fortunateconnections_ebook

FORTUNATE CONNECTIONS

To the memory of my sister-in-law Patricia, who always said she’d never vote for me, but who, due to cancer, was denied the chance to effectively carry out this plan.

EELCO KEIJ

FORTUNATE CONNECTIONS The Case for New Political Representation of Dutch Nationals Abroad

2014 Uitgeverij Personalia Leens

First Edition: February 2014 Copyright © 2014 Uitgeverij Personalia Valge 3, 9965 PD Leens (Gr.) The Netherlands www.uitgeverijpersonalia.nl www.kapitaleconnecties.nl Text Eelco Keij Cover Design and Typography Martijn Deurloo with Lior van Olphen Editor Rimke de Groot Translation Eleonore Speckens and Hanny Veenendaal, EuroNet Language Services, Inc., New York, USA Printed by Ten Brink, Meppel Paperback Dutch/English: ISBN 978-90-79287-30-7 e-Book – Dutch Version: ISBN 978-90-79287-31-4 e-Book – English Version: ISBN 978-90-79287-32-1 NUR 754 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in any automated database, or published, in any form or in any manner, either electronically, mechanically, via photocopies, recordings or any other way, without prior written permission from the publisher.

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Table of Contents

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Introduction

14 Chapter 1: Political Room for Dutch Nationals Abroad 16 19 21 24 27 31

France Italy Croatia Portugal Switzerland Preliminary Conclusions (I)

32 Chapter 2: Economic (added) value of Dutch 足Nationals Abroad for The Netherlands Itself 33 Indicators 1 and 2: Population Numbers and Registration for Elections 37 Indicator 3: Emigration 38 Indicators 4 and 5: Trade and Tourism 43 Preliminary Conclusions (II)

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Conclusions and Recommendations

49 Acknowledgments 51 Annex I: Economic (added)value value as a concept, and Chapter 2 resources research accountability 55 Annex II: Country Selection, and key trade 足information per country 63

About the Author

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Introduction

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Dutch nationals abroad should have more political room in the Dutch democracy.

This, of course, is a statement that does not come out of the blue, but which in stead is the result of a process that unfolded organically, and which began two years ago.

In 2010, a national discussion originated on the topic of dual ­nationality, after the then Cabinet had tried to restrict this as much as possible for Dutch nationals all over the world, by way of a bill proposal. A public online petition, combined with political ­lobbyists behind the scenes, resulted in the repeal of the heavily criticized bill proposal. 1 Even more importantly, Dutch nationals abroad as well as former Dutch nationals who had lost their Dutch citizenship ­involuntarily, were for the first time able to organize via the internet, and thus became the topic of discussion in The Hague politics.

A s­ imilar event took place earlier this year when full withdrawal of subsidies for Dutch education abroad loomed. Although major cuts turned out to be inevitable, here too a similar strategy had a ­dampening effect on the Cabinet’s original plans. 2 Through the ages, emigration has been a fact of life, and especially of Dutch life. Waves of emigrating Dutchmen date back to the nineteenth century and the nineteen-fifties. Also, more recently, (since 2002, despite a small dip in 2008 and 2009) there is again an i­ ncreasing emigration trend, consisting of 100,000 to 103,000 emi­grants annually; 1 http://nederlandersoverzee.petities.nl/ for the petition, and www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2012/11/27/ kamerbrief-met-een-overzicht-van-wetsvoorstellen-die-zullen-worden-ingetrokken/kamerbrief-met-een-overzicht-van-wetsvoorstellen-die-zullen-worden-ingetrokken.pdf for the letter in which the government announces the withdrawal of the bill proposal. Organizing the petition was handled by the ‘Staying Dutch’ movement (www.NederlanderBlijven.com).

2 http://nederlandsonderwijsinbuitenland.petities.nl/

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it should be noted that, unlike previous waves of emigrants, this one is not driven by any deliberate govern­mental policy. 3 Until recently, unlike other West-European countries, The Netherlands was tem­ po­rarily a net emigration country – it has been only as recently as 2007, that more immigrants are entering the ­country than emigrants ­leaving it. 4 Nevertheless, the current e­ migration numbers have al­ready surpassed the 2006 emigration peak.

It is important to note that ‘emigrants’ from The Netherlands cannot automatically be assumed to be Dutch nationals, just as ­‘immigrants’ coming into The Netherlands should not automatically be ­considered not having Dutch citizenship. The distinction used

by CBS of ­ ‘foreigners’ (Dutch: ‘allochtonen’) and ‘native people’ (Dutch: ‘autochtonen’) is often confusing: foreigners can certainly have the Dutch nationality only. 5 The estimates (outdated by now) of the number of Dutch nationals abroad range from 700,000 to more than one million. 6 An estimated 500,000 of these are eligible to vote.7 3 “Leaving the Netherlands, Emigration at the beginning of the 21st century,” Harry van Dalen and Kène Henkens, 2008. See also http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bevolking/ publicaties/artikelen/archief/2012/2012-3547-wm.htm and http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/ publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=37296NED&D1=63-64&D2=a&HDR=T&STB=G1&VW=T for CBS statistics on recent immigration and emigration.

4 For an effective discussion about defining “emigrants”, see http://www.flipvandyke.nl/2013/02/loopt-nederland-leeg-record-emigratie/.

It is obvious that one does not need to be born and raised in The Nederlands to have and maintain ties with The Nederlands after having left the country.

5 See http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/dossiers/allochtonen/methoden/begrippen/ default.htm?ConceptID=37. Often a distinction between ‘western’ and ‘non-western’ ­foreigners (“allochtonen”) is used. In 2009 there were 112,000 emigrants, 54,000 of whom holding the Dutch nationality. According to the definition used by the CBS, a quarter of these 112,000 people were ‘native Dutch’. In 2009 there were approximately 146,000 immigrants, a majority of whom (64 percent) was western and 19 percent Dutch.

See also http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=37946NED&D1= 0-1,3&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=1-2&D6=28-40&HDR=G1,G2,G3,T,G4&STB=G5&VW=T and http://www.flipvandyke.nl/2011/11/hoe-zit-t-nu-echt-met-de-immigratie/.

6 See http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/ archief/2005/2005-1659-wm.htm as well as the ACVZ rapport “Multiple nationalities from a European perspective,” 2008 (http://www.acvz.org/publicaties/VS-ACVZ-NR19-2008.pdf).

These CBS figures (based on OECD data) were compiled in 2001: therefore they do not include the figures of the recent emigration peak. Since there is no mandatory registration for Dutch emigrants, the government has no way of knowing how many Dutch nationals are living abroad; there are only estimates available, (e.g. on the basis of the number of passports issued to Dutch nationals abroad). An important note is that “many emigration movements are not on the policy and science radar. Many temporary emigrants or persons who live in two countries, and in that way try to unite the best of two worlds, are not being measured or, if measured, they are not attributed to these phenomena. This may involve large numbers. The ratio between permanent migration versus workers who spend part of the year working abroad

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This manifesto is based on two developments that I think should get actively connected.

New Emigration The first development has to do with ‘evolving’ Dutch nationals abroad: the new emigrant. What type of Dutch national leaves, why do they leave, where do they go, and do they ever return? According to Van Dalen and Henkens, it is mostly “single people, men, people in their twenties, independent entrepreneurs, and people in the higher income brackets (…) who are more likely to take the step to emigrate. (…) Most emigrants (70 percent) leave for another country in Europe. (…) Especially the quality of the public space (nature, quiet, space, and the pressure of high population density) and the existence of specific social problems (pollution, crime, multi-cultural society) constitute a powerful stimulus for emigration.” 8 Despite these ‘push factors,’ it is important to note that to many “emigration is not forever,” as Van Dalen and Henkens state: “within two years, one out of five native Dutch nationals returns to The Netherlands; within seven years, 45 percent has returned”. This is a sign of a new development: where in the nineteen-fifties Dutch ­nationals would wave a last goodbye from aboard the steamer to their beloved on the quay, now Dutch nationals more often travel back and forth to The Netherlands, are able to stay in touch with The Netherlands much more easily during their travels via modern ­communication devices, and emigration is often short-term. That is why the word “emigration” has, in addition to its original meaning, gotten a new, wider meaning. The ties modern-day Dutch emigrants maintain with The Netherlands are not only strong, but are continuously updated through regular contact with The Netherlands.

In stark contrast to the actualized ties of the emigrant with The Netherlands is the Dutch democratic system – this system has not

is roughly one-to-one.” (Van Dalen and Henkens). In short, the figures presented, most probably only reveal part of the real picture. See also footnoot 44 (Non-Resident Registration).

7 http://www.vn.nl/Archief/Buitenland/Artikel-Buitenland/Op-zoek-naar-een-rood-potlood. htm?forum=1063&message=34799&post=true 8 It should be noted that the already existing local presence of Dutch emigrants is therefore not a special “pull factor”.

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in the least adjusted itself to the Dutch nationals abroad. In thinking about democratic representation, the question needs to be addressed to what degree Dutch nationals are in fact allowed to participate in the Dutch democratic system.

Ties between Dutch emigrants among themselves have always existed, just as there have always been relations with the Dutch ­government at the country of residence. 9 In the last 10-15 years, these kinds of ties have become increasingly easier, both in regards the quantity and the speed with which these took shape. The major difference between the conditions then and now can justifiably be attributed to one development: the rise of the internet. The internet has made it easier for Dutch nationals abroad to join forces, not only locally, but across countries. The internet has made it easier for them to address the politics in The Hague: as a new, budding electorate.

The internet has also made it possible for grievances from Dutch ­nationals abroad in prior decades to finally be collected and documented. A recent study entitled “Modernizing diplomacy” states that “a ‘network-world’ [has] emerged with an explosive increase, and strong interconnectedness of state and non-state actors, of topics and channels through which cooperation can be achieved.(…) in addition to the physical world (…) now there also is a virtual network-world.” 10 The many older Dutch nationals abroad apparently used the abovementioned online petition on the dual nationality bill to also address prior grievances. Issues that are often mentioned, then and now, involve (dual) nationality, education, pensions, insurance, DigiD number, fiscal matters, inheritance issues, and more generally, existing administrative obstacles. The internet’s emergence suddenly makes it possible to address these old and new issues, at high speed, and in great numbers.

9 As an example of contacts among Dutch people abroad themselves, the Dutch local ­associations might be mentioned. These in turn are often well-connected, and are in direct touch with the local Dutch diplomatic representation.

10 “Modernizing Diplomacy,” Group of Wise Men Interim Report, led by Mr. Docters van Leeuwen, May 29, 2013.

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In 2012, I was a candidate for member of the Dutch House of Representatives, and I ran an international campaign advocating the interests of Dutch nationals abroad. Both during this campaign and at talks I regularly give at Dutch associations in various countries, I found that many Dutch nationals abroad do not feel represented by The Netherlands and by Dutch politicians. This could be contributed to a lack of interest, to say the least, and even more dominant is the feeling that in the Netherlands, Dutch nationals abroad are perceived negatively, in other words, people may be glad to be rid of them. The ties with the home country apparently are not mutual, is the way they express this.

Global economic interconnectedness and dependency The second development to be addressed in this manifesto, concerns the traditionally world-oriented Netherlands in an increasingly globalizing world. The open, international mentality of The Netherlands is generally commended and praised, but behind it hides a necessity: economically speaking, The Netherlands needs the world. “For an open and medium-sized economy like the Netherlands, economic and commercial diplomacy are not a choice but a necessity,” as Renée Jones-Bos and Stephan Raes wrote. 11 Diplomacy, of course, is not ­sufficient: all this is interwoven with international trade. The Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) indicated that exports contribute close to 30% of the Dutch economy – with a total value of exported goods and services equaling close to 70% of the GNP. 12 In short, The Netherlands has a very large outside world, as well as its own inherent economic interest to “care for” this outside world as deeply as possible.

Building Bridges What role do Dutch nationals abroad play in the open Dutch ­economy, or what role could they play? To what extent is it relevant for The Netherlands itself to maintain the ability of fellow citizens to branch out abroad – not only on an economic level, but also linguistically and 11 “Value for money: a network approach to Dutch economic and commercial diplomacy in the USA”, Renée Jones-Bos and Stephan Raes, International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy, 2012.

12 See http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/internationale-handel/publicaties/artikelen/ archief/2012/2012-3561-wm.htm

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culturally – and to stimulate this, if necessary? How do other countries interact with their own citizens abroad, how do they value them?

Since the internet has facilitated a sudden diversity of international connections, these questions would seem to be a justifiable, natural next step.

The manifesto before you, which has been written entirely in an ­individual capacity, and indistinctly contains a message to all political parties, can be broken down in two parts. The first chapter describes, compares, and analyses a number of (European) countries that have, at an earlier stage, granted influence or power to their citizens abroad. The second chapter attempts to give some indication as to whether, and to what extent, Dutch nationals abroad offer economic added value to The Netherlands itself. Based on observations in both ­chapters, this manifesto ends with conclusions and recommendations that especially address the political representation of Dutch nationals abroad.

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Chapter 1

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Political room for Dutch citizens abroad

Both inside and outside of Europe, there are countries that decided recently or a long time ago, to give their citizens abroad political ­influence or power. Columbia (1991) and the Dominican Republic (2010) have created, respectively, one and seven separate parliamentary seats that can be occupied by a citizen abroad who is mandated to represent the interest of fellow citizens living abroad. 13 Tunisia proceeded in 2011 to the direct representation of its citizens abroad: eighteen of the 217 (directly elected) parliamentary seats were assigned to Tunisians abroad. 14 Closer to The Netherlands, comparable structures were also set up: France, Italy, Croatia, Portugal, and Switzerland have systems that in a very concrete way provide a ­political structure for their citizens far and wide. 15 How do these systems operate exactly? When and why were they set up? Who are the actors involved? Are there any restrictions on this political space reserved for citizens abroad? Why would more political room for Dutch citizens abroad be beneficial to The Netherlands itself?

With these questions in mind, we will take a closer look, in alphabetical order, at the main characteristics of the five aforementioned European countries (for readability purposes, the often long prior ­history is summarized for each country). All sources used are listed 13 For Colombia, see among others http://www.registraduria.gov.co/rev_electro/rev_elec_jul/articulos/circuns_intern.htm, http://www.conexioncolombia.com/quien-sera-el-proximo-representante-de-los-colombianosen-el-exterior and http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/colombia/expatriates.htm. For the Dominican Republic, see among others https://nacla.org/article/dominicans-three-continents-go-polls 14 http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2392.htm.

15 Macedonia has a similar system, but it will not be considered since it is not an EU country.

Switzerland is an exception because of its long and strong democratic traditions. By the way, Macedonia recognizes that Macedonians abroad are of increasing economic significance to Macedonia itself: see also http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/ setimes/features/2012/12/28/feature-03.

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in one country-specific footnote. The chapter ends with a few preliminary conclusions.

FRANCE 16 An estimated 2.5 million French citizens are living abroad (the French overseas territories are considered France 17), which corresponds to almost 4 percent of the 65 million French citizens residing in France – a percentage that is just a little below the Dutch percentage. Because of France’s overseas colonies, the issue of French citizenship abroad was already discussed at the end of the eighteenth century.

Conseil supérieur des Français de l’étranger (CSFE) In 1946, the constitution determined that the Senate at the time (Conseil de la République) would apportion three seats to representatives of French citizens in Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific respectively. Since there already were four other organizations which (in certain subareas) represented French citizens abroad, it was decided in 1948, following an internal power struggle, to ­establish a completely new council, the Conseil supérieur des Français de l’étranger (CSFE), with an expanded number of seats (55), partially consisting of elected delegates, and partially appointed by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Two ideas formed the basis for the CSFE’s founding: getting better acquainted with the emigrated French citizens (by making it mandatory for them to register with a consulate), and making casting their vote conditional upon their joining a French organization (French: ‘organisme’) abroad. This way, insights were gained on the one hand where and how many French citizens resided 16 Sources for France: Christophe Bertossi & Abdellali Hajjat, Country Report France, EUDO Citizenship Observatory (January 2013), www.diplomatie.gouv.fr, www.senat.fr, www.assemblee-nationale.fr, www.assemblee-afe.fr, http://inside.org.au/the-diaspora-fights-back/, http://iphone.france24.com/en/20120604-socialists-leading-french-expat-vote-tally, http://elections.lefigaro.fr/presidentielle-2012/2012/04/09/01039-20120409ARTFIG00370les-candidats-courtisent-les-francais-de-l-etranger.php, www.lepetitjournal.com/expat-politique, http://www.social-informatics.net/exaro%20article.pdf and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html.

17 Legally, the overseas territories are part of France; these territories have their own representatives in the Assemblée Nationale and the Senate.

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abroad; on the other hand, French interests abroad were promoted.

In 1950, the first CSFE elections were held in 70 countries.

In the following decades, there were several reforms of the CSFE. What was important in this continued development of the CSFE, was the constitutional amendment of 1958 (art. 24), including the provision that “French citizens residing outside of France will be represented in the Senate” (there was no mention of the French Parliament, the Assemblée Nationale, as of yet). In 1982, general voting rights for CSFE delegates were introduced as well as the CSFE’s right to elect 12 members of the Senate. This strengthened the CSFE’s until then purely consultative status by giving it a political mandate favoring French citizens abroad. To this day, the French Senate has twelve members who specifically represent French citizens abroad.

Assemblée des Français de l’étranger (AFE) Faced with an ever decreasing voter turn-out abroad, France decided in 2004 to reform the CSFE and change its name. This new council was called Assemblée des Français de l’étranger (AFE). The word “Assemblée” (literally: General Assembly), which was already used to indicate the French Parliament (Assemblée Nationale), was used purposefully to recognize the public (legal) status of the French ­ citizens abroad. Additional reforms consisted of an increase in the number of voting districts, a change in the geographical location of the voting districts, and a decrease in the number of appointed ­delegates, whom, moreover, were given consultative authorization only in a number of areas.

Chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the AFE consists of 190 members, and is responsible for counselling the government on issues and matters that concern French citizens outside of France and the development of the French presence abroad. The plenary AFE meets twice a year in France. Worldwide, 155 members (advisors, conseillers) are elected directly for a six-year period, from 52 districts by general voting rights; in addition, 23 parliamentarians have a seat on the AFE as well 12 people appointed by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (experts in matters affecting French citizens abroad). The 190 members are in frequent contact, and information is exchanged

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to a great extent. In practice, the AFE advisory competencies resemble policy competencies, while the AFE acts as a de facto specialized social-­economic counsel that may initiate proposals and submit questions (for example, about education, the legal status of French c­ itizens abroad, tax matters, social issues, international trade, and other ­matters relevant to French citizens abroad). The 23 aforementioned parliamentarians comprise twelve senators (elected by the 155 members) and eleven delegates, elected directly by French citizens abroad.

Separate Parliamentary Seats for French Citizens Abroad Until 2012, these twelve senators were the only representatives of French citizens abroad; these senators did not have to have a current or past residence abroad. Then in 2012, eleven separate parliamentary seats were instituted for French citizens abroad: these delegates (comparable to Dutch Second Chamber representatives) are on the one hand part of the Assemblée Nationale, and on the other hand of the AFE. They are allowed to continue their stay in the country of residence, and they receive the same salary as their other colleagues.

A few recurrent subjects of concern among French citizens abroad are French education for French children abroad, tax legislation, and retirement benefits. 18 The 2012 elections were made possible based on amended legislation in 2009, when the world (outside of France) was divided in eleven districts (six in Europe, two in the Americas, two in Africa, and one in Asia/Pacific). Whereas the CSFE started out as an advisory body, the AFE currently shows de facto hybrid characteristics of both influence and power. Despite the fact that the eleven delegates were elected on the basis of districts outside of France, they represent all French citizens worldwide. The total number of delegates in the Assemblée Nationale is 577, including these eleven new representatives.

Two aspects made the 2012 presidential elections extra ­special: first, it became obvious that the always presumed right-wing voters abroad had turned to the left – which was an important vote for François Hollande’s final victory. The influence and economic force of the ‘foreign vote’ was palpable. As the party chairman of the 18 Interview with Frédéric Lefebvre, who became a member of the Assemblée Nationale in 2013 on behalf of the first district outside of France (Canada and the United States).

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Mouvement Démocrate, François Bayrou, said during his campaign, the French in and outside of Europe were “an opportunity for France”.

Secondly, French citizens abroad were able to vote for the first time via the internet, which foiled the recurrent complaints about voting by regular mail. 19

ITALY 20 According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, there are approximately 4.5 million Italian citizens abroad, versus more than 60 m ­ illion Italians in Italy. The ratio of Italian citizens residing abroad (versus the number of Italians in Italy) is therefore approximately 7.5 percent.

The discussion about the rights of Italian citizens abroad (including voting rights, citizenship) dates back more than a century. Voting rights for Italian citizens was finally introduced in 1948, although it was made conditional on travelling to Italy for actual voting 21 – a situation that changed only as recently as 2001. Starting that year, Italian citizens were allowed to vote by mail from abroad without having to travel to their homeland (for European parliament elections, this was already the case, even though it only applied to Italians residing in another member state of the European Union 22). In addition, special Parliamentary Seats were assigned for national elections for the Circoscrizione Estero (‘foreign voting district’): six senators and twelve members of parliament. 23 19 The French government had contracted the company Scytl (headquarters in Barcelona) for internet voting. Not surprisingly, these first elections did not go without a hitch: complaints about this procedure centered on a lack of transparency, vulnerability to fraud, and not being able to vote due to computer problems.

20 Sources for Italy: Guido Tintori, Access to Electoral Rights, Italy, EUDO Citizenship Observatory (June 2013), www.esteri.it, www.interno.gov.it, http://www.worldandijournal.com/subscribers/feature_detail.asp?num=25014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/13/italy, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-21531129 and http://www.reuters. com/article/2008/04/11/us-italy-election-fraud-idUSL1192223320080411.

21 Only within Italy, train transportation was reimbursed to foreign voters; of course this was hardly an incentive to go and vote.

22 At that time, the European Union was still called the European Economic Community. Starting in 1979, Italian citizens residing in (another) European Community country were able to vote in person locally at a consulate or other polling place for European parliamentary elections.

23 The discussion on additional parliamentary seats for Italian citizens abroad has already been a topic of debate since the eighties in Italy.

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The reasons to assign these seats were in principle threefold: democratization (greater involvement of Italian citizens abroad in the national democratic system), recognition of the financial contributions Italian citizens abroad had been sending to their homeland for years (‘remittances’), and finally, shortsighted power politics (the Berlusconi government hoped to gain more seats this way, but ironically it lost seats to the opposition). Geographically, these seats are divided among four districts (‘Ripartizioni’):

• Europe (including Russia and Turkey) – five parliamentary seats and two senate seats; • South America – four parliamentary seats and two senate seats; • North and Central America – two parliamentary seats and one senate seat; • Asia/Africa/Pacific and Antarctica – one parliamentary seat and one senate seat. 24

A small portion of the 945-member Italian parliament, which, like in the Netherlands consist of two Chambers (630 ‘members of the House of Representatives’ and 315 senators), was thus directly affected by voters abroad. The eighteen elected ‘foreign’ members of parliament were allowed to continue to reside abroad after the elections, although, from a practical point of view, many of course chose to be in Rome regularly. Their constituency is not bound to districts, and comprises all of Italy and any Italian citizen anywhere in the world, exactly like their colleagues in parliament. Practically, these ‘foreign’ members of parliament of course become involved with the concerns and interests of the Italian citizens abroad, especially for the district where they were elected (for example, taxes, citizenship, healthcare, education, and pensions).

New forms of democracy do not come about without friction. In the case of Italy, there have been several complaints of fraud involving foreign votes, including alleged mafia involvement in a specific voting 24 It is also interesting to mention that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a separate Directorate General for Italian citizens abroad.

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area abroad. In addition, the costs of the system are presumably high and sometimes encounter physical limitations: an Italian member of parliament residing in Australia might find it difficult in practice to fully participate in national politics, simply because of the remote geographical distance. Nevertheless, researcher Jean-Michel Lafleur has determined that many Italian politicians recognize the ­economic added value of these additional ‘foreign’ seats. During recent interviews with Lafleur, practically all members of parliament and senators emphasized that Italian citizens abroad were a resource for ­globalization of the Italian economy. 25 Member of Parliament Franco Narducci expressed this clearly to Lafleur: “Italians abroad are a strategic resource that can contribute to the development of Italy. To have such a network, it is a big asset.... finding products and people all over the world is an advantage.

This can help [economic] development and help international relations” (interview 19 February 2007).

CROATIA 26 On July 1, 2013, Croatia became a member of the European Union.

Croatia’s recent history might be called tumultuous in a number of areas, which had a major influence on the debate surrounding the r­epresentation of Croatians abroad. In 1991, the country left Yugoslavia, and declared its independence. This was promptly ­followed by a civil war, which ended in 1995 to the advantage of an independent Croatia.

Because of the various ethnic wars in the region, Croatians spread out across the Balkans, other areas of Europe, and beyond. A special position was, and is, reserved for Croatians in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 Jean-Michel Lafleur, Transnational Politics and the State: The External Voting Rights of Diasporas, Routledge (Taylor & Francis), 2013. Interview with the author, August 2013.

26 Sources for Croatia: Mirjana Kasapovi´c, Voting Rights, Electoral Systems, and Political Representation of Diaspora in Croatia, Sage Publications, 2012; Francesco Ragazzi, Igor Štiks & Viktor Koska, Report on Croatia, EUDO Citizenship Observatory (February 2013); email interview with Martina Tenko, Political Officer, Embassy of the Republic of Croatia ´ c, spokesperson, State Office for Croats Abroad; to the USA; email interview with Žana Cori´ www.gong.hr, www.hrvatiizvanrh.hr and http://legislationline.org/topics/country/37/topic/10/subtopic/32.

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Many of them had never lived in Croatia, and thus were not original inhabitants nor classic ‘emigrants’. They were, however, quickly considered as such: “All the Croatians, no matter where they live and what status they enjoy, belong to one indivisible Croatian nation”, as is stated in a recent policy document by the Croatian government.

Culture and Identity As a new country (nation), Croatia needed to consolidate and expand its identity wherever possible. Soon after the foundation of Croatia, upholding Croatian culture and identity became a major goal for the government: Croatian emigrants play a pivotal role in this. In 1990, the new constitution already included the following: “The Republic of Croatia shall protect the rights and interests of its citizens living or residing abroad, and shall promote their links with the homeland. Parts of the Croatian nation in other states shall be guaranteed special concern and protection by the Republic of Croatia.” (Article 10) Politically, this roughly translated to two priorities: establishing separate parliamentary seats for Croatian citizens abroad on the one hand, and establishing several government agencies focused on the interests of Croatian citizens abroad on the other hand.

Separate Parliamentary Seats for Croatian Citizens Abroad From 1992-2011, there have been various experiments to find the best possible structure for a non-disproportional, balanced representation of Croatian citizens abroad in the national parliamentary system. The start was obviously opportunistic: knowing that the large majority of Croatian citizens abroad were living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 27 and generally supported the conservative political party HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), voting rights – under strong HDZ influence – were given to Croatian citizens abroad as early as 1992; three years later, twelve separate parliamentary seats for Croatian citizens 27 In her clear political historical description, author Mirjana Kasapovi´c states ­without ­embellishments that “if it were not for the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ­participation of the Croatian diaspora in parliamentary and presidential elections in the country would be symbolic” (source: see footnote 24).

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abroad were created through one separate ‘worldwide’ electoral ­district (the eleventh district). In subsequent years, pressured by the SDP (Social-Democratic Party), which argued that the number of seats was disproportionally high (and always went to the HDZ), after several similar experiments, a compromise was struck in 2011: from now on, the Croatian citizens abroad would get three seats in parliament (the Croatian parliament consists of only one chamber).

In addition, a special Commission for Croatian Citizens Abroad was created in parliament. Thus far, the HDZ has won all ‘foreign’ seats in all elections. 28

Government Council for Croatian Citizens Abroad “Almost four million Croats live outside the Republic of Croatia. It is a huge and invaluable potential in human and economic terms”, states Daria Krstiˇcevi´c, head of the State Office for Croats Abroad. This number also includes those Croats who are of Croatian origin and do not have a Croatian passport. A total of more than 4 million Croatians live in Croatia itself. The majority of Croats residing outside of Croatia lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Reasoning that citizens abroad play a supplementary economic role for Croatia, the Croatian government has, in addition to creating separate parliamentary seats, undertaken further steps. The times demand, the government argues, that: “new conditions such as (…) the global market economy place new challenges before the Republic of Croatia as well as new demands that include the reinforcement of cooperation with the Croatians outside the Republic of Croatia.”

‘Strategy’ for Croatian Citizens Abroad Legitimized by Article 10 of the constitution and by the Strategy for the Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Croatians ­outside the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter: the Strategy) drafted in 2013, a State Office was recently established. This is a new government agency created to serve as a (coordination) umbrella agency for all organizations that are in one way or another involved with Croatian citizens abroad.

28 The current ‘foreign’ members of parliament are Ilija Filipovi´c, Perica Jele cˇ evi´c, and Marija Rapo.

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In other ways as well, the Strategy serves as a guideline for additional changes regarding the appreciation of, and dealings with, Croatian citizens abroad. For instance, the Strategy provides for the foundation of a special Council, an advisory body to support the Croatian ­government in creating and implementing policies, activities, and programs focused on Croatian citizens abroad (for example in the area of citizenship, culture, education, remigration, and entrepreneurship). The Council consists of 55 members appointed for a four-year term (nine members from Bosnia-Herzegovina, seventeen members from Croatian minorities, and twenty-nine members from Croatian citizens abroad). Membership is honorary and unsalaried.

Finally, the Strategy attempts to harmonize the above changes and the existing diplomatic service to a greater extent by partially reforming the latter, and organizing it for relations with Croatian citizens abroad. Apart from the Strategy, but nevertheless worth mentioning, is the announcement by the Croatian government to create a special day every year, the so-called ‘Day of Croatian Citizens Abroad’.

PORTUGAL 29 Portugal is a parliamentary republic with separate legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The Assembleia da República, the Portuguese parliament, consists of 230 members (the constitution only mentions a margin of 180 to 230 seats), and is elected every four years.

Portugal has approximately 10.5 million inhabitants. In ­addition, an estimated 5 million Portuguese reside abroad – or approximately 30 percent of the total population (15.5 million). Since 1986, Portugal has been a member of the European Union (at that time, it was still called the European Economic Community).

29 Sources for Portugal: Nuno Piçarra & Ana Rita Gil, Country Report: Portugal, EUDO Citizenship Observatory (November 2012); Marina Costa Lobo, Portugal: extended voting rights and decreasing participation, International IDEA/IFE, 2007; Peter J. Spiro, Dual citizenship as human right, Oxford University Press and New York University School, 2010; Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Die portugiesische Bevölkerung in der Schweiz, August 2010; Lidia Núñez, Electoral System Change in Europe since 1945: Portugal, 2011; www.ine.pt, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/portugal/38231, http://www.embassyportugal.se/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=105&Ite mid=127&lang=en, www.portugal.gov.pt, www.en.parlamento.pt and http://portuguese-diaspora-studies.com/index.php/ijpds/index.

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The current stable democracy is recent. Almost half of the t­ wentieth century, Portugal was under the dictatorial rule of Salazar and Caetano (1926-1974). This authoritarian Salazar-Caetano regime came to an end with the Carnation Revolution in 1974, leading the way to the start of democracy with the new 1976 constitution.

In the preceding years, especially the last 15 years of the dictatorship, large groups of Portuguese had emigrated due to dissatisfaction with or fear of the regime. Estimates of the number of emigrants for those years run as high as 2.5 million (at the then total population of barely 9 million); most emigrants went to France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Brazil, and Venezuela, among others. With the gradual solidification of democracy in Portugal, the (voting) rights for Portuguese citizens abroad were also established and expanded.

Voting Districts for Portuguese Citizens Outside of Portugal The Assembleia is elected with a system of proportional representation in conjunction with districts. There are 22 voting districts: ­eighteen on the mainland, one on the Island of Madeira and one on the Azores, one for the Portuguese citizens living in European ­countries, and for the Portuguese people living elsewhere in the world. The last two ‘foreign’ voting districts were created by the 1976 constitution because of the large number of Portuguese who left the country during the Salazar-Caetano-dictatorship and because of that, lost their voting rights. These districts each have two delegates in parliament (four in total); for the other voting districts, the number of delegates depends on the number of inhabitants. The reason for the two foreign districts being excluded from this system (the system of x number of delegates for y number of inhabitants) was the fear that the high number of Portuguese emigrants would otherwise lead to a relatively large number of parliamentarians – something that was considered unfair since this group did not live in Portugal itself. 30 Despite the fact that parliamentarians are elected from a specific district, all Portuguese parliamentarians – including the four ‘foreign’ parliamentarians – represent all Portuguese, and therefore not 30 With the exception of the two foreign districts, Portugal uses the so-called D’Hondt method for its allocation of parliamentary seats.

See also http://www.eerstekamer.nl/begrip/delegaties_interparlementaire.

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only the constituency of their own district. According to the current Portuguese Consul in Boston, José Caroço, the establishing of these four ‘foreign’ seats must be placed in the context of that era, with the ensuing economic, demographic, democratic, and diplomatic advantages desired. “Nowadays, it is a formidable economic network”, the Consul confirmed in a telephone interview. 31 The four elected parliamen­tarians do not need to live abroad, and usually choose to reside in Portugal. Their special constituency, of course, forces them to travel frequently, and to take up matters involving Portuguese citizens abroad in particular, such as citizenship, health care, ­ ­pensions, education, and taxes.

During the past decades, the Portuguese constitution was amended several times in favor of the influence of Portuguese citizens abroad, in particular where voting rights are concerned. The number of elections foreign citizens are allowed to cast their votes in was gradually extended, for example, European Parliament elections, national referendums, and presidential elections. This is based on Article 14 of the constitution: “Portuguese citizens staying or residing abroad enjoy the state’s protection while exercising their rights and obligations to the extent that these are not incompatible with their absence.”

In order to claim such protection, effective ‘ties’ must exist with the Portuguese community in Portugal, as set forth in Article 121 of the constitution. In 2005, this obligation was developed further with a number of criteria. 32 Emigrants must: a) not have resided for more than fifteen years in an EU country or a Portuguese-speaking country; b) not have resided for more than ten years in another country; c) or, have stayed at least thirty days in Portugal during the past five years, and be able to prove that he/she speaks Portuguese.

31 Telephone interview with Mr. José Caroço, Consul-General of Portugal in Boston, United States (September 20, 2013).

32 Act no. 5/2005 of September 8, 2005.

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Other Agencies for Portuguese Citizens Abroad At government level, two other agencies should be mentioned that were established with the Portuguese abroad in mind, i.e. the Council of Portuguese Communities Abroad, and the Undersecretary for Portuguese Communities Abroad. In 2007, the Council of Portuguese Communities Abroad was established with the objective to provide the Portuguese authorities with requested and unrequested advice on emigration issues and matters affecting Portuguese citizens abroad.

The Council, which meets twice a year, consists of 73 members, 63 of whom are elected directly, and 10 of whom are appointed.

It is striking that the Council (which is, after all, a g ­ overnment institution) does not have its ‘own’ civil servants among the ten appointed members, and that there are even members with a Portuguese background on the Council. Each member has a four-year mandate.

In addition, Portuguese citizens abroad can also exert (in)direct influence at other government levels. The Portuguese government has a special Undersecretary for Portuguese Communities Abroad, who­ answers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and who is the most important government spokesperson addressing Portuguese ­ citizens abroad. 33 In that capacity, he/she makes numerous visits to the Portuguese citizens and Portuguese communities abroad, thereby ­fulfilling a connective, diplomatic role while also promoting business and trade.

SWITZERLAND 34 Switzerland, which is known for its direct democracy and decentralized decision-making, is a federal republic (confederation) with a very high degree of direct democracy (referendums), possibly the most extensive system of its kind in the world. In case of a constitutional amendment, a referendum must be held that is decided by the opinion of Swiss citizens. The country is divided in 26 cantons, which are in turn divided in municipalities. The popular representation consists of the National Council (200 members) and the Cantonal Council (46 members; two 33 The current Undersecretary for Portuguese Communities Abroad is Mr. José Cesário.

34 Sources for Switzerland: www.swissworld.org, www.aso.ch, www.swissinfo.ch, www.schweizerclubsniederlande.com, www.swisscommunity.org, www.admin.ch and www.prodemos.nl.

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members for each of the twenty cantons, and one member for each of the six so-called half-cantons). The Swiss ­government consists of seven members, with an annually rotating federal president.

Approximately 6.5 million Swiss live in Switzerland itself, on a total population of approximately 8 million. The official languages in Switzerland are German, French, Italian, and Romansch. Especially in the period before WW2, Switzerland had more emigrants, who were usually trying to flee from poverty in their own country, than it had immigrants. Due to this earlier emigration wave, 11 ­percent of all Swiss citizens currently lives abroad (715.000), mostly in France, North America, Germany, Italy, and Asia (the so-called Auslandschweizer). These figures are not estimates: Switzerland has mandatory registration upon emigration – in the new home ­country, Swiss citizens must register with the nearest consulate or nearest embassy.

Representation For and By Swiss Citizens Abroad Especially in view of this large group of emigrants, the Neue Helvetische Gesellschaft as early as 1916 (!) founded the ‘Organization for Swiss Abroad’ (German: Auslandschweizer-Organisation (ASO), French: l’Organisation des Suisses de l’étranger (OSE)). The original goal was to support these emigrants, who sometimes had lost all their worldly possessions abroad, upon their return to Switzerland.

In addition, it was deemed important to strengthen the ties of Swiss emigrants with their home country, and enable them to play a more active role in life in Switzerland. Not long after, the first Congress for Swiss Abroad (German: Auslandschweizer-Kongress) took place, a recurrent event still held annually.

In the following decades, the ASO became more powerful and prestigious. The ASO, which thanks its existence to close to more than 750 Swiss clubs, associations, and institutions worldwide, consists of the so-­called Auslandschweizerrat (the Council for Swiss Abroad), a board, and a secretariat. The Council consists of 120 delegates from abroad, and twenty national delegates. To be elected from abroad, candidates have to be members of a foreign Swiss association or organization. 35 35 The ASO is currently having a discussion about dropping this condition of membership in one of the foreign associations or organizations, and to open up membership to every Swiss citizen residing abroad.

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The larger the foreign Swiss association or organization, the more delegates it is allowed to supply. The national ­delegates are representatives from the fields of politics, science and culture, and many among them have themselves had experience abroad.

Both the Council and the board are elected for a four-year term. 36 The Council is called the ‘Parliament of the Fifth Switzerland’ – ­referring to the four official languages being spoken in Switzerland itself – and meets twice a year in Switzerland. ASO membership is unpaid, and hardly any allowances are offered. In 1966, the Swiss constitution introduced a provision ruling that the Confederation must promote ties among Swiss citizens abroad and ties with Switzerland, and that the Confederation is allowed to support organizations that have this objective. 37 Two thirds of ASO’s financing comes from private sources (including fundraising, advertising, organization ­ of youth camps in Switzerland for Swiss citizens abroad), and one third is from governmental subsidies. 38

ASO Mandate The ASO represents the interests of Swiss citizens abroad before the Swiss government, and is both an independent, nongovernmental and a politically and religiously neutral organization. In addition to a ­general representation mandate, the ASO stimulates healthy ties among Swiss people abroad and their ties with Switzerland. In order to fulfill this role appropriately, the ASO informs and advises all Swiss citizens abroad about (Swiss) matters affecting them. Several services are offered, for example in the area of education, citizenship, (electronic) voting rights, pensions, and insurance. In addition to its own information bulletin, which is distributed among foreign Swiss associations and organizations, the ASO publishes the Schweizer Revue [Swiss Revue] in conjunction with the Confederation. This magazine is sent to all Swiss citizens abroad that have registered, and with its circulation of approximately 400,000 copies (in five languages), 36 In 2013, the new Council and the new board were instated; the first meeting took place in August, 2013, in Davos. See also http://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/politik_schweiz/ Auslandschweizer-Gesetz_braucht_noch_Feinschliff.html?cid=36672894.

37 Article 40 of the Constitution (Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft).

38 Interview with Rudolf Wyder, ASO Chairman, reported by intern Sanne Bosmans, student at the University of Tilburg, International Business Administration.

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it is one of Switzerland’s major publications. Via the ASO website, detailed information is provided on matters such as emigration, taxes, social security, and remigration.

In recent decades, the ASO has actively lobbied and booked several victories, including in the area of voting rights, social security, and healthcare.

Ties with Switzerland Just like Portugal, Switzerland has reflected on what ‘ties’ with the home country should entail (Switzerland calls it ‘close alliance’).

Former Swiss citizens who lost their Swiss citizenship when taking on another nationality are allowed to get their Swiss citizenship back when they: • visit Switzerland regularly; • are in close contact with Swiss clubs abroad; • have close contacts with people that live in Switzerland; • are able to communicate in one of Switzerland’s national ­languages or a Swiss dialect.

When one of these conditions is met ‘very strongly’, a close alliance can be established, even if the other criteria are not met. 39

Economic Added Value ‘Fifth Switzerland’ Thanks to today’s globalization, the Swiss government is well aware that the ‘Fifth Switzerland’ also has powerful economic value. At the 91st congress of Auslandschweizer in August 2013, member of the government (Bundesrätin) Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf stated that Swiss citizens abroad are one of the trump cards the government has at its disposal in today’s global competition. 40 The ASO website shows a video in which Swiss citizen Peter S. Kaul, Honorary Consul for Switzerland in Germany, characterizes Swiss citizens abroad as “uncut diamonds”.

39 For more reading material about citizenship, dual nationality, and political rights of citizens abroad, see Dual Citizenship as Human Right, Peter J. Spiro, Oxford University Press, 2010, and Perfecting Political Diaspora, Peter J. Spiro, University of Georgia Law School, 2006.

40 http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/ WidmerSchlumpf-preist-Auslandschweizer-als-Truempfe-/story/22220721.

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Preliminary Conclusions (I)

Not all beginnings are great. The origin of setting up international ­connections for and in cooperation with citizens abroad — which ­eventually was followed by, among other things, separate parliamentary seats for citizens abroad — in the aforementioned countries largely lies in a high degree of nationalist behavior and a retentive culture, sometimes combined with opportunistic short-term politics.

Recent examples of the latter have shown that voters abroad too can certainly change their political colors in a short period of time.

It is interesting to see how the accumulation of rights of citizens abroad gradually, sometimes over decades, took place in connection with the gradual recognition of the cultural, linguistic, and economic value of the population abroad. Especially where the explicit appreciation of the economic (added) value of citizens abroad for the country of origin itself is concerned — for example, the added value of established ­international economic networks — clear and recent examples can be found in each of the countries mentioned above.

Unlike France, Italy, Croatia, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Switzerland, the Netherlands does not have a system for separate political representation of its own citizens abroad. What is the story on the alleged economic (added) value of Dutch citizens abroad for the Netherlands itself? Can it be quantified in its entirety, or maybe ­partially? And if so, based on which sources? How many Dutch citizens are we talking about exactly, and where in the world are they?

These questions will be answered in detail in the next chapter.

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Chapter 2

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Economic (Added) Value of Dutch Citizens Abroad to The Netherlands Itself In this chapter, using five indicators, we will test the proposition that Dutch citizens abroad represent an economic (added) value to The Netherlands itself. The proposition breaks down into two issues, i.e. where do most Dutch citizens live abroad, and with which countries does The Netherlands have the strongest economic ties. For an explanation of the concept ‘economic (added) value’, either directly or indirectly, and a detailed accounting of the source research in this chapter, you are referred to Annex I. The five indicators – i.e. population figures, voter registration, emigration, trade, and tourism – will be discussed below in order, and sometimes, contextually. The final selection of countries that are most important to The Netherlands in view of the number of Dutch citizens, combined with the international trade balance, will be illustrated in summary with figures in Annex II.

FIVE INDICATORS: POPULATION FIGURES, VOTER REGISTRATION, ­E MIGRATION, TRADE, AND TOURISM Indicators 1 and 2: Population Figures and Voter Registration In September 2012, (early) elections for the Second Chamber took place in The Netherlands. The national turn-out was approximately 75 percent, a slight decrease compared to the previous elections in 2010. 41 Only Dutch citizens who had explicitly registered could vote from abroad (registration is mandatory for all elections to be allowed to vote, and it is easy to accidentally forget to register, or it is often too late when one does remember): in the end, it amounted to about 41 https://www.kiesraad.nl/nieuws/ officiele-uitslag-tweede-kamerverkiezing-12-september-2012.

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50,000 Dutch citizens abroad, which is approximately 10 percent of the total number of estimated registered voters. 42 In November 2013, the government informed parliament that “there is a slight increase of the number of voters that participate abroad (4% compared to 2012).” 43 It should be noted that Dutch emigrants need not register with the Dutch government upon emigration (unlike, for example, Swiss emigrants, of whom the Swiss government has exact numbers): after ‘deregistration from The Netherlands’, there is therefore no official registration of Dutch emigrants. This is the reason why estimates are usually applied. 44 Among the number of registered Dutch citizens abroad for the 2012 (50,000) Second Chamber elections, the turn-out was around 36,000, in other words, 72 percent. 45 Based on the number of estimated Dutch citizens abroad entitled to vote, one may therefore assume that only 7% of the Dutch citizens abroad voted in 2012. In its letter, the government outlines a more positive image, and claims a turn-out percentage of 89 (“calculated based on the number of voting papers that were sent out”). 46 The issue of voting from abroad, whether it is impossible or difficult to do so, is a separate discussion, which – although important – will not be addressed in this discussion. 47 42 http://www.intermediair.nl/weekblad/20121101/#22.

43 Government letter regarding “Further information promised as a result of the General Meeting about election matters concerning effectiveness of information campaign for voters outside The Netherlands, about research on internet voting, and about naming local political parties in Alkmaar with 31142 – Extending Experimental Law Voting at a Distance,” Tuesday, November 19, 2013, Chamber document 31 142 No. 38 (Meeting year 2013-2014).

44 For years, a lot of work has been done on establishing such a ‘database’: the so-called ­Non-Resident Registration Program (RNI, http://www.programmarni.nl/). A telephone interview in June 2013 with the RNI showed that they are ‘hoping’ to have an operational program at the start of 2014. This might give an initial impetus to building such a database of Dutch emigrants worldwide.

45 http://nos.nl/artikel/163661-alle-stemmen-zijn-geteld.html. These statistics are by definition incomplete: a number of Dutch citizens abroad did after all vote by proxy or personally in The Netherlands itself. See also footnote 43.

46 In addition, the appendix to the letter gives a good overview of the substantive complaints of Dutch citizens abroad regarding the voting process (footnote 43).

47 Voting from abroad can be a very cumbersome process: for various reasons, it often goes wrong. In the meantime, a bill has been filed, aiming to simplify the opportunity to vote, including electronic voting (Chamber documents II, 2011-2012, 33 354); the Ministry ­indicated that it wants to address this issue (http://nos.nl/artikel/481570-plasterk-wil-elektronisch-stemmen.html). In France, a first attempt for electronic voting by internet has meanwhile been put into practice

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The figures for the number of registered Dutch citizens abroad for the two previous Second Chamber elections (2010 and 2012) clearly give a first indication of where the largest concentrations of Dutch citizens reside (Table 1).

Table 1: Registered number of Dutch citizens, broken down by country, top 10 2010 1. Belgium 2. Germany 3. France 4. United Kingdom 5. United States 6. Switzerland 7. Spain 8. Netherlands (including via foreign affairs mail)*

9,265 7,901 5,314 2,653 2,488 2,362 2,247 1,036

9. Curacao 10. Italy

965 823

2012 1. Belgium 2. Germany 3. France 4. United Kingdom 5. United States 6. Spain 7. Switzerland 8. Australia

8,253 8,012 5,126 2,819 2,502 2,187 2,172 918

9. Italy 10. Curacao

742 672

* Dutch citizens who work at embassies/diplomatic posts who registered through the mailing address of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010. In 2012, the Election Bureau registered this group of Dutch citizens differently (usually through the country of residence), which is why this category disappeared from the top 10 in 2012 (Election Bureau, The Hague).

Source: Election Bureau, The Hague

(http://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/~eroberts/cs181/projects/2006-07/electronic-voting/ index_files/page0005.html). The fact that one already has to vote while the time of the most substantial and interesting issues of the campaigns in The Netherlands are still to come, undoubtedly contributes to the fact that many people are not yet engaged by the time the final deadline for voting from abroad comes along.

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The aforementioned picture was largely confirmed by the figures ­collected by EUROSTAT. The largest concentration of Dutch citizens within the EU (with the exception of Switzerland) are located in, in order (top 10, 2012, unless otherwise indicated): 1. Germany (145,706); 48 2. Belgium (141,191); 3. Spain (52,980); 4. United Kingdom (45,597) – figure dating from 2005; 5. France (35,518) – figure dating from 2003; 6. Italy (8,775); 7. Sweden (8,676); 8. Austria (6,676) – figure dating from 2009; 9. Denmark (6,587); 10. Portugal (4,725) – figure dating from 2011.

For other countries listed in Table 1, there are only known estimates (sometimes obsolete): • United States: more than 100,000; 49 • Switzerland: 30,000; 50 • Curacao: 5,000; 51 • Australia: 90,000. 52 Finally, there are large groups of Dutch citizens in China and South Africa: more than 10,000 53 respectively 36,000 54 Dutch people.

48 According to the German Bureau for Statistics, the number is even higher: 156,000 (http://www.dnhk.org/nl/niederlande/fakten/nederlanders-in-duitsland/).

49 http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2008/20082599-wm.htm. When asked, the Dutch embassy in Washington D.C. sent an email stating that it does not have any of these figures available.

50 http://www.nlclub.ch/.

51 http://www.lekkerwonenopdeantillen.nl/curacao/wonen-op-curacao/ and http://www.morends.com/cura%C3%A7ao.html.

52 http://www.australie.nl/nb/indexaus07_lang.html.

53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Investment Relations between The Netherlands and China, 2013.

54 In 2001, more than 40,000 Dutch people lived in South Africa according to CBS (http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2005/ 2005-1659-wm.htm). By email, the Consulate-General in Cape Town informed us that it did not have any official figures. Based on the number of passport applications, a (very ­conservative) estimate of approx. 36,000 Dutch people was given.

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Indicator 3: Emigration Table 2, which originates from the report by Van Dalen and Henkens mentioned before, entitled Weg uit Nederland [Leaving The Nether­ lands] is relevant, because it provides a clear picture of current emigration countries with regards to native Dutch emigrants. These still include the ‘traditional emigration countries’ (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa).

Table 2: Destination of all native Dutch emigrants from ­1999-2006 Number 1. Belgium 2. Germany 3. Rest of Europe (excl.

Germany and Belgium) Europe (total) 4. Traditional emigration countries * 5. Dutch Antilles and Aruba 6. Other countries Totaal

37,635 30,447 54,736

Proportional distribution 21.2 17.1 30.8

122,818 26,208

69.1 14.7

9,730 19,066 177,822

5.5 10.7 100.0

* Traditional emigration countries are in this case: US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

Source: Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008; based on Central Bureau for Statistics figures

The conclusion appears to be: the more Dutch people live in a specific country, the higher the number of votes cast from that country.

Although this is relevant, if should of course not be a surprise: it only becomes interesting if it’s also juxtaposed with an overview of the trading partners that are most important to The Netherlands, and with international tourism figures.

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Indicators 4 and 5: Trade and Tourism In 2012, the trading partners that are most important to The Nether­ lands (import/export including percentage) are listed in table 3. 55 Table 3: Most important trading partners for The Netherlands in 2012 Export 1. Germany 2. Rest of EU 3. Rest of the world 4. Belgium 5. France 6. United Kingdom 7. United States 8. BRIC 9. Poland 10. Turkey

25% 19% 16% 12% 9% 8% 4% 4% 2% 1%

Import 1. Rest of the world 2. Germany 3. BRIC 4. Rest of EU 5. Belgium 6. United States 7. United Kingdom 8. France 9. Poland 10. Turkey

23% 17% 15% 14% 10% 7% 7% 5% 1% 1%

Source: National Government

In 2012, almost 12 million foreign tourists visited The Netherlands; a new record. 56 According to CBS, there is no clear (and recent) source for the level of money spent by these tourists. 57 Nevertheless, the figures about the number of foreign tourists might already be important themselves: the question comes up whether there is an overlap between the countries that have large groups of Dutch residents and the countries from which most foreign tourists visit The Netherlands.

A first indication for this is the (top 10) registration of foreign guests by country of origin who stayed in Dutch lodging accommodations (Table 4).

55 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2012/08/02/ nederland-belangrijke-handelspartner-voor-alle-eu-landen.html.

56 Tourism in Perspective, NBTC Holland Marketing, July 2013.

57 Tourism and Leisure Figures, 2012, CBS, 2012.

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Table 4: Foreign guests in Dutch lodging accommodations by country of origin, x 1,000 2010 1. Germany 2. United Kingdom 3. Belgium 4. America (US) 5. Rest of Europe 6. France 7. Asia 8. Italy 9. Spain 10. Switzerland % of 2010 Total (10,880)

2011 2,850 1,560 1,260 1,220 1,130 670 620 440 440 180 95%

1. Germany 2. United Kingdom 3. Belgium 4. America (US) 5. Rest of Europe 6. Asia 7. France 8. Italy 9. Spain 10. Switzerland % of 2011 Total (11,300)

2,980 1,510 1,350 1,320 1,190 690 670 440 430 200 95%

Source: CBS, adapted

The resulting ranking is virtually the same for 2010 and for 2011 – with a somewhat higher figure for Asia in 2011. Asia again shows an increase in 2012, leading the NBTC to conclude: “The growth of the number of intercontinental guests from China and Japan to The Netherlands was the highest (respectively 26% and 23%).” 58 The World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) also cites a strong increase in tourism from China: “China became the number one source market in the world in 2012, spending US$ 1,042 billion in 2011.” 59 A second indicator for the connection between on the one hand countries where large numbers of Dutch people reside, and on the other hand countries from where most of the foreign tourists come to The Netherlands, is the (top 10) registration of the number of overnight stays of foreign guests by country of origin in Dutch lodging accommodations (after all, the longer their stay in The Netherlands, the greater the profit for the Dutch economy). 2010 and 2011 show an identical ranking. Moreover, the countries/continents mentioned in Tables 4 and 5 are also the same.

58 Tourism in Perspective, NBTC Holland Marketing, July 2013.

59 Tourism Highlights, 2013 Edition, World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 2013.

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Table 5: Overnight stays of foreign guests in Dutch lodging accommodations by country of origin, x 1.000.

2010 1. Germany 2. Belgium 3. United Kingdom 4. Rest of Europe 5. America (US) 6. France 7. Asia 8. Italy 9. Spain 10. Switzerland % of 2010 Total (26,800)

10,400 3,200 3,020 2,290 2,220 1,350 1,150 900 890 370 96%

2011 1. Germany 2. Belgium 3. United Kingdom 4. Rest of Europe 5. America (US) 6. France 7. Asia 8. Italy 9. Spain 10. Switzerland % of 2011 Total (27,740)

10,760 3,460 2,910 2,440 2,320 1,300 1,280 910 870 430 96%

Source: CBS, adapted

Based on Tables 4 and 5, combined with both the largest number of Dutch people residing abroad and the largest number of voter ­registrations, a high degree of overlap is noticed for Belgium, China, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, the US, and Switzerland.

China and South Africa Based on the trade and tourism figures, the so-called BRIC-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) cannot be ignored: all four of these are important for international trade from and tourism to The Netherlands. For two reasons, China is conspicuous among this group. In the Internationalization Monitor of 2012, the CBS indicates: “Although the majority of Dutch trade is with other European countries, imports coming from BRIC-countries continue to grow. Since 1996, imports from BRIC-countries quadrupled in size. In 2011, China was the third most important source of Dutch imports. BRIC countries are rapidly growing, also in terms of economic power, providing growth potential for Dutch

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exporters, which are somewhat lagging behind in entering these markets (compared to other EU-countries).” 60 In short, among the group of BRIC-countries, China carries the most economic weight for the Netherlands. Secondly, when choosing China, it was also considered that, going against the current trend (closing Dutch consulates in various countries 61), a new consulate was opened here recently. 62 Finally, South Africa was also included because of the strong ­historical ties with The Netherlands, the large number of Dutch people residing there (one of the traditional emigration countries), as well as the economically important position the country represents for The Netherlands: “The Netherlands [are] South Africa’s third largest trading partner in Europe and the seventh worldwide.” 63

60 Internationalization Monitor, CBS (2012).

61 At the very last minute, the consulates in Antwerp, Milan, Munich, and Chicago were saved from being closed: https://www.d66.nl/actueel/consulaten-blijven-open-bezuinigingen-gehalveerd/ 62 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2013/06/11/nederland-opent-consulaat-generaal-inchongqing.html.

63 http://southafrica.nlembassy.org/doing-business/economic--trade-relations.html#.

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The major countries for The Netherlands based on ­international trade and resident Dutch people Combining all sources mentioned above (population figures, voter registration, emigration, trade and tourism) and taking into consideration the historical relationship with South Africa, we arrived at the following selection of countries (in alphabetical order): 64 • Australia; • Belgium; • China; • Germany; • France; • Italy; • Spain; • United Kingdom; • United States; • South Africa.

These ten countries are important to The Netherlands in two ways, both for the international trade balance and for the number of Dutch citizens residing there. Annex II illustrates in more detail the major trade data and other important data relating to these ten countries in connection with The Netherlands. 65

64 Canada, one of the traditional emigration countries for Dutch people, and a country with which cultural and historical ties are very close, was not included because there are many parallels with the US-Netherlands relationship, which is included. The Netherlands is the third largest investor in Canada, and is among the top 10 of Canada’s export markets (see http://ottawa.the-netherlands.org/binaries/content/assets/postenweb/c/canada/theembassy-and-consulates-kingdom-of-the-netherlands/import/you_and_the_netherlands/ you_and_canada/travel_advisory_canada_in_dutch/canada.pdf and http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/canada).

Economic, cultural and historical parallels between Australia, the US and Canada in ­connection with The Netherlands can definitely be drawn (see later in this chapter).

65 The CBS definition for international trade is: “The value of goods supplied by foreign countries to The Netherlands and by The Netherlands to foreign countries. In the case of imports from EU countries, this constitutes the value of goods, including freight and insurance costs, up to the Dutch border. In the case of imports from non-EU countries, this is the value, including freight and insurance costs, up to the outside border of the European Union. In the case of exports, it is the value, including freight and insurance costs, up to the Dutch border.”

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Preliminary Conclusions (II)

This chapter argues that Dutch citizens abroad have economic (added) value to The Netherlands. When recent figures on population figures, voter registration, emigration, trade and tourism are added up, compared and analyzed (separately, these sources are not ­sufficient for interpretation), a number of observations can be made that — put together — seem to justify the argument.

The first (broad) observation is that in general the largest numbers of Dutch people live in countries that are of major importance for The Netherlands in the area of international trade, both in a relative and an absolute sense. The direct connection between trade and ­citizens abroad has been established earlier for the United States: “Immigrant links to the home country have a strong positive impact on exports and imports. [They] suggest a beneficial human-capital-type externality that enhances trading opportunities between the host and home countries.” 66 Secondly, the reciprocal economic relationship between The Netherlands and country X with which traditionally cultural-historical ties exist, is often very strong. 67 In addition, the reciprocal ­economic relationship between The Netherlands and country X where a large number of Dutch citizens reside, is also very strong. The fourth ­observation to be made is that the reciprocal economic relationship with many geographically nearby countries is also strong (very strong for Belgium and Germany). Finally, it can also be argued that (more

66 ‘Immigrant links to the home country: empirical implications for U.S. bilateral trade flows’, The Review of Economics and Statistics (1994), David M. Gould, MIT Press. Gould uses a mathematical economic-analytical model that will not be discussed here.

67 See also footnote 63 (Canada).

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than) 95 ­percent of foreign tourists to The Netherlands come from countries where also the largest numbers of Dutch people reside. 68 These joint observations provide a clear indication that Dutch citizens abroad have indeed (added) economic value for The Netherlands, and also that there is a high degree of correlation between those two sets of data. 69 Where Dutch people go, international trade for The Netherlands itself is generated, would seem to be the general ­conclusion. 70 China is an excellent example of this: despite the lack of ­geographical ­nearness or cultural ties, and with an only recent increase of Dutch people in China (historical ties do, however, go back to the seventeenth century, but without large numbers of Dutch people on location), The Netherlands is now already in tenth place on the list of China’s most important trade partners.

68 Even when omitting the (groups of) countries ‘Rest of Europe’, ‘Asia’, and Switzerland, which are not illustrated in detail, the percentage still is 78 to 85.

69 It should be repeated here that more detailed economic research in this area is needed.

70 In light of this (economic) observation, it is remarkable to have to observe that the previous government has tried to limit the number of people with dual nationality (and therefore also Dutch citizens abroad) to the extent possible, and that the current government also refuses to propose streamlining of the current regulations.

See also http://nederlanderblijven.com/2012/07/12/veelgestelde-vragen-faq-nieuwe-situatie/ and http://www.dutchnews.nl/columns/2013/04/eelco_keij_viva_la_reina.php.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

Both from the point of view of The Netherlands itself and from the ­position of Dutch nationals abroad, The Netherlands would do well to establish separate parliamentary seats for Dutch nationals abroad.

If this should, for now, be impossible as it would require a constitutional amendment, an advisory board to the parliament needs to be ­considered, in which, e.g., Dutch citizens abroad might participate (preferably elected, not appointed), as is the case in e.g. Switzerland.

In the Swiss model, clear personal (financial) responsibility of the ­citizens abroad is implied, possibly increasing the degree of ­acceptance in Switzerland itself.

Through the arrival of the internet, increasingly integrated globalization, a new emigration wave from The Netherlands, and ever-changing worldwide trade, The Netherlands is facing international develop­­­ ments that have huge consequences for the nation. As an open and ­dependent nation with an international focus, The Netherlands could now take the opportunity to establish a new international politicaleconomic n ­ etwork. In this regard, other countries, also within Europe (France, Italy, Croatia, Portugal, and Switzerland), have been far ahead of The Netherlands for decades, and are now singing the praises of the added economic value of something that began a long time ago as purely political representation. In this connection, the number of ­citizens abroad is indicative, but does not account for everything: France might serve as an example — the percentage of French ­nationals abroad is estimated to be smaller than Dutch nationals ­outside of The Netherlands.

It is ironic to find that many Dutch people abroad do not, or barely, feel that Dutch politicians understand them, let alone represent them, while

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at the same time there is a high degree of correlation between The Netherlands’ international economic activity and revenue on the one hand, and the geographic location of Dutch nationals abroad on the other. In the areas of politics, economics and culture, Dutch ­nationals abroad have without a doubt an added value for The Netherlands itself, even though they do not pay any direct taxes to The Netherlands.

As opposed to the emigrants of days past, the majority of present-day emigrants maintains ties with The Netherlands, that are continuously updated — for instance by Skyping, reading online newspapers, and cheap(er), short visits to The Netherlands. It should be an automatic democratic right for these emigrants to obtain a permanent seat in the Dutch political arena.

This ‘pool of ambassadors’ must undergo a political transformation.

The key to utilizing the available and versatile potential of Dutch nationals abroad for The Netherlands itself even more, is to include them in the political power system. Both parliament (Second and First Chambers) and the government, would do well to incorporate the interests of Dutch nationals abroad as a new agency and a power factor. In the case of parliament, one might think of establishing a Permanent Committee for Dutch Citizens Abroad, and as far as the government is concerned, appointing a special undersecretary of state. This could be a way to bridge two worlds that are de facto interwoven, and that need one another.

An estimated 700,000 to more than one million Dutch nationals live abroad. The number of Dutch citizens abroad entitled to vote is estimated at 500,000. Based on the most recent elections, this would mean five to seven Second Chamber seats, a number that is substantial enough to have an impact on coalition negotiations. The exclusiveness or exoticness evoked by living in a foreign country has very quickly eroded: many Dutch people these days know someone in their family or circle of friends who lives abroad. The 2011-2012 discussion about dual nationality was, and is, for many Dutch nationals, the fuse in the powder keg. The assertion that this international electorate keeps voting for the same party/parties, is disavowed by the recent election

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experiences in Italy and France. The electorate abroad amounts to an opportunity for all political parties.

As for the number of new Chamber seats to be determined (it could, but does not need to involve an expansion of the total number of 225 Chamber seats), we might consider a geographic distribution, as France and Italy have done. We would have to take into account the countries where most Dutch nationals abroad reside. It would be preferable to reserve a fixed number of Chamber seats for Dutch nationals abroad instead of using a number that depends on each individual ­election turnout: this way, there will be steady pressure on the political parties to actively communicate with this electorate.

The number of seats for Dutch citizens abroad to be created should not be ­disproportionate to the other ‘national’ seats, and needs to be determined in a reasonable and equitable fashion. For former Dutch nationals, who in the last decades involuntarily and often unexpectedly lost their Dutch citizenship, a smooth return to Dutch citizenship needs to be established. Their ties with, and their value for The Netherlands remains the same.

New international challenges require new and workable solutions, even if these do not appear to be completely in line with the system of proportional representation: a political mold should not constitute a way to get trapped in the future. Of course, there are elements of a constituency system tied to the proposal to establish separate Chamber seats for Dutch nationals abroad. This warrants research on how these elements might be combined, in the proper ratio, with the present system. Besides, the current political system has for some time contained a de facto feature of a constituency system: most, if not all, political parties apply a policy of informal regional distribution across their electorate. Moreover, it would seem logical for each member of the Chamber elected from abroad to be given the same kind of ­mandate as other Chamber members, without any (geographic) ­limitations, just as is the case in, for instance, France and Portugal.

This discussion primarily lies in the political arena. Looking ahead to the upcoming elections for the European Parliament (2014), in which

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Dutch nationals abroad are allowed to vote, this would be a great opportunity to make overtures towards parliament and the political parties, to offer new opportunities for the domestic economy, and to recognize that the times they are a-changing. Or, in the words of the third president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson: “(‌) with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times.â€?

Eelco Keij, 2014

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Acknowledgments

The idea of the ‘self-made man’ has always seemed artificial to me: without inspiration, insights, and other forms of mental infrastructure, nobody can build something entirely on his or her own. The same goes for this manifesto. After my international campaign in 2012 as a candidate for the Dutch House of Representatives, Kay van de Linde was the one who suggested that I ‘give Dutch nationals abroad a voice’ by way of a book or otherwise. That’s how it started.

A quest ensued, in the form of conversations, interviews, research, discussions, and sounding board sessions. Many people offered assistance. I would like to express my sincere thanks to the following people and organizations, in random order (and with apologies to the people who I have left out inadvertently): Tihana Bartulac Blanc, Martim Faria e Maya, Johan Valentijn, Worldconnectors, the ­mysterious team behind NederlanderBlijven.com, Tony and Etty van Rijn, Alexander Rinnooy Kan, Rick van der Woud, Berend de Vries, Sander Raaymakers, Flip van Dyke, Susanne Mooij, Hermie de Voer, Thijs van de Woestijne, Hans Anker, Martin Olde Monnikhof, Helena Sprenger, Marietje Schaake, Kène Henkens, Mirjana Krstiˇcevi´c, Koen Davidse, Massimo Bernacconi, Joan Bischoff van Heemskerck, Peter J. Spiro, my sister Inger and my brothers Ferdinand and Wilbert, Boris Dittrich, Harry van Dalen, Ans Vollering, Frans Andriessen, Esther Beneder, Peter van Gool, Egbert Verweij, Ina Post, Jan Joosten and Brunhilde Vergouwen, Rudolf Wyder, Joël van der Beek, Andreas Kolodziejak, Gemma Bakx, Sweder van Wijnbergen, Robert Farla, Rimke de Groot, Arend van Dam, Jean-Michel Lafleur, Frédéric Lefebvre, José Caroço, Freek van Krevel, Natalia Mirkovi´c, Dragan Zeli´c, Dulce Maria Scott, Bonnie Horbach, Olav Haazen, Stephan Raes and Charles Groenhuijsen.

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A very special thank-you goes to a number of people. First of all, Shaima Shahin and Sanne Bosmans, who, as interns, supported me in my research. Through her company Van Oort & Van Oort, Mariëlle van Oort offered them a work space and a stimulating environ­ ment, just as Vincent Ketelaars provided me with a work space and substantive feedback at ERAC BV company during the hot Dutch summer months. Thank you! Tom Bijvoet at Mokeham Publishing Inc. in Canada deserves mention for his involvement in the project at the very beginning. Peter and Audrey Denton took it upon themselves to take care of the kids at times, so that I could keep on writing.

My good neighbor John van Schaik supported me with coffee and playing devil’s advocate, while his wife Judith Matloff gave me ideas about the book’s structure. I am extremely appreciative to Seb van der Kaaden at Uitgeverij Personalia for both publishing this manifesto and for his patient and critical attitude during the writing process. Graphic designers Martijn Deurloo and Lior van Olphen deserve high praise for – once again! – our beautiful, creative cooperation.

And finally, Eleonore Speckens and Hanny Veenendaal completed the whole project with a professional translation.

Last but not least: my children Quintus and Siebo, surrounded by a mix of cultures in which they seem to be able to move effortlessly, have been – and continue to be – an enormous source of inspiration.

I owe my wife Tracey a debt of immense gratitude for her patience and understanding throughout this time-consuming and sometimes ­isolated process. I myself come from a downright ‘Nederlands’ family, but a family that was always internationally oriented – both in the way of languages and travel. My parents, Adrie and Ada Keij, have always been a driving force for me, my brothers and my sister to get to where we are now. In addition, they have taken up the consuming task of editing the manifesto before presenting it to the publisher, thus ­preventing me from errors during my writing work, while preserving the sharpness of my pen. Words in Dutch fail me, so I’ll just say it in the dialect of my native Tilburg: “dègge bedankt zèèt dè witte”.

Eelco Keij, 2014 New York/Berkel-Enschot 50

Annex I Economic (added) value as a concept, and Chapter 2 resources research accountability The Concept of Economic (Added) Value Stating that Dutch nationals abroad have an economic (added) value to The Netherlands itself immediately begs the question what this concept of economic (added) value implies. As far as we know, the ­literature does not provide a clear definition of economic (added) value in this context. 71 In the widest sense, concepts such as culture, l­anguage, and knowledge are as much part of economic worth as are ‘hard’ figures relating to taxes and international trade.

“Immigrant ties include knowledge of home-country markets, language, p ­ references, and business contacts that have the potential to decrease trading transaction costs”, wrote David M. Gould as far back as 1994. 72 Nonetheless, these are mostly values that are not, or barely, measurable.

Direct and Indirect Economic (Added) Value Most of the direct (added) value of Dutch nationals for The Netherlands can reasonably be expressed in tax worth. Dutch nationals abroad can roughly be divided in two groups: on the one hand, those who pay taxes to the Netherlands, and thus have a direct (added) value for The Netherlands (the traditional ‘expats’, who may have been sent abroad temporarily by a company headquartered in The Netherlands 73), and on the other hand, those who are paying taxes to the (other) country of residence. As far as the first group is concerned, the direct economic 71 Dutch economists who were interviewed gave different interpretations of ‘economic (added) value’, such as “the benefits and positive results for the Dutch economy”. With thanks to Prof. Dr. Sweder van Wijnbergen, Prof. H.P. Van Dalen, Mr. Joël van der Beek, Dr. A. Vollering, and Mr. A. Kolodziejak. All interviews were performed by intern Shaima Shahin, student at Hogeschool Rotterdam (Rotterdam Business School).

72 ‘Immigrant links to the home country: empirical implications for U.S. bilateral trade flows’, The Review of Economics and Statistics (1994), David M. Gould, MIT Press.

73 Therefore, diplomats are outside the definition of ‘expat’.

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value for The Netherland is easy to individualize. This is not possible for the other group. For this group, other measuring tools and ­methods have to be found for clues to determine the indirect added value. It seems impossible to individually assess the economic (added) value of Dutch nationals who do not pay taxes to The Netherlands; that is why in this manifesto, these Dutch nationals are viewed as a group only.

Resources Research How many Dutch nationals abroad do not pay taxes to The Netherlands? As per request, the Stichting Nederlands Onderwijs in het Buitenland [Dutch Education Abroad Foundation] (NOB, with head office in The Hague) informed us via e-mail that of all 13,000 ­children attending Dutch schools in foreign countries, about 30 ­percent of the parents are traditional expats. Therefore, this could be an indication to suppose that the portion of Dutch nationals abroad not paying taxes in The Netherlands amounts to around 70 percent – although in reality this may be a lower number. 74 Based on suggestions that came out of interviews with a number of Dutch economists, chapter 2 was limited to macro figures. By combining various sources (emigration, population, registration, trade and tourism), an attempt was made to substantiate the statement made in the beginning, and to identify concrete indications in support of this statement. This chapter also implies a call to further and more extensive economic research into more information on the possible relationship between Dutch nationals abroad and their economic (added) value for The Netherlands itself. As sources and individuals so far have confirmed (i.e. embassies, Central Bureau for Statistics, economists), this is still a largely unexplored terrain.

Dutch nationals and their activities are spread out all over the world.

The report quoted earlier, ‘Modernizing Diplomacy’, states that ­“multinational companies, financial institutions, flows of capital, but also the production of consumer goods have become unmoored from 74 Numbers of Dutch nationals abroad who pay real estate taxes in The Netherlands on Dutch real estate – and therefore indeed contribute directly to the Dutch economy – were not taken into consideration, and neither were Dutch nationals abroad who are putting money into the Netherlands annually (for instance by paying for their children’s studies).

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their physical location, and have been cut into pieces across many locations and several continents”. 75 Of course, the same kind of ‘physical unmooring’ of large groups of Dutch nationals applies. Based on a number of sources it was ­possible to make a good selection of countries that deserve further ­scrutinizing. The first thing to be considered in this regard was Van Dalen and Henkens’ emigration report mentioned earlier. Also the choice was made to examine and combine data from various other sources c.q. organizations such as the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid [Advisory Council on Government Policy] (WRR), EUROSTAT (the European Union’s Bureau of Statistics), the Elections Bureau in The Hague, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Nederlands Bureau voor Toerisme & Congressen [Netherlands Tourism and Conventions Bureau] (NBTC).

75 See Introduction, footnote 10.

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Annex II Country Selection, and key trade information per country Australia Belgium China Germany France Italy Spain United Kingdom United States South Africa All sources are listed in one footnote for each country.

Australia More than 300,000 Australians are of Dutch descent: between 1947 and 1971 more than 160,000 Dutch people moved to Australia, being one of the traditional emigration destinations. In 2011, there were more than 76,000 Australian residents who were born in The Netherlands. In addition to a high degree of common cultural ­heritage (stemming from the East India Company history), trade relations are consistently strong. The Netherlands is among the top five largest investors in Australia (especially machinery and medical equipment); at the same time, The Netherlands is the second largest market in the EU for Australia (especially coal and iron ore). The Dutch experience in the area of water management was recently also applied in Australia. Dutch companies such as ING Group, Fortis, Rabobank, AEGON, Shell, Unilever, Delta Lloyd, Philips, and AkzoNobel have subsidiaries in Australia. 76

76 See http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/netherlands/netherlands_country_brief.html and http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/australie.

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Belgium Cultural ties with Belgium are obvious: chief characteristics are the common language and history (mainly Flanders). Just like The Netherlands, Belgium has a very open and international economy; foreign trade is of great importance for the country’s economic development. In 2011, Belgium was (again) The Netherlands’ second trading partner: import from Belgium increased by 14 percent ­ to 36 billion euros, and export increased by 18 percent to 49 billion euros. The Netherlands imports mainly cars and refined oil ­products from Belgium (gas oil, heating oil). As for (growth) sectors, fuel, chemicals, and machinery constitute the largest portion of Dutch exports to Belgium. Dutch companies like AkzoNobel, DSM, Philips, TPG, Vendex KBB (with Blokker, Bart Smit, and Hema shops) and Randstad temp agency have subsidiaries in Belgium; in addition, all major Dutch banks are represented in Belgium. 77

China Despite the lack of a common culture and the existence of a frequently difficult entrepreneurial environment, Dutch companies generally do well in China (especially agro foods and services to companies).

In 2012, The Netherlands was the eighth trade investor in China (with an increase of Dutch imports from 10 billion euros in 2003 to 34 billion euros in 2012), but also, in the other direction, trade relations are increasing: exports to China grew considerably in the last few years, from 1.5 billion euros in 2003 to 9.5 billion euros in 2012 (with also increasing Chinese investments in The Netherlands up to 2.5 billion euros in 2012). With 350 subsidiaries of Chinese companies in The Netherlands (which are still growing in number), more than 7,000 direct jobs are created in The Netherlands itself. In 2009, more than 27,000 Dutch jobs were directly linked to exports to China.

The latest inventory of the Dutch economic network in China dates from March 2013 and provides an overview of 552 unique companies 77 See http://www.government.nl/issues/international-relations/belgium, http://www.compendiumvoordeleefomgeving.nl/indicatoren/nl2060-Wonen-over-de-grens. html?i=35-173, http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/internationale-handel/publicaties/belangrijkstehandelspartners-nederland/archief/2012/2012-belgie-2011-ih.htm and the report Buurmarkt België [The neighboring market of Belgium] MKB Nederland, 2007 (http://www.mkb.nl/images/MKB_Belgie_2007%5B1%5D.pdf).

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with a total of 975 locations, as well as 210 Dutch entrepreneurs in China. According to the CBS, one euro in exports to China generates more than an average export euro. 78

Germany Germany is The Netherlands’ biggest trade partner. Only the United States and Canada are more closely knit than The Netherlands and Germany. In 2011, The Netherlands was the major exporter to Germany (in the amount of more than 80 billion euros), followed by China and France. The products exported by The Netherlands include cokes and petroleum products, petroleum and natural gas, ­chemical products and foodstuffs). In 2012, The Netherlands imported goods worth 71 billion euros from Germany (especially chemical and pharmaceutical products, machinery, and foodstuffs), making it Germany’s fourth export partner.

In 2010, more than 2,750 companies with Dutch participation were registered in Germany (participation = more than a 10 percent stake), with a joint value of at least 600,000 jobs in Germany. On the other hand, German-controlled companies produced more than 120,000 jobs in The Netherlands in 2007 (the second foreign job creator for The Netherlands). 79

France In addition to the fact that The Netherlands and France have tradi­ tionally strong cultural ties, the economic ties between the two ­countries are also very strong. France is the third most important trading partner for The Netherlands, and The Netherlands is the s­ eventh largest trading partner for France (especially in the food industry, financial sector, and service sector). Several French and Dutch companies have initiated a high degree of cooperation during the past few years, such as Air France-KLM and Danone-Numico, which has 78 See http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/china, Business Survey Dutch Companies in China 2012, Netherlands Embassy in China, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (2012) and Trade and Investment Relations between The Netherlands and China 2013, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (2013).

79 See http://www.dnhk.org/nl/niederlande/fakten/handel-met-nederland/ and http://dusseldorf.nlconsulaat.org/themas/economie-en-handel/economie-en-handel/ minbuza%3Ashare/economische-relatie-nederland-duitsland.html.

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strengthened their competitive positions. Without this cooperation, it is very likely that in these times of continuous r­ ecession, even more Dutch jobs would have been lost. 80 Major Dutch export products to France include pharmaceutical products and crude and refined oil; products imported from France include alcohol (wine), chemical products, steel, machinery, cereals, and refined oil products.

The value of Dutch exported products to France amounted to more than 36 billion Euros in 2011, while the value of imports from France was 17 billion euros (a large increase compared to the year before). 81

Italy Cultural ties between Italy and The Netherlands are very close at the governmental level. The most recent trade figures made ­available by the CBS and the national government date from 2009-2010.

They show that the value of imported goods from Italy in 2010 was around 7 billion euros while the value of exported goods from The Netherlands to Italy was almost 19 billion euros. Until 2010, Italy was among the top five export countries for The Netherlands, while The Netherlands constituted Italy’s sixth export market. Major Dutch export products to Italy are foodstuffs, electrical machinery and equipment, metal products, synthetic fiber, chemical products, and raw materials (especially natural gas). Major products imported from Italy to The Netherlands include pharmaceuticals, iron and steel, and produce.

Many large and medium-sized companies (and some financial institutions) have subsidiaries in Italy, and vice versa. 82

80 Air France-KLM has already gone through several waves of (forced) layoffs: see http://nos.nl/artikel/535323-air-france-schrapt-extra-banen.html.

81 See http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/internationale-handel/publicaties/belangrijkstehandelspartners-nederland/archief/2012/2012-frankrijk-2011-ih.htm, http://www.government.nl/issues/international-relations/france, http://www.government.nl/news/2013/03/21/france-and-the-netherlands-can-strengthencooperation-between-northern-and-southern-europe.html and http://www.ambafrance-nl.org/Economische-betrekkingen.

82 See http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/italie, http://italie.nlambassade.org/producten-en-diensten/economische-dienstverlening/zakendoen-in-italie.html and http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/internationale-handel/ publicaties/belangrijkste-handelspartners-nederland/archief/2011/2010-italie-ih-2009.htm.

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Spain The relations with Spain, the fourth largest economy in the Eurozone, are solid on an economic, cultural and political level. Within NATO, Spain is a strategic partner to The Netherlands in addition to other cooperation, including in the areas of migration and police.

The Netherlands is one of Spain’s largest investors (i.e. in the ­service sectors, real estate, and ICT), and reversely, Spain is the seventh largest trading partner for The Netherlands, and also the second investor. In 2011, The Netherlands imported 6.6 billion euros worth of goods from Spain (a 7 percent decrease compared to 2010), which included chemicals, wine, and cars. Dutch exports to Spain also decreased in 2011 (3%), especially printers, computers, televisions, and telecommunication equipment. Other export products from The Netherlands to Spain include industrial materials and agricultural products, chemicals, and foodstuffs. 83

United Kingdom (UK) The political, economic, and cultural relations between The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are strong. For years, The Netherlands has been among the UK’s top 5 major trading partners.

In 2012, Dutch exports amounted to 34.9 billion euros, and imports to 27.5 billion euros – a considerable increase for both trading flows compared to 2011. The Netherlands mostly imports mineral fuels, ­chemicals (medicinal and pharmaceutical products), and ­machinery (office equipment, cars), while The Netherlands exports mainly ­telecommunication equipment, office equipment, vegetables, fruit, and meat.

The United Kingdom is the favorite destination of Dutch investments, while the UK is the third largest foreign investor in The Netherlands (2011). According to ING’s Economic Bureau, which uses the OECD’s and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) new database, trade with the British is the most profitable to The Netherlands (unlike what the usual sources report, usually indicating Germany).

83 See http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/internationale-handel/publicaties/belangrijkstehandelspartners-nederland/archief/2012/2012-spanje-2011-ih-art.htm, http://www.agentschapnl.nl/onderwerp/spanje-marktkenmerken, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2012/11/26/nederland-haalt-banden-met-spanjeaan%5B2%5D.html and http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/spanje.

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Dutch companies with subsidiaries in the UK include AkzoNobel, DAF, Heineken, ING, Philips, Rabobank, TomTom, Shell, and Unilever. 84

United States (US) The historical, cultural and political ties between The Netherlands and the United States date from the birth of the US, approximately 400 years ago. Both during the first emigration wave (1820-1920) and during the second wave (second half of the twentieth century), ­thousands of Dutch people left for the United States (in addition to Canada and Australia).

In 2011, exports of Dutch goods to the US were valued at almost 20 billion euros (an increase compared to 2011, especially for petroleum products), versus imports valued at 23.5 billion euros ­ (a decrease compared to 2011, especially due to less importation of chemicals). Other export and import products include office equipment, beverages, and chemicals on the one hand (Dutch exports to the US), and chemicals, computers, and electrical equipment on the other hand (Dutch imports from the US).

In 2010, The Netherlands was the third largest foreign investor in the US (217 billion dollar) while the US was the largest foreign ­investor in The Netherlands (521 billion dollar), making the US the ninth largest market for The Netherlands in 2010.

An estimated 680,000 Americans owe their jobs to the close ties between The Netherlands and the US. More than 850 Dutch companies have American subsidiaries, including AkzoNobel, DSM, ING, Philips, Shell, and Unilever. The Netherlands is the number one on the American list of countries for foreign direct investment (FDI, 595 billion dollar in 2011). 85

84 See http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/verenigdkoninkrijk, http://www.wtctwente.eu/nl/Nieuws/Meer+nieuws+2013/Handel+met+Britten+ levert+het+meest+op, http://www.hollanduktrade.nl/handels-en-investeringscijfers/ and http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/internationale-handel/publicaties/belangrijkstehandelspartners-nederland/archief/2012/2012-verenigd-koninkrijk-ih-2011.htm.

85 See http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/internationale-handel/publicaties/belangrijkstehandelspartners-nederland/archief/2012/2012-vs-2011-ih-art.htm, http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/ menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2008/2008-2599-wm.htm, http://economicties.org/us-netherlands-partnership/ and http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/verenigde-staten.

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South Africa Cultural and historical ties between The Netherlands and South Africa are strong, especially due to the Dutch colony on the Cape, and the solid Dutch support in the anti-apartheid conflict.

Dutch business (both small and large) is well represented in South Africa (this includes Berenschot, Royal Haskoning, Heineken, ING, Philips, and Shell) and is mainly involved in the construction of water and sewage facilities, as well as projects to connect ports to the hinterland. In the meantime, a number of South African companies has also opened subsidiaries in The Netherlands. South Africa is by and large The Netherland’s biggest trading partner on the African continent, while The Netherlands is the third largest European trading partner to South Africa, and the seventh worldwide. In 2011, imports from South Africa amounted to 1.3 billion euros, compared to 1.8 billion euros in exports. Products imported by The Netherlands from South Africa consist mainly of fruits (40 percent), with machinery comprising 45 percent of total export products. 86

86 See http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/zuid-afrika, http://southafrica.nlembassy.org/doing-business/economic--trade-relations.html, http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/internationale-handel/publicaties/belangrijkstehandelspartners-nederland/archief/2012/2012-zuid-afrika-2011-art.htm and http://www.sanec.org/.

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About the Author

In 2011, Eelco Keij (1977), a resident of New York, cranked up the debate on dual citizenship with the goal of fighting any further 足restrictions on this option for Dutch nationals abroad.

In his Fortunate Connections manifesto, Mr. Keij seeks to build a bridge between the politicians in The Hague and the sizable Dutch electorate abroad. The two foremost questions are: what added value do the (former) Dutch nationals abroad bring to The Netherlands itself, and how do other European countries deal politically with their citizens abroad?

Native Brabander Eelco Keij lives with his American wife and his Dutch-American children in West Harlem, New York. In 2011, he became a dual citizen, with a Dutch and an American passport.

In daily life, he is an entrepreneur and a fundraising strategist.

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