Key achievements of the biodiversity initiatives include: community capacity‑building through training (in 51 villages) on the collection, processing, storage and use of native tree species against desertification (five tree nurseries were established with 500,000 seedlings transplanted in Cross River, Delta and Kaduna States); the establishment of ten Forest Management Committees; baseline studies on fuelwood availability and consumption; and the development of the Kaduna Forest Policy. These initiatives created a high level of engagement with local communities, with thousands of beneficiaries and hectares targeted in three States. However, it appears that only Kaduna State has had reasonable traction with these initiatives, and the potential impact of the fuelwood initiative on forest cover in Nigeria may not be evident for a while. There will need to be much more extensive development of community forests, time for those to make a difference to ground cover, and rigorous use of synoptic imagery and ground truthing to detect any changes in forest cover due to the initiative.
2.4 COVID‑19 response Nigeria has had a relatively low rate of COVID‑19 cases and deaths, but high socioeconomic impact. The Government of Nigeria was swift in developing and adopting a National COVID‑19 Multi‑Sectoral Pandemic Response Plan (COVID‑19 National Plan) in March 2020, overseen by a high‑level Presidential Task Force mandated to coordinate the country’s response efforts.98 The COVID‑19 National Plan had an ambitious budget of $231 million, and required a range of partners to contribute to its implementation, including the private sector which committed more than $72 million.99 Recognizing that the economic impact of the pandemic might push more people further into poverty, the Government also passed the Economic Sustainability Plan in June 2020, to be implemented over one year. With an allocation of $5.6 billion, the Plan sought to expand social assistance, including a new rapid response cash transfer programme, as well as payroll support and loans to MSMEs. However, government support only reached a fraction of those in need.100 The United Nations and UNDP response plans were immediate. The joint One‑UN Response to COVID‑19 and One‑UN COVID‑19 Basket Fund were developed and launched in April 2020. Building on experience from previous health emergencies, to serve as a common platform and financing framework to complement the Government’s efforts. Finding 9. The COVID‑19 response presented an opportunity for increased coordination with the Government and development partners in the country. UNDP was swift to adapt its programming, set within the One‑UN Response Plan to COVID‑19 in Nigeria. While contributing to all six pillars of the Plan, UNDP led the national coordination and procurement pillars with agility. Recognizing that the Government required large‑scale partnership and resources to meet programmatic and funding goals in its national COVID‑19 response, UNDP seized on this opportunity for enhanced coordination with diverse stakeholders. Primarily capitalizing on its convening role and capacity, UNDP took a lead role in establishing and managing the One‑UN COVID‑19 Basket Fund facility (discussed further in the 98
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The National Plan had four interrelated objectives: (a) provide a coordinated and effective national and subnational response; (b) reduce COVID‑19 related morbidity and mortality; (c) mitigate pandemic‑related impacts on critical social, economic and health infrastructure and systems; and (d) facilitate post‑pandemic recovery and rehabilitation. World Bank (2020) Nigeria COVID‑19 Preparedness and Response Project: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ en/338411595586903178/pdf/Project‑Information‑Document‑Nigeria‑COVID‑19‑Preparedness‑and‑Response‑Project‑P173980.pdf. Human Rights Watch and Justice and Empowerment Initiatives (2021) Between Hunger and the Virus: The Impact of the COVID‑19 Pandemic on People Living in Poverty in Lagos, Nigeria. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/07/nigeria0721_ web_0.pdf.
Chapter 2. Findings
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