Lett projekt disc topsil sagen 2016

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016 •

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc I processen smeltes polykrystallinsk silicium om til en monokrystallinsk stang. Polykrystallen smeltes ved hjælp af induktionsvarme, og smelten løber gennem hullet på induktionsspolen ned på en monokrystallinsk podekrystal. Derved dannes en flydende zone mellem polykrystal og monokrystal, der kun holdes sammen af overfladespændinger, og som har givet metoden navnet float zone.

Andet trin: Det er på dette trin, Topsil opererer. Topsils siliciumskiver skæres ud af en monokrystallinsk stang.

Denne fremstilles efter float zone (FZ) metoden, hvilket giver markedets reneste form for silicium. FZ-processen er meget kompliceret, og kun få virksomheder mestrer den.

Første trin: Kvartssand smeltes i en reduktionsovn med kul. Herefter opløses den 98% rene silicium i saltsyre, og der dannes flydende siliciumtetraklorid, som raffineres ved destillation, indtil det er ultrarent. Efter raffineringen bringes silicium på fast form, hvor silicium udskilles fra siliciumgassen ved deponering, så der dannes en ultraren polykrystallinsk siliciumstang.

Siliciumproduktion er en lang og kompliceret proces: Topsil leverer siliciumskiver, som anvendes i fremstillingen af højeffektelektriske komponenter, der bruges i blandt andet vindmøller, solceller, elbiler, højhastighedstog og andre infrastrukturprojekter.

Fra sand til silicium

From sand to silicon Topsil produces silicon wafers which are used in the production of high-power electronic components for wind turbines, solar cells, electric cars, high-speed trains and other infrastructure projects.

Silicon production is a long and complex process: Step 1: Quartz sand is melted in a coal-fired reduction oven. After that, the 98% pure silicon is dissolved in hydrochloric acid to form liquid silicon tetrachloride, which is refined through distillation until it is ultrapure.

After the refining process, the silicon is solidified and separated from the silicon gas through deposition to form an ultrapure polycrystalline silicon rod.

Step 2: This is the step where Topsil operates. Topsil's silicon wafers are cut from a monocrystalline rod. This rod is made according to the float zone (FZ) method, which produces the purest form of silicon on the market.

The FZ process is very complex and only mastered by a few companies.

In this process, polycrystalline silicon is melted to form a monocrystalline silicon rod. The polycrystalline is melted by induction heating, and the melt flows through the induction coil hole down onto a monocrystalline seed crystal. This creates a float zone between polycrystalline and monocrystalline, which is only held together by surface tension and which has given the method its name.

Project Disc

The Topsil case 2016

The future belongs to the storytellers Jura og den juridiske verden er forunderlig. På den ene side den teoretiske jura – tør, nøgtern, ja nogle vil kalde den kedelig. På den anden side kombinationen af jura og den verden, som vi lever i og er en del af – den er inspirerende, uddannende og højt motiverende. Derfor er de klassiske advokatfilm så spændende.

I en verden under hastig forandring er det meget vigtigt at kunne gøre svære problem­ stillinger nemme og overskuelige, således at beslutninger kan træffes med høj kvalitet og træfsikkerhed i et hastigt tempo. I LETT vil vi gerne bidrage til at fremme forståelsen for erhvervslivets udfordringer, hvor disse er i sammenhæng med vores juridiske udgangspunkt.

Derfor præsenterer vi i denne bog en i offentligheden kendt virksomhed: Topsil Semiconductor Materials A/S og salget af dennes siliciumaktiviteter til en taiwansk køber. Et typeeksempel på globaliseringen af vigtige industrier.

Vi håber, at bogen vil være inspirerende, uddannende og motiverende og samtidig bekræfte, at praktisk jura er spændende.

Godt nytår og god læselyst!

LETT er et førende, erhvervsorienteret advokatkontor i Danmark. LETT har højt specialiserede medarbejdere og en stærk national og international praksis.

En stor tak til bidragyderne for inspirerende indlæg til denne bog: Carsten Borring, Nasdaq Nordic Caspar Rose, CBS Christian Reinholdt, SmallCap Danmark Christian Stampe Sørensen, SEB Claus Nørrind Hansen, EY Dorte Vestergaard Sonnichsen, Deloitte Esben Høstager, HØSTAGER | SOLO Jacob Erhardi, EY Jacob Lønfeldt, SEB Jens Borelli-Kjær, Topsil Jesper Bodeholt, Topsil Jon Kaznelson, SEB Kalle Hvidt Nielsen, Topsil Klaus Ingildsen, Jyske Bank Michael Hoe Knudsen, Deloitte Rasmus Grand Bjørnø, Udenrigsministeriet Sune Bro Duun, Topsil GlobalWafers Søren Corfixsen Whitt, Erhvervsstyrelsen

Fra LETT har følgende jurister bidraget til bogen: Anders Kaasgaard Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen Claus Holberg Martin Lavesen Mette Lykke N.E. Nielsen Nicholas Lerche-Gredal

Redaktør: Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, LETT Redaktionssekretær: Gina Ginelli, LETT Layout: Bettina Stefensen, LETT

Ønsker du en onlineudgave af bogen?

Besøg os på www.lett.dk

Oplysninger i denne bog er kun beregnet til at give læseren generel inspiration. Brugen og virkningen af lovgivning, praksis og fortolkning kan variere meget på grundlag af specifikke fakta. Oplysningerne videre­ gives ud fra den forudsætning, at bidragyderne og udgiveren ikke hermed yder juridisk, regnskabsmæssig, skattemæssig eller anden professionel rådgivning eller tjenesteydelse. Oplysningerne kan ikke anvendes som erstatning for rådgivning fra advokater, revisorer, skatterådgivere eller andre rådgivere.

ISBN 978-87-994799-3-7

LETT Advokatpartnerselskab København • Aarhus • lett.dk CVR 35 20 93 52

Indholdsfortegnelse Konklusion SALGET AF TOPSIL 1 Salget af Topsil N.E. Nielsen, LETT 2 Skattefri omdannelse – Tilpasning og omstrukturering forud for salg Michael Hoe Knudsen & Dorte V. Sonnichsen, Deloitte

15 Escrow agreements ved hushandler og internationale M&A transaktioner Klaus Ingildsen, Jyske Bank 16 Tovholderens rolle – Transaktionens regissør Mette Lykke, LETT OVERTAGELSESTILBUD OG BØRSRETLIGE FORPLIGTELSER

3 Fra Hellerup til Tapei – Fra blomsterhandel til hightech Mette Lykke, LETT

17 Overtagelsestilbud – Venligt eller fjendtligt Anders Kaasgaard, LETT

4 Kinesiske investeringer i Danmark – Skal vi frygte, når dragen vågner?

Rasmus Grand Bjørnø, Udenrigsministeriet

18 Bestyrelsens mange og nye roller i børsnoterede virksom heder også i salgssituationer – Et governance perspektiv Caspar Rose, CBS

ROLLER OG OVERVEJELSER I SALGSPROCESSEN

GENERALFORSAMLINGEN

5 I orkanens øje – Bestyrelsens rolle i en salgsproces Jens Borelli-Kjær, Topsil

19 Generalforsamlingsdirigenten Martin Lavesen, LETT

6 En medarbejderrepræsentants refleksioner Sune Bro Duun, Topsil/Topsil GlobalWafers

20 Hvem bestemmer: bestyrelsen eller aktionærerne?

Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, LETT

7 Direktionens arbejde i salgsprocessen Kalle Hvidt Nielsen & Jesper Bodeholt, Topsil

21 Anmelderansvar, kontrol og registreringers udslettelse Søren Corfixsen Whitt, Erhvervsstyrelsen

8

22 Bordet fanger – Brevstemmer Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, LETT

På udkig efter den rigtige partner i en global industri og i en globaliseret verden Jon Kaznelson, Christian Stampe Sørensen & Jacob Lønfeldt, SEB

9 Pressen – Et våben eller et selvmål?

Esben Høstager, HØSTAGER | SOLO M&A PROCESSEN

AKTIONÆRAKTIVISME OG BESTYRELSENS ANSVAR 23 Minoritetsaktionærernes talerør Christian Reinholdt, SmallCap Danmark 24 Når stormen raser: Åååh, sh** Esben Høstager, HØSTAGER | SOLO

10 At skabe et konkurrencemiljø mellem køberne Jon Kaznelson, Christian Stampe Sørensen & Jacob Lønfeldt, SEB

25 Fiduciary duties – Virkelighedens verden N.E. Nielsen, LETT

11 Standardiserede M&A-aftaler og -processer Nicholas Lerche-Gredal, LETT

26 Aktietilbagekøbsprogrammer – Typer og skattemæssige konsekvenser Claus Holberg, LETT

12 At repræsentere en kinesisk køber i Danmark Claus Nørrind Hansen & Jacob Erhardi, EY 13 Fortrolighedsaftaler Anders Kaasgaard, LETT 14 Datarum – Hvad skal der vises for køber og sælger?

Nicholas Lerche-Gredal, LETT

AKTIETILBAGEKØB OG TILBUDSPLIGT

27 Passive storaktionærers tilbudspligt Anders Kaasgaard, LETT 28 Fugl Fønix på fondsbørsen – Udviklingen på Nasdaq Carsten Borring, Nasdaq Nordic

Konklusion Læren – sælgers ledelse

1

Det er ikke nok, at det, du gør, er rigtigt. Det skal også se rigtigt ud

2

Evaluér løbende, om ejerskab og ejerstruktur passer til en realistisk fremtid

3

Risiko og afkast hænger sammen – sørg for fuld åbenhed

4

Hold virksomheden ude af kriser

5

Prioritér likviditet og frihed til driftsmæssigt fokus højt

6

Når ting går galt, er det altid værre, end du regner med

7

At deltage i en bestyrelse er et arbejde som alt andet – kræver også tid og flid

8

Sund fornuft er stadig afgørende

9

Det er andre menneskers penge, som du har ansvaret for – behandl dem med respekt

10 Vær klar, ærlig og direkte i al kommunikation 11 Ansvar sover ikke, det er der døgnet rundt

– både når det går skidt, og når det går godt – der er ingen forskel 12 Verden ændrer sig hastigt – ”speed is of essence” – gør noget ved tingene 13 Alt er kompliceret – hav de rette rådgivere omkring dig 14 Hold hovedet koldt og fokusér på løsningen uanset omverdenens reaktioner

4

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Læren – udenlandsk køber

1

Alt det sædvanlige, der skal til for teknisk at gennemføre en vellykket transaktion

2

Grundige forberedelser til vurdering af target, før en salgsproces starter – outside-in due diligence

3

Grundige forberedelser til forståelse af struktur og vilkår for virksomhedsdrift i Danmark

4

Opbyg tillid gennem samarbejder, små som store

5

Hav tid nok til at forstå ledelsens, medarbejdernes og virksomhedens reelle prioriteter og værdier

6

Beslut dine yderste grænser for at ville gennemføre transaktionen på et tidligt tidspunkt

7

Engager lokale, respekterede rådgivere, der kender transaktionsmarkedet, dets sædvaner og aktører i Danmark

8

Fasthold overblik, beslutningskraft og sund fornuft igennem hele transaktionen

9

Vær involveret og engageret efter købet, når hverdagen begynder

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

5

Salget af Topsil

1

En mørk, regnfuld eftermiddag i november på kontoret på Rådhuspladsen.

Et af de sædvanlige, lange konferencekald ventede om et nyt salg af en børsnoteret virksomhed. Men kaldet fik et helt andet og uventet indhold, da formanden spurgte: ”Hvis interesser kan jeg stole på, at I varetager: Topsils, bankens eller jeres egne?!!” En kort forbløffelse ved dette uventede, men befriende ærlige spørgsmål. Og med svaret startede syv måneders intensivt arbejde.

Topsil Semiconductor Materials A/S, blot kendt under navnet ”Topsil”, er en af de teknologi­ virksomheder, man som dansker skulle være stolt af. Men også den havde fået det hårdt i de globale eftervirkninger af finanskrisen. Dårlige resultater kombineret med et stort opkøb i Polen, en ny fabrik i Frederikssund og et volatilt konkurrencepræget marked for silicium medførte, at noget måtte ske.

N.E. Nielsen, Partner, LETT

På den ordinære generalforsamling i foråret 2015 pressede de mindre aktionærer på: Noget må ske, for at virksomheden skal komme videre, og for at der kan skabes værdi for aktionærerne.

Allerede på det tidspunkt havde selskabets ledelse igangsat et strategiarbejde for at sikre, at virksomheden havde en fremtid som en lille spiller på et globalt marked. Men der var som altid andre forhold, der fyldte ud over at drive virksomheden optimalt: En tvist om et for Topsil væsentligt patent var startet, og et uheldigt udfald kunne få afgørende indvirkning på Topsils fremtid. Samtidig havde flere års underskud og forventninger om noget tilsvarende også i 2015 og 2016 presset selskabet likviditetsmæssigt, så relationen til selskabets finansieringskilder var også et stort arbejde i sig selv.

I efteråret 2015 var bestyrelsen nået frem til, at enten skulle Topsil indgå i en konsolidering i branchen, eller også skulle der gennemføres en kapitaludvidelse, der ville give likviditetsmæs­ sigt frirum til at skabe den rigtige virksomhed for fremtiden.

„

Da årsrapporten for 2015 blev udsendt, afspejlede den tydeligt situationen for Topsil: Årets omsætning DKK 287 mio., årets resultat DKK (90) mio. Om forventningen til 2016: EBITDA DKK (40) – (50) mio. og om strategien:

6

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Derfor har vi truffet beslutning om at restrukturere forretningen og ophøre med tabsgivende aktiviteter samt indgå strategiske samarbejder for yderligere at styrke forretningen. Tilpasningen har betydet store nedskrivninger i 2015, og i 2016 vil resultatet være belastet af engangsomkostninger.

Så opgaverne var givet: • Hvordan struktureres virksomheden samlet set bedst muligt?

• Hvorledes håndteres det delejede, polske ejendomsselskab med store arealer og ejendomme?

• Hvorledes laves der house cleaning samtidig med etablering af et godt datarum?

• Hvorledes motiveres ledelsen til om nødvendigt at sætte sig selv til salg og samtidig at skulle arbejde ekstra hårdt?

• Proces med at finde ud af, om der var en strategisk eller finansiel partner eller ligefrem køber • Mulighed for overhovedet at gennemføre en kapitaludvidelse i et reelt nødlidende dansk small-cap selskab.

Disse processer er beskrevet i de følgende kapitler.

Alle kunne nu se, at der blev taget fat, men det var ikke muligt at sende et klart signal om, hvilken vej der ville blive fulgt; det var alt for tidligt. Under alle omstændigheder medførte de igangsatte aktiviteter, at finansieringskilderne holdt sig i ro. Teaser med kort beskrivelse af kendt stof blev sendt ud til en række industrielle og finansielle investorer. Der kom hurtigt reaktioner, der understøttede den oprindelige vurdering: En løsning for Topsil ville ligge i en kapitaludvidelse eller en teaming-up med en anden industriel spiller i branchen. De sædvanlige finansielle investorer var reelt ikke interesserede.

Det viste sig ligeledes hurtigt, at der virkelig var industrielle partnere, der ønskede at kon­ solidere branchen, også sammen med Topsil, men uheldigvis for Topsil var de involveret i andre konsolideringer, så Topsil var ikke ligefrem højeste prioritet. Branchen var så lille, at alle kendte alle, hvorfor det var svært at skabe overraskelser i den efterfølgende proces.

Skulle Topsil så i stedet gennemføre en kapitaludvidelse?

Det første spørgsmål, som meldte sig, var, om de eksisterende aktionærer ville deltage i en kapitaludvidelse, der i sagens natur skulle være ganske betydelig, hvis den skulle bringe sel­ skabet i ”safe haven”. Den eneste måde at gennemføre det på var at tegne den nye kapital til en meget lav kurs, der ville ”tvinge” de nuværende aktionærer til at tegne med for ikke at blive udvandet, ja helt udraderet, at sikre de eksisterende store aktionærers deltagelse i kapital­ udvidelsen og at sikre garanter for kapitaludvidelsen på forkant. Kontakter til få udvalgte inve­ storer bekræftede dette som et muligt scenarie. At det aldrig blev aktuelt, skyldtes en pludselig og hastig udvikling fra de potentielle industrielle partnere.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

7

Fire købere blev til én Længe så det ud til, at der var fire virkeligt interesserede, hvoraf to kunne være interessante partnere i ordets egentlige betydning. Men pludselig blev de to væk. Af de to resterende var der stor forskel på deres tilgang til processen. Selvom begge var langsomme efter dansk målestok, var den ene tydeligvis mere interesseret end den anden.

Så – lige pludselig – var der kun én, da den anden meddelte, at han ikke havde tid og slet ikke nu kunne bruge tid i datarum. Samtidig var der stort pres på Topsils ledelse fra alle sider for at finde en samlet løsning for virksomheden.

Den 20. maj – betinget aftale Den 20. maj 2016 lykkedes det så at nå til enighed om en betinget aftale med den tilbage­ værende byder. ”Topsil har indgået aftale om salg af siliciumforretningen GlobalWafers Co. Ltd. og Topsil Semiconductor Materials A/S har i dag indgået en aftale, i henhold til hvilken GlobalWafers køber Topsils samlede siliciumforretning for 320 mio. kr. på gældfri basis før transaktionsomkostninger.

Topsil har haft et mangeårigt samarbejde med GlobalWafers. I 2000 outsourcede Topsil sin skiveproduktion i Danmark til GlobalWafers, som siden da har været en af Topsils underleverandører af skivebearbejdning.” ”Det er bestyrelsens vurdering, at såfremt salget af siliciumforretningen ikke gennemføres, vil selskabet for at realisere sin strategi og skabe yderligere værdi for aktionærerne have behov for en betydelig kapitaltilførsel.”

Interessant var det at se, hvor vigtigt et globalt netværk af rådgivere, sprogkundskaber i selv de vanskeligste sprog og videokonferenceudstyr var for at sikre enighed om en sådan aftale.

Og så gensidig tillid. I den forbindelse skal det erindres, at Global Wafers’ CEO tilbage i tiden havde været storaktionær og bestyrelsesmedlem i Topsil og kendte virksomheden og dennes værdier indefra.

April 2015 • Strategi-proces igangsættes • Risikofyldt patentsag truer

8

December Bestyrelse igangsætter proces: Enten salg af selskabets aktiviteter relevante for en reel køber/-partner eller betydelig aktiekapitaludvidelse

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Aftalen var betinget af generalforsamlingsgodkendelse i Topsil, og der blev straks indkaldt hertil med kort varsel. Aftalen indeholdt ikke en non-solicitation klausul. Og det var godt, da proces­ sen udviklede sig i de næste dage.

Den 11. Juni – Geopolitisk spil?

Så skete der noget næsten surrealistisk: en telefonsamtale en lørdag formiddag med en advokat for en ny – men tidligere involveret – interessent. ”Det her drejer sig slet ikke om Topsil – det drejer sig om et geopolitisk spil om, hvem der skal have verdensherredømmet på silicium­ markedet – Taiwan eller Mainland China.”

Den pågældende interessent – NSIG – havde lige overtaget en af Topsils potentielle partnere i Finland og ville nu videre med yderligere opkøb, herunder Topsil. Topsil anså sig selv og den finske virksomhed som et interessant partnerskab, hvilket derfor gjorde den seriøse henven­ delse fra NSIG spændende.

Topsils bestyrelse vurderede, at det var i selskabets og aktionærernes bedste interesse at se, om dette var en potentiel køber, der kunne leve op til auktionsprocessens vilkår.

Fra den 11. juni og frem til generalforsamlingen den 17. juni arbejdede selskabet derfor på højtryk til alle sider, og ikke mindst den daglige drift krævede fortsat fuld opmærksomhed.

Derudover skulle der ske forberedelse af generalforsamlingen og gennemførelse af aftalen med GlobalWafers, og samtidig havde NSIG fået at vide, hvad konditionerne var for, at et tilbud overhovedet kunne komme i betragtning: en attraktiv pris og vilkår samt ingen betingelser.

Det medførte intensiv aktivitet i datarummet, calls og møder samt diverse udkast til aftaler.

Den 15. juni – Enighed?

Efter møder mellem parterne, først med og senere uden rådgivere, den 15. juni om aftenen troede alle, at der var et tilbud på vej næste morgen.

Januar 2016 • Bankdrøftelser

Februar • NDA’er indgås • Årsregnskab offentliggøres

Marts • Due diligence

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

9

Den 16. juni – noget andet og offentlighed Sidst på dagen den 16. juni blev alt vendt på en tallerken efter det positive forløb mellem par­ terne aftenen før. Nu var prisindikationen lavere end dagen før, begrundet med at Topsil ikke kunne give garanti for forløbet af generalforsamlingen den næste dag.

Nu eksploderende processen!

Den 16. juni kl. 18.43 Kl. 18.43 afgav NSIG et tilbud på Topsils siliciumforretning til den pris og på de vilkår, som de ca. 2 timer tidligere havde orienteret om telefonisk.

Den 16. juni ca. kl. 19.00 Ca. kl. 19.00 udsendte NSIG’s rådgiver en meddelelse herom via pressen og Nasdaq: “Offer for Topsil’s silicon business superior to the contingent offer from GlobalWafers – for immediate announcement” Den 16. juni kl. 20.55 Kl. 20.55 orienterede Topsil ved en selskabsmeddelelse om tilbuddet: ”National Silicon Industry Group afgiver tilbud på Topsils siliciumforretning Vedlagt denne meddelelse er et tilbud til Topsil fra National Silicon Industry Group (NSIG) for Topsil’s siliciumforretning med en pris på gældfri basis på DKK 335 mio., som Topsil netop har modtaget. Topsils bestyrelse har ikke haft lejlighed til at verificere eller forholde sig til indholdet af og udtalelser i NSIG’s tilbud.”

Meddelelsen, som blev udsendt over Nasdaq og dermed til pressen, medførte, at Topsils aktio­ nærer og Global Wafers blev vidende om tilbuddet. Og på trods af tidsforskellen var der straks kontakt fra Taiwan til Frederikssund.

April • Orientering til markedet om proces • Ordinær generalforsamling • Alternative overvejelser om kapitaludvidelse

10

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Samtidig skulle det fremsendte tilbud gennemgås med henblik på, om det kunne anbefales over for aktionærerne og alle andre med interesser i Topsil. Det var godt, at det var en af de lyse sommeraftener. Bestyrelsen skulle finde en strategi for, hvorledes generalforsamlingen skulle afholdes for at sikre balancen mellem hensynet til en fair proces, den bedst mulige pris, deal certainty og en afklaring, der ikke ville lægge virksomheden i vakuum i en længere periode.

Den 17. juni kl. 00.43 Det var stadig lyst, da vi kørte hjem og stadig talte sammen. Godt, mobiltelefonen er opfundet.

Den 17. juni kl. 05.30 Det var en smuk sommermorgen, hvis ikke det var fordi, jeg sad på sengekanten og talte med den kloge og tænksomme investment banker, der var på vej til Topsil og den ekstraordinære generalforsamling ”….jeg har fået en idé, så vi kan få dette sluttet, så virksomhed og aktionærer kan blive glade”.

Den 17 juni kl. 08.30 Bestyrelsen var oppe tidligt for at mødes i Frederikssund. Det var tidspunktet for at træffe beslutninger. Den afgørende beslutning blev, at de to interessenter skulle have lige vilkår for at byde, hvilket blev meddelt begge interessenter og Nasdaq 1½ time før generalforsamlingens start. Der blev givet en time til et endeligt bud: ”Bestyrelsens vurdering af tilbud fra National Silicon Industry Group Som følge af aftalen med GlobalWafers indgået af Topsil den 20. maj 2016 vil den ekstraordinære generalforsamling den 17. juni 2016 fortsat blive afholdt.

I forlængelse af ovenstående har bestyrelsen givet både GlobalWafers og NSIG mulighed for at komme med et endeligt bud inden generalforsamling. De modtagne bud vil i givet fald blive fremlagt på generalforsamlingen.

Såfremt Topsils aktionærer ikke godkender et salg til GlobalWafers på den ekstraordinære generalforsamling den 17. juni 2016, forventer Topsils bestyrelse at acceptere et tilbud fra NSIG om salg af siliciumforretningen, og vil indkalde Topsils aktionærer til en ny ekstraordinær generalforsamling i juli, hvor bestyrelsen bemyndiges til at gennemføre salg af siliciumforretningen.”

Maj • Aftale med GlobalWafers • Indkaldelse til ekstraordinær generalforsamling

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

11

Bestyrelsen ønskede selvfølgelig at opnå den bedst mulige pris, men også at der var en afslut­ ning på processen, da et langstrakt forløb i offentligheden ville være gift for virksomhedens drift og finansiering.

Den 17. juni kl. 09.30 Kort før kl. 09.30 afgav GlobalWafers et nyt, ubetinget og forbedret tilbud med bemærkning om, at det bortfaldt, hvis ikke det var accepteret senest den 17. juni 2016. NSIG afgav ikke noget andet tilbud.

Den 17. juni kl. 10.00 Generalforsamlingen startede.

Den 17. juni kl. 10.08 Kl. 10.05 meddelte NSIG telefonisk, at de ville lægge et bud på alle Topsils aktier, og kl. 10.08 kom så den officielle meddelelse: ”Hovedelementer i købstilbuddet NSIG vil tilbyde DKK 0,352 kontant pr. aktie.

Købstilbuddet vil indeholde en række sædvanlige betingelser og vilkår om bl.a. erhvervelse af 90 % af aktiekapitalen på fuldt udvandet grundlag samt godkendelse fra relevante myndigheder.”

Den 17. juni ca. kl. 10.10 Dirigenten suspenderede generalforsamlingen en time, for at bestyrelsen sammen med dens rådgivere kunne vurdere de to nu vidt forskellige tilbud.

Den 17. juni ca. kl. 11.30 Generalforsamlingen blev genoptaget. Hverken GlobalWafers eller NSIG var til stede. Bestyrelsen redegjorde for sine overvejelser. Hele forløbet udløste en heftig debat om tilbuddene, om forløbet, og om teknisk komplicerede, juridiske forhold. Bestyrelsen anbefalede at gennemføre aftalen med GlobalWafers, da den anså den for økonomisk bedst, da den var uden betingelser modsat NSIG’s tilbud, og da bestyrelsen havde fået tilkendegivelsen om, at den største aktionær med mere end 10 % af Topsils aktiekapital ikke ville acceptere NSIG’s tilbud, hvilket var nødvendigt for at opfylde NSIG-betingelsen om accept fra 90 % af aktiekapitalen.

Juni • Nye mulige budgivere • Nyt tilbud • Offentliggørelse af ny tilbudsgiver • Ekstraordinær general­forsamling • Auktion, offentlighed og bedste bud • Forhøjet bud på aktiviteterne • Offentligt købstilbud på aktier • Generalforsamling beslutter aktivitetssalg

12

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Generalforsamlingen godkendte med fornøden majoritet den forbedrede og ubetingede aftale med GlobalWafers.

Den 17. juni kl. 12.50 Generalforsamlingen var afsluttet, og virksomhedens situation var afklaret. Men sådan skulle det ikke være. Endnu en lang arbejdsweekend ventede.

Den 18. juni Den 18. juni blev ændringerne i Topsils vedtægter mv. registreret hos Erhvervsstyrelsen.

Den 19. juni En gruppe aktionærer i Topsil krævede en ekstraordinær generalforsamling for at tilbagekalde beslutningen om salg af siliciumaktiviteterne.

Den 20. juni Bestyrelsen orienterede Nasdaq om begæringen om en ekstraordinær generalforsamling, og forløbet gav anledning til stor medieomtale. Samtidig gjorde NSIG indsigelse over for Erhvervsstyrelsen mod de skete registreringer af de på generalforsamlingen besluttede forhold.

Dette medførte en omfattende korrespondance og deraf følgende proces mellem parternes advokater og Erhvervsstyrelsen, som tillige Finanstilsynet og Nasdaq blev involveret i.

Den 29. juni Erhvervsstyrelsen traf afgørelsen om ikke at give NSIG medhold: ”Erhvervsstyrelsen har truffet afgørelse Erhvervsstyrelsen har i dag truffet afgørelse om ikke at give NSIG medhold heri.”

• Aktionærerne kræver ny generalforsamling til omgørelse af beslutning • Klage fra offentlige tilbudsgivere til ES, FT og Nasdaq • Medier

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

13

Den 1. juli Parallelt med alt dette – af Topsils ledelse korrekt betegnet som ”juristeri” – blev overdragel­ sen til GlobalWafers planlagt. Igen kunne vi alle glæde os over, hvor lille verden er blevet, når moderne kommunikationsudstyr og grundige forberedelser fra begge sider går op i en højere enhed. En lettet og afklaret virksomhed kunne derfor den 1. juli udsende en selskabsmeddelelse: ”Gennemførelse af aftalen med GlobalWafers Co., Ltd. om salget af selskabets siliciumforretning” Den 1. juli skete der samtidig indkaldelse til ekstraordinær generalforsamling i Topsil. Herefter blev der tid til weekend.

Det efterfølgende forløb Efterfølgende har der været afholdt to ekstraordinære generalforsamlinger som følge af kravet fra aktionærerne og med henblik på at beslutte et aktietilbagekøbsprogram/udbytte til aktio­ nærerne. Aftalen med GlobalWafers var gennemført, så generalforsamlingen om at tilbagekalde den beslutning var ligesom ”post festum”. Aktietilbagekøbet er blevet besluttet og afventer nu en accept fra SKAT.

Historien En spændende dansk virksomhed er blevet bevaret i Danmark, nu 100 % på udenlandske hænder. Det er rigtig godt, for uden denne løsning havde Topsil og dets aktionærer været ilde stedt.

Hvad der startede som en vanskelig salgsproces, endte i et drama udspillet for åben skærm.

Kun fremtiden vil vise, hvem de egentlige vindere er.

Juli

Juli

• Aftalen godkendt på generalforsamling gennemføres • Klage afvises • Offentligt købstilbud opgives

14

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

• Ekstraordinær generalforsamling som krævet • Muligt udbytte/-aktietilbagekøbsprogram lanceres - skat - købstilbud

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

15

2

Skattefri omdannelse – Tilpasning og omstrukturering forud for salg Der er flere måder, hvorpå en virksomhed kan sælges. Et salg kan enten gennemføres som en aktiehandel eller som en substanshandel, hvorved aktiver og passiver overdrages. Forud for et salg vil det som oftest være nødvendigt at omstrukturere virksomheden, således at den tilpas­ ses de behov, som enten sælger eller køber måtte have. Flere faktorer har betydning for, hvilke strukturmæssige ændringer der er behov for at gennemføre, og hvordan disse i givet fald skal gennemføres. En af disse faktorer er de skattemæssige konsekvenser, som salget måtte have for henholdsvis køber og sælger. Omstrukturering af en virksomhed kan sædvanligvis gennem­ føres enten som en skattepligtig omstrukturering eller som en skattefri omstrukturering. Ved en skattefri omstrukturering sker der en skatteudskydelse, således at der ikke udløses skat umiddelbart i forbindelse med transaktionen.

Tilpasning af Topsils struktur Salget af Topsil kunne have været gennemført ved købers overtagelse af alle aktier i det børs­ noterede danske moderselskab. Ved en sådan transaktion ville aktionærerne i Topsil være blevet beskattet i Danmark efter de regler, der gælder i aktieavancebeskatningsloven for salg af aktier.

Michael Hoe Knudsen, Partner, Deloitte Tax M&A IT Dorte Vestergaard Sonnichsen, Director, Deloitte Tax M&A IT "Deloitte" er det brand, hvor­ under tusindvis af engagerede fagfolk over hele verden sam­ arbejder om at levere ydelser inden for revision, rådgivning, finansiel rådgivning, risikostyring og skatterådgivning.

Afdelingen Tax M&A IT yder skatte­rådgivning i forbindelse med fusioner og virksomheds­ overtagelser og skatterådgivning til danske og udenlandske sel­ skaber vedrørende internationale skatteforhold.

16

Det var imidlertid vurderingen, at en potentiel køber ikke ville være seriøst interesseret i, at Topsils polske ejendomsselskab, hvis eneste aktivitet var at eje fast ejendom i Polen, fulgte med i handlen. Af denne årsag var det nødvendigt at foretage en omstrukturering, hvorved det polske ejendomsselskab, der ikke udgjorde en del af Topsils kerneforretning, blev udskilt fra Topsils øvrige virksomhed. Det var endvidere Topsils forventning, at en potentiel køber ville være mindre interesseret i at købe et børsnoteret selskab, og dette forhold havde derfor også betydning for omstruktureringen forud for salget. Koncern- og hele transaktionsstrukturen er angivet i figuren på næste side.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

4) Share Purchase Agreement (Acquisition of Topsil GlobalWafers A/S) GlobalWafers Co. Ltd. (Taiwan)

Cemat A/S

Listed on Nasdaq Copenhagen A/S

3) Business Transfer Agreement (“Dump down”, incl. W130)

Transaction Object

100 %

100 %

2) Asset Transfer Agreement (silicon business) Topsil (Acquisition of assets Semiconductor and activities in TSM S.A.) Materials S.A. (to be named Cemat70 S.A.)

Topsil GlobalWafers A/S (Denmark) 100 %

W130

(to be named Top­ sil Semiconductor Materials S.A.)

W130

Topsil Semiconductor Materials KK

CeMat’70 S.A.

(to be named Topsil Semiconductor Materials S.A.)

(Poland)

(Japan)

1) Share Purchase Agreement (Acquisition of W130)

W130

(empty Polish shell company)

Som det fremgår, var moderselskabet Topsil (nu Cemat A/S) ejer af hele aktiekapitalen i det polske datterselskab, Topsil Semiconductors Materials S.A. (Topsil Polen), der havde en ejer­ andel på 77,6 % i det polske ejendomsselskab Cemat'70 S.A., der igen var ejer af tre polske datterselskaber, hvoraf to af dem havde ejendomme, mens det tredje var tomt. Ud over de polske datterselskaber havde Topsil et japansk datterselskab.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

17

Omstrukturering af Topsil trin for trin For at opnå den ønskede struktur forud for salget blev følgende plan iværksat med henblik på at udskille det polske ejendomsselskab og med henblik på at udskille selskabets kernevirksomhed, så det blev placeret i et selvtændigt ikke-børsnoteret selskab.

Trin 1:

Overdragelse af det tomme polske selskab (W130) fra Cemat70 S.A. til børsnoterede Topsil (Cemat A/S).

Trin 2:

Overdragelse af aktiviteterne i Topsil Polen til W130 – hvis moderselskab nu var blevet Topsil (Cemat A/S).

Trin 3:

Overdragelse af alle aktiver og passiver i Topsil (Cemat A/S) bortset fra aktierne i Topsil Polen, som nu alene var et polsk ejendomsholdingselskab, til et nystiftet dansk datterselskab (Topsil GlobalWafers).

Trin 4:

Salg af det nystiftede selskab til køber.

Trin 5:

Udlodning af salgsprovenu fra Topsil (Cemat A/S) til dets aktionærer (efter indfrielse af gæld).

Trin 6:

Udvikling af Cemat'70 S.A. med henblik på at sælge selskabet og udlodde salgs­provenuet til aktionærerne (hovedaktionær Cemat A/S).

Trin 7:

Likvidation af Cemat A/S eller salg af et tomt, børsnoteret selskab.

Gennemførelsen af omstruktureringen Deloitte i Polen bistod Topsil med overdragelse af aktierne i W130 (trin 1) og med overdragelse af Topsil Polens aktiviteter til W130 (trin 2), som nu er ejet af Topsil (Cemat A/S).

Deloitte i Danmark bistod med at ansøge de danske skattemyndigheder om tilladelse til at fore­ tage tilførslen af Topsils (Cemat A/S) aktiver til det nystiftede selskab (trin 3) som en skattefri tilførsel af aktiver. Ved en skattepligtig tilførsel af aktiver vil det overdragende selskab være skattepligtigt af avancer på de overdragne aktiver opgjort i forhold til aktivernes markedsværdi.

Såfremt overdragelsen udløser et tab, vil en skattepligtig tilførsel betyde, at dette tab kan frem­ føres i det overdragende selskab efter gældende regler. Ved en skattepligtig tilførsel anses det modtagende selskab i skattemæssig henseende for at have erhvervet aktiverne til markedsprisen.

I Topsil-sagen var børskursen på selskabets aktier mindre end selskabets bogførte egen­kapital.

En skattepligtig overførsel af aktiver ville derfor udløse et skattemæssigt tab. Da Topsil (Cemat A/S) efter overdragelsen ikke længere havde egne aktiviteter, ville et sådant tab være af begrænset værdi for selskabet.

18

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Ved at gennemføre tilførslen af aktiver og passiver som en skattefri tilførsel ville der hver­ ken blive udløst kapitalgevinst eller tab i skattemæssig henseende. Ved skattefri tilførsel af aktiver overtager det modtagende selskab aktiverne til deres skattemæssige værdi, og der sker derfor hverken skattemæssig nedskrivning eller opskrivning af aktiverne i forbindelse med tilførslen.

For at få tilladelse til at gennemføre tilførslen af aktiver som en skattefri tilførsel er det en betingelse, at overdragelsen er forretningsmæssigt begrundet, og at de aktiver og passiver, der overdrages, udgør en selvstændig virksomhed, der kan fungere ved egne midler. Derudover er det en betingelse, at alle aktiver og passiver, der er tilknyttet virksomheden, overføres til det nystiftede selskab, og det er derfor ikke muligt at efterlade enkelte aktiver eller forpligtelser i det overdragende selskab. Endvidere er det ikke muligt skattefrit at overdrage aktiver og pas­ siver, som ikke udgør en gren af en virksomhed.

Tilladelsen fra SKAT SKAT meddelte selskabet tilladelse til at gennemføre tilførslen af Topsils (Cemat A/S) aktiver og passiver til et nystiftet selskab som en skattefri tilførsel. SKAT godkendte i den forbindelse, at Topsils (Cemat A/S) gæld til banken kunne forblive i selskabet med henblik på at blive indfriet efter tilførslen. SKAT godkendte endvidere, at aktierne i Topsil Polen, som nu var blevet til et ejendomsholdingselskab, ikke udgjorde en del af Topsils (Cemat A/S) siliciumvirksomhed, og derfor var det ikke et krav, at disse aktier blev overdraget til det nye selskab som en del af tilførslen.

SKAT fastsatte ikke særlige vilkår for at give tilladelse til den skattefri tilførsel, bortset fra et vilkår om at de skattemæssige underskud i Topsil (Cemat A/S) skulle overføres til det nystiftede selskab. Dette vilkår beror på en af SKAT indført praksisændring om, at skattemæssige tab og underskud i forbindelse med en skattefri omstrukturering skal overføres til det modtagende selskab i det omfang, at tabene vedrører de overdragne aktiviteter. Konsekvensen er, at de overdragne tab og underskud fortabes, når det modtagende selskab ved et senere salg udtræ­ der af sambeskatning med det overdragende selskab. I to for nyligt afsagte afgørelser fra sep­ tember 2016 har Landsskatteretten imidlertid fastslået, at skattemæssige tab og fremførbare underskud i det overdragende selskab skal forblive i det overdragende selskab.

Den skattemæssige tilførsel af aktiver i Topsil blev gennemført pr. 1. juli 2016 umiddelbart forud for closing. Herefter var salget af siliciumaktiviteten en realitet og Topsil (nu Cemat A/S) et dansk børsnoteret ejendomsholdingselskab.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

19

3 Mette Lykke, Advokat, LETT

Fra Hellerup til Taipei – Fra blomsterhandel til hightech Det er ikke sådan til at sige, hvornår Topsil blev grundlagt. Ifølge www.topsil.com blev virksomheden etableret af erhvervsmanden Haldor Topsøe sidst i 1950’erne og senere, i 1972, udskilt som selvstændig virksomhed og frasolgt Haldor Topsøe A/S. Konsulterer man CVR-registret, er Topsil derimod fra 1981. Rekvirerer man Topsils stiftelsesdokument hos Erhvervsstyrelsen, viser det sig, at historien om Topsil tager sin begyndelse den 27. januar 1962, da fem blomsterhandlere stifter Danske Blomsterhandleres Handelsaktieselskab D.B. Hvor blomsterhandlerne er blevet af, melder de gamle annaler ikke noget om, men de fortæller historien om en virksomhed, der trods både op- og nedture har formået at gøre sig attraktiv i den store verden.

Topsøe + silicium = Topsil Haldor Topsøe havde fået interesse for siliciumfremstilling på en af sine mange udenlandsrej­ ser og havde ved siden af sin udvikling og produktion af katalysatorer, som var (og er) Haldor Topsøe A/S’ egentlige forretning, syslet med at dyrke siliciumkrystaller efter float zone-princip­ pet, en metode til at producere meget rent silicium. Haldor Topsøe begyndte at eksperimentere med udvikling af maskiner til zonesmeltning af silicium og krystaldyrkningsforsøg i sin kælder i hjemmet i Hellerup.

Omkring 1960 blev den første siliciumproduktion iværksat, og dermed var Topsil – ”Top” fra Topsøe og ”sil” fra silicium – en realitet. Både produktionsmaskinerne og råvarer til silicium­ produktionen blev produceret af Topsøes egne teknikere. Siliciumskiverne var i begyndelsen meget små, 1-1,5 tommer i diameter, men der skulle senere vise sig at være mulighed for at producere i andre størrelser.

Siliciumbranchen var allerede dengang domineret af store multinationale koncerner, hvilket gjorde det vanskeligt at navigere som en mindre spiller på markedet. I 1960’erne lancerede Topsil sit første højkvalitetsprodukt, hyper pure silicon (HPS), der kunne anvendes til avan­ cerede detektorer og sensorer. Disse komponenter indgår i dag i medicoteknisk udstyr som CT- og MR-scannere samt i sikkerhedsscannere i lufthavne. Topsil havde dermed fundet sit niche­marked ved at udvikle et så rent produkt, at det både teknologisk og kvalitetsmæssigt var konkurrencedygtigt. Silicium – eller silicon, som det hedder på engelsk – er et halvledermate­ riale og bruges primært til at producere computerchips, solceller og materialer til infrastruktur; det er derfra, navnet på computerindustriens fødeby, Silicon Valley, stammer. Topsil fremstiller dog silicium i meget højere kvalitet end det, computerchips behøver, og meget renere end det,

20

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

der bruges i solceller, da renheden er en forudsætning for overhovedet at kunne fremstille energieffektive elektriske komponenter. Det indgår typisk i højeffektkomponenter til energi­ transport og -distribution i blandt andet pumper, kompressorer, airconditionanlæg og robotter.

Andre områder er styring af vindmøller og distribution af vindmøllestrøm til el-nettet, regulering af strøm til køreledninger til højhastighedstog og regulering af strøm mellem batteri og motor i el- og hybridbiler.

Globalt gennembrud I forhold til større multinationale konkurrenter havde Topsil i Frederikssund for lille volumen og for høje produktionsomkostninger til at kunne opretholde en rentabel drift. I 1972 besluttede Haldor Topsøe derfor at udskille Topsil som selvstændig virksomhed og frasolgte det til Thrige Titan i Odense.

I den globale halvlederindustri var der på den tid gang i udviklingen af en ny type komponen­ ter, som skulle være hjørnestenen i omformningen af højspændingsvekselstrøm til jævnstrøm, hvilket stillede store krav til silicium i form af ensartethed og pålidelighed. Trods uenighed i forskerverdenen om, hvorvidt bestrålet – neutrondoteret (NTD) – silicium ville resultere i radio­ aktive og ubrugelige siliciumkrystaller, udviklede Topsil i 1974 i samarbejde med forskere på prøveatomreaktoren Risø og en stor kunde (den virksomhed, der i dag er ABB) som de første på verdensmarkedet bestrålet silicium. Det fik de stor succes med, og dermed cementerede virksomheden sin position som ”frontrunner” og mønsterbryder.

Tidernes gunst og ugunst Thrige Titan videresolgte i 1974 Topsil til den amerikanske elektronikkoncern Motorola, der havde brug for ny og større produktionskapacitet. På grund af den økonomiske afmatning og en faldende dollarkurs var det svære afsætningsbetingelser for silicium, og Topsils omsætning faldt drastisk. Afmatningen medførte, at Topsil i årene herefter gennemgik en turbulent peri­ ode, og trods forsøg på restrukturering og genetablering blev Topsil erklæret konkurs i 1983.

Resterne af Topsil blev samlet op af et dansk-hollandsk konsortium af investorer sammen med bl.a. Lønmodtagernes Dyrtidsfond og RB-Invest. I 1986 blev Topsil børsnoteret på Københavns Fondsbørs (i dag Nasdaq Copenhagen).

I 1989 opgav Topsil sin egenfremstilling af råvarer (polysilicium), da en ekstern leverandør (de hed oprindelig Union Carbide, men blev opkøbt af ASIMI, som blev opkøbt af det norske, børsnoterede selskab REC Silicon ASA (REC)) kunne producere råvarer, der kunne opfylde Topsils høje kvalitetskrav. Det højnede produkteffektiviteten, og Topsil blev i stand til at udvide produktionskapaciteten betydeligt. I begyndelsen af 1980’erne var siliciumskiverne oppe på 4 tommer, mens de i slutningen af årtiet var oppe på skiver med 5 tommer i diameter.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

21

Grøn omstilling I 1990’erne arbejdede Topsil både på at forenkle og strømline siliciumfremstillingen og på en ny type silicium, det gasdoterede float zone-produkt, målrettet mellemspændingskomponenter, som var en videreudvikling af produktet fra 70’erne. Processen var billigere, og leveringstiden var kortere, da produktet ikke længere skulle bestråles i en atomreaktor. På ledelsesfronten skete der også forandring i disse år, idet John Olesen, der havde været administrerende direktør siden genetableringen i 1981 og dermed nærmest var indbegrebet af ”Mr. Topsil”, fratrådte i 1998.

I slutningen af årtiet begyndte Topsil at tage del i den hastigt voksende solcelleindustri, da de øjnede muligheden for at producere et produkt til særligt højeffektive solceller. I begyndelsen af 00’erne måtte Topsil dog konstatere, at det ikke var lykkedes at etablere en rentabel mas­ seproduktion af float zone-silicium til solceller, selvom siliciumproduktet overgik markedets øvrige produkter i produktivitet, men var for dyrt til at kunne konkurrere. Topsil nedlagde sin skiveproduktion i Frederikssund og outsourcede det meste til GlobalWafers’ moderselskab, det taiwanske selskab Sino American Silicon (SAS), hvor Doris Hsu et par år senere blev admini­ strerende direktør. Nogle specialprodukter blev outsourcet til en anden taiwansk virksomhed, WaferWorks Corporation (WWX).

Topsil kæmpede også i disse år med at stabilisere økonomien, herunder ved at indgå råvarekon­ trakter med REC, og Topsil fik omkring årtusindskiftet tilført kapital ad flere omgange, således i 1999, 2000, 2002 og 2006. I 2002 indskød GlobalWafers DKK 25 mio., og Doris Hsu indtrådte i bestyrelsen, hvor hun sad som henholdsvis formand, næstformand og menigt bestyrelses­ medlem, indtil hun udtrådte i 2005, og SAS solgte deres aktier.

Midt i 2000’erne stod verdensøkonomien i fuldt flor, og politikere, virksomheder m.v. havde fokus rettet mod grøn omstilling og udvikling. Efterhånden som solcelleindustrien voksede, kom der akut mangel på råvaresilicium. REC, Topsils hovedleverandør gennem 20 år, opsagde sine kontrakter, og Topsil ville miste sit eksistensgrundlag, hvis ikke nye leverancekontrakter blev indgået. Med Keld Lindegaard Andersen som administrerende direktør fra 2005-2010 indgik Topsil langtidskontrakter med vareleverandører, skiveleverandører og de fem største kunder.

Det krævede store forudbetalinger at indgå leverandørkontrakterne, men kombineret med kun­ dekontrakterne fulgte en periode med stor stabilitet, en sikker indtjening og som følge deraf en aktiekurs, der næsten eksploderede. Topsil formåede således i disse år at udnytte den mangel på råvaresilicium, der var forårsaget af solcelleboomet.

Med opkøbet af det polske Cemat Silicon S.A. i 2008 fik Topsil adgang til czozhralski-silicium­ fremstillingsteknologien målrettet de lavere spændingsniveauer, som ellers blev nedlagt i produktionen i 1970’erne. Med Cemat kunne Topsil få mere hånd om skivebearbejdningen såsom savning, polering, slibning osv. og trække denne del af processen hjem igen fra Taiwan.

Samtidig kunne Topsil med kontrol over såvel processen som teknologien bruge Polen til at

22

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

presse priserne over for SAS og WWX. Ved købet i Polen fik virksomheden også ejerskab til et polsk ejendomsselskab. Det har hele tiden været meningen, at ejendomsselskabet skulle sælges, som det allerede blev beskrevet i Topsils børsprospekt i 2010.

Markedsudvikling Alle indikatorer i markedet pegede mod en omsætning, der ville nå uanede højder, men prog­ noserne holdt ikke stik, og markedet vendte omkring 2008-2009. Der kom igen overkapacitet af råvarer, og da både kunder og leverandører var kæmpekoncerner, havde Topsil svært ved at fastholde sine kunder i langtidskontrakterne.

Som følge af globale megatrends som grøn omstilling og energieffektivitet lancerede Topsil i 2010 en offensiv vækststrategi, der gennem udvikling af nye produkter med forbedrede tek­ niske egenskaber, næste generation af siliciumskiver med større diameter og opførelsen af en ny fabrik skulle udnytte markedspotentialet bedre. Den nye CEO, Kalle Hvidt Nielsen, skulle øge salget og effektivisere produktionen. Forholdene var vanskelige, for fra 2012 og årene derefter blev Topsil presset på markedspriserne og mistede markedsandele til en stor tysk konkurrent, der var vendt tilbage i NTD-segmentet, og efter en erstatningssag og et vigende marked var det svært for Topsil at finde fodfæste igen i et marked præget af konsolidering.

Overdragelsen Topsil solgte den 1. juli 2016 sin siliciumforretning til GlobalWafers med Doris Hsu i spidsen.

Den resterende del af Topsil – aktiemajoriteten i et polsk ejendomsselskab – ligger fortsat i det børsnoterede selskab, der har skiftet navn til Cemat A/S. GlobalWafers har overtaget en virksomhed, der fra sin spæde begyndelse har produceret højkvalitetsprodukter, som markedet fortsat har brug for. Eksempelvis indgår HPS-produktet fra 1960’erne stadig i Topsils produkt­ palette som specialprodukt, ligesom Topsil frem til i dag har formået at fastholde sin globale position som markedsledende leverandør af NTD-silicium, der var 1970’ernes store opfindelse.

Fremtiden vil vise, om Topsils siliciumforretning i nye, men dog velkendte hænder, vil fortsætte med at flytte grænserne for, hvad silicium kan.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

23

4

Kinesiske investeringer i Danmark – Skal vi frygte, når dragen vågner?

Napoleon sagde om Kina: ”Lad hende sove, for når hun vågner, vil verden ryste.” Kineserne nøjes ikke længere med at sidde på Højbro Plads, men køber stort op af virksomheder i hele verden. I kølvandet på opkøbsbølgen kommer usikkerheden. Er de nuværende opkøb kun begyndelsen? Hvad vil de nye ejere med virksomhederne, og hvilken effekt har kinesisk ejerskab for virksomheder, medarbejdere og selvfølgelig rådgiverbranchen?

Kommer ulven?

Næsten hver uge byder på nye, store, kinesiske investeringer i Europa. Især i Tyskland, Storbritannien og Frankrig er kinesisk erhvervslivs appetit på veldrevne virksomheder tilsyne­ ladende umættelig. I Sydeuropa har de økonomiske udfordringer ført til slagtilbud, så her har kinesiske virksomheder også købt op i stor stil.

Rasmus Grand Bjørnø, Direktør, Invest in Denmark, Udenrigsministeriet Rasmus Grand Bjørnø er ud­ sendt af Udenrigsministeriet til Shanghai, hvor han de sidste 4 år har været chef for Invest in Denmarks organisation i Kina.

Invest in Denmark promoverer med udgangspunkt i danske styrkepositioner Danmark som investeringsland og assisterer udenlandske virksomheder med at etablere virksomhed i Danmark.

Væksten i kinesiske investeringer i udlandet kender i disse år kun én vej. 33,6 % om året de sidste 13 år. Med en række spektakulære investeringer i Volvo, Pirelli, Kuka, Syngenta og senest finske Supercell sætter kinesiske investorer for alvor dagsordenen i Europa. På trods af nye restriktioner på kapitaludførsel kølner interessen næppe foreløbig.

I Danmark har kinesiske investeringer også fyldt godt på erhvervssiderne. I år blev Sparkle Rolls' interesse for Bang & Olufsen til en længere føljeton i flere afsnit, mens denne bogs tema, GlobalWafers’ køb af Topsil, i sidste ende havde alle ingredienser til et højspændt trekantsdrama.

Indtil videre er det kun omkring et par håndfulde kinesiske virksomheder, som har etableret virksomhed i Danmark gennem opkøb. Langt hovedparten er resultatet af mindre etableringer.

Som Huawei og AsiaInfo har vist, kan små salgsafdelinger sagtens vokse til anseelig størrelse.

Fra 5-10 medarbejdere i 2007 har Huawei Danmark i dag over 250 medarbejdere og er næppe færdige med at vokse.

Langt størstedelen af de kinesiske investorer i Danmark er private virksomheder. Det står i skarp kontrast til resten af Europa, hvor de statsejede kinesiske virksomheder står for 60-70 % af værdien af investeringerne. Kapitalfonde og venturefirmaer kigger stadig primært inden for egne grænser. Syd for grænsen har de store opkøb, herunder købet af robotfirmaet Kuka, og udsigten til forøget indirekte, kinesisk, statsligt ejerskab af vigtige dele af den tyske vækstmotor ført til skepsis over for fortsatte kinesiske investeringer. Senest har usikkerheden ført til revurdering af godkendelsen af købet af chipproducenten Aixtron SE.

24

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Mistilliden til især de statsejede investeringer er indtil videre ikke begrundet i dårlige erfaringer.

Virksomhedsoverdragelser er oftest langstrakte affærer, og effekten af den seneste opkøbsbølge kendes først for alvor om en årrække. Samtidig er der også et element af manglende gensidig­ hed. De kinesiske investorer i Europa oplever få begrænsninger på opkøbsmulighederne, mens europæiske virksomheder mødes af restriktive regler for investeringer i Kina. Ubalancen er et vigtigt emne i forhandlingerne om en investeringsaftale mellem EU og Kina.

Danmark – hovedstaden i IKEA? I forhold til amerikanske og europæiske virksomheder er kinesiske virksomheder kun i begræn­ set omfang til stede i Danmark. I Invest in Denmark i Kina regner vi med, at omkring 130 virksomheder fra Kina, inklusive Taiwan og Hong Kong, har aktiviteter i Danmark. Det er ikke dem alle, vi har hjulpet med investeringerne i Danmark, men vi har haft kontakt med langt hovedparten. Henvendelserne kommer ikke af sig selv, og Danmark er sjældent på radaren, når virksomheden er moden til at prøve kræfter med Europa. Styrkepositioner inden for lyd, vedvarende energi, miljø, fødevarer og sundhed giver dog en vis resonans – også i Kina.

Findes den typiske investor?

Det vil være forkert at skære alle kinesiske virksomheder over en kam. Virksomheder fra Taiwan og Hong Kong har normalt langt større erfaring med internationalisering. En stor del af ledelsen er enten uddannet i USA eller har erfaring fra arbejde i eller med amerikanske virksomheder.

Forretningskulturen er kraftigt påvirket af kinesisk virksomhedskultur, men ligner i højere grad den amerikanske. GlobalWafers er næsten lige til fagbøgerne. Her er skarpt fokus på kerne­ forretningen. Virksomheden har allerede mange internationale investeringer, og ledelseslaget har stor international erfaring, inklusive lang erfaring fra bestyrelsesarbejde i Topsil. Kan den danske del af virksomheden fortsat leve op til de høje krav, giver det enormt rygstød at være en del af verdens største producent af silicium.

Kigger vi på virksomheder fra fastlandskina, er det en anden sag. Mange kinesiske virksomheds­ ejere er på trods af snart 40 års åben økonomi stadig novicer, når det kommer til internationale aktiviteter. Produktion og salg til Europa er kendt stof, og lysten til at ekspandere uden for Kina er stor, men den manglende internationale erfaring er stadig en hæmsko for succes.

I Asien lever konglomerattankegangen i bedste velgående. Store kinesiske virksomheder følger i mange tilfælde andre lærebøger end de europæiske og hylder mantraet om at sprede risi­ koen. Kommer vi ud i ekstremerne, har vi i Invest in Denmark tidligere modtaget henvendelser fra stålproducenter med et godt øje til lakseopdræt og ejendomsinvestorer med interesse for medicinsk teknologi. Heldigvis hører den slags henvendelser til undtagelserne. Med kinesiske virksomhedslederes stigende internationale erfaring bliver dialogen hurtigt mere målrettet og seriøs.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

25

Hvad hvis jeg gerne vil have kinesiske investorer?

Tålmodighed og forberedelse er som i de fleste andre sammenhænge nøglebegreber. En inve­ stering fra en kinesisk virksomhed kommer sjældent over night. At finde den rigtige kinesiske investor føles ofte som at lede efter nålen i høstakken. Mange er interesserede, men få kan, og færre vil. Som i mange andre af livets forhold er det nemmere at indlede forpligtende drøftelser med eksisterende samarbejdspartnere. Accelinks køb af Ignis i Birkerød, Titans køb af Vestas tårnfabrik og også GlobalWafers' køb af Topsil var alle logiske fortsættelser af leverandørforhold eller samarbejder. Starter søgningen fra grunden, vil det være en stor fordel at benytte en god rådgiver med erfaring fra Kina. Det kan være en god ide at droppe forventningen om den hurtige gevinst og i stedet indledningsvis fokusere på etablering af et mere forpligtende samarbejde.

For mange danske rådgivervirksomheder er Kina en stor mundfuld. Som flere har opdaget, er spillereglerne anderledes og dialogen tidskrævende. Sproget kan være en barriere, og investe­ ringen i opbygning af tillid er tidskrævende og omstændelig. Heldigvis for leveren er tidligere tiders fokus på relationsopbygning gennem indtagelse af helbredstruende mængder af alkohol kraftigt på retur. Der er dog ingen vej uden om hyppige besøg i Kina, ligesom mange har set fordelene ved tilknytning af kinesisktalende personale. Selve forretningsmodellen er også under pres i Kina. Kinesiske virksomheder betaler kun nødigt for serviceydelser. En anden form for prissætning vil derfor være en overvejelse værd, hvis rådgivningen sker på køberside.

For medarbejdere, der pludselig møder en kinesisk chef, giver de eksisterende eksempler ingen grund til frygt, men for de fleste vil den kinesiske udviklingsmodel kræve tilvænning.

Udviklingstempoet er højt og time to market kort. Virksomhedslederne er i mange tilfælde også grundlæggere og vant til enerådigt at træffe beslutninger. Det har i ikke så få tilfælde givet anledning til frustrationer på begge sider, når danske medarbejderes fokus på at bidrage gennem forslag til konstruktive forbedringer tolkes som manglende villighed til at udføre en allerede given ordre.

Hvorfor går køberne uden om Danmark?

Der kan være flere grunde til, at kinesiske virksomheder ikke i stor stil er lykkedes med opkøb i Danmark. Generelt er danske virksomheder attraktive og højt prissat. Samtidig betyder det udbredte fonds- og familieejerskab i Danmark, at mange store virksomheder ikke kan betragtes som reelle opkøbsemner.

De veldrevne danske virksomheder sælges ofte i internationale budrunder. En proces, især de statsejede kinesiske virksomheder hidtil ikke har haft succesfulde erfaringer med i Danmark.

Korte budprocesser og komplicerede interne beslutningsgange gør det i mange tilfælde sværere at vinde internationale budrunder.

I tillæg til de interne udfordringer er det let at overse den rolle, kulturforskelle kan spille, når forhandlingerne grundstøder. For især ældre virksomhedsejere eller -ledere fra Kina er personlig

26

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

kemi og opbygning af gensidig troværdighed af stor betydning. I stedet for en overtagelse baseret på budrunder og due diligence foretrækkes begrænset samarbejde som et første skridt.

Samtidig er det ingen hemmelighed, at succesfulde, kinesiske virksomhedsovertagelser tit har krævet lange og komplicerede forudgående forløb. Ofte med genforhandling af allerede ind­ gåede aftaler. Et populært kinesisk ordsprog lyder noget i retning af ”når en dør lukkes, åbnes et vindue” og vidner om en grundlæggende pragmatisk forhandlingstilgang. Er investeringen interessant nok, tages en afvisning sjældent for pålydende. I stedet prøves med en ny vinkel.

Mange gange til stor frustration for de involverede danske virksomheder og deres rådgivere, som naturligt nok primært har erfaring fra en kortere og mere fokuseret dialog med virksom­ heder fra Europa og Nordamerika.

Øst, vest, hjemme bedst Det er ingen hemmelighed, at det er i Kina, væksten findes. Selv med faldende vækstrater, forventes stadig en middelhøj vækst i årene fremover. For de fleste kinesiske virksomhedsledere står valget mellem at bruge ressourcer på et velkendt hjemmemarked med en årlig vækst i BNP på 6-7 % og et stort, ukendt, modent og lidt langsommere voksende marked i Europa. Få bruger lang tid på den beslutning.

Investeringer i Danmark sker for de fleste for at opnå viden og kompetencer, som kan bruges til at forøge omsætningen på hjemmemarkedet. De kinesiske investorer fokuserer primært på teknologitunge sektorer. I Danmark særligt inden for IT og vedvarende energi. I resten af Europa også fødevare-, auto-, rumfarts-, og robotteknologi, samt nye materialer, turisme og kendte forbrugerbrands. Virksomheder med førende teknologi og innovationskraft er de fore­ trukne investeringsobjekter.

Et positivt bekendtskab De få eksempler på private kinesiske opkøb, vi indtil videre har set i Danmark, har ubetinget haft en positiv effekt for beskæftigelse i Danmark og følger det generelle mønster for kinesiske virksomheders ageren i Europa.

Kinesiske virksomheder har sjældent stor erfaring med virksomhedsdrift uden for Kina og viderefører derfor oftest eksisterende ledelse i opkøbte virksomheder, mens de selv tager sig af det kinesiske marked. Ofte er eksisterende ledelse og arbejdspladser bevaret og yderligere ressourcer tilført om nødvendigt.

Volvo er det bedste, skandinaviske eksempel, men vi har også set de positive effekter i Danmark.

Den 13. december 2016 indvier Dynaudio i Skanderborg en af Europas mest avancerede forsk­ ningsfaciliteter til akustikudvikling. Centret er betalt af den nye kinesiske ejer GoerTek, som ud over den nye facilitet i Skanderborg også har etableret et udviklingscenter i København til samarbejde med Samsung, Sony, Google, Microsoft, LG og andre af GoerTeks kunder.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

27

28

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

GoerTek er som mange andre kinesiske investorer startet som en succesfuld underleverandør.

På en rundtur i det showroom, som alle kinesiske virksomheder har, ses ure, høretelefoner, højttalere, kontrollere til spillekonsoller og mange andre dagligdags produkter. Alle markedsført under andre navne, men produceret på kontrakt af GoerTek. Købet af Dynaudio er for GoerTek en af vejene til at komme ind på markedet for højkvalitetslyd, hvor indtjeningen per enhed er højere og branding en kernedisciplin. En rejse væk fra volumen­ markedet, som mange kinesiske virksomheder er på i disse år.

Skal vi frygte dragen?

Napoleon havde ret. Kina er for alvor vågnet op til dåd. Med fortsatte høje vækstrater bliver Kina fremover et endnu vigtigere marked, også for danske virksomheder. Indtil videre har kinesiske opkøb af danske virksomheder og investeringer i danske klynger generelt styrket de danske virksomheder.

Interessen for Danmark har selvfølgelig konsekvenser for de involverede. For virksom­heder, rådgivere og medarbejdere vil bekendtskabet med kinesiske investorer kræve behov for nytænkning.

Flere kinesiske virksomheder i Danmark giver bedre mulighed for at rekruttere medarbejdere med erfaring med kinesisk forretningskultur og udviklingsmodel. For de virksomheder, der lykkes med et kinesisk ejerskab, er mulighederne intet mindre end enorme. For rådgiversiden er markedspotentialet stort og de kommende frustrationer næppe mindre.

Fælles for os alle er, at det bliver svært og udfordrende, og der er ingen garanti for, at guldet venter for enden af regnbuen, men alternativet, at kinesiske virksomheder overser Danmark, er ensbetydende med spildte muligheder og tabt indtjening. Kinesiske investeringer i Danmark lykkes, hvis forarbejdet er gjort ordentligt, hvis Danmark har viden eller kompetencer, som kineserne efterspørger, eller markedspotentialet er stort nok. Når Danmark er blandt verdens førende inden for en sektor, er kompetencerne selvfølgelig også interessante for kinesiske investorer.

Forhåbentlig bliver kinesiske ejere også fremover et positivt bekendtskab for Danmark.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

29

5

I orkanens øje – Bestyrelsens rolle i en salgsproces En dansk hightech succeshistorie I april 2011 kunne jeg som stolt bestyrelsesformand fremlægge Topsil Semiconductor Materials A/S’ hidtil bedste regnskab. Omsætningen havde rundet MDKK 450, og driftsresultatet var på over MDKK 100. Bestyrelse, direktion og medarbejdere kunne med tilfredshed se tilbage på en række meget succesfulde år.

Da jeg seks år tidligere var trådt ind i bestyrelsen og samtidig havde overtaget formandshver­ vet, var Topsils omsætning på kun godt MDKK 100 og resultatet beskedent. Virksomheden havde forud for det gennemlevet adskillige op- og nedture med skiftende storaktionærer. En tidligere formand havde på et tidspunkt udtalt: ”Jeg fik at vide, at man kom sand ind i den ene ende af maskinerne, og så kom der guld ud af den anden ende. Jeg har nu ved selvsyn konstateret, at det forholder sig lige omvendt...!”

Jens Borelli-Kjær, Bestyrelses­formand, Topsil Jens Borelli-Kjær (1960) (Civil­ ingeniør, HD, MBA) er direktør og har mere end 30 års ledelsesog bestyrelseserfaring fra virk­ somheder inden for medicinsk udstyr, elektronik og bygge­ materialer. Siden 2005 har Jens Borelli-Kjær også været ejer af og administrerende direktør i ovenlysproducenten VITRAL.

Det første problem, vi stod overfor i 2006, var adgang til råvarer. Topsil ”lever af” polysilicium, et materiale fremstillet af netop sand, som både anvendes til halvlederindustrien (som Topsil forsyner) og til fotovoltaiske solceller. Solcellemarkedet var på det tidspunkt i nærmest eksplosiv vækst og aftog allerede næsten lige så store mængder polysilicium som den samlede globale halvlederindustri med det resultat, at vi (og vore konkurrenter) for at få adgang til råvarer var nødt til at indgå langtidsaftaler med leverandørerne og med store up-front betalinger som entrébillet.

Adgangen til råvarerne brugte vi til at lave tilsvarende langtidsaftaler med de største kunder, hvorved vi fik bragt os i en situation, hvor sand faktisk – i hvert fald i pænt omfang – kunne veksles til guld. De følgende år fik vi desuden drejet fokus mod at producere mere og mere af det ultrarene silicium til brug i højspændingsområdet, og vi fik lukket Topsils egne aktiviteter inden for solceller ned, så vi kunne fokusere 100 % på halvlederindustrien. I 2011 kunne vi således ikke blot præsentere et flot resultat; vi var også verdens største leverandør af ultrarent float zone silicium, NTD, til højspændingsområdet.

Finanskrisen var gået forholdsvis nådigt hen over siliciumindustrien. Mange af Topsils kunder leverede halvlederkomponenter – på basis af Topsil-skiver – til store infrastrukturprojekter, især højhastighedsjernbanenet og energidistribution. Det var projekter med årelange løbetider, som ikke blev sat i bero, ”bare” fordi der var støj på finansmarkederne og fald i verdens BNP.

30

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Ny fabrik i et meget presset marked I 2010 sidder vi således og kigger ind i en situation, hvor vi inden for få år forventer at ramme kapacitetsloftet i den eksisterende fabrik samtidig med, at vi skal finde plads til nyt produktions­ udstyr til et 300 mm produkt, som er på vej gennem produktudvikling. Efter mange analyser kan vi i januar 2011 meddele, at vi igangsætter byggeriet af en ny fabrik – en investering på knap MDKK 300 finansieret af forventet indtjening fra driften, kreditter og provenuet fra en kapitaludvidelse foretaget i 2010.

I 2012 og de følgende år kommer Topsil under alvorligt prispres i et marked, som i sig selv pludselig skrumper i volumen. En stor tysk konkurrent er vendt tilbage til NTD-segmentet og tager med lave priser markedsandele, og den japanske yen falder fra et niveau over 7,50 til 5,20, så vores japanske konkurrenter gør det samme i Europa, Topsils ”hjemmemarked”.

Da vi når frem til 2015, hvor vi undervejs bl.a. har skiftet ud i Topsils direktion, er virkeligheden for Topsil, at vi sidder med en ny, state-of-the-art og langt hen ad vejen lånefinansieret fabrik i et marked, hvor volumen de foregående år er skrumpet (eller i bedste fald har været konstant) og til markedspriser, der er 40 % lavere, end da vi traf beslutningen om at bygge fabrikken.

Endelig gennemlever vi i 2014-2015 en meget alvorlig reklamationssag, som betyder, at salget til en af Topsils største kunder i en lang periode går helt i stå. Sagen afsluttes med, at Topsil må betale erstatning til kunden og derudover producere og genlevere en stor mængde skiver uden beregning. Kvalitetsproblemet er opstået hos en underleverandør, som uden Topsils vidende og i strid med kontrakten har ændret sit produktionsudstyr og sine produktionsprocesser, så produkterne bliver forurenede. På trods af en kompensation fra underleverandøren ender hele reklamationssagen med at koste Topsil over MDKK 30 – penge vi på det tidspunkt ikke havde særligt godt råd til at miste.

Behov for handling – strategiske samarbejder og/eller markedskonsolidering I bestyrelsen diskuterer vi løbende i de senere år, om vi har en fremtid som selvstændigt børs­ noteret selskab, eller om vi skal søge at indgå i en større sammenhæng. Det bliver klart, at vi efterhånden er så finansielt svage, at et yderligere fald i indtjening eller et nyt ”bump” på vejen i form af en reklamationssag eller et forkert udfald af en verserende patentsag kan blive endog meget kritisk for virksomheden. Topsils bankforbindelse ser naturligvis også med uro på udviklingen og ønsker, at ledelsen finder en fornuftig, fremtidssikker løsning.

Efter den ordinære generalforsamling i foråret 2015 intensiveres diskussionen i bestyrelse og direktion om mulighederne for enten at indgå i et strategisk samarbejde til styrkelse af de afsætningsmæssige muligheder (og der indledes realitetsforhandlinger med en mulig partner) eller indgå i et større ejerskab.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

31

Store dele af branchen er finansielt på hælene på grund af den faldende volumen og de kraftigt faldende priser – en situation, der kalder på konsolidering. I Asien er konsolideringen allerede så småt gået i gang. Bestyrelsens beslutning bliver derfor, at vi hellere vil være en aktiv del af en konsolidering end stå tilbage på perronen, når konsolideringstoget er kørt forbi.

Spørgsmålet er, om Topsil skal eller kan være den drivende kraft i en konsolidering? Vi har allerede på bestyrelsesformands-/administrerende direktørniveau haft en dialog med en anden spiller gennem et par år og uforpligtende drøftet muligheden. Nu er vi imidlertid i en situa­ tion, hvor vi ikke har råd til flere negative overraskelser, og i en svækket forhandlingssituation beslutter vi derfor, at vi er nødt til at undersøge muligheden for en hurtigere løsning i form af et salg. Især den nye float zone fabrik i Frederikssund og en organisation med mange, mange års akkumuleret erfaring og teknologividen vil være interessant for en del mulige købere.

Salgsprocessen – et meget intensivt halvår I november 2015 samler vi således et team bestående af SEB Corporate Finance, LETTs M&Aafdeling, Topsils direktion, formand og næstformand og går i gang! Den resterende bestyrelse deltager ikke direkte, men i de kommende 8 måneder holder vi flere bestyrelses- og telefon­ møder i bestyrelsen, end vi har gjort de foregående mange år tilsammen.

Vi er fra starten helt sikre på, at vi ikke vil køre en offentligt kendt proces. Det skyldes, at vi er i gang med en række produktkvalificeringer hos potentielt nye kunder – en proces det kan tage flere år at få lov til at gå i gang med, og som det kan tage 1-2 år at gennemføre. Vi er simpelthen bange for, at disse kvalificeringer vil blive sat i bero af de nye kunder, hvis der opstår usikkerhed om Topsils fremadrettede tilhørsforhold.

Vi laver hurtigt en short list over mulige, interesserede, industrielle købere, som tæller virk­ somheder både i Europa, Asien og USA. Der er også et antal kapitalfondes navne på listen.

Derudover sætter vi via SEB og andre kanaler en proces i gang for at identificere andre mulige købere i Asien, selskaber som vi ikke kender på forhånd, da der især i Kina er sket meget inden for de senere år, og vi skal være helt sikre på, at vi arbejder med en komplet liste.

Hen over jul/nytår bliver datarummet etableret. Den jul var der desværre nogle nøglepersoner i Topsil, som ikke så meget til familierne.

I en virksomhed i krise er ledelsen i forvejen meget hårdt spændt for og arbejder et godt stykke udover, hvad der normalt kan forventes. Vi var klar over, at i det øjeblik vi gik i gang med en salgsproces, ville arbejdsbelastningen yderligere forøges markant. Det, vi i bestyrelsen havde brug for, var en direktion, som 1) ville være villig til at lægge en helt ekstraordinær indsats i en periode, som potentielt kunne tage ½ år eller mere, og 2) som vi var sikre på, ikke undervejs ville blive fristet af andre jobtilbud og et trods alt lidt nemmere og sikrere arbejdsliv andet­ steds. Vi lavede derfor et tillæg til hver af de tre direktørers kontrakter, som dels gav dem

32

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

et økonomisk incitament og dels gjorde deres ansættelsesmæssige situation helt klar for det tilfældes skyld, at vi ville lykkes med at sælge Topsil.

”Kaniner” spiser lasagne En salgsproces er meget intens, og man skal som formand indstille sig på, at arbejdsmæng­ den stiger betydeligt. Fra december 2015 til udgangen af juni 2016, hvor vi var næsten i mål, brugte jeg i gennemsnit to hele dage om ugen på Topsil – samtidig med at jeg havde mit eget direktørjob at passe! Utallige er de telefonsamtaler og møder, jeg deltog i undervejs, og langt over 1.000 mails har jeg læst eller skrevet. Og jeg ved, at især den administrerende direktør og økonomidirektøren har været endnu mere flittige ved skærmen end jeg.

Det er umuligt at gennemføre sådan en proces, hvis deltagergruppen er for stor – simpelthen af praktiske årsager. Men vi havde hele tiden en meget tæt dialog i hele bestyrelsen (typisk som telefonmøder på ofte ”skæve” tidspunkter”), hvor vi diskuterede fremdrift, forhandlingsstrategi, risici og meget andet.

Forløbet kulminerer kort inden en ekstraordinær generalforsamling i juni 2016, som er ind­ kaldt for at lade aktionærerne tage stilling til en aftale om at sælge hele siliciumforretningen til GlobalWafers fra Taiwan. I ugerne op til generalforsamlingen er en anden mulig køber, som også havde været involveret helt fra starten, men som undervejs havde trukket sig fra forhand­ lingerne, kommet tilbage med et ønske om at byde på Topsil.

I bestyrelsen er vi ikke i tvivl om, at begge købere kan blive gode partnere for Topsil, og at de begge har både ambitionerne og de finansielle muligheder for at sikre virksomhedens fortsatte udvikling i en anden og større sammenhæng.

Det er nogle meget intensive dage. Crescendoet indtræffer for mit vedkommende et par dage inden den afgørende generalforsamling, der afholdes en fredag. Onsdag aften var vi færdige med arbejdet hen ad kl. 22.00, og da skulle jeg først hjem og i gang med at lave lasagne! Jeg var hjælpeinstruktør for en gruppe nye kajakroere, som vi skulle have på vandet den følgende aften efterfulgt af fællesspisning med mig som kok. Men den torsdag aften når jeg kun lige ind i indkørslen derhjemme, da LETT ringer: De har modtaget information om, at den tilbage­ vendte byder vil ”go public” – telefonmøde om 15 minutter! Jeg når ned i kajakklubben med tele­fonen i den ene hånd og den kolde lasagne fra køleskabet i den anden kun for at lade de andre instruktører tage ”kaninerne” på vandet uden mig. Da de kommer tilbage 1½ time senere, taler jeg stadig i telefon. Og da den sidste roer har spist færdig og er gået hjem yderligere 1½ time senere, er jeg lige blevet færdig med telefonmødet og kan gå sulten hjem igen med det tomme lasagnefad og en telefon, der næsten er tom for strøm…

Det allersidste af flere bud fra den tilbagevendte køber tikker ind på en mail i stort set samme sekund, som generalforsamlingen skal gå i gang fredag. Dirigenten må suspendere

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

33

generalforsamlingen med en time, så vi har tid til at vurdere buddet. Samme morgen har GlobalWafers hævet sit bud til det, som bliver den endelige pris, nemlig MDKK 355 stort set uden betingelser ud over sædvanlige indeståelser. Det konkurrerende og meget sent ankomne bud er af tilsvarende størrelse, men behæftet med en række betingelser, der gør, at vi i besty­ relsen vurderer, at det simpelthen er for usikkert. I hele forløbet har vi arbejdet ud fra to regler: Vi opgiver ikke et bindende tilbud for fugle på taget, og vi realitetsforhandler ikke med nogen, som ikke kan ”show us the money”.

Efter en times forsinkelse kan jeg derfor gå tilbage på talerstolen med bestyrelsens anbefaling til aktionærerne om at sige ja til aftalen med GlobalWafers, idet vi vurderer, at det både vil sikre den højst mulige pris og desuden er en ”sikker deal”. Vi ønsker ikke at tage risikoen for pludselig at stå helt uden aftale eller med en aftale, hvis værdi i et efterfølgende forløb er blevet udvandet. Det skal i den forbindelse bemærkes, at den endelige salgspris bliver markant højere end de prisindikationer, vi modtog tilbage i marts-april fra de 3-4 potentielle købere, som på det tidspunkt var inde i processen.

Min sværeste formandsopgave under salgsforløbet har været at skabe enighed i bestyrelsen om, hvornår vi var tilfredse med den opnåede pris. Vi har haft både ”bulls” og ”bears” i besty­ relsen, og vi har heller ikke altid været enige med rådgiverne om, hvor hårdt vi skulle gå til den i forhandlingerne. Vi kom i mål og til en pris, som jeg er meget tilfreds med – og den blev en del højere, end mange af deltagerne i processen troede muligt, da vi gik i gang et halvt års tid tidligere. Som i de fleste andre forhandlinger blev der taget, og der blev givet undervejs, og alle deltagerne gennemlevede perioder med store frustrationer.

Tilbage er ”resten” af virksomheden, nemlig ejendomsselskabet CeMat’70 i Warszawa i Polen, som vi nu kan fokusere 100 % på at få solgt til den bedst mulige pris.

34

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

35

6 Sune Bro Duun, tidligere ansat og medarbejdervalgt bestyrelsesmedlem i Topsil og i dag ansat i Topsil GlobalWafers Sune Bro Duun er 39 år og har været medarbejderrepræsen­ tant i lidt over et år. Han har en baggrund som civilingeniør og har derudover en ph.d. i halv­ lederfysik.

Sune har de sidste 6 år arbejdet som projektleder i udviklings­ afdelingen, hvor han har været ansvarlig for udviklingen af flere af Topsils nye produkter

36

En medarbejderrepræsentants refleksioner Hvad vil du helst: Være selvstændig og fattig eller være et datterselskab og velkonsolideret?

Da jeg kom ind i bestyrelsen i april 2015, troede jeg ikke, at det var dilemmaet, som jeg snart skulle stå i. Jeg startede med et ønske om at være med til at rette virksomheden op, skabe nye muligheder og sikre en god arbejdsplads fremover. Ideerne var mange, og jeg glædede mig til at skulle prøve at påvirke beslutningerne i den rigtige retning. Jeg regnede dog med som nyt og uprøvet bestyrelsesmedlem lige at skulle bruge et halvt års tid på at finde mine ben i bestyrelsen. Inden jeg rigtig havde nået at finde min ben, var en svær situation blevet værre, og det var klart, at der skulle store tiltag til for at ændre situationen.

I denne situation føler man et enormt ansvar – ikke kun over for aktionærerne, men især over for alle ens kollegaer, der i værste fald kan miste deres job. Vi arbejdede i bestyrelsen med flere planer for, hvordan man kunne sikre fremtiden som selvstændig virksomhed, men i november 2015 måtte vi erkende, at planerne var for skrøbelige, eftersom situationen kun var blevet værre. Dilemmaet om at være selvstændig og fattig eller være et datterselskab og velkonso­ lideret var pludselig ikke så svært. Det gjaldt om at sikre vores job og aktionærernes penge i stedet for at vente og håbe på bedre tider med risiko for, at det kunne gå helt galt.

Det var heller ikke så sjov en arbejdsplads, som det havde været nogle år tidligere, hvor frem­ tiden var lys, og alt kunne lade sig gøre. Nu var fester og personalegoder skåret væk, og det havde i lang tid kun handlet om at spare sig til at overleve. Der havde været flere fyringsrunder, og det var trist at se sine kollegaer sige farvel.

Det var selvfølgeligt sørgeligt ikke at skulle værre herre i eget hus længere, men når det var erkendt, så kom mulighederne også. Hvem kunne de nye ejere blive? Hvilke muligheder kunne det give os?

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Feltet af mulige købere viste sig at være spændende, og det kunne sagtens blive godt. Der var selvfølgelig nogle, man som medarbejder hellere ville købes af end andre, men det var også ganske klart, at opgaven som bestyrelsesmedlem var at få den højeste pris. Der var kun tilbage at krydse fingre for gode bud fra de mest ønskværdige købere.

De to potentielle købere, der var tilbage i slutspurten, var begge interessante for os med­ arbejdere. Den ene, GlobalWafers, var en underleverandør, som vi kendte godt, og det var klart, at vi ville passe godt ind i deres organisation, da de manglede vores produkt for at fuldende deres sortiment. Den anden, NSIG, havde allerede købt en finsk underleverandør og kunde (Okmetic) og havde måske flere indkøb i vores branche i tankerne. Begge købere kunne byde på en interessant fremtid for Topsil.

Slutspurten blev en rodet og beskidt affære, men som medarbejder stod vi med to fornuftige, mulige, nye ejere. Det er dog klart, at da de endelige tilbud kom og var sammenlignelige i pris, vejede det meget tungt, at GlobalWafers’ tilbud ville være bindende med et ja på generalfor­ samlingen og dermed kunne sikre en fremtid for os medarbejdere.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

37

7

Direktionens arbejde i salgsprocessen Tænk at en hovedpude kan føles så rar – og så kl. 15 en fredag eftermiddag midt i juni måned – tæt på årets lyseste dag. Efter et utroligt hektisk døgn, hvor aktionærerne godkendte salget af Topsils siliciumforretning til GlobalWafers, er det svært at falde helt til ro. Jeg har arbejdet intenst i 36 timer i streg, og hovedet, kroppen og øjnene er trætte, men hjernen roterer og reflekterer over det sidste døgn, det sidste, intense halve år og tiden, siden jeg i 2012 startede som CEO for Topsil.

Forarbejdet I 2015 havde direktionen i flere år arbejdet på strategiske samarbejder med industrielle partnere. Dels for at kompensere for Topsils manglende mulighed for investering i moderne wafering­linjer (udskæring og polering af siliciumkrystalskiver), dels for at sikre, at der kunne skabes en interesseret køberskare, såfremt bestyrelsen på et tidspunkt skulle beslutte at lade Topsil deltage aktivt i den tiltagende konsolidering i markedet. Disse samarbejder og relationer var et stærkt aktiv, da salgsprocessen blev sat i gang på et bestyrelsesmøde i november 2015.

Kalle Hvidt Nielsen, tidligere CEO i Topsil Jesper Bodeholt, tidligere CFO i Topsil Kalle Hvidt Nielsen er 52 år og har 30 års erfaring fra ledelse i højteknologiske virksomheder, heraf 16 år som administrerende direktør i Brüel & Kjær, Bang & Olufsen og Topsil. Kalle har en universitetsgrad i computer­ teknologi fra DTU samt en HD i afsætning fra CBS. Jesper Bodeholt er 46 år og har 25 års erfaring inden for øko­ nomiområdet. Jesper begyndte sin karriere inden for revision, hvor han var i 9 år, efterfulgt af ledende økonomstillinger i blandt andet Coca-Cola, Carlsberg, Coop og Intermail inden han startede som CFO hos Topsil i marts 2013.

Jesper har en HD i regnskab samt en Cand. Merc. Aud.

38

Inden da havde direktionen gennemført en større strategisk analyse, som viste, at det kunne være særdeles svært for en mikrospiller som Topsil fortsat at stå på egne ben og klare sig i den tiltagende konkurrence. Direktionen havde anbefalet bestyrelsen enten at igangsætte et salg af Topsil eller at iværksætte en betydelig omstrukturering, som i realiteten betød en lukning af størstedelen af Topsils polske aktiviteter og reduktion i medarbejderstaben på mere end 50 %.

Strategien pegede også på, at det på trods af de massive restruktureringer kunne blive svært at finde finansiering til den fortsatte drift. Bestyrelsen tilkendegav dog samtidig, at direktionen parallelt med forberedelserne af et potentielt salg ligeledes skulle undersøge mulighederne for at finde yderligere kapital til at sikre den nødvendige finansiering.

Arbejdshandskerne på I et tæt samarbejde med SEB, som bestyrelsen havde valgt som finansiel rådgiver, blev der udarbejdet præsentationer, liste over potentielle købere, transaktionsstrukturer, datarum mv.

Specielt Topsils finansfunktion kom på overarbejde i denne periode. Perioderesultater, budgetter og 5-års planer skulle udarbejdes og nedbrydes på en måde, som passede til transaktions­ strukturen og samtidig vise de gode værdier, som Topsil indeholdt, for de potentielle købere. Alt sammen skulle gennemgås med ekstern revisor, og der skulle indhentes forhåndsgodkendelser fra SKAT. Ethvert problem i denne periode kunne være dræbende for processen.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Samtidig gennemførte vi afgørende forhandlinger om de råvarekontrakter, som blev indgået i 2010. Det var op ad bakke, da der ved kontrakternes indgåelse i 2010 blev stillet meget store bankgarantier for Topsils overholdelse af kontrakterne. Men kun et positivt udkomme var en mulighed, ellers kunne hele korthuset risikere at vælte. Sidst, men ikke mindst, var det afgø­ rende at sikre bankens support. Banken havde gennem en længere periode gjort det klart, at den ønskede at nedbringe sit engagement. Men råvareforpligtigelserne krævede yderligere finansiering, som kun kunne komme fra banken. I et tæt og intensivt samarbejde mellem direktionen og bestyrel­sesformanden lykkedes det at løse denne gordiske knude og få alle med på en aftale.

Mens alt dette pågik, skulle køberfeltet identificeres. Sammen med SEB blev markedet under­ søgt, og en række virksomheder blev identificeret som mulige købere. Feltet bestod både af finansielle investorer i form af kapitalfonde og en række primært industrielle købere, herunder asiatiske, som direktionen kendte rigtig godt – ikke de store overraskelser. Det blev efterføl­ gende aftalt med SEB, at der skulle laves en ekstra analyse i Kina, hvilket førte til, at en helt ny spiller dukkede op. NSIG – en ny kinesisk fond, som få måneder forinden var sat i verden til at sikre kinesiske interesser i netop semiconductorindustrien – en perfekt køber til Topsil. Midt i processen annoncerede NSIG, at de havde afgivet tilbud på finske Okmetic, som laver en anden type silicium end Topsil. Dette tiltag vurderedes positivt, da Topsil og Okmetic ville være et fint match med mange mulige synergier. Køberfeltet snævrede sig hurtigt ind til NSIG/Okmetic og GlobalWafers samt to andre kinesiske virksomheder. Alle havde tidligt fået direktionens intro­ duktion til Topsil og havde valgt at underskrive den fortrolighedsaftale, som gav adgang til en grundig gennemgang af Topsils forretning.

Herefter var det op til de potentielle købere at komme med en prisindikation, som gjorde det muligt at vælge den eller de potentielle købere, som skulle have mulighed for at lave due diligence med henblik på at give forpligtende bud. I Kina fungerer denne budafgivning anderledes end i Vesten.

Det krævede en tæt dialog og masser af opfølgning for at sikre, at buddene kom frem til den aftalte tid. Her kom direktionens forudgående relationsopbygning til de potentielle købere til stor gavn. Buddene kom ind, og de var – for at sige det pænt – ikke imponerende. Det var tydeligt, at der krævedes meget mere salgsarbejde, som direktionen og SEB iværksatte i tæt samarbejde – endnu flere møder og diskussioner om muligheder, synergier, markeder, analyser, råvarekontrak­ ter mv. Gennembruddet kom, da GlobalWafers i begyndelsen af maj hævede deres bud markant.

Forventningerne var, at også NSIG ville hæve deres bud. De var imidlertid ikke interesserede i dette. Gentagne kontakter til NSIG førte ikke til yderligere dialog. Gennem daglige telefonforhand­ linger lykkedes det at få GlobalWafers til at hæve deres bud yderligere, og SEB, direktionen og bestyrelsen vurderede, at vi gennem processen havde nået det bedst mulige resultat.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

39

Aftalen med GlobalWafers var vanskelig, da de pågående forhandlinger om råvarekontrakter endnu ikke havde kunnet færdiggøres. Samtidig var kronjuvelen i Topsil truet af et patent, som Topsils største konkurrent havde fået tildelt i Danmark. På trods af at Topsil havde gjort ind­ sigelser og vurderedes at have en god sag, var der altid en teoretisk risiko for, at sagen blev tabt, hvilket kunne trække tæppet væk under Topsils forretning. Enden på de lange forhandlinger blev en aftale, som kun var betinget af Topsils aktionærers godkendelse og med et muligt nedslag i pris, såfremt visse forhold opstod, herunder at Topsil ikke fik medhold i patentsagen.

Slutspurten Efter annoncering af aftalen kom NSIG helt uventet tilbage og viste nu stor interesse. Bestyrelsen havde bundet sig til en aftale med GlobalWafers, men betinget af aktionærernes godkendelse, hvorfor bestyrelsen selvfølgelig havde en tungtvejende forpligtigelse over for aktionærerne at sikre den bedst mulige pris. Det besluttedes derfor at give NSIG mulighed for helt ekstra­ordinært at komme tilbage i processen (på trods af at de tidligere gentagne gange havde afslået), for at de skulle fremsætte et bindende tilbud inden den indkaldte generalforsamling. Det ville således være op til aktionærerne at beslutte, om de ville sælge og i givet fald, om de ville sælge til NSIG eller GlobalWafers.

Selv om NSIG efter direktionens opfattelse i sidste ende brød aftalen om at give bindende bud på aftalte betingelser, bar anstrengelserne frugt. Hele processen endte med et fyrværkeri af en budproces, som udviklede sig fra den 16. juni 2016, natten igennem og først sluttede en time inde i generalforsamlingen den 17. juni 2016. I processen lykkedes det at få hævet prisen yder­ ligere og fjernet GlobalWafers' mulighed for prisreduktion. Det hele kulminerede med en kontro­ versiel afstemning, hvor aktionærerne besluttede at godkende salgsaftalen med GlobalWafers.

Alt i alt en meget intens og spændende tid som resulterede i, at Topsil blev en del af en større familie og dermed fik større muskler til at drive udvikling og vækst samt sikre en god og inte­ ressant dansk arbejdsplads for Topsils mange kompetente medarbejdere – og vi i direktionen fik for første gang i mange måneder en god nats søvn.

40

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

41

8

På udkig efter den rigtige partner i en global industri og i en globaliseret verden Sådan ville Hollywood dreje filmen om Project Disc ‟Selskabets aktionærer gør oprør, leverandørerne misbruger deres forhandlingsposition, i en patentretssag bestrider en konkurrent selskabets ret til at producere et vigtigt produkt, der er alvorlige problemer med kvaliteten hos underleverandørerne, de største kunder kræver millioner i erstatning, gælden skal nedbringes, og en væsentlig del af selskabets aktiver, der ligger i Østeuropa, er vanskelige at sælge pga. tvister om ejendomsretten, der stammer helt tilbage fra kommunisttiden (for slet ikke at tale om risikoen for miljøansvar efter årtiers produktion med anvendelse af meget giftige – og endog radioaktive – stoffer). Hvordan sælger man sådan et selskab? Og hvad vigtigere er, hvordan sælger man sådan et selskab til en pris, som ikke blot dækker selskabets betragtelige gæld, men også er attraktiv for aktionærerne?”

Positionering af selskabet for at maksimere salgsprisen At nå det ultimative mål om at maksimere værdien for aktionærerne i en salgsproces er ikke nogen skovtur, og der er ikke nogen opskrift, som garanterer succes. I Project Disc var det afgørende på optimal vis at fremhæve fordelene ved at investere i Topsil, at forstå den kom­ plekse globale skiveindustri og den hastige forandringsproces, som industrien dengang var inde i, samt – vigtigst af alt – at finde frem til de rette købere og skabe den optimale dynamiske proces i forbindelse med virksomhedsoverdragelsen.

Jon Kaznelson, Analyst, SEB Corporate Finance Christian Stampe Sørensen, Vice President, SEB Corporate Finance Jacob Lønfeldt, Director, SEB Corporate Finance SEB Corporate Finance yder råd­ givning om køb, salg og fusioner af selskaber samt aktieemissio­ ner og børsnoteringer gennem SEB’s Equity Capital Markets.

Vores klienter består hovedsaligt af store nordiske virksomheder, internationale selskaber med M&A aktiviteter i Nordeuropa og private kapitalfonde.

42

Fordelene ved at investere i selskabet vises ved, at de vigtigste salgsargumenter fremhæves, præsenteres og dokumenteres igen og igen af investeringsbankerne med henblik på at til­ trække potentielle købere og overbevise dem om den lyse fremtid, selskabet går i møde, og de enorme indtjeningsmuligheder, der venter lige rundt om hjørnet. På trods af mange vanskelige år i siliciumskiveindustrien kunne Topsil byde på en række fordele: de globale makrotendenser pegede i den rigtige retning, Topsil havde en verdensledende position med en velinvesteret for­ retningsplatform, og der var betydeligt potentiale for at styrke den fremtidige indtjening, særligt hvis selskabet kunne komme til at danne parløb med en af de større spillere i skiveindustrien.

Ved at analysere og forstå værdikæden fås et værdifuldt indblik i f.eks. konsolideringstenden­ serne i industrien, mulighederne for øget indtjeningsmargin, forhandlingspositionen, handlen mellem konkurrenterne, synergieffekterne og købermotivationen. Værdikæden for Topsil er illustreret på næste side.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Polysilicium

Færdige skiver

Powerkomponent

Powermodul

Slutbrugerapplikation

Der var (desværre) overkapacitet og hård konkurrence inden for “færdige skiver”, som er Topsils del af værdikæden, og mange selskaber var i økonomiske vanskeligheder. Industriens globale kæmper som Siemens, ABB og mange andre selskaber, der var adskillige gange større end Topsil, dominerede værdikæden og fik Topsil til at se ud som en lille fisk i det store vand med høje bølger og sultne hajer.

I Project Disc var det vigtigt at forstå tendenserne i den globale industri. Da Project Disc kørte, var Kina i færd med at opstille et geopolitisk mål om at få kontrol over den globale industri inden for halvledermaterialer samt dens økosystem, som Topsil var en del af. Samtidig ønskede Kinas rival, Taiwan, også at stramme grebet om halvlederindustrien. Det er værd at bemærke, at visse halvledere udgør centrale delkomponenter i avancerede våbensystemer. En af de åbenlyse konsekvenser heraf var, at der var øremærket politisk kapital på jagt efter aktiver som Topsil, hvilket under de rette omstændigheder kunne bane vejen for en budkrig om det kriseramte selskab.

I Project Disc var køberanalysen afgørende for i sidste ende at kunne gennemføre et vellykket salg. Der blev foretaget en omfattende analyse af køberuniverset for at finde frem til de mest oplagte køberemner. I denne proces indgår adskillige para­ metre i overvejelserne: økonomisk formåen, strategisk moti­ vation, synergimuligheder, M&A track record, IP-rettigheder og match i forhold til driften. Screeningsprocessen er som en tragt, hvilket illustreres af figuren til højre, hvor man starter med et bredt felt af køberemner, der snævres ind til en kerne­ gruppe af de mest oplagte, som bør have særbehandling i salgsprocessen.

Identificerede køberemner

Udvalgte køberemner

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

43

Udnyttelse af den ekstra værdi Den indledende analyse tydede på et meget stærkt køberfelt og muligheden for at igangsætte en struktureret salgsproces, hvor køberne kunne kæmpe mod hinanden i en budproces. Der var to elementer, som ansås for at være centrale i udnyttelsen af den ekstra værdi i Topsil og dermed maksimeringen af værdien for aktionærerne: 1. Synergimulighederne blev anset for at være væsentlige for de fleste af de centrale købere.

Med henblik på at få en forståelse af synergieffekterne og det potentielle indtjeningsbidrag under nye ejerforhold blev der foretaget en grundig analyse. Analysen viste, at køberne ville kunne opnå væsentlige synergieffekter, som var adskillige gange større end Topsils indtje­ ning som selvstændig virksomhed, ved at trække i flere forskellige håndtag: 1) optime­ring af produktionseffektiviteten enten ved at øge mængden og/eller ved at konsolidere produktio­ nen, 2) reduktion af de faste omkostninger i dele af fremstillingsprocessen, 3) mulighed for internt at håndtere visse produktionsprocesser, som på daværende tidspunkt var outsourcet, og 4) opnåelse af en styrket forhandlingsposition og krydssalg.

„

2. Den strategiske motivation var indlysende: I hele industrien var man allerede i gang med at konsolidere sig, og flere interessenter kunne se vigtigheden af Topsils produkter som følge af deres anvendelse i mange projekter inden for kritisk infrastruktur og grøn energi.

I hele industrien var man allerede i gang med at konsolidere sig, og flere interessenter kunne se vigtigheden af Topsils produkter

Nu hvor de stærkeste køberemner var fundet, og argumenterne for at udnytte Topsils fulde potentiale var på plads, var det tid at finde den helt rigtige fremtidige partner.

Indretning af processen efter industriens globale spillere i den globaliserede verden På grundlag af de køberemner, der var fundet, og den indgående baggrundsanalyse blev pro­ cessen indrettet således, at der kunne gennemføres en budproces. Det næste vigtige skridt var at kontakte de centrale beslutningstagere hos hvert af køberemnerne.

I lyset af transaktionens globale tilsnit med flere køberemner fra hele verden blev en række SEB-kontorer involveret i henvendelserne til køberemnerne. SEBs tilstedeværelse i Kina og Hong Kong gav en helt særlig indgangsvej til mange af de centrale køberemner. Takket være SEBs erfaring med asiatiske selskaber blev der endvidere taget højde for de kulturelle aspekter, f.eks. ved hurtigt at afholde personlige møder i både Danmark og Asien.

Den indledende fase i due diligence-processen og de første budrunder forløb som forventet, og alt var på rette spor. Men M&A-processer er pr. definition komplekse og går sjældent helt efter planen; denne proces var ingen undtagelse. Efter de første budrunder og evalueringen af,

44

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

hvem der kunne være den helt rigtige partner, afgav et af de centrale køberemner et offentligt købstilbud på et af de andre centrale køberemner, hvilket i høj grad komplicerede processen – men ikke desto mindre var det jo et bevis for teorien om den igangværende konsolidering i industrien. Nu var tiden så kommet til, at alle rådgiverne skulle styre Topsil igennem det komplicerede transaktionsfarvand, som den nye situation havde skabt. Efter utallige møder og telefonsamtaler på alle tider af døgnet, justeringer af tidsplanen, ledelsespræsentationer og due diligence-seancer kunne budkrigen omsider tage sin begyndelse på den dramatiske eks­ traordinære generalforsamling den 17. juni 2016.

„

Nu var tiden så kommet til, at alle rådgiverne skulle styre Topsil igennem det komplicerede transaktionsfarvand, som den nye situation havde skabt.

Takket være indkredsningen af de centrale problemstillinger på et tidligt tidspunkt, den rigtige positionering af Topsil og en omfattende køberanalyse blev der langt om længe fundet den rigtige partner til at videreføre Topsils arv i den globale siliciumskiveindustri.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

45

9

Pressen – Et våben eller et selvmål?

At man taler om "budkrig" i forbindelse med mange M&A-aktiviteter er ikke noget tilfælde. Ofte er disse processer nemlig præget af decideret krigeriske handlinger og en adfærd, hvor pressen bliver forsøgt brugt til at svine "modparten" til. Men hvor klogt er dét nu lige? Især, hvis man bare er "en dårlig taber"… Og hvad er det egentlig for overvejelser, man bør gøre sig, inden man "går til pressen"?

Indimellem må man undre sig. Undre sig over, hvad ellers respektable og erfarne mennesker dog kan finde på, blot fordi verden går dem lidt imod. Det være sig investorer, porteføljemana­ gers, aktieanalytikere, advokater, revisorer, kommunikationsfolk og mange andre.

Esben Høstager, Rådgiver for bestyrelser og direktioner gennem 25 år, HØSTAGER │ SOLO Esben Høstager er en højt spe­ cialiseret rådgiver, der gennem 25 år har hørt til topchefernes foretrukne sparringspartnere.

Han har rådgivet direktioner og bestyrelser i et utal af virksom­ heder og organisationer, ligesom han har haft sin gang i ministerier, styrelser og kommuner. Forud for sit virke som rådgiver var han i 11 år kommunikationsdirektør i to af de dengang største virk­ somheder i den finansielle sektor.

I dag driver han virksomheden HØSTAGER │ SOLO, hvor han udelukkende beskæftiger sig med strategisk kommunikations­ rådgivning, issues management og krisehåndtering. Læs mere på www.hostager.dk

For hævntørsten er åbenbart stor, når vi mennesker ikke får det præcis, som vi har sat snuden op efter. Eller måske når vi som rådgivere har stillet vores opdragsgiver et resultat i udsigt, der nu pludselig fortoner sig i horisonten… Døden skal som bekendt have en årsag – så hvad gør man?

Man går da til pressen…!

En frygtelig masse bøvl Når vi taler køb og salg af virksomheder, bevæger vi os på et område, hvor strategisk brug af kommunikation ofte er fraværende – i hvert fald i opstarts- og planlægningsfasen. Dermed mener jeg, at M&A-disciplinens såkaldte nøglerådgivere – typisk investment bankers, advokater og revisorer – altid sidder med omkring bordet fra dag 1, hvorimod andre først inviteres, når alt er klappet og klart til den store offentliggørelse…

Nu er en M&A-proces imidlertid sjældent noget, hvor alt kører i olie fra start til slut. Derfor ender netop strategisk kommunikation da også tit med at blive en efterspurgt disciplin; her­ under især erfaring med kommunikationsmæssig håndtering af såvel afvigelser som diverse "bagholdsangreb".

Men – hvor strategisk kommunikation burde have været brugt til (intelligent) at identificere og komme (mange af) problemerne i forkøbet, ender det ofte som ren damage control. Det er ikke kun tidskrævende; det er også frustrerende og tilmed dyrt. Resultat: En frygtelig masse bøvl, hvoraf meget kunne være undgået. Og vi taler vel at mærke om bøvl af den slags, der efterlader de nævnte fagpersoner med blivende skrammer i renommeet og dybe ridser i rådgivningslakken.

46

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Da strategisk kommunikation tilmed er det enkeltområde, som gennem de seneste 5-10 år er steget allermest i betydning for bestyrelser – læs: den ultimative opdragsgiver i M&Asammenhæng – ja, så har vi fat i en disciplin, hvor en erfaren kommunikationsrådgiver skal have en plads omkring bordet fra den spæde start.

Fri mig for overraskelser Og så er vi tilbage ved udgangspunktet – nemlig, hvorvidt involvering af medierne skal ses som et våben til at vinde (bud)krigen, eller om kontakten til pressen i stedet vil føre til et rent selvmål.

Stort set alle de bestyrelsesformænd, jeg rådgiver, har i dag den udtrykte holdning, at de hader at blive taget på sengen: "Fri mig for overraskelser. Jeg insisterer på at få problemerne op på bestyrelsesbordet, mens vi kan gøre noget ved dem. En CEO, der putter med tingene, er en CEO, der selv beder om bøvl".

Samme tankegang bør selvfølgelig gennemsyre ethvert M&A-forløb. Issues management er et af midlerne – altid med en erfaren kommunikationsrådgiver som tovholder.

Pressen som våben "Jeg kender lidt til en på Børsen – ham ringer jeg sgu’ til…" – er ofte en af de første reaktioner (frustrationer), jeg møder. Og nu skal det gå stærkt. Man er overbevist om, at man har "en rigtig god historie", så hvorfor dog bruge tid på at syreteste den?

Dumt, nærmest barnligt! For hvor klog er den fremgangsmåde mon?

Ja, det kommer naturligvis helt an på, om man har noget reelt at brokke sig over, eller man bare er "en dårlig taber", som nægter at se nederlaget i øjnene.

For når der virkelig er noget (substantielt) at komme efter, kan en henvendelse til pressen sagtens vise sig at blive et endog meget centralt våben. En egentlig game changer. Dét er der mange eksempler på.

Men – det kræver altså, at materien er i orden. At man er i stand til at dokumentere – som minimum at sandsynliggøre – at man (f.eks.) er blevet forholdt vigtig information. For natur­ ligvis skal man forfølge en sag, som påviseligt har fået et forkert udfald.

Dét siger sig selv. Og her kan pressen være en meget effektiv medspiller.

Tænk bare på de mange eksempler, hvor den angrebne part (f.eks. en kursusudbyder, en bank, et forsikringsselskab, en bestyrelsesformand m.m.fl.) er vendt 180 grader og totalt har ændret både holdning og adfærd. Af én eneste grund: Fordi pressen pludselig er gået ind i sagen:

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

47

"Først da TV-avisen ringede, skete der noget. Så gik det til gengæld også stærkt. Fra den ene dag til den anden har bestyrelsesformand [Søren Sørensen] totalt ændret holdning, og i dag – altså over fire måneder efter, at aktionæren [Peter Petersen] første gang henvendte sig – siger han til TV-avisen, at, og jeg citerer; "selskabet helt klart har begået en utilgivelig fejl". Bestyrelsesformanden lover derfor allerede i morgen at indkalde til en ny ekstraordinær generalforsamling, for at processen kan gå om…"

Derfor: Føler man sig udsat for urent trav – og der dokumenterbart har været noget at udsætte på (f.eks.) en budproces – kan pressen bestemt være det våben, der får verden til at ændre sig. Som oftest tilmed meget hurtigt.

Pressen som selvmål Når vi derimod har med "den dårlige taber" at gøre – og dem er der rigtig mange af, hvis nogen skulle være i tvivl – ser udsigterne noget anderledes ud. Risikoen for et både pinligt og pin­agtigt selvmål er derfor overhængende; dét skal man bare vide, før man (uigennemtænkt) "går til pressen". For: • hvad er det egentlig, man har at brokke sig over?

• hvor er det præcis, at man er blevet udsat for urent trav?

• hvordan kommer dét til udtryk? Eksempler!

• hvem er det helt konkret, der har handlet kritisabelt? osv., osv.

Disse ting gør man klogt i at tage en indgående diskussion med sig selv om, inden man ringer til journalisten. Det er med andre ord klogt liiige at klappe hesten, når man "bare" er skuffet, frustreret eller vred, men derudover intet reelt har at have sin hævntørst i; når man påtænker at gå til pressen alene for at svine modparten til; når man ved lidt hurtig hovedregning må erkende, at ens bud nok ikke var så stærkt som de andres.

Med andre ord: En taktik funderet på frustrationer og følelser er samtidig en uigennemtænkt taktik, hvor netop et selvmål er inden for rækkevidde. Hav derfor følgende i erindring:

48

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

• For det første skriver journalister ikke bare det, man beder dem om. Desværre, vil nogen mene. Men sådan fungerer pressen i vore dage (heldigvis) ikke.

• Journalister stiller som regel en række ret fornuftige spørgsmål; tro mig. Først og fremmest for selv at forstå, hvad historien handler om; men i lige så høj grad for at teste, om de er i færd med at blive spændt for en eller anden vogn. Så vær forberedt på at blive udfordret, selv om du mener, at det er dig, der er "the good guy" – ham, der serverer "en rigtig god historie"…

• Ingen journalist vil basere sin historie på kun én kilde – og da slet ikke, når en anden part bliver kritiseret. Den angrebne part skal altid gives mulighed for at svare.

• Når man tager fat i pressen for at kritisere andre mennesker, går journalisten ud fra, at man er indstillet på selv at lægge navn til kritikken. Dét kommer imidlertid tit bag på "den dårlige taber". Og så bakker han… "Arrrhj – du må da kunne skrive det uden at nævne mig...!"

• Endelig er det de færreste "dårlige tabere", der har nogen nævneværdig erfaring med pressen. Kort sagt: De aner intet om spillereglerne og kender sjældent noget videre til den journalist, de påtænker at kontakte. Resultat: De må starte med at afmystificere deres hen­ vendelse – ja, kommer måske ligefrem til at stave deres eget navn… Ingen optimal start, når man er ude i et sådant ærinde.

Det går derfor (hurtigt) op for journalisten, at henvendelsen ikke er gjort af det stof, gode artikler er gjort af. Og herefter sker der typisk én af to ting: Enten stopper sagen her: "Tak for opringningen, men nej tak til din historie".

Eller (og dette har "den dårlige taber" sjældent taget med i sine overvejelser): Journalistens nysgerrighed er blevet vakt. "Pudsig henvendelse…! Den må jeg vist hellere forske lidt mere i…" Resultat: Historiens vinkel tager en 180 graders drejning, så det i stedet bliver en historie om, ja – den forsmåede, dårlige taber.

Man ligger, som man har redt. Selvmålet er en realitet.

Spørgsmål, du skal stille dig selv Derfor: Før du mere eller mindre uigennemtænkt søger hævn via pressen, er der flere over­ vejelser, du bør gøre dig. Og vær nu helt ærlig, når du besvarer spørgsmålene: • "Gør vi det her, fordi vi som de professionelle fagfolk, vi er (læs: advokater, revisorer, investment bankers, porteføljemanagers/investorer etc.), kan påvise, at der helt åbenlyst ER noget at komme efter?"

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

49

• "Eller gør vi det mest af alt for at kunne legitimere, at vi som rådgivere "har gjort alt i vores magt" – velvidende, at sandsynligheden for at få ændret – f.eks. – en generalforsamlingsbeslutning er ikke-eksisterende?"

• "Hvis disse overvejelser bevirker, at vi beslutter os for at kontakte en journalist, har vi så forberedt os grundigt på de bolde, vi med garanti får smidt lige tilbage i synet?

• "Har modparten "noget på os", som han – som en "tak for sidst’ – må forventes at dele med journalisten? Hvad svarer vi så? Og hvor er vi ellers sårbare?"

• "Er vi fortsat 100 procent tilgængelige for pressen 24/7? – eller har vi det okay med, at journalisten skriver, at vi trods gentagne henvendelser ikke vendte tilbage…? – med det signal, dét sender om os?"

• "Er vi som – f.eks. – advokater, revisorer, kommunikationsrådgivere villige til at løbe risikoen for at blive omtalt som de rene amatører?"

• "Eller står vi os bedst ved at "tage det som en mand" – dvs. at droppe sagen og erkende, at det denne gang ikke gik vores vej?"

Alting har en pris. Også pinlig pressekontakt Uanset hvad man beslutter sig for, så glem aldrig, at kontakt med pressen ikke er en omkost­ ningsfri disciplin. Og det er der jo ingen grund til at lære the hard way! For det vi taler om her, er sådan set det dyrebareste for enhver ledelse og enhver virksomhed – omdømme og anseelse.

Det gambler man ikke ustraffet med. Eller som Warren Buffett har udtrykt det: "If you lose money for the firm I will be understanding.

If you lose reputation I will be ruthless."

50

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

51

10

At skabe et konkurrencemiljø mellem køberne Ville du købe en bil før du havde prøvekørt den? Eller et hus, før du havde været ude at se på det? Eller hvad med at købe en state-of-the-art siliciumskive-virksomhed via Skype? Hvis det er omstændighederne, kan du blive overrasket over, hvad der sker.

Et konkurrenceklima skaber højere aftaleværdi Det allervigtigste i en salgsproces er, at sælgeren fastholder konkurrenceklimaet, så der opnås en vellykket transaktion, og prisen maksimeres. Når salgsprocessen er skudt i gang, er det vigtigt at strukturere processen, så der skabes en stærk følelse af konkurrence for på den måde at presse køberemnerne til at forpligte sig med alle forhåndenværende ressourcer og komme med deres bedste bud. Dette gælder, selvom der rent faktisk kun er én interesseret køber, idet de pågældende ikke må få at vide, at de er de eneste, og/eller at de konkurrerer mod andre, herunder at der måske slet ikke er nogen transaktion.

Efterhånden som man sammen med rådgiverne og ledelsen i targetselskabet nærmer sig afslut­ ningen på ugers – og måneders – arbejde med at udarbejde det markedsføringsmateriale, hvor alle selskabets fordele er fremhævet, finde frem til køberemnerne og skitsere den optimale salgsproces, stiger spændingen. Man kan ikke vide, hvordan den umiddelbare feedback fra køberemnerne er, før man har spurgt dem. Hvem – om nogen overhovedet – vil gå efter even­ tuelt at overtage selskabet, hvor interesserede er de, når det kommer til stykket, og hvilken pris vil de give for targetselskabet?

Jon Kaznelson, Analyst, SEB Corporate Finance Christian Stampe Sørensen, Vice President, SEB Corporate Finance Jacob Lønfeldt, Director, SEB Corporate Finance SEB Corporate Finance yder råd­ givning om køb, salg og fusioner af selskaber samt aktieemissio­ ner og børsnoteringer gennem SEB’s Equity Capital Markets.

Vores klienter består hovedsaligt af store nordiske virksomheder, internationale selskaber med M&A aktiviteter i Nordeuropa og private kapitalfonde.

52

For at få så brugbare svar som muligt på disse spørgsmål, medfølger sammen med markeds­ føringsmaterialet et procesbrev med en kort gennemgang af salgsprocessen samt en beskrivelse af retningslinjerne for foreløbige bud. Intentionen med dette procesbrev er at angive følgende: 1. Den første foreløbige tilbudskurs skal være klart defineret – dette lyder ganske vist selv­ forklarende, men investeringsbanker og køberemner har det med at væve eller med at gøre tingene komplicerede, fx ved at anvende relative vurderinger såsom P/E-kvoter eller ved at angive alt for store vurderingsspænd. Men det er nu sådan, at man som sælger ønsker et fast tal (som regel enterprise value, dvs. værdien af selskabet ekskl. likvide beholdninger og på gældfri basis) i en bestemt valuta;

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

2. Bedømmelse af hvor stor interessen er hos køberemnerne, herunder risikoen for at deres opkøbsplaner går i vasken, dvs. hvor sandsynligt det er, at et køberemne kan få omdannet et attraktivt foreløbigt bud til en endelig transaktionsværdi. Dette gøres ved at bede om angivelse af en række andre faktorer i de foreløbige bud, herunder forudsætningerne for til­ budskursen, finansieringskilderne, due diligence-kravene samt den strategiske motivation; 3. Udsendelse af vigtige meddelelser om processen, fx om den type køberemner der er blevet kontaktet samt en (vag) angivelse af det mulige antal konkurrerende budgivere, idet dette vil styrke konkurrenceelementet.

Krigen om Topsil I Project Disc var det ikke så ligetil at få skabt et hårdt konkurrenceklima. Topsil var kun en lille fisk i det store vand. Flere af de potentielle købere var i økonomiske vanskeligheder og de, som havde den økonomiske formåen, var også i gang med at overtage andre – måske endda vigtigere – dele af siliciumskiveværdikæden. Men oven på en kolossal indsats fra Topsil og deres rådgivere blev det muligt at identificere og friste et mindre antal køberemner og overbevise dem om Topsils mange fordele i en sådan grad, at der i Project Disc blev et af de hårdeste kon­ kurrenceklimaer nogensinde. Dette kunne lade sig gøre takket være ledelsens og rådgivernes globale netværk og dybdegående analyser af værdikæden i skiveindustrien kombineret med synergimulighederne og den strategiske motivation hos de enkelte køberemner.

„

oven på en kolossal indsats fra Topsil og deres rådgivere blev det muligt at identificere og friste et mindre antal køberemner og overbevise dem om Topsils mange fordele

Den første del af Project Disc-salgsprocessen blev gennemført som en struktureret, traditionel budproces, der var bygget op for at sikre og forstærke spændingen i konkurrencen mellem køberemnerne. I markedsføringsmaterialet stod alle de relevante oplysninger til køberemnerne, så man kunne anslå værdien af Topsils siliciumforretning som selvstændig virksomhed, og de oplysninger, der var nødvendige for at kunne danne sig et indtryk af synergimulighederne. Dog er det sådan, at køberemner i en traditionel, struktureret budproces ikke får nogen anvisninger om kursniveauet og skal indgive deres foreløbige bud uden at kende den kurs, som sælger forventer, og uden at vide, hvem de byder op imod.

En helt speciel katalysator i Project Discs konkurrenceklima kom på banen den 18. februar 2016, hvor SunEdison Semiconductors, en af Topsils konkurrenter (og et af de potentielle køberemner) meddelte, at deres bestyrelse var ”i færd med at undersøge strategiske alternativer i kølvandet på uopfordrede interessetilkendegivelser”. Det er sådan, et børsnoteret selskab informerer sine aktionærer om, at det sandsynligvis bliver solgt inden for den nærmeste fremtid. Med denne meddelelse blev det også klart for siliciumskiveindustrien, at en konsolidering nu havde taget fart. Den 1. april 2016, ikke lang tid efter meddelelsen fra SunEdison Semiconductors, blev

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

53

der indgivet et officielt købstilbud på den finske skiveproducent Okmetic, som var endnu et centralt køberemne!

På grundlag af denne nøje planlagte budproces og den hastige industrikonsolidering var alt kørt i stilling til, at det endelige slag om Topsil kunne tage sin begyndelse.

Det endelige slag Mens man i offentligheden endnu ikke vidste, hvem der gjorde kur til SunEdison Semiconductors (det skulle senere vise sig, at GlobalWafers, som opkøbte Topsils siliciumaktiviteter, også ville opkøbe SunEdison Semiconductors), kom det offentlige købstilbud på Okmetic fra en relativt ny aktør i siliciumskiveindustrien, den kinesiske industri- og investeringskoncern, National Silicon Industry Group (NSIG), der ligeledes var et af de centrale køberemner til Topsils siliciumakti­ viteter. På grundlag af de meget omfattende, tilgængelige ressourcer fra den implicitte støtte, der kom via den kinesiske stat, varslede NSIGs træk nye tider i den globale siliciumindustri.

De spillere, der allerede var inde på banen, havde grund til at være bekymrede for, hvad dette kunne komme til at betyde i forhold til, hvordan fremtiden ville tegne sig for deres virksomheder.

Både GlobalWafers og NSIG var på et tidligt tidspunkt udpeget som centrale køberemner til Topsils siliciumskiveaktiviteter, og i flere måneder havde der pågået drøftelser. Med de to igangværende opkøb af henholdsvis SunEdison Semiconductors og Okmetic i kulissen, satte GlobalWafers sit købstilbud på Topsils siliciumaktiviteter kraftigt i vejret under forudsætning af en lynhurtig process hen imod underskrift og offentliggørelse, langt hurtigere end hvad der ellers er muligt for en amerikansk eller europæisk køber, selv under usædvanlige omstændig­ heder. GlobalWafers’ forhøjede købstilbud var så attraktivt for Topsil, at transaktionen omsider kunne offentliggøres. Efter offentliggørelsen var transaktionen med GlobalWafers fortsat betin­ get af myndighedsgodkendelser samt godkendelse på Topsils ekstraordinære generalforsamling, hvilket åbnede en flanke for en aggressiv, konkurrerende budgiver.

„

54

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

GlobalWafers satte sit købstilbud på Topsils siliciumaktiviteter kraftigt i vejret under forudsætning af en lynhurtig process hen imod underskrift og offentliggørelse langt hurtigere end, hvad der ellers er muligt for en amerikansk eller europæisk køber, selv under usædvanlige omstændigheder.

Samtidig med den fremskyndede proces med GlobalWafers fortsatte drøftelserne med de andre købere, men de øvrige parter viste ikke nær så stor interesse som GlobalWafers – i hvert fald ikke frem til det tidspunkt, hvor transaktionen med GlobalWafers var blevet offentliggjort.

Denne offentliggørelse fik faktisk NSIG til at vise særlig stor interesse for at købe Topsils siliciumaktiviteter. Aftenen før, at den ekstraordinære generalforsamling i Topsil skulle godkende transaktionen med GlobalWafers, afgav NSIG et konkurrerende tilbud, som var en anelse højere i forhold til transaktionen med GlobalWafers.

De bedste og endelige tilbud På baggrund af den dramatiske udvikling oven på meddelelsen om transaktionen med GlobalWafers blev både GlobalWafers og NSIG – i de tidlige morgentimer forud for den ekstra­ ordinære generalforsamling i Topsil den 17. juni 2016 – opfordret til at afgive deres bedste og endelige købstilbud på Topsils siliciumaktiviteter. Således afgav GlobalWafers et højere købs­ tilbud, hvorimod NSIG besluttede sig for at afgive et ”fjendtligt” købstilbud på alle aktierne i Topsil. Dette tilbud kunne ikke direkte sammenlignes med transaktionen med GlobalWafers og udgjorde en væsentlig risiko for, at deres opkøbsplaner ville gå i vasken. Topsils aktionærer vedtog en beslutning om at gennemføre transaktionen med GlobalWafers på de nye og forbed­ rede vilkår.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

55

11

Standardiserede M&A-aftaler og -processer ”Det bliver formentlig en drop-down model af hele siliciumaktiviteten i et nyt datterselskab…” – således var den indledende instruks fra advokat N.E. Nielsen til teamet af advokater, der skulle effekture salget af Topsils siliciumforretning i samarbejde med SEB Corporate Finance og Deloitte.

Overdragelsesaftaler Overdragelsesaftaler ved virksomhedsoverdragelser (M&A) på det danske marked er i en vis grad blevet præget af udenlandske strømninger, herunder særligt angelsaksiske juristtraditioner.

Sådanne aktie- eller aktivoverdragelsesaftaler fra USA og UK er ofte meget ordrige og sigter på at regulere forhold mellem parterne i aftalen ned til mindste detalje. Dette medfører som regel, at aftalen bliver meget lang, men samtidig ofte tager højde for alle forhold mellem parterne.

Den lader mindre tilbage efterfølgende at fortolke.

Nicholas Lerche-Gredal, Advokat, LETT

Locked box-mekanisme og lækagebestemmelser Den endelige struktur af salget af siliciumforretningen indebar en omstrukturering af Topsils selskabs- og ejerskabsstruktur for at understøtte en proces, hvor Topsils siliciumaktivitet i sin helhed blev skudt ned i et dertil nystiftet datterselskab (NewCo) med henblik på efterfølgende at sælge aktierne i dette.

Der var, som ved alle andre lignende M&A-transaktioner, behov for at afklare, hvilken meka­ nisme, der skulle anvendes for at fastsætte købesummen for aktierne i NewCo. Topsil ansøgte og fik tilladelse fra SKAT til at foretage denne del af omstruktureringen som en skattefri til­førsel af aktivitet fra Topsil til NewCo, der skulle stiftes på closing (gennemførelsesdagen) med regn­ skabsmæssig virkning tilbage fra den 1. januar 2016. Det var i overdragelsesaftalen bestemt, at købesummen skulle opgøres med udgangspunkt i en locked box-mekanisme, hvor skærings­ datoen var den 1. januar 2016. Valget af locked box-mekanisme indebar, at den endelige equity value (dvs. den købesum, der faktisk skulle betales for aktierne i datterselskabet) blev fastsat pr. 1. januar 2016 uden nogen regulering for gæld og forskelle i arbejdskapital.

Aktie – eller aktivoverdragelsesaftaler Ved en aktieoverdragelsesaftale (”Share Purchase Agreement”) er salgsgenstanden kapitalandele, aktier eller anparter i målvirksomheden, mens salgsgenstanden ved en aktivoverdragelsesaftale (”Asset Purchase Agreement” eller ”Business Transfer Agreement”) er det underliggende aktiv/aktivitet – substansen.

56

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Købesumsmekanismen og formuleringen af denne fylder ofte en del ved M&A-transaktioner og bør meget specifikt og konkret tilpasses parternes forhandling om virksomhedens værdi og den forventede proces. Det har næsten altid værdi at holde reguleringen forholdsvis klar og simpel.

Omvendt har mange andre bestemmelser i overdragelsesaftaler – og strukturen heri – bl.a. grundet den stigende påvirkning fra udlandet, fået et mere standardiseret præg (”boiler-plate”), der ikke altid reelt lader meget tilbage at forhandle om. Det kunne f.eks. være bestemmelser om fortrolighed, lovvalg og værneting, erklæringer og indeståelser (garantier) m.v.

Der blev efter en langstrakt proces indgået en betinget aftale med en taiwansk køber, Globalwafers, om salg af NewCo (efterfølgende fik selskabet navnet Topsil GlobalWafers A/S). Handlen skulle gennemføres primo juli 2016 og var betinget af godkendelsen fra aktionærerne i Topsil.

I overdragelsesaftalen med GlobalWafers blev der på sædvanlig vis givet køber beskyttelse mod lækage af værdier (”leakage”) for perioden siden balancedagen og frem til closing (gennem­ førsel af transaktionen). Indtil closing var aktiviteten drevet af Topsil, hvilket potentielt kunne skabe et problem, hvor sælgers interesser ikke nødvendigvis var tilsvarende købers interesser, og køber ville derfor være eksponeret for en række risici, herunder afgang i likvider (”cash leakage”) og svind i aktivers værdi (”value leakage”) i perioden frem til closing. Dette blev reguleret via lækagebestemmelser i aktieoverdragelsesaftalen.

Bilaterale forhandlinger og auktionsprocesser Salget af Topsil var tilrettelagt som en struktureret auktionsproces, hvor både industrielle og finansielle købere havde mulighed for at byde på virksomheden. Dette havde betydning for udarbejdelsen af de respektive overdragelsesaftaler, idet ”serveretten” til at lave første udkast til overdragelsesaftalen ved auktionsprocesser normalt ligger hos sælger – i dette tilfælde hos bestyrelsen for Topsil, da Topsil var den sælgende enhed af det nystiftede datterselskab, hvori siliciumaktiviteten var nedskudt ved afslutningen af overdragelsen.

Auktionsprocesser har typisk et grundlæggende andet forløb end bilaterale forhandlinger om en virksomhedsoverdragelse. Køber vil i mindre omfang medvirke til fastlæggelsen af vilkårene i overdragelsesaftalen, idet sælger har mulighed for at levere første udkast til aftaleteksten og derved har mulighed for at ”sætte ankeret” for de efterfølgende forhandlinger. Dette er, som i mange andre forhandlingssituationer, en fordel, som ikke skal undervurderes.

For Topsils vedkommende var den første væsentlige overdragelsesaftale en "business transfer agreement" (aktivoverdragelsesaftale), hvor hele siliciumaktiviteten blev nedskudt i det nyetablerede datterselskab, Topsil GlobalWafers A/S, der blev stiftet samtidig med indskuddet.

Denne business transfer agreement var i sit udgangspunkt en intern aftale mellem Topsil og det helejede datterselskab, men krævede afbalancerede vilkår, da datterselskabet skulle overdrages umiddelbart efter stiftelsen. Aftalen skulle tillige samtænkes med den øvrige aftalestruktur, herunder i særdeleshed hvilke oplysninger og indeståelser sælger kunne give over for køber.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

57

Repræsentations and Warranties Parternes oplysninger og indeståelser er typisk samlet i et særskilt afsnit i overdragelsesaftalen (garantikatalog). Udtrykkene ”representation” (oplysning) vedrører erklæringer om faktiske forhold, mens ”warranty” (garanti eller indeståelse) tilsikrer, at de meddelte faktiske oplysninger er korrekte.

Omvendt bliver udarbejdelsen af overdragelsesaftalen ved eventuelle bilaterale forhandlinger i mange tilfælde anderledes og måske “mindre strømlinet”. Efterhånden som salgsprocessen skri­ der frem, afdækkes flere og flere potentielle problemområder som følge af købers due diligence undersøgelser m.v., som ønskes håndteret i aftalen, og der ses en tendens til, at problemerne og formuleringerne bliver mere og mere detaljeorienterede.

Garantiforsikring i virksomhedsoverdragelser Der er en stigende trend både i udlandet og i Danmark til ved større transaktioner at over­ veje, om sælgers garantier kan afdækkes med en forsikringsdækning, såkaldte ”Warranty and Indemnity Insurances”. Sådanne W&I-forsikringer har været tilgængelige i en årrække på det danske marked, men er først nu for alvor ved at vinde indpas herhjemme. Det var særligt en relativt høj præmie for policen, der medførte, at det ikke var et reelt alternativ, medmindre forsikringstypen blev anvendt til at få sagen afsluttet. Dette blev tillige overvejet ved salget af Topsil, men transaktionsstrukturen med nedskydning af siliciumaktiviteten i et datterselskab og efterfølgende salg medførte et andet behov, hvorfor det ikke blev aktuelt.

Selvom klarhed over transaktionsvilkårene bestemt er tilrådeligt og ønskværdigt, er det ofte værdifuldt for begge parter at overveje, hvor niveauet for risikoallokeringen skal lægges, her­ under om overdragelsesaftalen ved en virksomhedsoverdragelse skal følge en dansk rets­ tradition eller lade sig inspirere af en mere detaljeorienteret tilgang i stil med den angelsaksiske.

„

Det store forhandlingspunkt er i mange transaktioner, hvilke forhold der er købers risiko, og hvilke forhold sælger må tage et vist medansvar for og hvor tæt det skal beskrives i aftaletek­ sten. Samtidig må koncipisten af overdragelses­aftalen have et vist overblik over transaktionen og en tanke på, hvor parterne kan lande en fælles enighed om aftalevilkårene:

For den, der ikke ved, hvilken havn han styrer imod, er ingen vind gunstig.

(Seneca) Som i så mange andre forhold er det advokaternes opgave at tilsikre en forståelig struktur, en overskuelig kontrakt og entydige formuleringer.

58

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

59

12

At repræsentere en kinesisk køber i Danmark Vestlig eller kinesisk investor i danske virksomheder, det kan vel ikke gøre den store forskel for transaktionens rådgivere – eller hvad? Både vestlige og kinesiske investorer må være interesserede i at forstå virksomheden og dens muligheder og risici, købe billigst muligt og få tilstrækkelig afdækning i overdragelsesaftalen.

Når der ydes transaktionsrådgivning i form af M&A-rådgivning eller fx finansiel due diligence til en vestlig investor, er det nogenlunde klart, hvad der forventes. Kunden ønsker at forstå virk­ somheden, komme dybt i forståelsen af den historiske, finansielle udvikling, få den nødvendige indsigt i virksomhedens forhold og splitte budgetterne ad, så der kan opbygges en fornuftig business plan til brug for værdiansættelsen. Men har kinesiske investorer ikke de samme vinkler eller interesser?

Fokus De første kinesiske investorer i vestlige selskaber havde ingen erfaring i at håndtere udenlandske investeringer. Det var typisk statsejede selskaber med fokus på råstoffer eller infrastruktur. Derfor gik den første bølge også i høj grad uden om Danmark.

Jacob Erhardi, Partner, Transaction Advisory Services, EY Claus Nørrind Hansen, Exe­cutive Director, Transaction Advisory Services, EY Transaction Advisory Services er en del af EY og rådgiver om køb og salg af virksomheder. EY Transaction Advisory Services har betydelig erfaring med Kina-relaterede transaktioner i forbindelse med vestlige virk­ somheders opkøb i Kina samt kinesiske virksomheders opkøb i Vesten.

De seneste 3-5 år er der imidlertid langt flere privatejede selskaber, der kigger efter investerin­ ger uden for Kina, og disse selskaber har ofte fokus rettet mod andre sektorer, herunder tek­ nologi/R&D, life science, consumer brands – ofte produkter eller teknologier, som det købende selskab kan drage fordel af på hjemmemarkedet i Kina. Men også for disse investorer er der nogle væsensforskellige udfordringer for rådgiver.

Der er et par helt overordnede forhold, det ofte er relevant at være opmærksom på, inden det mere detaljerede arbejde med transaktionen begynder eller overhovedet giver mening: • Kinesiske investorer foretrækker ofte joint ventures eller strategiske samarbejder. Hvis dette af den ene eller den anden grund ikke er en mulighed, kan forberedelserne til transaktionen ofte afblæses allerede der.

• Der investeres ofte i selskaber, som det kinesiske selskab allerede har kendskab til eller forretningsmæssige relationer til – tillid har afgørende betydning for, om en transaktion gennemføres. Hvis der ikke allerede er skabt sådanne relationer og tillid, og de heller ikke kan skabes i løbet af processen, kan den potentielle transaktion ofte vise sig vanskelig at få afsluttet.

60

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Der kan åbenlyst også forekomme kulturelle udfordringer, og sprogbarrierer kan være vanske­ lige at overkomme. Det giver næsten sig selv, og som rådgiver søges dette afhjulpet ved at inddrage etniske kinesere på transaktionsteamet. Det er ikke nødvendigvis tilstrækkeligt, men i så fald er der ikke så meget at gøre ved det.

Formål med opkøb En væsentlig årsag til den anderledes ageren fra kinesiske investorer er, at disse ofte har et andet formål for øje end vestlige investorer. Kinesiske investeringer uden for Kina har typisk ikke til formål at generere kortsigtet profit eller at holde det opkøbte selskab i en periode for at sælge igen. I stedet vil det primære formål være at etablere tilstedeværelse eller at opnå ny teknologi, R&D-kompetencer, salgskanaler eller brands. Det betyder, at kinesiske investorer ofte ikke er interesserede i en traditionel, finansiel due diligence eller i hvert fald har et andet fokus end den typiske vestlige investor. Når man som due diligence-udbyder taler om normaliseret historisk indtjening eller optimistiske budgetter, risikerer man at ramme ved siden af fokus for køber, idet man hellere skulle have talt om niveauet for R&D eller medarbejderstabens tilstræk­ kelighed kvantitativt såvel som kvalitativt.

Auktionsprocesser Især under den første bølge af investeringer, men også nu, er der et forhold, der særligt gør sig gældende, når der er tale om strukturerede udbudsprocesser: kinesiske selskaber havde og har vanskeligt ved at håndtere en hurtig transaktionsproces, idet beslutningsprocesserne hos de kinesiske investorer ofte er langsommelige og med udfald undervejs, ofte som følge af den bag­ vedliggende governance-struktur. Det stigende antal private, kinesiske virksomheder, der kigger på udenlandske opkøbsmuligheder, har de senere år betydet, at rådgiverne er blevet mere bevidste om beslutningsprocessen i kinesiske virksomheder, og at det kan være af afgørende betydning at få den potentielle køber hurtigt ind i en traditionel transaktionsproces og tilpasse denne, for at der ikke mistes for megen momentum i processen. Ligeledes er de kinesiske virk­ somheder blevet betydeligt bedre til at håndtere disse konkurrenceprægede udbudsprocesser.

De kinesiske selskaber er også langt bedre forberedt, når de går ind i en proces i dag i forhold til for få år siden, hvor kun meget få kinesiske selskaber havde dedikerede M&A-afdelinger, der kunne understøtte beslutningstagerne før og under transaktionsprocessen.

Vanskeligheder vedrørende kommunikationen mellem aktørerne kan ofte blive en deal breaker, idet især mindre kinesiske selskaber typisk har en mellemmand involveret i forhandlingerne.

Den faktiske beslutningstager kommer derfor ofte først på banen langt inde i processen. En anden kritisk faktor for succes er at opnå transparens og komfort omkring finansiering. Hvor kommer den fra, og er der fornøden sikkerhed, hvilke bankrelationer anvender køber, etc.?

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

61

Særlige kinesiske overvejelser Der vil ofte være områder vedrørende transaktionen, som en kinesisk investor skal hjælpes med at forstå. Det kan fx dreje sig om følgende, som en rådgiver vil stå sig godt ved at hjælpe med at forklare: • Der er ikke behov for særlig myndighedsgodkendelse, for at et udenlandsk selskab kan få lov til at investere i et dansk selskab • Der er ingen restriktioner vedrørende ledelsens nationalitet • En gruppes struktur kan nemt og hurtigt ændres • Bankfinansiering gøres ofte nemmere ved, at banken kan opnå sikkerhed i målselskabets aktiver • Den danske flexicurity-model gør HR-forhold effektive og skalerbare, idet det er nemt at hyre og fyre • Strukturelle fordele ved at investere i Danmark via Hong Kong eller Luxembourg • Det er nødvendigt at lave en ordentlig due diligence, også fordi køber vil blive betragtet som havende kendskab til alt i datarum • Der er skrappe transfer pricing regler med potentielt alvorlige konsekvenser, hvis de ikke overholdes

62

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Der vil også kunne være forhold vedrørende selve due diligence-processen, som ofte vil over­ raske en kinesisk investor: • Anvendelse af en vendor due diligence er fortsat ikke særligt udbredt i Kina og vil ofte af en kinesisk investor blive tillagt ingen eller begrænset værdi • Registreringsstandarden i Danmark er så høj, at der i due diligence processen ikke bliver brugt meget tid på verifikation af data, men derimod på at analysere data Så selvom de seneste kinesiske investorer i vestlige selskaber i højere og højere grad agerer, som vestlige investorer forventes at gøre, er der fortsat en række forhold, der er nødvendige at tage hensyn til i rollen som rådgiver. Men den afgørende faktor for, om kinesiske investorer på sigt bliver succesfulde, er, om de er i stand til at transformere sig til et egentligt internationalt selskab. Huawei er et godt eksempel på en kinesisk virksomhed, som har gennemført en sådan transformation, og som også har opnået stor succes i Danmark. Og den transformation ligger normalt uden for rådgivers indflydelsesområde.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

63

Fortrolighedsaftaler

13

Juridiske dokumenter kan i nogle tilfælde være svært tilgængelige – svære at læse. Ofte bliver det ikke nemmere, hvis de er skrevet på et sprog, som man ikke behersker til fulde. I Topsil-sagen gav det dog anledning til nogen overvejelse, da Topsil modtog en fortrolighedsaftale – en såkaldt NDA (nondisclosure agreement) – i form af en kinesisk oversættelse af Topsils engelske fortrolighedsaftale. Og tilmed indeholdende en passus om, at den kinesiske version havde forrang.

Fortrolighedsaftaler er ellers ret sædvanlige i erhvervsforhold. De bruges mellem selskaber, der har brug for i fortrolighed at dele oplysninger og information i forbindelse med et muligt samarbejde.

Anders Kaasgaard, Advokat, LETT

På samme vis er fortrolighedsaftaler en helt fast bestanddel af alle M&A-processer. Alle poten­ tielle bydere, der udtrykker interesse for at deltage i en struktureret salgsproces, vil blive bedt om at skrive under på en fortrolighedsaftale, så de kan få adgang til informationsmateriale om selskabet og efterfølgende gennemføre due diligence og eventuelle Q&A-sessions med sel­ skabets ledelse. Når børsnoterede selskaber er involveret, er det helt afgørende, at en sådan fortrolighedsaftale udbygges med de særlige bestemmelser om forbud mod handel med det eller de børsnoterede selskabers aktier.

Fortrolighedsaftalen i M&A-processer Fortrolighedsaftaler er i et vist omfang standarddokumenter, og en godt formuleret og balan­ ceret fortrolighedsaftale vil oftest kunne underskrives uden megen forhandling. I mange proces­ ser er det gavnligt, at der ikke allerede opstår ”badwill”, når der skal drøftes eller underskrives en fortrolighedsaftale. Fortrolighedsaftalen er som noget, der ”bare” skal på plads, for at man kan komme videre i processen.

De forhold, som oftest giver anledning til drøftelser mellem parterne, er forhold som varig­ hed, eventuelle standstill-bestemmelser og bodsbestemmelser. De sidste især, hvis der aftales konventionalbod.

Et enkelt forhold, som først i de senere år er blevet genstand for forhandling, er aftalepunkter om, at materiale leveres tilbage/destrueres, hvis processen afbrydes. Sådanne bestemmelser var tidligere helt standard, men i dag har langt de fleste virksomheder et IT set-up, hvor der automatisk tages backup flere gange om dagen. Disse backups er ofte meget vanskelige eller umulige at tilgå for at sikre permanent sletning af data. Således vil det ofte blive aftalt, at denne karakter af backup er tilladt også efter, at en eventuel proces er afbrudt.

64

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Et punkt, som begge parter har særlig interesse i, er lovvalg og værneting. Det mest normale og generelt accepterede er dog, at målselskabets lov og værneting er afgørende. Det er her, selskabet ligger, og det er her, informationen er tilgængelig.

Hvad skal man særligt overveje Hvis man står på bydersiden, bør man navnlig undgå at acceptere konventionalbod, og så bør man sikre sig, at man kan overholde den aftale, som man forpligter sig til. Kan man for eksem­ pel slette modtaget data? Giver den foreslåede fortrolighedsaftale mulighed for, at man kan dele information både internt i sin organisation (hvor relevant) og med sine rådgivere? Kan man som potentiel køber have direkte kontakt til målselskabets ledelse uden om diverse rådgivere og investeringsbanker? Og er der andre forhold, som man ved, bliver svære at overholde, så bør de også søges undgået fra begyndelsen.

Hvis man står på sælgersiden, er der nogle få forhold, som man bør insistere på. Navnlig stand­ still-bestemmelser, så man selv bevarer kontrol over processen, og hvis man er børsnoteret som i Topsil-sagen, så tillige bestemmelser om, at de potentielle bydere bliver insidere med de følger, det har.

Værdien af en fortrolighedsaftale Reelt er det uhyre sjældent, at fortrolighedsaftaler i M&A-processer efterfølgende påberåbes, og det gøres gældende, at fortrolig information er misbrugt. Samtidig må man dog gøre sig klart, at mange virksomheder formentlig bruger den opnåede viden – måske også i strid med en indgået fortrolighedsaftale. Det er bare ikke noget, som virksomheden nogensinde opdager eller kan forfølge.

Man kan i den forbindelse gøre sig nogle overvejelser om, hvilken værdi en fortrolighedsaftale reelt har. Særligt hvis man har med udenlandske bydere at gøre. Det er utroligt svært, for ikke at sige umuligt, at kontrollere, om f.eks. en aftalepart fra Asien eller Sydamerika efter en endt proces bruger opnået viden i strid med det aftalte. Og hvis den pågældende part ikke i øvrigt er til stede i Danmark eller som minimum Europa, kan det også være meget vanskeligt at håndhæve fortrolighedsaftalen, selv ved brud på denne.

Set i det lys må en fortrolighedsaftale primært betragtes som en gentlemanaftale, hvor profes­ sionelle parter aftaler ikke at misbruge modtaget information. Og en fortrolighedsaftale vil da utvivlsomt også forhindre den mest åbenlyse misbrug, men det er formentlig en vildfarelse at tro, at en fortrolighedsaftale beskytter mod enhver form for misbrug.

Med denne indsigt i bagagen kan man også nemmere gøre sig klart, at der er grænser for, hvor meget man skal forhandle en fortrolighedsaftale, og hvor meget man bare skal acceptere for at komme videre.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

65

Fortrolighedsaftaler kan dog også fungere som et godt styringsværktøj. Og netop her ligger måske deres egentlige værdi. De kan bruges til at styre processen og til at sikre tilslutning til processen.

At selv en godt formuleret fortrolighedsaftale dog ikke kan sikre kontrol over enhver proces, er Topsil-sagen et godt eksempel på. Selvom fortrolighedsaftalerne indeholdt både standstill-­ bestemmelser og bestemmelser, der skulle forhindre et uønsket offentligt købstilbud, så må man konstatere, at det i sager med krydsende transaktionsspor (i Topsil-sagen med både et klassisk M&A aktivitetssalg på den ene side og et muligt overtagelsestilbud via børsen på alle selskabets aktier på den anden side) er vanskeligt at beholde den fulde kontrol over processen.

Navnlig i de sidste og afgørende dage i Topsil-sagen kan man vel – pænt sagt – sige, at proces­ sen enkelte steder var meget vanskeligt kontrollerbar, da NSIG offentliggjorde deres intention om at afgive et offentligt købstilbud samtidig med gennemførelsen af den generalforsamling, som skulle tage stilling til aktivitetssalget til GlobalWafers.

Og i den situation er det ligegyldigt, om fortrolighedsaftalen er på dansk, engelsk eller kinesisk.

66

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

67

14

Datarum – Hvad skal der vises for køber og sælger? ”Det må godt nok være et kedeligt og trivielt arbejde at være M&A-advokat” – denne tanke havde vist mere end strejfet en af de ledende medarbejdere i Topsil, da denne første gang blev præsenteret for diverse "request lister", der skulle bruges som tjekliste til at indsamle materiale om koncernen til brug for etablering af det virtuelle datarum…

Nicholas Lerche-Gredal, Advokat, LETT

De potentielle købere blev som led i budprocessen inviteret til at foretage en due diligence af såvel finansielle, kommercielle og juridiske forhold vedrørende Topsil. De udvalgte bydere skulle derfor have adgang til at gennemgå materiale og dokumenter om Topsil samlet i et datarum.

Due diligence omfatter således undersøgelser, der under hensyntagen til de konkrete omstæn­ digheder må vurderes at være nødvendige for, at en køber – på et oplyst grundlag – kan træffe sin beslutning om at gennemføre købet.

Due diligence "Due diligence" er en betegnelse for de undersøgelser af f.eks. juridisk karakter, som køber af en virksomhed foretager forud for den endelige gennemførelse af handlen Det blev tidligt i processen afklaret, at datarummet skulle være elektronisk (virtuelt), så udenlandske potentielle købere havde lige adgang til datarummet uanset fysisk placering.

Datarummet skulle opbygges af LETT i samarbejde med udvalgte betroede medarbejdere i Topsil. Det var et centralt tema i denne fase, at de mulige byderes gennemgang af datarummet ville blive betragteligt lettet, hvis etableringen af datarummet var omhyggelig, og materialet blev præsenteret i en overskuelig og fyldestgørende form.

68

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

„

Sælgers loyale oplysningspligt Som sælger af en virksomhed opstod spørgsmålet om, hvilke oplysninger om virksomhedens forhold Topsil skulle give til den eller de potentielle købere for at sikre, at køber fik et fyldest­ gørende indblik i virksomhedens forhold og drift, og for at reducere sælgers risiko for ansvar for eventuelle mangler ved virksomheden.

Det er efter dansk ret et grundlæggende princip, at sælger af en virksomhed loyalt skal give og fremlægge oplysninger til køber om forhold, der har betydning for købers bedømmelse af salgsgenstanden (virksomheden), og som sælger kender eller burde kende til; det vil sige forhold, som sælger har viden om eller burde have viden om. Dette princip betegnes "sælgers loyale oplysningspligt".

Den loyale oplysningsforpligtelse kan sælger opfylde ved at fremlægge disse oplysninger i et datarum, hvorefter det er op til køberen at gennemgå og vurdere materialet og spørge ind til rette sammenhæng (om nødvendigt).

Det kan også være i sælgers interesse at opfylde oplysningsforpligtelsen og komme sælger til fordel ved, at køber i mangel af anden aftale som udgangspunkt ikke kan rejse krav mod sælger i anledning af de forhold, som sælger loyalt har oplyst køber om. Det er derfor som oftest i sælgers egen interesse at fremlægge alle forhold af betydning om den overdragne virksomhed for køber, inden overdragelsesaftalen indgås.

Det er imidlertid ikke enhver oplysning, der kan være relevant eller nyttig for køber, som sælger skal give til køber for at opfylde sin loyale oplysningspligt. Hvis oplysningen skal være omfattet af sælgers loyale oplysningspligt, skal sælgers manglende videregivelse af oplysningen kunne karakteriseres som retsstridig. Den manglende videregivelse skal således kunne karakteriseres som en forsømmelse, det vil sige et forhold, der kan bebrejdes sælger som culpøst – en forsæt­ lig eller uagtsom fortielse af viden som sælger har eller burde have om det pågældende forhold.

Den loyale oplysningspligt Sælger skal loyalt oplyse om forhold, der efter sælgers egen vurdering er af betydning for overdragelsen af målvirk­­­somheden – samt forhold, som sælger indser eller bør indse, har betydning for købers bedømmelse af målvirksomheden.

Købers undersøgelsespligt Det kan overvejes, hvorvidt købet af en virksomhed er direkte omfattet af den danske købelovs regler, men der synes dog at være en vis enighed om, at køber har en undersøgelsespligt efter principperne i købeloven.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

69

Efter købelovens § 47 følger, at køber som udgangspunkt ikke kan gøre mangler gældende, såfremt køber har undersøgt salgsgenstanden eller uden særlig grund har undladt at efterkomme sælgerens opfordring til at undersøge salgsgenstanden, og manglen burde være opdaget ved en sådan – ofte omfattende – undersøgelse.

Etablering af datarummet – og lidt hjælp fra Nietzsche Opstart af en proces for indsamling af dokumenter og materiale til brug for etablering af et datarum lægger næsten uden undtagelse stort beslag på kapaciteten i den virksomhed, der skal sælges. Det er let at udarbejde en liste over alt det materiale, som køber gerne vil se, men udfordrende for sælger at fremfinde det efterspurgte materiale. Processen for etablering af et datarum kræver lige dele struktur og tilpasningsevne for alle parter, hvis man skal nå i mål inden for den oftest pressede tidsramme – ”Man må endnu have kaos i sig for at kunne føde en dansende stjerne”...

Datarummet, der blev etableret for at fremvise Topsils virksomhed, blev som nævnt opbygget i virtuel (elektronisk) form via en webbaseret platform. Både byderne og disses rådgivere fik herved adgang til at gennemlæse materialet, der var uploadet, og stille spørgsmål til dette.

Selve indsamlingen af materiale skete på baggrund af "request lister", der skulle bruges som tjekliste til at indsamle materiale om koncernen. Listerne omfattede de væsentligste forhold om Topsils virksomhed, og det indsamlede materiale blev gennemgået for at sikre, at kopier af materialet var komplette og indekseret korrekt i den valgte struktur.

Særligt om kommercielle kontrakter Medarbejderne hos Topsil og teamet hos LETT måtte kritisk tage stilling til alt materiale, der skulle lægges i datarummet. Mange spørgsmål blev rejst, herunder om virksomhedens kundeog leverandørkontrakter kunne fremlægges, når de i mange tilfælde indeholdt bestemmelser om fortrolighed. Det var også nødvendigt at vurdere, om fremlæggelse af oplysninger om Topsils medarbejdere var sensitive og omfattet af regler om beskyttelse af persondata. Løsningen var i nogle tilfælde i første omgang at overstrege/fjerne udvalgte dele af kontrakten for dernæst at fremlægge hele dokumentet senere i processen, når der var mere "deal certainty" – fase 2 i due diligence. En sådan faseomdelt datarumsproces stiller krav til teamet – særligt med flere samtidige bydere. Hvem skal se hvad og hvornår?

Topsil havde fra første dag i processen fokus på, om de igangværende kontrakter, som virk­ somheden fremlagde i datarummet f.eks. med kunder, leverandører m.v., kunne opsiges med forkortet varsel som følge af et salg. Sådanne "change of control"-bestemmelser kunne give betydelige udfordringer tidsforhandlingsmæssigt og kunne i værste fald reducere den pris, som man kunne få for siliciumforretningen. Der var herudover også fokus på at beskytte de rettig­ heder, som anvendtes af Topsil, herunder selskabsnavn, logo, design eller andet IPR.

70

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Datarumsmemoer Der blev endvidere udarbejdet en række såkaldte "datarumsmemoer", der beskrev forhold eller dokumenter, som krævede en forklaring eller uddybning – eller blot for at angive, at der intet materiale var at finde for et givet punkt. Disse datarumsmemoer skulle gerne nedbringe antallet af spørgsmål fra køberfeltet.

Det muliges kunst Det skal ikke altid være let at sælge en virksomhed, og et vellykket salg kræver en blanding af strategi, timing, kommercielle overvejelser, jura – og følelser. Det er også det muliges kunst.

Topsils team af finansielle og juridiske rådgivere bidrog med at skabe overblik, opstille mulige scenarier og pege på faktorer, der skulle forøge virksomhedens – og derved aktionærernes – værdi samt optimere ledelsens forhandlingsposition og råderum i forhold til byderne.

Langsigtet salgsmodning – hvad kan man gøre for at forøge virksomhedens værdi?

Det havde væsentlig indvirkning på processen og mulighederne, om overdragelsen af silicium­ forretningen skulle ske til en konkurrent med branchekendskab eller en finansiel køber, f.eks. en private equity fond, herunder f.eks. om de ledende medarbejdere i Topsil skulle fortsætte efter et salg.

„

En langsigtet salgsmodningsproces, der startes i god tid, kan således bidrage til at øge virk­ somhedens og ejernes værdi ved at sikre, at virksomheden fremstår fra sin bedste side, og at eventuelle udfordringer og forretningsmæssigt problematiske forhold ser dagens lys tidligt i processen, så parterne kan finde fornuftige løsninger på en fair risikoallokering.

Der må gerne dufte af nybagte boller, når køber kigger forbi, men reelt skidt skal ikke fejes ind under gulvtæppet…

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

71

15

”Escrow agreements” ved hushandler og internationale M&A transaktioner Antallet af virksomhedshandler, hvor danske selskaber er genstand for opkøb, har de sidste par år været i kraftig vækst, og som man ser det i andre sammenhænge, forekommer der en internationalisering af sådanne transaktioner. Dette skyldes blandt andet, at der kan være udenlandske parter involveret. Men også selvom der kun er danske parter involveret, skal alt foregå efter engelske paradigmer, hvilket til tider kan skabe nogen begrebsforvirring sammenholdt med dansk ret.

Hvorfor escrow agreements?

Klaus Ingildsen, Erhvervs­jurist, Jyske Bank Gruppen ”Erhverv og Kapital” under juridisk afdeling i Jyske Bank håndterer forskellige trans­ aktioner relateret til bankens erhvervskunder og kapitalmar­ kederne fra bankens perspektiv, herunder udarbejdelse af låne­ dokumentation, gennemgang af due diligence dokumentation i forbindelse med virksomheds­ handler og andre dertilhørende dokumenter såsom Escrow Agreements og Release letters.

I en virksomhedshandel vil der ofte være tilknyttet en ”escrow agreement” mellem køber, sælger og en ”escrow agent” angående en ”escrow account” (en konto i en bank), hvor en del af købssummen aftales indbetalt til sikkerhed for opfyldelse af visse af sælgers forpligtelser under købsaftalen, herunder særligt afgivelsen af sælgergarantier/indeståelser (”Guarantees”).

Såfremt der ikke måtte blive fremsat krav under garantierne inden for en given periode, par­ terne er enige, eller der foreligger dom/voldgiftsafgørelse herom, vil det indbetalte beløb blive frigivet til sælger som en del af købssummen, alternativt ført tilbage til køber.

Hvad betyder “escrow” på dansk?

Den engelske Oxford Dictionary definerer begrebet ”escrow” som “kept in the custody of a third party and taking effect only when a specified condition has been fulfilled”. For så vidt angår ”escrow account” anføres ”a deposit or fund held in trust or as a security”. I Gyldendals Røde Ordbøger oversættes ”custody” på engelsk til ”deponering” på dansk i denne sammenhæng.

Herefter kan den danske forståelse af begrebet ”escrow agreement” sammenfattes til en form for betinget aftale angående et indestående på en konto (”escrow account”), som er depo­neret til sikkerhed for en forpligtelse, hvor banken som ”escrow agent” er depositar og oftest er ansvarlig for at berigtige frigivelsen af det deponerede beløb.

På baggrund af denne sammenfatning vil det være nærliggende at lave en analogi til en ”depo­ neringsaftale”. Disse er meget anvendt i forbindelse med ejendomshandler i Danmark, hvor køber – som en betingelse under købsaftalen – indbetaler købesummen på en konto oftest i sælgers navn op til gennemførelsen af handlen som dokumentation for, at køber har de nød­ vendige midler til rådighed og for at sikre samtidigheden, men hvor udbetaling af beløb fra deponeringskontoen er betinget af, at den fulde ejendomsret til ejendommen overgår til køber.

72

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Det er værd at bemærke, at der ikke er tale om en deponering i deponeringslovens forstand, hvor skyldner kan frigøre sig ved deponering i henhold til loven.

Er deponerede midler beskyttet mod retsforfølgende kreditorer?

Et interessant spørgsmål relateret til en deponering er, om de deponerede midler er beskyttet mod købers og sælgers retsforfølgende kreditorer. I de escrow agreements, som vi har set de seneste år, vil escrow account ofte være etableret i sælgers navn. Der har dog været en tendens til – særligt hvis det er en udenlandsk køber – at parterne ønsker escrow account etableret i både sælgers og købers navn. Endvidere ses det fra tid til anden, hvis der er tale om flere sælgere, at der ønskes oprettet en escrow account i alle sælgernes navne.

Afhængig af den enkelte konstellation af ejerskabet for den etablerede escrow account er det ikke altid lige til at klarlægge, hvem der har ejendomsretten til det deponerede beløb på escrow account, særligt da deponeringen er sket under en betinget aftale. En deponering i sælgerens navn må have antagelsen for sig, at det deponerede beløb må skulle tilregnes sælgerens aktiver efter frigivelsen af beløbet til sælger, når betingelserne for frigivelse er opfyldt. Mere kompliceret bliver det i de øvrige konstellationer med en konto med flere kontoindehavere, da ejerskabet mellem parterne aldrig ses nærmere aftalt i escrow agreement, hvorfor banken i sin kapacitet af depositar forsøger at undgå disse konstellationer. Dette skyldes blandt andet, at det giver udfordringer i forbindelse med automatisk indrapportering til skattemyndighederne og medfører, at der skal laves compliancetjek i forbindelse med kundeoprettelsen, hvilket kan være ganske omfattende.

Efter det deponerede beløb er blevet indbetalt på escrow account, men inden frigivelsen af det deponerede beløb har fundet sted, kan det endvidere have en betydning, hvordan escrow account er etableret. Dette skyldes, at ejerforholdet i tilfælde, hvor aftalegrundlaget ikke giver den nødvendige beskyttelse mod retsforfølgende kreditorer, som udgangspunkt vil blive vur­ deret ud fra den formodning, at de deponerede midler tilhører den, i hvis navn kontoen er registreret, og hvis flere kontoindehavere, at ejerskabet er forholdsmæssigt.

Problemstillingen ses ikke umiddelbart at få meget opmærksomhed fra de involverede parter.

Dette skyldes måske, at når begrebet ”escrow” importeres fra engelsk ret, er udfordringen ikke så relevant, da det kan være aftalt (som det fremgår af oversættelsen af begrebet ”escrow account” ovenfor), at de deponerede midler vil blive holdt under ”trust”. Anvendelsen af trust under engelsk ret giver en beskyttelse mod kreditorer, da det kun er det juridiske ejerskab (legal title), som bliver overdraget, mens selve det økonomiske ejerskab (equitable title) forbliver, indtil betingelserne er opfyldt. Trustinstituttet anerkendes dog ikke under dansk ret og løser derfor ikke udfordringen i Danmark.

Det er formodningen under dansk ret, at deponerede midler er beskyttet mod retsforfølgende kreditorer i forhold til det aftalte, hvilket stiller krav til indholdet af selve aftalen, herunder

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

73

betingelserne for frigivelsen af det deponerede beløb. Det ses ofte, at det i escrow agreement er aftalt, at de deponerede midler “…is to be held in escrow as security for any and all claims caused by a breach of any of the Sellers' Warranties…”. Når man læser ordlyden, kan det være nærliggende at kvalificere aftalen nærmere som en form for sikkerhedsstillelsesaftale end som en deponeringsaftale.

Sikkerhedsstillelsesaftale et bedre alternativ?

Hvis man forfølger den fortolkning, at der retteligt er tale om en sikkerhedsstillelsesaftale i stedet for en deponeringsaftale, medfører det, at parterne får et klarere grundlag for retsstil­ lingen, da reglerne i gældsbrevsloven regulerer, hvornår en part har foretaget sin sikringsakt og dermed opnår beskyttelse mod retsforfølgende kreditorer. Dette vil i tilfælde med indestående på konti i en bank være meddelelse til banken om pantsætningen fulgt op af en rådigheds­ berøvelse over den pantsatte konto.

De aftalte frigivelsesmekanismer i escrow agreements ses ikke umiddelbart at give anledning til udfordringer i relation til oprettelsen af rådighedsberøvelsen, da det typisk vil være aftalt, at de indbetalte midler kun kan udbetales, hvis (1) parterne er enige, (2) der foreligger endelig dom/voldgiftsafgørelse, eller (3) beløbet frigives automatisk til sælger efter et nærmere aftalt tidspunkt, såfremt der ikke er fremsat krav. Sælger kan dermed ikke frit råde over de depone­ rede midler, og rådighedsberøvelsen bør derfor være iagttaget. En nuance kan måske være, at det i dette ”negative rentemiljø” kan være aftalt med banken, at der skal betales negativ rente på indestående på kontoen, som dermed vil sive fra kontoen.

Anbefaling Det kan anbefales at lade escrow agreement være reguleret af dansk ret, da begrebet ”escrow” ikke kan overføres direkte til dansk ret og tilpasses i overensstemmelse hermed, hvis det omfat­ ter anvendelsen af ”trusts”, da dansk ret ikke anerkender anvendelsen af trusts. Alternativt kan det overvejes at anvende en sikkerhedsstillelsesaftale vedrørende kontoen for det indbetalte i stedet for, da det er et mere anerkendt instrument under dansk ret, som også giver sikkerhed mod retsforfølgende kreditorer, hvis sikringsakten er behørigt iagttaget.

74

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

75

16 Mette Lykke, Advokat, LETT

Tovholderens rolle – Transaktionens regissør Det er fredag, og klokken er 8.00. Topsils ledelse og holdet fra SEB og LETT sidder samlet i et mødelokale på Rådhuspladsen i København. I et lign­ende mødelokale 8.938 km væk (i fugleflugtslinje) sidder et hold friske Global­ Wafers-folk klar. Da vi sidder der og ser hinanden i øjnene via fjernsynsskærmen, er det ikke til at forstå, at vi er så langt fra hinanden. ”Good afternoon”, lyder det fra Taipei. Vi kan ikke lade være med at trække på smilebåndet og svarer ”Good morning”. Selv om teknikken får os til at føle, at vi lever i en global landsby, kan vi ikke gøre noget ved tidsforskellen, men som vi påbegynder closing, og intensiteten stiger, tænker vi ikke meget over tid og sted.

Vejen til closing gik via utallige telefonmøder, udveksling af udkast til transaktionens mange aftaledokumenter og et hav af mails. Det er der ikke noget ualmindeligt i, når man befinder sig i en salgsproces. For hver enkelt trin i processen er forbundet med megen praktik, og de forskel­ lige trin tilsammen udgør en lang kæde af grænseoverskridende handlinger, der er afhængige af hinandens gennemførelse, så det er vigtigt, at aftalerne kan realiseres i den virkelige verden.

Det ville jo f.eks. ikke nytte noget at skrive i aftalen, at pengene skal betales på et bestemt tidspunkt, hvis det tidspunkt ligger uden for bankernes åbningstid i enten Danmark eller Taiwan.

Hvad der derimod var usædvanligt ved salget af Topsil, var, at netop som Topsil havde indgået en betinget købsaftale med GlobalWafers og offentliggjort dette, meldte endnu en interesseret køber sig på banen, kinesiske NSIG. Et nyt transaktionsspor med tilhørende dokumentpakke skulle derfor igangsættes, og nye forhandlinger måtte indledes på et tidspunkt, hvor vi ellers troede, vi befandt os i slutfasen med GlobalWafers.

Parallelle spor For at sikre, at transaktionskæden ikke blev brudt i nogen af de to spor, var et lille hold "prak­ tiske grise" – i den virkelige verden typisk advokater – samlet til at holde styr på aftalerne, bilagene, forhandlingerne og processerne i øvrigt.

At åbne datarummet for NSIG var det mindste problem, da de relevante data allerede var i datarummet. Men NSIG’s adgang til datarummet tilføjede due diligence-fasen en ny dimension: NSIG skulle, ligesom GlobalWafers havde fået det, have svar på spørgsmål om fremlagte doku­ menter samt adgang til nye dokumenter, hvis de anmodede om det, hvis dokumenterne efter en nøje vurdering af væsentligheds-, fortroligheds- og konkurrencehensyn kunne fremlægges.

Når det nye dokument eller en ny oplysning blev udvekslet med NSIG, skulle det samtidig

76

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

vurderes, om GlobalWafers også skulle præsenteres for dette, for de to bydere skulle af bl.a. loyalitetshensyn tilbydes samme vilkår, selv om de var vidt forskellige steder i processen.

Således foregik aftaleforhandlingerne også simultant. Nogle dage begyndte med en telefon-/ videokonference med Taipei, mens den sluttede med et telefonmøde med NSIG’s danske råd­ givere. Derimellem modtog vi et utal af mails fra begge bydere, som vi hurtigt måtte ekspedere for at fremskynde processen, og inden de gik i seng i Taiwan og Kina. Der var ikke noget med at køre på autopilot, pennen skulle være skarp hele tiden. Det at holde tungen lige i munden er i den grad en del af jobbeskrivelsen for en praktisk gris, men ikke desto mindre var det alt­ afgørende for timingen af processerne i begge spor, at mails ikke lå ubesvaret i hele eller halve timer, at praktikken i det aftalte var gennemtænkt, at tidsplanen blev overholdt osv.

Over grænser Det vanskelige ved at styre en proces er det, der ikke ligger i éns egne hænder, det ufor­ udsete, der kan opstå i en transaktion som denne, hvor enkelte trin i processen foregår uden for Danmarks grænser efter andre regler og anden myndighedspraksis, og hvor man er nødt til at sætte sin lid til andres knowhow.

At byderne var fra Taiwan og Kina gav utvivlsomt koordineringen en sproglig og kulturel dimension. Vi modtog omfattende, aftalemæssig, original dokumentation på kinesisk. Selv om eksempelvis det taiwanske eller kinesiske bankstempel så helt ægte ud på bydernes financing commitment letter – dokumentationen for at køber rent faktisk har pengene til at betale købe­ summen – var vi nødt til at få dokumenterne valideret og gennemlæst af folk med kendskab til kinesiske, finansielle dokumenter. Et andet spørgsmål dukkede op i forbindelse med under­ skrivelsen af aftalerne. Hvem var tegningsberettiget for byderne, og hvordan verificerede man i øvrigt underskriften, når der blev skrevet under med den pågældendes engelske navn, som ikke var det samme, som fremgik af vedkommendes pas? Her hentede vi med kort frist – eller nærmest ingen – vigtig hjælp fra kolleger i Shanghai, Taipei, Hongkong og Warszawa.

Et andet grænseoverskridende element i salget af Topsils siliciumforretning var den model, overdragelsen var bygget op om. Tanken bag modellen var, at siliciumaktiviteterne i Topsil og dets datterselskaber i Polen og Japan skulle skydes ned i et til lejligheden nystiftet dansk dat­ terselskab, som skulle være genstand for salget, det såkaldte transaction object.

At skyde siliciumaktiviteterne fra Polen ned i det danske datterselskab var ikke sådan lige at gøre og krævede minutiøs planlægning som følge af et pludseligt opstået skatteproblem i Polen.

Dette trin i processen blev drøftet i et særskilt forløb, hvor Deloitte fremlagde flere forskellige modeller for processen, som så blev drøftet på en række telefonmøder og i endnu flere mails. I denne situation gjorde vi god brug af polske kolleger, der førte os gennem de polske trin i planen.

For at vi tovholdere i København kunne holde styr på denne del af transaktionen, blev der kon­ tinuerligt indrapporteret på eksekveringen af planen og prognosen for at nå i mål inden closing.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

77

78

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Når det skal klappe Closing er i bund og grund det tidspunkt, hvor handlen gennemføres. Det var dagen, der havde været fikspunktet for hele processen, og hvor alting skulle klappe.

Den 1. juli om morgenen lød startskuddet til closing som beskrevet indledningsvis. Via video­konferencen kunne vi siddende med vores morgenkaffekopper på Rådhuspladsen se GlobalWafers’ team sidde med eftermiddagsteen om et rundbord i Taiwan.

Kaffe- og teanekdoten er ikke et påfund. Det var genstand for latter, da vi indledningsvis var nødt til at foreslå en kaffepause, hvilket taiwanerne rettede til tepause. Sagen var, at vi nær ikke var kommet i gang, før der opstod et alvorligt, uforudsigeligt problem knyttet til stiftelsen af det datterselskab, hvori siliciumaktiviteterne skulle nedskydes. Stiftelse er nu ellers en formssag, da det hele sker online hos Erhvervsstyrelsen på nem og effektiv vis; sædvanligvis kan man have sit CVR-nummer inden for bare minutter, fra man har indtastet de påkrævede oplysninger og trykket ”Stift virksomhed”. På closingdagen var det bare ikke sådan. Da der var gået over en time fra indberetningen, kontaktede vi styrelsen. En medarbejder i kundeservice fortalte venligt, at vores sag som led i almindelig stikprøvekontrol var udtaget til manuel behandling, og at det kunne tage op til 14(!) dage, før vores sag ville blive behandlet. Det kunne vi ikke vente på, mens holdet fra Taiwan fulgte os live. Erhvervsstyrelsen havde forståelse for problemet, og det viste sig snart, at sagen slet ikke var udtaget til manuel behandling som led i stikprøvekontrol, men på grund af systemproblemer, og derfor blev vores stiftelse øjeblikkeligt gennemført manuelt.

Den polske del af transaktionen blev iværksat dagen før closing for at sikre, at praktik­ ken med myndighedsregistreringer m.v. kunne være færdigafviklet i rette tid til closing.

Vores polske kolleger sendte nærmest på klokkeslæt en skriftlig bekræftelse på den polske transaktionsgennemførelse.

Samtidig modtog vi besked fra Jyske Bank om, at de havde modtaget købesummen, og at banken kunne frigive deres sikkerheder, hvilket var nødvendigt for at sælge Topsil uden for­ pligtelser. Selve pengeoverførslen havde også været en særskilt problemstilling, fordi der ikke kunne betales i DKK fra Taipei. Købesummen måtte derfor lige ind over en konto hos SEB, hvor den blev omvekslet til DKK, inden den blev sendt videre til Jyske Bank.

Det var en kæmpe forløsning at se resultaterne af lang tids planlægning vise sig. Selv om salgs­ processer i det store og hele følger samme skabelon, er der altid mange små detaljer, som de færreste tænker over, men som har stor indflydelse på tidsplanen. Dertil kommer det uforud­ sete. Det var en præmis for overdragelsen, at det hele kunne ske simultant, og det lykkedes, fordi kæden af begivenheder var gennemtænkt og praktikken på plads.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

79

17

Overtagelsestilbud – Venligt eller fjendtligt Under hele sagen med Topsil var der mange dramatiske dage – men ingen dag var så dramatisk som den 17. juni 2016. Dagen hvor den afgørende generalforsamling fandt sted. Fra bestyrelsen mødtes tidligt om morgenen, bestyrelsens overvejelser, dialogen med de to bydere til en generalforsamling, der blev sat i gang, suspenderet og sat i gang igen. Midt i det hele, lige da generalforsamlingen tog sin begyndelse, tikkede en meddelelse ind om, at NSIG ville fremsætte et overtagelsestilbud på alle selskabets aktier.

Når man er i gang med at gennemføre et frasalg af et børsnoteret selskabs primære aktivite­ ter – noget der i sig selv er en kompliceret proces – bliver situationen naturligvis ikke mindre kompliceret, når man midt i det hele skal håndtere sådan en meddelelse.

Anders Kaasgaard, Advokat, LETT

Denne artikel beskæftiger sig med de generelle regler om frivillige overtagelsestilbud og et par af de principielle problemstillinger, som meddelelsen om overtagelsestilbud i Topsil-sagen gav anledning til.

Reguleringen af overtagelsestilbud Reglerne om overtagelsestilbud er baseret på EU-regulering, mens de konkrete danske bestem­ melser findes i værdipapirhandelslovens §§ 31-32a og i Finanstilsynets bekendtgørelse om overtagelsestilbud (overtagelsesbekendtgørelsen) med tilhørende vejledning. Reguleringen af overtagelsestilbud varetager grundlæggende flere forskellige formål, såvel værdipapirhandelsog selskabsretlige formål som beskyttelse af aktionærerne i selskabet – og beskyttelse af selskabet selv.

80

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

• Ligeretsprincippet. Alle aktionærer i målselskabet, der ejer aktier inden for samme aktieklasse, skal behandles ens, som det kendes fra den almindelige selskabsret.

• Gennemsigtighedsprincippet. Aktionærer i målselskabet skal have tilstrækkelig tid og tilstrækkelige oplysninger til at kunne tage stilling til tilbuddet på et velinformeret grundlag. Hvilket blandt andet giver sig udslag i, at målselskabets ledelse skal oplyse aktionærerne om, hvordan realisering af tilbuddet kan forventes at påvirke målselskabet, herunder bl.a. beskæftigelsen.

• Ledelsens loyalitetspligt. Målselskabets ledelse skal varetage selskabets interesser som helhed og må ikke fratage aktionærerne mulighed for at tage stilling til fordelene ved tilbuddet.

• Forbud mod kunstige markeder. Der må ikke skabes kunstige markeder for aktierne i målselskabet, i det tilbuds­ givende selskab eller i noget andet selskab, der berøres af tilbuddet, hvilket kort sagt betyder, at tilbuddet ikke skal forstyrre markedernes normale funktionsmåde. Altså skal man undgå uhensigtsmæssig kurspåvirkning.

• Sikkerhed for tilbuddets gennemførelse. Tilbudsgiveren må først give meddelelse om et tilbud, når der er sikkerhed for, at tilbudsgiver kan finansiere kontant modydelse (købesum for aktierne), og når tilbudsgiver i øvrigt har truffet alle rimelige foranstaltninger til sikring af, at andre former for modydelse kan erlægges.

• Målselskabets drift. Målselskabets normale drift skal forstyrres så lidt som muligt som følge af et fremsat tilbud om overtagelse af selskabets aktier, herunder blandt andet i forbindelse med indsamling af information til konkurrencemyndighedsgodkendelse.

Selve processen med gennemførelse af et frivilligt overtagelsestilbud afspejler ovenstående hensyn. I langt de fleste tilfælde har der først været en periode med dialog mellem målselskabet og den mulige tilbudsgiver. Det er dog ikke altid tilfældet.

Processen for frivillige overtagelsestilbud Når tilbudsgiver beslutter sig for at afgive tilbud på aktierne i målselskabet, skal meddelelse herom sendes til målselskabet, og det relevante marked skal orienteres. Herefter skal tilbuds­ giver inden 4 uger fremsætte det formelle tilbud godkendt af Finanstilsynet i form af et tilbuds­ dokument, acceptblanket og tilbudsannonce.

Bestyrelsen skal herefter, inden halvdelen af tilbudsperioden er forløbet, afgive sin redegørelse til aktionærerne. Redegørelsen offentliggøres også til det relevante marked.

Groft sagt kan frivillige overtagelsestilbud inddeles i tre kategorier: (i) venligtsindede og an­­ befalede tilbud, (ii) venligtsindede tilbud, og (iii) fjendtlige eller uinviterede tilbud.

Venligtsindede og anbefalede tilbud vil typisk fremkomme efter aftale mellem tilbudsgiver og målselskabets ledelse og eventuelt også nogle af de større aktionærer. Venligtsindede og an­ befalede tilbud er oftest resultatet af en struktureret proces, og ofte vil målselskabets ledelse anbefale overtagelsestilbuddet samtidig med, at det fremsættes.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

81

Venligtsindede tilbud er tilbud, som fremsættes efter forudgående dialog, men på initiativ af tilbudsgiver, og uden at målselskabets ledelse på forhånd har forpligtet sig til at anbefale tilbuddet.

Fjendtlige eller uinviterede tilbud er tilbud, der fremsættes uden forudgående dialog mellem tilbudsgiver og målselskabet.

Principielt vil en tilbudsgiver kunne forberede og gennemføre et overtagelsesforsøg på egen hånd uden målselskabets medvirken som et uinviteret overtagelsestilbud. I praksis ses det dog meget sjældent. Normalt vil en tilbudsgiver have behov for at gennemføre forudgående due diligence undersøgelser af målselskabet og ligeledes have gennemført forhandlinger med målselskabets ledelse eller større aktionærer for at sikre sig opbakning til sit tilbud. Eller som minimum en viden om, hvilke tilbud der vil være interessant for de større aktionærer, og hvilke der ikke vil.

Ofte ses overtagelsestilbud fremsat som følge af en struktureret proces, som målselskabet selv har igangsat for at ”sælge sig selv”, eller også kommer tilbuddet fra en eksisterende aktionær i selskabet, som ønsker at overtage den fulde kontrol med selskabet.

Et overtagelsestilbud er derfor typisk baseret på en aftale mellem tilbudsgiver og målselskabet/ de større aktionærer om købstilbuddet og en forudgående aftale om den udtalelse om købstil­ buddet, som målselskabets bestyrelse ifølge regelsættet er forpligtet til at afgive. På baggrund heraf udarbejder tilbudsgiver det formelle tilbudsdokument, som fremsættes til aktionærerne i målselskabet efter Finanstilsynets godkendelse.

Forberedelsesfase/ forhandling af transaktionsaftale og tilbudsdokument

Offentliggørelse af tilbudsgivers købstilbud

Max. 4 uger

Offentliggørelse af tilbudsdokument.

Tilbudsperiode begynder

Inden for første halvdel af tilbudsperioden

Ved ændring af tilbuddet: Krav om tillæg til tilbudsdokument og til bestyrelsens redegørelse Tilbudsperioden: Min. 4 og max. 10 uger*

82

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Offentliggørelse af redegørelse fra målselskabets bestyrelse

Overtagelsestilbuddet i Topsil-sagen I Topsil-sagen var der tale om en struktureret salgsproces af siliciumaktiviteten (ikke selska­ bet), der var igangsat og styret af Topsils ledelse, og man kunne således forledes til at tro, at det fremsatte overtagelsestilbud var afgivet i forståelse med Topsil. Det var dog ikke tilfæl­ det, hvilket også ses af timingen af meddelelsen om overtagelsestilbuddet, der blev afsendt umiddelbart ved starten af den afgørende generalforsamling, der skulle godkende salget af siliciumforretningen.

Denne timing bragte overvejelser om navnlig ét hensyn, nemlig gennemsigtighedsprincippet.

Som anført ovenfor følger det af dette princip, at aktionærerne skal have tilstrækkelig tid og tilstrækkelige oplysninger til at kunne tage stilling til tilbuddet på et velinformeret grundlag.

Udfordringen i Topsil-sagen var, at meddelelsen om intentionen om at fremsætte et overtagel­ sestilbud først blev fremsat samme dag og samtidig med, at generalforsamlingen skulle tage stilling til GlobalWafers' købstilbud på siliciumforretningen (og ikke aktierne), som endda udløb efter generalforsamlingens afholdelse den dag. Havde man således udskudt generalforsam­ lingen om GlobalWafers' købstilbud, ville dette være bortfaldet. I øvrigt var det ikke muligt at undlade at afholde afstemningen om GlobalWafers' købstilbud, da der var afgivet brevstemmer hertil, hvorfor afstemningen ifølge de selskabsretlige forskrifter skulle afholdes.

Omvendt ville en vedtagelse af salget af siliciumforretningen på generalforsamlingen alt andet lige betyde, at overtagelsestilbuddet på alle aktierne i selskabet bortfaldt.

Generalforsamlingen vedtog GlobalWafers' tilbud.

Tilbudsperiodens udløb** Offentliggørelse af foreløbigt resultat og tilbuddets afslutning (eller forlængelse) senest 18 timer efter udløbet af tibudsperioden

Max. 3 dage

*

** ***

Offentliggørelse af endeligt resultat af tilbudsproces***

Afvikling af aktiehandler

Max. 3 hverdage

Mulighed for forlængelse af tilbudsperiode for at opnå godkendelse fra konkurrencemyndigheder – dog max 9 måneder fra tilbudsdokumentets offentliggørelse.

I tilfælde af konkurrerende tilbud forlænges tilbudsperioden for det oprindelige tilbud automatisk til udløbet af det konkurrerende tilbud.

Ved indgåelse af en aftale om køb/salg af aktier i målselskabet på mere fordelagtige vilkår end tilbuddet indenfor 6 måneder efter meddelelsen om tilbuddets afslutning, skal tilbudsgiver kompensere de aktionærer, der accepterede tilbuddet, kontant.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

83

Købstilbud – dispensation Situationen gav anledning til en anden finurlig juridisk krølle på hele Topsil-sagen. Det følger af overtagelsesbekendtgørelsens § 4, at tilbudsgiver hurtigst muligt, efter tilbudsgiver har truffet beslutning om at fremsætte et frivilligt tilbud, skal offentliggøre en meddelelse herom.

Og videre i stk. 2: ”Tilbudsgiver skal hurtigst muligt og senest 4 uger efter offentliggørelsen af beslutningen om fremsættelse af et frivilligt tilbud offentliggøre et tilbudsdokument og en tilbudsannonce”. Finanstilsynet har mulighed for at give dispensation for § 4 efter overtagel­ sesbekendtgørelsens § 30.

Det er et bærende hensyn for Finanstilsynet, at man ikke vil ”forvirre” markedet og dermed skabe unødvendig uro. Derfor accepteres det ikke, hvis der fremsættes og offentliggøres beslut­ ninger om at afgive overtagelsestilbud, uden at disse følges op af et reelt tilbud som beskrevet ovenfor.

Omvendt – og ud fra samme hensyn – ville et fremsat tilbud i Topsil-sagen, som efterfølgende blev trukket tilbage grundet ændrede forudsætninger, ikke tjene noget formål, men blot skabe uro, hvilket ikke gavner nogen. Og man må formode, at NSIG ville trække deres tilbud tilbage straks efter fremsættelse, da siliciumforretningen blev solgt fra, jf. beslutningen truffet på generalforsamlingen i Topsil.

Finanstilsynet gav da også dispensation til NSIG.

Moalem Weitemeyer Bendtsen Advokatpartnerselskab Att.: Advokat Dan Moalem Amaliegade 3-5 1256 København K

8. juli 2016

Moalem Weitemeyer Bendtsen Advokatpartnerselskab Att.: Advokat Dan Moalem Amaliegade 3-5 1256 København K LETT Advokatpartnerselskab Att.: Advokat Anders Kaasgaard Afgørelse 4om dispensation fra pligt Rådhuspladsen 1550 København V.

8. juli 2016

sættelse af frivilligt overtagelsestilbud

84

Ref. jcs J.nr. 6373-0071

Ref. jcs J.nr. 6373-0071 12. august 2016

til frem-

Ref. jcs/mbd

FINANSTILSYNET

Århusgade 110 J.nr. 6373-0073 2100 København Ø

Sendt til aka@lett.dk De harpr. påmail vegne af National Silicon Industry Group (”NSIG”) den 4. juli 2016 Tlf. 33 55 82 82 Fax fordi 33 55 82 00 anmodet fra pligten om til atikke offentliggøre et tilbudsdokument Man kunneom lidtdispensation polemisk overveje, pligten skulle være fastholdt, alene konse­ Afgørelse om jf.dispensation fra pligt til fremFINANSTILSYNET CVR-nr.

10 59 81 84 og en tilbudsannonce, § 4, stk.

2 i bekendtgørelse om overtagelsestilbud kvenserne af en vedtagelse af salget af siliciumforretningen på generalforsamlingen den 17. Århusgade 110 finanstilsynet@ftnet.dk for2016 så vidtvar angår frivilligeovertagelsestilbud overtagelsestilbud til aktionærerne i Cematom at afgive sættelse af NSIGs frivilligt 2100 København Ø www.finanstilsynet.dk juni kendt på tidspunktet for fremsættelsen af intentionen et offentligt A/S (”Målselskabet1”). købstilbud derforafvar der, rent principielt, ikke tale om etden nyt4.og De har på–vegne National Silicon Industry Group (”NSIG”) juliukendt 2016 forhold.

Tlf.Det spørgsmål 33 55 82 82 udtalelse bestemmende indflyFINANSTILSYNET Fax 33 55 82 00 er Vejledende givetvis om mere teoretisk endpligten praktisk.

Men for fremtiden er det værd at overveje samspillet anmodet dispensation fra til at offentliggøre et tilbudsdokument En tilbudsgiver, der har truffet beslutning om fremsættelse af et frivilligt tilÅrhusgade10110 CVR-nr.

59 81 84 og en tilbudsannonce, jf. § 4, stk.

2 i bekendtgørelse om overtagelsestilbud mellem almindelige M&A-processer og de børsretlige overtagelsesregler. bud og offentliggjort meddelelse herom efter § 4, stk. 1, i tilbudsbekendtgødelse ved passivitet 2100 København Ø finanstilsynet@ftnet.dk ERHVERVS - OG VÆKSTMINISTERIET for så har vidt forpligtet angår NSIGs overtagelsestilbud til aktionærerne i Cemat www.finanstilsynet.dk relse, sig tilfrivillige at offentliggøre et godkendt tilbudsdokument jf. § 1 De har som advokat A/S (”Selskabet”) ved mail af 8. juli 2016 Tlf. 33 55 82 82 ”). for Cemat A/S (”Målselskabet 4, stk.

2 i bekendtgørelse om overtagelsestilbud.

Fax 33 55 82 00 anmodet om Finanstilsynets vejledende udtalelse om, hvorvidt et påtænkt Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016 CVR-nr. 10 59 81 84 aktietilbagekøbsprogram (”Programmet”) af Selskabets egne aktier vil kunEn tilbudsgiver, deri særlige har truffet beslutning om fremsættelse Finanstilsynet kan tilfælde dispensere herfra jf. § 30.af et frivilligt tilfinanstilsynet@ftnet.dk ne udløse tilbudspligt, jf. § 31, stk.

1, efter i lov §om m.v. for bud og offentliggjort meddelelse herom 4, værdipapirhandel stk. 1, i tilbudsbekendtgøwww.finanstilsynet.dk ERHVERVS - OG VÆKSTMINISTERIET Eivind har Dam Jensen,sig som for tilbagekøbet besidder ca. 15 pct. af aktirelse, forpligtet til forud at offentliggøre et godkendt tilbudsdokument jf. §

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

85

18

Bestyrelsens mange og nye roller i børsnoterede virksomheder også i salgssituationer – Et governance perspektiv Bestyrelsens rolle når der foreligger et offentligt tilbud

Caspar Rose, Professor, CBS Caspar er uddannet jurist fra KU samt cand.merc. og Ph.D. fra CBS med speciale i finansie­ ring og regnskabsvæsen. Hans forskningsområder omfatter god selskabsledelse, M&A's, aktie­ investeringer og de finansielle markeder. Caspar Rose har også en fortid i Dansk Industri og Danske Bank.

Bestyrelsen skal forestå den strategiske ledelse af selskabet, hvilket især aktualiseres, når selskabet enten skal foretage et opkøb eller igangsætter en struktureret salgsproces. Der er i sådanne processer mange værdier på spil, afhængig af om man køber for dyrt eller sælger for billigt. Dette illustreres bl.a. ved det faktum, at næsten halvdelen af alle virksomhedsopkøb ender med at destruere aktionærværdi. Dette er der mange forklaringer på, f.eks. at man har budt for dyrt eller ikke har en klar plan for at høste synergierne. Desuden er det i praksis særdeles vigtigt, at byderselskabet har en klar ”post merger integration” plan. Det er ikke bare IT-systemer, som skal køre på fælles systemer, men det gælder også om at integrere menne­ sker, hvor der kan være store kulturforskelle f.eks. i internationale opkøb. Det er ofte i denne efterfølgende proces, at der tabes værdier. Dette skyldes risikoen for, at topledelsen mister fokus på integrationen. Det er her, bestyrelsen skal træde i karakter og holde direktionen op på de forventede kvantitative synergimål.

Målselskabets bestyrelse kan ikke bare forholde sig passivt, når der foreligger et offentligt tilbud på virksomheden. Umiddelbart skulle man mene, at da tilbuddet er rettet imod aktionærerne og ikke ledelsen, burde det være en indbyrdes sag mellem aktionærerne og byder. Lovgiver har dog alligevel præciseret, at bestyrelsen skal give sin begrundende holdning til kende offentligt, jf. § 23 i overtagelsesbekendtgørelsen. Redegørelsen skal bl.a. indeholde bestyrelsens hold­ ning til konsekvenserne for alle selskabets interessenter og tilbudsgivers strategiske planer for målselskabet og disses sandsynlige konsekvenser for beskæftigelsen og driftsstederne. Det er unægtelig store spørgsmål, som målselskabets bestyrelse skal forholde sig til. Baggrunden for, at lovgiver kræver bestyrelsens holdning, er, at ledelsen har et langt bedre beslutningsgrundlag for at vurdere tilbudsgivers bud, herunder især pris, men også når det gælder vilkår. Ledelsen kender virksomheden internt, og derfor vil målselskabets aktionærer i sagens natur lytte meget til, hvad bestyrelsen har af holdning til tilbuddet.

Lovgiver kræver, at tilbudsdokumentet indeholder tilbudsgivers intentioner med selskabet og strategi herfor, herunder bibeholdelse af arbejdspladser og enhver væsentlig ændring i ansæt­ telsesvilkårene, samt hvis tilbudsgiver vil lade målselskabet foretage udbetaling af målselskabets midler inden et år efter gennemførelsen af overtagelsestilbuddet. Det sidste er indsat i bekendt­ gørelsen som følge af, at mange kapitalfonde efter overtagelsen gearede virksomheden voldsomt

86

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

og trak store værdier ud af selskabet. Sådanne udlodninger var helt lovlige, men til trods herfor tiltrak de store overskrifter i medierne. Eksempelvis trak TDC DKK 6 mia. ud i ekstra­ordinært udbytte i 2009. Pengene kom fra TDCs næsten-salg af sit schweiziske mobilselskab Sunrise, som fusionerede med France Telecoms Orange.

Man kan spørge sig selv, om tilbudsgiver kan bliver erstatningsansvarlig, hvis tilbudsgiver afgiver nogle intentioner om selskabet, som efterfølgende viser sig ikke at holde stik. Dette må der svares benægtende på, forudsat at tilbudsgiver har afgivet sine oplysninger i god tro.

Forudsætningerne i byders businessplan kan vise sig at blive ændret efterfølgende, f.eks. som følge af makroøkonomiske påvirkninger.

Fokus på værdiskabelsen til ejerne eller selskabets øvrige interessenter?

I en række sager i USA har det vist sig, at byder efterfølgende har tømt selskabet for værdier og efterladt selskabet tilbage som en tom skal med en regning til samfundet, hvilket betegnes som ”asset stripping”. Eksempelvis har man oplevet, at bydere har købt papirfabrikker og lukket dem ned efter at have tømt selskaberne for de mest værdifulde aktiver. Man har i nogle tilfælde ryddet store skovarealer og undladt at genplante skovene. Disse negative effekter kaldes eks­ ternaliteter. I Danmark har vi en bred loyalitetsforpligtelse, hvor ledelsen ikke kun skal varetage aktionærernes interesser, benævnt shareholder value. Det er økonomisk efficient, når ledelsen varetager aktionærernes interesser, da aktionærerne er såkaldt residualaflønnede, dvs. først når alle andre interessenter har fået deres andel af overskuddet, kan aktionærerne få deres andel i form af udbytte eller aktietilbagekøb. Netop derfor har aktionærerne et incitament til at maksimere den samlede værdiskabelse til gavn for alle de øvrige interessenter. Men når der foreligger store eksternaliteter, bør ledelsen i højere grad fremme en ”stakeholder orientation”.

Ledelsens loyalitetsforpligtelse – over for hvem?

Fra amerikansk ret kendes begreberne ”duty of care” og ”duty of loyality” også kaldet ”fiduciary duties”. I Danmark har vi en retsgrundsætning benævnt ledelsens loyalitetsforpligtelse. Den går i korthed ud på, at ledelsen, dvs. bestyrelse og direktion, skal varetage selskabets interesser.

Hvert ledelsesmedlem skal med andre ord sætte selskabets økonomiske interesser over sine egne interesser. Under almindelige forhold reguleres dette bl.a. ved inhabilitetsreglerne og tavshedspligten. Retsgrundsætningen indebærer desuden, at selskabets interesser skal have forrang, når man f.eks. anvender blankofuldmagter på en generalforsamling. Man skal ikke for enhver pris arbejde på at fremme et salg af virksomheden. Det afgørende er, at ledelsen i målselskabet kan dokumentere, at man arbejder på, at værdiskabelsen i selskabet maksimeres.

Det er imidlertid de færreste bestyrelser, som kontinuerligt oplever at være genstand for offent­ lige opkøb. Men netop i en opkøbssituation bør målselskabets ledelse forholde sig til, om man skal være loyal over for de eksisterende aktionærer eller de nye mulige ejere, herunder hvad der gavner en selv. Der er ingen tvivl om, at måleselskabets ledelse udelukkende skal varetage de eksisterende ejeres interesse. Dette gælder også i de situationer, hvor overtagelsen ikke

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

87

gennemføres. En ledelse, som handler i selskabets interesse, vil ligesom i Topsil casen ofte vælge at få andre bydere på banen. Flere bydere fører alt andet lige til, at præmien stiger.

Der vil i sagens natur være udskiftning i ledelsen, når et tilbud accepteres, og selskabet får en ny ejer. Det betyder, at målselskabets bestyrelse må forlade selskabet, hvilket i nogle til­ fælde kan skabe modstand mod at acceptere et offentligt tilbud. I praksis ses det bl.a. ved, at målselskabets ledelse afviser tilbuddet som værende for lavt, hvorefter man henviser til de mange ”intrinsic values” og det store potentiale, som man forventer, vil materialisere sig i den kommende tid. Man kan dog spørge sig selv, om der skulle et offentligt bud til, før ledelsen ”tager skeen i den anden hånd”.

For at sikre, at målselskabets loyalitetsforpligtelse ikke anfægtes, er det bl.a. i overtagelsesbekendtgørelsen fastsat, at når der indledes forhandlinger med målselskabet, og indtil forhand­ lingerne afbrydes, må der ikke indgås aftaler eller foretages ændringer i bestående aftaler om bonus eller lignende ydelser i målselskabets ledelse, jfr. § 19. Dette er til for at sikre, at uhen­ sigtsmæssige incitamenter ikke kan få indflydelse på ledelsens vurdering. Derfor kræves det ligeledes oplyst i tilbudsdokumentet, hvis der eksisterer aftaler om honorar, incitamentsprogram­ mer m.v. til målselskabets ledelse i forbindelse med overtagelsestilbud, jfr. § 10, stk. 2, nr. 6.

”Fjendtlige overtagelser” – en myte?

I USA kendes begrebet ”a market for corporate control”. Ideen er, at hvis en ledelse ikke er i stand til at generere tilstrækkelig med værdi baseret på selskabets nuværende aktiver, vil aktiekursen komme under pres. Dette medfører, at alternative ledelsesteams/bydere vil initiere et ”tender offer”. Årsagen er, at byderne vurderer, at de vil være bedre til at forvalte de eksiste­ rende aktiver. Omvendt betyder dette ikke, at business casen ikke kan medføre frasalg og andre strategiske tiltag. Frygten for at blive afsat vil dermed få ledelsen til at fokusere og minimere de såkaldte ”agency costs”. Agency costs dækker over de omkostninger, som skyldes, at ledelsen optimerer sin egen nytte på bekostning af selskabet. Agency costs har mange ansigter, f.eks. for dyre opkøb, ”empire building”, corporate perks, overdreven bonusaflønning osv.

I det tilfælde at selskabet er ”beskyttet” via forskellige overtagelsesværn, fungerer markedet for corporate control mindre effektivt, og disciplineringen af målselskabets ledelse bliver svagere.

Omvendt kan man argumentere for, at selskaber, der er effektivt beskyttet imod en såkaldt ”fjendtlig overtagelse”, er mere langsigtede og dermed ikke behøver at indrette sig efter aktie­ markedernes skiftende ”luner”.

Begrebet ”fjendtlig overtagelse” er i grunden misvisende. Dette skyldes, at målselskabets aktionærer i mange tilfælde modtager en præmie i størrelsesordenen 30-40 procent, viser amerikanske undersøgelser. En overtagelse kan derimod godt betragtes som fjendtlig set fra målselskabets ledelses side.

88

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Det har været diskuteret, om såkaldte ”gyldne faldskærme” kan sidestilles med et overta­ gelsesværn. Argumentet herfor er, at sådanne fratrædelsesordninger i sagens natur fordyrer overtagelsen, da den afgående direktør skal kompenseres økonomisk. Omvendt kan en gylden faldskærm være med til at give måleselskabets direktør et incitament til at ”slippe taburetten”.

Konsekvensen heraf er, at overtagelsesforsøget ikke bliver opfattet som fjendtligt, hvilket øger sandsynligheden for, at overtagelsen gennemføres.

Hvad siger anbefalingerne om god selskabsledelse?

Anbefalingerne om god selskabsledelse siger, ”Det anbefales, at selskabet etablerer en beredskabsprocedure for overtagelsesforsøg, der vedrører perioden fra bestyrelsen får begrundet formodning om, at et overtagelsestilbud vil blive fremsat. Beredskabsproceduren bør fastsætte, at bestyrelsen afholder sig fra uden generalforsamlingens godkendelse at imødegå et over­ tagelsesforsøg ved at træffe dispositioner, som reelt afskærer aktionærerne fra at tage stilling til overtagelsesforsøget.” (pkt. 1.3.1).

Fordelen ved en beredskabsprocedure er, at denne er med til at sikre, at aktionærerne får reel mulighed for at tage stilling til, om de ønsker at afstå deres aktier i selskabet på de tilbudte vilkår, samt at bestyrelsen er bekendt med formelle forhold i tilfælde af henvendelser udefra, har drøftet, hvem der påtager sig hvilke opgaver, og hvilke rådgivere bestyrelsen eventuelt vil gøre brug af. Som nævnt er det sjældent, at bestyrelsen har erfaringer med at være genstand for en opkøbsproces.

Derfor er det især relevant at trække på rådgivere og specialister. Man kunne evt. overveje at få udarbejdet en såkaldt fairness opinion, hvor en ekstern rådgiver vurderer tilbuddets pris og vilkår. Dette har den fordel, at ledelsen får en uafhængig tredjeparts vurdering, som samtidig vil mindske risikoen for efterfølgende sagsanlæg fra skuffede aktionærer i målselskabet, hvis overtagelsen ikke gennemføres pga. den mistede præmie.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

89

Generalforsamlingsdirigenten

19

Jeg stod på Hotel Griffen og kiggede ud over Østersøen kl. 05.00. Folke­ mødet på Bornholm med al sin magiske festivalstemning var i fuld gang.

Regnskyerne hang tungt over øen, men fredag den 17. juni 2016 var alligevel en smuk morgen. Jeg så solen stå op, mens jeg ventede på mit lift til lufthavnen. Jeg var mentalt i gang med at forberede mig til dagens generalforsamling fem timer senere i Frederikssund. Jeg var ikke klar over, hvilke svære dirigentdilemmaer dagen ville bringe.

At være dirigent Dirigenten leder generalforsamlingen og har vide beføjelser, jf. selskabslovens § 101. Dirigenten må ikke opfatte sig selv ”blot” som en ordstyrer. Beskedenhed er en dyd, men ikke hvis det fører til ansvarsflugt. På generalforsamlingen står dirigenten over selskabets ledelse, og den gode dirigent forstår sin rolle som neutral opmand i forholdet mellem bestyrelsen og kapitalejerne.

Dirigenten har en selvstændig ledelsesopgave og skal være sig sin opgave og sit ansvar bevidst.

Martin Lavesen, Partner, LETT

Under generalforsamlingen – og derfor også i handlinger og beslutninger som led i forberedelsen af generalforsamlingen – er det dirigenten, som har kompetencen til at træffe afgørelser, der er indgribende for selskabet og kapitalejerne. Dirigenten kan fastlægge forløbet, udsætte og gen­ optage forhandlinger, afgøre afstemningstemaer og styre debatten. Dirigenten afgør de enkelte kapitalejeres ret til at deltage og omfanget af deres stemmeret med respekt af lovgivning, dags­ orden og vedtægter. Dirigentens rolle er omfattende og ansvaret tilsvarende stort.

Såfremt dirigenten tilsidesætter sine forpligtelser, måske på grund af manglende viden om de relevante regler, kan dirigenten sagsøges, da ansvaret påhviler dirigenten som person. Hvis selskabet er børsnoteret, skal dirigenten ikke kun efterleve de selskabsretlige regler, men også sikre, at generalforsamlingen afvikles på en sådan måde, at selskabet overholder sine børsretlige oplysningsforpligtelser. En dirigent, som ikke forbereder sig ordentligt, svarer til en bornholmsk fisker, der ikke har respekt for vejrets luner.

Første akt: Forvarsel om storm Generalforsamlingen var indkaldt med det ene formål, at kapitalejerne skulle tage stilling til, om de ville acceptere salget af Topsils siliciumaktiviteter til taiwanske GlobalWafers for DKK 320 mio. på gældfri basis med eventuel negativ købssumsregulering. Topsil skulle som led heri skifte navn og formål. Aftalen med GlobalWafers var indgået i maj måned, men betinget af generalforsamlingens godkendelse. En på papiret simpel og overkommelig dagsorden…

Jeg havde i god tid forberedt mig ved at gennemtænke mulige scenarier og var taget til Folkemøde med selskabsloven i tasken og forventningen om, at generalforsamlingen ville sejle i smult vande.

90

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Det første varsel på, at generalforsamlingen ikke ville blive let at dirigere, kom allerede aftenen før. Jeg sad til middag i Allinge, da jeg pr. telefon fik at vide, at der var modtaget et bud på DKK 335 mio. fra kinesiske NSIG på Topsils siliciumaktiviteter. Jeg meddelte bestyrelsen, at dette tilbud ikke kunne behandles på generalforsamlingen, da det ikke var på dagsordenen, jf. selskabsloven § 91. Den ekstraordinære generalforsamling skulle fortsat afvikles som planlagt med en ja/nej-stillingtagen til GlobalWafers’ bud. På dette tidspunkt var det derfor sådan, at det forventedes, at det ville blive til et nej til det foreliggende bud på DKK 320 mio.

Med to interesserede købere kunne salgsprisen på Topsils siliciumaktiviteter måske presses yderligere op, og telefonerne glødede tidligt fredag morgen. En åben og sjælden budkrig i et børsnoteret selskab var i gang. Selv om NSIGs tilbud ikke direkte kunne behandles på generalforsamlingen, var NSIGs rådgivere på vej mod Frederikssund for at igangsætte en auktionsproces på selve generalforsamlingen. Jeg meddelte, at NSIGs rådgivere ikke havde møderet på generalforsamlingen. Generalforsamlingen må ikke udvikle sig til en åben og ustyr­ lig kampplads.

„

Generalforsamlingen må ikke udvikle sig til en åben og ustyrlig kampplads.

I samråd med ledelsen blev det derfor tidligt fredag morgen besluttet, at begge bydere kunne afgive et endeligt bud, som skulle foreligge en halv time før starten på generalforsamlingen.

GlobalWafers forbedrede sit tilbud til DKK 355 mio. og gav afkald på negative købesumsregule­ ringer. Kl. 10.00 – da generalforsamlingen skulle starte – meddelte NSIG ved en telefonopring­ ning, at der ville komme et overtagelsestilbud på Topsils aktier, Finanstilsynet var informeret, og der blev opfordret til, at generalforsamlingen blev aflyst. Det var det andet varsel på, at det ville blive en ”lang dag på kontoret” – og generalforsamlingen var end ikke i gang.

Anden akt: Vindstyrke 12 Generalforsamlingen blev startet op, og ca. 80 personer – de fleste hårdtprøvede kapitalejere – var klar. Som bestyrelsens udpegede dirigent erklærede jeg generalforsamlingen for lovlig og beslutningsdygtig og traf straks min første ”on-stage” dirigentbeslutning. Generalforsamlingen blev suspenderet i en time, for at bestyrelsen og jeg i ro kunne vurdere situationen med et overtagelsestilbud. Det er dirigenten, som beslutter, at der skal holdes en pause og længden heraf. I vanskelige situationer bør dirigenten ikke tøve med at kalde en sådan ”time out”. Det er klogt lige at købe sig lidt tid til at tænke sig om, hvis der er tale om usædvanlige situationer.

Da generalforsamlingen blev genoptaget, blev næste dirigentbeslutning truffet. Jeg gjorde alle deltagere til insidere, da jeg ikke kunne udelukke, at der ville blive omtalt eller opstå intern viden på generalforsamlingen, men samtidig mente jeg, at den interne viden under mødet kunne ”styres”. Jeg gjorde det tydeligt for alle, hvad intern viden er, at ikke-kendte oplysninger kunne fremkomme, og at videregivelse ville være underlagt forbuddet i værdipapirhandelslovens § 36.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

91

Dirigenten skal – ved siden af de selskabsretlige regler for generalforsamlingen – sikre sig, at de børsretlige regler ikke overtrædes i forbindelse med generalforsamlingen.

Næste dirigentbeslutning fulgte umiddelbart efter. Jeg besluttede, at bestyrelsens forslag om salg af siliciumaktiviteter til GlobalWafers kunne behandles uagtet NSIGs fremsatte meddelelse om overtagelsestilbud. En dirigent kan ikke afvise behandlingen af et gyldigt fremsat forslag på grund af udefrakommende forhold, herunder et overtagelsestilbud. Rent praktisk gjaldt yderligere, at det konkrete overtagelsestilbud indeholdt en række betingelser. Jeg orienterede generalforsamlingen om indholdet af meddelelsen fra NSIG, således at kapitalejerne kunne inddrage denne information i deres overvejelser forud for dagens afstemning. I forhold til de afgivne brevstemmer vurderede jeg, at oplysningen ikke havde en sådan karakter, at disse herved bortfaldt.

„

En dirigent kan ikke afvise behandlingen af et gyldigt fremsat forslag på grund af udefrakommende forhold

Herefter traf jeg beslutning om, at det forbedrede tilbud fra GlobalWafers kunne behandles. Til alle forslag kan der stilles ændringsforslag, hvilket følger af bemærkningerne til selskabslovens § 91. Et ændringsforslag må dog ikke gå ud over, hvad der med rimelighed kan forventes ved­ taget inden for rammerne af det oprindelige forslag. Konkret var det nye tilbud fra GlobalWafers et mere attraktivt tilbud til Topsils kapitalejere, da prisen var højere end oprindeligt, og da til­ buddet ikke længere havde en negativ købesumsregulering. Det nye bud var således en ensidig forbedring og kunne derfor tages under behandling.

Efter en lang og til tider ophedet debat blev jeg tvunget til min næste dirigentbeslutning. En af Topsils større aktionærer havde forud for generalforsamlingen brevstemt, men var allige­ vel mødt op til generalforsamlingen og ønskede nu at tilbagekalde sine brevstemmer, der støttede forslaget om salg til GlobalWafers. En situation, hvor der skal træffes en beslutning, og hvor dirigenten – uagtet beslutningen – kan blive udsat for kritik. Jeg lagde mig op ad Erhvervsstyrelsens opfattelse og den mest gængse teori om, at når en brevstemme er afgivet, så er den én gang for alle afgivet og kan ikke tilbagekaldes.

Forslaget om salg af siliciumaktiviteten til GlobalWafers blev sat under afstemning og blev ved­ taget med 73,7 % af den repræsenterede kapital. Hvis brevstemmerne i stedet var talt med som nej-stemmer, havde forslaget ikke opnået den nødvendige 2/3-tilslutning. Dirigentbeslutningen havde således afgørende betydning for Topsils fremtid. Generalforsamlingen blev afsluttet, der blev straks sendt selskabsmeddelelse om generalforsamlingens forløb, registreringer af det ved­ tagne blev foretaget, referat blev skrevet, og Topsil igangsatte processen med at gennemføre salget af siliciumaktiviteterne til GlobalWafers. Dirigentens job var udført.

92

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Tredje akt: Vinden lægger sig

„

Sidst på dagen tog jeg retur til et regnfuldt Folkemøde på Bornholm. I flyet reflekterede jeg over, at forberedelse og afholdelse af generalforsamlinger i børsnoterede selskaber har udviklet sig til et kompliceret område at beskæftige sig med. Advokatens rolle ved ikke-standard general­ forsamlinger har ændret sig fra kun at være dirigent/juridisk rådgiver for selskabet til også at være praktisk sparringspartner gennem hele forløbet. Som dirigent er det vigtigt ikke at træffe forhastede beslutninger, men også at kunne træffe beslutninger.

Som dirigent er det vigtigt ikke at træffe forhastede beslutninger, men også at kunne træffe beslutninger.

Generalforsamlingen fik et efterspil, da NSIG et par dage senere klagede til Erhvervsstyrelsen over bl.a. de beslutninger, som jeg havde truffet. På dette tidspunkt var det vedtagne registreret, og Erhvervsstyrelsen kan kun under særlige omstændigheder ophæve foretagne registreringer.

Erhvervsstyrelsen traf den 30. juni 2016 afgørelse i sagen, og NSIG fik ikke medhold i sine ind­ sigelser. Jeg har således i dag styrelsens ord for, at der i mit dirigenthverv ikke kunne ”konsta­ teres åbenlyse overtrædelser af selskabsloven eller selskabets vedtægter”.

Salget til GlobalWafers blev gennemført den 1. juli 2016 baseret på den beslutning, som blev truffet på generalforsamlingen den 17. juni 2016. Min egen læring fra dagen er todelt. Dels at en dirigent på stedet skal turde træffe hurtige beslutninger på spørgsmål, der er komplicerede, og hvor dirigenten ikke blot kan læne sig op ad kendt praksis. Dette forudsætter både erfaring og rygmarvskendskab til de relevante regler. Dirigenthvervet er således blevet et håndværk.

Dels at ingen kender dagen, før solen går ned, og vinden har lagt sig – uagtet om det er i Frederikssund eller på Bornholm.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

93

20

Hvem bestemmer: bestyrelsen eller aktionærerne? ”I forbindelse med strategiarbejdet i 2015 har Topsil analyseret udviklingen i markedet, sin markedsposition og de fremadrettede muligheder. Som led heri har selskabet taget kontakt til andre aktører i siliciumbranchen og til forskellige dele af værdikæden.

I forlængelse heraf har Topsil modtaget et antal henvendelser om selskabets mulige interesse i at frasælge hele eller dele af siliciumforretningen eller indgå i en større strategisk sammenhæng. Nogle henvendelser har form af ikke-bindende, indikative købstilbud.”

Uddrag af selskabsmeddelelse nr. 3/2016, onsdag den 20. april 2016.

Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, Advokatfuldmægtig, LETT

Sådan lød det offentlige startskud på det, der skulle vise sig at blive en helt usædvanlig salgs­ proces, hvor alle aspekter af juraen, børsmarkedet og kommunikationens verden kom i spil.

Selskabsmeddelelse nr. 3/2016 var den første information fra Topsils bestyrelse til offentlig­ heden om, at et salg af Topsils hovedaktivitet, siliciumforretningen, var undervejs. Reaktionen fra markedet var umiddelbar – den dag steg Topsils aktiekurs med 26 %.

Forinden havde bestyrelsen nøje overvejet aktionærernes råb om forandring, og med hjælp fra investeringsrådgivere, advokater og revisorer blev strategien lagt, og salget af siliciumforret­ ningen sat i gang.

Et af de første spørgsmål, der meldte sig på banen, var spørgsmålet om, hvem der i sidste ende skulle træffe beslutningen om at sælge siliciumforretningen: bestyrelsen eller aktionærerne?

Bestyrelsens kompetenceområde På det generelle plan er spørgsmålet om bestyrelsens vs. aktionærernes beslutningskompe­ tence interessant på grund af bestyrelsens handlepligter og tilhørende erstatningsansvar.

Bestyrelsens kompetenceområde er blandt andet fastlagt i selskabslovens § 115, hvorefter bestyrelsen skal varetage den overordnede og strategiske ledelse og sikre en forsvarlig organi­ sation af selskabets virksomhed. Heri ligger, at bestyrelsen beskæftiger sig med spørgsmål og beslutninger af væsentlig eller usædvanlig karakter om blandt andet fastlæggelsen af selska­ bets politikker og strategier med hensyn til, hvordan selskabet skal finansieres og organiseres, etablering og køb af nye virksomheder, indtrængning på nye markeder, produktudvikling osv.

94

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Uden for bestyrelsens kompetence falder dispositioner i strid med eller uden for selskabets formål som fastsat i vedtægterne, ændringer af vedtægterne og områder, hvor generalforsam­ lingen ifølge selskabsloven er enekompetent. Bestyrelsens kompetence kan også begrænses af generalforsamlingen ved, at denne træffer en konkret beslutning eller indsætter en bestem­ melse i vedtægterne om, at bestemte typer af beslutninger hører under generalforsamlingens kompetence.

Beslutning om ændring af vedtægter, herunder navn og formål, kræver vedtagelse af generalforsamlingen med mindst 2/3 af såvel de stemmer, som er afgivet, som af den del af selskabskapitalen, som er repræsenteret på generalforsamlingen, såkaldt kvalificeret majoritet, jf. selskabslovens § 106, stk. 1.

Almindelige beslutninger, herunder om salg (der ikke kræver en ændring af vedtægterne) kan træffes med simpelt stemmeflertal, jf. selskabslovens § 105.

Vigtigheden af bestyrelsens kompetence afspejles af konsekvenserne ved fejltrin: Handler bestyrelsen uden for kompetenceområdet, kan bestyrelsen pålægges erstatningsansvar.

Splittelse inden for retsvidenskaben I de tilfælde, hvor salg af et selskabs væsentligste aktiviteter ikke kræver vedtægtsændringer eller strider mod selskabets formål, indeholder selskabsloven ikke nogen bestemmelser, der direkte tager stilling til, om salg af et selskabs væsentligste aktiviteter ligger inden for bestyrel­ sens kompetenceområde.

Spørgsmålet har heller ikke været prøvet direkte i nyere retspraksis. Enkelte juridiske forfattere har fremhævet to ældre domme, U 1936.35 H (salg af et mejeriselskabs eneste mejeri) og U 1943.448 Ø (salg af ejendomsselskabs eneste ejendom), som indikation på, at salg af væsent­ lige dele af selskabets virksomhed ligger inden for bestyrelsens kompetence, så længe der ikke kræves en vedtægtsmæssig ændring af selskabets formål eller selskabets opløsning. De to sager omhandlede imidlertid alene spørgsmålet om, med hvilken majoritet general­forsamlingen kunne træffe beslutning, hvorfor sagerne ikke giver svar på, om bestyrelsen kan gennemføre et salg egenhændigt og uden forelæggelse for generalforsamlingen.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

95

I mangel på klare holdepunkter i lovgivningen og i retspraksis har der i grove træk dannet sig to skoler inden for retsvidenskaben:

”Indenfor”

”Udenfor”

Flertallet af de juridiske forfattere taler for, at salg af hele et selskabs virksomhed eller væsentlige dele heraf ligger inden for besty­ relsens kompetence, såfremt dette sker i selskabets interesse. De mest radikale for­ fattere fastholder endda bestyrelsens kompe­ tence selv i de tilfælde, hvor det undertiden står klart, at et salg reelt sker for at forbe­ rede afvikling af selskabet, med den begrun­ delse at det her er op til generalforsamlingen at træffe endelig beslutning om likvidation af selskabet eller pålægge bestyrelsen at iværksætte nye aktiviteter1. De mere mode­

Mindretallet af de juridiske forfattere taler for, at salg af hele et selskabs virksomhed eller væsentlige dele heraf ligger uden for besty­ relsens kompetenceområde. De tilslutter sig i stedet forelæggelsen for generalforsamlingen som det klare udgangspunkt med det argu­ ment, at det vil være i overensstemmelse med moderne principper for god corporate gover­ nance og de forudsætninger, som mange akti­ onærer har for at investere i selskabet.

rate forfattere angiver, at spørgsmål af helt fundamental karakter bør forelægges for og afgøres af generalforsamlingen, hvor hensyn til hurtighed og diskretion ikke taler imod.

Baggrunden herfor er, at processen ved ind­ kaldelse til generalforsamling i børsnoterede aktieselskaber tager lang tid, og at afholdelse af generalforsamlinger er offentlig.

Fravigelse af udgangspunktet bør kun helt lej­ lighedsvis tillades, hvor dette kan begrundes i varetagelsen af selskabets og dermed akti­ onærernes og de øvrige interessenters inte­ resse. Dette kunne for eksempelvis være for at undgå konkurs eller rekonstruktion.

Sammenfattende kan det siges, at de juridiske forfattere inden for retsvidenskaben ikke er enige om, hvorvidt bestyrelsen egenhændigt kan foretage salg af selskabets væsentligste aktiviteter uden forelæggelse for generalforsamlingen.

1 Synspunktet kan synes noget vidtgående, idet et gennemført salg ikke altid kan erstattes med køb af tilsvarende eller nye aktiviteter, og en beslutning ikke altid kan trækkes tilbage, når først beslutningen er truffet og eksekveret (som det var tilfældet i Topsil).

96

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

De praktiserende juristers dilemma Uden et klart svar fra retsvidenskaben befinder de praktiserende jurister sig i lidt af et dilemma: Hvad skal de råde bestyrelserne i den virkelige verden til at gøre?

Ser man bort fra retsvidenskaben et øjeblik og sætter sig i aktionærernes sted, kan svaret på spørgsmålet formentligt koges ned til følgende: Hvad siger den sunde fornuft, hvis aktionærerne (ejerne af selskabet) skal anse sig for ordentligt behandlede i år 2016/2017? De skal selvfølgelig selv tage stilling til spørgsmål af så afgørende karakter!

Ud fra denne betragtning kan bestyrelsen, lidt frækt beskrevet, vælge mellem at gøre to ting: 1) ”tage chancen” og træffe beslutningen med risiko for, at aktionærerne føler sig dårligt behandlede og efterfølgende gør et personligt ansvar gældende over for bestyrelsens medlem­ mer, eller 2) følge bonus paters smalle sti og forelægge beslutningen for generalforsamlingen.

Beslutningen i Topsil I Topsil var svaret ligetil: Aktionærerne skulle inddrages – både af hensyn til respekten for aktionærerne og deres mulighed for som ejere at udøve indflydelse på Topsils fremtid, men også fordi Topsil under den planlagte transaktionsstruktur skulle ændre både navn og formål i vedtægterne (hvilket utvivlsomt kræver generalforsamlingens vedtagelse med kvalificeret majoritet i henhold til selskabsloven).

I tiden efter offentliggørelsen af salgsprocessen accelererede denne, og en måned senere indgik bestyrelsen aftale med det taiwanske GlobalWafers om salget af siliciumforretningen.

Ud over myndighedernes godkendelse betingede bestyrelsen aftalen af generalforsamlingens godkendelse. Forelæggelsen fandt sted på den ekstraordinære generalforsamling den 17. juni 2016 under stort postyr. Få minutter efter generalforsamlingens planmæssige start tikkede et offentligt købstilbud ind på alle Topsils aktier fra en ny kinesisk byder, generalforsamlingen blev udsat, og de fremmødte aktionærer blev gjort til insidere af generalforsamlingsdirigenten.

Efter en times drøftelser valgte bestyrelsen at holde fast i anbefalingen til aktionærerne om at stemme for salget til GlobalWafers – og generalforsamlingen fulgte anbefalingen.

Samlet set viste bestyrelsens beslutning om at betinge salget af aktionærernes godkendelse sig at være en fordel for alle parter: Ud over at aktionærerne fik den endelige beslutnings­ kompetence i en meget afgørende og kompleks situation, forlængede ventetiden ind til gene­ ralforsamlingens godkendelse også budprocessen, hvorved der opstod en decideret priskrig, som i sidste ende gav aktionærerne en højere pris for siliciumforretningen.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

97

21

Anmelderansvar, kontrol og registreringers udslettelse Erhvervsstyrelsen har udviklet en række nye digitale selvbetjenings­ løsninger til brug for registrering af virksomheder. I disse nye digitale selv­ betjeningsløsninger sker straksregistrering af 90 % af sagerne, eller mere, hvis en række automatiserede, indbyggede minimumsregler er opfyldt. Det vil sige, at det kun er et fåtal af sager, der kommer til manuel kontrol hos en sagsbehandler.

Selvbetjeningsløsningerne bygger på et lovfæstet princip om anmelderansvar, det vil sige, at anmelder indestår for, at registreringen er lovligt foretaget, herunder at der foreligger behørig fuldmagt, og at dokumentationen i forbindelse med registreringen er gyldig.

Søren Corfixsen Whitt, Chefkonsulent, Erhvervsstyrelsen Erhvervsstyrelsen er en styrelse under Erhvervsministeriet.

Erhvervsstyrelsen arbejder for at styrke danske virksomheders konkurrenceevne og bidrager derigennem til at løse udfordrin­ gerne med at skabe øget vækst og nye arbejdspladser i hele Danmark.

Det skal i den forbindelse understreges, at hvis nogen finder, at en foretagen registrering er den pågældende til skade, hører spørgsmålet om registreringens udslettelse under domstolenes afgørelse. Uoverensstemmelser mellem selskaber og tredjemand, herunder i tilfælde af uenig­ hed af det på generalforsamlingen passerede, skal således afgøres af domstolene.

Anmelderansvar Det er af væsentlig betydning, at offentligheden kan have tillid til de i Erhvervsstyrelsen registrerede oplysninger. Da anmeldelser til registrering i Erhvervsstyrelsen sker ved selv­ registrering ved brug af Erhvervsstyrelsens it-registreringsløsninger, hvilket umiddelbart fører til registrering, er det vigtigt at sikre, at det anmeldte er korrekt og overholder lovens regler.

Erhvervsstyrelsen har allerede gennem en årrække med hjemmel i selskabsloven tydelig­ gjort, at der påhviler anmelder et særligt ansvar i forbindelse med det nærmere indhold af de anmeldte/registrerede forhold, jf. selskabslovens § 15.

Hvis anmelder ikke selv har deltaget i eller overværet beslutninger om registreringspligtige forhold, er det efter omstændighederne anmelders vurdering, om der er behov for at afklare tvivlsspørgsmål eller for at udbede sig nærmere dokumentation for de forhold, som ligger til grund for anmeldelsen.

Der er ikke tale om objektivt ansvar, men det påhviler anmelder at undersøge sagen nærmere, hvis forholdene giver anledning hertil.

Endvidere bør anmelder ikke medvirke til registreringer, hvis anmelder er bekendt med eller har en formodning om, at registrering af det anmeldte ikke er i overensstemmelse med lov­ givningen, selskabets vedtægter eller det, der reelt er besluttet vedrørende selskabets forhold.

98

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Anmelder indestår således for, at anmeldelsen, der ligger til grund for registreringen, er lovligt foretaget, herunder at der foreligger behørig fuldmagt, og at dokumentation i forbindelse med registreringen eller anmeldelsen er gyldig.

Manuel kontrol En registrering i Erhvervsstyrelsens selvbetjeningssystem kan afgøres ved digital straks­ afgørelse, eller sagen kan udtages til manuel sagsbehandling, jf. anmeldelsesbekendtgørelsens § 3, stk. 2. Det er Erhvervsstyrelsen, der beslutter, hvorvidt en sag skal udtages til manuel sagsbehandling.

Erhvervsstyrelsens it-system indeholder en række regler for, hvilke sager der skal behandles manuelt af en sagsbehandler i Erhvervsstyrelsen. Den manuelle sagsbehandling skal sikre en kontrol af, at det anmeldte er i overensstemmelse med lovgivningen.

Sager vedrørende visse særlige virksomhedstyper som fx de finansielle virksomheder eller erhvervsdrivende fonde bliver altid udtaget til manuel sagsbehandling, uanset hvad indberet­ ningen omhandler.

Sagstypen kan ligeledes begrunde, at en sag tages ud til manuel sagsbehandling. Som eksem­ pel herpå kan nævnes, at alle sager om opløsning ved betalingserklæring, genoptagelser samt gennemførelser af fusioner og spaltninger altid undergives manuel sagsbehandling.

Endelig kan anmelderen af en konkret sag eller den konkrete virksomhed, sagen vedrører, ligeledes medføre, at en sag tages ud til manuel sagsbehandling.

Efterfølgende kontrol af en registrering Selvom en sag er registreret, kan den dog fortsat udtages til manuel sagsbehandling og kontrol.

En række af de registrerede sager udtager Erhvervsstyrelsen således til en efterfølgende kon­ trol med henblik på at kontrollere, at den foretagne registrering er i overensstemmelse med lovgivningen. Indførelsen af de nye it-systemer har gjort denne kontrol langt mere målrettet, da der i det nye system er indbygget en funktionalitet til at påsætte såkaldte kontrolmærkater.

Kontrolmærkaterne markerer sager, hvor systemet på baggrund af en række regler, der er opstillet i systemet, vurderer, at der kan være grundlag for at foretage en efterfølgende kontrol af den foretagne indberetning.

Den efterfølgende kontrol består i en gennemgang af de dokumenter og oplysninger, der er indtastet i forbindelse med registreringen, ligesom der også ofte indhentes dokumentation hos anmelderen af sagen.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

99

Hvis Erhvervsstyrelsen i forbindelse med en sådan kontrol konstaterer fejl, orienteres anmel­ deren herom. Hvis der er indikationer på, at der er tale om en bevidst falsk registrering, vil Erhvervsstyrelsen anmelde personen til politiet eller Advokatrådet og samtidig spærre perso­ nens mulighed for at lave selvregistreringer via Erhvervsstyrelsens it-system.

Erhvervsstyrelsens mulighed for at slette en registrering Når en registrering har fundet sted via Erhvervsstyrelsens selvregistreringssystem, som det var tilfældet i den konkrete sag, henhører spørgsmålet om registreringens udslettelse som udgangspunkt under domstolene, jf. selskabslovens § 20.

Erhvervsstyrelsen kan alene administrativt ændre registreringer, hvis der er tale om en åbenbar utilsigtet fejlskrift fra anmelders side i de tilfælde, hvor anmeldelse er registreret ved brug af Erhvervsstyrelsens selvregistreringssystem. Tilsvarende kan der ske korrektioner af registre­ ringer, der er foretaget i forbindelse med sagsbehandling i Erhvervsstyrelsen, hvis fejlen beror på en sagsbehandlerfejl. Det samme er tilfældet, hvis det registrerede åbenbart er en nullitet.

En åbenbar nullitet skal i denne forbindelse forstås som tilfælde, hvor anmeldelsen er åbenlys lov- eller vedtægtsstridig eller klart ikke er i overensstemmelse med de faktiske forhold.

Erhvervsstyrelsen har som registreringsmyndighed ikke kompetence til at foretage en egentlig bevisvurdering, da den henhører under domstolene.

Når Erhvervsstyrelsen ikke på baggrund af de modtagne dokumenter kan konstatere utvivl­ somme overtrædelser af selskabsloven eller selskabets vedtægter, der kan begrunde admini­ strativ udslettelse af de foretagne registreringer i selskabet, henviser Erhvervsstyrelsen parterne til at afklare tvisten ved domstolene.

100

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Topsil-sagen Det var i den konkrete sag Erhvervsstyrelsens vurdering, at der ikke på baggrund af de mod­ tagne dokumenter kunne konstateres åbenlyse overtrædelser af selskabsloven eller selskabets vedtægter, der kunne begrunde en administrativ udslettelse af de foretagne registreringer.

Erhvervsstyrelsen lagde ved sin vurdering vægt på, at det fremgår af generalforsamlings­ referatet af 17. juni 2016, som var offentliggjort på selskabets hjemmeside (www.cemat.dk), og som var bilagt registreringen, at generalforsamlingen var lovlig og beslutningsdygtig. Det fremgår endvidere af referatet, at afstemningsresultatet betød, at begge bestyrelsens forslag blev vedtaget af generalforsamlingen.

Det er dirigentens og anmelderens ansvar, at de oplyste forhold er korrekte, herunder at der var den fornødne majoritet tilstede på generalforsamlingen til at vedtage forslagene.

Det var på baggrund af ovenstående Erhvervsstyrelsens vurdering, at der var tale om kom­ plicerede forhold i et selskabs interne forhold med alvorlig uenighed til følge. I sådanne tilfælde er Erhvervsstyrelsen ikke rette myndighed til at afgøre konflikten. En afgørelse af en sådan konflikt vil sædvanligvis kræve vidneforklaringer og bevisbedømmelse, og her er domstolene det rette forum.

Den første lov om aktieselskaber blev vedtaget i 1917. Da man med loven indførte en særlig selskabsretlig lovgivning, var det nødvendigt med en enhed, som kunne forestå registreringen af aktieselskaber. Som følge heraf blev Aktieselskabsregisteret oprettet i 1918.

I 1988 var der en større reform i det daværende Industriministerium, der medførte, at en række nye styrelser overtog nogle af de opgaver, som tidligere havde været placeret i ministeriets departement. Reformen betød blandt andet, at Aktieselskabsregisteret skiftede navn til Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, samt at styrelsen udover registreringsmyndigheds­ opgaven for virksomheder overtog administrationen af områder som næringsret, liberale erhverv, lukkelov m.v.

Erhvervsstyrelsen blev etableret den 1. januar 2012, som led i en fusion mellem Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, Erhvervsog Byggestyrelsen samt dele af IT- og Telestyrelsen.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

101

22

Bordet fanger – Brevstemmer Den vigtigste afstemning i Topsils historie var slut og stemmerne talt op: Bestyrelsens forslag om salg af siliciumforretningen til GlobalWafers blev vedtaget af generalforsamlingen med 73,65 % af de repræsenterede stemmer. Men ikke alle de fremmødte aktionærer, der havde stemt for forslaget, var tilfredse med resultatet.

Brevstemmer fik en særdeles afgørende betydning ved salget af Topsils siliciumforretning.

Under drøftelserne på den ekstraordinære generalforsamling den 17. juni 2016 proklamerede en større aktionær, at han ønskede at tilbagekalde sin brevstemme for forslaget. Baggrunden for ønsket var de hektiske begivenheder dagen før og under selve generalforsamlingen. Herefter måtte generalforsamlingsdirigenten tænke hurtigt: Hvad står der i loven om brevstemmer?

Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, Advokatfuldmægtig, LETT

Man kan ikke fiske stemmesedlen op af stemmeboksen igen Aktionærer kan stemme på tre måder til en generalforsamling: ved personligt fremmøde, ved fuldmagt eller ved brevstemme. Til trods for de store konsekvenser ved de forskellige måder at afgive stemme på, er emnet undervurderet i retsvidenskaben og vel især i den praktiske juridiske verden – dette var generalforsamlingen i Topsil et godt eksempel på.

Brevstemmer er reguleret i selskabslovens § 104, stk. 2. Muligheden for at trække afsendte brevstemmer tilbage er imidlertid ikke direkte reguleret i selskabsloven. Af forarbejderne til selskabsloven fremgår dog: ”Har selskabet modtaget brevstemmen, har kapitalkapitalejeren stemt om de pågældende forhold, og stemmen kan ikke tilbagekaldes. Heri adskiller en brevstemme sig væsentligt fra en fuldmagt, som kan tilbagekaldes til enhver tid, jf. § 80, stk. 2, dvs. så længe fuldmægtigen endnu ikke har gjort brug af fuldmagten”.1

Selskabslovens § 104, stk. 2: ”Kapitalejere har mulighed for at brevstemme, dvs. for at stemme skriftligt, inden generalforsamlingen afholdes. I kapital­ selskaber, der ikke har værdipapirer optaget til handel på et reguleret marked i et EU/EØS-land, kan denne mulighed fraviges i kapitalselskabets vedtægter. Skriftlig stemmeafgivelse må kun underlægges de krav og begrænsninger, der er nødvendige for at sikre identifikation af kapitalejerne, og kun for så vidt de står i rimeligt forhold til dette mål.”

1 Jf. Lovforslag nr. 170: Forslag til lov om aktie- og anpartsselskaber (selskabsloven) som fremsat 25. marts 2009, Til § 104 (Folketingstidende 2008-2009, Tillæg A, Spalte 5455).

102

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

„

Har selskabet modtaget brevstemmen, har kapitalkapital­ejeren stemt om de pågældende forhold, og stemmen kan ikke til­bagekaldes.

Med henvisning til selskabslovens forarbejder er den altherskende opfattelse inden for den juridiske litteratur, at afgivne brevstemmer ikke kan tilbagekaldes. Tankegangen er den, at når en brevstemme er afgivet, er afstemningen sat i gang, og man kan så at sige ikke fiske stemmesedlen op af stemmeboksen igen. En enkelt forfatter åbner dog op for, at selskaber har ret, men ikke pligt til, at kunne tillade, at en brevstemme kan tilbagekaldes med respekt af lighedsgrundsætningen.

På den anden side låser brevstemmer ikke et forslag og muligheden for at stille ændringsforslag.

Så længe ændringsforslaget ligger inden for det oprindelige forslags område og må anses som en forbedring af det oprindelige forslag, er der ingen tvivl om, at brevstemmer kan anvendes ved afstemningen om ændringsforslaget. I Topsils tilfælde kom der umiddelbart før general­ forsamlingens start en utvetydig forbedring af købesummen til fordel for aktionærerne.

Generalforsamlingsdirigentens beslutning og det juridiske efterspil I Topsils indkaldelse til den ekstraordinære generalforsamling den 17. juni 2016 var det (som sædvanligt i Topsils indkaldelser) angivet, at brevstemmer ikke kan tilbagekaldes.

Selskabslovens forarbejder, litteraturen og angivelsen i indkaldelsen taget i betragtning valgte dirigenten at afvise aktionærens ønske om at tilbagekalde brevstemmen. Herefter blev for­ slaget sat til afstemning, og med alle de afgivne brevstemmer som tungen på vægtskålen blev forslaget vedtaget med 73,65 % af de fremmødte stemmer/kapital (i henhold til selskabslovens § 106, stk. 1, krævede vedtagelsen af forslaget 2/3 majoritet, svarende til 66,67 % af stem­ merne og kapitalen).

Men spørgsmålet om brevstemmer skulle vise sig ikke at være et overstået kapitel (endnu). Et par dage efter generalforsamlingens afholdelse modtog Topsil meddelelse om, at den kinesiske byder, NSIG, havde valgt at indgive en klage til Erhvervsstyrelsen over afholdelsen af general­ forsamlingen. I klagen var det blandt andet anført, at generalforsamlingsdirigenten ikke lovligt kunne fastholde aktionæren på dennes brevstemme under hensyn til de omstændigheder, som var indtruffet efter afgivelsen af brevstemmen, i henhold til EU-lovgivningen, nærmere bestemt det såkaldte Aktionærrettighedsdirektiv2 , dansk rets lære om bristede forudsæt­ninger og aftalelovens § 36. Erhvervsstyrelsen afviste dog klagen, og dirigentens beslutning stod således ved magt.

Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2007/36/EF af 11. juli 2007 om udøvelse af visse aktionær­ rettigheder i børsnoterede selskaber.

2

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

103

104

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Tvungen gennemførelse af en meningsløs afstemning Brevstemmer spøgte endnu engang på en af Topsils efterfølgende generalforsamlinger, men denne gang på en helt anden måde. Næsten samtidig med indgivelsen af NSIG’s klage til Erhvervsstyrelsen havde en mindre gruppe aktionærer efter reglerne i selskabslovens § 89, stk. 3, anmodet Topsil om afholdelse af en ekstraordinær generalforsamling med det ene punkt på dagsordenen at tilbagekalde den generalforsamlingsbeslutning, som den 17. juni 2016 havde godkendt salget til GlobalWafers. Bestyrelsen indkaldte i overensstemmelse med de lov­givningsmæssige frister til ekstraordinær generalforsamling den 5. august 2016, men da dagen kom, var aftalen med GlobalWafers closet og siliciumforretningen overført. Her stod Topsil og aktionærerne med et forslag om at tilbagekalde en beslutning, som allerede var gennem­ ført, og der var – for dramaets skyld fristes man til at sige – selvfølgelig afgivet brevstemmer.

Afstemningen var i sagens natur meningsløs, men i henhold til den juridiske litteratur var der ikke noget at gøre: Er der afgivet brevstemmer for et forslag, anses afstemningen for at være gået i gang med det resultat, at afstemningen skal gennemføres. Herefter blev forslaget pligt­ mæssigt sat under afstemning af dirigenten, og forslaget blev stemt ned.

Bordet fanger Historien om salget af Topsils siliciumforretning er eksempel på, at bordet fanger ved afgivelse af brevstemmer på mere end én måde: i) brevstemmer kan ikke tilbagekaldes, og ii) en afstem­ ning skal gennemføres, når der er afgivet brevstemmer.

Til de aktionærer, som i fremtiden overvejer at brevstemme, men ikke er 100 % sikre på deres stemme (uanset hvad der sker), kan det kun anbefales at stemme ved fuldmagt i stedet – denne kan nemlig tilbagekaldes til enhver tid, det vil sige så længe fuldmægtigen endnu ikke har gjort brug af fuldmagten.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

105

Minoritetsaktionærernes talerør

23 Christian Reinholdt, Adm. direktør, SmallCap Danmark A/S SmallCap Danmark er en niche­ orienteret kapitalforvaltnings­ virksomhed, der er specialist i børsnoterede, nordiske mindre og mellemstore virksomheder.

SmallCap Danmark driver to fonde, SmallCap Danmark A/S og Investeringsforeningen SmallCap Danmark, med et samlet kapitalgrundlag på ca.

480 mio. kr. (pr. 31.12.15).

Begge fonde er børsnoterede og åbne for private investorer.

SmallCap Danmark udnytter markedets investorfokus på store virksomheder som en konkurrencefordel i arbejdet med small cap investering.

Interview af Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen og N.E. Nielsen, LETT

Stemningen i den lånte kantine på Topsils gamle adresse var anspændt – forholdet mellem bestyrelsen og minoritetsaktionærerne var som hund og kat. ”Kommunikationen i salgsprocessen har simpelthen været for dårlig. Jeg er mildest talt forundret over, at bestyrelsen påtænker et aktie­tilbagekøbsprogram til en kurs på 30,5 øre pr. aktie. Jeg opfordrer på det kraftigste bestyrelsen til at hæve prisen til mindst 35,2 øre pr. aktie svarende til prisen i NSIG’s offentlige købstilbud, og dette afspejler ikke engang selskabets indre værdi” – sådan lød det fra SmallCap Danmark A/S’ repræsentant, Christian Reinholdt, hvorefter de fremmødte aktionærer brød ud i klapsalver.

Bølgerne gik højt på Cemats ekstraordinære generalforsamling den 5. august 2016.

Generalforsamlingen blev afholdt på baggrund af en anmodning fra en gruppe aktionærer, der ønskede at tilbagekalde den generalforsamlingsbeslutning, som halvanden måned forinden havde blåstemplet salget af hovedaktiviteten, siliciumforretningen – sjældent set!

Oven på en salgsproces ud over det sædvanlige har vi sat Christian Reinholdt, adm. direktør i SmallCap Danmark A/S, i stævne til en snak om, hvordan det er at være minoritetsaktionær, og hvad der generelt er vigtigt for minoritetsaktionærer i danske small cap selskaber.

Energieffektivisering og solceller First things first – vi var selvfølgelig interesserede i at høre, hvordan og hvorfor SmallCap Danmark oprindeligt blev aktionær i Topsil. Christian Reinholdt trak på smilebåndet og begyndte at fortælle: ”Det var i 2009. Vi var til møde i LD om noget helt andet. På vej ud ad døren blev vi stoppet: Om vi ikke lige ville høre lidt om Topsil? Ahh, vi havde hørt så meget dårligt om Topsil i gamle dage, så det havde vi egentlig ikke lyst til. Men med tilbud om en frokost og muligheden forhøre mere om Topsil fandt vi ud af, at det faktisk gik forrygende på det tidspunkt. Solcellerne bragede afsted, og det, Topsil ikke kunne bruge i siliciumproduktionen, kunne i stedet sælges til solcelleindustrien for en høj pris. Vi syntes også, energieffektiviseringstrenden var interessant

Retten til at kræve indkaldt til en ekstraordinær generalforsamling I henhold til selskabslovens § 89, stk. 3, kan aktionærer, der ejer 5 % af aktieselskabets kapital, skriftligt forlange, at der afholdes en ekstraordinær generalforsamling. Indkaldelse med behandling af et bestemt angivet emne skal ske senest 2 uger efter, at det er forlangt.

106

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

– transformation af energi rundt omkring i Europa blandt andet til højhastighedstog. Topsils produkter var high end, og der havde vi så muligheden for inden for vores small cap segment at hoppe med på vognen.”

Ufrivillige insidere og misbrugte talerstole Som aktionær i Topsil var SmallCap Danmark igennem de senere år i løbende dialog med ledelsen. Ifølge Christian Reinholdt skal man dog som aktionær være ekstremt opmærksom på, hvilken type information kommunikationen med ledelsen frembringer: ”Det værste, selskabet kan gøre, er at gøre dig til insider. Du bliver fuldstændig låst. Det har jeg understreget mange gange over for diverse selskaber. Du kan blive gjort til ufrivillig insider, men ved at have en løbende dialog med selskabet forstår du bedre, hvad de tænker, hvordan de opfatter tingene og de meddelelser, som de sender ud. Det er derfor, at det er så vigtigt at lære selskabet og især dets ledelse at kende. I kraft af analysearbejdet af regnskaber osv. kan man have en meget skarpere dialog med ledelsen om problemerne og mulighederne. Det er meget afgørende at lære ledelsen at kende særligt i det segment, som SmallCap Danmark er i, og med den investeringsfilosofi, som vi har."

„

Det værste, selskabet kan gøre, er at gøre dig til insider.

SmallCap Danmark har også flere gange været aktiv på Topsils generalforsamlinger. Men hvor­ dan er det at stille sig op på en generalforsamling og vide, at man er i undertal? ”Man kan lægge et moralsk pres, men man går ikke fra generalforsamlingen med de store forventninger.

Som investor er det vigtigt, at man er kendt – generalforsamlingen er en måde at synliggøre sig på over for ledelsen og for andre aktionærer. For os i SmallCap Danmark er det også en måde at vise vores egne aktionærer, at vi har en holdning til vores investeringer. Vi er aktive og forsøger at bruge de midler, vi kan. Men det skal heller ikke misbruges – nogle aktionærer betragter generalforsamlingen som en talerstol, hvor de endelig har mulighed for at udbasunere hvad som helst – altså noget er støj og spild af tid, der ikke har gang på jord.”

Kommunikation, tillid og en kompetent ledelse Med 30 års erfaring inden for branchen har Christian Reinholdt været med til et utal af investe­ ringer både i gode og dårlige tider og dermed fået indsigt i, hvordan investeringer i small cap selskaber adskiller sig fra investeringer i større selskaber, hvor aktierne er anderledes likvide og kan afhændes med dags varsel til børskurs. På denne baggrund var det interessant at spørge om, hvad der fra investorens synsvinkel generelt er vigtigt for minoritetsaktionærer i danske small cap selskaber.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

107

”Small cap selskaber er meget forskellige, man kan ikke bare sige, at de er på én måde. Men vi har lært en hård lektie i Topsil. Man skal være utroligt omhyggelig med at lære personkredsen i selskabet at kende, både bestyrelsen og den daglige ledelse – det havde vi nok forsømt i Topsil.

I dag bruger jeg endnu mere tid på at prøve at sætte mig ind i, hvad det er for en bestyrelse, vi har med at gøre. Normalt har man ikke den samme dialog med bestyrelsen som med den daglige ledelse, men det kan godt være vigtigt i nogle situationer, så man forstår, hvad de blandt andet tænker om kommunikation. Det er et af de problemer, som er i mange små selskaber – kommunikationen til markedet er ikke stringent, der er ikke en rød tråd. Nogle gange er det helt modsat af, hvad de sagde for blot et kvartal siden. De lukker ikke det gab, der kan være.

De finder blot på noget nyt at sige, og så kan man som aktionær blive enormt bange, specielt hvis resultaterne er rigtig dårlige over en længere periode. Hvis resultaterne er gode, og kommunikationen ikke er så god, ser man lidt gennem fingre med det. Et godt eksempel herpå er Vestas – de har gjort det fremragende, efter de har fået den nye ledelse, men de siger aldrig noget som helst. Det med at lære ledelsen at kende hænger også sammen med tillid – man skal have tillid til ledelsen. Ledelsen skal være kompetent – hands on med tingene og kritisk. Mister man først tilliden til ledelsen, mister man som regel også tilliden til investeringen.

Ejerstrukturen er også enormt vigtig. Det er hånden på kogepladen – ledelsen skal selv have en økonomisk interesse i virksomheden, men balancen er svær. Det er ikke altid, at storaktionærer i bestyrelsen har samme interesse som minoritetsaktionærerne. Hvis du har en bestyrelse, som sidder og beskytter sig selv, kan du ikke komme efter den. Så er man låst i en dum situation.

En af de ting, som vi vil være endnu mere omhyggelige med at finde ud af på forhånd, er, hvordan der bliver tænkt i bestyrelsen, herunder på mindretalsaktionærerne. Det er jo altid, når det går galt, at du har brug for at vide det, og ikke når det går godt. Og når det så går galt, er det ofte for sent.

„

108

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Det er hånden på kogepladen – ledelsen skal selv have en økonomisk interesse i virksomheden, men balancen er svær.

Endelig har jeg har også fået en stor respekt for hårdt finansielt gearede virksomheder, specielt når man har at gøre med virksomheder, der ikke er supergodt ledede – så kan det være døden.

Selskabet er i en tvangssituation, hvor det ikke kan træffe nogen ordentlige, kommercielle beslutninger – så handler alt om at overleve. Banken har kun én interesse, og det er dens kredit, den er hamrende ligeglad med aktionærerne – end of story, det er enhver bank – og det skal en bank måske nok også være.

Hvis jeg skal kritisere os selv lidt i Topsil-sagen, skulle vi nok have reageret noget før, men vi fik hele tiden at vide, at det gik bedre. Til sidst havde vi ikke noget at stå imod med. Vi købte ind i en siliciumforretning og ikke et polsk ejendomsselskab – den investment case, vi købte ind i, er der ikke mere.

Dårlige investeringer gør ondt, men der er selvfølgelig også en egenskyld – man kunne jo have ladet være med at investere. Desværre er det ofte for sent at komme ud igen på grund af illikviditet, medmindre man sætter prisen ned med 50 %.”

Minoritetsaktionærens lære fra Topsil: 1. Invester i likvide aktier, medmindre du bevidst har valgt en langvarig strategi 2. Lær bestyrelsen og direktionen godt at kende – og kommuniker med dem 3. Overvej om ejerstrukturen kan være et problem 4. Undgå hårdt finansielt gearede virksomheder 5. Sælg, hvis du ikke længere har tillid til ledelsen eller investeringen – også selvom dette medfører et tab – smid ikke (flere) gode penge efter dårlige penge

Advokater i bestyrelsen Interviewet lakkede mod enden, men inden vi gik, måtte vi lige stille ét sidste spørgsmål: Hvad er din holdning til advokater i bestyrelsen? Svaret fra Christian Reinholdt kom prompte og med et glimt i øjet: ”Sjældent godt. Jeg vil have en kommerciel bestyrelse – en der kan træffe kommercielle beslutninger. Man er ikke kvalificeret, fordi man er advokat, men man kan godt være advokat og kvalificeret og kommerciel.”.

Sidstnævnte var vi helt enige i.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

109

Når stormen raser: Åååh, sh**

24

De sociale mediers magt er enorm. Og er man først havnet i en shitstorm er der tre ting, man har brug for: Hastighed. Mod. Beslutningskraft. For shitstormens omdrejningspunkt – kritikken eller forargelsen – er ofte helt berettiget. Så hvad pokker gør vi?

At blive centrum i en shitstorm er ikke rart. Faktisk helt forfærdeligt. Folk, der har gennemlevet sådan en, glemmer den aldrig, ligesom flere virksomheder og topledere ikke genvinder den status, respekt og anseelse, de levede af før stormen.

Når de første tegn på en shitstorm er en realitet, er der derfor kun én vej ud: Smid alt(!) hvad du har i hænderne – NU! For evner du ikke at reagere MED DET SAMME, havner du i – ja, deep sh**.

Du får nemlig sjældent en chance mere.

Esben Høstager, Rådgiver for bestyrelser og direktioner gennem 25 år, HØSTAGER │ SOLO Esben Høstager er en højt spe­ cialiseret rådgiver, der gennem 25 år har hørt til topchefernes foretrukne sparringspartnere.

Han har rådgivet direktioner og bestyrelser i et utal af virksom­ heder og organisationer, ligesom han har haft sin gang i ministerier, styrelser og kommuner. Forud for sit virke som rådgiver var han i 11 år kommunikationsdirektør i to af de dengang største virk­ somheder i den finansielle sektor.

I dag driver han virksomheden HØSTAGER │ SOLO, hvor han udelukkende beskæftiger sig med strategisk kommunikations­ rådgivning, issues management og krisehåndtering. Læs mere på www.hostager.dk

110

Lyder det ligetil? Det er det ikke. Men husk det venligst alligevel.

For et par år siden rådgav jeg en af de store butikskæder, som ved et rent tilfælde var blevet opmærksom på, at et af deres produkter var meget negativt omtalt på Facebook – ja, faktisk var der fotos af produktet i brand (og det burde ikke kunne brænde)!

Dét var imidlertid ikke det værste. For som vi hurtigt konstaterede, flash’ede en af tidens allerstørste reality-stjerner præcis samme produkt på sin egen Facebook-side – med en kærlig kommentar om, at vedkommende havde fået det i gave ”af min søde mor”… Og den pågældende reality-stjerne havde – hold fast – 350.000 følgere.

Et brændende produkt, der ikke burde brænde – i kombination med en reality-stjerne med flere hundredetusinde Facebook-fans. Et bedre afsæt for en lynhurtig reaktion fås ikke. Det synes topchefen i den pågældende butikskæde heldigvis også. Det var godt, for min anbefaling var nemlig helt enkel – krævede kun en lynhurtig beslutning:

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

”Fjern det produkt fra markedet NU. Kommuniker STRAKS på Facebook, at I er meget glade for at blive gjort opmærksom på miseren, samt at alle naturligvis kan få deres penge tilbage, hvis de har et tilsvarende produkt. Kvittering ikke nødvendig”.

Den slags beslutninger kræver både mod og beslutningskraft. For når man har over 500 forret­ ninger, heraf flere i andre lande, er det en dyr omgang at trække et produkt tilbage. ”Og hvem siger i øvrigt, det er vores skyld…?”. Glem det! Du har ikke tid. Sorry.

Så den sag skulle bare lukkes. Og helst uden skrammer i renommeet. Det blev den.

Shitstormen udeblev, hvad der i sagens natur også var formålet. Og mig bekendt fik butiks­ kæden positiv feedback fra Facebook-folket, der ikke kun fandt det på sin plads, at produktet blev trukket tilbage, men samtidig gav udtryk for, at det var flot, at virksomheden straks (for dét var det) havde reageret – tilmed no questions asked.

Det er en fornøjelse at have med så handlekraftige folk at gøre. Topchefer, som godt ved, hvor meget dyrere en shitstorm er end en udramatisk produkttilbagekaldelse.

Men så godt går det også kun, når ledelsen har modet til at handle, inden alt er undersøgt til bunds. Det er der nemlig ikke tid til.

Er det rimeligt? Næppe. Men hvad havde alternativet været? Meget værre, tro mig!

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

111

25

Fiduciary Duties – Virkelighedens verden Som bestyrelse har man ansvaret i gode og i dårlige tider. Der er sjældent stor ros til bestyrelsen, når det går godt – og når det går skidt, kommer ord som ”personlig kritik”, ”søgsmål” og ”ansvar” hurtigt på tale. I tilspidsede situationer gælder det om at fastholde pejlemærkerne: den sunde fornuft, respekten for alle interessenter og formelle regelsæt. Det gjorde Topsils bestyrelse den 17. juni 2016 kl. 10.08.

Situationen

N.E. Nielsen, Partner, LETT

Bestyrelsen har qua dens stilling en række ”fiduciary duties” for forsvarlig varetagelse af alle stakeholders interesser i virksomheden og dens værdiskabelse. Også – og måske særligt – i salgssituationen har en bestyrelse pligt til at sikre bedst mulig interessevaretagelse for alle stakeholders – aktionærer, medarbejdere, kreditorer, samarbejdspartnere, finansielle partnere og samfundet, men primært og oftest aktionærernes interesser.

Af Anbefalinger om god selskabsledelse år 2013 (senest opdateret november 2014) fremgår det, at et selskabs beredskabsprocedure ved overtagelsestilbud bør fastsætte, ”at bestyrelsen afholder sig fra uden generalforsamlingens godkendelse at imødegå et overtagelsesforsøg ved at træffe dispositioner, som reelt afskærer aktionærerne fra at tage stilling til overtagelses­ forsøget”. Denne ”soft law” var også tiltrådt af Topsil i selskabets governance-politik som offent­ liggjort på hjemmesiden. Og derfor var det også helt selvfølgeligt for Topsils bestyrelse at indkalde til ekstraordinær generalforsamling for at beslutte salget af virksomhedens hoved­ aktivitet – siliciumforretningen.

”Deal certainty” For Topsil havde det været et meget afgørende element igennem hele salgsprocessen, at der var sikkerhed for, at et salg blev gennemført, når det blev aftalt og offentliggjort. Dernæst var hensynet til selve virksomheden højt på agendaen. Topsil arbejdede med fortsatte underskud og med en gearet finansiel balance i forhold til virksomhedens situation. Hvor længe kunne det fortsætte, uden at aktio­ nærerne og alle andre stakeholders mistede deres værdier fuldt ud, og uden at bankerne sagde stop? ”Deal certainty” var derfor afgørende. Aftalen med GlobalWafers, der blev fremlagt for aktionærerne, indeholdt en række betingelser, der successivt var blevet opfyldt frem mod generalforsamlingen, ligesom der nok så vigtigt var dokumentation og sikkerhed for, at købesummen kunne blive betalt.

Endvidere havde bestyrelsen indhentet en fairness opinion fra dens corporate finance rådgiver. Så alt var således på plads til, at bestyrelsen havde opfyldt sine forpligtelser på en ordentlig måde over for alle interessenter, uanset at prisen inden generalforsamlingen absolut ikke var prangende set i forhold til tidligere tiders børskurser, men alligevel forbedret lige inden generalforsamlingen.

112

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Og så alligevel Da der lige efter generalforsamlingens start kom en pressemeddelelse om, at en anden byder ville fremsætte et frivilligt købstilbud på alle aktierne i Topsil, blev bestyrelsens fiduciary duties udstillet.

Alle problemstillinger kom op i luften. Var det potentielle købstilbud samlet set bedre end den betingede, snart endelige, aftale om salg af siliciumaktiviteten, der lå på bordet? Skulle aktio­ nærerne have mulighed for at tage stilling til den nye situation på en særlig generalforsamling?

Ville Topsils bankforbindelse og kreditorer acceptere en usikker udsættelse? Var det mulige tilbud betinget af forhold, som ikke kunne opfyldes? Hvilket personligt ansvar kunne bestyrelsen ifalde, uanset hvad bestyrelsen besluttede?

Værdibevarelsen var det afgørende i bestyrelsens overvejelser og beslutning. Og selvfølgelig blev bestyrelsen udsat for kritik. Hvis virksomheden var gået konkurs, eller hvis værdien for­ svandt ved at opgive det tilbud, der lå på bordet til generalforsamlingens godkendelse, og som udløb ultimativt samme dag, ville bestyrelsen med rette kunne bebrejdes. Og hvis bestyrelsen ikke indkaldte til ny generalforsamling for at tage stilling til den tilkendegivne hensigt om at afgive et købstilbud på alle aktier, kunne bestyrelsen bebrejdes, at den ikke havde forsøgt at forbedre aktionærernes situation. Så ligegyldigt hvad bestyrelsen gjorde, ville det være vanske­ ligt, for ikke at sige umuligt, at undgå kritik – også fordi aktionærerne ikke kendte detaljerne i, hvor presset Topsil var i situationen.

Bestyrelsen påtog sig ansvaret og kunne samlet beregne, at det tilbud, der forelå til general­ forsamlingens godkendelse, efter bestyrelsens egne vurderinger var marginalt bedre end det endnu ikke fremsatte, men tilkendegivne, betingede tilbud, som bestyrelsen samtidig vidste, at den største enkeltaktionær – over 10 % – ikke ville acceptere.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

113

Om bestyrelsens redegørelse om købstilbud Ifølge § 23 i overtagelsesbekendtgørelsen om købstilbud på børsnoterede virksomheder – aktiehandel og ikke aktivitetsoverdragelse – skal bestyrelsen senest 2 uger efter købstilbud­ dets endelige fremsættelse ”udarbejde en redegørelse indeholdende det centrale ledelsesorgans holdning til tilbuddet og begrundelse herfor, herunder ledelsesorganets holdning til konsekvenserne for alle selskabets interessenter og tilbudsgivers strategiske planer for målselskabet og disses sandsynlige konsekvenser for beskæftigelsen og driftsstederne”.

Sådanne redegørelser har efterhånden fået en relativt skematisk form. Trods det er der mange overvejelser om hvert ord, der anvendes, fordi ledelsen i disse formuleringer læner sig ud bl.a. med et synspunkt om virksomhedens værdi og fremtidige værdiskabelse. I få tilfælde, fx i Stylepit, angav bestyrelsen en tvetydig holdning, da det var forventninger om en helt umoden branches udvikling, der afgjorde værdien. Modsat andre, som fx senest Topdanmark, hvor anbefalingen var klar og entydig.

I alle situationer sidder bestyrelsen med vurderingen: Hvis vi ikke anbefaler, og fremtiden bliver anderledes og slet ikke så god, som vi alle seriøst og grundigt har vurderet, og aktiekursen falder, hvad siger aktionærerne så? Eller kursen falder, blot fordi tilbudsgiver er væk. Og hvis vi anbefaler, og aktionærerne ikke accepterer (som fx ved overtagelsen af Danisco), og kursen stiger og stiger, hvad siger aktionærerne så? Det er i sådanne situationer, at bestyrelsens døm­ mekraft, sunde fornuft og mod virkelig kommer på prøve.

Fiduciary duties er i bund og grund et spørgsmål om respekt for andres penge og sund fornuft.

114

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

115

26

Aktietilbagekøbsprogrammer – Typer og skattemæssige konsekvenser Aktietilbagekøb Ved et ”aktietilbagekøb” forstås den disposition, at det udstedende selskab opkøber sine egne aktier og derved en del af sig selv. Aktietilbagekøbsprogrammer er i dag almindeligt forekom­ mende i børsnoterede selskaber, og de igangsættes oftest som et alternativ til en udbytte­ udlodning. Men hvorfor vælger børsnoterede selskaber at igangsætte et aktietilbagekøb, og hvilke fordele er der forbundet med et aktietilbagekøbsprogram sammenlignet med en udbytte­ udlodning? Hos Topsil fik dette spørgsmål særlig fokus, idet bestyrelsen valgte at fremsætte to alternative forslag og derved lagde op til generalforsamlingen at vælge imellem, om selskabet skulle udbetale udbytte eller iværksætte et aktietilbagekøbsprogram.

Hvorfor aktietilbagekøbsprogram Claus Holberg, Partner, LETT

Aktietilbagekøbsprogrammer igangsættes normalt kun, når selskabet har for meget likviditet og ikke ønsker at være overkapitaliseret. På det globale marked anses et aktietilbagekøbsprogram for at være et investorvenligt tiltag, dels fordi tilbagekøbet påvirker værdiansættelsen, og dels fordi aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet – modsat en deklareret udbytteudlodning – i princippet giver investorerne mulighed for selv at vælge, hvornår de vil tage gevinsten hjem. Med fuld indsigt i et selskabs aktietilbagekøbsprogram kan de aktionærer, der ikke ønsker at få udbetalt udbytte, undlade at sælge deres aktier, og de stilles herved oftest bedre, end hvis selskabet havde udloddet et udbytte, som aktionærerne efterfølgende skulle have geninvesteret i selskabet. Det gælder fx i skattemæssig henseende, idet udbytter beskattes på udlodningstidspunktet. Ved et aktietilbagekøbsprogram kan børsnoterede selskaber endvidere sikre en harmonisk kursudvik­ ling for selskabets aktier, idet selskabet har mulighed for at opkøbe egne aktier over børsen.

Det er ikke det samme som, at selskabet udøver kursmanipulation.

I de fleste tilfælde sker opkøb af egne aktier med henblik på annullering af de opkøbte aktier, og tilbagekøbet er derved udtryk for en reduktion i kapitalgrundlaget, der kan sidestilles med en udbytte udlodning. I visse tilfælde ses det dog også, at selskabet beholder de opkøbte aktier. Det kan fx skyldes, at selskabet ønsker at tilbyde disse til medarbejdere som led i en medarbejderaktie, eller at selskabet anvender disse som vederlag ved køb af en virksomhed eller i forbindelse med en fusion. I sådanne tilfælde kan tilbagekøbene ikke sidestilles med udbytteudlodninger.

Baggrunden for Topsils aktietilbagekøbsprogram I Topsils tilfælde blev aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet aktualiseret af, at Topsil havde frasolgt sin kernevirksomhed. Selskabet var derved blevet betydeligt overkapitaliseret i forhold til den beskedne aktivitet, der var efterladt i selskabet. Navnlig af denne årsag ønskede Topsils ledelse

116

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

at give alle aktionærerne mulighed for at komme helt ud af investeringen til en fair pris. Med en udbytteudlodning ville selskabet kunne have reduceret den overskydende likviditet, men en sådan ville ikke på samme måde give de mange småaktionærer, der måtte ønske det, mulighed for at komme af med alle deres aktier til en fair pris.

Topsil havde på daværende tidspunkt ca. 7.000 aktionærer, og bortset fra en enkelt større aktionær var ejerkredsen i Topsil således sammensat af en stor skare af småaktionærer og nogle enkelte med aktieposter omkring 5 %. De mange småaktionærer havde oprindelig købt aktier i en virksomhed med siliciumaktiviteter, men efter frasalg af dette forretningsområde var Topsils eneste tilbageværende aktivitet en ejerandel i et polsk ejendomsselskab og derved et forretningsområde, der væsentligt adskilte sig fra det helt oprindelige. Iværksættelsen af et aktietilbagekøbsprogram var derfor både relevant i forhold til Topsils aktivitetsniveau, såvel som i forhold til aktionærkredsen.

Den selskabsretlige tilrettelæggelse af aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet Et selskabs opkøb af egne aktier adskiller sig på flere måder fra en almindelig aktiehandel.

Det skyldes som anført, at der er tale om en transaktion, der rent teknisk har mange ligheds­ punkter med en kapitalnedsættelse eller en udbytteudlodning, idet selskabets egne midler udbetales til aktionærerne ved opkøb af aktierne i selskabet selv. Både selskabslovgivningen og skattelovgivningen indeholder derfor særregler, der regulerer et sådant tilbagesalg til det udstedende selskab.

Med ændringen af selskabsloven i 2010 blev den tidligere 10 % grænse for, hvor mange egne aktier et selskab måtte eje, ophævet, og der gælder i dag ikke længere et fast loft for et selskabs køb af egne aktier. Udgangspunktet er, at et selskab må anvende sine frie reserver til opkøb af egne aktier, og at ledelsen er underlagt de samme begrænsninger, som gælder for udbyt­ teudlodning; det vil sige, at opkøb kun må ske, såfremt selskabet har tilstrækkeligt med frie reserver hertil, og kun såfremt det er forsvarligt under hensyntagen til selskabets drift. Opkøb af egne aktier forudsætter endvidere, at det sker efter bemyndigelse fra generalforsamlingen.

Topsil I Topsils tilfælde var de frie reserver mindre end den overskudskapital på ca. DKK 120 mio., som ledelsen ønskede at tilbagebetale til aktionærerne. For at muliggøre nedbringelse af Topsils overskudslikviditet til det ønskede niveau, var det derfor nødvendigt, at Topsil forud for iværk­ sættelsen af tilbagekøbsprogrammet gennemførte en nedskrivning af selskabets aktiekapital fra ca. DKK 132 mio. til ca. DKK 10,5 mio., hvorved ca. DKK 121,5 mio. kunne frigøres fra den bundne aktiekapital ved overførsel til Topsils frie reserver. Samtidig blev stykstørrelsen på Topsils aktier reduceret fra nominelt DKK 0,25 til nominelt DKK 0,02. Dette skete ved en særskilt general­forsamlingsbeslutning og var betinget af offentliggørelse af proklama i Erhvervsstyrelsens IT-system med henblik på, at kreditorer kunne anmelde deres krav over for selskabet.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

117

Selve beslutningen om udbetaling af Topsils overskudslikviditet blev fra Topsils side fremlagt for generalsamlingen som et valg mellem udlodning af beløbet som udbytte eller udlodning via et aktietilbagekøbsprogram. En udbytteudlodning ville betyde, at alle aktionærer modtog en forholdsmæssig andel af udlodningen, hvorimod et aktietilbagekøbsprogram kun gav udbetaling til de aktionærer, der gjorde brug af tilbuddet om at sælge deres aktier. Da tilbuddet skulle fremsættes over for alle aktionærer, indebar beslutningen om aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet, at der måtte sættes et loft over det antal aktier, som Topsil maksimalt kunne påtage sig at tilbagekøbe. Dette loft ville blive aktuelt, såfremt en meget stor andel af aktionærerne valgte at gøre brug af tilbuddet. Aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet gav derved ikke en garanti for, at Topsil ville være i stand til fuldt ud at opkøbe alle aktier tilhørende de aktionærer, der ønskede at gøre brug af tilbuddet.

De skatteretlige konsekvenser af aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet Valget mellem udbytteudlodning og aktietilbagekøbsprogram havde dog også skattemæssige konsekvenser for aktionærerne, og disse var formentlig i sidste ende udslagsgivende for, at gene­ ralforsamlingen besluttede at vedtage et aktietilbagekøbsprogram fremfor en udbytteudlodning.

I skatteretlig henseende er det ikke ligegyldigt, om et selskab udlodder kapital via udbytte eller via et tilbagekøb af egne aktier. Forskellen består i, at beskatningsgrundlaget ved en udbytte udlodning udgør hele provenuet, mens det ved et aktiesalg kun er avancen, der beskattes.

Beskatningsgrundlaget er derved mindre ved et aktiesalg, ligesom der ved et aktiesalg er mulighed for tabsfradrag, hvis salgssummen er lavere end købesummen. Efter de skatteretlige regler vil et salg af aktier derfor normalt være mere gunstigt for aktionærerne end et udbytte.

En undtagelse hertil er dog, når aktionæren er et selskab med ejerandel på over 10 %, idet udbytter i denne situation er skattefrie for moderselskabet.

Da et salg til udstedende selskab vil kunne bruges som alternativ til en udbytteudlodning, er der i skatteretten etableret en såkaldt værnsregel, der skal værne mod en omgåelse af udbyttebeskatningen ved brug af reglerne om salg til udstedende selskab. De nærmere regler herom, der findes i ligningslovens § 16A og § 16B, bestemmer, at det provenu, der mod­tages i forbindelse med et salg af aktier til det udstedende selskab eller en kapitalnedsættelse, skal beskattes som udbytte hos aktionæren og derved uden fradrag af købesummen. Denne beskatning kan herefter ændres af SKAT ved en udstedelse af en konkret dispensation. Herved gives der SKAT mulighed for at kontrollere, at dispositionen ikke er udtryk for omgåelse af reglerne. For ikke-børsnoterede selskaber skal der altid søges om dispensation, og dispen­ sationspraksis er forskellig afhængig af, om der er tale om en kapitalnedsættelse eller et til­ bagesalg. For børsnoterede selskaber har lovgiver dog gjort en undtagelse, idet der er fastsat en generel dispensationsadgang, der betyder, at beskatningen ved salg af børsnoterede aktier til det udstedende selskab følger de almindelige aktiebeskatningsregler og endda med mulighed for, at aktionærerne kan vælge at lade sig udbyttebeskatte i stedet, hvilket i ganske få og helt særlige tilfælde kan være en fordel. Normalt giver aktietilbagekøbsprogrammer i børsnoterede

118

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

selskaber derfor ikke anledning til skattemæssige problemer, da aktionæren vil blive beskattet på samme måde, som hvis han havde solgt aktierne til tredjemand over børsen og derved efter det mest lempelige alternativ.

Et lille flag Når der alligevel fra skatterådgivernes side blev rejst et lille flag i Topsil-sagen, skyldtes det, at Topsils aktietilbagekøbsprogram skulle gennemføres i umiddelbar forlængelse af en kapital­ nedsættelse, hvor de bundne reserver var blevet opløst, og at opkøbene herefter skulle ske med henblik på at gennemføre endnu en nedsættelse af aktiekapitalen ved annullering af de opkøbte aktier. Den særlige lovbestemte dispensationsadgang, der gælder for børsnoterede aktier, omfatter kun provenu, der udbetales i forbindelse med et tilbagekøb af aktierne, men ikke et provenu, der udbetales i forbindelse med en kapitalnedsættelse. Det var derfor væsent­ ligt at få afklaret, at aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet også af SKAT ville blive kvalificeret som et aktietilbagekøbsprogram og ikke som en kapitalnedsættelse, og yderligere – såfremt SKAT mod forventning måtte kvalificere udbetalingen som et provenu fra en kapitalnedsættelse – at der da blev givet en konkret dispensation, hvorved provenuet blev undtaget fra udbyttebeskatning.

Det var derfor nødvendigt at gøre selve beslutningen om aktietilbagekøbet betinget af, at disse skattemæssige forhold blev afklaret ved indhentelse af et bindende svar fra SKAT. I skrivende stund er der intet svar fra SKAT – SKAT er enten meget hurtig til at svare, eller også tager det meget lang tid…

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

119

27

Passive storaktionærers tilbudspligt Har du nogensinde været ude at spise med vennerne og aftalt, at I deler regningen – og så oplevet, at mens du var oppe i baren, gik de andre, og du hang på hele regningen? Måske ikke – men den følelse kunne have ramt den største aktionær i Cemat.

Efter det dramatiske forløb ved generalforsamlingen den 17. juni 2016 begyndte bestyrelsen i Cemat at overveje, hvordan man kunne imødekomme de utilfredse aktionærer, der ret markant havde givet udtryk for, at de ønskede at sælge deres aktier nu og ikke ville vente på en potentiel værdistigning af den polske ejendomsforretning. Den oplagte løsning var at anvende provenuet fra salget af siliciumforretningen til at igangsætte et omfattende aktietilbagekøbsprogram.

Anders Kaasgaard, Advokat, LETT

Denne løsning indebar dog et muligt problem, der ikke er ulig situationen beskrevet ovenfor, hvor én person overraskende ender med hele regningen for den fælles middag.

Gennemførelse af et aktietilbagekøbsprogram i Cemat skulle i givet fald fremsættes som et tilbud til alle aktionærer. Næstformanden i bestyrelsen ejede personligt og gennem sit selskab ca. 15 % af aktierne. Såfremt han ikke deltog i aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet, ville han med al sandsynlighed efterfølgende opnå bestemmende indflydelse i Cemat med en ejerandel over 33 % (og formentlig også over 50 %).

Næstformanden blev tidligt i forløbet spurgt af den øvrige bestyrelse, om han ønskede at sælge sine aktier, da hans deltagelse ville mindske muligheden betydeligt for at få udarbejdet et attraktivt aktietilbagekøbsprogram til de øvrige aktionærer. Omvendt – hvis han valgte ikke at sælge, ville han efter al sandsynlighed opnå kontrollerende indflydelse i Cemat og dermed være i risiko for at ifalde pligt til at fremsætte overtagelsestilbud over for de øvrige tilbagevæ­ rende aktionærer.

Pligten til at fremsætte overtagelsestilbud Tilbudspligt efter værdipapirhandelslovens § 31 udløses, hvis en aktionær opnår kontrolle­ rende indflydelse, når der ”overdrages en aktiepost i et selskab, (...), direkte eller indirekte til en erhverver eller til personer, der handler i forståelse med denne”. Det er således som udgangspunkt et krav, at der til erhververen – altså her næstformanden i Cemat – overdrages en aktiepost.

Formålet med reglerne om pligtmæssige overtagelsestilbud er at sikre, at aktionærer kan komme ud af deres investering i et selskab, hvis en ny person opnår bestemmende indflydelse

120

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

over selskabet. Som anført ovenfor er det et krav, at der sker en overdragelse af aktier til per­ sonen, der samtidig opnår bestemmende indflydelse. Det vil derfor kræve en aktiv handling fra den aktionær, der opnår bestemmende indflydelse.

Ved et aktietilbagekøbsprogram i Cemat overdrages der ingen aktier til næstformanden; han undlader blot at sælge aktier. Og dermed burde problemet være løst – for man kan da ikke ved sin passivitet blive pålagt den betydelige økonomiske byrde, som det ville være, at skulle give tilbud på køb af alle aktierne i et selskab?

Udfordringen bestod i værdipapirhandelslovens § 31, stk. 5, 2. pkt., hvoraf det følger: ”Et selskabs erhvervelse af egne aktier udløser dog tilbudspligt efter stk. 1, såfremt erhvervelsen er et udtryk for omgåelse af de grænser, der er nævnt i stk. 2 og 3.”.

Af forarbejderne til værdipapirhandelsloven fremgår det, at ovenstående er en undtagelse til hovedreglen. Bestemmelsen omhandler den situation, hvor en aktionær (som oprindeligt har erhvervet aktier i selskabet, uden at det medførte tilbudspligt) påvirker selskabet eller en af dets dattervirksomheder til at opkøbe selskabets egne aktier, og opkøbet af egne aktier medfører, at aktionæren, ved fraregning af selskabets beholdning af egne aktier, opnår kontrol. I dette tilfælde kan aktionæren blive pålagt tilbudspligt, såfremt opkøbet er et udtryk for omgåelse af pligten til at afgive tilbud til de øvrige aktionærer. Det er i den forbindelse ikke et krav, at aktionæren selv har erhvervet aktier i selskabet.

I henhold til Finanstilsynets vejledning punkt 3.3.41 gælder pligten ikke bestemmende ind­ flydelse, der er opnået ved passivitet. Til eksempel omhandler vejledningens Eksempel 14 en aktionær, der opnår bestemmende indflydelse i forbindelse med et aktietilbagekøbsprogram, som gennemføres på selskabets initiativ – i denne situation udløses der ikke tilbudspligt.

Finanstilsynet har i en konkret sag truffet afgørelse om, at en aktionær ikke ville ifalde tilbud­ spligt, hvis denne opnåede bestemmende indflydelse i forbindelse med et aktietilbagekøbs­ program i målselskabet, da der var tale om passivitet, jf. Finanstilsynets afgørelse af 22. oktober 2013. I den pågældende sag lagde Finanstilsynet blandt andet vægt på, at aktionæren, der var et selskab, ikke havde initieret aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet og ikke var repræsenteret i målselskabets bestyrelse.

I Cemats tilfælde havde næstformanden ikke initieret aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet, men han var i modsætning til situationen i den ovennævnte afgørelse en del af bestyrelsen. Han ville derfor som udgangspunkt også være en del af den bestyrelse, som skulle indstille til Cemats generalforsamling, at aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet skulle igangsættes.

1 Finanstilsynets vejledning nr. 9687 af 15. september 2014 om § 31, stk. 1-3, 6 og 8, i lov om værdipapir­ handel m.v. og bekendtgørelse om overtagelsestilbud.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

121

Udtalelse fra Finanstilsynet Da forslaget om et aktietilbagekøbsprogram ikke var bragt op i bestyrelsen på initiativ af næst­ formanden, men af mindretalsaktionærerne, var det Cemats opfattelse, at næstformanden alle­ rede derfor ikke ville ifalde pligt til at fremsætte et offentligt overtagelsestilbud. For at afklare situationen blev der indhentet en udtalelse fra Finanstilsynet.

LETT Advokatpartnerselskab Att.: Advokat Anders Kaasgaard LETT Advokatpartnerselskab Rådhuspladsen 4 Att.: Advokat Anders 1550 København V. Kaasgaard Rådhuspladsen 4 1550 V. SendtKøbenhavn pr. mail til aka@lett.dk

12. august 2016 Ref. jcs/mbd 12. august 2016 J.nr. 6373-0073 Ref. jcs/mbd J.nr. 6373-0073

Sendt pr. mail til aka@lett.dk

Vejledende udtalelse - bestemmende indflydelse ved passivitet Vejledende udtalelse - bestemmende indflyDe har som advokat for Cemat A/S (”Selskabet”) ved mail af 8. juli 2016 delse ved passivitet

FINANSTILSYNET

Århusgade 110 2100 København Ø FINANSTILSYNET

Århusgade 110 Tlf. 33 55 82 82 2100 København Ø Fax 33 55 82 00 anmodet om Finanstilsynets vejledende udtalelse om, hvorvidt et påtænkt Finanstilsynet lagde ved sin vurdering vægt på, at vedtagelse af aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet CVR-nr. 10 59 81 84 De har som advokat for (”Programmet”) Cemat A/S (”Selskabet”) ved egne mail af 8. juli aktietilbagekøbsprogram af Selskabets aktier vil 2016 kunTlf. 33 55 82 82 finanstilsynet@ftnet.dk forudsatte en generalforsamlingsbeslutning, og at bestyrelsen kun kunne fremsætte forslag Fax 33 55 82 00 anmodet Finanstilsynets vejledende om, hvorvidt et påtænkt ne udløseom tilbudspligt, jf. § 31, stk. 1, i udtalelse lov om værdipapirhandel m.v. for www.finanstilsynet.dk CVR-nr. 10 59 81 84 herom, hvis der var flertal i bestyrelsen herfor. aktietilbagekøbsprogram af Selskabets aktier Eivind Dam Jensen, som (”Programmet”) forud for tilbagekøbet besidderegne ca. 15 pct. vil af kunaktifinanstilsynet@ftnet.dk ne tilbudspligt, jf. § 31,i stk.

1, i lovog omsom værdipapirhandel m.v. for erneudløse og stemmerettighederne Selskabet, herudover er næstforwww.finanstilsynet.dk

122

Finanstilsynet vurderede videre, at gennemførelse aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet ikke ville Eivind Dam Jensen, som forud for tilbagekøbet besidderafca.

15 pct. af aktimand for bestyrelsen i Selskabet. erne og stemmerettighederne i Selskabet, og som for herudover er næstforudløse pligt til at fremsætte overtagelsestilbud aktionærer, der alene pga. aktietilbage­ ERHVERVS- OG VÆKSTMINISTERIET mand for bestyrelsen i Selskabet.

Næstformanden vil ikke selv erhverve aktier i Selskabet, men kanuden komme købsprogrammet ville opnå bestemmende indflydelse, dvs. at tilder forelå en transaktion opnåindikationer bestemmende i forbindelse med tilbagekøbet ERHVERVS ogatuden påindflydelse omgåelsei Selskabet af reglerne om at fremsætte overtagelsestilbud til- OG deVÆKSTMINISTERIET øvrige Næstformanden ikke selv af erhverve aktieregne i Selskabet, og efterfølgende vil annullering Selskabets aktier. men kan komme til aktionærer. at opnå bestemmende indflydelse i Selskabet i forbindelse med tilbagekøbet og efterfølgende af Selskabets aktier.henvendelse, hvorfor Det bemærkes, annullering at det er Selskabet, der egne har rettet Det forhold, at et kontrolskifte måtte være fremkaldt af, at de øvrige aktionærer benyttede sig nærværende udtalelse er rettet til Selskabet og ikke til næstformanden. af Det aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet til at der træde af deres investering, ville ikke udgøre en aktiv bemærkes, at det er Selskabet, harud rettet henvendelse, hvorfor handling for den enkelte aktionær, der i den forbindelse opnår bestemmende indflydelse ved nærværende udtalelse er rettet til Selskabet og ikke til næstformanden.

1. Vurdering ikke at sælge sine aktier – og der udløses derfor ikke pligt for aktionæren til at fremsætte et Det vurderes, at et aktietilbagekøbsprogram, som det præsenterede, kan 1. Vurderingtil de øvrige aktionærer. overtagelsestilbud gennemføres, uden at det udløser pligt for en aktionær, der pga. ProgramDet at et aktietilbagekøbsprogram, som detet præsenterede, kan met vurderes, opnår bestemmende indflydelse, til at fremsætte overtagelsestilbud, gennemføres, at det udløserm.v. pligt for en aktionær, der pga. Programjf. § 31 i lov omuden værdipapirhandel met opnår bestemmende indflydelse, til at fremsætte et overtagelsestilbud, Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016 jf. § bemærkes, 31 i lov om værdipapirhandel m.v.

Det at det er væsentligt, at Selskabet i forbindelse med behandling af Programmet på generalforsamlingen oplyser aktionærerne i SelskaDet bemærkes, atkonsekvenser det er væsentligt, at Selskabetgennemførelse. i forbindelse med behandbet om de mulige af Programmets

Finanstilsynet bemærkede videre, at det var vigtigt, at selskabet oplyste de øvrige aktionærer om konsekvenserne af aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet – herunder at en aktionær ville kunne opnå kontrollerende indflydelse, og at denne ikke ville ifalde pligt til at fremsætte overtagelsestilbud.

Følgende passus fra Finanstilsynets udtalelse er dog værd at holde i erindringen ved fremtidige lignende problemstillinger: ”Det vurderes, at gennemførelse af Programmet ikke vil udløse pligt for aktionærer, der alene pga. Programmet opnår bestemmende indflydelse, dvs. uden at der foreligger en transaktion og uden indikationer på omgåelse, til at fremsætte et overtagelses­ tilbud til Selskabets øvrige aktionærer, jf. § 31, stk. 1, i lov om værdipapirhandel m.v.”.

Det er sjældent vanskeligt at konstatere, om der er sket en transaktion, dvs. en overdragelse af aktier i et givet selskab, hvorved en aktionær opnår kontrollerende indflydelse. Det kan imidler­ tid være meget vanskeligt at vurdere, om der er indikationer på omgåelse. Med Finanstilsynets udtalelse in mente skal det altid overvejes, om der i den konkrete situation er nogen indikationer på omgåelse af pligten til at fremsætte overtagelsestilbud, som en tredjemand berettiget eller uberettiget kunne rejse spørgsmål om.

Aktietilbagekøbsprogram i Cemat Ved generalforsamlingen, som bemyndigede bestyrelsen til at gennemføre aktietilbagekøbs­ programmet, valgte bestyrelsen grundet forskellige opfattelser ikke at give aktionærerne nogen anbefaling af, hvorvidt et aktietilbagekøbsprogram eller udbytte skulle være den bedst egnede model for at føre midler tilbage til aktionærerne. Som generalforsamlingen skred frem, stod det klart, at næstformanden stemte for udbytte og ikke aktietilbagekøb – og i øvrigt fandt, at det var den bedste løsning for alle aktionærer.

Næstformanden var således ikke aktiv – nærmest aktiv imod et aktietilbagekøbsprogram. Sagen viser, at det kan lade sig gøre at gennemføre et aktietilbagekøbsprogram, selvom man har en større aktionær i bestyrelsen, der kan opnå kontrollerende indflydelse. Sagen viser dog også, at det er vigtigt at holde de øvrige aktionærer informeret, således at de ved, hvad de går ind til.

I Cemat ender det således med, at de tilbageværende aktionærer efter forventet gennemførelse af aktietilbagekøbsprogrammet deler regningen og i fællesskab øger deres ejerandel – og ikke parkerer regningen hos én aktionær.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

123

28

Fugl Fønix på fondsbørsen – Udviklingen på Nasdaq Dramaet forlader aldrig børsmarkedet. Som i en opera af Mozart eller Verdi finder alle rolleindehavere et passende partitur at spille efter på børsen: nogle sejrer, nogle forgår, andre sygner hen; nogle finder hinanden, andre går hver til sit; nye kommer til, ofte akkompagneret af stor fanfare og applaus, mens tidligere tiders publikumsfavoritter i stilhed fortrækker scenen.

Mens verdens største børsintroduktion i år trak fulde huse i andet kvartal, udspillede der sig et lille drama bag scenetæppet. DONG løb med rampelyset, men i kulissen tog intensiteten til i kappestriden om Topsil, et intermezzo der endte med et salg til Taiwan.

Men inden vi går om bord i dramaturgien om Topsil, skal vi først en tur rundt i scenografien for at forstå, hvilke rammer dramaet udspiller sig i.

Carsten Borring, AVP & Head of Listing & Capital Market, Nasdaq Nordic Nasdaq Copenhagen drives i dag af den globale børsgruppe Nasdaq, som også driver børserne i Stockholm, Helsinki, Island, de baltiske lande og New York.

Siden 1808 har den danske fondsbørs været infrastruktur for kapitalrejsning og finansiering gennem et voksende obligationsog aktiemarked. I dag omsætter aktiemarkedet for over DKK 5 mia. i daglig omsætning, og børsnoterede selskaber rejser i 2016 tilsammen over DKK 40 mia. i ny-noteringer og aktie­ udvidelser.

Scenen er sat Historien om Københavns Fondsbørs (eller Nasdaq Copenhagen som i dag er markedspladsens formelle navn) har tidligere været, at aktivitet og likviditet var lav med få børsnoteringer og mange afnoteringer, samt at tidligere flagskibe, såsom Topsil, solgte ud af arvesølvet til uden­ landske købere med efterfølgende deroute og afnotering af selskabsresterne.

Men i dag er historien om den danske markedsplads en ganske anden. Siden 2008 har den danske børs gennemlevet en stille revolution og er i dag en svane, for at blive lidt i poesiens verden, der er vokset sine nordiske søsterbørser over hovedet. Her er tre fakta om det danske børsmarked, som man skal holde sig for øje: 1. Omsætningen i danske aktier stikker af fra andre europæiske børser 2. Nasdaq Copenhagen ser langt de største kapitalrejsninger 3. Nasdaq Nordic, børserne i Stockholm, Helsinki og København, er førende på børsnoteringer i Europa i 2016 Der sker i disse år noget skelsættende i det danske marked. To ud af verdens tre største børs­ noteringer er i år sket på den danske fondsbørs, Nasdaq Copenhagen. 70 procent af den sam­ lede rejste kapital i Norden kan i 2016 tælles i danske kroner og øre.

124

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Og det er på en baggrund, hvor Nasdaq Nordic i 2016 er den børs i Europa med flest børs­ noteringer og de største kapitalrejsninger. Således rejste 47 selskaber på Nasdaq Nordic og First North i årets første seks måneder EUR 4,2 mia. Til sammenligning rejste 39 selskaber på London Stock Exchange og dens vækstbørs AIM EUR 3,5 mia. Mens det er Sverige, som står for at tiltrække langt de fleste børsnoteringer i det nordiske regnskab, er det i Danmark, man ser de største transaktioner.

Siden 2012 er aktieomsætningen fordoblet på den danske børs fra et dagligt gennemsnit på DKK 2,4 mia. til DKK 5,3 mia. til dato. I samme periode er udlandets andel af den danske børshandel vokset støt til i dag at udgøre over 65 procent.

Den udvikling er ikke kommet af sig selv, og vi har i Nasdaq Nordic siden finanskrisen arbejdet med at fintune børsen til en ny konkurrencesituation, som trådte i kraft i 2008, hvor EU indførte en række direktiver for at skabe større konkurrence på de europæiske børsmarkeder. I stedet for på bagkant at forsvare en faldende markedsandel af børshandelen med dansk noterede aktier, har Nasdaqs strategi været at gøre kagen større. Ved at udnytte den ny konkurrence­ situation, er det lykkedes os at trække flere internationale børshuse til Danmark og dermed gøre danske aktier lettere tilgængelige for flere investorer, globalt såvel som i Danmark.

Resultatet er til at tage at føle på: Den stigende interesse og omsætning i danske aktier har aldrig været højere, og det har skabt en positiv spiral, der gør markedet attraktivt og relevant for store børskandidater som Pandora, ISS og DONG. Omvendt udløser de mange, nye, store børsnoteringer store mængder ny aktiekapital i markedet, som igen øger interessen for og likviditeten i danske aktier.

I dag står de seneste års største børsnoteringer for godt 20 procent af omsætningen i det danske marked. De største børsnoteringer har dermed været helt centrale i at rykke børsen i København op fra en fjerdeplads i Norden til i dag at have overhalet både Oslo og Helsinki. Og det er vigtigt, fordi den udenlandske likviditet er med til at gøre markedet og prissætningen langt mere attraktiv og dermed sænke handelsomkostninger og generelt lette kapitalrejsning for danske selskaber.

Intet europæisk børsmarked har som det danske kunnet optage nye large cap-noteringer i deres ledende blue chip indeks, som det er tilfældet i Danmark: Selskaber som Chr. Hansen, Pandora, TDC, ISS er alle eksempler på store large cap-noteringer, som efter børsnotering er gået i C20 ved det efterfølgende indeks review. Det er rart at se, at DONG og Nets, som de største europæiske børsnoteringer i år, gør dem kunsten efter.

Nye scener udspilles Men… på børsen er alt som bekendt til salg og intet børsår uden afnoteringer. En levende børs betyder også, at selskaber løbende bør vurdere, om de kan vokse mere uden for børsen, om

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

125

andre ejere kan drive virksomheden bedre, eller om der er synergieffekter ved at lægge selska­ bets aktivitet sammen med andres eksisterende aktiviteter. Afnotering af selskaber er en lige så naturlig del som nynoteringer, da der hele tiden skal være den rette dynamik på en børs, og markedet konstant skal holde sig effektivt.

Så længe afnoteringerne sker på transparente og regulære vilkår, er det kun en gevinst for aktiemarkedet, at der løbende foregår et tjek-op på, hvilken vej selskaberne skal fortsætte ad – op, ned eller helt ud. I det danske marked holder såvel Finanstilsynet som Nasdaq Copenhagens Overvågningsafdeling øje med, at reglerne overholdes, og det sikrer en høj grad af tillid og transparens i det danske marked.

I 2016 har der været en række afnoteringer, hvor Mols-Linien nok er den, som har fyldt mest i offentligheden. Men andre selskaber har også fundet nyt liv efter børslivet. MPI flyttede eksempelvis sin notering til Nasdaq First North i Stockholm, mens Mermaid Technology slog sig sammen med det svenske First North noterede selskab MultiQ.

Og så var der Topsil…

Hos Nasdaq i København gælder reglen, at såfremt der over en kort periode sker væsentlige ændringer i et selskab eller dets aktiviteter i en sådan grad, at selskabet kan anses for at være et nyt selskab, skal selskabet offentliggøre oplysninger om ændringerne og konsekvenserne heraf.

Uddybende oplysninger om ændring i identiteten skal således kommunikeres til markedet sva­ rende til det, der kræves iht. prospektreglerne og i princippet på samme måde, som når et selskab skal børsnoteres.

Det betyder, at Nasdaq Copenhagen altid foretager en vurdering af, om optagelsesbetingelserne er opfyldt, som var det til et nyt selskab. Et identitetsskifte kan således finde sted, og selskabet kan derefter fortsætte som børsnoteret.

Følgende forhold vil normalt indgå i vurderingen af en identitetsændring: • Hvis ejerforhold, ledelse eller aktiver ændres • Om et selskabs eksisterende forretning sælges og i den forbindelse, om der opkøbes en ny forretning • Det købte selskabs omsætning eller aktiver overstiger det noterede selskabs omsætning eller aktiver

126

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

• Det købte selskabs markedsværdi overstiger selskabets markedsværdi, eller det betalte vederlag, eks.: værdien af de nyudstedte værdipapirer overstiger selskabets markedsværdi • Kontrollen med selskabet overføres på grund af en transaktion • Flertallet af bestyrelsen eller direktionen udskiftes som følge af en transaktion På Nasdaq-børsen er vi altid klar til at hjælpe selskaber, som går med overvejelser om, hvorvidt selskabet kan opretholde sin børsnotering, og vi vil meget gerne være konstruktive, da spørgs­ målet om børsnotering eller ej ofte er et vigtigt element i en transaktion.

Enkelte selskaber kan efter gennemførelse af en sådan transaktion stå uden eller med meget lille aktivitet, og det betyder i princippet, at der er tale om et tomt selskab eller en såkaldt børsskal.

Og skulle det vise sig, at der var et selskab, der måtte ønske at komme på børsen uden at udføre en decideret børsnotering med alt, hvad der hører sig til, kan det være oplagt at udnytte en såkaldt børsskal.

Når et ikke-børsnoteret selskab køber sig ind i et børsnoteret selskab uden aktivitet, omtales det ofte som en bagdørsnotering, og det kan være en optimal løsning for nogle selskaber. Men det er uhyre vigtigt, inden man giver sig i kast med at købe en børsskal, og inden man lægger de store fremtidsplaner om livet på en børs, at man tager fat i Nasdaq Copenhagen. For lige­ som med en formel børsintroduktion skal de samme forhold være opfyldt, før vi kan optage til handel, og et givent selskab skal i store træk gennem samme godkendelsesprocedure som ved en gængs børsnotering.

Topsil blev til Cemat, og livet som børsnoteret selskab fortsætter; nu i ny form og med en ny strategi. Det bliver spændende at følge Cemat ud på børsmarkedets skrå brædder og se, hvilken fugl der skulle rejse sig om ikke af asken, så af resterne af det hedengangne Topsil.

Velkommen til Nasdaq Copenhagen.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

127

Silicium bruges overalt i det moderne samfund Megatrends • En voksende middelklasse i verden kræver moderne bekvemmeligheder som adgang til stabil elforsyning, en velfungerende offentlig transport, biler, hårde hvidevarer osv.

• Udvikling af grønne teknologier drevet af bekymringer om øget forurening, fokus på CO2 udledning og priser på fossile brændstoffer.

• Politiske beslutninger: Forbedringer af el-ledningsnettet og planlægning af offentlig transport er politisk bestemt inklu­ sive omfanget af investeringer og hastigheden, hvormed de bliver gennemført.

Kilde: Årsrapport 2015, Topsil.

LEDNINGSNETTET Silicium bidrager til energieffektiv transport af elektricitet. I fremtidens intelligente eldistributionsnet eller ”Smart Grids” kan forskellige energikilder kobles ind og ud efter behov for at udligne forbruget hen over døgnet. Silicium hjælper med at omforme strøm, for eksempel fra vekselstrøm til jævnstrøm, til opkobling til nettet og til at sikre en gnidningsfri transport af elektricitet, ofte over lange afstande.

HØJHASTIGHEDSTOG Når et elektrisk tog kører, hentes energien fra køreledninger og skinner. Der er brug for energieffektiv strømtilførsel, og her hjælper silicium til. Silicium bidrager også til at regulere togets hastighed og opsamle energi. Silicium findes blandt andet i de komplekse strømstyringssystemer over og under toget.

128

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

PRODUKTIONS­ MASKINER Industrien har behov for elektricitet for at kunne producere varer. Produktionsmaskiner skal kunne tændes og slukkes, og elektrisk energi og hastigheder skal kunne reguleres.

I maskinernes styringsmekanismer og elmotorer indgår silicium, som kontrollerer og leder strømmen. Silicium er et højeffektivt materiale, som både bidrager til optimal styring af maskinen, og som samtidigt optimerer energiforbruget.

VINDMØLLER En vindmølle skal kunne fange vinden og rotere, opsamle elektricitet og koble sig ind og ud på ledningsnettet, alt efter vindstyrke. Styring af vindmøller og transport af energi kræver intelligent elektronik, og her indgår silicium. Der er silicium i de elektriske komponenter, som sidder i møllehatten. Der er også silicium i vindmøllens transformersystem, som samler energien og leder den ud på ledningsnettet.

EL­ OG HYBRIDBILER I fremtiden forventes flere el- og hybridbiler på vejene. De kan kun køre, hvis de får ladet batterierne op og kun geare op eller ned, hvis strømtilførslen kan reguleres. Silicium har gode strømstyrende egenskaber og kan bruges til energieffektivt at overføre og regulere elektricitet. Silicium findes under kølerhjelmen og i ladestanderen til opladning af bilen.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

129

130

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

131

132

因此，从一开始，向潜在的买家提交一份切实可行的时间流程表是至关 重要的。它可以让买家有足够的时间认真工作，另一方面，如果卖家坚 持时间流程方案不会有任何更改，而买家不能跟进执行，这种情况下， 也不会浪费双方的时间和精力。 氛围 对于绝大多数卖家来说，成交价格当然是最重要的。而另一方面，能 看着公司在新的所有者手中继续在丹麦蓬勃发展，对于卖家来说，也 是意义重大，尤其是对于那些家族企业来说。买家描述对并购后公司 未来的展望，是流程中一个固有环节。在这个环节中，买家如若能够 切实描述公司的前景，特别是收购后对现有领导层和员工的影响，那此 买家将会在众多的买家当中脱颖而出。如果买家正好准备继续沿用现有 的领导层，那其优势不言而喻。同时也很重要的是，买家要坚决主张卖 家，公司现有领导层，潜在买家三方要有足够的时间在一起，互增了解 和信任。这样买家在对领导层，公司，并购流程有足够的信任满意度的 情况下，才能达成交易。 价格 谈到价格，有一个很重要的因素，那就是潜在的买家在交易的最后阶段 有足够的决策权。在竞标期间，卖家总是会试图抬高价格或是新增一些 对其有利的条款。在此情形下，如果买家还要再申领更高授权，或临时 向上层请示，那就很不现实。所以买家的代表一定要有最终的拍板决策 权。 支付 鉴于Topsil的前车之鉴：要有由国际知名银行出具的，证明有能力支付 收购金额和运营资金的文件，然后丹麦的银行才能在收到准确无误的银 行担保函或财政保函的前提下出具确认函。TOPSIL案例中，在这类文件 上花费了相当长的时间。 LETT的经验 通过本例并购案，我们发现有许多中国买家对丹麦公司感兴趣。丹麦的 科技，创新，商业头脑与中国的勤勉，市场知识，干劲相结合，一定能 为中丹两国带来无与伦比的发展前景。

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016

132

在丹麦如何收购公司?

– Topsil 被收购案例的经验之谈 作者 N.E. Nielsen, 合伙人, LETT 2016年夏季Topsil 半导体材料有限公司硅晶业务的并购案，充斥着地 域政治的弦外之音。买家会是期待中的美国公司，欧洲公司，亦或是某 家PE基金？事实却超乎想象。最终决定Topsil命运的，竟然是来自台湾 和中国大陆两个买家之间的竞争。其被并购过程颇值得反思。 丹麦主要商业组织宣称，在接下来的几年里，将有20000家丹麦公司， 由于代际变更需要变更企业所有者。它们涉及大大小小的公司，有高科 技产业，有低端产业，遍及全球，国际，国内各个地区。这些公司及其 所有人有几个共同的特征：1. 他们期望一个简单的并购过程，2. 他们 期望一个较高的成交价，3. 被收购之后，期望公司和员工有一个美好 的未来。 过程 在丹麦已经逐渐形成一种模式，在被收购过程中，一定要有一位投资咨 询顾问参与其中。投资咨询顾问通过提交一个固定的流程，来制造一个 买家之间相互竞争的环境。世界各地都可能存在潜在的买家。因此，设 计一个能够让所有潜在的买家都有充裕的时间来参与竞投，最终达成协 议的流程是极为重要的。在此，文化差异起着举足轻重的作用。 时间 过往经验显示，在中国大陆，决策过程通常是需要较长的时间。诸如投 标，签署协议之类的重大决策，都要先通过内部的反复研究。中国大陆 买家一般着重考虑的，是目标公司现有的领导层如何在被并购之后继续 运营该公司。而不是象其他的买家早已做好了收购完成之后立即更换领 导层的准备。除此之外丹麦人通常除了英语，德语和一些法语，很难用 其他外语进行交流，这也是使收购流程变得更为漫长的主要原因之一。

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

131

130

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

PRODUCTION MACHINERY Industry needs electricity to manufacture goods. Production machinery requires turning on and off, and it must be possible to adjust electric energy and speed.

Silicon is used in machine control mechanisms and electric motors to control and conduct electricity. Silicon is a highly efficient material contributing to optimum machine control as well as to optimum energy consumption.

WIND TURBINES A wind turbine must be able to catch the wind and rotate, generate electricity and connect to and disconnect from the power grid depending on the wind force.

Intelligent electronics are required for operating wind turbines and transporting energy, and this is where silicon comes in. Silicon is used in the electric components of the wind turbine nacelle.

It is also used in the transformer system collecting energy and distributing it to the power grid.

ELECTRIC CARS AND HYBRID VEHICLES Electric cars and hybrid vehicles are expected to become more common on the roads in future.

However, they can only run if their batteries are charged beforehand, and it is only possible to shift to a higher or lower gear if the electricity supply is regulated. Silicon has good power control properties and may be used for energy-efficient electricity supply and regulation. Silicon is used, for example, under the bonnet and in the charging stations used to charge the car.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

129

Silicon is used in all parts of modern society Megatrends • The world’s growing middle classes demand modern convenience, such as access to a stable power supply, wellfunctioning public transport, cars, domestic appliances, etc.

• The development of green technologies, driven by concerns about increasing pollution, focus on carbon emissions and fossil fuel prices.

• Political decisions: Improvements to the power grid and planning of public transport are subject to political decisions, including the scope of investments and the speed at which they are made.

Source: Annual report 2015, Topsil.

POWER GRIDS Silicon contributes to energy-efficient transport of electricity. In the intelligent electricity distribution network of the future, “Smart Grids”, different energy sources may be connected or disconnected according to need in order to balance consumption day and night. Silicon helps convert electricity from, for example, alternating current to direct current, to connect to the grid and ensure smooth transport of current, often over long distances.

HIGHSPEED TRAINS When electric trains are moving, they pick up energy from overhead wires and the rails. An energy-efficient electricity supply is required, and this is where silicon comes in.

Silicon also helps regulate train speed and pick up energy. For example, it is used in complex power control systems installed on top of and underneath trains.

128

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

• Does the market capitalisation of the acquired company exceed the market capitalisation of the company, or does the consideration paid – e.g. the value of the new securities that have been issued – exceed the market capitalisation of the company?

• Is there a change of control due to the transaction?

• Are a majority of the members of the board of directors or the executive board removed as a result of a transaction?

At Nasdaq we are always happy to help companies which are considering whether to maintain their listing, and we always strive for a constructive approach as the issue of listing or no listing is often an important element of a transaction.

A few companies may be left with no or only little activity following such a transaction, and in principle this means that the company is now an empty shell.

And if it turns out that a company would like to have its shares admitted to trading without carrying out a listing as such with all the etceteras, it may be an obvious choice to use an empty shell.

When a non-listed company buys a listed company with no activity, this is known as a backdoor listing, and it may be the best solution for some companies. But it is extremely important to contact Nasdaq Copenhagen before embarking on the process of buying an empty shell and before making any future plans for life on the stock exchange. For, in the same way as a formal flotation, the same conditions must be met before we can admit the shares to trading, and a given company must more or less go through the same approval procedure as with a regular listing.

Topsil became Cemat, and life as a listed company continues, now in a new form and with a new strategy. It will be exciting to follow Cemat on to the stock market stage and see what will rise, if not from the flames then from the remains of the former Topsil.

Welcome to Nasdaq Copenhagen.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

127

126

ongoing basis whether they would be able to increase growth off the stock exchange, whether other owners would be better at driving the company, or whether there are synergies to be had from merging the company’s activities with existing activities. Company de-listings are just as natural as new listings, as it is important for a stock exchange to maintain the right dynamics and the market must keep up its efficiency.

So long as the de-listings are transparent and regular, the stock market will only benefit from such regular checkups as to the direction the companies are to be heading – up, down or exit. In the Danish market, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority as well as Nasdaq Copenhagen’s Surveillance Department will keep an eye on compliance, thus providing a high degree of trust and transparency on the Danish market.

In 2016 there have been a number of de-listings, with Mols-Linien probably attracting the most public attention. But other companies have also found new life after life on the stock exchange.

For instance, MPI transferred its listing to Nasdaq First North in Stockholm, while Land & Leisure, DK Company and Mermaid Technology partnered up with MultiQ, which is also listed on First North in Stockholm.

And then there was Topsil ...

At Nasdaq Copenhagen there is a rule that if major changes take place in a company or its activities over a short period of time to the extent that the company is in effect a new entity, the company must disclose information about the changes and their effects.

More detailed information about the change of identity must thus be communicated to the market to the same extent as under the prospectus rules and in principle to the same extent as for company listings.

This means that the assessment made by Nasdaq Copenhagen will be the same as the assessment of whether admission conditions are met for a new company. A change of identity may then be implemented and the company may maintain its listing.

The following factors will usually form part of the assessment of a change of identity: • Are there any changes in ownership structure or management or assets?

• Is the company’s existing business being sold and in that connection, is a new business acquired?

• Does the turnover or assets of the acquired company exceed the turnover or assets of the listed company?

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

And these changes are playing out against a backdrop where in 2016 Nasdaq Nordic is the stock exchange in Europe with the greatest number of listings and the largest capital raises.

For instance, in the first six months of the year, 47 companies on Nasdaq Nordic and First North raised EUR 4.2bn. In comparison, 39 companies on the London Stock Exchange and its dedicated growth market AIM raised EUR 3.5bn. While Sweden is the country that attracts by far the most listings in the Nordic region, Denmark is where we are seeing the biggest transactions.

Since 2012, share trading volumes have doubled on the Danish stock exchange from a daily average of DKK 2.4bn to DKK 5.3bn today. In the same period, the foreign share of Danish trading volumes has grown steadily to more than 65% today.

These changes have not just happened; at Nasdaq Nordic, we have worked steadily since the financial crisis to fine-tune the stock exchange to a new competitive reality which commenced in 2008 when the EU introduced a number of directives to strengthen competition in the European stock markets. Instead of simply defending a decreasing share of trading in Danish shares, Nasdaq’s strategy was to make the cake bigger. By using the new competitive reality, we have succeeded in attracting more international stock brokers to Denmark, making Danish shares more readily available to a greater number of investors globally as well as nationally.

The results are tangible: The increasing interest in and trading volumes of Danish shares have never been bigger, creating a positive spiral that makes the market attractive and relevant to major IPO candidates like Pandora, ISS and DONG. Also, the large number of new listings release large amounts of new share capital into the market, which in turn increases interest in and the liquidity of Danish shares.

Today, the largest listings of recent years represent just over 20% of the trading volume in the Danish market. The largest listings have thus been crucial to moving up the Copenhagen stock exchange from fourth place in the Nordics to overtaking Oslo as well as Helsinki. And this is important because foreign liquidity contributes to making the market and the prices far more attractive and thus lowering trading costs and generally increasing capital availability for Danish companies.

No European stock market has admitted new large cap listings to their leading blue chip index to the same extent as in Denmark. Companies like Chr. Hansen, Pandora, TDC and ISS are all examples of big large cap IPOs which were included in the Danish blue chip index at the first index review following their IPO. It is nice to see that DONG and Nets, this year’s largest European IPOs, replicate their success.

New scenes being played out But ... at the stock exchange, as everyone knows, everything is for sale and no year without de-listings. A stock exchange that is alive also means that companies should consider on an

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

125

28

The story of the phoenix on the stock exchange – Developments at Nasdaq The stock markets are always full of drama. Like an opera by Mozart or Verdi, all actors find a suitable score to play at the stock exchange: Some win, some perish, others languish, some partner up, others break up, new ones arrive, often to great fanfare and applause, while yesterday’s favourites with the crowd leave the scene quietly.

While this year’s largest IPO worldwide played to a packed house in Q2, a more low-key drama was taking place backstage. The limelight was on DONG, but behind the scenes the battle for Topsil built in intensity, an intermezzo that ended with a sale to Taiwan.

Carsten Borring, AVP & Head of Listing & Capital Market, Nasdaq Nordic Today, Nasdaq Copenhagen is operated by Nasdaq, Inc., the world’s largest exchange company, which also operates the stock exchanges in Stockholm, Helsinki, Iceland, the Baltics and New York.

Since 1808, the Danish stock exchange has served as infrastructure to raise capital and funding through a growing bonds and stock market. Today, daily share trading volumes exceed DKK 5bn, and in 2016 listed companies are raising more than a total of DKK 40bn in new listings and share capital increases.

But before we enter the dramaturgy of Topsil, we will first take a tour of the stage to understand the setting in which the drama unfolds.

The scene is set The narrative about the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (or Nasdaq Copenhagen as the market place is formally named) used to be one of low activity and liquidity with few listings and many de-listings, and with former flagships such as Topsil selling off the family silver to foreign buyers, leading to a gradual decline and subsequent de-listing of the corporate remains.

Today, however, the story about the Danish market place is entirely different. Since 2008, the Danish stock exchange has seen a quiet revolution, transforming into a swan – in poetic terms – that has outgrown its Nordic sibling stock exchanges. There are three facts about the Danish stock market that need to be noted: 1. Danish share trading volumes are much higher than for other European stock exchanges 2. Nasdaq Copenhagen is seeing by far the largest capital raises 3. Nasdaq Nordic, the stock exchanges in Stockholm, Helsinki and Copenhagen, is the market leader in listings in Europe in 2016 The Danish market is currently undergoing landmark changes. Two of the world’s three biggest listings this year were at the Danish stock exchange, Nasdaq Copenhagen. 70% of all capital raised in the Nordics in 2016 is in the Danish currency.

124

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

on the part of the individual shareholder who in that connection obtains control by not selling his shares – and the shareholder will therefore not be obligated to submit a takeover bid to the other shareholders.

The Danish FSA further noted that it was important that the company informed the other shareholders about the consequences of the share buy-back programme – including that a shareholder could potentially obtain control and that he would not be obligated to make a takeover bid.

The following passage from the Danish FSA’s opinion is worth bearing in mind in connection with future problems of a similar nature: ”In our opinion, if executed, the Programme will not trigger an obligation for the shareholders who obtain control only on account of the Programme, i.e. without a transaction having taken place and without indications of any avoidance, to make a takeover bid to the Company’s other shareholders, see section 31(1) of the Securities Trading Act”.

It is rarely difficult to determine whether a transaction has taken place, i.e. a transfer of shares in a given company whereby a shareholder obtains control. However, it may be very difficult to say whether there are any indications of avoidance. Bearing in mind the Danish FSA’s opinion, it must always be considered whether in the specific case there are any indications of avoidance of the obligation to make a takeover bid which may be justly or unjustly raised by a third party.

Share buy-back programme in Cemat At the general meeting which authorised the board of directors to launch the share buy-back programme, the board of directors decided – due to differences of opinion – not to make any recommendation to the shareholders as to whether a share buy-back programme or a dividend distribution would be the most suitable model for channelling funds back to the shareholders.

As the general meeting progressed, it became clear that the vice-chairman voted in favour of a dividend distribution and not the share buy-back programme – and that he believed that this was the best solution for all shareholders.

Thus, the vice-chairman was not active – almost actively against a share buy-back programme.

This case shows that it is possible to launch a share buy-back programme even though you have a major shareholder sitting on the board of directors who may obtain control. This case also shows, however, that it is important to keep the other shareholders informed so that they know what they are getting themselves into.

In the case of Cemat, after the expected completion of the share buy-back programme, the whole story thus ends with the remaining shareholders splitting the bill and together increasing their shareholdings – and not leaving the bill for one single shareholder to pay.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

123

122

In the case of Cemat, the vice-chairman had not initiated the share buy-back programme, but in contrast to the situation in the above decision, he was a part of the board of directors. He would thus as a general rule also be part of the board of directors which would recommend Cemat’s general meeting to initiate the share buy-back programme.

Opinion by the Danish FSA As the proposal for a share buy-back programme had not been brought up on the board on the vice-chairman’s initiative but by the minority shareholders, Cemat was of the opinion that the vice-chairman would not become obligated to make a public takeover bid. In order to clarify the situation, an opinion was obtained from the Danish FSA.

LETT Advokatpartnerselskab Att.: Advokat Anders Kaasgaard LETT Advokatpartnerselskab Rådhuspladsen 4 Att.: Advokat Anders 1550 København V. Kaasgaard Rådhuspladsen 4 1550 V. SendtKøbenhavn pr. mail til aka@lett.dk

12. august 2016 Ref. jcs/mbd 12. august 2016 J.nr. 6373-0073 Ref. jcs/mbd J.nr. 6373-0073

Sendt pr. mail til aka@lett.dk

Vejledende udtalelse - bestemmende indflydelse ved passivitet Vejledende udtalelse - bestemmende indfly-

FINANSTILSYNET

Århusgade 110 2100 København Ø FINANSTILSYNET

Århusgade 110 De har som for Cemat A/S (”Selskabet”) ved mail af 8. juli 2016 Tlf. 33 55 82 82 delse vedadvokat passivitet 2100 København Ø Fax 33 55 82 00 om Finanstilsynets vejledende udtalelse om, hvorvidt et påtænkt In anmodet its opinion, the Danish FSA had regard to the fact that adoption of the share buy-back proCVR-nr. 10 59 81 84 De har som advokat for (”Programmet”) Cemat A/S (”Selskabet”) ved egne mail af 8. juli aktietilbagekøbsprogram af Selskabets aktier vil 2016 kunTlf. 33 55 82 82 gramme was subject to a resolution by the general meeting and that the board of directors could finanstilsynet@ftnet.dk Fax 33 55 82 00 anmodet Finanstilsynets vejledende om, hvorvidt et påtænkt ne udløseom tilbudspligt, jf. § 31, stk. 1, i udtalelse lov om værdipapirhandel m.v. for www.finanstilsynet.dk only table the proposal if a majority of the board members were in favour of it.

CVR-nr. 10 59 81 84 aktietilbagekøbsprogram af Selskabets aktier Eivind Dam Jensen, som (”Programmet”) forud for tilbagekøbet besidderegne ca. 15 pct. vil af kunaktifinanstilsynet@ftnet.dk ne tilbudspligt, jf. § 31,i stk.

1, i lovog omsom værdipapirhandel m.v. for erneudløse og stemmerettighederne Selskabet, herudover er næstforwww.finanstilsynet.dk The Danish FSA further stated that a launch of the share buy-back programme would not trigger Eivind Dam Jensen, som forud for tilbagekøbet besidder ca.

15 pct. af aktimand for bestyrelsen i Selskabet. anerne obligation to make a takeover bid for shareholders who would obtain controlERHVERVS only because of og stemmerettighederne i Selskabet, og som herudover er næstfor- OG VÆKSTMINISTERIET themand share meaning a transaction having forbuy-back bestyrelsen i Selskabet.

Næstformanden vil programme, ikke selv erhverve aktier without i Selskabet, men kan komme til taken place and without at opnå bestemmende indflydelse i Selskabet i forbindelse med tilbagekøbet indications of any avoidance of the rules concerning takeover bids to the otherERHVERVS shareholders.

- OG VÆKSTMINISTERIET Næstformanden ikke selv af erhverve aktieregne i Selskabet, og efterfølgende vil annullering Selskabets aktier. men kan komme til at opnå bestemmende indflydelse i Selskabet i forbindelse med tilbagekøbet The fact that a change of control may have been brought about by the other shareholders using og efterfølgende annullering af Selskabets egne aktier.henvendelse, hvorfor bemærkes, at programme det er Selskabet, der har investments rettet theDet share buy-back to exit their would not constitute a positive action nærværende udtalelse er rettet til Selskabet og ikke til næstformanden.

Det bemærkes, at det er Selskabet, der har rettet henvendelse, hvorfor nærværende udtalelse er rettet til Selskabet og ikke til næstformanden.

1. Vurdering

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Det vurderes, at et aktietilbagekøbsprogram, som det præsenterede, kan 1. Vurdering gennemføres, uden at det udløser pligt for en aktionær, der pga. ProgramDet at et aktietilbagekøbsprogram, som detet præsenterede, kan met vurderes, opnår bestemmende indflydelse, til at fremsætte overtagelsestilbud,

As mentioned above, it is a requirement that a share transfer is made to the person who then at the same time obtains control. Positive action from the shareholder obtaining control is thus required.

In a share buy-back programme in Cemat, no shares will be transferred to the vice-chairman; he simply abstains from selling shares. And that should solve the problem – for surely, your non-action cannot result in such a considerable financial burden being imposed on you as having to make a bid for all of the shares in a company?

The challenge here was represented by the second sentence of section 31(5) of the Securities Trading Act, which reads as follows: ”A company’s acquisition of own shares shall, however, be subject to mandatory offers according to subsection (1) if the acquisition expresses circum­ vention of the limits mentioned in subsections (2) and (3)”.

According to the legislative material to the Securities Trading Act, the above is an exception to the general rule. The provision concerns the situation where a shareholder (who originally bought shares in the company without this triggering any obligation to make a mandatory offer) influences the company or one of its subsidiaries to buy the company’s own shares, and the acquisition of own shares then results in the shareholder, when deducting the company’s holding of own shares, obtaining control. In that case, the shareholder may become obligated to make a mandatory offer if the acquisition expresses circumvention of the obligation to make a mandatory offer to the other shareholders. It is not a requirement in this connection that the shareholder himself has bought shares in the company.

According to the paragraph 3.3.41 of the Danish FSA’s Guidelines, this obligation does not apply to control obtained through non-action. By way of example, Example 14 of the Guidelines concerns a shareholder who obtains control in connection with a share buy-back programme that is effected at the company’s initiative – in that situation, no mandatory offer is required.

The Danish FSA has decided in a specific case that a shareholder would not become obligated to make a mandatory offer if he obtained control in connection with a share buy-back programme in the target, as he had not obtained such control by any action on his own part, see the Danish FSA’s decision of 22 October 2013. In the relevant case, one of the things which the Danish FSA had regard to was that the shareholder, which was a company, had not initiated the share buy-back programme and was not represented on the board of directors of the target.

1 The Danish FSA’s Guidelines no. 9687 of 15 September 2014 about section 31(1)-(3), (6) and (8) of the Danish Securities Trading Act and the Executive Order on Takeover Bids.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

121

27

Mandatory offers by passive majority shareholders Have you ever been out to dinner with friends and agreed that you would split the bill – and then suddenly, while you were at the bar, your friends left and you got stuck with the whole bill? Perhaps not – but the majority shareholder in Cemat may have had that feeling.

After a dramatic process at the general meeting on 17 June 2016, the board of directors of Cemat started considering how to accommodate the unhappy shareholders who had stated in no uncertain terms that they wanted to sell their shares now and that they did not want to wait for a potential increase in the value of the Polish property holdings. The most obvious solution was to use the proceeds from the sale of the silicon business to launch a comprehensive share buy-back programme.

Anders Kaasgaard, Lawyer, LETT

However, this solution involved a potential problem not unlike the situation described above where one person suddenly ends up with the whole bill for the shared dinner.

If the solution with a share buy-back programme in Cemat was opted for, it would have to be presented as an offer to all shareholders. Personally and through his own company the vice-chairman of the board of directors held around 15% of the shares. If he did not participate in the share buy-back programme, he would most likely end up controlling Cemat with an ownership share above 33% (and probably even above 50%).

Early in the process, the vice-chairman was asked by the other board members whether he wanted to sell his shares as his participation would significantly reduce the chance of drawing up an attractive share buy-back programme to the other shareholders. Conversely – if he decided not to sell, he would in all probability obtain control over Cemat and thus run the risk of becoming obligated to make a takeover bid to the other remaining shareholders.

Mandatory takeover bids Under section 31 of the Danish Securities Trading Act (værdipapirhandelsloven), a mandatory takeover bid must be made if a shareholder obtains control over the company when a ”shareholding is transferred directly or indirectly in a company (..) to an acquirer or to persons who act in concert with him”. Thus, as a general rule, it is a requirement that a shareholding is transferred to the acquirer – in this case, the vice-chairman of Cemat.

The purpose of the rules governing mandatory takeover bids is to provide shareholders with a way out of their investments in a company if a new person obtains control over the company.

120

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

sold the shares to a third party on the stock exchange and thus according to the most lenient alternative.

A small warning flag The reason why the tax advisers nevertheless raised a small warning flag in the case of Topsil is that Topsil’s share buy-back programme was to be completed immediately following a capital reduction where the undistributable reserves had been freed up, and that the purchases were then to take place with the aim of effecting yet another share capital reduction by cancellation of the purchased shares. The special statutory right of exemption applying to listed shares only applies to proceeds paid out in connection with a buy-back of the shares but not proceeds paid out in connection with a capital reduction. It was thus essential to verify that the share buyback programme would also by the tax authorities be qualified as a share buy-back programme and not as a capital reduction, and furthermore – if contrary to expectations the tax authorities were to qualify the payout as proceeds from a capital reduction – that a specific exemption would then be granted to exempt the proceeds from dividend taxation. It was thus necessary to make the resolution about the share buy-back programme conditional upon clarification of these tax issues by obtaining a binding ruling from the tax authorities.

At the time of writing, no response has been received from the tax authorities – they are either very quick to respond or take their own time…

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

119

118

The actual decision to pay out its excess liquidity was submitted by Topsil to the general meeting as a choice between distributing the amount as dividends or via a share buy-back programme.

A dividend distribution would mean that all shareholders would receive a proportionate share of the distribution whereas a share buy-back programme would only result in a payout to the shareholders who decided to take up the offer to sell their shares. As the offer was to be submitted to all shareholders, the resolution in favour of a share buy-back programme meant that the number of shares which Topsil would be allowed to buy back had to be capped. The cap would become relevant if a very large number of shareholders chose to take up the offer.

The share buy-back programme thus did not involve any guarantee that Topsil would be able to buy back all shares held by the shareholders wishing to accept the offer.

Tax consequences of the share buy-back programme The choice between a dividend distribution and a share buy-back programme also involved a number of tax consequences for the shareholders and these were probably decisive in terms of the general meeting resolving to adopt a share buy-back programme over a dividend distribution.

As regards tax, it is not unimportant whether a company distributes capital by way of a dividend distribution or a buy-back of own shares. The difference lies in the tax base. In a dividend distribution, the whole proceeds are taxable whereas in a share sale only the gain is taxable. The tax base is thus smaller in a share sale and if the sales price is lower than the purchase price, a loss deduction may be available. Under existing tax rules, a sale of shares will thus usually be more attractive to the shareholders than a dividend distribution. An exception to this rule is, however, when the shareholder is a company with an ownership share above 10%, as dividends are tax-exempt for the parent company in this situation.

As a sale to the issuing company can be used as an alternative to a dividend distribution, a so-called anti-avoidance rule has been established in Danish tax law to prevent dividend tax avoidance using the rules governing sale to the issuing company. The relevant provisions in this respect, which may be found in sections 16A and 16B of the Danish Tax Assessment Act (ligningsloven), provide that the proceeds received by a shareholder in connection with a sale of shares to the issuing company or a capital reduction are taxable as dividends and the purchase price is thus not deductible. The tax authorities may subsequently change this tax liability and issue a specific exemption. This enables the tax authorities to verify that the transaction does not involve any avoidance of the rules. Unlisted companies must always apply for an exemption, and exemption practice differs depending on whether the transaction involved is a capital reduction or a sale-back. For listed companies, however, the legislators have made an exception in that a general right of exemption exists, which means that shares in a listed company sold to the issuing company are taxable according to the general share taxation rules and even with an option for the shareholders to opt for dividend taxation instead, which only in few and very exceptional cases will be an advantage. Share buy-back programmes in listed companies thus rarely give rise to tax problems as the shareholder will be taxed in the same way as if he had

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Topsil’s management wanted to give all shareholders the opportunity to sell their investments altogether at a fair price. With a dividend distribution, Topsil would have been able to reduce its excess liquidity, but this would not provide those of the many small shareholders who would want to the same opportunity to sell all of their shares at a fair price.

At the time, Topsil had around 7,000 shareholders and except for a single major shareholder, the group of owners was composed of mainly small shareholders and a few with shareholdings of around 5%. The many small shareholders had originally bought shares in a company with silicon activities, but after these activities had been disposed of the only remaining activity in Topsil was a shareholding in a Polish property company and thus a business which was materially different from what it had been originally. The launch of a share buy-back programme was thus relevant not only in relation to Topsil’s level of activity but also in relation to the shareholder group.

Company law organisation of the share buy-back programme A company’s purchase of its own shares differs from an ordinary share deal in more ways than one. As already mentioned, the reason for this is that a purchase of own shares is technically very similar to a capital reduction or a dividend distribution as the company’s own funds are paid to the shareholders in connection with the purchase of the shares in the company. Danish company as well as tax law provide specific rules governing a saleback like that to the issuing company.

With the new Danish Companies Act in 2010, the previous 10% limit of how many own shares a company was allowed to hold was repealed and today there is no specific limit to a company’s purchase of own shares. The general rule is that a company may use its distributable reserves to purchase own shares and that management is subject to the same limitations as apply to dividend distributions; meaning that the purchase of own shares is only allowed if the company has enough distributable reserves to fund such purchase and only if it is deemed reasonable, having regard to the company’s operations. Any purchase of own shares is further conditional upon authorisation from the general meeting.

Topsil In Topsil’s case, the amount of distributable reserves was below the around DKK 120m in excess capital which management wanted to pay back to the shareholders. In order to facilitate the reduction of Topsil’s excess liquidity to the desired level Topsil thus needed – prior to its launch of the share buy-back programme – to reduce its share capital from around DKK 132m to around DKK 10.5m, thus freeing up around DKK 121.5m from the tied-up share capital to Topsil’s distributable reserves. At the same time, the shareholders in general meeting resolved by separate resolution to reduce the nominal value of Topsil’s shares from DKK 0.25 to DKK 0.02. This resolution was conditional upon publication of a notice to creditors in the IT system of the Danish Business Authority informing creditors that they could lodge their claims against the company.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

117

26

Share buy-back programmes – Types and tax consequences Share buy-backs A ”share buy-back” refers to the purchase by a company of its own shares and thus a share of itself. Share buy-back programmes are quite common in listed companies and they are often used as an alternative to dividend distributions. But why do listed companies choose to launch a share buy-back, and what are the advantages of a share buy-back over a dividend distribution?

This question was given special attention by the Topsil board of directors as it decided to put two alternative proposals to the general meeting, asking the shareholders to choose between a dividend distribution or a share buy-back programme.

Why a share buy-back programme?

Claus Holberg, Partner, LETT

Share buy-back programmes are usually only launched when the company has excess liquidity and does not wish to be overcapitalised. In the global market, share buy-back programmes are considered an investor-friendly initiative, one reason being that the buy-back affects the valuation and another reason being that the share buy-back programme – as opposed to a declared dividend distribution – in principle offers investors a choice as to when they want to take home the gain. With full insight into a company’s share buy-back programme, the shareholders who do not want to receive dividends can choose not to sell their shares and so they will often be placed in a better situation than if the company had distributed dividends which the shareholders were to subsequently reinvest in the company. For example, they will be placed in a better position taxwise as dividends are taxed on distribution. By way of a share buy-back programme, listed companies may furthermore ensure a harmonious share price development as the company has the option of buying its own shares on the stock exchange. That is not the same as the company engaging in price manipulation.

In most cases, own shares are purchased for the purpose of cancellation and the buy-back thus in effect constitutes a reduction of the company’s capital base which may be equated with a dividend distribution. However, sometimes companies have also been known to keep the purchased shares. One of the reasons for this may be that the companies wish to offer these shares to their employees under an employee share programme or that the companies use the shares as consideration in a business transfer or in connection with a merger. In those cases, the buy-backs cannot be equated with dividend distributions.

Background to the Topsil share buy-back programme In Topsil’s case, the share buy-back programme became relevant because Topsil had disposed of its core activity. As a result, the company had become significantly overcapitalised relative to the rather modest activity that was left in the company. For this reason in particular,

116

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

115

114

Taking ownership of the situation, the board made some calculations which showed that overall, the bid that had been submitted to the general meeting for adoption was marginally better in the board’s opinion than the conditional bid which had been announced but not submitted yet, and which the board also knew would not be acceptable to the biggest single shareholder (+10%).

About the board’s report on the bid Under section 23 of the Executive Order on Takeover Bids, the board of directors must – if the bid is for the shares of the company and not its activities – within two weeks after the submission of the bid “prepare a report setting out the views of the central management body on the bid and its reasons for the views, including the body’s views on the effects for all of the company’s stakeholders and the bidder’s strategic plans for the target and their likely repercussions on employment and the various establishments of the company”.

Over time, such reports have increasingly become more and more template-like. Even so, every word used will be considered at length because in these reports management offers its views on the company’s value and future value creation. In a few cases – Stylepit being one of them – the board’s views were ambiguous as the valuation of the company was based on expectations to future developments in an entire and immature industry. In other cases – most recently, Topdanmark – the board’s recommendation was clear and unambiguous.

Whatever the situation, the board will have to balance the following concerns: If we do not recommend and the future turns out otherwise and not as good as all of us believed after serious and thorough contemplation and the share price falls, what will the shareholders say?

Or the share price falls simply because the bidder backs out. And if we recommend and the shareholders then reject the bid (as was the case with the Danisco deal) and the share price rises and rises, what will the shareholders then say? In such situations, the sound judgement, common sense and courage of the board are really put to the test.

So, basically, fiduciary duties are simply a matter of respecting other people’s money and showing good judgement and common sense.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

could be said to have duly and properly fulfilled its obligations in respect of all stakeholders, and although the bid before the general meeting was certainly not obscenely high considering the share prices of former times, it had nonetheless been raised right before the general meeting.

And then again When a press release was received just when the general meeting had started, saying that another bidder would be submitting a voluntary bid for all of the shares in Topsil, the fiduciary duties of the board were on display.

All issues were now up in the air. Was the potential bid overall better than the conditional, soonto-be final, agreement to sell the silicon business that was already on the table? Should the shareholders have an opportunity to consider the new landscape at a special general meeting?

Would Topsil’s bankers and creditors accept an uncertain postponement of the transaction? Was the potential bid subject to conditions that could not be fulfilled? To what extent would the board be personally liable, whatever decisions it made?

The overriding concern of the board in its deliberations and decision was to safeguard the company’s value. And the board was of course criticised. If the company went bankrupt or if the company’s value disappeared because the board did not accept the bid that was already on the table for adoption by the general meeting and would lapse later the same day, the board should indeed be blamed. And if the board did not convene a new general meeting to decide on the announced intention to submit a bid for all of the shares, the board might be blamed for not having tried to maximise shareholder value. So whatever the board ended up doing, it would be hard – not to say impossible – to avoid criticism, also because the shareholders were not aware of the magnitude of the pressure that had been brought to bear on Topsil in the situation.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

113

25

Fiduciary duties – The real world As the board of directors, the responsibility is yours in good times and in bad times. There is generally not much praise for the board in the good times – and in the bad times words such as “personal criticism”, “lawsuit” and “liability” often come up. In critical situations you need to focus on common sense, a respect for all stakeholders and formal rules as your guiding principles. That is what the board of directors of Topsil did on 17 June 2016 at 10:08 am.

The situation

N.E. Nielsen, Partner, LETT

By virtue of its office, the board of directors has a number of fiduciary duties with regard to safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders of the company and value creation in the company.

Also in a sales process – and perhaps particularly so – the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to safeguard in the best way possible the interests of all stakeholders – shareholders, employees, creditors, business partners, financial partners and society at large – but primarily and most often the shareholders’ interests.

According to the Danish Corporate Governance Recommendations 2013 (most recently updated November 2014), the contingency procedures of a company in case of a takeover bid should lay down that “the board of directors should not without the acceptance of the general meeting, attempt to counter the takeover bid by making decisions which in reality prevent the shareholders from deciding on the takeover bid themselves”. This soft law had been implemented

by Topsil in its corporate governance policy as posted on the company’s website. And it was therefore only natural for Topsil’s board to convene an extraordinary general meeting to decide whether to sell the company’s core activity – the silicon business.

Deal certainty For Topsil, it had been a very crucial element throughout the entire process that the deal would actually go through once it was agreed and announced. The next priority was the interests of the company as such. Topsil was operating with continuing losses and a highly-geared financial balance sheet relative to the company’s situation. How long could this continue without the shareholders and all other stakeholders taking a full loss and without the bankers putting their foot down? Deal certainty was thus a crucial parameter. The GlobalWafers deal that was presented to the shareholders involved a number of conditions that had been successively fulfilled in the period up until the general meeting and – just as importantly – Topsil had documentation and comfort that GlobalWafers had sufficient funds to pay. In addition, the board had obtained a fairness opinion from its corporate finance advisor. So, the scene had been set – the board

112

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

A decision like that takes courage as well as decisiveness. For when you have more than 500 stores, in Denmark as well as abroad, it is a very costly exercise to recall a product. “And who’s to say it’s our fault anyway ...?” Forget it! You just don’t have time for that. Sorry.

So this was an imminent disaster that simply had to be headed off. And preferably without any collateral damage to the company’s reputation. And so it was.

The shitstorm never came, which was obviously also the purpose of our efforts. And, to my knowledge, the retailer received positive feedback from Facebookers, who not only found it appropriate for the product to be recalled, but also applauded the company for its instant (and that is what it was) response – no questions asked.

It is a pleasure working with people who are this resolute. Top executives who appreciate the fact that a shitstorm is much costlier than an undramatic product recall.

But these situations only end well if management has the courage to act before all details are known. There simply is no time for that.

Is that fair? Probably not. But what was the alternative? Much worse, believe me!

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

111

24

When the shitstorm hits the fan: Ooooh, sh** Social media are extremely powerful. And once you find yourself in a shitstorm, there are three things you need: Speed. Courage. Decisiveness. For the criticism or outrage that induced the shitstorm is more often than not justified. So what to do?

Being on the receiving end of a shitstorm is not very nice. In fact, quite horrible. Those who have lived through such a phenomenon will never forget it, and a number of companies and CEOs never regain the status, respect and reputation they earned a living from before the shitstorm.

So when the first signs of a shitstorm appear, there is only one way out:

Esben Høstager, Advisor to boards and executives for more than 25 years, HØSTAGER │ SOLO Esben Høstager is a highly specialised top management advisor with more than 25 years’ experience. He has advised boards and executives in a number of companies and organisations as well as central and local government. Before becoming an advisor, he served for 11 years as SVP, corporate communications, with two of the largest companies in the financial sector at the time.

Today, he runs his own consultancy firm HØSTAGER │ SOLO, advising exclusively on strategic communication, issues management and crisis management.

For more details, see www.hostager.dk.

Drop everything(!) you’re doing – NOW! For if you fail to respond IMMEDIATELY, you will end up – well, in deep sh**.

And – most likely – there will be no second chances.

Does that sound easy? It’s not. But please remember it anyway.

A couple of years ago, I advised one of the major retailers, which had discovered, quite by accident, that one of their products was receiving very bad coverage on Facebook – in fact, there were photos of the product burning (and being flammable was certainly not part of its main attributes)!

But, unfortunately, that was not the worst part. For, as we soon found out, one of the biggest reality stars at the time was flashing the exact same product on her personal Facebook page – accompanied by a loving comment that she had received it as a gift “from my sweet mom” ...

And that particular reality star had – no kidding – 350,000 followers.

A non-flammable product on fire – coupled with a reality star with hundreds of thousands of Facebook fans. A better reason for a swift response does not exist. I am happy to say that the CEO of the retailer agreed. That was a good thing, for my recommendation was extremely simple – requiring only a swift decision: “Take the product off the market NOW. Post a message on Facebook INSTANTLY, saying that you are so happy to be told of the unfortunate problem, and that everybody will of course get their money back if they have one of those products. No receipt required.”

110

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Finally, I’m wary of highly geared companies, especially if they’re not managed that well – that could mean death. The company is having its arm twisted and is unable to make sound commercial decisions – it’s all about survival. The bank has one interest only and that’s its money, it doesn’t care one bit about the shareholders – end of story, that’s how all banks are – and perhaps how all banks should be.

If I was to criticise ourselves with regard to Topsil, we should probably have reacted sooner, but we were told all the time that things were looking up. In the end, we didn’t have anything left. We bought into a silicon business and not a Polish property company – the investment case we bought into is no more.

Bad investments hurt, but there is of course an element of own fault – you could have decided not to invest. Unfortunately, it’s often too late to get out as a result of illiquidity, unless you take a loss of 50%.”

The lesson learned from Topsil by the minority shareholder: 1. Invest in liquid shares, unless you deliberately opt for a long-term strategy 2. Get to know the board of directors and the executive board – and communicate 3. Consider whether the ownership structure may be a problem 4. Avoid highly-geared companies 5. Sell if you lose faith in management or the investment, even if it involves a loss – don’t throw (any more) good money after bad

Lawyers on the board of directors The interview was drawing to a close, but before leaving we had one more question to ask.

What are your views on lawyers on the board? Christian Reinholdt answered promptly, tongue in cheek: “Generally not a good thing. I want a commercial board – one that’s capable of making commercial decisions. You aren’t qualified because you’re a lawyer, but it’s possible to be a lawyer and be qualified and be commercial”.

We agreed with the last part.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

109

108

“Small caps are not all the same, you can’t say that they’re this way or that. But for us, Topsil was a lesson learned. You need to be extremely careful to get to know the group of persons that’s involved in the company, both the board of directors and the day-to-day management – I guess we didn’t do that in Topsil. Today, I spend even more time trying to understand what the board of directors is like in each case. Usually, you don’t have the same dialogue with the board of directors as with the day-to-day management, but it may be important in some situations in order to understand what they think of things such as communication. That’s one of the problems that many small companies have – the communication to the market isn’t stringent, there’s no consistency. Sometimes they’ll say something that’s the exact opposite of what they said only three months ago. They don’t close the gap that may exist. They’ll just come up with something new to say and then you can get really scared as a shareholder, particularly if the results are really bad and have been for a long period of time. If results are good and communication not as good, you’ll sort of turn a blind eye. A good example of this is Vestas – they’ve been splendidly successful after the change of management, but they never say anything.

The thing about getting to know management also has to do with trust – you need to trust management. Management must be competent – hands-on and critical. Once you lose faith in management, you usually also lose faith in the investment.

The ownership structure is also immensely important. Like putting your hand on a hotplate – management itself must have a financial interest in the company, but it’s a tough balance.

Majority shareholders on the board of directors will not always go after the same things as the minority shareholders. If you have a board of directors that’s just sitting there protecting itself, then it’s hard for you to get at them. Then you are locked in a frustrating situation. One of the things that we’ll make an even greater effort to find out beforehand is how the board of directors see things, including how they see minority shareholders. As you know, it’s when the going gets tough that you’ll need to know – not when things are nice and smooth. And when the going gets tough, it’s often too late.

„

Like putting your hand on a hotplate – management itself must have a financial interest in the company, but it’s a tough balance.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

for high-speed trains. Topsil’s products were high-end and here we saw an opportunity within our small cap segment to get a piece of the action.”

Involuntary insiders and abused platforms As a shareholder in Topsil, SmallCap Danmark maintained an ongoing dialogue with management in the latter years. According to Christian Reinholdt, however, as a shareholder you need to pay extreme attention to what kind of information you get from your communication with management: “The worst the company can do is make you an insider. You’ll be completely boxed in. I have pointed that out a lot of times to a number of companies. You may become an involuntary insider, but by maintaining an ongoing dialogue with the company you’ll have a better understanding of what they’re thinking, how they see things and the announcements they send out. That’s why it’s so important to get to know the company and particularly its management. Analysing the financial statements and so on, you can have a much sharper dialogue with management about problems and opportunities. It’s crucial to know management well, particularly in the segment where SmallCap Danmark operates and with the investment philosophy that we subscribe to.”

„

The worst the company can do is make you an insider.

SmallCap Danmark has also played an active role at several general meetings of Topsil. But what is it like to take the floor at a general meeting, knowing that you are a minority? “You can exert a moral pressure, but you don’t really leave the general meeting with high hopes. As an investor, it’s important to be known – the general meeting is a way of making yourself known to management and other shareholders. For us at SmallCap Danmark, it’s also a way of showing our own shareholders that we have an attitude to our investments. We’re active and try to use whatever means that are available to us. But this is not something that should be abused – some shareholders see the general meeting as a platform where they have a chance at long last to say whatever they like – that’s just noise and a waste of time that shouldn’t be allowed.”

Communication, trust and competent management With 30 years of industry experience, Christian Reinholdt has participated in numerous investments in good times and in bad, thus gaining an insight into how investments in small caps differ from investments in larger companies where the shares are much more liquid and may be sold at a day’s notice at the market price. Against this backdrop it would be interesting to know what aspects are generally important to minority shareholders in Danish small caps from an investor’s perspective.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

107

23 Christian Reinholdt, Adm. direktør, SmallCap Danmark A/S SmallCap Danmark is a provider of niche asset management services, specialising in listed Nordic small and medium caps.

SmallCap Danmark operates two funds, SmallCap Danmark A/S and Investeringsforeningen SmallCap Danmark, with a capi­ tal base totalling approximately DKK 480m (as at 31 December 2015).

Both funds are listed and open for private investors. SmallCap Danmark uses the market’s investor focus on larger companies as a competitive advantage in its small cap investment activities.

The voice of minority shareholders Interview by Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen and N.E. Nielsen, LETT

The atmosphere in the borrowed canteen at Topsil’s former premises was tense – the board of directors and the minority shareholders were like cat and dog. “Communication has simply been disastrously bad in the sales process. I’m surprised, to say the least, that the board of directors is considering a share buy-back programme at DKK 0.305 per share. I strongly recommend the board to raise the price to at least DKK 0.352 per share, equivalent to the price of NSIG’s public bid, and this doesn’t even reflect the company’s equity value” – these were the words of Christian Reinholdt of SmallCap Danmark A/S, and he was applauded enthusiastically by the attending shareholders.

Tension was running high at Cemat’s extraordinary general meeting on 5 August 2016. The general meeting was held at the request of a group of shareholders who wanted to reverse the resolution by the general meeting 1½ months earlier to sell the core activity – the silicon business – not something that happens every day!

After a sales process that was quite out of the ordinary, we have asked Christian Reinholdt, CEO of SmallCap Danmark A/S, to meet us for a talk about what it is like to be a minority shareholder and what aspects are generally important to minority shareholders in Danish small caps.

Energy efficiency and solar cells First things first – we would obviously like to know how and why SmallCap Danmark became a shareholder in Topsil. Smiling, Christian Reinholdt started telling his story: “It was in 2009.

We’re at a meeting with investment fund LD in another context. On our way out, we were stopped: Wouldn’t we like to hear about Topsil? Well – we’d heard so many bad things about Topsil in the old days, so not really, no. But with the offer of a free lunch and an opportunity to hear more about Topsil, we found out that things were actually going extremely well at the time. The solar cells were hugely successful, and what Topsil couldn’t use in its silicon production it could sell instead to the solar industry at high prices. We also thought that the energy efficiency trend was interesting – transformation of energy across Europe, among other things

Right to request an extraordinary general meeting Under section 89(3) of the Danish Companies Act (selskabsloven), shareholders holding 5% of the share capital may request an extraordinary general meeting in writing. The notice convening the meeting and the specific agenda to be discussed must be sent out no later than two week from receipt of the request.

106

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Forced completion of pointless voting procedure The issue of postal votes was revisited at one of Topsil’s subsequent general meetings, but this time in a completely different way. Almost at the same time as the complaint was lodged by NSIG with the Danish Business Authority, a small group of shareholders requested Topsil under section 89(3) of the Companies Act to hold an extraordinary general meeting with one item on the agenda: A proposal to revoke the resolution passed by the general meeting on 17 June 2016 to approve the transfer to GlobalWafers. The board of directors convened an extraordinary general meeting for 5 August 2016 in accordance with the statutory time-limits, but when the day arrived, the deal with GlobalWafers had been closed and the silicon business transferred.

Topsil and the shareholders now found themselves in a situation where they were to vote on a proposal to revoke a resolution which had already been implemented, and postal votes had of course – with an eye to increasing the drama, one might be tempted to say – been cast. It goes without saying that the vote was pointless, but according to legal literature nothing could be done: If postal votes have been cast on a resolution, the voting procedure will be regarded as having begun and then the voting procedure must be completed. The proposal was then put out to a vote for the sake of observing formalities, and the proposal was defeated.

No going back The case about the transfer of Topsil’s silicon business shows that for postal votes, there is no going back in more than one sense: (i) postal votes cannot be recalled, and (ii) the voting procedure must be completed once postal votes have been cast.

Any shareholders who are considering whether to vote by post in future, but are not 100% certain of their vote (whatever happens) are recommended to vote by proxy instead – for the proxy may be withdrawn at any time, i.e. as long as the proxy-holder has not yet used the proxy to vote.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

105

104

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

„

If the company has received the postal vote, the shareholder has cast his vote on the matter in question and the vote cannot be recalled.

With reference to the preparatory notes to the Companies Act, legal literature is dominated by the view that postal votes cannot be recalled. According to this line of thinking, when a postal vote has been cast, the voting procedure has started and then there is no getting the voting card out of the ballot box. One author does suggest, however, that companies are entitled, but not required to allow postal votes to be recalled subject to the principle of equality.

On the other hand, postal votes will not deadlock a resolution that has been proposed or the possibility of tabling an amendment to the resolution. So long as the amendment is within the scope of the original proposal and may be regarded as an improvement on the original proposal, there is no doubt that postal votes will also count in the vote on the amendment. In Topsil’s case, a clear improvement of the price in the shareholders’ favour was received immediately before the general meeting was scheduled to begin.

Decision of the chairman of the meeting and the legal aftermath The notice convening the extraordinary general meeting of Topsil on 17 June 2016 stated (in the same way as usual) that postal votes could not be recalled.

Having regard to the preparatory notes to the Companies Act, legal literature and the statement in the notice, the chairman of the meeting decided to deny the shareholder’s request to recall his postal vote. The resolution was then put out for voting, and with all the postal votes received tipping the scales the resolution was adopted by 73.65% of the votes/capital represented at the meeting (under section 106(1) of the Companies Act, a two-thirds majority was required to adopt the resolution, equivalent to 66.7% of the votes and capital).

But the issue of postal votes would later turn out not to be quite closed (yet). A couple of days after the general meeting, Topsil was informed that the Chinese bidder NSIG had decided to lodge a complaint with the Danish Business Authority with regard to the proceedings at the general meeting. NSIG complained, among other things, that as a result of the events that had taken place after the postal vote was submitted, the chairman of the meeting did not have the requisite power to enforce the shareholder’s original postal vote under EU law, more specifically the Shareholder Rights Directive2, the principle of frustation in Danish law and section 36 of the Danish Contracts Act (aftaleloven). However, the Danish Business Authority dismissed the complaint, and the decision of the chairman of the meeting was thus upheld.

1 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

103

22

No going back – Postal votes The most important vote in Topsil’s history was over and the votes had been counted: The resolution proposed by the board of directors to sell the silicon business to GlobalWafers had been adopted by 73.65% of the votes represented at the general meeting. But not all of the shareholders who had attended the general meeting and voted in favour of the proposal were happy about the result.

Postal votes played a crucial part in the sale of Topsil’s silicon business. During the discussions at the extraordinary general meeting on 17 June 2016, a major shareholder announced that he wanted to recall his postal vote on the resolution, citing the hectic events the day before and at the general meeting itself. The chairman of the meeting then had to think quickly: What does the law say about postal votes?

Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, Junior Lawyer, LETT

No getting the voting card out of the ballot box There are three different ways that shareholders may vote at a general meeting: in person, by proxy or by post. Notwithstanding the far-reaching implications of the different voting methods, this is a highly underrated subject in jurisprudence and probably even more so in the practical legal world – the general meeting of Topsil being a case in point.

Postal voting is governed by section 104(2) of the Danish Companies Act (selskabsloven). But the option of recalling postal votes that have already been sent is not directly regulated in the Companies Act. However, the preparatory notes to the Companies Act do note that: “If the company has received the postal vote, the shareholder has cast his vote on the matter in question and the vote cannot be recalled. A vote by post is thus materially distinct from a vote by proxy, which may be withdrawn at any time, see section 80(2), i.e. as long as the proxy-holder has not actually used the proxy to vote.”.1

Section 104(2) of the Danish Companies Act “Shareholders may vote by post, ie by casting their votes in writing, before the general meeting. In limited liability companies whose securities are not admitted to trading on a regulated market in an EU/EEA country, this provision may be departed from in the articles of association. Requirements and restrictions may be imposed on the casting of votes in writing only if they are necessary to ensure identification of the shareholders and are reasonable taking the objectives into account.”

1 See Bill no. 170: The Private and Public Limited Companies Bill (the Companies Bill) as introduced on 25 March 2009 – section 104 (the Official Report of Parliamentary Proceedings 2008-2009, Appendix A, col. 5455).

102

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

The Topsil case In this very case, the Danish Business Authority assessed that, based on the documents received, there was no evident breach of the Danish Companies Act or the Articles of Association of the Company which could justify an administrative cancellation of the registrations made.

In its assessment, the Danish Business Authority had regard to the fact that, in the minutes of the general meeting of 17 June 2016, which had been announced on the Company’s website (www.cemat.dk), and which were attached to the registration, it appeared that the general meeting was lawful and quorate. It also appeared in the minutes that the result of the voting meant that both proposed resolutions of the Board of Directors were adopted by the general meeting.

The chairman of the meeting and the applicant are responsible that the information provided is correct, including that the requisite majority was present at the general meeting to adopt the proposed resolutions.

Based on the above, the Danish Business Authority assessed that this was a case of complex matters in a company’s internal matters, and that these matters entailed serious disagreement.

In such cases, the Danish Business Authority is not the proper authority to settle the conflict.

A settlement of a conflict of this kind generally requires witness statements and assessment of evidence, and, in this case, the proper venue would be the courts.

The first Danish Act on public limited companies was passed in 1917. As the Act introduced special legislation on company law, a body was required to be in charge of the registration of public limited companies. As a result, the Danish Registrar of Public Limited Companies was set up in 1918.

In 1988, a major reform of the then Danish Ministry of Industry led to a number of new agencies assuming some of the functions that had until then been performed by the ministerial department. The reform meant, among other things, that the Registrar of Public Companies was renamed the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency and that, in addition to the registration authority function, the Agency assumed the administration of areas such as the right to carry on business, the professions, the Danish shopping hours legislation, etc.

The Danish Business Authority was established on 1 January 2012 as part of a merger between the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency, the Danish Enterprise and Building Agency and parts of the Danish National IT and Telecom Agency.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

101

100

The subsequent control consists of a review of the documents and information entered in connection with the registration, however, documentation may also be collected from the applicant of the case.

If, in connection with such control, the Danish Business Authority establishes errors, the app­licant will be notified of these errors. If there are indications that a false registration has deliberately been made, the Danish Business Authority will report the person in question to the police or the General Council of the Danish Bar and Law Society and, at the same time, block such person’s possibility to make self-registrations via the Danish Business Authority’s IT system.

The Danish Business Authority’s possibility to cancel a registration When a registration has been made via the Danish Business Authority’s self-registration system - as happened in the case in question - the issue as to cancelling the registration is, in general, dealt with by the courts, cf section 20 of the Danish Companies Act. The Danish Business Authority may only administratively change registrations in the event of evidently unintended clerical errors on the part of the applicant where the application in question had been registered via the the Danish Business Authority’s self-registration system.

Likewise, corrections of registrations made in connection with the case handling in the Danish Business Authority may take place if the error is a case-worker error. This also applies if the registration made is an evident nullity. In this connection, an evident nullity is where the app­ lication is evidently contrary to the law or the articles of association in question or does evidently not comply with the actual matters concerned.

In its capacity as registration authority, the Danish Business Authority has no competence to carry out an actual assessment of evidence, as this assessment is dealt with by the courts.

Where, not on the basis of the documents received, the Danish Business Authority finds indisputable breaches of the Danish Companies Act or the articles of association of the company in question which may justify an administrative cancellation of the registrations made in respect of the company, the Danish Business Authority will refer the parties concerned to have the dispute resolved by the courts.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Furthermore, the applicant should not contribute to registrations if the applicant is aware of or suspects that the registration of the information is not in accordance with the law, the articles of association of the company in question or the matters actually decided in respect of the company’s situation.

Thus, the applicant is responsible for the application underlying the registration being legally made, including that any necessary authorisation is obtained, and that documentation relating to the registration or application is valid.

Manual control A registration in the self-registration system of the Danish Business Authority may be decided immediately online, or the case may be selected for manual processing, cf. section 3(2) of the Danish Executive Order on application for registration etc with the Danish Business Authority.

It is for the Danish Business Authority to decide whether a case is to be selected for manual processing.

The IT system of the Danish Business Authority includes a number of rules for the cases that are to be handled by a caseworker of the Danish Business Authority. The manual processing is to ensure that the decisions in respect of which application for registration has been made are in accordance with the law.

Cases concerning certain specific types of businesses as e.g. financial enterprises or commercial funds are always selected for manual processing irrespective of the subject of the reporting.

Furthermore, the type of case can also justify that a case be selected for manual processing.

It is mentioned as an example thereof that all cases on dissolution by payment declaration, re-openings and completion of mergers and demergers are always subject to manual processing.

Finally, the applicant of a specific case or the specific company concerned may also lead to the case being selected for manual processing.

Subsequent control of a registration Even though a case has been registered, it may, however, still be selected for manual processing and control.

Thus, the Danish Business Authority selects a number of registered cases for subsequent manual control in order to control that the registration made complies with the law. The introduction of the new IT systems has made this control far more focused in that the new system has a designed-in functionality of which the purpose is to label control marks. The control marks indicate cases where, based on a number of rules set out in the system, the system assesses that there may be reason to carry out a subsequent control of the registration made.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

99

21

Applicant’s liability, control and cancellation of registrations The Danish Business Authority has developed a number of new digital self-service solutions for the use of business registrations. These new digital self-service solutions basically mean that an immediate registration can be made of 90% of the cases, or more, if a number of automated, builtin minimum rules are complied with. This means that only a few number of cases result in a manual control by a caseworker.

The self-service solutions are based on a statutory principle on applicant’s responsibility meaning that the applicant warrants that the registration has been lawfully made, including that the applicant is duly authorised, and that documentation required for the registration or application is valid.

Søren Corfixsen Whitt, Chief Special Advisor, Danish Business Authority The Danish Business Authority is a body under the Danish Ministry of Business.

The Business Authority endeavours to enhance the competitiveness of Danish enterprises and, in that way, contributes to meeting the challenges of promoting growth and creating new jobs across Denmark.

In this connection, it is emphasised that if anyone finds that a registration made is prejudicial to the person in question, the issue as to the cancellation of the registration is for the courts to decide. Disputes between companies and third parties, including in case of disagreement of the proceedings at the general meeting, are, thus, to be decided by the courts.

Applicant’s liability It is essential that the public is able to trust the information registered with the Danish Business Authority. As applications for registration with the Danish Business Authority are made by self-registration using the Danish Business Authority’s IT registration solutions, resulting in an immediate registration, it is important to ensure that the information notified is correct and complies with the legal regulations.

The Danish Business Authority has already for a number of years, under the authority of the Danish Companies Act, clarified that a special responsibility rests with the applicant in respect of the specific content of the information notified/registered, cf section 15 of this Act. If the applicant has not participated in or attended decisions on matters subject to registration, it is, depending on the circumstances, the applicant’s assessment whether there is a need to clarify any uncertainties or request further documentation of the matters underlying the application.

It does not involve a strict liability, but it is the responsibility of the applicant to investigate the matter in more detail if the circumstances give rise thereto.

98

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Legal practitioners’ dilemma Without a clear answer from legal scholars, legal practitioners find themselves in somewhat of a dilemma: What advice are they going to give to the board of directors out there in the real world?

Forgetting legal scholars for a moment and putting yourself in the shareholders’ place, the answer to the question probably boils down to this: Using common sense, what does it take for the shareholders (the owners of the company) to see themselves as having been given a fair treatment in 2016/2017? The obvious answer to that question is that they must have the final say on issues of such importance!

Based on this reflection, the board of directors has, in bold terms, two options: (1) They can “take the chance” and make the decision themselves but in doing so run the risk that the shareholders feel unfairly treated and subsequently hold the board members personally liable or (2) they can do what a reasonable man would do and submit the decision to the general meeting.

Topsil’s decision For Topsil the answer was easy: The shareholders would be involved – not only out of respect for them and their possibility as owners to exert influence on Topsil’s future, but also because the transactional structure that had been planned for Topsil involved changing its name and the objects clause in the articles of association (which under the Companies Act requires adoption by a qualified majority at the general meeting).

The sales process accelerated in the time after its publication, and a month later the board of directors concluded an agreement with Taiwanese GlobalWafers on the sale of the silicon business. Apart from the regulatory approval, the board of directors also made the agreement conditional upon the approval of the general meeting. The agreement was submitted to the extraordinary general meeting on 17 June 2016 to much commotion. Only a few minutes after the general meeting had been scheduled to start, a public tender offer ticked in from a new Chinese bidder for all of the shares in Topsil, the general meeting was adjourned and the shareholders present were informed by the chairman of the meeting that they were now insiders.

After an hour of deliberations, the board of directors decided to stay with their recommendation to the shareholders to vote in favour of the sale to GlobalWafers – and the general meeting went with the recommendation.

Overall, the board of directors’ decision to make the sale conditional upon shareholder approval turned out to be an advantage to all parties: Not only was the ultimate decision-making power in a very decisive and complex situation laid in the hands of the shareholders, the waiting time until the general meetings’ adoption also prolonged the bidding process, creating an outright bidding war which ultimately left the shareholders with a higher price for the silicon business.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

97

96

In the absence of clear guiding principles in statutory and case law, two schools of thought have more or less evolved within jurisprudence:

A departure from this rule should only be allowed on an occasional basis where this can be explained by the need to safeguard the interests of the company, and thus of the shareholders and other stakeholders – for example to avoid bankruptcy or restructuring proceedings.

activities1. The more moderate jurists argue that issues of an entirely fundamental nature should be submitted to and decided by the general meeting in the absence of a need for swift action and discretion. The reason for this is that the process of convening general meetings in listed companies is a lengthy affair and general meetings are open to the public.

A minority group of jurists advocate that a sale of a company’s business or a substantial part thereof falls outside the scope of competence of the board of directors. Instead they subscribe to the view that such decisions must be submitted to the general meeting as the overriding rule, arguing that this would be in accordance with modern corporate governance principles and the qualifications which many shareholders have for investing in the company.

Most jurists advocate that a sale of a company’s business or a substantial part thereof falls within the scope of competence of the board of directors if the sale is in the company’s interest. The most radical jurists even maintain the board of director’s competence in situations where it is sometimes clear that a sale is de facto in preparation of the liquidation of the company, arguing that in such situations it is up to the general meeting to make the final decision to liquidate the company or instruct the board of directors to initiate new

”Outside”

”Inside”

Summing up, it may thus be concluded that jurists and scholars of jurisprudence do not agree whether the board of directors on its own can sell a company’s most significant assets without submitting the matter to the general meeting.

1 This view may seem rather drastic as a sale cannot always be substituted for the purchase of corresponding or new activities and as a decision cannot always be withdrawn once it has been made and executed (as was the case with Topsil).

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Transactions that are in conflict with or fall outside the company’s objects as defined in the articles of associations, amendments to the articles of association and areas on which the general meeting has exclusive competence under the Companies Act all fall outside the scope of competence of the board of directors. The general meeting may also limit the board of directors’ competence by passing a specific resolution or including a provision in the articles of association to the effect that specific types of decisions fall within the scope of competence of the general meeting.

Resolutions to amend the articles of association, including name and objects, must be passed by at least two-thirds of the votes cast as well as of the share capital represented at the general meeting (also known as a qualified majority), see section 106(1) of the Companies Act. Simple majority resolutions, including decisions to sell (which do not require an amendment of the articles of association) may be passed by a simple majority of votes, see section 105 of the Companies Act.

The importance of the board of directors’ competence is reflected in the consequences of a misstep: If the board of directors acts outside its scope of competence, the board of directors may incur liability in damages.

Disagreement among scholars of jurisprudence In the situations where a sale of the company’s most significant activities does not require an amendment of the articles of association or is not contrary to the objects of the company, the Companies Act does not contain any provision which specifically provides whether the sale of a company’s most significant assets falls within the scope of competence of the board of directors.

Nor has this issue been tried directly in more recent case law. A few jurists have singled out two early judgments printed in the Danish weekly law reports from 1936 (U1936.35H – sale of a dairy company’s only dairy facility) and from 1946 (U1943.448Ø – sale of a real estate company’s only real property) as an indication that the sale of significant parts of a company’s activities falls within the scope of competence of the board of directors as long as this does not require an amendment of the objects of the company in the articles of association or the dissolution of the company.

However, the two cases only concern the issue of which majority was required for the general meeting’s resolution, for which reason these cases do not provide an answer as to whether the board of directors can complete a sale on its own and without submitting the matter to the general meeting.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

95

20

Who decides: the board of directors or the shareholders?

“In connection with the strategy review carried out in 2015, Topsil analysed market developments, its market position and its future opportunities.

During this process, we approached other players in the silicon industry and different parts of our value chain.

In continuation of these soundings, Topsil has been approached by various parties concerning our possible interest in divesting parts or all of our silicon business or in entering into a strategic partnership. Some of these inquiries are in the form of non-binding indicative offers.”

Extract of company announcement no. 3/2016, Wednesday 20 April 2016.

Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, Junior Lawyer, LETT

This was the public kick off to what later turned out to be a rather unusual sales process where all aspects of the law, the stock market and the communications scene came into play.

Announcement no. 3/2016 was the first communication from Topsil’s board of directors to the public about a sale of Topsil’s main activity, the silicon business, being on the way. The market responded immediately – that day, Topsil’s share price increased by 26%.

Prior to that, the board of directors had closely considered the shareholders’ call for a change, and with the help of investment, legal and financial advisors the strategy was planned and the sale of the silicon business was put into action.

One of the first questions that came up was who would ultimately be making the decision to sell the silicon business: the board of directors or the shareholders?

Scope of competence of the board of directors At a general level, the issue of boards of directors’ vs shareholders’ decision-making authority is interesting because of the board of directors’ duty to act and the related liability in damages.

The scope of competence of the board of directors is defined, among other things, in section 115 of the Danish Companies Act (selskabsloven), which provides that in addition to being in charge of the overall and strategic management the board of directors must also ensure the proper organisation of the company’s activities. This means that the board of directors must deal with issues and decisions of a material or unusual nature concerning, among other things, the definition of company policies and strategies in terms of how the company is to be financed and organised, set up and acquire new businesses, penetrate new markets, product development, etc.

94

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

The proposed resolution to sell the silicon business to GlobalWafers was put out to a vote and was adopted by 73.7% of the votes represented at the general meeting. If the postal votes had counted against the proposed resolution instead of in favour of it, the proposed resolution would not have obtained the required two-thirds majority. The decision from the chair thus had a crucial effect on Topsil’s future. The general meeting ended, a company announcement concerning the outcome of the general meeting was immediately sent, the registrations according to the adopted resolutions were made, the minutes were written and Topsil initiated the process of completing the sale of the silicon business to GlobalWafers. The chairman’s job was over.

Act Three: Abating wind

„

Later that day, I returned to the People’s Meeting on Bornholm, where it was raining. On the flight back to the island, I reflected on the fact that the task of preparing for and chairing general meetings in listed companies is now a complicated one. The lawyer’s role at non-standard general meetings has changed from being simply a chairperson/legal advisor to the company to also being a practical discussion partner throughout the entire process. As the chairperson, it is important not to make hasty decisions, but it is also important to be able to make decisions.

As the chairperson, it is important not to make hasty decisions, but it is also important to be able to make decisions.

There was an aftermath to the general meeting when, a couple of days later, NSIG lodged a complaint with the Danish Business Authority, among other things, with regard to the decisions I had made. At this point in time, the resolutions adopted had been duly registered and the Danish Business Authority is only empowered to undo such registrations in extraordinary circumstances. On 30 June 2016 the Danish Business Authority issued its decision, dismissing NSIG’s complaint. Thus, I have the Authority’s word that there were no “obvious violations of the Companies Act or the company’s articles of association” under my chairmanship.

The sale to GlobalWafers was concluded on 1 July 2016 based on the resolution adopted at the general meeting on 17 June 2016. The lesson I have learned from that day is dual. Partly that a chairperson must be capable of making quick decisions on the spot in response to questions that are complicated and where there is no known practice to lean on. To be able to do so requires experience and deep-rooted knowledge of the relevant rules. Thus, chairmanship has become a craft. Partly that no one knows the day or the hour until the sun sets and the wind drops – whether in Frederikssund or on Bornholm.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

93

92

to take a break and for how long. In difficult situations, the chairperson should not hesitate to call such a time-out. It is wise to buy some time to think things through if the situation is unusual.

When proceedings were resumed, the next decision from the chair was made. I announced that all of those present were insiders as I was unable to rule out the possibility that inside information might be discussed or communicated at the general meeting, but at the same time I believed that the inside information communicated at the meeting would be “controllable” .

I made it clear to everybody what inside information is, that non-public information may be communicated and that they were all of them subject to the duty of confidentiality under section 36 of the Danish Securities Trading Act (værdipapirhandelsloven). The chairperson must ensure that – in addition to the company law and its provisions on general meetings – there will be no violation of securities law in connection with the general meeting.

The next decision from the chair followed immediately after this. I decided to allow discussion of the resolution proposed by the board of directors to sell the silicon business to GlobalWafers, notwithstanding the takeover bid announced by NSIG. A chairperson cannot refuse to discuss a duly proposed resolution due to external factors, including a takeover bid. In addition, there was also the practical fact that the takeover bid in question was subject to a number of conditions. I informed the general meeting of the contents of NSIG’s communication to allow the shareholders to take this information into account when deciding whether to vote yes or no. As far as the postal votes were concerned, I believed that the nature of this information was not such as to cancel them.

„

A chairperson cannot refuse to discuss a duly proposed resolution due to external factors, including a takeover bid.

I then decided to allow a discussion of the improved bid from GlobalWafers. Amendments may be proposed to all proposed resolutions, as is clear from the notes to section 91 of the Companies Act. However, an amendment must not go beyond what may reasonably be expected to be adopted within the framework of the original resolution. Specifically, the new bid from GlobalWafers was more attractive for Topsil’s shareholders as the price was higher than the original bid and as the bid no longer involved any negative adjustment of the price. The new bid was thus an unambiguous improvement on the former bid and could therefore be discussed.

After a lengthy and sometimes heated debate, I was forced to make my next decision from the chair. One of Topsil’s major shareholders had voted by post before the general meeting, but also attended the meeting in person and now wanted to recall his postal votes in favour of the sale to GlobalWafers. A scenario where one decision must be made and where the chairperson – regardless of the decision – may be exposed to criticism. I followed the line adopted by the Danish Business Authority and the most prevalent theory that once a postal vote has been cast, then it has been cast once and for all and cannot be recalled.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Topsil would change its name and objects. The deal with GlobalWafers had been concluded in May, but was conditional on acceptance by the general meeting. A straightforward and manageable agenda, at least on paper ...

I had prepared myself well in advance by mentally going through the possible scenarios and had arrived at the People’s Meeting on Bornholm with the Danish Companies Act in my briefcase, expecting the general meeting to go smoothly.

The first warning that the general meeting would not be an easy one to chair had come already the evening before. I was at a dinner party in Allinge on Bornholm when I received a phone call that a DKK 335m bid for Topsil’s silicon business had been submitted by Chinese NSIG. I told the board of directors that this bid could not be discussed at the general meeting because it was not on the agenda; see section 91 of the Companies Act. The extraordinary general meeting was still scheduled to go ahead as planned with a yes/no vote on GlobalWafers’ bid. At this point in time, a no was therefore expected on the existing DKK 320m bid.

„

Now that there were two interested buyers, this might drive up the price of Topsil’s silicon business, and telephones were extremely busy Friday morning. There was now an open and not-often-seen bidding war for a listed company. Although NSIG’s bid could not be decided on at the general meeting, NSIG’s advisors were heading to Frederikssund to start an auction process at the general meeting. I informed NSIG’s advisors that they were not entitled to attend. The general meeting could not be allowed to turn into an open and unruly arena.

The general meeting could not be allowed to turn into an open and unruly arena.

Early Friday morning, it was therefore decided in consultation with the management that both bidders would be allowed to submit a final bid no later than 30 minutes before the start of the general meeting. GlobalWafers increased its bid to DKK 355m and waived its requirement for negative adjustments of the price. At 10:00 am – when the general meeting was scheduled to begin – NSIG announced over the telephone that it would make a takeover bid for Topsil’s shares, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority had been informed, and we were encouraged to call off the general meeting. This was the second sign that this would be a “long day at the office” – and the general meeting had not even started yet.

Act Two: Force 12 The general meeting started, and around 80 persons – most of them veteran shareholders – were ready. As the board-appointed chairman of the meeting, I declared that the general meeting had been duly convened and legally competent to transact business and then made my first on-stage decision from the chair. I adjourned proceedings for an hour to give the board of directors and myself time to analyse the situation with the takeover bid. The chairperson is the one who decides

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

91

19

Chairing a general meeting I was standing at the Griffen Hotel, looking out on the Baltic Sea at 05:00 am.

The People’s Meeting on Bornholm with all of its magic festival atmosphere was at its height. Heavy rain clouds gathered over the Danish island, but even so Friday, 17 June 2016, was a beautiful morning. I watched the sun rise, while I waited for my lift to the airport. Mentally, I was starting to prepare for the general meeting five hours later that day in Frederikssund. Little did I know that I would be facing very difficult dilemmas later that day in my role as chairman of the meeting.

Chairing a meeting

Martin Lavesen, Partner, LETT

The chairperson presides over the proceedings at the general meeting and has great powers; see section 101 of the Danish Companies Act (selskabsloven). The chairperson should not see him- or herself as “just” a moderator. Modesty is a virtue, but not for purposes of shirking responsibility. At the general meeting, the chairperson ranks above the company’s management, and a good chairperson understands that his or her role is to serve as a neutral umpire in the relationship between the board of directors and shareholders. The chairperson has a managerial role to perform and must be conscious of his or her job and responsibility.

At the general meeting – and therefore also in the actions and decisions taken in preparation for the general meeting – the chairperson is the one with the power to make decisions which may interfere with the company and its shareholders. The chairperson can decide on procedural issues, adjourn and resume proceedings, decide on voting themes and control discussions.

The chairperson can decide on the individual shareholders’ right to attend and the extent of their voting right subject to the law, the agenda and the articles of association. The role of the chairperson is extensive and the responsibility correspondingly great.

If the chairperson neglects his or her duties, perhaps from an ignorance of relevant rules, the chairperson may be sued on a personal liability basis. If the company is a listed company, the chairperson must not only comply with company law, but also ensure that the general meeting is conducted in a manner that allows for the company’s compliance with its disclosure obligations under securities law. A chairperson who does not prepare properly for the general meeting may be likened to a fisherman on the island of Bornholm who underestimates the capriciousness of the weather.

Act One: Storm warning The general meeting had been convened for the sole purpose of having the shareholders accept or reject Taiwanese GlobalWafers’ bid to buy Topsil’s silicon business for DKK 320m on a debtfree basis with a possible negative adjustment of the purchase price. As part of this process,

90

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Basically, the notion of hostile takeovers is misleading. This is because in many cases the target shareholders will receive a premium of 30-40% according to US studies. On the other hand, a takeover may well be regarded as hostile from the perspective of the target management team.

Whether golden parachutes should be regarded as an anti-takeover measure has been a subject of discussion. The case for saying that they should is that such types of severance pay will obviously make the acquisition more costly as the exiting CEO will have to be compensated financially. On the other hand, a golden parachute may act as an incentive for the target CEO to “let go” of their job. The consequence of this is that the takeover bid will not be regarded as hostile, which will increase the likelihood of the deal actually going through.

What do the recommendations on corporate governance say?

According to the recommendations on corporate governance, “The Committee recommends that the company set up contingency procedures in the event of takeover bids from the time that the board of directors has reason to believe that a takeover bid will be made. According to such contingency procedures, the board of directors should not without the acceptance of the general meeting, attempt to counter the takeover bid by making decisions which in reality prevent the shareholders from deciding on the takeover bid themselves.” (recommendation 1.3.1).

The advantage of contingency procedures is that they contribute to ensuring that the shareholders will have a real possibility of deciding whether they wish to sell their shares in the company on the terms offered, and that the board of directors is aware of the formalities to observe in case they are contacted by external parties, has discussed who will do what and also which advisors it wishes to use. As already mentioned, boards of directors are only rarely experienced in being on the receiving end of a takeover bid.

Therefore, it may be even more relevant to consult with advisors and specialists. For instance, the board of directors may retain an external advisor to issue a fairness opinion concerning the price and terms of the bid. This has the advantage of providing management with a second opinion from an independent third party, which will also reduce the risk of subsequent lawsuits from disappointed target shareholders if the deal falls through because of the premium lost.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

89

88

However, only very few boards of directors will experience on a continuous basis that their company is an acquisition target. But especially in an acquisition scenario the target management team should consider whether to place their loyalties with the existing shareholders or the new potential owners, including what would benefit they themselves the most. There is no doubt that the target management team must safeguard only the interests of the existing owners. This also applies in the situations where the deal falls through for whatever reason. Like in Topsil, a management team acting in the company’s interests will often choose to invite other bidders in. Multiple bidders will – all other things being equal – drive up the price premium.

Obviously, there will be a change of management once a bid has been accepted and the company changes hands. This means that the target board of directors will have to leave, which in some cases may cause them to oppose a bid. In practice, this can be seen among other things by the target management team rejecting the bid as too low with reference to the many intrinsic values and the great potential they expect to see in the near future. However, sometimes one may wonder whether a public bid is required for management to really get down to work.

In order to ensure that the target’s fiduciary duties are not questioned, the Executive Order on Takeover Bids provides among other things that when negotiations are initiated with the target and until the negotiations are stopped, no agreements may be concluded and no existing agreements may be changed concerning bonuses and similar benefits for the target management team; see section 19. This provision is intended to ensure that there are no undue incentives which may affect management’s judgement. The bid must therefore also specify whether any agreements exist with regard to fees, incentive programmes, etc. to the target management team in connection with bidding procedures, see section 10(2)(vi).

“Hostile takeovers” – a myth?

US law operates with the concept of a market for corporate control. The idea is that if a management team is unable to generate sufficient value based on the company’s current assets, the share price will suffer. This means that alternative management teams/bidders will submit what is known as a tender offer. The reason is that the bidders believe that they would be more successful at managing the existing assets. Conversely, it does not mean that the business case will not lead to divestment and other strategic initiatives. The fear of removal will thus make management focus and minimise the so-called agency costs. Agency costs are the costs arising as a result of management’s wish to maximise their own power and wealth to the detriment of the company. Agency costs are many-faced and cover costs such as too expensive acquisitions, empire building, corporate perks, excessive incentive schemes, etc.

If the company is “protected” via different anti-takeover measures, the market for corporate control will be less effective and the discipline imposed on the target management team will weaken. Conversely, there may be a case for arguing that companies with effective protection against hostile takeovers are much more long-term in their perspective and therefore do not have to adjust to the capriciousness of the stock markets.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

conditions of employment, and also if the bidder wants the target to distribute funds within a year after the transaction. The latter has been included in the Executive Order on Takeover Bids because a lot of private equity funds would greatly increase the gearing ratio after acquiring the target and then distribute large amounts of funds. Such distributions were entirely legal at the time, but even so attracted a lot of media attention. For instance, Danish telecom operator TDC paid out DKK 6bn in extraordinary dividends in 2009. The money came from TDC’s near-sale of Swiss mobile company Sunrise, which merged with France Telecom’s Orange.

This may give rise to the question of whether the bidder may be held liable if the intentions stated by the bidder for the company turn out subsequently not to hold true. The question must be answered in the negative, provided that the bidder stated its intentions in good faith. The assumptions underlying the bidder’s business plan may subsequently turn out to change, e.g. as a result of macro-economic effects.

Focus on value creation for the owners or the other stakeholders of the company?

There are numerous examples of transactions in the US where the bidder stripped the assets of the company after the transfer, leaving only an empty shell and a bill to be footed by the tax­ payers. In some cases, bidders acquired paper mills and then closed them after stripping their most valuable assets. In other cases, large forest areas have been cleared and not replanted.

These negative effects are known as externalities. In Denmark, management has a broad fiduciary duty to not just safeguard the shareholders’ interests, also known as shareholder value. It is economically efficient when management safeguards the shareholders’ interests as the shareholders have what is known as a residual claim on the assets, meaning that only when all other stakeholders have received their share of profits will the shareholders receive their share in the form of dividends or buyback of shares. For this very reason, the shareholders have an incentive to maximise the total value creation for the benefit of all other stakeholders. But when major externalities exist, management should increasingly take a stakeholder orientation approach.

Management’s fiduciary duties – to whom?

US law operates with the concepts of duty of care and duty of loyalty, also known as fiduciary duties. In Denmark, we have the legal doctrine of management’s fiduciary duty. In brief, this doctrine means that management – i.e. the board of directors and the executive board – must safeguard the company’s interests. In other words, each member of management must put the company’s financial interests above their own interests. In normal circumstances this balance is maintained by the conflict of interest rules, the duty of confidentiality, etc. The doctrine also means that the company’s interests must take precedence, for instance when blank proxies are used at a general meeting. Management is not required to use all endeavours to sell the company. The crucial factor is that the target management team is able to demonstrate that they are endeavouring to maximise value creation in the company.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

87

18

The many new roles of the board of directors of listed companies also in a sales scenario – A governance perspective The role of the board of directors on receiving a public bid

Caspar Rose, Professor, CBS Caspar Rose is a Professor at the Copenhagen Business School.

He holds a Master of Laws from the University of Copenhagen as well as a Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration and a Ph.D. from the Copenhagen Business School (Finance and Accounting). He focuses on corporate governance, M&A, equity investment and financial markets in his research. Caspar Rose also has practical business experience from the Confederation of Danish Industry as well as Danske Bank.

The board of directors is in charge of the strategic management of the company, a role that becomes particularly relevant when the company is either in the process of acquiring another company or initiating a structured sales process. In such processes, great sums of money are at stake, depending on whether the price paid by the company is too high or the price paid for the company is too low. This may be illustrated by the fact that almost 50% of all acquisitions ends up destroying shareholder value. There are many explanations for this, e.g. that the bid was too high or that there is no clear plan for how to harvest synergies. Moreover, it is very important in practice that the bidder has a clear post-merger integration plan. Not only should IT systems run on a shared platform, but it is also important to integrate employees if there are large cultural differences, e.g. in international transactions. It is often in the subsequent process that value is lost. This is because top management risks losing its focus on integration.

This is where the board of directors must prove its worth and keep the executive board firmly focused on the anticipated quantitative synergy targets.

The target board of directors cannot refrain from acting when a public bid is submitted for their company. One initial reaction might be to think that since the bid is directed at the shareholders and not management, it should be a matter between the shareholders and the bidder. However, the legislators have imposed an obligation in section 23 of the Danish Executive Order on Takeover Bids for the board of directors to issue a motivated statement. Among other things, the statement must set out the board of directors’ views on the effects for all of the company’s stakeholders and the bidder’s strategic plans for the target and their likely repercussions on employment and the various establishments of the company. These are undeniably major issues that the target board of directors must consider. The reason why the legislators would require the board of directors to issue such a statement is that management is much better placed to evaluate the bidder’s bid, including particularly with regard to the price, but also when it comes to the terms of the bid. Management knows the internal workings of the company, and the target shareholders will therefore obviously listen closely to what the board of directors thinks of the bid.

The legislators require the bid to state the bidder’s intentions with the company and its strategy for it, including with regard to retention of jobs and any changes to the fundamental terms and

86

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

85

84

Takeover bids – exemption There was another legal twist to the whole Topsil case. The Executive Order on Takeover Bids provides in section 4 that the bidder must publish an announcement as soon as possible after deciding to submit a voluntary bid. And according to subsection (2): “The bidder shall, as soon as possible and no later than four weeks after the announcement of the decision to submit a voluntary bid, publish an offer document and a bid announcement”. Exemption from section 4 is available from the Danish FSA under section 30 of the Executive Order.

In its regulatory practice, the Danish FSA pursues the essential principle of not wanting to “confuse” the market so as to avoid creating unnecessary market unrest. Therefore, it will not accept if decisions to submit a takeover bid are made and announced but not followed up by a bona fide offer, as described above.

On the other hand – and based on the same principles – if a bid for Topsil had been made and then withdrawn due to a failure of assumptions, this would serve no purpose but simply cause market unrest, which does not do anyone any good. And there was a presumption that NSIG would withdraw their bid immediately after having submitted it when the silicon business was sold in accordance with the resolution adopted at the general meeting in Topsil.

And the Danish FSA did grant NSIG an exemption.

Moalem Weitemeyer Bendtsen Advokatpartnerselskab Att.: Advokat Dan Moalem Amaliegade 3-5 1256 København K Moalem Weitemeyer Bendtsen Advokatpartnerselskab Att.: Advokat Dan Moalem Amaliegade 3-5 1256 København K LETT Advokatpartnerselskab Att.: Advokat Anders Kaasgaard Afgørelse 4om dispensation fra pligt Rådhuspladsen 1550 København V.

til frem-

8. juli 2016 Ref. jcs J.nr. 6373-0071 8. juli 2016 Ref. jcs J.nr. 6373-0071 12. august 2016 Ref. jcs/mbd

FINANSTILSYNET

Århusgade 110 J.nr. 6373-0073 2100 København Ø

sættelse af frivilligt overtagelsestilbud

Sendt til aka@lett.dk De harpr. påmail vegne af National Silicon Industry Group (”NSIG”) den 4. juli 2016 Tlf. 33 55 82 82 Fax should 33 55 82 00 anmodet dispensation til at et tilbudsdokument You might om argue, just for fra thepligten sake of it, offentliggøre that the duty to submit an actual offer have Afgørelse om dispensation fra pligt til fremFINANSTILSYNET CVR-nr.

10 59 81 84 og en tilbudsannonce, jf. § 4, stk. 2 i bekendtgørelse om overtagelsestilbud been enforced, if for no other reason then because the consequences of a resolution Århusgade 110to sell finanstilsynet@ftnet.dk for så vidt angår frivilligeovertagelsestilbud overtagelsestilbud til aktionærerne i Cemat af NSIGs frivilligt 2100 København Øthe www.finanstilsynet.dk thesættelse silicon business at the general meeting on 17 June 2016 were known at the time when A/S (”Målselskabet1”). intention to vegne submit a publicSilicon bid was announced – in principle, therefore, these were33not new De har på af National Industry Group (”NSIG”) den 4. juli 2016 Tlf. 55 82 82 Vejledende udtalelse indfly-than practical. and unknown consequences.

Sure,- this is more academic But FINANSTILSYNET Fax 33 55going 82 00 anmodet om dispensation fra pligten til bestemmende at question offentliggøre et tilbudsdokument En tilbudsgiver, der har truffet beslutning om fremsættelse af et frivilligt tilÅrhusgade10110 CVR-nr.

59 81 84 forward, it wouldpassivitet be worth considering the interaction between general M&A processes and the og en jf. § 4, stk.herom 2 i bekendtgørelse bud ogtilbudsannonce, offentliggjort meddelelse efter § 4, stk. om 1, i overtagelsestilbud tilbudsbekendtgødelse ved 2100 København Ø finanstilsynet@ftnet.dk ERHVERVS - OG VÆKSTMINISTERIET for så har vidt angår NSIGs overtagelsestilbud til aktionærerne i Cemat takeover regulation under market et law. www.finanstilsynet.dk relse, forpligtet sig tilfrivillige atstock offentliggøre godkendt tilbudsdokument jf. § 1 De har som advokat A/S (”Selskabet”) ved mail af 8. juli 2016 Tlf. 33 55 82 82 ”). for Cemat A/S (”Målselskabet 4, stk.

2 i bekendtgørelse om overtagelsestilbud.

Fax 33 55 82 00 anmodet om Finanstilsynets vejledende udtalelse om, hvorvidt et påtænkt CVR-nr. 10 59 81 84 aktietilbagekøbsprogram (”Programmet”) af egne aktier vil kunEn tilbudsgiver, deri særlige har truffet beslutning omSelskabets fremsættelse Finanstilsynet kan tilfælde dispensere herfra jf. § 30.af et frivilligt tilfinanstilsynet@ftnet.dk ne udløse tilbudspligt, jf. § 31, stk. 1, i lov om værdipapirhandel m.v. for bud og offentliggjort meddelelse herom efter § 4, stk.

1, i tilbudsbekendtgøwww.finanstilsynet.dk ERHVERVS - OG VÆKSTMINISTERIET Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016 Eivind har Dam Jensen,sig som for tilbagekøbet besidder ca. 15 pct. af aktirelse, forpligtet til forud at offentliggøre et godkendt tilbudsdokument jf. § Det er Finanstilsynets vurdering, at der i nærværende sag foreligger særlige erne i Selskabet, og som herudover er næstfor4, stk.og 2 i stemmerettighederne bekendtgørelse om overtagelsestilbud. konkrete omstændigheder, hvorfor Finanstilsynet på denne baggrund medmand for bestyrelsen i Selskabet.

The takeover bid for Topsil In Topsil’s case, a structured sales proces of the silicon business (not the company) had been initiated and was managed by Topsil’s management, and it would therefore be easy to conclude that the bid that was submitted was done so in agreement with Topsil. That was not the case, however, as will be clear from the timing – the announcement of the bid coincided with the start of the general meeting that had been convened to approve the sale of the silicon business.

This timing caused concern with regard to one of the principles in particular: the principle of transparency. As already mentioned, shareholders must have adequate time and information to make an informed decision on the takeover bid.

The problem for Topsil was that the announcement of the intention to submit a takeover bid was made the same day and at the same hour as the general meeting was to consider whether to accept GlobalWafers’ bid for the silicon business (and not the shares), a bid which would more­over lapse after the general meeting the same day. Thus, if the general meeting on GlobalWafers’ bid had been postponed, the bid would have lapsed. In addition, it was not an option to simply refrain from putting GlobalWafers’ bid to a vote at the general meeting as postal votes had already been received and the vote therefore had to be called under company law.

Vice versa, the adoption of a resolution to sell the silicon business at the general meeting could be presumed to mean that NSIG’s bid for all of the shares in the company would lapse.

The general meeting adopted GlobalWafers’ bid.

Expiration of the offer period** Publication of preliminary result and the offer’s expiration (or ex­ tension) no later than 18 hours after the expiration of the offer period

3 days at a maximum

*

** ***

Publication of the final result of the offer process***

Settlement

3 business days at a maximum

Access to extension of the offer period to obtain approval from the competition authorities – however, 9 months at a maximum from the date of publication of the offer document.

In the event of a competitive offer, the offer period for the original offer is automatically extended until the expiration of the competitive offer.

If an agreement on purchase/sale of shares in the target company on more favourable terms than those of the offer is signed within 6 months after notification of the expiration of the offer, the bidder shall give the shareholders, who accepted the offer cash compensation.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

83

Preparation phase/ negotiation of transaction agreement and offer document

Friendly bids are bids which are submitted following a dialogue, but on the bidder’s initiative and without the target management having undertaken to recommend the bid to the shareholders.

Hostile or unsolicited bids are bids which are submitted without prior dialogue between bidder and target.

In principle, a bidder may prepare and make a takeover attempt on its own without any assistance from the target, as an unsolicited takeover bid. In practice, however, this does not happen very often. A bidder will usually need to carry out a prior due diligence investigation of the target and will also have conducted negotiations with the target management or major shareholders to secure the necessary backing. Or, as a minimum, obtain an insight into which offers would be interesting for the major shareholders and which would not.

Often, takeover bids are submitted as a result of a structured process initiated by the target in order to “sell itself”, or the bid may come from one of the existing shareholders wishing to take full control over the company.

A takeover bid is therefore typically based on an agreement between bidder and target/major shareholders about the bid and a prior agreement about the report on the offer which the target board of directors is required to issue under the law. On that basis, the bidder will prepare the formal offer document, which will be submitted to the target shareholders after regulatory approval from the Danish FSA.

Publication of the bidder’s purchase offer

4 weeks at a maximum In the event of amendment of the offer: Requirement for a rider to the offer document and to the board’s report

82

Publication of the offer document Offer period begins

Publication of the statement of the target company’s board

Within the first half of the offer period

The offer period: Min. 4 weeks and 10 weeks at a maximum*

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

• •

• •

•

•

Principle of equal treatment. All target shareholders with shareholdings in the same class must be afforded equal treatment, in the same way as under general company law.

Principle of transparency. The target shareholders must have sufficient time and information to enable them to reach a properly informed decision on the bid. This means, among other things, that the target management must give its views on the effects of implementation of the bid, including on jobs.

Management’s fiduciary duties. The target management must act in the interests of the company as a whole and not deny the shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid.

Prohibition of false markets. False markets must not be created in the shares of the target, the bidder or any other company affected by the bid and, put simply, this means that the takeover bid must not distort the normal functioning of the markets. The purpose here is to avoid any inappropriate actions that may affect the share price.

Ability to complete. The bidder must announce a bid only after ensuring that it can fulfil in full any cash consideration offered (the price of the shares) and after taking all reasonable measures to secure the implementation of any other type of consideration.

Target’s operations. A takeover bid for the target shares must cause as little interference with the normal operations of the target as possible, including among other things in connection with the compilation of information for submission to the competition authorities with a view to regulatory approval.

The process as such with regard to voluntary takeover bids reflects the above purposes. By far the majority of cases starts out with an initial dialogue between the target and the potential bidder. But not always.

The process of voluntary takeover bids When deciding to submit a bid for the target shares, the bidder must notify the target and also the relevant market. The bidder then has four weeks to submit a formal offer which has been approved by the Danish FSA, in the form of an offer document, acceptance form and bid announcement.

Before they are halfway into the acceptance period, the board of directors must issue its report on the offer to the shareholders. The report will also be communicated to the relevant market.

In broad terms, voluntary takeover bids may be divided into three categories: (i) friendly and recommended bids; (ii) friendly bids; and (iii) hostile or unsolicited bids.

Friendly and recommended bids are typically submitted as per agreement between bidder and target management and possibly also some of the major shareholders. They are most often the result of a structured proces and the target management will often recommend the offer when it is submitted.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

81

17

Takeover bids – Friendly or hostile Throughout the entire Topsil case there were many dramatic days – but none of them as dramatic as 17 June 2016. The day of the crucial general meeting. From the board of directors gathering early in the morning, their deliberations, the dialogue with the two bidders at a general meeting that was started, adjourned and then resumed. All of a sudden, right when the general meeting was beginning, an announcement ticked in saying that NSIG intended to submit a takeover bid for all of the company’s shares.

When you are in the process of sellling the primary activities of a listed company – a complicated process in itself – things clearly do not get any less complicated by all of a sudden having to deal with an announcement like that.

Anders Kaasgaard, Lawyer, LETT

This article discusses the general rules on voluntary takeover bids and some issues of general importance that came up as a result of the announcement of the takeover bid for Topsil.

Regulation of takeover bids Takeover bids are regulated by EU law, while the specific Danish provisions may be found in sections 31-32a of the Danish Securities Trading Act (værdipapirhandelsloven) and in the Executive Order on Takeover Bids and the accompanying guidance notes issued by the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority. Basically, the regulation of takeover bids serves a number of purposes, including purposes under securities trading and company law as well as the purpose of protecting the company’s shareholders – and the company itself.

80

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Smooth going Closing is basically the date and hour when the transaction is closed. It was the scheduled end date of the entire process and we needed everything to go smoothly.

On the morning of 1 July, the closing meeting started, as described above. Via the video conferencing system we could see from the Town Hall Square in Copenhagen, morning coffees in our hands, the GlobalWafer team enjoying a cup of afternoon tea around a table in Taiwan.

The coffee and tea anecdote is not made up. It made everybody laugh when initially we had to propose a coffee break, which the Taiwanese people then corrected to a tea break. The fact was that we had almost not even started when a serious unforeseeable problem came up with regard to the formation of the Danish subsidiary intended to serve as the transaction object.

Company formations are usually just a formality – an online procedure that takes place all the time with the Danish Business Authority and is very easy and efficient. Usually, you will be issued with your new company registration number within a couple of minutes after entering the required data and pressing the “Yes” button. At closing, however, things did not go that smoothly. Having waited an hour after pressing the button, we contacted the Authority. A friendly customer service associate told us that our application had been selected for a random check and would be processed manually, which might take up to 14(!) days. We did not have time for that, as the Taiwanese team was following us live. The Danish Business Authority was sympathetic to our problem, and it soon emerged that the application had not been selected for a random check and manual processing at all, but because of IT system problems, and our application was therefore processed manually with immediate effect.

The Polish part of the transaction was initiated the day before closing to ensure that the practicalities with regard to regulatory registrations etc. could be completed in time for closing.

Almost at the exact date and hour, our Polish colleagues sent written evidence showing that the Polish part of the transaction had been completed.

At the same time, we were notified by Jyske Bank that they had now received the funds and would release their security, which was necessary for an unconditional transfer of Topsil. The transfer of funds itself had also been a separate issue as payment in DKK was not an option from Taipei. The funds therefore had to pass through an account with SEB where they were converted into DKK, and then they were transferred to Jyske Bank.

It was a huge relief to see the results of our long-term plans taking form. Although sales processes more or less all follow the same template, there are always numerous little details which most people don’t even know about, but which have a great impact on timing all the same. On top of this, there are the unforeseeables. The deal was based on the premise that everything would occur simultaneously, and it did – because the chain of events had been carefully planned and all practicalities were in place.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

79

78

Injecting the Polish silicon business into the Danish subsidiary was not a straightforward exercise and required very detailed planning because of a tax issue that had suddenly arisen in Poland. This step in the process was discussed in a separate process where Deloitte submitted a number of proposed models, which were then discussed in a number of conference calls and in an even greater number of e-mails. In this situation, we benefited from the assistance of our Polish colleagues, who took us through the Polish steps of the plan. In order for us project coordinators in Copenhagen to manage this part of the transaction, we received constant reports and updates on the execution of the plan and the prognosis for crossing the finish line before closing.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

confidentiality and competition aspects before access could be granted. When the new document or a new piece of information was provided to NSIG, we also had to consider whether to provide the same document or information to GlobalWafers for the two bidders had to be placed on an equal footing – among other things, for good faith purposes – although they were at two different stages of the process.

As a result, negotiations were also simultaneous. Some days started off by a conference call/ video conference with Taipei and ended with a conference call with NSGI’s Danish advisors.

Inbetween, we received a huge amount of e-mail from both bidders, which we had to deal with swiftly to accelerate the process and get back to Taiwan and China before they were off to bed.

No more cruising on autopilot – we had to be constantly on our toes. Treading carefully is very much part of the job description of a practical coordinator, but even so it was crucial to the timing of the processes in the two tracks that e-mails were responded to within 30 minutes or an hour, that all practicalities had been considered, that the time schedule was observed, etc.

Across borders The difficult part of process management is the things that are beyond your control, the unforeseen problems that may come up in a transaction like this where some of the steps in the process take place outside Denmark’s borders and are subject to other laws and regulations and other regulatory practices, and where you simply have to put your faith in other people’s know-how.

The fact that the bidders were from Taiwan and China only added a linguistic and cultural dimension to the process. We received extensive original documentation in the Chinese language for purposes of drafting the agreement. Although, for instance, the Taiwanese or Chinese bank stamp seemed entirely genuine on the bidder’s financing commitment letter – the documentation verifying that the buyer actually has sufficient funds to pay the transfer price – we had to have the documents authenticated and checked by people with a knowledge of Chinese financial documents. Another issue came up in relation to signing. Who was authorised to sign for the bidders, and how to verify their signature when the persons in question used the English version of their name, which is not the same as the name according to their passport? On this issue we obtained important assistance at short – or rather, nearly no – notice from colleagues in Shanghai, Taipei, Hong Kong and Warsaw.

Another cross-border element in the transfer of Topsil’s silicon business was the model that was used for the acquisition. The idea behind the model was to inject the silicon business of Topsil and its Polish and Japanese subsidiaries into a new Danish subsidiary that would be set up for purposes of the transaction, also known as the transaction object.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

77

16 Mette Lykke, Lawyer, LETT

Project coordinators – The art of multitasking It’s Friday and it’s 8:00 am. The Topsil management team and the team from SEB and LETT have gathered in a conference room at the Town Hall Square in Copenhagen. In a similar conference room 8,938 kilometres away (direct line), a team of fresh GlobalWafers people is ready. As we sit there looking into each other’s eyes via the television screen, it is hard to grasp that we are that far apart. “Good afternoon”, Taipei says. Unable to fight the urge to smile, we say “Good morning”. Although the technical set-up makes us feel part of the global village, nothing can be done about the time gap, but as we begin the process of closing and intensity increases, we no longer focus on time and place.

The path to closing went via numerous telephone conferences, exchange of many draft transactional documents and a profusion of e-mails. That is not unusual when you are in the middle of a sales process. For each step of the process involves a host of practicalities and, taken together, the many individual steps make up a long chain of cross-border actions that depend on each other for execution, so it is important to ensure that the agreements are capable of realisation in the real world. By way of example, there would be no use in inserting a provision in the agreement requiring the money to be paid at a specified date and hour if the banks in Denmark or Taiwan are not open for business at that date and hour.

What was unusual about the sale of Topsil, however, was that just as Topsil had signed a conditional sales agreement with GlobalWafers and issued an announcement to that effect, another interested buyer showed up – Chinese NSIG. A new transactional track and the documentation package to go with it therefore had to be set up and new negotiations had to be initiated at a point when we thought that we were in the final stages of closing a deal with GlobalWafers.

Parallel tracks In order not to break the transaction chain in any of the two tracks, a small team of project coordinators – in the real world, typically lawyers – was set up to manage agreements, appendixes, negotiations and processes in general.

Admitting NSIG to the data room was the least of our problems as the relevant data were already in the data room. But NSIG’s access to the data room added a new dimension to the due diligence investigation phase: Like GlobalWafers, NSIG was to receive answers to their questions about the documents made available and, if so requested, access to new documents as well, but for each such document requested we had to carefully consider various materiality,

76

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

75

74

There is a presumption under Danish law that escrow funds are protected from suing creditors only to the extent stipulated in the escrow agreement, which means that the agreement must be carefully drafted, including the terms of release. It is often seen in escrow agreements that the parties have agreed that the escrow funds “…are to be held in escrow as security for any and all claims caused by a breach of any of the Seller’s Warranties…”. When reading this wording, it lays near at hand to further qualify the agreement as a form of security agreement rather than as a deposit agreement.

Is the security agreement a better alternative?

If you pursue this interpretation – that it is rightly a security agreement instead of a deposit agreement – the parties will have a clearer basis for their legal rights as the provisions of the Danish Debt Instruments Act (gældsbrevsloven) govern when a party has performed its act of perfection and thus obtained protection from suing creditors. In the case with a bank account deposit, this act of perfection would be the notice to the bank about the pledging arrangement followed up by dispossession of the pledged account.

The release mechanisms agreed in escrow agreements do not at first seem to give rise to challenges in relation to the creation of the dispossession as the parties will usually have agreed that the escrow funds will only be released if (1) the parties so agree, (2) a final judgment/ arbitration award has been made or (3) the amount is automatically released to the seller after a specified date provided that no claim has been made. This means that the seller is not free to deal with the escrow funds, and dispossession has thus been effected. One subtlety may be that in the existing ”negative interest environment” it may have been agreed with the bank that the deposit is to accrue a negative interest which will thus trickle from the account.

Recommendation It is recommended to have the escrow agreement governed by Danish law as the concept of escrow cannot be transferred directly to Danish law and adjusted accordingly if the concept of trust is applied as well, as this is not an acknowledge concept in Danish law. Alternatively, there is the option of using a security agreement instead in relation to the account for the escrow amount as this is a more widely accepted instrument under Danish law, which also provides protection against suing creditors if the act of perfection has been duly observed.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

of the purchaser having the necessary funds available and in order to ensure simultaneousness, but where the release of the deposited amount is conditional upon full title to the property passing to the purchaser. It is worth noting that this is not depositing within the meaning of the Danish Escrow Account Act (deponeringsloven) where the debtor may fulfil its obligations by deposit under the law.

Are escrow funds protected from suing creditors?

One interesting question in relation to escrow funds is whether such funds are protected from creditors suing the purchaser and the seller. In the escrow agreements we have seen in recent years, the escrow account has often been opened in the seller’s name. However, there has been a tendency – particularly where non-Danish purchasers are involved – for the parties preferring an escrow account to be opened in both the seller’s and the purchaser’s name. Where there is more than one seller, an escrow account is also sometimes opened in the names of all of the sellers.

Depending on the specific constellation of ownership of the escrow account opened, it is not always easy to establish who is the owner of the escrow amount, especially as the act of escrow is effected under a conditional agreement. When a deposit is made in the seller’s name, there must be a presumption that the escrow amount is attributable to the seller’s assets after release of the amount to the seller once the conditions for release have been fulfilled. It gets even more complicated in the other constellations involving an account with more than one account holder as the ownership ratio of the parties is never agreed in detail in the escrow agreement, which is why the bank in its capacity as depositary seeks to avoid these constellations. One of the reasons for this are the challenges involved in automatic reporting to the tax authorities, and also that compliance checks have to be made when entering the customer in the systems, which can be quite an extensive process.

After the escrow amount has been paid into the escrow account, but before the actual release of the amount, it may also be relevant how the escrow account has been opened. The reason for this is that in the situations where the contractual basis does not provide the necessary protection from suing creditors, the ownership ratio will generally be determined on the presumption that the escrow funds belong to the registered account holder and, where there is more than one account holder, that they own the funds pro rata.

This problem does not seem to be given much attention by the parties involved. The reason for this may be that as the concept of escrow is imported from English law, the challenge is not that relevant as the parties may have agreed (as will be seen from the meaning given to the concept of escrow account in Danish) that the escrow funds will be held in trust. The use of trust under English law provides protection against creditors as only legal title is transferred whereas equitable title remains unchanged until the conditions have been fulfilled. However, the trust institution is not accepted under Danish law and thus fails to solve the challenge faced in Denmark.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

73

15

Escrow agreements in property transactions and international M&A transactions In recent years, the number of business transfers with Danish businesses as objects of acquisition has increased significantly and – as in other contexts – such transactions have become increasingly international. One obvious reason for this is that sometimes international parties are involved. But even if only Danish parties are involved, the whole transaction is based on English form contracts, which may sometimes lead to conceptual confusion with Danish law.

Why escrow agreements?

Klaus Ingildsen, Erhvervs­jurist, Jyske Bank The ”Corporate and Capital” group under the legal department of Jyske Bank handles various transactions in relation to the bank’s corporate customers and capital markets from the bank’s perspective, including the preparation of loan documents, review of due diligence documentation in connection with business transfers and other related documents such as escrow agreements and release letters.

Business transfers will often involve an escrow agreement between the purchaser, seller and escrow agent in relation to an escrow account (an account with a bank). The parties will agree to pay part of the purchase price into the escrow account as security for the seller’s performance of certain obligations under the transfer agreement, including in particular the seller’s representations and warranties. If no breach of the representations and warranties is claimed within a given period, if the parties so agree, or if a judgment/arbitration award has been given to that effect, the amount in escrow will be released to the seller as part of the purchase price, alternatively transferred back to the purchaser.

What does “escrow” mean?

The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the concept of ”escrow” as “a bond, deed, or other document kept in the custody of a third party and taking effect only when a specified condition has been fulfilled”. An ”escrow account” is defined as ”a deposit or fund held in trust or as a security”. In Danish dictionaries, ”custody” is in this context translated into the Danish word for ”depositing”.

The Danish understanding of the concept of ”escrow agreement” may thus be boiled down to some sort of conditional agreement relating to an amount held in an account (”escrow account”) which is deposited as security for an obligation, with the bank as ”escrow agent” being the depositary and most often responsible for releasing the escrow funds.

On the basis of this summary, there is an obvious analogy to ”deposit agreement”. Deposit agreements are widely used in connection with property transactions in Denmark where the purchaser – as a condition under the transfer agreement – pays the purchase price into an account, which is most often in the seller’s name, right before completion of the sale as documentation

72

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Data room memos Moreover, a number of data room memos were prepared describing matters or documents that required explanation or elaboration – or simply stating that no material was available for a given item. Those data room memos were intended to reduce the number of questions from the group of buyers.

The art of the possible Selling a business is not always easy, and a successful transfer requires a mixture of strategy, timing, commercial savvy, law – and emotions. It is also the art of the possible.

Topsil’s team of financial and legal advisors contributed by providing an overview, preparing various scenarios for discussion and identifying factors that would increase the value of the business – and thus shareholder value – and optimise management’s bargaining strength and latitude in relation to the bidders.

Getting ready for a sale in the long term – how to increase value?

The process and opportunities available were greatly affected by the question of whether the silicon business was to be acquired by a competitor with industry knowledge or a financial buyer such as a private equity fund and also whether, for instance, top management would stay on or be removed after the transaction.

„

If initiated in time, a long-term process to get the business ready for a sale may thus contribute to increasing the value of the business and its owners by showing the business in the most favourable light and unearthing any challenges and commercial issues as early in the process as possible to allow the parties to find sensible solutions to a fair allocation of responsibility.

It is one thing to greet the buyer with the smell of freshly baked bread, but do not sweep any real dirt under the carpet...

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

71

70

Under section 47 of the Sale of Goods Act, the buyer will generally not be entitled to claim any defects if the buyer has examined the subject-matter of sale or has failed without good reason to accommodate the seller’s request to examine the subject-matter of sale, and if the defect ought to be discovered in the course of such – often quite extensive – examinations.

Setting up the data room – and a little help from Nietzsche The start-up of a process to gather documents and material for inclusion in a data room to be set up will almost invariably draw heavily on resources in the target. It is easy to make a list of all material requested by the buyer, but not so easy for the seller to actually locate the requested material. The process of setting up a data room requires an equal measure of structure and adaptability from all parties if the goal is to complete the task within what is often a very short timeframe – “One must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star”...

As already mentioned, the data room that was set up for Topsil’s business was a virtual forum provided via a web-based platform. The bidders as well as their advisors were given access to read the uploaded material and ask questions.

The material was gathered on the basis of a number of request lists which served as checklists for the collection of group-related material. The lists covered the material aspects of Topsil’s business, and the material collected was reviewed to ensure that copies of material were complete and duly indexed according to the designated structure.

Particularly on commercial contracts The Topsil employees and the team from LETT had to consider all material to be included in the data room from a critical angle. A lot of questions were raised, including whether the contracts with customers and suppliers could be disclosed given that a large number of them contained a confidentiality clause. It was also necessary to consider whether the employee data included in the data room were sensitive and covered by data protection law. In some cases, the solution was initially to delete/redact certain parts of the contract and then disclose the full document later in the process when the deal certainty was higher – phase 2 of a due diligence process.

Such a phased data room process requires an experienced and competent team – particularly in a multi-bidder scenario. Who should see what and when?

From the very beginning, Topsil’s focus was on whether the current contracts, e.g. with customers, suppliers, etc., available in the data room contained a change of control clause to allow early termination in case of a transfer. Such change of control clauses could constitute a serious challenge in terms of both time and negotiations and – in the worst case scenario – might reduce the price that could be obtained for the silicon business. In addition, focus was on protecting Topsil’s intellectual property rights, including its company nane, logo, designs or other intellectual property.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

„

The seller’s duty to disclose As the seller of a business, Topsil was faced with the question of which information to disclose to the potential buyer(s) to ensure that the buyer was given adequate insight into the operations and activities of the business and to reduce the seller’s liability for any defects in the business.

It is a fundamental principle of Danish law that the seller of a business must loyally disclose in good faith to the buyer all information which may affect the buyer’s evaluation of the subject-matter of sale (the business) and which is or ought to be known to the seller, i.e. information that the seller is or ought to be aware of. This principle is known as “the seller’s duty to disclose” (sælgers oplysningspligt).

The seller may fulfil its duty to disclose by making the information available in a data room, where it will then be up to the buyer to go through and assess the information and ask questions about the right context (where necessary).

It may actually be in the seller’s interest to fulfil its duty to disclose and the seller may benefit from it in so far as the buyer will have no claim against the seller in respect of the information that has been duly disclosed by the seller, unless otherwise agreed. It is therefore most often in the seller’s own interest to disclose all material information about the target to the buyer, before the transfer agreement is signed.

To fulfil its duty to disclose, however, the seller does not need to disclose any information that may be relevant or useful to the buyer. If the information falls within the scope of the seller’s duty to disclose, any failure by the seller to disclose the information must be capable of being characterised as unlawful. The non-disclosure must thus be capable of being characterised as culpable negligence, i.e. information which the seller knows or ought to know but fails to disclose by reason of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

The duty to disclose The seller must loyally disclose in good faith all information which in the seller’s own opinion is important to the transfer of the target – as well as all information which the seller realises or ought to realise is important to the buyer’s evaluation of the target.

The buyer’s duty of care Whether or not the acquisition of a business falls directly within the scope of the Danish Sale of Goods Act (købeloven), there seems to be a consensus under Danish law that the buyer owes a duty of care under the principles of that Act.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

69

14

Data room – What to show the buyer and the seller?

“Being an M&A lawyer must be so boring and trivial” – this is a thought that seems to have more than crossed the mind of a senior Topsil employee on initially being presented with a number of request lists that served as checklists for the collection of group-related material for the virtual data room...

Nicholas Lerche-Gredal, Lawyer, LETT

As part of the acquisition process, the potential buyers were invited to carry out a financial, commercial and legal due diligence investigation of Topsil. The selected bidders therefore needed access to review materials and documents about Topsil in a data room. A due diligence investigation is the investigations that are deemed to be necessary based on the target’s situation to enable a buyer to make an informed decision about whether to buy the target.

Due diligence A due diligence investigation is the investigation of legal or other matters which the buyer will make before actually buying the business.

It was decided early on that the data room would be a virtual one to provide foreign potential buyers with equal access to the data room, regardless of their physical location. The data room would be set up by LETT in collaboration with a couple of trusted Topsil employees. It was a central theme during this phase that it would considerably facilitate the data room process for the potential bidders if the data room set-up was carefully organised and the material was clearly presented and adequate.

68

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

67

66

However, NDAs may also function as a strong process management tool. And this may be exactly where its real value lies. It can be used to manage the process and ensure backing to the process.

The Topsil case is a particularly good example of the fact that even a well-drafted NDA is not in itself enough to ensure control of every process. Although the NDAs contained standstill clauses and provisions designed to prevent unsolicited public bids, the fact of the matter is that in cases involving multiple transaction trails (in the Topsil case with both a classic M&A sale of activities, on the one hand, and a potential takeover bid via the stock exchange for all of the company’s shares, on the other hand) it is difficult to stay in complete control of the process.

Especially during the last crucial days in the Topsil case, one might say – to put it mildly – that in some aspects the process was very difficult to control when NSIG announced their intention to submit a public bid at the same time as the general meeting was about to consider the sale of the silicon business to GlobalWafers.

And in situations like that, it makes no difference whether the NDA is in Danish, English or Chinese.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

One particular issue in which both parties have a particular interest is the governing law and jurisdiction clause. The most common and generally accepted approach, however, is to agree on the target company’s governing law and home court. That is where the company has its registered address and where the information is available.

What to consider in particular If you are on the bidding side, it is important to avoid accepting an agreed penalty, and you should also ensure that you are able to honour the agreement to which you have committed yourself. For example, are you able to delete data received? Does the proposed NDA allow for information to be shared internally in your organisation (where relevant) and with your advisers? Are you as a potential buyer allowed to have direct contact with the target management and thereby bypass various advisers and investment bankers? And if there are other things which you know will be difficult to keep, then try to avoid them from the outset.

If you are on the selling side, there are a few things you should insist on including. Especially standstill clauses in order to stay in control of the process, and if you are a listed company like Topsil then it is important to insist on clauses which specify that the potential bidders will become insiders with the resulting consequences.

Real value of NDAs NDAs in M&A processes are actually only quite rarely enforced afterwards by a party claiming unauthorised use of confidential information. At the same time, however, it is important to understand that a lot of companies will probably use the information obtained – perhaps even contrary to the NDA. It is just not something that the other company will ever find out.

In that connection, it could be worthwhile to consider the real value of NDAs. Especially where non-Danish bidders are involved. It is incredibly hard – if not impossible – to check whether a contracting party from, for example, Asia or South America makes unauthorised use of the information obtained, after the process has been completed. And if, on top of that, the other party does not have a presence in Denmark or even in Europe, it may also be very difficult to enforce the NDA, even in the event of breach.

Seen in that light, an NDA must primarily be considered a gentleman’s agreement where professional parties agree not to make unauthorised use of information obtained. And an NDA will no doubt prevent the most obvious forms of unauthorised use, but it would probably be a mistake to think that an NDA will protect against any type of unauthorised use.

With this knowledge under the belt, it will also be easier to accept that there is a limit to how much negotiation you should put into an NDA and how much should simply be accepted in order to get on with the process.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

65

13

Non-disclosure agreements Legal documents can be very complex and hard to read. And often it gets even trickier if they are written in a language that you do not master. In the case of Topsil, however, it gave rise to considerations when Topsil received a so-called non-disclosure agreement (NDA) in the form of a Chinese translation of Topsil’s English language NDA. It even had a passage saying the Chinese version would prevail.

NDAs are quite common in international business. They are used between companies that need to be able to share information in confidence about a potential future cooperation.

Anders Kaasgaard, Lawyer, LETT

NDAs are also an integral part of all M&A processes. All potential bidders who express an inte­ rest in participating in a structured sales process will be asked to sign an NDA in order to obtain access to information material about the company and to subsequently perform a due diligence investigation and Q&A sessions with the company’s management. When listed companies are involved, it is crucial that the parties sign an NDA with specific provisions which prohibit trading in the shares of the listed company(ies).

NDAs in M&A processes NDAs are to a certain extent standard documents, and it will often be fairly straightforward and only require little prior negotiation in order for the parties to sign a well-drafted and balanced NDA. It is no doubt preferable in most processes that the NDA does not give rise to any badwill between the parties when it is negotiated or signed. The NDA is something that “just” has to be in place in order for the parties to get on with the process.

Some of the issues which most often give rise to discussions between the parties are duration, any standstill clauses and penalty clauses; the latter in particular where the clauses involve an agreed penalty.

One particular clause which has become the subject of negotiations only in recent years is the one about material having to be returned or destroyed if the process is aborted. In the past, such clauses were quite standard, but today most companies have an IT setup where backups are generated several times each day. These backups are often very difficult or even impossible to access in order to permanently delete data. The parties will thus often agree that this type of backup is allowed, also after a process has been aborted.

64

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

The actual due diligence process may also contain elements which will often surprise a Chinese investor: • Vendor due diligence investigations are still not particularly common in China and will often be seen by a Chinese investor as being of little or no value • The registration standard in Denmark is so high that not much time will be used in the due diligence process to verify data, but rather to analyse data So even if recent Chinese investors in Western companies are increasingly acting the same way as is expected of Western investors, there are still a number of things which must be taken into consideration by the advisor. But the factor determining whether Chinese investors will be successful in the long term is whether they are capable of transforming themselves into a genuinely international company. Huawei is a good example of a Chinese company which has made the transformation and become highly successful in Denmark. And that transformation usually lies outside the scope of the advisor’s powers.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

63

62

Considerations specific to Chinese investors There will often be aspects of the transaction which a Chinese investor will need to be advised on. Some of those aspects – which it would serve an advisor well to explain – are listed below: • No special regulatory approval is needed for a foreign company to invest in a Danish company • There are no restrictions with respect to management’s nationality • A group structure may easily and quickly be changed • Bank financing is often easier if the target’s assets are offered as collateral • The Danish flexicurity model makes HR management effective and scalable, as it is easy to hire and fire • Structural advantages in investing in Denmark via Hong Kong or Luxembourg • It is necessary to make a proper due diligence investigation, not least because the buyer will be deemed to know all of the information that is available in the data room • Strict transfer pricing rules apply which may have potentially serious consequences if not observed

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

And it goes without saying that there may be cultural challenges and language barriers which may be difficult to overcome. As an advisor you often seek to solve these challenges and barriers by bringing ethnic Chinese on to the transaction team. That will not necessarily do the trick, but in that case nothing much can be done about it.

Different end in view One essential reason why Chinese investors act differently from Western investors is that they often have another end in view than Western investors. Usually, Chinese investments outside China are not made with an aim of generating short-term profit or holding the acquired company for a certain period only to sell it again. Rather, the primary aim is often to establish a presence or obtain new technology, R&D competences, sales channels or brands. This means that Chinese investors are often not interested in a traditional financial due diligence investigation, or at least they have a different focus than your typical Western investor. When you as a due diligence provider talk about normalised historical earnings or optimistic budgets, you risk being off target as the buyer’s focus is more on the level of R&D or the sufficiency of staff, quantitatively as well as qualitatively.

Public sale processes Especially during the first wave of investments, but also now, one thing stands out in relation to structured auction processes: Chinese companies have historically as well as now often found quick transaction processes difficult to handle as the internal decision-making processes of the Chinese investors are often slow and with failures along the way, often due to the underlying governance structure. In recent years, the increasing number of private Chinese companies that are prospecting for foreign acquisition candidates has resulted in the advisors becoming more and more conscious of the decision-making process in Chinese companies and the all-­ importance of quickly getting the potential buyer into a traditional transaction process and then adjusting it in order to not lose too much momentum in the process. Also, the Chinese companies have become much better at handling these competitive auction processes. The Chinese companies are much better prepared when stepping into a bidding process today compared to just a few years ago when only very few Chinese companies had dedicated M&A departments in place to support decision-makers before and during the transaction process.

Communication difficulties between the parties may often turn out to be a deal breaker, as especially small Chinese companies usually involve an intermediary in the negotiations. Often, the actual decision-maker will not come forward until a long way into the process. Another critical factor to success is to obtain transparency and comfort in relation to financing. Where does it come from and has sufficient security been provided, which bankers are used by the buyer, etc.?

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

61

12

Representing a Chinese buyer in Denmark Western or Chinese investor in Danish companies, there can’t really be that much of a difference for the advisors involved in the transaction – or can there? Western and Chinese investors alike must be interested in understanding the company as well as its potentials and risks, buying at the lowest price possible and being sufficiently hedged under the transfer agreement.

When providing transactional advice in the form of M&A advice or financial due diligence advice to a Western investor, it is more or less clear what is expected of the advisor. The client wants to understand the company, dig deep into understanding its past financial development, get the necessary insight into the company’s affairs and take the budgets apart to build a business plan that can be used for valuation purposes. But don’t Chinese investors share our perspectives and interests?

Focus

Jacob Erhardi, Partner, Transaction Advisory Services, EY Claus Nørrind Hansen, Exe­cutive Director, Transaction Advisory Services, EY Transaction Advisory Services is a part of EY and advises on mergers and acquisitions. EY Transaction Advisory Services has a considerable experience with China related transactions in connection with western companies’ acquisitions in China and Chinese companies’ acquisitions in the Western World.

The first Chinese investors in Western companies had no foreign investment experience. They were usually state-owned companies with a focus on raw materials or infrastructure. That was probably also the reason why the first wave of investments largely bypassed Denmark.

In the last three to five years, however, far more privately held companies have been looking to invest outside China, and these companies often focus on other sectors, including technology/ R&D, life science, consumer brands – often products or technologies which they may utilise on their home market in China. But these investors as well represent some essentially different challenges to the advisor.

There are a couple of very general issues which would often be relevant to note before the more detailed transactional work begins or even makes sense: • Chinese investors often prefer joint ventures or strategic alliances. If for some reason this is not possible, the preparations for the transaction may often be called off right then and there.

• Chinese investors often invest in companies which are already known to them or with which they already have business relations – trust is absolutely crucial to close a deal. If such relations and trust have not already been built and if they cannot be built in the course of the process either, it may often prove difficult to close the potential deal.

60

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

59

Representations and warranties The parties’ representations and warranties are typically compiled in a separate section of the agreement. In this context, “representations” means factual statements and “warranties” ensures that the factual statements are correct.

In case of bilateral negotiations, however, the drafting of the agreement will in many cases be different and perhaps “less streamlined”. As the bidding process progresses, more and more potential issues are uncovered as a result of the buyer’s due diligence investigations etc. and such issues should be addressed in the agreement, and in this connection there is a tendency towards the issues and their wording becoming more and more detailed.

Warranty and indemnity insurances In larger transactions, there is an increasing trend internationally as well as in Denmark to consider whether to take out a warranty and indemnity insurance to cover the seller’s warranties.

Such W&I insurances have been available in the Danish market for a number of years, but are only now beginning to gain ground. Especially the relatively high policy premium has often rendered it an unattractive alternative, unless the insurance type was used to close the matter. This insurance was also considered in the Topsil transaction, but the transactional structure with a drop-down, the due diligence exercise and subsequent transfer ended up making it less attractive.

Even though clarity about the terms of the transaction is definitely advisable and desirable, it is often valuable for both parties to consider where to set the level of risk allocation, including whether the transfer agreement in a business transfer should follow Danish legal tradition or draw inspiration from a more detail-oriented Anglo-Saxon style approach.

„

The crucial point of negotiation in many transactions is which risks should be borne by the buyer and which risks the seller should take some responsibility for. At the same time, the person drafting the transfer agreement must have a certain helicopter perspective on the transaction and try to find common ground between the parties with regard to the contractual terms:

When a man does not know what harbour he is making for,

no wind is the right wind.

(Seneca) As in so many other aspects, it is the lawyers’ task to provide an easy-to-understand structure, a clearly-laid out contract and unambiguous wording.

58

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

The equity value mechanism and how it is worded is often a major issue in M&A transactions and should be adjusted very specifically and individually to the parties’ negotiations about the company’s equity value and the anticipated process. It will nearly always be a good idea to opt for a relatively simple and clear mechanism. On the other hand, a number of other transfer agreement provisions and the structure of such agreements have – among other things due to international influence – become increasingly standard (or boilerplate), which does not always leave much to be negotiated. Examples of such provisions could be provisions on confidentiality, governing law and jurisdiction, representations and warranties, etc.

After a lengthy process, a conditional agreement was concluded with a Taiwanese buyer, GlobalWafers, about the sale of NewCo (subsequently named Topsil Globalwafers A/S). The transaction was scheduled for closing in early July 2016 and was conditional on approval from the shareholders in Topsil.

In the agreement with GlobalWafers the buyer was provided with the usual protection against asset leakage for the post-balance sheet period until closing (the date when the transaction is closed). Until closing, the business would be managed by Topsil, which could potentially create a problem as the seller’s interests would not necessarily be the same as the buyer’s and the buyer would therefore be exposed to a number of risks, including cash leakage and value leakage in the period until closing. These risks were regulated by leakage provisions in the agreement.

Bilateral negotiations and bidding processes The sale of Topsil was designed as a structured bidding process where both industrial and financial buyers would be invited to submit a bid. This affected the drafting process of the business transfer agreement and the share purchase agreement as the seller is usually the party who will make the first draft of the agreement in a bidding process – in this case, the Topsil board of directors as Topsil was the seller of the new subsidiary into which the silicon business would be dropped down at closing.

Bidding processes typically follow another script than bilateral negotiations as far as business transfers are concerned. The buyer will not be as involved in laying down the terms of the agreement as the seller will make the first draft of the agreement and is thus in a position to “set the anchor” for the negotiations that will follow. As in many other negotiation settings, this is an advantage that should not be underestimated.

In the Topsil transaction, the first major transfer agreement was a business transfer agreement whereby the entire silicon business was dropped down into the new subsidiary, Topsil GlobalWafers A/S, that was established when the business was contributed. This business transfer agreement was basically an intragroup agreement between Topsil and its wholly owned subsidiary, but required balanced terms as the subsidiary was to transfer immediately after its formation. The agreement also had to fit in with the rest of the contractual structure, including in particular which representations and warranties the seller could give to the buyer.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

57

11

Standardised M&A agreements and processes “It will most likely be a drop-down of the entire silicon business into a new subsidiary...” – that was the initial instructions from Partner N.E. Nielsen to his team of lawyers that would help execute the sale of Topsil’s silicon business together with SEB Corporate Finance and Deloitte.

M&A transfer agreements Transfer agreements in the Danish market have been influenced to some extent by international trends and Anglo-Saxon legal tradition in particular. The transfer agreements (share or asset purchase agreements) used in the US and the UK are often very wordy, aiming to govern the parties’ relationship down to the last detail. Usually, this means that the agreement will be quite long, but at the same time often address a number of aspects of the parties’ relationship. It does not leave much for interpretation.

Nicholas Lerche-Gredal, Lawyer, LETT

Locked box mechanism and leakage provisions The final structure of the sale of the silicon business involved a restructuring of Topsil’s corporate and ownership structure to support a process where Topsil’s entire silicon business was dropped down into a new subsidiary (NewCo) that had been founded for that purpose and would then be sold by way of a share purchase agreement.

As with all other similar M&A transactions, there was a need to clarify which mechanism to use to determine the equity value of NewCo. Topsil applied for and was given permission from the Danish tax authorities to carry out this part of the restructuring as a tax-exempt contribution of the business from Topsil to NewCo, which would be founded at closing (the date when the transaction is closed), with the effective date for accounting purposes being 1 January 2016. The transfer agreement stipulated that the equity value was to be determined based on a locked box mechanism with 1 January 2016 as the reference date. The choice of the locked box mechanism meant that the final equity value (i.e. the price that would actually be paid for the shares in the subsidiary) was set as at 1 January 2016 without any post-completion adjustments for debt and differences in working capital.

Share or asset purchase agreements A share purchase agreement is used when the subject matter of sale is shares or other equity securities in the target, while an asset purchase agreement (or business transfer agreement) is used when the subject matter of sale is the underlying asset/business – the substance.

56

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Parallel to the accelerated process with GlobalWafers, discussions with other buyers had continued, but the other parties did not show an interest near the same level as GlobalWafers – at least not until the transaction with GlobalWafers was announced. This announcement did in fact motivate NSIG to express a very strong interest in buying Topsil’s silicon business. On the evening before Topsil’s EGM to approve the transaction with GlobalWafers, NSIG announced a competing offer which was slightly superior to the transaction with GlobalWafers.

Best and final offers Based on the dramatic turn of events following the announcement of the transaction with GlobalWafers, both GlobalWafers and NSIG were – during the early hours of the morning before Topsil’s extraordinary general meeting 17 June 2016 – invited to present their best and final offers for Topsil’s silicon business. GlobalWafers thus submitted an improved offer while NSIG decided to launch a “hostile” offer for all the shares of Topsil. This offer was not directly comparable with the transaction with GlobalWafers and entailed significant execution risk. Topsil’s shareholders decided to complete the transaction with GlobalWafers on the new and improved terms.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

55

54

The last battle While it was not yet public knowledge who were closing in on SunEdison Semiconductors (it would later turn out that GlobalWafers, the acquirer of Topsil’s silicon business, would also acquire SunEdison Semiconductors), the public offer for Okmetic was made by a relatively new player in the silicon wafer industry, the Chinese industrial investment group National Silicon Industry Group (NSIG), who were also a key prospective buyer of Topsil’s silicon business.

Based on the vast resources available from the implicit backing of the Chinese state, this move

by NSIG signalled a new order for the global silicon industry. The incumbent players had reason to be concerned about what this could mean for the future of their businesses.

Both GlobalWafers and NSIG were early on identified as key prospective buyers of Topsil’s silicon wafer business, and discussions had been ongoing for months. With the two pending acquisitions of SunEdison Semiconductors and Okmetic as a backdrop, GlobalWafers increased the offer for Topsil’s silicon business significantly subject to an extremely quick process towards signing and announcement, much quicker than would be possible with a US or European buyer, even in extraordinary circumstances. GlobalWafer’s enhanced offer was so attractive for Topsil that a transaction was at long last announced. After announcement, the transaction with GlobalWafers was still subject to regulatory approvals as well as approval at an extraordinary general meeting of Topsil, which provided an opening for an aggressive competing bidder.

„

GlobalWafers increased the offer for Topsil’s silicon business significantly subject to an extremely quick process towards signing and announcement, much quicker than would be possible with a US or European buyer, even in extraordinary circumstances.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

3. Sending important messages about the process, e.g. the type of prospective buyers that have been contacted and a (vague) indication of the potential number of competing bidders, thus helping to create the competitive element.

The war over Topsil For Project Disc, it was not straightforward to create a high level of competitive tension. Topsil was a small fish in a large pond. Many of the potential buyers had financial difficulties, and those who did have the financial capacity were also busy consolidating other – potentially more important – parts of the silicon wafer value chain. However, based on a tremendous effort from Topsil and its advisors it was possible to identify and entice a small number of prospective buyers and convince them of Topsil’s many attractions to an extent that brought the competitive tension of Project Disc among the highest ever. This was achieved with a combination of the global network of the company’s management team and the advisors, thorough analyses of the wafer industry value chain as well as the synergy potential and strategic rationale of each of the prospective buyers.

„

based on a tremendous effort from Topsil and its advisors it was possible to identify and entice a small number of prospective buyers and convince them of Topsil’s many attractions

The first part of the Project Disc sales process was a fairly traditional structured auction process designed to secure and enhance the competitive tension among the prospective buyers. The marketing material provided all the relevant information for prospective buyers to estimate the value of Topsil’s silicon business on a stand-alone basis, as well as the information required to make an initial assessment of potential synergies. However, prospective buyers in a traditional structured auction process are not provided any guidance on the price level and must provide their indicative offer without knowing what price level the seller expects and who they may be bidding against.

A particular catalyst for the competitive tension of Project Disc happened on 18 February 2016 when SunEdison Semiconductors, one of Topsil’s competitors (and one of the key prospective buyers identified), announced that its board was “exploring strategic alternatives following unsolicited indications of interest”. This is how a listed company typically tells its shareholders that it could likely be sold in the near future. This announcement also made it clear to the silicon wafer industry that consolidation was now accelerating. On 1 April 2016, not long after the announcement from SunEdison Semiconductors, a public offer was announced for the Finnish wafer manufacturer Okmetic, another key prospective buyer!

Based on the carefully designed auction process and the accelerating industry consolidation, the pieces were in place for the last battle for Topsil to unfold.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

53

10

Creating competitive tension among buyers Would you buy a car without test driving it? Or a house without taking a walk around it? Or how about acquiring a state-of-the-art silicon wafer production facility via Skype? If the circumstances require it, you may be surprised of what may happen.

Competitive tension to maximise deal value The most crucial element of a sales process is for the seller to maintain competitive tension to achieve a successful transaction and maximise the price. When a sales process is executed, it is important to structure the process to create a strong sense of competition in order to pressure prospective buyers to commit all available resources and submit their best possible offers. This even applies when there is effectively only one interested buyer, as that buyer should not know it is alone, and/or that it is competing with alternatives, including no transaction.

As you approach the end of the weeks – and sometimes months – of preparation work by the advisors and the target company’s management team of creating marketing material highlighting the attractions of the company, identifying all prospective buyers and designing the optimal sales process, the excitement of the process is building up. You cannot know what the initial feedback from prospective buyers will be before you have asked. Who – if anyone – wants to pursue a potential acquisition of the company, how interested are they really, and what price will the prospective buyers put on the target company?

Jon Kaznelson, Analyst, SEB Corporate Finance Christian Stampe Sørensen, Vice President, SEB Corporate Finance Jacob Lønfeldt, Director, SEB Corporate Finance SEB Corporate Finance provides advisory services for company acquisitions, divestments and mergers as well as share issues and listings executed with SEB’s Equity Capital Markets operations. Our clients consist mainly of large Nordic corporates, international companies with M&A activities in Northern Europe and private equity firms.

52

To get the most useful answers to these questions, a process letter outlining the sales process and providing guidelines for indicative offers is distributed together with the marketing material.

The process letter has a few important objectives: 1. A first indicative offer price has to be clearly defined – this sounds self-explanatory but investment bankers and prospective buyers often prefer to remain vague or complicate things by e.g. using relative valuation in the form of earnings multiples or submitting wide valuation ranges. However, as a seller you want one absolute number (usually enterprise value, i.e. the value of the company on a cash and debt free basis) in a defined currency; 2. Assessing how interested the prospective buyers are, as well as the execution risk, i.e. how likely it is that a prospective buyer can convert an attractive indicative offer into a final transaction value. This is done by asking for specifications of a range of other elements of the indicative offers such as assumptions behind the offer price, source(s) of financing, due diligence requirements and strategic rationale;

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

51

50

Questions you need to ask yourself Therefore: Before you make a more or less rash decision to seek revenge through the media, there are a number of things that you need to consider. And do be honest when you answer those questions: • “Are we doing this because we – as the professional people that we are (i.e. lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, portfolio managers/investors, etc.) – are able to demonstrate that there IS most definitely a news story here?”

• “Or are we doing this most of all as a way of legitimising our claim that we as advisors “have done everything in our power” – knowing full well that the chances of reversing – for instance – a resolution by a general meeting is non-existent?”

• “If this process ends with a decision to contact the media, have we done our homework well enough to tackle the critical questions that will surely be thrown at us?”

• “Does the other party know something that they most likely decide to share with the reporter – to “settle the score”? In that case, how do we respond? And do we have any other vulnerabilities?”

• “Are we going to be 100% accessible to the media 24/7 – or are we okay with a news story noting that we have not responded despite several attempts to contact us...?, bearing in mind the signal that this would send about us?”

• “Are we as – for instance – lawyers, accountants, communications advisors willing to run the risk of being depicted as real amateurs?”

• “Or would the better option be to “take it like a man” – i.e. let it go and accept that this time things did not go our way?”

There is a price to everything. Including embarrassing media contact Whatever you decide, do not forget that contact to the mediadoes not come free. And there is no reason to learn this the hard way! For what we are dealing with here is simply the most precious things to any management and any company – brand image and reputation.

Don’t gamble with those two and think you can get away with it. Or, in the words of Warren Buffett: “If you lose money for the firm I will be understanding.

If you lose reputation I will be ruthless.”

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

when you have to admit after some quick mental arithmetics that your bid was probably not as strong as the other bidders’.

In other words: A tactic based on frustration and emotion is also an ill-considered tactic that will often end up with an own goal. Therefore, please remember: • First of all, reporters don’t just write what you ask them to write. Unfortunately, some might say. But that is not how the media work in our day and age (fortunately).

• Reporters usually ask a number of rather sensible questions; believe me. First of all, in order to understand themselves what the story is about, but just as much to test if they are being played to further a hidden agenda. So be prepared to be challenged even though you think you are the “good guy” – the guy that hands them a “scoop”...

• No reporter will base his or her story on one source alone – and much less when the other side is being criticised. The party under attack will always be given a fair opportunity to comment.

• When you turn to the media to criticise other people, the reporter will always assume that you are willing to go on record. However, that often comes as a surprise to the “sore loser”.

And then he will backpedal... “Oh no – surely, you can write that without mentioning my name...!”

• And, finally, only very few “sore losers” have much experience in dealing with the media. Put simply: They haven’t got a clue about the ground rules and often don’t know the reporter they are planning to contact. Result: They have to start out by demystifying their business with the reporter – indeed, they may even have to spell their own name... Not a perfect start to this kind of “game”.

As a result, the reporter will (soon) realise that this story is not particularly newsworthy. And then one of two scenarios will typically play out: Either it all stops here: “Thanks for calling, but no thanks”.

Or (and this is something that the “sore loser” usually has not considered): The reporter is now curious. “What a strange call...! I guess I’ll have to look into this...” Result: The framing of the story then shifts 180 degrees, focussing instead on – well, the jilted sore loser...!

You made your bed, and now you must lie in it. Your weapon has turned on you.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

49

48

Just think of the many examples where the party under attack (e.g. a provider of training courses, a bank, an insurance company, a chairman of the board, etc.) has made a U-turn and totally changed their attitude and conduct. For one reason and one reason alone: Because of the sudden media attention: “Only when the TV news called did something happen. And then things happened quite fast.

Overnight, Chairman of the Board [Michael Jones] totally changed his position, and today – more than four months after the initial contact from shareholder [John Doe] – he tells us that – and I’m quoting – that “the company has clearly made an unforgiveable mistake”. Chairman [Jones] is therefore promising to convene a new extraordinary general meeting already tomorrow to right the wrongs...”

Therefore: If you suspect foul play (for instance) in a bidding war – and you have the documentation to prove it – the media may definitely help you score a touchdown. And often a pretty fast one.

Media as an own goal On the other hand, if what we are dealing with is the “sore loser” – and there are quite a lot of those, mind you – the prospects are very different. In those cases, there is an imminent risk of scoring an “own goal” that is both embarrassing and painful; and you ought to be clear about that before making a (rash) decision to “go to the media”. For: • what exactly is your grievance?

• where exactly can you claim foul play?

• how has it manifested itself? Examples!

• who exactly has acted in bad faith? and so on and so forth.

You would be well advised to discuss these points in-depth with yourself before actually calling the media. In other words, hold your horses – when you are “just” disappointed, frustrated or angry, but otherwise have no real reason for your thirst for revenge; when

you are considering going to the media out of a desire to badmouth the other side;

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

As strategic communication is moreover the individual discipline that has taken the highest leap up the board room agenda – boards being the ultimate client in an M&A context – over the past 5-10 years – we are certainly looking at a discipline where an experienced communications advisor simply must have a place at the table from the very beginning.

No surprises, please And then we are back where we started – whether the involvement of the media should be seen as a weapon that will win you the (bidding) war or whether the contact to the media will lead to an own goal instead.

More or less all board chairmen that I advise say that they hate being caught unawares.

“No surprises, please. I insist on having the problems brought to the board room table while we may still do something about them. A CEO who does not escalate matters when necessary is a CEO who is asking for trouble.”

The same line of reasoning should of course permeate any M&A process. Issues management is one of the means – always with an experienced communications advisor as the anchor person.

Media as a weapon “I know someone at the leading daily business newspaper – I think I’m gonna call him...” – is often one of the first reactions (frustrations) I meet. And at this point in time people really want to speed things up. They are convinced that their story is “a newsworthy scoop” so why waste time putting it through the acid test?

Stupid, almost childish! For how smart is this way of action really?

Well, that obviously depends on whether your grievance is genuine or whether you are just “a sore loser” who refuses to admit defeat.

For when there is actually substance to your story, contacting the media may very well prove an extremely central weapon. A veritable game changer. There are many examples of this.

But – it does require a measure of substance to the story. That you are able to document – at the very least, render probable – that (for instance) crucial information has been kept from you.

For you must obviously pursue a matter that has demonstrably ended with the wrong result.

That goes without saying. And here the media may well be a very effective player to have on your team.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

47

9

The media – A touchdown or an own goal?

The fact that you talk about a “bidding war” in connection with a lot of M&A activity is not a coincidence. These processes are often characterised by downright militant moves and attempts to use the media to smear the “other side”. But is that really smart? Particularly, if you are just “a sore loser”... And what sort of scenarios would you need to consider before “going to the media”?

Sometimes you just have to wonder. Wonder what otherwise respectable and experienced persons are capable of doing, simply because things are not going according to (their) plan. For instance, investors, portfolio managers, stock analysts, lawyers, accountants, communication professionals and many others.

Esben Høstager, Advisor to boards and executives for more than 25 years, HØSTAGER │ SOLO Esben Høstager is a highly specialised top management advisor with more than 25 years’ experience. He has advised boards and executives in a number of companies and organisations as well as central and local government. Before becoming an advisor, he served for 11 years as SVP, corporate communications, with two of the largest companies in the financial sector at the time.

Today, he runs his own consultancy firm HØSTAGER │ SOLO, advising exclusively on strategic communication, issues management and crisis management.

For more details, see www.hostager.dk.

Indeed, we seem to have a thirst for revenge when things do not pan out exactly the way we had hoped for. Or maybe when we as advisors have promised our client a particular result which is now somehow failing to materialise... Surely, you yourself are not to blame – so what to do?

You go to the media, of course...!

A whole lot of bother When it comes to M&A, we are dealing with an area where strategic use of communication is often absent – at least in the start-up and planning phase. By this, I mean that the so-called M&A key advisors – typically investment bankers, lawyers and accountants – are invariably involved from day one, while others are not invited in until the deal is ready to be officially announced.

Generally, however, an M&A process is not often a process where everything goes smoothly from start to finish. Therefore, strategic communication ends up being a discipline much in demand; including in particular experience in how to handle unforeseen deviations as well as various “ambushes” from a communications perspective.

But – where strategic communication should have been used (intelligently) to identify and forestall (many of) the problems, it often ends up as just damage control. This is not just a time-consuming process, it is also frustrating and even quite costly. Result: A whole lot of bother, much of which could have been avoided. And bother of the kind that leaves the above-mentioned key advisors with a tarnished image and a permanently scarred reputation.

46

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

„

complicating the process significantly – nonetheless it was a testament to the on-going industry consolidation hypothesis. Now was the time for all advisors to manoeuvre Topsil through the complicated deal landscape that the new situation had created. After many, many meetings and calls at all hours of the day, timetable adjustments, management presentations and due diligence sessions the bidding war could at long last unfold at the dramatic EGM on 17 June 2016.

Now was the time for all advisors to manoeuvre Topsil through the complicated deal landscape that the new situation has created.

The early identification of key concerns, correct positioning of Topsil and a comprehensive buyer analysis at long last resulted in finding the right partner to carry on Topsil’s legacy in the global silicon wafer industry.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

45

44

Unlocking the extra value The initial analysis indicated a very strong buyer field and potential to launch a structured auction process to pitch the buyers against each other in a competitive process. Two main elements were considered key to unlock the extra value of Topsil and thereby maximise shareholder value: 1. The synergy potential was considered significant for most of the key buyers. In order to understand the synergies and potential earnings contribution under a new ownership, a detailed analysis was carried out. The analysis indicated that the buyers could realise significant synergies of a magnitude of several times Topsil’s stand-alone earnings through several levers: i) optimising production efficiency, either by increasing volumes and/or consolidating production, ii) fixed cost reduction in part of the manufacturing process, iii) possibility for internalising certain production processes which were currently outsourced, and iv) gain more bargaining power and cross sales.

„

2. The strategic rationale was evident; consolidation in the entire industry was already on-­ going and several stakeholders saw the importance of Topsil’s products as a result of the application in many critical infrastructure and green energy projects.

consolidation in the entire industry was already on-going and several stakeholders saw the importance of Topsil’s products

With the strongest buyers identified and the arguments in place to unlock the full potential of Topsil, the time came to find the right future partner.

Process design to meet demands of global industry players in a global world Based on the prospective buyers identified and the intensive background research, the process was designed to facilitate a competitive auction process. The next important step was to contact the key decision makers of each of the prospective buyers.

Given the global perspective of the transaction with several buyers from around the world, several SEB offices were engaged to approach the buyers. SEB’s presence in China and Hong Kong gave a unique inroad to many of the key buyers. Further, through SEB’s experience with Asian companies, cultural aspects were considered such as quickly establishing face-to-face meetings, both in Denmark and in Asia.

The initial phase of the due diligence process and first round bids went as expected and everything was on track. However, M&A processes are by nature complex and rarely go exactly as planned; this was no exception. After the first round bids and the evaluation of who could be the right partner, one of the key buyers launched a public offer for another of the key buyers

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Polysilicon

Finished wafers

Power component

Power module

Final application

There was (unfortunately) overcapacity and intense competition within “finished wafers”, Topsil’s part of the value chain, and many companies were facing financial difficulties. Global industry giants such as Siemens, ABB as well as many other companies many times the scale of Topsil were dominating the value chain making Topsil a tiny fish in the huge sea with rough waters and hungry sharks.

For Project Disc, understanding the global industry trends was important. At the time of Project Disc, China was launching a geo-political goal to control the global semiconductor materials industry and its ecosystem, which included Topsil. At the same time, China’s rival Taiwan also wanted to strengthen its hold of the semiconductor industry. It is worth noting that certain semiconductors are crucial subcomponents of advanced weapons systems. This had a clear implication: dedicated political money was hungry for assets like Topsil, which, under the right circumstances, could facilitate a bidding war for the troubled company.

For Project Disc, the buyer analysis was the decisive element in order to execute a successful sale in the end. A comprehensive analysis of the buyer universe was carried out to identify the most likely buyers. Several parameters are considered in this process: financial capacity, strategic rationale, synergy potential, M&A track record, intellectual property, and operational fit. The screening process works like a funnel, illustrated by the graph to the right, starting with a broad field of prospective buyers narrowed down to a core group of the most likely buyers that should receive special treatment in the sales process.

Identified buyers

Selected buyers

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

43

8

Finding the right partner in a global industry and a global world How Hollywood would spin Project Disc ”The company’s shareholders are rebelling, suppliers are abusing their bargaining power, a competitor disputes the company’s right to produce a vital product with patent litigation, sub-suppliers have serious quality issues, the largest customers are claiming millions in damages, the level of debt must be reduced, and a significant part of the company’s assets located in Eastern Europe are difficult to sell because of ownership disputes dating back to the communist era (not to mention the risk of environmental liabilities following decades of production using highly toxic – and even radioactive – materials). How do you sell such a company?

More importantly, how do you sell such a company at a price that will not only cover the company’s sizable debt, but also be attractive for shareholders?”

Positioning a company to maximise sales price Reaching the ultimate goal of maximising shareholder value in a sales process is no walk in the park and there is no fixed formula guaranteeing success. For Project Disc it was crucial to position Topsil’s investment attractions optimally, understand the complex global wafer industry and the rapid changes it was undergoing at the time, and – most importantly – identify the right buyers and create the optimal “deal dynamics”.

Jon Kaznelson, Analyst, SEB Corporate Finance Christian Stampe Sørensen, Vice President, SEB Corporate Finance Jacob Lønfeldt, Director, SEB Corporate Finance SEB Corporate Finance provides advisory services for company acquisitions, divestments and mergers as well as share issues and listings executed with SEB’s Equity Capital Markets operations. Our clients consist mainly of large Nordic corporates, international companies with M&A activities in Northern Europe and private equity firms.

42

The investment attractions are the company’s key selling points highlighted, presented, documented and repeated by investment bankers to attract prospective buyers and convince them of the bright future awaiting the company and the colossal earnings potential waiting just around the corner. Despite many difficult years in the silicon wafer industry, Topsil had a number of attractions: global macro trends were pointing in the right direction, Topsil held a world leading position with a well-invested business platform and there was significant potential to enhance future earnings, particularly if the company could partner with one of the larger players in the wafer industry.

Various valuable insights such as industry consolidation trends, earnings margin potential, bargaining power, trade among competitors, synergies and buyer rationale are gained from analysing and understanding the value chain. The value chain for Topsil is illustrated on the next page.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

41

40

The deal with GlobalWafers was difficult as the ongoing negotiations about raw materials contracts had not yet been finalised. At the same time, Topsil’s crown jewel was threatened by a patent that Topsil’s biggest competitor had been granted in Denmark. Notwithstanding that Topsil had initiated opposition proceedings and was believed to have a good chance of prevailing, there is always a theoretical risk of losing, which might pull the rug from under Topsil’s business. The end of the lengthy negotiations was a deal that was only conditional on approval from Topsil’s shareholders, with the option of a price reduction if certain events occurred, including if Topsil lost the patent proceedings.

Finishing the job After the announcement of the deal, NSIG returned quite unexpectedly, now keenly interested.

The board of directors had committed itself to a deal with GlobalWafers, but conditional on shareholder approval, and the board of directors obviously had a compelling obligation to achieve the best possible price for the shareholders. It was therefore decided – quite extraordinarily – to allow NSIG back into the process (although they had declined such offer on several occasions in the past) in order to have them submit a binding bid before the general meeting that had been convened. It would then be up to the shareholders to decide whether to sell and, if so, whether to sell to NSIG or GlobalWafers.

Although, in the opinion of the executive board, NSIG ultimately broke its agreement with us to submit a binding bid on the agreed terms, we ended up with the intended result. The whole process was brought to a spectacular finish – a bidding process that started off on 16 June 2016, went on the entire night and only ended an hour into the general meeting on 17 June 2016.

During the process we managed to increase the price further and remove the mechanism that would entitle GlobalWafers to a potential price reduction. It all culminated in a controversial vote where the shareholders voted in favour of approving the deal with GlobalWafers.

All in all, a very intense and exciting period, which resulted in Topsil joining a larger family and thus a larger muscle to drive innovation and growth as well as secure a number of good and interesting Danish jobs for Topsil’s many competent employees – and for the first time in many months, we on the executive board had a good night’s sleep.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

clearances had to be obtained from the tax authorities. Any problem during this period was potentially a show-stopper.

At the same time, we engaged in decisive negotiations about the raw materials contracts that were concluded in 2010. It was an uphill struggle as very large bank guarantees for Topsil’s performance of the contracts had been furnished when the contracts were concluded in 2010.

But a positive outcome was the only option; otherwise, the entire house of cards might collapse.

Last, but not least, it was crucial to secure the bank’s support. The bank had made it clear for a while now that it wanted to reduce its commitment. But Topsil’s obligations with regard to raw materials required additional financing, which could only come from the bank. In a close and intensive collaboration between the executive board and the chairman of the board of directors, we succeeded in cutting this Gordian knot and getting everyone on board.

While all of this was happening, the field of buyers had to be identified. Together with SEB, we scanned the market and identified a number of potential buyers. The field was composed of financial investors in the form of private equity funds and a number of primarily industrial buyers, including Asian, which the executive board knew well – no surprises there. It was then agreed with SEB that China should be the subject of extra analysis, which resulted in an entirely new player emerging. NSIG – a new Chinese fund, which had been set up a couple of months earlier to safeguard Chinese interests in the semi-conductor industry – a perfect buyer for Topsil.

In the middle of the process, NSIG announced that it had submitted a bid for Finnish Okmetic, which manufactures another type of silicon than Topsil. This deal was seen as a posi­tive thing as Topsil and Okmetic would be a good match with a lot of potential synergies. The field of buyers quickly narrowed down to NSIG/Okmetic and GlobalWafers as well as two other Chinese companies. All of them had been given the executive board’s presentation of Topsil and had signed the non-disclosure agreement that allowed them to take an in-depth look at Topsil’s business.

Then it was up to the potential buyers to give a price indication which would enable us to select the potential buyer(s) that would be given access to carry out a due diligence investigation and then submit a binding bid. In China, this bidding process differs from what we are used to in the West. It required close dialogue and a lot of follow-up to ensure that the bids were submitted at the agreed date and hour. Here, we benefited from the relationships that the executive board had been building with the potential buyers in the past. The bids were submitted, and they were – to put it mildly – not impressive. Evidently, a lot more footwork was needed, and this process was initiated by the executive board and SEB in close cooperation – even more meetings and discussions about possibilities, opportunities, synergies, markets, analyses, raw materials contracts, etc. The breakthrough came in early May when GlobalWafers raised their bid considerably.

The expectations were that NSIG would also raise theirs. But they were not interested in that.

Repeated contacts to NSIG did not lead to further dialogue. Through daily telephone negotiations, we managed to get GlobalWafers to raise their bid further, and SEB, the executive board and the board of directors believed that we had achieved the best possible result through the process.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

39

7

The role of the executive board in the sales process To think that a bed pillow could feel this nice – and at 3 o’clock on a Thursday afternoon in mid-June – close to the longest and lightest day of the year.

After an incredibly hectic 24 hours where the shareholders approved the sale of Topsil’s silicon business to GlobalWafers, it is hard to settle down and get some rest. I have worked intensively for 36 hours straight, and my head, body and eyes are tired but my brain is working overtime, rethinking the last 24 hours, the last intense six months and the whole period since I joined Topsil as CEO in 2012.

Making the preparations In 2015, the executive board had been at work for several years, forging strategic partnerships with industrial partners. Partly to compensate for Topsil’s inability to invest in modern wafering lines (cutting and polishing of silicon crystal wafers) and partly to ensure that a group of inte­ rested buyers would be ready if the board of directors were to decide at some point to have Topsil play an active part in the increasing consolidation that was taking place in the market.

These partnerships and relations were a strong asset when the sales process was initiated at a board meeting in November 2015.

Kalle Hvidt Nielsen, former CEO in Topsil Jesper Bodeholt, former CFO in Topsil Kalle Hvidt Nielsen has 30 years of management experience in high-tech companies, of which 16 years as CEO of Brüel & Kjær, Bang & Olufsen and Topsil. Kalle holds a university degree in computer technology (DTU) and a Graduate Diploma (HD) in Sales & Marketing Management (CBS).

Jesper Bodeholt has 25 years of experience within the financial area. Jesper started his carrier in auditing, where he worked for 9 years, followed by executive financial positions successfully in Coca-Cola, Carlsberg, Coop and Intermail before, in March 2013, he became CFO of Topsil.

Jesper has a Graduate Diploma (HD) in Accounting and is MSc in Business Administration and Auditing.

38

Before that, the executive board had conducted a major strategic analysis showing that it could be exceedingly difficult for a micro-player like Topsil to continue into the future on its own and be successful in an increasingly competitive market. The executive board had recommended the board of directors to either commence the process of selling Topsil or implement substantial restructurings that, in reality, would mean closing down most of its Polish activities and cutting more than 50% of the jobs. The strategy also indicated that, even if massive restructurings were implemented, it may still be difficult to raise the necessary funds to finance operations.

However, the board of directors also asked the executive board to explore the possibilities of procuring additional capital to secure the necessary financing, in a parallel process with the preparations for a potential sale.

Getting down to work In a close partnership with SEB, the corporate finance advisers retained by the board of directors, we drafted presentations, a list of potential buyers and transaction structures, set up a data room, etc. Topsil’s finance department in particular was working overtime during this period. Interim results, budgets and 5-year plans were drafted and broken down in a manner that was consistent with the transaction structure and also would show off to potential buyers the sound assets that Topsil had. All of it had to be reviewed by an external auditor, and advance

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Obviously, it would also be sad to no longer be the master in your own house, but once reality had sunk in, we were able to focus on opportunities. Who might the new owners be? What opportunities could that bring about?

The field of potential buyers turned out to be exciting, and things might turn out well after all.

As an employee, of course, some buyers were preferable to others, but it was also quite clear that with the job as a board member came the duty to obtain the highest price. The only thing left to do was to cross your fingers and hope for high bids from the most desirable buyers.

The two potential buyers that were left at the very end were both interesting for us employees.

One of them – GlobalWafers – was a subsupplier that we knew well, and it was clear that we would fit well into their organisation as they needed our product to complement their product range. The other – NSIG – had already acquired a Finnish subsupplier and customer (Okmetic) and was perhaps looking to make more acquisitions in our industry. Both buyers would have an interesting future to offer Topsil.

The final stage ended up being a muddled and messy process, but from an employee’s perspective the two potential new owners were both sound. It is clear, however, that when the final bids were submitted and they were comparable in terms of price, it weighed heavily with the board of directors that the bid from GlobalWafers would be binding once accepted by the general meeting and would thus provide us employees with a future.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

37

6 Sune Bro Dunn, ex–employee and ex–employee repre­ sentative on the board of directors of Topsil, now an employee of Topsil Global­ Wafers Sune Bro Duun is 39 years old and has been employee-representative for just above a year.

Sune is a graduate engineer and holds a Ph.D in semiconductor physics.

For the last 6 years, Sune has been Project Manager in Research & Development where he is responsible for developing a number of Topsil’s new products.

36

Reflections of an employee representative Which would you rather: Be autonomous and poor or a subsidiary and financially secure?

When I joined the board of directors in April 2015, I did not think that I would soon be forced to consider this dilemma. When I joined, I wanted to help in the turn-around, create new opportunities and make the company a good place to work. The ideas were numerous and I looked forward to trying to influence decisions in the right direction. As a new and untested member, however, I thought that I would have six months or so to find my bearings. But before I had had a chance to find my bearings, the company had gone from bad to worse and it was clear that big decisions were needed to change the situation.

In a situation like that, you feel a huge responsibility – not just towards the shareholders – but particularly towards all of your colleagues, who might lose their job if worst comes to worst. On the board, we worked with several plans for how to secure our future as an autonomous entity, but in November 2015 we had to acknowledge that our plans were too frail as the situation had only worsened. Suddenly, the dilemma of whether to be autonomous and poor or a subsidiary and financially secure was no longer so difficult. The all-important thing was to secure our jobs and the shareholders’ money, instead of waiting and hoping for better times and ignoring the risk that things may go awfully wrong.

And, actually, working for the company was no longer as much fun as it used to be a couple of years earlier when the future was bright and everything was possible. Now, parties and perks had been cut and for a long period of time the company had focused its efforts on saving money in its battle to survive. A number of redundancy exercises had taken place, and it was sad to see your colleagues being forced to say goodbye.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

35

34

arrive at the kayak club with my phone in one hand and the cold lasagne from the fridge in the other hand, asking the other instructors to take the “rabbits” kayaking without me. When they return 1½ hours later, I am still on the phone. And when the last person finishes dinner and goes home another 1½ hours later, I have just finished on the telephone and can go home hungry with the empty lasagne dish and a telephone with almost no power left ...

The last of several bids submitted by the returning buyer is ticking in on an e-mail more or less the second the general meeting is to begin Friday. The chairman of the meeting suspends proceedings for an hour to give us time to evaluate the bid. The same morning, GlobalWafers has upped its bid to what ends up as the final price, DKK 355m – more or less unconditionally, except for the usual representations and warranties. The competing and very late bid is of the same size, but subject to a number of conditions which make us on the board of directors believe that it is simply too uncertain. Throughout the entire process, we have worked according to two principles: We will not abandon a binding offer for two birds in the bush, and we will not enter into substantive discussions with a bidder unless they “show us the money”.

After an hour’s delay, I can therefore return to the podium and recommend the shareholders on behalf of the board of directors to accept the bid from GlobalWafers, as we believe that it will provide the highest possible price and is also a sure deal. We do not want to run the risk of suddenly standing there without a deal or with a deal which is then diluted in the subsequent process. In this connection, it should be noted that the final sales price ends up being much higher than the price indications we received back in March-April from the three or four potential buyers involved in the process then.

Throughout the process, the most difficult task as chairman of the board has been to obtain agreement on the board of directors as to when we were satisfied with the bid price. We have had “bulls” as well as “bears” among us and we have not always seen eye to eye with our advisors as to how hard an approach we should take to the negotiations. We crossed the finish line and at a price I am very happy with – and it was a great deal higher than many of the participants in the process thought would be possible when we embarked on the process six months earlier. Like in most other cases, the negotiations involved some give and take and all participants experienced periods of great frustration.

What is now left is the “rest” of the company – the property company CeMat’70 in Warsaw, Poland, and our full focus is now on selling this company at the best possible price.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

In a struggling company, the management team is already hard pressed and works a great deal more than what would usually be expected. We knew that the moment we started the sales process, the workload would increase even more. What we on the board of directors needed was an executive board which (i) would be willing to put in a very extraordinary effort for a period of time which could potentially be six months or more; and (ii) we felt sure would not be tempted partway into the process by other job opportunities and what would surely be an easier and more secure worklife elsewhere. We therefore issued an addendum to the employment contract of the three executives which provided them with a financial incentive to stay and clarified their employment situation if we succeeded in our endeavours to sell Topsil.

“Rabbits” eat lasagne A sales process is very intense and, as chairman of the board, you need to be clear that your workload will increase dramatically. From December 2015 to the end of June 2016 when the finish line was in sight, I spent an average of two full days a week on Topsil business – while at the same time having a CEO job of my own to attend to! I participated in numerous telephone conversations and meetings and read or wrote much more than 1,000 e-mails during the process. And I know that the CEO and the CFO in particular were even busier at their computer than I was.

It is impossible to conduct such a process if the group of participants is too big – simply for reasons of practicality. But we maintained a very close dialogue on the entire board of directors throughout the process (typically telephone conferences, often at “odd hours”) where we discussed progress, negotiation strategy, risks and many other issues.

The process culminates shortly before an extraordinary general meeting in June 2016, which was convened for the shareholders to decide on an agreement to sell the entire silicon business to GlobalWafers of Taiwan. In the weeks leading up to the general meeting, another potential buyer which had also been involved right from the start, but which had withdrawn from the process, returned and asked to submit a bid for Topsil.

On the board of directors, we had no doubt that both buyers were potentially good partners for Topsil and that both of them had the ambition as well as the funds to secure the continued growth of the company in a different and larger context.

A number of very intensive days followed. From my perspective, the crescendo occurs a couple of days before the all-important general meeting that is scheduled to take place on a Friday.

Wednesday night we finished work at around 10:00 pm and I was off home to cook a large portion of lasagne! I was an assistant instructor for a group of new kayakers who were scheduled to go on the water the next evening followed by dinner together, cooked by me. But that Thursday evening I receive a call from LETT as I approach my driveway: They have been informed that the returning bidder wants to go public – telephone conference in 15 minutes! I manage to

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

33

32

Following the annual general meeting in the spring of 2015, the board of directors and the executive board intensify their effort to explore the possibilities of either forming a strategic partnership to strengthen sales opportunities (initiating actual negotiations with a potential partner) or finding a buyer.

Large parts of the industry are financially on their knees due to the decrease in volumes and the rapid drop in prices – a situation that calls for consolidation. In Asia, they have already taken the first steps towards consolidation. The board of directors thus decides that we would rather make an active effort to consolidate than stand on the platform looking at the train of consolidation whizzing past us.

The question is whether Topsil must or can drive a consolidation? At the chairman/CEO level, we have already been having an informal dialogue with another player for a couple of years to explore the possibilities. Now, however, we find ourselves in a situation where we cannot afford any more negative surprises, and we therefore decide in a weak bargaining situation that we have to explore the possibilities of a swifter solution in the form of a transfer. Especially the new float zone facility in Frederikssund, Denmark, and an organisation with many, many years of accumulated experience and technology know-how would be interesting to a number of potential buyers.

Sales process – a very intensive six months In November 2015 we therefore set up a team composed of SEB Corporate Finance, the M&A department of LETT law firm, Topsil’s executive board and the chairman and vice-chairman of the board and set to work! The other members of the board of directors do not participate directly, but over the next eight months the board of directors meets more often – whether in person or over the telephone – than in all of the previous years combined.

From the outset, we are certain that we do not want a public process. This is because we are conducting a number of product qualification processes with potentially new customers – a process that may take several years to obtain approval for and one or two years to actually complete. We are simply afraid that those processes may be put on hold by the new customers if any uncertainty arises as to Topsil’s ownership.

We compile a quick shortlist of potential interested industry buyers, which includes companies in Europe, Asia and the US. A number of private equity funds are also included on the list. In addition, we initiate a process through SEB and other channels to identify other potential buyers in Asia – companies that are unknown to us, especially because of the rapid changes taking place in China over the past years, and we need to be 100% sure that the list we have is exhaustive.

Over Christmas/New Year the data room is set up. That Christmas, unfortunately, a number of our key employees did not see much of their family.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

New facility in struggling market In 2010, we are thus looking at a scenario where we expect to reach maximum capacity at the existing facility within a few years, while at the same time having to find the space required for new production equipment for a new 300mm product which is being developed. After much analysis, we announce in January 2011 that we will initiate the construction of a new facility – an investment of almost DKK 300m financed by expected operating revenue, credits and the proceeds from a capital increase made in 2010.

In 2012 and the following years, Topsil is experiencing serious pricing pressure in a market which is also suddenly shrinking in volume. A major German competitor has now returned to the NTD segment and is winning market shares due to its low prices, and the Japanese yen is falling from over 7.50 to 5.20, so our Japanese competitors are doing the same in Europe – Topsil’s “home market”.

As 2015 dawns, after we have changed the executive board of Topsil and implemented various other changes, the reality for Topsil is that we are now the owner of a new state-of-the-art and mainly credit financed facility in a market where previous years’ volumes have shrunk (or, at best, reached a constant level) and at market prices which are 40% lower than when we decided to build the new facility.

Finally, in 2014-15, one of our largest customers complained about the quality of our products – a very serious turn of events that meant that our business with that customer slowed to a standstill for quite a period of time. The matter was closed by Topsil – in addition to paying damages to the customer – manufacturing and making a replacement delivery of a large quantity of wafers free of charge. The quality issue was caused by one of Topsil’s subsuppliers, which – unknown to Topsil and in breach of the contract – had changed its production equipment and processes, thereby contaminating the products. Notwithstanding the damages paid by the subsupplier, the matter ended up costing Topsil more than DKK 30m – money that we could not very well afford to lose at that point in time.

Need for action – strategic partnership and/or market consolidation On the board of directors, we have discussed on an ongoing basis over the past years whether we see ourselves having a future as an independent listed company or whether we need to become part of something bigger. It gradually becomes clear that we are now so financially weak that an additional drop in revenue or a new “bump” in the road in the form of quality issues or the wrong outcome of a pending patent case may be even very crucial to the company’s survival. Topsil’s bankers are obviously also concerned about the situation and want management to find a sound and future-proof solution.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

31

5 Jens Borelli-Kjær, Chairman of the Board, Topsil Jens Borelli-Kjær (1960) (M.Sc. Mech Eng/Physics, BA Intl Bus, MBA) is a senior industrial exe­ cutive with 30 years of service in the medical devices, electronics and building materials sectors in varoius executive and board level roles. Since 2005, Jens Borelli-Kjær has also been the owner and Managing Director of the roof glazing companies group, VITRAL.

In the eye of the storm – The role of the board of directors in a sales process A Danish hightech success story In April 2011, I, the proud chairman of the board of directors of Topsil Semiconductor Materials A/S, presented the company’s best financial statements ever. Revenue had reached DKK 450m and the operating profit was more than DKK 100m. The board of directors, the executive board and our employees could all look back on a number of highly successful years.

When I joined the board as chairman six years earlier, Topsil’s revenue was only around DKK 100m and the profit was modest. In the years prior to that, the company had had its ups and downs with majority shareholders coming and going. A former chairman had said at one point: “They told me that sand was fed into the machines and then gold would come out at the other end. I have now seen for myself that it is the other way around ...!”

The first problem we faced in 2006 was access to raw materials. Topsil “makes its living” from polysilicon, which is a sand-based material used in the semiconductor industry (which Topsil supplies) and for photovoltaic solar cells. The solar cell market was undergoing almost explosive growth at the time and already purchased almost as much polysilicon as the total global semiconductor industry, which meant that in order to gain access to raw materials, we (and our competitors) were forced to accept long-term agreements with suppliers and pay large up-front payments as an entry ticket.

We used this access to raw materials to enter into similar long-term arrangements with our largest customers, which meant that we found ourselves in a situation where sand was in fact – at least to a large degree – being transformed into gold. The following years we also managed to shift our focus on to producing more and more ultra pure silicon for high voltage use, and we discontinued Topsil’s own solar cell activities to allow us to focus 100% on the semiconductor industry. In 2011, therefore, we were not only able to present a handsome net profit; we were also the world’s largest supplier of ultra pure float zone silicon, NTD, for high voltage use.

The financial crisis left the silicon industry relatively untouched. A great number of Topsil customers were suppliers of semiconductor components – based on Topsil wafers – for major infrastructure projects, particularly high-speed railways and energy distribution. These were multi-year projects that were not put on hold “simply” because of the noise in the financial markets and a drop in global GDP.

30

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Volvo is the best Scandinavian example, but we have also seen positive effects in Denmark.

On 13 December 2016 Dynaudio in Skanderborg will open one of Europe’s most sophisticated acoustic R&D facilities. The facility is funded by the new Chinese owner GoerTek, which apart from the new facility in Skanderborg has also established a development centre in Copenhagen for collaboration with Samsung, Sony, Google, Microsoft, LG and other GoerTek customers.

Like many other Chinese investors, GoerTek started out as a successful subsupplier. On a tour of the showroom that all Chinese companies have, you will see watches, headsets, loudspeakers, game console controllers and many other everyday products. All of them marketed under other brands, but manufactured by GoerTek under a contract.

The acquisition of Dynaudio is one of the ways that GoerTek has of getting access to the high-quality audio market where earnings per unit is higher and branding a core discipline. A journey away from the mass volume market where many Chinese companies are operating these years.

Should we fear the dragon?

Napoleon was right. China has woken up in earnest. With its continued high growth rates, China will become an even more important market in the future, also for Danish companies. So far, the Chinese acquisitions of Danish companies and investments in Danish clusters have generally strengthened Danish companies.

The interest in Denmark obviously has consequences for those involved. For companies, consultancy firms and employees, their contact with Chinese investors will require a need for innovative approaches and ideas.

More Chinese companies in Denmark will make it easier to recruit employees with experience in Chinese business culture and development models. For the companies that succeed under Chinese ownership, the opportunities are simply huge. For consultancy firms, the market potential is great and the frustrations to come hardly less great.

Common for all of us is the fact that it will be hard and challenging and there is no guarantee that there will be a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, but the alternative – that Chinese companies will bypass Denmark – is the same as wasted opportunity and lost potential. Chinese investments in Denmark will be successful if the right preparations are made, if Denmark has the know-how or competences sought by Chinese companies, or if the market potential is great enough. If Denmark is among the world leaders within a sector, the competences will obviously be of interest to Chinese investors, too.

Hopefully, Chinese owners will also be a positive acquaintance for Denmark in the future.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

29

28

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Well-run Danish companies are often sold in international bidding rounds. A process that has not been very successful in Denmark for especially the state-owned Chinese companies. Short bidding processes and complicated internal decision-making procedures sometimes make it very difficult to win international bidding rounds.

In addition to the internal challenges, it is easy to underestimate the role of cultural differences when negotiations reach a deadlock. Personal chemistry and accumulation of mutual trust is of great importance, particularly for older business owners or leaders from China. Instead of a takeover based on bidding rounds and due diligence investigations, a preferred model is to start out with a limited cooperation. At the same time, it is no secret that successful Chinese acquisitions have often required long and complicated processes before the deal came through. Often with renegotiation of already concluded agreements. A popular Chinese saying goes something like “when a door closes, a window will open” and is testament to a fundamentally pragmatic approach to negotiations. If the investment is sufficiently interesting, a no will generally not be taken for an answer. Instead, the Chinese party will approach the matter from another angle. A lot of times much to the frustration of Danish companies and their advisers, who are naturally used to a shorter and more focused dialogue primarily with companies in Europe and North America.

East or West, home is best It is no secret that, growth-wise, China is where the action is. Even with decreasing growth rates, the expectation is still middle-to-high growth in the years ahead. For most Chinese business leaders, the choice is between spending the company’s resources on a well-known home market with an annual GDP growth of 6-7% and a large, unfamiliar, mature and somewhat slower market in Europe. Only few of them spend a lot of time pondering this choice.

For most Chinese companies, the purpose of making investments in Denmark is to achieve know-how and competences which may increase home market sales. Chinese investors focus mostly on technology-driven sectors. In Denmark, particularly IT and renewable energy. In the rest of Europe, also foods, automobiles and space and robot technology as well as new materials, tourism and well-known consumer brands. Companies with leading technology and innovation force are the preferred objects of investment.

A positive acquaintance The few examples of private Chinese acquisitions in Denmark so far have definitely had a posi­ tive effect on jobs creation in Denmark and follow the general pattern of Chinese companies’ conduct in Europe.

Chinese companies often have little experience in doing business outside of China and therefore often retain the existing management team of the companies they acquire and then handle the Chinese market themselves. Often the existing management team and jobs will be maintained and additional resources will be provided, if necessary.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

27

26

of the most extreme examples, we at Invest in Denmark have been approached by steel manufacturers looking to diversify into salmon breeding and property investors with an interest in medical technology. Fortunately, approaches like that are an exception to the rule. With the increasing international experience of Chinese business leaders, the dialogue quickly becomes specific and serious.

How do I get Chinese investors?

As in most cases, patience and preparations are key. An investment from a Chinese company does not happen overnight. Finding the right Chinese investor often feels as if you are looking for the proverbial needle in the haystack. A lot of interested companies, but only a few who can and even fewer who want to. As in many other aspects of life, the easier way is to sit down at the table with your existing partners. Accelink’s acquisition of Ignis in Birkerød, Titan’s acquisition of the Vestas turbine tower production facility and also GlobalWafers’ acquisition of Topsil were all of them the logical next step in an existing partnership or customer/supplier relationship.

If you start from scratch when looking for investors, a good adviser with experience of China would be a great asset. It might be a good idea to drop the expectation of quick gains and instead initially focus on how to build a lasting partnership.

For many Danish consultancy firms, China is a slightly daunting prospect. As people have increasingly found out, the ground rules are a lot different and the dialogue time-consuming. Language may be a barrier and the investment in trust building is time-consuming and long-winded.

However, your liver will appreciate that the focus on building relations through consumption of unhealthily large amounts of alcohol is increasingly a thing of the past. Even so, there is no escaping the fact that frequent visits to China will be necessary, and many have seen the advantage in hiring Chinese-speaking staff. The business model itself is also under pressure in China. Chinese companies are very reluctant to pay for services. It would therefore be worthwhile to consider another pricing mechanism, as far as the buyer side of a transaction is concerned.

Employees who suddenly find themselves with a Chinese manager have nothing to fear based on the experience so far, but for most people the Chinese development model will require some getting used to. Development is fast-paced and the time to market is short. In many cases, those in charge of the companies are also the founders and used to unfettered decision-­ making powers. In quite a few cases, it has given rise to frustrations on both sides when Danish employees’ focus on contributing by proposing constructive improvements is seen as an unwillingness to carry out an already issued order.

Why do buyers bypass Denmark?

There may be a number of reasons why Chinese investments in Denmark are still small scale.

Generally, Danish companies are attractive and highly priced. At the same time, many large companies in Denmark are owned by a foundation or a family and they are therefore not regarded as actual acquisition objects.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

overall investments. Private equity and venture funds still very much maintain their national focus. South of the Danish border the major acquisitions, including the acquisition of robotics company Kuka, and the prospects of increased indirect Chinese state-owned ownership of important parts of the German growth engine have led to scepticism about future Chinese investments. Most recently, the uncertainty has led to the regulatory procedure to approve the acquisition of chip manufacturer Aixtron SE being reopened.

The distrust of especially the state-owned investments has so far not come from any bad experience. Business transfers are most often a lengthy process, and the real effects of the recent acquisition spree will not be known until in a couple of years at least. At the same time, there is also an element of non-mutuality. Chinese investors in Europe are only subject to few restrictions, while European companies are met with extensive investment restrictions in China.

This imbalance is an important issue in the negotiations for an EU-China investment agreement.

Denmark – the capital of IKEA? Compared with US and European companies, Chinese companies only have a limited presence in Denmark. In the China section of Invest in Denmark we estimate that around 130 companies from China, including Taiwan and Hong Kong, are active in Denmark. Not all of them have been assisted by us with their investments in Denmark, but we have been in contact with nearly all of them. This contact is not easily come by, and Denmark is not really on the radar of Chinese companies looking to invest in Europe. However, core strengths within the audio, renewable energy, pollution control, foods and health industries resonate with foreign markets – also with China.

Is there a typical investor?

It would be wrong to think that all Chinese companies are the same. Companies from Taiwan and Hong Kong usually have much more international experience. Many members of management typically have an academic degree from the US or experience from working for or with US companies. The corporate culture is strongly influenced by the Chinese corporate culture, but has some similarities with the US culture. GlobalWafers is almost straight out of a textbook.

This company has an intensive focus on its core business. It already has a lot of international investments and a management with much international experience, including long board experience from Topsil. If the Danish part of the company can continue to meet the high standards, it will be a tremendous boost to be part of one of the largest silicon manufacturers worldwide.

If we look at companies from mainland China, however, it is quite a different story. Notwithstanding almost 40 years of open economy, many Chinese business owners are still very new to the idea of going international. Production and sales to Europe are familiar to them and the drive to expand outside of China is big, but their lack of international experience is still a barrier to success.

In Asia conglomerates as a concept are still going strong. Big Chinese companies often follow other teachings than in Europe, upholding the principle of risk diversification. To mention some

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

25

4

Chinese investments in Denmark – Should we fear the dragon when it awakes?

Napoleon once said of China: “Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will shake the world”. The Chinese people are no longer just sitting in Højbro Square in Copenhagen like the famous Danish children’s song; they are buying up a lot of companies on a worldwide scale. In the wake of the acquisition spree, uncertainty follows. Are the current acquisitions only the beginning? What plans do the new owners have for the companies, and what are the implications of the Chinese ownership for companies, employees and of course the consultancy industry?

Cry wolf?

Rasmus Grand Bjørnø, Director, Invest in Denmark, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rasmus Grand Bjørnø is on a posting by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Shanghai, where, for the past 4 years, he has headed Invest in Denmark’s organisation in China. Highlighting Danish core strengths, Invest in Denmark promotes Denmark as an investment country and assists foreign enterprises in setting up business in Denmark.”

Almost every week there are new major Chinese investments in Europe. Particularly in Germany, the UK and France the Chinese business sector seems to have an insatiable appetite for wellrun companies. The economic distress in Southern Europe has led to bargain offers so Chinese companies have also made large-scale acquisitions there.

The growth in Chinese investments outside of China is going one way and one way only these days. 33.6% a year in the last 13 years. With a number of high-profile investments in Volvo, Pirelli, Kuka, Syngenta and most recently Finnish Supercell, Chinese investors are really setting the agenda in Europe. Even with the new restrictions on capital outflow, the interest will hardly cool down any time soon.

In Denmark, Chinese investments have also filled the business pages of the papers. This year, Sparkle Roll’s interest in Bang & Olufsen turned into a lengthy multi-part serial, while the theme of this booklet – GlobalWafers’ acquisition of Topsil – ultimately had the makings of an intense love triangle drama.

So far, only about a couple of handfuls of Chinese companies have bought their way to a fullfledged presence in Denmark. For the most part, their presence in Denmark has evolved from minor set-ups. As shown by Huawei and AsiaInfo, minor sales offices can easily grow into a considerable presence. From 5-10 employees in 2007, Huawei now has over 250 employees in Denmark and is hardly done growing.

By far the major part of Chinese investors in Denmark is private companies. This is in sharp contrast with the rest of Europe, where state-owned Chinese companies represent 60-70% of

24

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

became the owner of a Polish property company. From the outset, Topsil has intended to sell the property company, as already described in the prospectus from 2010.

Market developments All market indicators pointed towards revenues soaring to new heights, but the prognoses did not hold and the market turned in 2008-2009. There was now again a surplus capacity of raw materials and since both customers and suppliers were huge multinationals, Topsil found it difficult to hold its customers to the long-term contracts.

On the back of global megatrends like the green agenda and energy efficiency, Topsil launched an offensive growth strategy in 2010 to better exploit the market potential by developing new products with improved technical properties, launching the next generation of large-diameter silicon wafers and building a new production facility. New CEO Kalle Hvidt Nielsen was tasked with increasing sales and driving efficiencies. But conditions were tough: From 2012 and onwards, Topsil felt the demand for lower prices in the market and lost market shares to a large German competitor which had returned to the NTD segment, and after being ordered to pay damages to a customer and seeing the market decline it was difficult for Topsil to find its feet again in a market characterised by consolidation.

The transfer On 1 July 2016, Topsil sold off its silicon business to GlobalWafers led by Doris Hsu. The remaining part of Topsil – the majority holding in a Polish property company – is still with the listed company, which has changed its name to Cemat A/S. GlobalWafers has taken over a company that from the very beginning has produced high-quality products which are still in demand. For instance, the HPS product, which dates back to the 1960s, is still a part of Topsil’s product range as a special-purpose product, and Topsil has managed up until today to maintain its global position as the market leading supplier of NTD silicon – the great invention of the 1970s. Time will tell if Topsil’s silicon business will continue – now that it is on new, but well-known hands – to push the boundaries of what is possible with silicon.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

23

22

The green agenda In the 1990s, Topsil’s focus was on simplifying and streamlining silicon production and on a new type of silicon – the gas phase doped float zone product targeted at medium-voltage com­ ponents – which was based on the earlier product generations from the 1970s. The process was less costly and delivery time was shorter as the product no longer required radiation in a nuclear reactor. The management side also saw some changes these years, as long-standing CEO and “Mr Topsil” John Olesen left the company in 1998.

In the late 1990s, Topsil saw the potential of the rapidly growing solar industry and the opportunities involved in producing a product for high-efficiency solar cells. In the early 2000s, however, Topsil was forced to accept that it had not succeeded in setting up a profitable mass production of float zone silicon for solar cells; the silicon product exceeded the other products available in the market in productivity, but it was too expensive to be competitive. Topsil closed down its wafer production and outsourced most of it to the GlobalWafers parent, Taiwanese Sino American Silicon (SAS), where Doris Hsu would become the CEO a couple of years later. A couple of special-purpose products were outsourced to another company, Taiwanese WaferWorks Corporation (WWX).

Topsil was struggling throughout this period as well to stabilise its economy, among other things by entering into raw materials contracts with REC, and around the turn of the century the company received several capital injections – in 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2006. In 2002, GlobalWafer contributed DKK 25 million, and Doris Hsu joined the board of directors, where she served as chairman, vice-chairman and regular member until 2005 when she retired from the board and SAS sold its shares.

In the mid 2000s, the world economy was in full bloom and politicians, businesses etc. had centred their focus on the green agenda. As the solar industry grew, an acute shortage of silicon as raw material kicked in. REC, Topsil’s main supplier of 20 years, terminated its contracts and Topsil stood to lose its livelihood unless new supply contracts were made. With Keld Lindegaard Andersen as its CEO from 2005-2010, Topsil entered into long-term contracts with suppliers of materials and wafers and five major customers. The long-term contracts involved large advances, but coupled with the customer contracts this period was characterised by great stability, steady earnings and thus a share price that almost exploded. Topsil thus managed to exploit the shortage of silicon raw material caused by the solar industry boom.

With its acquisition of Polish Cemat Silicon S.A. in 2008, Topsil gained access to Czochralski silicon technology, targeting the lower voltage levels that had been abandoned in production in the 1970s. With Cemat, Topsil would have more control of wafering production such as sawing, polishing, sanding, etc. and insourced this stage of the production process from Taiwan. At the same time, Topsil could use Poland with its new-found control over process as well as tech­ nology to demand price cuts from SAS and WWX. With its Polish acquisition, the company also

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

electrical components in the first place. It is typically seen in high-performance energy transmission and distribution components such as pumps, compressors, air conditioning systems and robots. Other uses include wind turbine management and distribution of wind power to the transmission grid, adjustment of power to overhead wires for high-speed trains and adjustment of power between battery and engine in electric and hybrid cars.

Global breakthrough Compared with its large multinational competitors, Topsil was operating at too low volumes and too high production costs to be profitable. In 1972, Haldor Topsøe therefore decided to sell off Topsil as a separate company to Danish Thrige Titan.

In the global semiconductor industry at the time, a new type of components was being developed to form the cornerstone of the transformation of high-voltage alternating current into direct current, a process which required much of the silicon in terms of consistency and reliability. Despite scientific scepticism as to whether radiated – neutron transmutation doped (NTD) – silicon would result in radioactive and useless silicon crystals, Topsil was the first in the market to develop radiated silicon in 1974 in collaboration with scientists at Risoe nuclear test reactor and a major customer (now ABB). This product was hugely successful, and the company thus cemented its position as a frontrunner and trailblazer.

Ups and downs over time In 1974, Thrige Titan sold off Topsil to US electronics giant Motorola, which was in need of new and larger production capacity. Due to a sluggish economy and a falling dollar rate, Topsil struggled in the market with a dramatic drop in sales. The slow sales resulted in a turbulent period for Topsil in the following years and, despite a number of restructuring and restoration attempts, Topsil was declared bankrupt in 1983. The remains of Topsil were picked up by a Danish-Dutch consortium of investors, together with a group of Danish private and institutional investors. In 1986, Topsil IPO’ed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (now, Nasdaq Copenhagen).

In 1989, Topsil decided to cease production of raw materials (polysilicon) as it was able to source raw materials that met its strict standards from an external supplier (originally, Union Carbide, but it was acquired by ASIMI, which was acquired by Norwegian REC Silicon ASA (REC)). Thus, product efficiency was increased and Topsil was able to significantly expand production capacity. In the early 1980s, the wafer diameters grew to 4 inches, reaching 5 inches by the end of the decade.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

21

3 Mette Lykke, Lawyer, LETT

From Hellerup to Taipei – From flowers to hightech It is not easy to pinpoint the exact date when Topsil was founded. According to www.topsil.com, the company was founded by Danish engineer and scientist Haldor Topsøe in the late 1950s and later, in 1972, spun off from Haldor Topsøe A/S as a separate company. According to the Danish business register, however, Topsil was founded in 1981. According to Topsil’s memorandum of association on file with the Danish Business Authority, the story of Topsil begins on 27 January 1962 when five florists partnered up to form a flower trading company by the name of Danske Blomsterhandleres Handelsaktieselskab D.B. What happened to the florists the old documents do not say, but they do tell the story of a company that, despite its changing fortunes, has managed to make itself attractive in the world market.

Topsøe + silicon = Topsil Haldor Topsøe had become interested in silicon production on one of his many foreign travels, and in parallel with the development and production of catalysts which made up (and still makes up) the core business of Haldor Topsøe A/S, he dabbled a bit in the cultivation of highly pure float zone silicon crystals. Haldor Topsøe began experimenting, developing machinery for silicon zone melting and crystal cultivation in the basement of his home in Hellerup, Denmark.

Around 1960, the first silicon production began, and Topsil was born – its name a combination of “Top” from Topsøe and “sil” from silicon. Both the production equipment and raw materials for the silicon production were produced by Topsøe’s own engineers and scientists. In the beginning, the silicon wafers were quite small in diameter, 1-1.5 inches, but later they managed to make them in other sizes as well.

Already then, the silicon industry was dominated by large multinationals, making it difficult for a minor player to navigate the market. In the 1960s, Topsil launched its first high-quality product, hyper-pure silicon (HPS), for use in sophisticated detectors and sensors. Today, those components are used in medical engineering devices such as CT and MR scanners, as well as in airport security scanners. Thus, Topsil had found its niche market by developing a product of such purity as to be competitive in terms of technology as well as quality. Silicon is a semi­conductor material which is mainly used in the production of computer chips, solar cells and infrastructural materials, and Silicon Valley – the home of hightech – is named after this material. Only, the quality of silicon produced by Topsil is much higher than required for computer chips and the purity much higher than required for solar cells, purity being a condition for producing energy-effective

20

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

By effecting the addition of assets and liabilities as a tax-exempt addition, no capital gain or loss would be triggered for tax purposes. In a tax-exempt addition of assets, the receiving company will take over the assets at their value for tax purposes, which means that there will be no write-down or revaluation for tax purposes of the assets in connection with the addition.

In order to obtain permission to effect the addition of assets by way of a tax-exempt addition, it is a condition that the transfer is commercially justified and that the assets and liabilities being transferred represent an independent business capable of functioning by its own means. It is a further condition that all assets and liabilities related to the company are transferred to the newly established company, and it is thus not possible to leave a few assets or liabilities in the transferred company. Moreover, it is not possible to make a tax-exempt transfer of shares and liabilities which do not constitute a branch of an activity.

Permission from the tax authorities The tax authorities granted the company permission to add the assets and liabilities of Topsil (Cemat A/S) to a newly established company by way of a tax-exempt addition. In that connection, the tax authorities approved that the debt owed by Topsil (Cemat A/S) to the bank could remain in the company with a view to repayment after the addition. The tax authorities further approved that the shares in Topsil Poland, which had now become a property company, did not form part of Topsil’s (Cemat A/S) silicon business, and it was thus not a requirement that these shares were transferred to the new company as part of the addition.

The tax authorities did not set up special requirements for granting permission to the tax-­ exempt addition, except that the tax losses in Topsil (Cemat A/S) had to be transferred to the newly established company. The reason for this is that the tax authorities have introduced a change in practice to the effect that tax losses in connection with a tax-exempt restructuring must be transferred to the receiving company to the extent that the losses relate to the transferred activities. The consequence of this is that the transferred losses will be lost when, in connection with a subsequent sale, the receiving company withdraws from its joint taxation with the transferred company. However, in two recent decisions from September 2016 the National Tax Tribunal established that tax losses and loss carryforwards in the transferring company must remain in the transferring company.

In the Topsil transaction the addition of assets for tax purposes was completed with effect from 1 July 2016, immediately prior to closing. After that, the sale of the silicon business was a reality and Topsil – now Cemat A/S – had become a Danish listed property holding company.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

19

18

Restructuring of Topsil step by step In order to achieve the desired pre-sale structure, the following plan was launched to spin off the Polish property company in order to separate the company’s core business and place it in an independent unlisted company.

Step 1: Transfer of Polish shell company (W130) from Cemat’70 S.A. to listed Topsil

(Cemat A/S).

Step 2: Transfer of the activities in Topsil Poland to W130 – whose parent company had now

become Topsil (Cemat A/S).

Step 3: Transfer of all assets and liabilities in Topsil (Cemat A/S), except for the shares in Topsil

Poland, which was now only a Polish property company, to a newly established Danish

subsidiary (Topsil GlobalWafers).

Step 4: Sale of the newly established company to the buyer.

Step 5: Distribution of sales proceeds from Topsil (Cemat A/S) to its shareholders

(after repayment of debt).

Step 6: Development of Cemat’70 S.A. with the aim of selling the company and distributing

the sales proceeds to the shareholders (majority shareholder Cemat A/S).

Step 7: Liquidation of Cemat A/S or sale to a listed shell company.

Execution of the restructuring process Deloitte Poland assisted Topsil in the transfer of the shares in W130 (step 1) and in the transfer of Topsil Poland’s activities to W130 (step 2), which was now owned by Topsil (Cemat A/S).

Deloitte Denmark assisted in applying for the Danish tax authorities’ permission to add Topsil’s (Cemat A/S) assets to the newly established company (step 3) by way of a tax-exempt addition of assets. In a taxable addition of assets the transferring company will be liable to tax on gains on the transferred assets relative to their market value. If the transfer gives rise to a loss, a taxable addition will mean that this loss can be carried forward in the transferring company under applicable rules. In a taxable addition, the receiving company will be regarded for tax purposes as having acquired the assets at market value.

In the Topsil transaction, the market price of the company’s shares was below the company’s equity book value. A taxable addition of assets would thus trigger a tax loss. As Topsil (Cemat A/S) would no longer have any activities of its own after the transfer, such loss would be of limited value to the company.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

4) Share Purchase Agreement (Acquisition of Topsil GlobalWafers A/S) GlobalWafers Co. Ltd. (Taiwan)

Cemat A/S

Listed on Nasdaq Copenhagen A/S

3) Business Transfer Agreement (“Dump down”, incl. W130)

Transaction Object

100%

100%

2) Asset Transfer Agreement (silicon business) Topsil (Acquisition of assets Semiconductor and activities in TSM S.A.) Materials S.A. (to be named Cemat70 S.A.)

Topsil GlobalWafers A/S (Denmark) 100%

W130

(to be named Topsil Semiconductor Materials S.A.)

W130

Topsil Semiconductor Materials KK

(to be named Topsil Semiconductor Materials S.A.)

CeMat’70 S.A. (Poland)

(Japan)

1) Share Purchase Agreement (Acquisition of W130)

W130

(empty Polish shell company)

As will be seen, the parent company Topsil (now Cemat A/S) held the entire share capital in the Polish subsidiary, Topsil Semiconductors Materials S.A. (Topsil Poland), which held an ownership interest of 77.6% in the Polish property company Cemat’70 S.A, which in turn was the owner of three Polish subsidiaries two of which owned properties whereas the third was a shell company. In addition to the Polish subsidiaries, Topsil also owned a Japanese subsidiary.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

17

2

Tax-exempt conversion – Pre-sale adjustment and restructuring There are more ways than one in which to sell a company. A sale may be effected either as a share deal or as an asset deal. Prior to a sale, it will often be necessary to restructure the company to fine-tune it to the needs of the seller or the buyer. Several factors are important in terms of which structural changes are needed to be made and how such changes are to be made. One of these factors is the tax consequences of the sale to the buyer and the seller, respectively. The restructuring of a company may usually be effected as either a taxable or tax-exempt restructuring. In a tax-exempt restructuring, the tax liability is deferred so that no tax will be triggered immediately in connection with the transaction.

Adjustment of Topsil’s structure The sale of Topsil could have taken place by a buyer taking over all of the shares in the listed Danish parent. In such a transaction, the shareholders in Topsil would have been taxed in Denmark according to the rules of the Danish Capital Gains Tax Act (aktieavancebeskatnings­ loven) governing the sale of shares.

Michael Hoe Knudsen, Partner, Deloitte Tax M&A IT Dorte Vestergaard Sonnichsen, Director, Deloitte Tax M&A IT “Deloitte” is the brand under which thousands of dedicated professionals throughout the world collaborate to provide services in audit, consulting, financial advisory, risk management and tax advisory services.

However, it was believed that a potential buyer would not be seriously interested in Topsil’s Polish property company, whose only activity was to own real estate in Poland, being included in the transaction. It was thus necessary to effect a restructuring whereby the Polish property company, which did not form part of Topsil’s core business, was spun off from Topsil’s other activities. Topsil furthermore expected that a potential buyer would be less interested in buying a listed company, so this issue also played a role in the decision to effect a restructuring prior to the sale. The group and transaction structure in Topsil is shown in the figure on the next page.

The department Tax M&A IT provides tax advice in connection with mergers and acquisitions and tax advice to Danish and foreign companies regarding international tax matters.

16

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

15

14

1 July In parallel with all this ”legalistic quibbling” – as aptly put by Topsil’s management – the transfer to GlobalWafers was planned. Once again we could all witness how small the world had become when modern communications equipment and careful preparations on both sides work so beautifully together. On 1 July, a relieved and satisfied company could thus make the following announcement: ”Conclusion of the agreement with GlobalWafers Co. Ltd. on the sale of the silicon business of the company” Also on 1 July, an extraordinary general meeting was convened in Topsil. Now it was time to enjoy the weekend.

Epilogue Since then, two extraordinary general meetings have been held due to the shareholder request and in order to choose between a share buy-back programme or a dividend distribution to the shareholders. The agreement with GlobalWafers had been concluded, so the general meeting held for the purpose of reversing the decision was kind of ”post festum”. The share buy-back was adopted and is now awaiting acceptance from the tax authorities.

The story A fascinating Danish company has been preserved on Danish soil, but now 100% on foreign hands. This is a good thing because, if not for this solution, there would have been little hope for Topsil and its shareholders.

What started out as a difficult sales process ended in a drama played out before our eyes.

Only time will tell who the real winner is.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

With the required majority, the general meeting approved the improved and unconditional agreement with GlobalWafers.

17 June at 12:50 pm The general meeting was closed and the company’s situation was now settled. But no, that wasn’t to be after all. Another long working weekend ahead.

18 June On 18 June, the amendments to Topsil’s articles of association etc. were registered with the Danish Business Authority.

19 June A group of shareholders in Topsil requested an extraordinary general meeting to reverse the resolution to sell the silicon business.

20 June The board of directors informed Nasdaq about the request for an extraordinary general meeting and the whole course of events gave rise to a lot of media attention. At the same time, NSIG objected to the Danish Business Authority over its registration of the business transacted at the general meeting.

This resulted in extensive correspondence and resulting process between the parties’ legal advisers and the Danish Business Authority, and the Danish FSA and Nasdaq also became involved.

29 June The Danish Business Authority made a decision not to allow NSIG’s complaint: ”The Danish Business Authority has made a decision Today the Danish Business Authority has made a decision not to find in favour of NSIG.”

• Shareholders request new general meeting to reverse the decision • Complaint from public bidders to Danish Business Authority, Danish Financial Supervisory Authority and Nasdaq • Media

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

13

June

Obviously, the board of directors wanted the best price possible, but they also wanted the process to come to an end as a lengthy process in the press would be poison to the company’s operations and financing.

17 June at 9:30 am Shortly before 9:30 am, GlobalWafers made a new, unconditional and improved offer that would lapse if not accepted the same day. NSIG made no second offer.

17 June at 10:00 am The general meeting started.

17 June at 10:08 am At 10:05 am NSIG announced by telephone that they would make an offer for all of Topsil’s shares and at 10:08 am the official announcement ticked in: ”Main elements of the offer NSIG is offering DKK 0.352 in cash per share.

The offer will contain a number of usual terms and conditions, among other things about the acquisition of 90% of the share capital on a fully diluted basis and approval by the relevant authorities.”

17 June, at 10:10 am The chairman of the meeting adjourned the general meeting for an hour to allow the board of directors and its advisers to evaluate the two now completely different offers.

17 June, at 11:30 am The general meeting was resumed. Neither GlobalWafers nor NSIG was present. The board of directors gave an account of their deliberations. The whole process triggered a heated debate about the offers, the process and about technically complex legal matters. The board of directors recommended concluding the agreement with GlobalWafers as it considered this to be the financially better of the two as it was unconditional as opposed to NSIG’s offer and as the board of directors had been informed that the largest shareholder with more than 10% of Topsil’s share capital would not accept NSIG’s offer, which was necessary in order to fulfil NSIG’s condition about acceptance from 90% of the share capital.

• New potential bidders • New offer • Announcement of new bidder • Extraordinary general meeting • Auction, publicity and best offer • Increased offer for activities • Public offer for shares • General meeting decides sale of activities

12

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

At the same time, the offer was to be studied in detail to find out whether to recommend it to the shareholders and all other stakeholders in Topsil. It was a good thing that all of this played out on one of the long bright summer nights. The board of directors had to find a strategy for the general meeting to balance the interests of a fair process, the best possible price, deal certainty and clarification of the situation so that the company would not end up in a vacuum for a long period of time.

17 June at 00:43 am It was still light outside when we drove home still talking together. Thank God for mobile phones!

17 June at 5:30 am It was a beautiful summer morning, if it had not been for the wise and reflective investment banker calling me on his way to Topsil and the extraordinary general meeting to say that: ”….I have an idea that will end all this in a way that will make the company and the shareholders happy”.

17 June at 8:30 am The board of directors met early in Frederikssund. This was decision-making time. The decisive decision was that the two bidders would have equal terms for bidding, which was announced to both bidders and Nasdaq 90 minutes before the general meeting was scheduled to start. The bidders would have one hour to make a final offer: ”The board’s assessment of the offer from National Silicon Industry Group Due to the agreement with GlobalWafers announced by Topsil on 20 May 2016, the extraordinary general meeting 17 June 2016 will be held.

Following the above the board of directors has invited GlobalWafers and NSIG to provide a final offer, and if received, to be presented at the general meeting.

If the shareholders of Topsil do not approve the sale to GlobalWafers at the extraordinary general meeting on 17 June 2016, the board of directors of Topsil expects to accept an offer from NSIG on the sale of the silicon business, and will convene the shareholders to an extraordinary general meeting in July to authorise the board of directors to complete a sale of the silicon business.”

May • Agreement with GlobalWafers • Notice to convene extraordinary general meeting

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

11

16 June – something else and publicity Late in the day of 16 June the whole situation u-turned in spite of the positive process between the parties on the night before. Now the price indication was lower than the day before, the reason being that Topsil could not guarantee the outcome of the general meeting the next day.

Now the process exploded!

16 June at 6:43 pm At 6.43 pm, NSIG submitted an offer for Topsil’s silicon business at the price and on the terms which they had communicated over the phone just a couple of hours earlier.

16 June, at 7:00 pm At around 7:00 pm, NSIG’s advisor released an announcement to that effect via the press and Nasdaq: “Offer for Topsil’s silicon business superior to the contingent offer from GlobalWafers – for immediate announcement” 16 June at 8:55 pm At 8:55 pm, Topsil issued an announcement about the offer: ”National Silicon Industry Group has made an offer for Topsil’s silicon business Attached to this announcement is an offer to Topsil from National Silicon Industry Group (NSIG) for Topsil’s silicon business at a price on a debt-free basis of DKK 335m, which Topsil has just received. Topsil’s Board of Directors has not yet had the opportunity to verify or respond to the contents, nor the statements in NSIG’s offer.”

The announcement that was issued via Nasdaq and thus to the press resulted in Topsil’s shareholders and GlobalWafers learning about the offer. And despite the time difference, Taiwan immediately got into contact with Frederikssund.

April • Information about the process disclosed to the market • Ordinary general meeting • Alternative considerations about capital increase

10

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

The agreement was conditional upon approval from the general meeting of Topsil, and a general meeting for this purpose was immediately convened at short notice. The agreement did not have a non-solicitation clause. And that turned out to be a good thing, considering how things developed over the next few days.

11 June – Geopolitical game?

Then something almost surreal happened: A telephone conversation one Saturday morning with the legal advisor of a new – but previously involved – potential buyer. ”This has nothing to do with Topsil – this is a geopolitical game for world supremacy over the silicon market – Taiwan or Mainland China.”

The potential buyer in question – NSIG – had just taken over one of Topsil’s potential partners in Finland and was now looking for other objects of acquisition, including Topsil. Topsil saw itself and the Finnish company as an interesting partnership, which thus made the serious inquiry from NSIG exciting.

Topsil’s board of directors believed that it would be in the company’s and the shareholders’ best interest to see if this was a potential buyer that could meet the terms of the bidding process.

In the period from 11 June and until the date of the general meeting on 17 June, the company thus worked at full stretch covering all scenarios, and not least the day-to-day operations still required full attention. On top of that, preparations had to be made for the general meeting and the conclusion of the agreement with GlobalWafers, and at the same time NSIG had been informed of the conditions for a bid even being considered: an attractive price and terms and no conditions.

That resulted in intensive data room activity, calls and meetings as well as various drafts of agreements.

15 June – Agreement?

Then, in the evening of 15 June, after several meetings between the parties, initially in the company of advisers and later without them, everyone thought that a bid would come in the next morning.

January 2016 • Bank negotiations

February • NDAs agreed • Annoncement of annual report

March • Due diligence

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

9

April 2015 • Strategy process is launched • Risky patent infringement case is threatening

8

When four became one For quite some time, it looked like there were four genuinely interested buyers, two of whom might be interesting partners in the true sense of the word. But suddenly two of them were gone. The remaining two were very different in terms of their approach to the process. Although they were both slow by Danish standards, one of them was clearly more interested than the other.

Then – all of a sudden – there was only one left when the other announced that he did not have time and certainly not any time for the data room. At the same time, Topsil’s management was under immense pressure from all sides to find an overall solution for the company.

20 May – conditional agreement On 20 May 2016, an agreement was reached with the remaining bidder about a conditional agreement. ”Topsil has signed an agreement on the sale of its silicon business GlobalWafers and Topsil Semiconductor Materials A/S have today signed an agreement pursuant to which GlobalWafers will acquire Topsil’s entire silicon business at a price of DKK 320 million on a debt-free basis before transaction costs Topsil has been working with GlobalWafers for many years. In 2000, Topsil outsourced its Danish wafer production to GlobalWafers, which has since been a wafer processing supplier to Topsil.” ”The Board of Directors believes that if a divestment of the silicon business is not completed, the Company will require a significant capital contribution in order to achieve its strategy and create additional value for the shareholders.”

It was interesting to see the importance of a global network of advisors, language skills in even the most difficult languages and video conferencing equipment in ensuring backing for such an agreement. And also mutual trust. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that GlobalWafers’ CEO had been a majority shareholder and member of the board of directors of Topsil a while back and knew the company and its assets inside out.

December The board of directors launches proces: Either sale of the company’s activities, relevant to a proper buyer or partner, or substantial capital increase.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

So the tasks had been set: • How to best structure the company overall?

• How to handle the partly owned Polish property company with large sites and properties?

• How to clean the house while at the same time setting up a suitable data room?

• If necessary, how to motivate management to put itself up for sale while at the same time working extra hard?

• How to find out whether a strategic or financial partner or perhaps even a buyer existed • What are the chances of even effecting a capital increase in an ailing Danish small cap

These processes are described in the following chapters.

It was apparent to everybody that we were now getting down to work, but it was not possible to send a clear signal about which direction we would take; that was much too soon. Anyhow, the activities that had been initiated kept the financiers quiet. A teaser with a brief description of publicly known information was sent to a number of industrial and financial investors. Responses were soon received which supported the original assessment: The solution for Topsil would be to effect a capital increase or team up with another industrial player in the business. The usual financial investors were not really interested.

It also soon became clear that there were actually industrial partners out there who wanted to consolidate the industry, even with Topsil, but unfortunately for Topsil they were involved in other consolidations, so Topsil was not exactly their top priority. The industry was so small that everyone knew everyone and that made it hard to create surprises in the subsequent process.

So, should Topsil go with a capital increase instead?

The first question to arise was whether the existing shareholders would participate in a capital increase which would obviously have to be quite substantial to take the company to a ”safe haven”. The only way to go about it was to subscribe for the new capital at a very low price which would ”force” the existing shareholders to go along to avoid dilution, or rather complete obliteration, to ensure that the existing major shareholders would participate in the capital increase and to secure the guarantors of the capital increase up front. Contacts to a few selected investors confirmed this as a possible scenario. That it never became relevant was due to a sudden and quick change on the part of the potential industrial partners.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

7

1

The sale of Topsil A dark and rainy November afternoon in my office at the Town Hall Square in Copenhagen. One of the usual, long conference calls was waiting about a new project to sell a listed company. But the call turned out to be completely different from what I was used to when the chairman unexpectedly asked: “Whose interests can I trust you to protect: Topsil’s, the bank’s or your own?!!” A brief moment of amazement at this unexpected, but refreshingly honest question. And with the answer, seven months of intensive work began.

Topsil Semiconductor Materials A/S, known simply as ”Topsil”, is one of the high-tech companies all Danes should be proud of. But also Topsil was having a hard time in the global aftermath of the financial crisis. Poor results combined with a major acquisition in Poland, a new facility in Frederikssund and a volatile competitive silicon market called for something to happen.

N.E. Nielsen, Partner, LETT

At the annual general meeting in the spring of 2015 the small shareholders were pushing for something to happen: Something must be done for the company to move on and for shareholder value to be created. The company’s management had already launched a strategic initiative to ensure the company’s future as a small player on a global market. But, as always, there were other things that needed management’s attention apart from running the company optimally: A dispute concerning a very essential patent for Topsil had started and an adverse outcome could have a decisive influence on Topsil’s future. At the same time, several years of deficits and a similar outlook for 2015 and 2016 put a squeeze on the company’s cash flow, so relations with the company’s financiers also required a great deal of effort in itself.

In the autumn of 2015 the board of directors had reached the conclusion that Topsil should either consolidate or effect a capital increase to boost its cash flow and create the right company going forward.

„

When the annual report 2015 was sent out, it was a clear testament to the situation which Topsil was in: Annual revenue DKK 287m, loss for the year DKK (90)m. Outlook for 2016: EBITDA DKK (40) - (50)m, and the following was stated about the strategy:

6

Therefore, we have decided to restructure our operations, terminate loss-making activities and enter into strategic partnerships to further strengthen the business. These measures gave rise to substantial impairment losses in 2015, and our 2016 results will be adversely affected by non-recurring costs.

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Lessons learned – foreign buyer

Be involved and committed after the transaction when the real work begins

9

Maintain a helicopter perspective, abillity to make decisions and common sense throughout the process

8

Hire reputable local advisors who know the transaction market, its customs and players in Denmark

7

Decide your outer limits for wanting to effect the transaction early

6

Take the time to understand the real priorities and values of the management, the employees and the company

5

Build trust through cooperation, whether big or small

4

Thorough preparations to understand the structural and framework conditions for doing business in Denmark

3

Thorough preparations to investigate the target before a sales process begins – outside-in due diligence process

2

All of the elements that are usually needed technically for a successful transaction

1

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

5

4

Conclusion Lessons learned – seller’s management

The money you’re responsible for is other people’s money – treat them with respect

9

Common sense is still crucial

8

Being a member of the board of directors is a job like everything else – requires time and effort as well

7

When things go wrong, it’s always worse than you think

6

Give high priority to cash flow and freedom of operational focus

5

Keep the company out of crisis

4

Risk and return are inherently related – ensure full transparency

3

Evaluate on an ongoing basis whether the ownership and ownership structure is compatible with a realistic future

2

It’s not enough that what you’re doing is correct. It also needs to appear correct

1

10 Be clear, honest and direct in all communication 11 Responsibility doesn’t sleep, it is 24/7 – in good times and in bad times, too

– there’s no difference 12 The world is changing rapidly – speed is of the essence – make things happen 13 Everything is complicated – be sure to have the right advisors 14 Keep cool and focus on the solution, whatever the reactions from the outside world

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Table og contents Conclusion THE SALE OF TOPSIL 1 The sale of Topsil N.E. Nielsen, LETT 2 Tax-exempt conversion – Pre-sale adjustment and restructuring Michael Hoe Knudsen & Dorte V. Sonnichsen, Deloitte

3 From Hellerup to Taipei – From flowers to hightech Mette Lykke, LETT 4 Chinese investments in Denmark – Should we fear the dragon when it awakes?

Rasmus Grand Bjørnø, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ROLLS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN THE SALES PROCESS 5 In the eye of the storm – The role of the board of directors in a sales process Jens Borelli-Kjær, Topsil 6 Reflections of an employee representative Sune Bro Duun, Topsil/Topsil GlobalWafers 7 The role of the executive board in the sales process Kalle Hvidt Nielsen & Jesper Bodeholt, Topsil 8 Finding the right partner in a global industry and a global world Jon Kaznelson, Christian Stampe Sørensen & Jacob Lønfeldt, SEB

15 Escrow agreements in property transactions and international M&A transactions Klaus Ingildsen, Jyske Bank 16 Project coordinators – The art of multitasking Mette Lykke, LETT TAKE OVER BIDS AND DUTIES UNDER SECURITIES LAW 17 Takeover bids – Friendly or hostile Anders Kaasgaard, LETT 18 The many new roles of the board of directors of listed companies also in a sales scenario – A governance perspective Caspar Rose, CBS

THE GENERAL MEETING 19 Chairing a general meeting Martin Lavesen, LETT 20 Who decides: the board of directors or the shareholders?

Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, LETT 21 Applicant’s liability, control and cancellation of registrations Søren Corfixsen Whitt, The Danish Business Authority

22 No going back – Postal votes Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, LETT

23 The voice of minority shareholders

9 The media – A touchdown or an own goal?

Esben Høstager, HØSTAGER | SOLO

SHAREHOLDERS ACTIVISME AND THE BOARDS’ LIABILITY

THE M&A PROCESS 10 Creating competitive tension among buyers Jon Kaznelson, Christian Stampe Sørensen & Jacob Lønfeldt, SEB 11 Standardised M&A agreements and processes Nicholas Lerche-Gredal, LETT

Christian Reinholdt, SmallCap Danmark

24 When the shitstorm hits the fan: Ooooh, sh** Esben Høstager, HØSTAGER | SOLO 25 Fiduciary duties – The real world N.E. Nielsen, LETT SHARE BUY BACK AND MANDATORY OFFERS

28 The story of the phoenix on the stock exchange – Developments at Nasdaq Carsten Borring, Nasdaq Nordic

14 Data room – What to show the buyer and the seller?

Nicholas Lerche-Gredal, LETT

27 Mandatory offers by passive majority shareholders Anders Kaasgaard, LETT

13 Non-disclosure agreements Anders Kaasgaard, LETT

26 Share buy-back programmes – Types and tax consequences Claus Holberg, LETT

12 Representing a Chinese buyer in Denmark Claus Nørrind Hansen & Jacob Erhardi, EY

We wish to thank the contributors for their inspiring articles to this booklet: Carsten Borring, Nasdaq Nordic Caspar Rose, CBS Christian Reinholdt, SmallCap Danmark Christian Stampe Sørensen, SEB Claus Nørrind Hansen, EY Dorte Vestergaard Sonnichsen, Deloitte Esben Høstager, HØSTAGER | SOLO Jacob Erhardi, EY Jacob Lønfeldt, SEB Jens Borelli-Kjær, Topsil Jesper Bodeholt, Topsil Jon Kaznelson, SEB Kalle Hvidt Nielsen, Topsil Klaus Ingildsen, Jyske Bank Michael Hoe Knudsen, Deloitte Rasmus Grand Bjørnø, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sune Bro Duun, Topsil GlobalWafers Søren Corfixsen Whitt, The Danish Business Authority

The following legal staff members from LETT have contributed to this booklet Anders Kaasgaard Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen Claus Holberg Martin Lavesen Mette Lykke N.E. Nielsen Nicholas Lerche-Gredal

Editor: Anna Christine Krøger-Petersen, LETT Editorial assistant: Gina Ginelli, LETT Layout: Bettina Stefensen, LETT

Would you like an online version of the booklet?

Please visit www.lett.dk

Any information contained herein is intended to provide general inspiration only. The use and impact of legislation, practice and interpretation may vary a great deal depending on specific facts and circumstances. The information passed on does not entail that the contributors or the editor thereby provide legal, accounting, tax-related or any other professional advice or service, nor is the information a substitute for advice from lawyers, accountants, tax advisors or any other advisors.

LETT Law Firm P/S Copenhagen • Aarhus • lett.dk CVR VAT DK 35 20 93 52

ISBN 978-87-994799-3-7

The future belongs to the storytellers The law and the world of law is wondrous. On the one hand, theoretical law – dry, unemotional, even boring to some. On the other hand, the combination of the law and the world we live and interact in – it is inspiring, educative and highly motivating. That is why classic courtroom dramas are so fascinating to watch.

In a rapidly changing world it is imperative to have the ability to make difficult issues easy and understandable in order to enable swift, high-quality and accurate decision-making. At LETT, we wish to contribute to promoting an understanding of the challenges faced by the business sector where they interface with our legal expertise. That is why in this booklet we are presenting a company which is virtually unknown to the public at large: Topsil Semiconductor Materials A/S and the transfer of its silicon business to a Taiwanese buyer. A typical example of the globalisation of important industries.

We hope that the booklet will be inspiring, motivational, educative and at the same time confirm that practical law is exciting.

Happy New Year and happy reading!

LETT is a premier commercial law firm in Denmark, highly specialized and with a strong national and international practice.

Project Disc – Topsil-sagen 2016 •

Project Disc – The Topsil case 2016

Topsil-sagen 2016

Project Disc I processen smeltes polykrystallinsk silicium om til en monokrystallinsk stang. Polykrystallen smeltes ved hjælp af induktionsvarme, og smelten løber gennem hullet på induktionsspolen ned på en monokrystallinsk podekrystal. Derved dannes en flydende zone mellem polykrystal og monokrystal, der kun holdes sammen af overfladespændinger, og som har givet metoden navnet float zone.

Andet trin: Det er på dette trin, Topsil opererer. Topsils siliciumskiver skæres ud af en monokrystallinsk stang.

Denne fremstilles efter float zone (FZ) metoden, hvilket giver markedets reneste form for silicium. FZ-processen er meget kompliceret, og kun få virksomheder mestrer den.

Første trin: Kvartssand smeltes i en reduktionsovn med kul. Herefter opløses den 98% rene silicium i saltsyre, og der dannes flydende siliciumtetraklorid, som raffineres ved destillation, indtil det er ultrarent. Efter raffineringen bringes silicium på fast form, hvor silicium udskilles fra siliciumgassen ved deponering, så der dannes en ultraren polykrystallinsk siliciumstang.

Siliciumproduktion er en lang og kompliceret proces: Topsil leverer siliciumskiver, som anvendes i fremstillingen af højeffektelektriske komponenter, der bruges i blandt andet vindmøller, solceller, elbiler, højhastighedstog og andre infrastrukturprojekter.

Fra sand til silicium

From sand to silicon Topsil produces silicon wafers which are used in the production of high-power electronic components for wind turbines, solar cells, electric cars, high-speed trains and other infrastructure projects.

Silicon production is a long and complex process: Step 1: Quartz sand is melted in a coal-fired reduction oven. After that, the 98% pure silicon is dissolved in hydrochloric acid to form liquid silicon tetrachloride, which is refined through distillation until it is ultrapure.

After the refining process, the silicon is solidified and separated from the silicon gas through deposition to form an ultrapure polycrystalline silicon rod.

Step 2: This is the step where Topsil operates. Topsil's silicon wafers are cut from a monocrystalline rod. This rod is made according to the float zone (FZ) method, which produces the purest form of silicon on the market.

The FZ process is very complex and only mastered by a few companies.

In this process, polycrystalline silicon is melted to form a monocrystalline silicon rod. The polycrystalline is melted by induction heating, and the melt flows through the induction coil hole down onto a monocrystalline seed crystal. This creates a float zone between polycrystalline and monocrystalline, which is only held together by surface tension and which has given the method its name.

Project Disc

The Topsil case 2016