in November 2011.10 Police authorities in each Force area in England and Wales will be abolished, to be replaced in November 2012 by PCCs and Police and Crime Panels. Separate arrangements will apply in London where The Queen will continue to appoint the Metropolitan Police Commissioner (equivalent to the Chief Constable) on the recommendation of the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary will now have to have regard to any recommendations made by the Mayor of London’s Office.

The public accountability for the delivery and performance of the police service is placed into the hands of the electorate of the Force area and their directly elected PCC. The PCC will draw on his/her mandate to set and shape the strategic objectives of the Force in consultation with the Chief Constable. The PCC of each Force area will be accountable to the electorate; the Chief Constable will be accountable to the PCC. The Police and Crime Panel within each Force area will be empowered to maintain a regular check and balance on the performance of the PCC. Police and Crime Commissioners The PCCs are charged with responsibility for the totality of policing within their area. Each PCC will be the recipient of all funding, including the government grant and precept. PCCs will be designated as Crown servants under the Official Secrets Act, making them subject to the same duties in relation to sensitive material as Government Ministers to policing and crime reduction.

The PCC has the legal power and duty to: 

 

  

Hold the Chief Constable to account for the exercise of the functions of the office of Chief Constable and the functions of the persons under the direction and control of the Chief Constable; Not fetter the operational independence of the police force and the Chief Constable that leads it; Publish information specified by the Secretary of State and information that the PCC considers necessary to enable the people who live in the force area to assess the performance of the PCC and Chief Constable; Comply with all formal requests from the Police and Crime Panel to attend their meetings; Prepare and issue an annual report to the Police and Crime Panel on the PCC’s delivery against the objectives set within the Police and Crime Plan; and Keep abreast of all complaints made against senior officers and staff, whilst solely acting to determine how best to manage complaints against the Chief Constable.

10 The Policing Protocol Order 2011 (Home Office 2011)

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Chief Constables The Chief Constables are charged with the employment and impartial direction and control of all constables and staff. The Act does not impinge on the legal authority and statutory foundation for the Office of Constable to maintain the Queen’s Peace without fear or favour. The will of Parliament and Government is that the Office of Constable shall not be open to political interference. The Chief Constable is responsible to the public and accountable to the PCC for:        

 

 

Leading the force in a way that is consistent with the attestation made by all constables on appointment and ensuring that it acts with impartiality; Appointing the force’s Senior Officers and Staff after consultation with the PCC; Supporting the PCC in the delivery of the strategy and objectives set out in a Police and Crime Plan; Assisting the PCC in planning the force’s budget having regard to the Strategic Policing Requirement; Having regard to the Strategic Policing Requirement when exercising their policing activity in respect of their force’s national and international policing responsibilities Notifying and briefing the PCC of any matter or investigation which the PCC may need to provide public assurance in company with the Chief Constable; Being the operational voice of policing in the force area and regularly explaining to the public the operational actions of officers and staff under their command; Entering into collaboration agreements between other Chief Constables and forces that benefit their force area and deliver better value for money and enhanced policing capabilities with the consent of their PCC; Remaining politically independent of the Office of Police and Crime Commissioner; Managing all complaints against the force, its officers and staff, including those of ACPO rank, and ensuring that the PCC is kept abreast of developments of those complaints in a regular and timely fashion; Exercising the power of direction and control in such a way as is reasonable to enable their PCC to have access to all necessary information and staff within the force; and Having day-to-day responsibility for financial management of the force within the framework of the agreed budget allocation and levels of authorisation issued by the PCC.

Police and Crime Panels Although the Chief Constable will retain responsibility for operational direction and control, the PCC will establish Police and Crime Panels in each police area, comprising a majority of local councillors drawn from every council in the police area and independent members. Once established, panels will be free to co-opt further members, both elected and independent, where required, up to a maximum panel size of twenty. The Police and Crime Panels will have the aim of providing a check and balance against the performance of the PCCs and will be responsible for advising and scrutinising the work of the PCC. The Police and Crime Panels will not scrutinise the Chief Constables but will scrutinise the PCCs’ exercise of their statutory functions. This includes the powers:

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        

To veto, by three-quarters majority, over the PCC’s proposed budget; To veto, by three-quarters majority, over the PCC’s proposed candidate for Chief Constable; To ask HMIC for a professional view when the PCC intends to dismiss a Chief Constable; To review any draft Police and Crime Plan and make recommendations to the PCC who must have regard to them; To review the PCC’s Annual Report and make reports and recommendations at a public meeting, which the PCC must attend; To require any papers in the PCC’s possession (except those which are operationally sensitive); To require the PCC to attend the Police and Crime Panel to answer questions; To appoint an acting PCC where the elected PCC is incapacitated, resigns or is disqualified; and Responsibility for all complaints about a PCC, although serious issues must be passed to the IPCC.

The Chief Constable retains responsibility for operational matters. If the Police and Crime Panel seek to scrutinise the PCC on an operational matter, the Chief Constable or other officers may need to attend alongside the PCC to offer factual accounts and clarity if needed for the actions and decisions of their officers and staff. The accountability of the Chief Constable remains firmly to the PCC and not to the Police and Crime Panel.

4.2.2

Role of governance and oversight in integrity programmes

Governance Responsibility for designing and implementing an integrity programme lies with executive management and in the police service these are the senior officers. Good organisational practice demands that there should be separation of the governance from the executive function. A benchmark is the Corporate Governance Code, which is the standard for corporate governance in the UK. It provides the following: ‘There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision.’11 The Code goes on to say: ‘Corporate governance is therefore about what the board of a company does and how it sets the values of the company, and is to be distinguished from the day-to-day operational management of the company by full-time executives.’ 12 With regard to public service, the function of governance is clearly described by the Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services. It states: ‘Good governance is to ensure that an organisation or partnership fulfils its overall purpose, achieves its intended outcomes for citizens and service users, and operates in an effective, efficient and ethical manner. This principle should guide all governance activity.’13 This guidance goes on to identify six principles for good governance: 11 The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council 2010), p.10.

12 The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council 2010), p.1, clause 4.

13The Good Governance Standard for Public Service (The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services 2004), p.7

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1. Focusing on the organisation’s purpose and on outcomes for citizens and service users; 2. Performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles; 3. Promoting values for the whole organisation and demonstrating the values of good governance through behaviour; 4. Good governance means taking informed, transparent decisions and managing risk; 5. Developing the capacity and capability of the governing body to be effective; and 6. Engaging stakeholders and making accountability real.

Applying the good practice governance approach to the integrity programme means that the governance function gives direction to the executive function on integrity standards, checks if the integrity programme is being implemented effectively and, importantly, tests and challenges the executive function on risks.

‘Governance should be principles-based, requiring Boards to think seriously about a wide range of issues and to apply the principles appropriately to their organisation.’

An independent governance review of the International Cricket Council, Lord Woolf and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, March 2012

The non-executive role in holding the executive to account A key element for good governance is the involvement of independent directors or non-executive representatives. In public companies these will be the non-executive board directors and in the public sector where there are various forms of governing body, they can be such as non-executive directors as in NHS Trusts. For the police under the existing structure, the counterpart of nonexecutive directors are the independent members of the Local Police Authority but this governance oversight will disappear with the creation of Police and Crime Panels as these are charged to scrutinise the PCCs’ exercise of their statutory functions, not the Forces.

Although the ACPO report includes a section on governance, it does not in fact describe the governance of integrity but rather the executive management of integrity in ACPO and Forces. The report confuses the non-executive role with the role of the executive, suggesting that governance should be placed within the executive: ‘Statutorily, police authorities provide governance of forces, and chief officers provide oversight within forces. However, many issues of concern that arise about police integrity could be reduced by effective internal and external governance’.14

14 Without Fear or Favour - A review of police relationships (HMIC December 2011), p.15.

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There should be provision for independent oversight in the governance of police integrity and clarity on the specific responsibilities in relation to the integrity programme.

Independent input is a critical activity in checking that integrity programmes are functioning correctly. There should be provision for independent oversight in the governance of police integrity and clarity on specific responsibilities in relation to the integrity programme. The Good Governance Standard for Public Service says: ‘Non-executives have a vital role in holding the executive to account for its performance in fulfilling those responsibilities, including through purposeful challenge and scrutiny.’15 The independent input for governance applies to organisations of all types, whether public sector or commercial. The Ministry of Justice in its guidance to the UK Bribery Act 2010 advises: ‘In a large multi-national organisation the board should be responsible for setting bribery prevention policies, tasking management to design, operate and monitor bribery prevention procedures, and keeping these policies and procedures under regular review.16 TI-UK in its guidance to adequate procedures to the UK Bribery Act states: ‘The board must be knowledgeable about the programme and alert to the risks of bribery. This means that countering bribery should be a standing item on the board agenda and the board should receive regular reviews on the implementation of the programme, reports on any incidents or allegations of bribery and actions taken to correct deficiencies. The board should test the CEO and management on the reviews and challenge any areas where the board feels concern. The board should also assess the competence, judgement and attitudes to integrity of the CEO and senior management.’17

In summary, accepted good governance on integrity management determines that there be a governance function which is clearly separate from the executive, that the governance function incorporates non-executive members and that it sets standards and values, gives direction and challenges and tests the executive.

4.2.3

PCCs and PCPs: integrity governance

The premise of this report is that effective integrity programmes require adequate governance. This section looks at how the relevant structures that will come in with the establishment of PCCs and PCPs will allow for this required governance.

The Police and Crime Panel will scrutinise the PCC – but not the Chief Constable – and its governance powers related to integrity oversight will extend essentially to being able to require the PCC to attend the PCP to answer questions and to require any papers in the PCC’s possession (except those which are operationally sensitive).

15The Good Governance Standard for Public Service (The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services 2004), p.10.

16 The Bribery Act 2010 – Guidance (Ministry of Justice, 2011), p.24, section 2.4.

17 The 2010 Bribery Act – Adequate Procedures (TI-UK 2010), p.15, section 3.5.1.

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The concentration in the PCC of both governance and executive functions (setting budget and the strategic plan) and the removal of governance powers from the local authority raises questions over how police integrity programmes will be managed according to the good practice identified in this report.

The concentration in the PCC of both governance and executive functions (setting budget and the strategic plan) and the removal of governance powers from the local authority raise questions over how police integrity programmes will be managed according to the good practice for integrity management identified in this report.

The UNODC in a handbook on police accountability commented on governance as follows: ‘Just as it is unwise to vest all powers and discretion entirely in the police, giving them complete operational independence and relying entirely on their professional judgement, it is also unwise to vest all authority over the police in any single body, regardless of whether that body represents the executive or the community or is an independent oversight body, since impartiality cannot be assured.’18 The PCCs, elected by the community, will have great power and influence on Forces and will be inextricably involved in the executive function through budget and strategy setting. Integrity programmes need close and frequent attention from the governance body, but the new structure does not appear to provide this.

The desire of the public for checks and balances was identified in a MORI survey of 2010 which found that despite participants having a strong preference for a local ‘figurehead’, only a minority of respondents wanted an individual who would be solely responsible for holding the Police to account.

The most common preferences for where responsibility should fall were either through a structure similar to that currently in place, or through a named-individual plus a scrutiny panel. Participants favouring the latter option envisaged that a panel would work alongside a figurehead in both an advisory and scrutiny role.19 The changes which will take place in November 2012 present concerns about governance heightened by the loss of other oversight structures such as the Audit Commission which has inspected Forces in partnership with HMIC (a total of 22 Forces in 2009-2010). Additional solutions will have to be sought beyond the limited provisions of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 in order to provide the required balance and transparency of governance and oversight.

In a paper of 2005, Samuel Walker said: ‘In principle, police should be held accountable through multiple channels to multiple audiences or constituencies. Oversight bodies should be judged on their integrity (thoroughness and fairness), their legitimacy (stakeholders’ perceptions), and their impact on learning (meaningful feedback).20

18 Handbook on police accountability, oversight and integrity (United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime, 2011), p.13.

19 Police accountability and governance structures-public attitudes and perceptions (Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute 2010), pp. 2-3.

20 The New World of Police Accountability (Samuel Walker, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 2005).

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Questions which need to be addressed in relation to integrity governance and the new structure for PCCs and PCPs include:      

How will the critical and frequent review of integrity risks and testing of the police management be ensured in the new structure?

What governance role exists for the Police and Crime Panels?

How could Police and Crime Panels broaden the base for governance?

How could the PCCs and police be subject to checks and balances beyond the limited provisions of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011?

How could the public be reassured about the governance of police integrity?

What will be the role of the Home Office which is the ultimate oversight body for the police?

Ways in which governance by PCCs could be enhanced The following are suggestions for ways in which PCCs could broaden the base for governance and yet be subject to checks and balances beyond the limited provisions of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011: 

 



Public transparency in an up-to-date way of the integrity programme and PCC reviews (subject to confidentiality or security) – limiting public transparency to an annual report is too infrequent to deal with immediacy of issues that occur in relation to integrity; Expert independent panel review (see case study in the box below); Forces to have their own boards with non-executives – most large companies have an audit committee comprised of non-executives who are responsible for integrity issues and with direct access to external auditors and the SFO has such a strategic board ;Stakeholder panels and reviews; and Engagement of NGOs, civil society and the community.

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Case study: Expert panel with governance oversight The New York Police Commission to Combat Police Corruption was created in 1995 as a permanent board to monitor and evaluate the anti-corruption programmes, activities, commitment, and efforts of the New York City Police Department. The Commission is completely independent of the NYPD, and is presently comprised of six Commissioners appointed by the Mayor who advise a full time staff of attorneys. The Commission was created based upon the 1994 recommendations of the Commission To Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department (the "Mollen Commission") issued July 7, 1994. That study found that the New York City Police Department has undergone alternating cycles of corruption and reform. The Mollen Commission believed that the creation of an independent commission to monitor the anti-corruption activities of the Police Department, and help keep the NYPD vigilant in this area, would help break these cycles of corruption.

Accordingly, the Mayor, with the support of the Police Commissioner, created The Commission to Combat Police Corruption on February 27, 1995, by Executive Order No. 18. The Chair and five Commissioners serve on the Commission on a pro bono basis. Each was appointed by the Mayor and serves staggered terms.

Individually and collectively, the Commissioners possess extensive experience in the criminal justice system and in law enforcement corruption-related issues, providing a broad and diverse amount of experience to the Commission. The Commissioners oversee a full-time staff.

4.3

Risk assessment is critical to the design of an effective integrity programme

INTEGRITY RISK ASSESSMENT Risk assessment is critical to the design of an effective integrity programme. Without a systematic and continuous assessment process, there cannot be a comprehensive and upto-date view of where bribery and other corruption risks lie. This will restrict the ability to design and implement adequate policies and procedures to counter risks. Where adequate policies and procedures are designed, risk can be significantly mitigated. An example of this is the extensive work on recruitment vetting which is now the third branch of Professional Standards. The risk assessment should identify the influences, internal and external, that can result in corruption, whether systemic or individual. The internal and external influences are described below and these, acting in combinations, can present the circumstances in which there is potential for corruption. How the corruption takes place in its various forms is described in the next section. Through a continuous process of risk assessment the integrity programme should be adapted and maintained to meet changing conditions and to mitigate risks.

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Five pillars for integrity risk assessment:     

An analytical framework incorporating the underlying influences and opportunities for corruption; A typology of risks; A critical and open minded approach to corruption risks; Non-executive or independent challenge and stimulation to the executive so that risks are not overlooked or not given inadequate attention; and Continuous review.

Considerable work is being carried out by SOCA, ACPO, HMIC and Forces to analyse and understand the underlying structures of corruption and identify the key risks. This work also includes creating a standardised intelligence collection plan to record and report the forms of corruption. SOCA carries out a triennial assessment of risks, the most recent being produced in May 2010, supplemented by annual assessments which are seen as internal processes to inform local control strategies as well as inform the national strategic assessment. These annual assessments are further complemented by problem profiles to examine emerging trends.

Forces should rely not only on the SOCA tri-annual assessment and their own annual assessments but on a continuing, dynamic process which addresses local risks and is fed into the national risk assessment.

4.4

INFLUENCES FOR CORRUPTION

This section first provides an analytical model for the influences or factors that lead to corruption and then discusses the main risks.

The 2010 SOCA assessment described the corruption threat by analysing the corruptors, corrupt employees and corrupt actions undertaken, as well as highlighting common themes or factors. It also identified personal and organisational vulnerabilities exploited for the purposes of corruption.

Apart from the work of SOCA, HMIC, IPCC and Forces, there have been numerous academic research reports addressing corruption risks in policing and offering analytical structures.

This TI-UK report suggests three factors for corruption risk:   

Internal pressures Individual vulnerability External pressures

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Internal vulnerabilities Weak control environment

Organisational inherent risk

Poorly designed integrity programme Internal pressures Processes vulnerable to corruption

A culture of integrity and commitment to public service provides the enabling environment for countering corruption. This will suffer if there is weak governance, management and supervision and weak or mixed messages on integrity.

There can be inherent risks from the organisational structure. Larger, highly centralised Forces may make management and supervision of the anticorruption programme remote from local operations. Work structures (teams, shifts, advancement) may set an environment that impacts the individual adversely. If a Force relies significantly on contract staff or outsourced services, it will need to embed its standards for integrity within the contractors and suppliers whose commitment to public service or anti-corruption standards may not measure up to that of the client Force.

If the design of the anti-corruption measures is weak, this can be exploited or may allow incidents though ignorance and negligence.

Peer or team pressures, performance targets, ‘noble cause’.

Corruption risk occurs whenever there is a transaction, movement or change. Functions presenting risks are such as purchasing and contracting, assets management, information, documentation processing, HR, seizure or handling of property, cash and drugs e.g., from criminals, drugs, accidents, victims.

Individual vulnerability Vulnerable circumstances Self-tasked Inadequacy Conflict of interest

Secondary employment Rogue employees

Family and peer demands, debt, desire for financial or other benefits, improper behaviour or associations, criminal act, de-motivation, addiction.

Desire for gain, success, advancement or other benefit, ‘noble cause’.

Uncertainty or ignorance of policies and procedures, negligence, lack of skills.

Not corrupt in itself but it can lead to abuse of trust, inappropriate association, revolving door, vulnerability to extortion or corruption attempts.

Can be a conflict of interest, might be an inappropriate association.

The bad apples - the basically corrupt, infiltrated criminals or others with vested interests.

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External influences Inducement and grooming

Solicitation Threats, extortion from corruptors

4.5

Corrupt individuals suborn individuals by using methods such as frequent hospitality, excessive gifts, sexual enticement, inducing officers to bend the rules - and then the corruption approach is made.

Approaches are made to individuals with offers of bribes or other improper benefits.

Criminals, organised crime, terrorists, action groups, media, business interests.

FORMS OF CORRUPTION RISK

To counter corruption, it is necessary to define and understand forms of corruption, the channels used and the influences and pressures both internal and external that can create vulnerability to corruption. Transparency International views forms of corruption as universal for organisations and cultures but differences lie in perceptions of what constitutes corruption and the degree and extent to which particular forms occur.

Definitions and risks of corruption in policing have been extensively identified, researched and commented on in various reports including the ACPO Report. The HMIC Report ‘Without Fear or Favour’ identified risk areas including misuse of credit cards, lack of clarity around the acceptance of gifts and hospitality; and around conflicts of interest, tax and other legal implications of police officers and staff having second jobs or other business interests. This section draws on these reports by commenting on the main risks and the controls that can be put in place to mitigate them.

Section 3 of the ACPO Report refers to risk assessments and to four reports providing research on corruption. The ACPO report identifies and discusses three dimensions of corruption: corruptors, corrupt employees and corrupt actions. Miller in his 2003 report used an analytical approach comprising personal circumstances, opportunities for corruption and broader culture and values. 21 The ACPO Report could have been extended to cover more forms of corruption and to accommodate emerging forms of corruption.

It is recommended that ACPO builds on the current work by SOCA and produces a standard typology of forms of police corruption to provide a common language for ACPO Forces and for future research and monitoring. The ACPO typology, as well as defining and describing forms of corruption and the associated vulnerabilities and pressures, could extend to including red flags, preventive measures and case studies. The typology would form the basis for recording and analysing integrity violations and risks across Forces.

It is also recommended that Forces institute robust systems to ensure risks are identified, monitored and managed arising from relationships and transactions. These include such as information disclosure, gratuities, hospitality, purchasing and contracting, secondary 21 Police Corruption in England and Wales: An assessment of current evidence (Joel Miller, Home Office 2011)

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employment and conflicts of interest. Forces should do so on the basis of national standards and expectations – there are no geographical variables when it comes to integrity and there should not be local differences in standards. This work on national standards should be encouraged by the Home Office and promoted by ACPO and leaders in the Forces.

How corruption manifests itself The risks of the various forms of corruption have been extensively analysed by police bodies as well as researchers. This section separates the process or channel of corruption from the benefit or inducement. It discusses in detail some selected channels and forms of corruption which TI-UK considers warrant greater attention.

Process abuse

Disclosure of information Misuse of access to information (including IT) Drug dealing Promotions and favours Perverting the course of justice Police protection for those engaged in illegal activities Human resources e.g., recruitment Secondary employment Revolving door Purchasing and contracting

Theft and fraud

Assets theft Opportunistic theft Fraud

Influence

Cronyism Nepotism

Extortion

Trading in influence Monetary, sexual

Bribes

Hospitality, gifts and expenses Kickbacks Contra favours Facilitation payments

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4.5.1

Cronyism and nepotism

Cronyism is where partiality is shown to a friend or acquaintance and nepotism is favouring family.

These forms of improper behaviour show themselves in different ways, most commonly as:    

Providing advantage related to recruitment or appointment Supplying information Access to police facilities or assets Endorsement

Cronyism and nepotism have figured in recent scandals and encapsulate the theme running through this review, which is a lack of clarity in creating awareness or understanding by individual officers of how they should be behave and an understanding of the risks related to external perception. What might appear as reasonable, such as favouring a close professional contact or placement of one’s child on work experience, can be seen by the public to be inappropriate because it indicates too close a relationship with a particular organisation or using office to gain or provide an advantage.

Police must be trained to know how to recognise inappropriate situations and improper behaviour.

Examples of nepotism and cronyism risk In 2011 the Chief Constable of North Yorkshire Police received a final written warning for gross misconduct over a police recruitment drive after he helped a relative, and a relative of his deputy, gain an advantage in a force-wide recruitment exercise. Two members of the force were dismissed for nepotism, while a constable was given a final written warning in connection with the affair.

Dick Fedorcio, director of public affairs and internal communications at the Met, told the Leveson Inquiry on 13 March 2012 that he helped set up placements at The Sun for both his own son in 2003 and 2004, and also Ian Blair’s son in 2005. The Leveson Inquiry also heard that one of Sir Ian's predecessors, Lord Condon, had also arranged for one of his two sons to have a work placement at The Sun. 4.5.2

Procurement and contracting

Procurement has been low on the risk profile for police but it is an area of growing integrity risk.

The ACPO report does not address the risks within procurement nor does the HMIC Report, ‘Without fear or favour which states: ‘There was clear evidence of major contracts and procurement being professionally and consistently managed’.

Forces manage substantial budgets ranging from the near £4 billion of the Metropolitan Police to less than £100 million for some Forces. A greater part of budgets is personnel costs but the pressure on budgets is encouraging Forces to seek to privatise their activities. In March 2012, West Midlands and Surrey Forces invited bids for services and it was reported that 64 companies

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attended the briefing on the bid process. The widely drawn West Midlands/Surrey contract notice said that all those services that could ‘be legally delegated to the private sector’ had been put on the table while ‘preserving the integrity of the office of constable’. Services such as car fleets, IT, payroll and custody suites are already being run by contractors but the list of services put up for tender also included guarding crime scenes and taking care of suspects. Contracts up for bidding have a potential value of £1.5bn over seven years but could rise to £3.5bn, depending on how many other Forces sign up to outsourcing. However, in answer to voiced concerns that core police services were at risk within such an outsourcing/contracting plan, the Government insisted that powers of arrest would remain with trained police officers.

It is likely that police procurement functions will be managing increasing number of outsourcing contracts and this, plus their existing responsibilities, suggests that police integrity programmes should give greater attention to the purchasing functions. This should be in four areas: due diligence on suppliers, the procurement process, change or exception orders and training of purchasing staff.

Forces’ procurement process Forces’ procurement is governed by European Union and UK procurement legislation as well as the UK Government's value for money policy. As part of a transparency agenda, the UK Government has implemented commitments with regard to procurement and contracting: all new central government and Non Departmental Public Body (NDPB) ICT contracts over the value of £10,000 should be published in full online and all new central government and NDPB tender documents for contracts over £10,000 should be published on a single website with this information to be made available to the public free of charge. New items of central government and NDPB spending over £25,000 and all new central government contracts should be published in full online and made available to the public free of charge. Contracts between suppliers and Forces should be published online though in some circumstances, limited redactions are made to some contracts before they are published in order to comply with existing law and for the protection of national security. Another development in police procurement is the use of an online National Police Procurement Hub which will give the police service the ability to select, purchase and pay for a range of approved goods and services online from 500 vetted and approved suppliers, and is set to save the police service £30 million over six years.

Vulnerability of the procurement process The transparency of police processes for bidding and awarding of contracts and the use of online procurement provide a significant protection against corruption. Additional protection is provided by procedures for sign-off of contracts and contractual rights to cancel contracts where a supplier is perceived to have engaged in corruption. It should be noted that under the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 a company is automatically and perpetually debarred from competing for public contracts where it is convicted of a corruption offence.

There are also generic corruption risks in procurement that could apply to Forces despite these protections. Procurement corruption risk often takes place related to ‘rush’, ‘change’ and ‘exception’ orders’ which allow the controls to be circumvented or specifications changed. The procurement process can also be circumvented or rigged by specifications being influenced to be

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favourable to potential bidders or favouring bidders to receive advance notice or inside information to give them advantage. Corruption in purchasing and contracting usually takes the form of bribes, kick-backs, nepotism/cronyism and conflict of interest. It can also be associated with lavish, disproportionate or repeated hospitality, gifts and expenses. Care should be taken that controls are in place which are adequate to deal with these risks.

Dick Fedorcio, the Metropolitan Police’s director of public affairs, resigned on 29 March 2012 after learning he faced a gross misconduct charge for awarding a £1,000-a-day public relations contract to Chamy Media run by Neil Wallis, a former News of the World executive.

IPCC deputy chairwoman Deborah Glass said its inquiry focused ‘on the circumstances under which a contract for senior-level media advice and support was awarded to Mr Wallis’s firm. She said in a statement: “Our investigation found Mr Fedorcio has a case to answer in relation to his procurement of the contract for Chamy Media.’ Mr Fedorcio had been questioned previously at the Leveson inquiry about inviting leading PR firms Bell Pottinger and Hanover to submit rival bids for the contract that was awarded to Mr Wallis.

Chairman Lord Justice Leveson suggested the head of public affairs chose these firms because he knew they would be more expensive than the former News of the World executive, adding: ‘The point is, this is set up to get a result.’ Mr Fedorcio denied this but confirmed he initially wanted to award the contract to Mr Wallis without any competition.

Training of procurement staff The review did not research training or capabilities of procurement staff related to anti-corruption but there were indications in one Force that training had not been given to purchasing staff.

Forces should ensure that tailored training is given to procurement staff and that they are assessed regularly for capabilities in this area.

Due diligence on suppliers The due diligence processes for suppliers were not researched for this report but the ACPO report revealed that as some suppliers provide services to more than one Force, a National Contractor Vetting Scheme had been developed which is operated and maintained by Warwickshire Police on behalf of the Portfolio. The clearances conducted by Warwickshire are accepted by all Forces nationally. This aims to ensure that the contractors are vetted to a minimum standard and that there is no need for a duplication of work with the contractors being cleared by more than one Force.

The Ministry of Justice Guidance to the UK Bribery Act gives guidance on due diligence on suppliers and requires adequate procedures for anti-bribery including due diligence on associated parties. The Guidance states: ‘The principal way in which commercial organisations may decide to approach bribery risks which arise as a result of a supply chain is by employing the types of antibribery procedures referred to elsewhere in this guidance (e.g. risk-based due diligence and the use of anti-bribery terms and conditions) in the relationship with their contractual counterpart, and by requesting that counterpart to adopt a similar approach with the next party in the chain.’

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Consideration should also be given to the integrity of the supplier across the range of responsibility and integrity areas including human rights and supply chain sustainability. Apart from the reputational risks of an association with a supplier that has issues, vulnerability in another integrity area other than corruption, such as human rights, is a red flag for corruption concerns.

The due diligence process, whether Force-based or shared between Forces, should require bidders to demonstrate that they have adequate anti-bribery procedures in place and place contractual requirements on suppliers to observe integrity standards.

Even where processes are carried out correctly the risk of adverse public perception must be considered.

Sir Ian Blair, Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ran into trouble in 2008 with the awarding of a contract worth more than £3 million to a firm run by a close personal friend. He chaired a panel which handed a contract to the company and disclosed his friendship before joining the panel in a private letter to the MPA. Sir Ian was subsequently cleared by an independent review but this illustrates the risk of adverse public perception.

4.5.3

Facilitation payments

Facilitation payments, also called ‘facilitating’, ‘speed’ or ‘grease’ payments, are defined by Transparency International as small unofficial payments made to secure or expedite the performance of a routine or necessary action to which the payer of the facilitation payment has legal or other entitlement.22 Such payments are often extorted and can be common to police activities in countries that are vulnerable to corruption such as Eastern Europe or emerging markets but are not currently an issue in the UK. Officers may on occasion travel on police work to countries with risks of facilitation payments and Forces should establish a policy on facilitation payments and train officers at risk on how to resist such payments.

4.5.4

Secondary employment

Many police officers are engaged in second employment and this creates risks for integrity management as it can place officers under financial stress, may involve inappropriate employment and expose officers and staff to corruptors and conflicts of interest. It can also be seen unfavourably by the public and detract from the integrity reputation of Forces, although the HMIC report ’Without Fear or Favour’ stated that public focus groups conducted as part of the review suggested that the participants saw nothing wrong with the police having second jobs provided that they did not conflict with their primary duty. According to the HMIC Report, at 31 March 2011, the police in England and Wales (including BTP) employed 141,741 officers and 95,761 staff (including Police Community Support Officers). These officers had declared 14,916 business interests to their Force, and the staff declared a further 4,413, the most common interest being property letting. The

22 Business Principles for Countering Bribery (Transparency International 2009), p.8.

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report noted that these figures should be treated with caution as there is inconsistency with the way Forces record this data.

Police, as a result of the Edmund-Davies reforms of 1978, are not underpaid in comparison with average private sector or public sector workers. Nevertheless, the poor economy is placing officers under increasing financial stress and secondary employment can be a factor in this. Apart from the financial pressures, police are attracted to secondary employment as they have specialist skills which can present opportunities in areas other than policing and shift systems allow extended days off during which officers can pursue other employment interests.

Business interests of police officers are legislated for in the Police Regulations 2003, specifically Regulation 7.59 which states: ‘An officer must apply for permission to have a business interest, whereupon … the chief officer shall determine whether or not the interest in question is compatible with the member concerned remaining a member of the force.’ ACPO through its ACPO Workforce Modernisation Business Area has provided guidance to assist in the decision making process around compatibility.23 This provides examples of four business interests that could be incompatible accompanied by reasons why. However, the HMIC report commented that it had found significant variations in the policies, procedure and authorisation processes and evidence of a range of risks in the way the regulations are operated in practice.

This TI-UK report is confined to examining integrity and how secondary employment represents a risk to integrity. As such, TI-UK considers that the approach of ACPO and the Forces should be to strengthen policies and procedures to ensure there is clarity and consistency across Forces about secondary employment and the occupations that can be allowed and the authorisation of such employment. The key is to create an environment where officers are transparent about secondary employment and their interests are documented so that cross-Force analysis can be carried out based on good data and that conflicts of interest are identified and managed. Forces should also consider developing approaches by which risks can be mitigated such as that which is being carried out in one Force where small business training is given to officers so they are more likely to succeed. It is common for Forces to provide debt counselling but this takes place only after the event. Prevention is better.

4.5.5

Post-service employment

Post-service employment is commonly termed ‘revolving door’ and in respect of this report refers to the movement of senior officers to positions in the private sector. Such movements can represent conflicts of interest and bring associated risks which can occur before, after or during a role in service. For example:  

Officers might abuse their power while in service to gain favour with a certain company with a view to positioning themselves to gain employment upon leaving the Force; Former officers who accept positions in business might influence their former colleagues to make decisions in a way that favours their new employer; and

23 The Management of Business Interests and Additional Occupations for Police Officers and Police Staff (ACPO November 2009).

33



Former officers might use confidential information to benefit their new employers – for example during procurement procedures – and it should be noted that the increase in outsourcing means that this is a growing risk.

‘For the public official who has been through the revolving door, or aspires to go through it, that connection with the private sector presents a potential conflict with his or her duty to serve the public interest. In short, the risk is that this conflict could impair the judgement of public officials and hence damage the public interest they are employed to serve.’

CABS FOR HIRE? fixing the revolving door between government and business Transparency International UK, May 2011

HMIC in its report ‘Without Fear or Favour’ reported that it had identified isolated incidents of risk and vulnerability, but it did not contend that corruption and lack of integrity is either systemic or endemic. However, public perception of post-service appointments is an important consideration and this might be adverse to the reputation of a Force if the appointment process has not been properly handled. The HMIC report commented on the lack of adequate processes: ‘The risk is caused by poor processes and systems, driven by a lack of understanding. The boundaries of acceptability are vague; rather than ensuring uniformity, the regulatory framework is too subjective, leading to some startling examples of inconsistency. Particularly concerning are the numerous instances where outside business interests have been approved that contradict the limited examples given in the ACPO guidance.’

TI-UK suggests that the ACPO approach to post-service appointments should comprise the following elements:   



Policies and approval processes consistent for all Forces; Clarity related to the levels of officer and circumstances in which the processes should be applied; A cooling-off period during which officers may not take up appointments – the period could be fixed, say six months or tailored according to the nature of position in the police and the prospective appointment; and A publicly available register of appointments that have undergone review.

The HMIC report found that there was little evidence of cooling-off’ periods being required for senior staff leaving to take up posts with commercial or other bodies with related interests. In only one Force had the authority attempted to restrict retiring chief officers from taking up immediate employment with commercial organisations connected with the Force.

The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA) currently advises the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and former Ministers on applications made to it under Business Appointment Rules, about appointments former Ministers, senior civil servants and other Crown servants wish to take up on leaving government. Former civil servants, diplomats, members of the Armed Forces and members of the security services are subject to the Business Appointment Rules for two years after leaving Crown service, and, in certain circumstances, they must seek permission before taking up any outside appointment or employment during that period.

34

The police as Crown servants should fall under the scope of ACOBA24.

4.6

COMMUNICATION AND TRAINING

The scope of this report does not cover communication and training as this would have required an extensive review of Forces’ communication processes and examination of training materials and courses. Nevertheless, this report emphasises the critical role of communication and training in implementing integrity programmes. Internal communication should ensure that all officers and staff are informed about and understand the Forces’ commitment to integrity, what is required of them and the sanctions that will be applied should they breach that commitment. They should know where to get advice and how to use whistleblowing channels. The communications methods can make use of the whole range of communication channels including intranet, notice boards and manuals and in-service training. Messages and demonstration of commitment from senior officers should be used to reinforce the messages given in written communications. The communication materials should be kept up-to-date and officers and staff required to record periodically that they have read the Force’s manual or guidance on integrity and sign off on their understanding of integrity requirements.

Integrity training should be given regularly to all officers and staff and tailored training should be given to functions identified as having higher risk, such as recruitment and procurement.

Contractors should be required to show that they have adequate training in place and the Forces could extend their training to contractors. This is important where multiple functions are being outsourced. Training can enable dilemmas to be explored and officers and staff to role play to learn how to deal with situations they may encounter. The quality of training should be assessed and details of officers and staff training recorded in their personnel files.

Periodic surveys of officers and staff should be carried out to assess their understanding of and commitment to the integrity programme and also their own perception of how the Forces live up to their integrity commitments. Feedback from training should be collected and used to improve the integrity programme.

4.7

SANCTIONS AND DISCIPLINE

There are substantial procedures for application of sanctions or disciplinary procedures to officers and staff for violations of integrity. In any organisation the sanctions for violations of integrity should be communicated clearly and seen to be applied openly and consistently.

In January 2005, William Taylor published his report on his review of Police Disciplinary Arrangements in the Police Service and this resulted in new procedures issued in 2008. There were 19 recommendations in the Taylor review and two have particular relevance to integrity management. One was that a new single code should be produced to be a touchstone for It should be noted that, in its 2011 ‘Cabs for Hire Report’, TI-UK identified several weaknesses in ACOBA and therefore recommended that it be replaced by a statutory body with responsibility for enforcing and monitoring more robust business appointment rules. Were such a body to be created, the police should fall under its scope.

24

35

individual behaviour and a clear indication of organisational and peers’ expectations. This matches the recommendations of this TI-UK report that there should be clarity and consistency across all Forces and a model integrity code and accompanying tools. Another recommendation was that conduct issues should be separated into two distinct groups – misconduct and gross misconduct – in order to promote proportionate handling with the overall intention to:  



Promote the fair, timely and proportionate handling of each case; Ease of understanding, to ensure that both members of the police service and the public can see how an incident of alleged misconduct will be dealt with; and Ensure that the police service learns the lessons from each case.

In general the Taylor recommendations lean toward good practice integrity management but there are aspects that fall short. The public and those working for the police service need to see not only how an incident is dealt with but that the outcome is fair and proportionate where integrity is concerned. Integrity violations are significant as they not only betray the trust placed in police as Crown servants but represent red flags for future risk related to an employee or group of employees. The starting point for integrity programmes should be one of zero tolerance of corruption. A minor infringement of expenses integrity might be attributed to error but there can be no financial materiality level for integrity. For senior officers who are the people providing leadership, any integrity violation, small or large, is even more significant as it communicates an approach of inequality to police service and the public. If a senior officer commits a serious integrity breach and yet remains in post, this sends the wrong message to all and severely undermines the integrity programme.

‘Stronger police accountability has been called for after a BBC Panorama investigation found that officers accused of misconduct were being allowed to quietly resign rather than face the disciplinary process.’

BBC Panorama, 31 October 2011

ACPO, if it has not done so already, could consider developing disciplinary matrices and test the validity of the matrix through internal and external consultation. ACPO should also consider how the disciplinary processes reflect the gravity of breaking integrity trust and whether existing sanctions are adequate to support the implementation of an effective integrity programme. The zero tolerance approach but has to be applied within appropriate employment disciplinary processes that will distinguish misconduct and gross misconduct.

It is therefore important to be clear as to what constitutes gross misconduct.

4.8

MONITORING, AUDITING AND REVIEW

Monitoring and review by the executive and also the governance body establish the degree to which an integrity programme is working over time, and the degree to which it is meeting integrity objectives. An important aspect of monitoring is gaining and disseminating knowledge learned from incidents.

36

The ACPO National Decision Model has within its process ‘reviewing what happened’ but it does not otherwise address monitoring. The HMIC report ‘Without Fear or Favour’ includes a useful selfcheck list of integrity questions which could form the basis for an ACPO monitoring and review tool.

Auditing is another dimension of monitoring but evidence was not obtained on how or the degree to which this is currently carried out in regard to integrity management.

Learning from incidents and regular review of monitoring reports by the governance function is an essential component of an integrity programme. ACPO should extend the role of monitoring in the NDM and build reviews of monitoring reports into the new structure of PCCs and PCPs.

37

5 PUBLIC REPORTING This section describes the findings from a review by Transparency International of public reporting by a small number of UK and overseas Forces.

5.1

INTRODUCTION

Public reporting is vital, not only because it informs the public what anti-corruption measures a Force is taking, but also because it is evidence of a Force’s full commitment to anti-corruption. The European Code of Police Ethics states: ‘The police should be as transparent as possible towards the public. A readiness by the police to disclose information on its activities is crucial for securing public confidence.’ 25 This is affirmed by another report which says ‘Police activity must be open to observation and regularly reported to outsiders. Police need to be accountable for their use of state resources — both fiscal resources and their use of their legal powers.’26 ‘Quality reporting on anti-corruption can effectively support the deeper integration of anti-

corruption measures into business operations by establishing an external accountability mechanism and stimulating companies to improve their internal management systems.’

Georg Kell, Executive Director, UN Global Compact Introduction to the Global Compact-Transparency International Guidance on Reporting on the 10th Principle against Corruption, 2010

Regular reporting on anti-corruption programmes also instils an awareness of the issue among employees and communicates externally the seriousness which the organisation attaches to integrity. As well as raising their capacity to prevent corruption, the process can contribute to staff understanding and belief in the organisation and its integrity. In policing, whose perceived veracity has been shaken by public scandals and exposed to daily media exposure and criticism, it is just as important to remind officers and staff that the vast majority of the Force acts with integrity and opposes malpractice. As an added bonus, transparent reporting allows the sharing of innovative anti-corruption techniques among Forces, nationally and internationally.

Disclosure will act as an aid to risk management. It will enable the public to judge material issues, form a view on whether the Force is managing the issues adequately and, if need be, enter into discussion with the Force if concerns arise. Finally, the process of regular disclosure in itself will encourage the Force to strive for improvement and to live up to its stated commitments and targets.

Reporting can take many forms, and different approaches will be suitable for different Forces. Both quantitative (e.g., ‘30% of senior inspectors attended a three-day course on effective anticorruption discipline’) and qualitative (e.g., a downloadable report detailing lessons learnt from a recent corruption case) information is useful, but most crucially, reporting should describe real, practical actions that have been taken, with the outcomes predicted or achieved. The aim is not to 25 European Code of Police Ethics (Council of Europe, 2001), p. 43.

26 Recognizing Values in Policing (Mark H. Moore, Washington DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2003).

38

create superficial ‘hoops’ through which Forces must jump to maintain reputation, but to formalise and publicise anti-corruption procedures that are in many cases already in place.

Transparency about integrity management and the handling of incidents increases public trust and can deter the corruptors. By public reporting of anti-corruption measures and corruption incidents on its website and through other communication channels, a Force sends out a correct message that it is acting on the interest of the public and has nothing to hide, and makes clear that the misconduct of a minority does not indict the Force as a whole. It is already the mandate of UK Forces to build the trust of their local communities, which is vital in operations such as gathering evidence and gaining cooperative witnesses. The frank disclosure of anti-corruption measures and, where they occur, corruption cases, can contribute directly to this goal. The PCCs will have a reporting role too as a PCC is required to prepare and issue an annual report to the Police and Crime Panel on the PCC’s delivery against the objectives set within the Police and Crime Plan.

The PCC must also publish information that the PCC considers necessary to enable the people who live in the Force area to assess the performance of the PCC and Chief Constable.

Transparency International has surveyed the public reporting of 500 top global companies on the premise that public reporting is an approximate proxy for effective integrity programmes. 27 It can be argued that publicly available information may not provide a true picture of a Force’s integrity commitments. Not all organisations with good practices will report well, others that report well may be adept at telling a good story while the reality may well be different. However, a recent Harvard review of corporate incidents of corruption compared to levels of reporting as recorded in the TI survey of corporate reporting concluded that firms with abnormally high disclosures enforce policies designed to combat corruption and that these policies are accompanied by lower subsequent allegations of corruption.28 This would suggest that if the Harvard Business School findings were extrapolated to Forces, there could be a strong correlation between Forces reporting extensively on their integrity programmes and actual lower allegation numbers and incidents of corruption.

It should be stressed that the generally low scores among UK Forces in this review should not be read as an indication of poor integrity practice but rather that public reporting on anti-corruption programmes is in its infancy, for police reporting is much as it was when TI carried out its survey of corporate reporting in 2007 which provided the data for the report published in 2009. The purpose of this review of reporting is to generate discussion around the value of public reporting by Forces on integrity programmes, debate the indicators that should be used and establish a benchmark for future reviews.

5.2

METHODOLOGY

The Forces analysed have not been named because this is the first survey of its kind and TI-UK has not disseminated or consulted with Forces on the methodology. The aim of this review of reporting is not to identify poor practice (for there are not yet widely agreed benchmarks for good 27 Transparency International, Transparency in Reporting on Anti-Corruption: a Report on Corporate Practices (2009), p.7.

28 Causes and Consequences of Firm Disclosures of Anticorruption Efforts, Working Paper (Paul Healy and George Serafeim, Harvard Business School 2011).

39

practice), but to highlight the areas in which reporting on anti-corruption could be developed. If benchmark surveys of good practice were to be established by ACPO and a period of time allowed for Forces to improve, then future reports could adequately assess and name Forces.

Increasingly, it is the website of a business, government department or Force that is its main window of communication with the general public, largely due to the speed and ease of access and the growing sophistication of the public and other stakeholders. Other new media are also being used to communicate such as the reports on activity by the Metropolitan Police Service helicopter on Twitter. This review is concerned with formal reporting by Forces on anti-corruption measures.

Each of six ACPO and four international Forces were scored on the basis of information on their websites according to 30 indicators for public disclosure of anti-corruption measures. Thus, those Forces for which meagre or no anti-corruption information was found on their websites scored poorly.

The 30 indicators chosen cover the three areas of an integrity programme as described earlier in this report: commitment and policy, implementation including prevention of key risks and monitoring. They assess Forces’ public disclosure of various aspects of their anti-corruption procedures. Forces were given a score of 1 for each indicator that they performed satisfactorily on, and 0.5 if they partially met the criteria (e.g., if there was a statement about gifts and hospitality but not a fully detailed policy). A Force’s total score out of 30 provides an indication of its current performance in reporting.

5.3

FINDINGS

The review of the sample indicates that there is significant room for improvement in anti-corruption reporting by UK Forces. The low scores and considerable variations in reporting standards between the sample UK Forces highlight a lack of recognition of the value of public reporting and transparency. The relatively high scores of some overseas Forces demonstrate that it would be possible to improve reporting by UK forces. The higher average score of the international Forces (6.9 compared to 4.7 for the UK), while still disappointingly low out of a total of 30 points, should take into account that two international Forces performed exceptionally well: one Force scored 12 points and another 17 (and conversely, some performed worse than ACPO Forces).

40

UK Forces reporting: score out of 30 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0

2.0 0.0 1

2

3

4

5

6

Average

6

Average

International Forces: score out of 30 18.0 16.0 14.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 1

 







2

3

4

5

Those international Forces that performed exceptionally well had previously suffered very high profile corruption scandals; There is a notable trend that both businesses and Forces which have had corruption publicly exposed and have therefore come under greater scrutiny, are also those with the most robust reporting methods, and by proxy, the strongest anti-corruption measures; One area in which international Forces were noticeably stronger than UK Forces was in the engagement of independent organisations and the general public (who constitute the key stakeholders of the police) in monitoring anti-corruption progress; Several ACPO and international Forces performed adequately in providing easily accessible ways for the public to report corruption and in publishing clear policies on the acceptance of gifts and hospitality; A few of the ACPO Forces showed commendable commitment to transparency in areas not rewarded by the indicators, but worthy of mention: for example in publishing gift registers, the travel expenses of senior officers, minutes of executive meetings and the

41



5.4

secondary employment of staff members – in these cases, ACPO Forces showed more transparency than their international counterparts; and Some Forces tended to use euphemisms such as such as ‘customer satisfaction’, ‘public confidence’ and ‘performance’ rather than referring to integrity, accountability or anticorruption. While the desire to avoid a term with negative implications such as ‘anticorruption’ is understandable, euphemisms are unsatisfactory as they fail to communicate to the public Forces’ actions on integrity and anti-corruption.

RECOMMENDATIONS 





 





ACPO should encourage the development of a robust model integrity programme for use by all Forces – public reporting could then be carried out on the results of implementation of integrity programmes and allow progress to be tracked and best practice benchmarked; ACPO should establish a good practice standard for reporting on its integrity programme and monitor and benchmark police reporting. This would advance communication to the public, government and other stakeholders and provide a basis for benchmarking and improvement of practise; Forces should define and understand the value of public reporting and report in a standardised manner to stakeholders on their integrity programmes. There are considerable disparities among the ACPO Forces studied. HMIC has urged the standardisation of acceptable relationships with external bodies, value limits on gifts and rules on secondary employment, and the same should apply to reporting; 29 Forces should coordinate their reporting with the PCC annual report; Reporting would further the aim of communicating with the community. For example, there might be a sub-section in every PCC annual report dedicated to Integrity. The default state is a ‘clean’ Force with a proactive approach to integrity. The inclusion of a regular integrity or anti-corruption section in the annual report or continuous reporting through the website would signal a continuing vigilance against corruption. In the same way that members of the public tend to feel safer if they see uniformed police officers on the street, even if they have not recently experienced a crime, the steady discussion of how integrity is managed and potential risks are countered would maintain the confidence of both the public and police employees; Forces should communicate anti-corruption measures to police officers and support staff as well as to contractors and the public. In addition to public reporting on its website, a Force’s leadership should regularly remind all officers and staff as well as contractors not just of their obligation to report misconduct and what support will be given if they do, but of the positive procedures in place to help them to avoid the temptation for corruption (e.g., training in dealing with bribe offers, advice on personal financial matters). While encouraging internal reporting of misconduct is important, it should not be emphasised to the extent of creating a witch-hunt within a Force: e.g., the NYPD ‘Field Associates’ programme after the Knapp Commission of 1972, in which 1 in 10 officers agreed to report on colleagues, resulting in an unhealthy culture of suspicion; 30 Forces should show the commitment of the executive leadership (e.g., Chief Constable) by their public commitment to anti-corruption such as a prominent online statement and/or

29 Without Fear or Favour, HMIC (2011), p.60.

30 Understanding and Preventing Police Corruption: Lessons from the Literature (T Newburn 1999), p.36.

42















regular section in the annual report and details of activities such as attendance at community events, staff meetings, training course for officers. These demonstrations of commitment should provide realistic, proactive messages that highlight the importance of integrity and preventive action rather than focusing on sanctions alone. It should also positively affirm the integrity of the majority, but make it clear that corruption risk does not just relate to a few ‘rotten apples’, rather it can occur anywhere if the preventive measures are not in place. The PCC should also demonstrate his/her commitment to the integrity programme; The Force should disclose its risk assessment process, including the results of any stakeholder consultations, to describe and subject to security the significant risks identified and the measures taken to mitigate the risks; Forces should report on the key risks facing police officers (e.g., personal financial difficulties, involvement in tackling drugs or gambling crime, conflicts of interest involving family members) and demonstrate how these risks are mitigated and built into integrity measures. For example, in the Singapore Police Service, officers are rotated out of anti‘vice’ investigations every three years. A focus on risk management helps emphasise the benefit of having proactive policies and procedures by helping to prevent vulnerable, but otherwise upstanding, officers from succumbing to the temptation of corruption; ACPO Forces should make clear reference to the application of their integrity programme to support staff and contractors (e.g., outsourced emergency call centre staff). Frequently, these staff have access to important information and have significant vulnerability to corruption (e.g., from organised criminals offering bribes or threat), but possibly less of the sense of loyalty felt by staff members more explicitly incorporated in the ‘greater police family’.

Forces should publish their full sanctions policy online. Rather than just stressing ‘zero tolerance’, this policy should be frank and realistic, acknowledging grey areas around police decision-making and including informal discipline such as meetings with senior officers; Forces should encourage public participation in preventive anti-corruption measures. By asking public stakeholders not just to react to corruption when it becomes a problem but inviting them to suggest improvements and challenge practice, Forces can send out a powerful message that the responsibility for avoiding corruption stretches beyond the Force itself. This could include a discussion forum on the police website or public workshops in co-ordination with civil society organisations. For example, in India campaigns stress the public’s role in raising awareness and advocate refusing to pay bribes to police officers; Currently ‘clean’ Forces should also take preventive action. International experience suggests that, as in the private sector, it is those police services which have recently undergone high-profile corruption scandals that are most likely to have better standards of anti-corruption reporting. Even those Forces which have not yet suffered corruption scandals should proactively implement preventative measures and public reporting to reduce their vulnerability to such cases in the future; Any anti-corruption programme or reform should be given a realistic, incremental timeframe. The purpose of this is not to bind Forces to superficial targets, but the opposite: to avoid the problem that too many changes are attempted simultaneously and

43

therefore become unsustainable. It is better to effect change in manageable and constantly monitored stages.

44

6 REVIEW OF THE ACPO REPORT Structure of the ACPO integrity approach The ACPO report comments on selected elements of a good practice integrity programme but the underlying systems approach is lost in the description of the many organisational functions involved in integrity management. There could have been greater clarity in setting out the commitment of the police to integrity and then how a system for integrity management is designed and implemented based on the National Decision Model described on page 46 of the ACPO report.

Then the roles of the various ACPO functions could be shown more clearly and how they feed into the system.

The chart below compares the report’s content to the TI-UK’s recommended good practice integrity programme and is followed by review of the components looking at references in the ACPO report followed by TI-UK’s ’comments.

Stage Commitment

Good practice elements of an integrity programme Publicly communicated integrity values and zero tolerance of corruption Commitment to implement an integrity programme

ACPO report

Pages

Yes

Introduction, 48

Yes

Definition of scope of integrity

No

Assess

Risk assessment

Yes

9-10, 13-19

Plan

Organisation and responsibilities

Yes

5-12

Design of detailed policies and procedures

Yes

16

Governance

No

Implement

Leadership commitment

Partial

34

Policies and procedures implemented

No

Management of key forms of integrity risk

Yes

Associates

No

Internal communication of the integrity programme

No

36

Partial

21-22

Training Human resources alignment to the programme

No

HR: Vetting (as part of recruitment)

Yes

HR: early intervention

Yes

Help and complaints (whistleblowing) channels

No

External communication

No

Public reporting

No

Stakeholder engagement

No

Collaborative working

No

Sanctions

Yes

23-35; 49-51

39-41

41,42

45

Monitoring and Internal controls improvement Self-assessment and monitoring

Reporting

Yes

16, 38-40

Yes

16-18

Audit – internal and external

No

Public reporting on aspects material to stakeholders

No

Commitment ACPO Report: There is a statement of mission and values for the police service on page 48 of the ACPO report and this states that the police will act with integrity. The Introduction alludes to integrity commitment although it expresses integrity only implicitly by referring to the service’s commitment to tackle integrity failures.

Comment: The ACPO approach should be a positive message of commitment to and maintaining integrity rather than solely discussing integrity failures. The Commitment to Integrity Statement and its underlying values should ideally have been placed at the front of the report.

Risk assessment ACPO Report: Section 2 includes a review of the role of the ACPO Professional Standards Portfolio (PSP) which sets standards across the service to provide a more holistic view of integrity management and identifies quality improvement and professional excellence. The PSP feeds into the risk assessment process by recognising and understanding the concept of risk and developing preventive strategies. Section 3, ‘Identifying the risk – intelligence’, describes the risk assessment process as being based on intelligence led policing. It focuses on the role of the Professional Standards Department and the use of the intelligence function as the starting point. It uses a systems model of corruptors, corrupt employees and corrupt actions. SOCA produces a triennial categorisation of corruption intelligence and ACPO has developed a framework for recording incidents.

Comment: The report does not describe how the risk assessment process is translated into detailed policies and procedures nor how the continuous improvement of the programme can be achieved through incidents and learning. The section could have been extended to show the process by which Forces carry out annual reviews. ACPO could report further on the influences and factors leading to corruption. This would add to its structural model used in its review of preventive actions.

Governance ACPO Report: It devotes eight pages to a section entitled ‘Governance and Function’. This describes the role of ACPO, its Business Areas, the role of the Workforce Development Business Area and its strategy, the ACPO Professional Standards Portfolio and the ACPO Counter Corruption Advisory Group.

Comment: The report has a section entitled ‘Governance and Function’ but in fact this describes the executive management of integrity and not the governance process which is currently exercised by Local Police Authorities and soon to be overseen by the PCCs and PCPs. The report could usefully have looked at a different approach, one which shows how ACPO arrives at and implements its integrity commitments, how policies are set and implemented and the governance

46

structure for this process. The work of the ACPO Professional Standards Portfolio is the core function of the implementation of the ACPO integrity programme but is not a governance function.

Organisation and responsibilities ACPO Report: The organisation of management is discussed extensively in Section 2.

Comment: As stated in this report’s section on governance, it would help to simplify the ACPO report section in order to clarify the system for integrity and how the many various functions within ACPO and the Forces carry this out. As it stands, the Section just describes the responsibilities of each ACPO function.

Management of key forms of risk ACPO Report: Section 5 first addresses six key forms of risk: drug and alcohol misuse, data security and information leakage, secondary employment and business interest, unmanageable debt, inappropriate associations and gifts and gratuities. It then looks at early intervention for mitigating integrity risks and concludes with brief remarks on supervision and management.

Section 8.2 focuses on the relationship between the police service and the media and section 8.3 describes the ACPO Information Security Portfolio which covers access to information systems.

Comment: The section could have been structured by first identifying all main forms of integrity risk, then describing the controls and intervention methodologies to counter risks, policies and procedures, supervision, profiling, IT systems, red flags, internal and external audits and concluded by identifying six key risks and showing how the controls and intervention methodologies are used to mitigate these specifically.

Internal communication ACPO Report: Section 6 describes the publication in 2006 of its ‘Guidance for the investigation of corruption within the police service’ which aims to provide practical advice to senior officers and investigators who investigate corruption.

Comment: This is the only reference in the ACPO report on how ACPO communicates its integrity programme. Communication of the integrity programme by Forces is a vital component of an integrity programme and would have been a positive element to describe.

Training ACPO Report: Page 21 of the report describes training given at three levels to those involved in investigation – Strategic, Senior Investigating Officer and Investigator. Page 12 refers to the role of ACCAG in developing and maintaining nationally accredited counter-corruption training. Page 47 refers to the input made by the ACPO Professional Ethics Portfolio to the Senior Command Course and Leading Powerful Partnerships Course.

Comment: The report does not provide a composite view of the training given to officers or support staff on the integrity programme nor information about tailored training given to those in identified risk areas.

Human resources ACPO Report: The ACPO Report does not discuss the alignment of Human Resources to the integrity programme but it does describe the role of the ACPO Vetting Group on vetting of individuals joining/ being appointed to the Police Service, Management Vetting and Non-Police Personnel Vetting.

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Comment: Human Resources has an important role to play in design and implementation of an integrity programme in the areas of recruitment, appraisal and counselling and personnel policies such as second jobs.

External communication ACPO Report: Not addressed

Public reporting ACPO Report: Not addressed

Internal controls ACPO Report: Section 7 focuses on vetting and outlines how ACCAG, the ACPO National Vetting Group and ACPO Complaints and Misconduct Working Group are closely linked and how they support the aims of Professional Standards. It describes vetting procedures. Section 5 also touches on controls.

Comment: The ACPO Report could have discussed internal controls and how financial and organisational checks and balances are structured as well as the use of reviews and internal and external audits.

Sanctions ACPO Report: Section 7.2 describes the role of the ACPO Complaints and Misconduct Working Group.

Comment: The ACPO report does not review how disciplinary decisions are made and how they support an integrity programme.

Monitoring ACPO Report: Integrity programmes need to be kept up-to-date by building on lessons learned from incidents, using the views of experts as well as results of reviews with the governance body.

The ACPO report identifies that ACCAG has a dynamic response to emerging threats and is monitoring risks and issuing problem profiles for changes to key risks or identifying new risks such as steroid misuse or social networking sites.

Comment: The up-to-date relevance needs further consideration, for it was noted that the profile for social networks was issued in 2009 and does not address risks in this fast changing area such as use of Twitter or the growth of popularity of Facebook. The case studies quoted refer to detection of violations but do not analyse if the integrity programme had been inadequate and what changes had been made as a result. The report did not describe how incidents and improvements were communicated to the governance body or how the integrity programme policies and procedures were modified, if at all. However, the National Decision Model includes within the cycle, a stage of Take Action and review what happened.

48

7 Appendix: Reporting Survey – Charts of Scor UK 1

UK 2

UK 3

UK 4

UK 5

UK 6

Average

0

1

0.5

0.5

0.5

0

0.4

0

0.5

0

0

0

0

0.1

Does the force’s code of conduct / anti-corruption policy explicitly apply to all employees?

0

1

1

0

1

0

0.5

Does the force’s code of conduct / anti-corruption policy explicitly apply to all contractors?

0

0.5

0.5

0

0

0

0.2

Does the force use a risk-based approach in designing its anti-corruption programme?

0

0.5

0

0

0.5

0

0.2

Does the force publish a realistic long-term plan for the implementation of these policies and procedures?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Do the force's recruitment policies and procedures support the anti-corruption commitment?

0

0

0.5

0

0.5

0.5

0.3

Does the force report how it communicates its anti-corruption programme to employees?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force report that it requires all contractors to comply with its anti-bribery policy?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force publicly communicate its anti-corruption programme to contractors?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force report on its anti-corruption training programme for employees?

0

0

0.5

0

0

0

0.1

Does the force report on its anti-corruption training programme for contractors?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force tailor anti-corruption training to specific risk areas?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force provide channels through which employees can seek advice or report potential violations of policy (whistle blowing) in confidence?

Does the force provide channels through which the public can report potential violations of policy (whistle blowing) in confidence?

0

1

0.5

0

0.5

0

0.3

1

0.5

1

0.5

1

1

0.8

Does the force publish its sanctions policy for integrity violations?

0

0

0

0

1

0

0.2

Does the force report on participation in voluntary anti-corruption initiatives?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force report regularly to stakeholders on its anti-corruption programmes?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force make public a clear structure of governance and oversight procedure?

0

0

0

0.5

0

0

0.1

Does the force actively encourage stakeholder engagement in anti-corruption programmes?

0

0

1

0

0

0

0.2

Does the force publish a policy against bribery?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force publish a policy on gifts and hospitality?

0

1

1

0.5

1

0

0.6

Does the force publish a policy on conflicts of interest?

0

0

0

0

0.5

0

0.1

Does the force publish a policy on nepotism and cronyism?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force report on its identified key integrity risks and measures to address them?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

0.5

0.5

0

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.4

Does the governance body regularly carry out comprehensive reviews of its anti-corruption programme?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force publicly report on complaints or incidents of corruption?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

Does the force report on sanctions taken?

0

0

0.5

0

0

0

0.1

0.5

0

1

0

0

0

0.3

2

6.5

8

2.5

7

2

4.7

System stage

Indicator – UK Police Services

Commitment

Does the force publish a detailed code of conduct / anti-corruption policy?

Does the force leadership publicly commit to anti-corruption measures?

Implementation

Key risks

Monitoring

Does the force report on its anti-corruption monitoring and review process?

Does the force publish external, independent assurance of its integrity programme?

Total (out of 30)

May 2012, Final Report

Confidential to ACPO

49

System stage

Indicator – International Police Services

Int 1

Int 2

Int 3

Int 4

Int 5

Int 6

Average

Commitment

Does the force publish a detailed code of conduct / anti-corruption policy?

Does the force leadership publicly commit to anti-corruption measures?

Does the force’s code of conduct / anti-corruption policy explicitly apply to all employees?

Does the force’s code of conduct / anti-corruption policy explicitly apply to all contractors?

Does the force use a risk-based approach in designing its anti-corruption programme?

Does the force publish a realistic long-term plan for the implementation of these policies and procedures?

Does the force's leadership demonstrate its commitment to counter corruption both internally and publicly?

Do the force's recruitment policies and procedures support the anti-corruption commitment?

Does the force report how it communicates its anti-corruption programme to employees?

Does the force report that it requires all contractors to comply with its anti-bribery policy?

Does the force publicly communicate its anti-corruption programme to contractors?

Does the force report on its anti-corruption training programme for employees?

Does the force report on its anti-corruption training programme for contractors?

Does the force tailor anti-corruption training to specific risk areas?

Does the force provide channels through which employees can seek advice or report potential violations of policy (whistle blowing) in confidence?

Does the force provide channels through which the public can report potential violations of policy (whistle blowing) in confidence?

1 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0.5 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0.5 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5

1

0

1

1

0.5

0.5

0.7

Does the force publish its sanctions policy for integrity violations?

Does the force report on participation in voluntary anti-corruption initiatives?

Does the force report regularly to stakeholders on its anti-corruption programmes?

Does the force make public a clear structure of governance and oversight procedure?

Does the force actively encourage stakeholder engagement in anti-corruption programmes?

Does the force publish a policy against bribery?

Does the force publish a policy on gifts and hospitality?

Does the force publish a policy on conflicts of interest?

Does the force publish a policy on nepotism and cronyism?

Does the force report on its identified key integrity risks and measures to address them?

Does the force report on its anti-corruption monitoring and review process?

Does the governance body regularly carry out comprehensive reviews of its anti-corruption programme?

Does the force publicly report on complaints or incidents of corruption?

Does the force report on sanctions taken?

Does the force publish external, independent assurance of its integrity programme?

0.5 1 1 0 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 1 0.5 1 17

0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.5

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 7

1 0 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 0 1 0.5 1 12

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 3.5

0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.6 6.9

Implementation

Key risks

Monitoring

Total (out of 30)

May 2012, Final Report

Confidential to ACPO

50