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Home on the Range: The U. S. Air Force Range in Utah, a Unique Military Resource
Wendover Field, November 1959, USHS collections, gift of Leonard J. Arrington.
Home on the Range: The U. S. Air Force Range in Utah, a Unique Military Resource
BY ROGER D. LAUNIUS
MOST UTAH BUSINESSMEN AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS did not Consider the state's western desert well suited for development, but the vast expanse of open territory, the unique features of the landscape, and the proximity to major western air force bases all contributed to the creation and sustainment over the years of a significant training facility eventually named the Utah Test and Training Range. Founded on the remains of prehistoric Lake Bonneville, in the fifty years since its first use this range has been an invaluable resource for the air force.
The history of the Utah military range can be traced to the latter part of the decade of the Great Depression when the Army Air Corps underwent a remarkable expansion program in preparation for eventual war. A unique element of air corps requirements, unlike those for the rest of the army, was expansive facilities for training of aircrews to perform the strategic bombing and gunnery missions emphasized by those in military leadership capacities. Unfortunately, the Army Air Corps in 1939 had only six small bombing and gunnery ranges available. This shortage was partially solved, along with other preparedness initiatives, in January 1939 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress to appropriate funds for the air corps to increase the capabilities and number of its aircraft, expand its personnel numbers, and augment and upgrade its facilities.
The air corps at that time was especially concerned that any new installations be located so as to facilitate the defense of the United States against enemy attack. Accordingly, air corps officials sought to reserve locations on the coasts for the continental air defense mission with support activities— depot, maintenance, logistics, training, and headquarters— located in the nation's heartland. From this background a War Department board located and recommended the acquisition of a large tract of land in western Utah for use as a training center for the air corps.
The selection of the Utah range site was based on several factors. The town of Wendover, Utah, where a staging base would be built, sits on the Utah-Nevada border approximately 110 miles west of Salt Lake City with almost nothing surrounding it for miles. On the western fringe of the Great Salt Lake Desert the site had vast amounts of open flat land that the Department of the Interior already controlled. The town of approximately 103 people at that time possessed adequate railroad lines running between Salt Lake City and the West Coast and was generally equidistant from the three major West Coast military centers at Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Weather in the area was also ideal, as there was very little rain or snow and flight training could take place year-round Adding to the attractiveness of the area were Army Air Corps plans to base a heavy bomber unit at the Salt Lake City municipal airport and to locate a supply and repair depot near Ogden In June 1940 the Utah desert site was designated as a general purpose range for aerial gunnery and bombing practice; accordingly it would have a regional clientele.
On September 20, 1940, the Army Air Corps began building structures on what would eventually become Wendover Field, a site destined to become one of the principal Army Air Corps training bases in the West The facilities at the Wendover base during the early 1940s were largely designed to be temporary, except for the four runways completed by early 1941. This installation became operational as a subpost of Fort Douglas, Salt Lake City, on July 29, 1941. Initial planning called for a detachment of soldiers to maintain and operate the range for bombers from other locations, but very quickly the Army Air Corps realized the base was ideal as a staging location for units undergoing training. The War Department then decided to procure an additional 265,000 acres of land for the establishment of base facilities, bringing the total area of the Wendover site to approximately 1,822,000 acres. The site was 86 miles long, from 18 to 36 miles wide, and covered an area in Utah extending into three counties— Box Elder, Tooele, and Juab. Fittingly, in the summer of 1941 the Wendover range complex was hailed as the largest bombing and gunnery range in the world.
The facilities for the range were only minimally ready for use by the summer of 1941, but the impending crisis prompted the air corps to rush ahead with activation. The first unit to be assigned was a bombing and gunnery range detachment activated on July 29, 1941, and charged with making the range ready for use. Capt Darold G Smith, an infantry reserve officer who had been ordered to active duty on July 25, 1941, at Fort Douglas, was appointed commander, and on August 12 Smith led his detachment of one fellow officer and ten enlisted men into the western desert to set up operations at Wendover.
It was a difficult and inhospitable job. Not long thereafter, moving with thirty-seven other men to the range, came a draftee from Illinois named Byron Dussler. In a letter to his cousins Dussler described his experience on encountering the Great Salt Lake Desert for the first time:
In spite of constant activity, improvements on the range proceeded at a slow pace. Dussler described how he and some other airmen spent several days "filling flares with kerosine which outline the night targets, and spreading used crankcase oil in an enormous circle to outline a day target" But the people working on such activities were too few to ready the range for use by the time established by the War Department Not until October, for example, were steel towers delivered to the range for use as observation posts for instructors. The events of December 7, 1941, however, rapidly changed the priority of the range as thousands of gunners and bombardiers sharpened their combat skills there during the war.
Prior to World War II each bombardment group trained its own personnel up to standards established by General Headquarters Air Force. This system worked well until the 1939 military expansion when the level of experienced personnel was spread exceedingly thin. The mobilization of World War II further exacerbated this problem. To address this situation, in January 1942 the Second Air Force was assigned the mission of training heavy bombardment groups for the Army Air Force, and that unit remained the primary "schoolhouse" for heavy bombardment groups throughout the war. Second Air Force leaders immediately implemented a two-phased program, each of six weeks duration The first phase was conducted at bases in Arizona, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon and involved drilling in rudimentary bombardment skills. Two locations were planned for the second phase of the process— the Wendover and Salt Lake City Army Air Bases— and the Utah range was to be readily available for trading from both installations. Wendover Field worked well for this effort, but the Salt Lake base had to be dropped because its proximity to a major population center created difficulties ranging from airspace congestion to safety violations. This second phase of instruction focused on increasing the proficiency of individual crew members in their specialties marksmanship and bombardment accuracy—while at the same time molding the crews into integral teams. Training on the range was primarily the responsibility of the individual bomb groups going through the system, with each commander using a checklist procedure to ascertain the progress of his aircrews. Although an important step beyond earlier methods of training, the two-phased program had to be expanded into a three-phased program of four weeks each by the summer of 1942. The Utah range served as the second stop for the groups in training with this approach. The third phase, most of which took place at Sioux City Army Air Base, Iowa, trained the crews to work as part of larger formations and stressed long-range navigation.
In mid-April 1942 the first unit, the 306th Bombardment Group (Heavy), with four bombardment squadrons of B-17 "Flying Fortresses," arrived in Utah for training on the range. The normal authorization for a heavy bomber group, either B-17 or B-24, consisted of 72 aircraft and 2,261 people. When this first group arrived with such large numbers of personnel and airplanes the installation's resources were sorely taxed. Only twelve buildings on the base provided living accommodations, and these were of a temporary nature. The 306th Bomb Group and its squadrons were also forced to share one 50-by-20-foot room for their headquarters. A table was improvised by laying boards on carpenters sawhorses aligned in a U shape around the room to give the inevitable military clerks a place to work Discarded cardboard boxes served as filing cabinets. Under the envisioned six-week training schedule, the 306th should have completed its training and departed Utah in June 1942. The inadequate facilities made this schedule impossible. The 306th muddled through its training and left the range on August 1.
Fortunately, the situation was about to change. By the fall of 1942 the construction program was beginning to make more buildings available for use. On the range improvements were also made. The bombing and gunnery range detachment, consisting of two dozen enlisted men and one sergeant, began creating more legitimate targets. The first were enemy battleships, built up on the salt crust using tar and thereby adding dimension and realism. The detachment installed their own electrical system to provide lighting for night practice bombing and constructed an elaborate gunnery facility for the aircrews. The primary role of heavy bombers in combat was obviously to place their bombs on target, and such skill was developed in these simulated bombing missions. Equally important, the B-17, B-24, and later B-29 crews had to be taught to penetrate the enemy's defenses and attack strategic targets without the benefit of escorting fighter protection. Officials soon realized that the skill and proficiency of the gunners on these bombers would be the best and often the only defense against enemy fighter aircraft To train the gunners the range detachment established both skeet and rifle ranges as well as a stationary machine gun range with moveable target mechanisms. The machine gun range was built in a circular pit with a track to steer a jeep around the circle. A target mounted on the jeep provided machine gun practice as it moved around its track at speeds of between 5 and 30 miles per hour and went from 170 to 240 yards away from the gunner's position. Shooting at a moving target gave the gunners valuable training by providing depth of range changes and by simulating attacking and retreating aircraft.
Shooting at a moveable target from a stationary position was obviously good but not optimum training, for in annual combat both the gunner and the target would be moving. To provide more realism, therefore, the Army Air Forces purchased a railroad flatcar and a section of track for use on the range. The range personnel installed three machine guns on the railroad car. A section of railroad track was laid and an interphone system installed on the flat car. The interphone system, similar to those with throat microphones on aircraft, allowed the gunners to communicate with each other and with the instructors while their hands remained free. The railroad car hit speeds up to 40 miles per hour as it approached the moving targets. Hitting a moving target with consistency from the moving railroad car required excellent marksmanship skills. This training method simulated to the greatest extent possible the conditions of aerial warfare. At other gunnery schools machine guns were mounted on trucks, but these were not as elaborate or realistic as the railroad car on the Utah range. This car was dubbed the Tokio Trolley, and it gained a certain fame among gunnery instructors throughout the United States for its realism.
These training devices for the gunners were put into use by November 1942. Prior to taking a ride on the Tokio Trolley the gunners spent many hours in the classroom learning theory and applications. The innovations of the bombing and gunnery range detachment personnel were apparent in this sphere as well. They devised a unique training aid for use in the classroom. Hanging model aircraft from fishing poles on a platform in the rooms, the instructors could adjust the positions of the aircraft to different formations, point out the best firing angles, and demonstrate the best offensive and defensive positions. While undergoing this classroom instruction the gunners also spent time on the rifle ranges. First they went to the small bore rifle range and then moved up to the skeet ranges. Skeet shooting gave the gunners practical experience at leading and swinging into moving targets.
By the end of 1942 the range facilities had been firmly established and four bomb groups had completed training. Of these, two had been B-17 and two B-24 groups, and an additional B-17 group was in training. Throughout 1943 the western Utah desert continued its primary role in the training of heavy bombardment groups. Also, in late 1943 the three-phased bomber training program was modified so that all training could take place at one station Thus, training activities at the Utah range took on a new look. The bombing and gunnery training continued as before, but added was the responsibility of welding the individual crews into effective units. This included extensive training in high-altitude formation flying, long-range navigation, target identification, and simulated combat missions.
All told, thirteen bombardment groups were trained at the Utah range through 1943 and another three groups were still in training. As 1944 began one of these departed, leaving two remaining B-24 groups in training. These two groups were the last of the Liberator groups to be trained at the desert range. Over the course of bomb group training at the range a total of twenty B-17 and B-24 groups were trained— enough to outfit the entire Eighth Air Force, although not all went to that organization. In all, well over 1,000 aircrews were trained at the Utah range. These crews participated in the strategic bombing of Germany, flew in support of D- Day, and conducted combat operations around the world from the Mediterranean to China. Some of the men became heroes; in fact three of the groups produced Medal of Honor recipients.
Until the latter part of the war the range was under the direct charge of the Second Air Force. But on April 18, 1944, the 72d Fighter Wing took charge of the range. This move was made to facilitate the range's changing role from bomber training to fighter pilot training. For fighter pilots the site became a combat crew training school that drilled individuals prior to their assignment to operational fighter groups. Fighter transition and gunnery training in the P-47 aircraft were accomplished on the Utah ranges during the summer of 1944.
This fighter training program was divided into two phases: air and ground. Ground training consisted of photography, combat intelligence, chemical warfare, and a range orientation. Also included was training in the Link flight simulator. Air training consisted of air-to ground and air-to-air gunnery, communications, and flight instruction. Flight instruction was necessary as the pilot trainees sent to the site had no experience in the P-47, having flown only trainer aircraft Each pilot completing the program at Wendover had to have a minimum of eighty flying hours in the P-47.
The first group of sixty P-47 pilot trainees arrived to use the range on May 31, 1944. They came from the Harding Field Indoctrination Center, Louisiana, and were followed by a second group of sixty trainees on June 30, also from Harding Field. By July 22, forty-two pilot trainees had completed this part of their training and were transferred to other organizations. The second, and ultimately the last, group of P-47 pilot trainees (forty-seven total) completed the program in August 1944. During the period of P-47 training on the range more than 100 Thunderbolts were located at Wendover Field, and novice pilots peppered targets on the ground and in the air over the desert ranges. In September 1944 control of the range reverted to the Second Air Force and P-47 training was terminated. The P-47 aircraft and the remaining trainees were transferred to bases in the 72d Fighter Wing.
The hurried departure of the P-4 7 s from the site made room for the 393d Bombardment Squadron (Very Heavy), a B-29 unit The 393d, which had been stationed at Fairmont Army Air Field, Nebraska, was moved to the airfield without explanation and on short notice. The orders moving the 393 d were cut on September 10, and just four days later the unit was formally relocated to Utah. Without question this was a very special squadron, for the 393d became the nucleus of the 509th Composite Group, the only unit ever to drop an atomic bomb in combat.
In the fall of 1944 the Manhattan Project was in full swing developing the atomic bomb, and the Army Air Forces began to prepare for the delivery of the weapon. Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold insisted that the most capable United States aircraft be used for this purpose—the newly developed B-29 Superfortress. The B-29 was the only U. S. aircraft that was large enough and had sufficient range to deliver the expected payload. The only other possibility in service at the time was the British built Lancaster bomber. With the aircraft settled on, the major remaining task was to form and train a unit to use the new weapon. The first step in this process was to choose a leader for the effort For this critical responsibility Arnold selected Lt Col. Paul W. Tibbets, a veteran bomber pilot who had already served in Europe. He was also intimately familiar with the B-29, having been the air corps' principal B-29 test pilot Prior to his selection to lead this unit, Tibbets, like all but a select few in the nation, had no knowledge of the effort to develop nuclear weapons.
In early September 1944 Tibbets was called to the office of Maj. Gen. Uzal Ent, commander of the Second Air Force at Colorado Springs, Colorado. After being questioned and cleared by a security official, Tibbets was briefed on the Manhattan Project and given his task by Ent, who stressed that secrecy was of the utmost importance; no one was to know any more than required for his job. Tibbets was urged to make up a fictitious story to explain to his associates what they were doing. General Ent also told the colonel that he could select virtually anyone in the Army Air Force for his unit To start the project Tibbets was given the 393d Bombardment Squadron, still stationed in Nebraska at that time. He was also told that if he encountered any difficulties in acquiring what he required to complete his mission, he was to use the code name for the project—Silver Plate. Although most did not understand what Silver Plate meant, it would ensure priority for his requests.
For an operating location Tibbets was offered three suitable bases: Mountain Home, Idaho; Fairmont, Nebraska,; and Wendover, Utah. All three had acceptable facilities and runways for B-29 operations. The choice of location was left to Tibbets, who, after surveying all the facilities, asked to move his command to the isolated Utah desert where the range could be used to train his aircrews. With this request the wheels were rapidly set in motion to relocate the P-47s from Wendover and move in the 393d.
Tibbets based his choice on several factors. The availability of the bombing and gunnery range on the western Utah desert was an important consideration. The fact that heavy bombers had trained at the installation in the past and all the necessary facilities were readily available also contributed to his choice. Adding to Wendover's attractiveness, according to Tibbets, was its relative closeness to Los Alamos, New Mexico, a location he would have to visit frequentiy to consult with the scientists and engineers building the bomb. The primary reason for selecting the installation, however, was its isolation, which meant that security could be maintained with relative ease.
When the 393d moved to the site a detachment of 400 FBI agents also moved in. They checked each member associated with the unit to verify his loyalty and dependability. These investigations turned up people who had used false names to enter the army and some who had psychiatric problems. One individual, a machinist, was discovered to be wanted by police in another state on suspicion of murder. The murder suspect, according to Tibbets, was "a very good machinist," and since his skills were needed he stayed with the group. But others who were considered security risks were removed by Manhattan Project security officials. The FBI agents in Utah probed incessantly for possible security leaks. They monitored telephone calls and followed and approached individuals in attempts to get them to talk about what they were doing, even though none had any idea of the ramifications of the unit's activities.
During the unit's stay in Utah only five individuals were removed for security reasons. In a reflective article, Tibbets recounted the story of one of these individuals. The group's first operations officer was a major who liked to impress his subordinates and strangers with his importance. Once informed of several incidents concerning this major, Tibbets told the Manhattan people to "ship him." A bogus temporary duty assignment was arranged to the East Coast for the talkative major. Upon boarding a military aircraft in Salt Lake City— no transient aircraft were allowed at Wendover— the major soon discovered that he was not going east Tibbetts had sent the major to a special camp arranged by the Manhattan people where he" found other people of like inclination with whom he talked until the end of the war." Security at the installation was extremely tight and obviously very effective.
The training program designed by Tibbets stressed accuracy. Although the 393d aircrews had already received flight training and were capable of meeting the normal standards for accuracy, Tibbets demanded more. The squadron's crews normally counted a miss of up to 500 feet from the center of the target as a bull's eye, but Tibbets required that they be no more than 200 feet from the center at an altitude of 30,000 feet Moreover, bombing was to be done visually, with no radar allowed Another unique aspect of the crew training program involved practice to deliver a single bomb. These dummy bombs were initially 500-pound iron bombs, but later they used 10,000-pound models of the Fat Man design called pumpkins. The crews were also taught to execute a tight 158-degree turn just after bomb release, unaware that the reason was to retreat as far away as possible fi-om the target to avoid the expected shock waves from the atomic explosion.
While the 393d began its intensive training program, Tibbets supported the test and development program for the bomb. This task included marrying the bomb to the aircraft by modifying carriage and release mechanisms as well as the bomb-bay doors. Testing indicated a need to make modifications to the weapon's shape so that it would "fly" a predictable flight path to the target, a difficult task since the scientists and engineers were constantly making changes. Also, an altitude fusing mechanism was perfected to detonate the bomb. All of this testing and development was done with shapes and models, not an actual bomb. During the entire stay of the unit in Utah no atomic bomb had been built or detonated anywhere.
It should be noted that during the early months in Utah, Tibbets had no formal association with the 393 d; he was neither the commander nor assigned to the squadron, but the 393d commander reported to him. The unique requirements of the mission created the need for a larger organization. Accordingly, on December 17, 1944, the 509th Composite Group was activated at Wendover Field. Tibbets became commander of this organization, and the 393d was assigned to the 509th. A self-sufficient organization, this group had its own air service organization, transport unit, and military police company. Another squadron, the 1st Ordnance Squadron (Special), was assigned in March 1945 and became the armorers for the group.
By May 1945 the shape and ballistics of the bomb had been finalized, the aircrews of the 393 d had attained the accuracy and flying skills Tibbets demanded, and the group's B-29s had been modified for the nuclear delivery mission. Indeed, it appeared that all was in order, and so on May 29, 1945, the 509th was officially relocated to Tinian in the Mciriana Island chain to carry out its special mission On August 6, 1945, Colonel Tibbets, flying his B-29, the Enola Gay, dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. Three days later another B-29, Bock's Car, from the 509th dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. Discussion of the necessity of using these weapons aside, the 509th Composite Group, created and trained on the range in the western Utah desert, executed its mission with efficiency and precision.
The Utah range was also ideal for missile testing. In February 1944, while the last of the normal heavy bomber units were being trained on the range, another unit moved in— the Special Weapons Field Test Unit As its name implied, this unit tested new weapons that were under development Two programs in particular were important in 1944 and 1945. One involved the development of glide bombs designed so that they could hit heavily defended targets while the aircraft maintained a safe distance. The other tested the Azon bomb, a bomb that could be radio controlled from the tailgunner's position but had limited movement right or left in flight Neither of these weapons saw extensive use in World War II. However, this unit marked the beginning of an important postwar mission for the range.
Following World War II the air force, which became a service independent of the army in September 1947, continued to conduct a missile research and development program in which the vast ranges of western Utah played an important part The first postwar experiments involved captured German missiles. During World War II Germany had successfully developed an operational missile capability. Two weapons in particular were used —the V-I buzz bomb and the V-2 rocket The V-I, first used in June 1944, had one substantial weakness; it was relatively slow with a top speed of 400 miles per hour. This made it possible for Allied pilots and antiaircraft operators to destroy it Of the more than 8,000 V-Is launched, over half were destroyed before reaching their targets; but those that did reach London exacted a toll: 6,000 dead, 40,000 wounded, and 75,000 homes destroyed.
The V-I was essentially an air-breathing cruise missile, but the second German weapon was the first true ballistic missile. A liquid propellent missile rising 46 feet in height, the V-2 flew at speeds in excess of 3,500 miles per hour. It was first employed against targets in Europe beginning in September 1944. By the end of the war 1,155 had been fired against England and another 1,675 had been launched against Antwerp and other continental targets. The guidance system for these missiles was imperfect and many did not reach their targets, but there was no defense against them. Clearly the technology employed in both missiles was worth American study.
Accordingly, near the end of the war in Europe many captured V-1 and V-2 missiles were brought to the United States for testing. Along with them came many of the scientists and engineers who had developed these weapons, most notably Wernher von Braun, head of the German rocket development team at the Peenemunde Experimental Center. Some experimental activities for the V-1 test program were set up on the Utah range, and during the late 1940s a series of important investigations taught the U. S. Air Force much about the characteristics of rocket technology. The V-2s were tested at the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico.
The first postwar missile experience at the Utah range was with an American version of the V-1. Dubbed the JB-2, this missile had been developed by the Navy to be launched from submarines. Its value was also recognized by the air force One of General "Hap" Arnold's key assistants wrote to technical advisor Vannevar Bush late in the war
Work with the J B-2 on the Utah range involved virtually all facets of the research and development program: assembly, launching, flight control, and radar tracking. To support the JB-2 test program the army constructed an inclined launching ramp 400 feet long just south of the Wendover runways as well as support facilities in late 1945. This launch complex consisted of a three-rail launching sled powered by rocket cartridges designed to catapult the JB-2 to a flying altitude rapidly. Since its flight characteristics were slow, P-51 Mustangs were used as chase aircraft. If the JB-2 went astray the P-51 could intercept and destroy the missile while still in the air. During 1946 numerous JB-2 s were launched over the western Utah desert, but the program was hampered by many technical problems, including both the launching sled and the missile. Indeed, the JB-2 never reached the point where it could be established as an operational weapon system. Nevertheless, air force officials claimed that it had given them valuable experience in propulsion, fight control, and launching mechanics for future missile systems.
Somewhat more significant was the Ground-to-Air Pilotless Aircraft (GAPA) program begun in 1946 to test a system under development by the Boeing Airplane Company. Essentially, the GAPA program aimed toward the development of a tactical supersonic missile with remote control that could intercept aircraft flying at speeds of up to 700 miles per hour at altitudes between 8,000 and 60,000 feet This missile was approximately ten feet in length and propelled by a solid fuel rocket motor. To support this test program approximately thirty Boeing technicians moved onto the range in the spring of 1946. A launching pad and control bunker were constructed in the Knolls area of the north range. Meanwhile, at Wendover Field "GAPA City" was created as the site for Boeing employees to assemble the missiles before taking them out to the desert for launching. For the GAPA tests Boeing moved the first sophisticated monitoring equipment into the west Utah desert, a system of radar and theodolite stations installed along a path extending six miles downrange from the launch site.
After adequate preparations on the range—while the JB-2 program was underway nearby— the first launching of the GAPA took place on Junel3, 1946. It took another month of launches before one yielded positive results and could be considered successful. Of the forty GAPA missiles launched on the desert range between June 1946 and September 1947, each was strikingly different from all the others. Since the GAPA program gathered scientific data on the problems of developing a surface-to-air missile system, the missiles were purposely dissimilar to present different sets of data History was made on the range on the twelfth test launch of the missile. On August 6, 1946, the GAPA became the first air force flight vehicle to crack the sound barrier, achieving supersonic speeds. Later versions of the GAPA achieved even greater speeds, the last versions exceeding 1,500 miles per hour. Besides setting these marks, the GAPA program provided much needed scientific data, especially in the areas of roll stabilization and control. This successful program led directly to the development of the Bomarc missile system by Boeing in the 1950s. The Bomarc, also a surface to-air-missile system, served well until finally phased out in 1968.
Testing of munitions delivered by aircraft also continued on the Utah range after the war. One of these was the ROC, a 1,000-pound glide bomb equipped with a television camera in its nose which relayed target information to the aircraft The bomb could then be guided to the target Another system tested was a six-ton radio-controlled free-falling air-to-ground bomb dubbed the Tarzan. These weapons were direct ancestors of the modern smart weapons.
Although not specifically a bomb or missde program, another research and development effort in the western Utah desert became known as the "beeper school." It tested the capabilities of pilots on the ground to fly B-17 aircraft via remote control. This idea emerged during the latter stages of World War II when someone suggested loading worn out B-17s and B-24s with explosives and using them as flying bombs. During the war these B-17s had been labeled Weary Willies and never saw extensive use, but throughout 1946 pilots on the Utah range tested the flying of B-17s by remote control, either from the ground or from other aircraft The pilots were not successful in maintaining effective operation of the aircraft under remote control. Moreover, the aircraft were found to be too vulnerable to enemy attack. The project was abandoned in late 1946 after months of frustration.
In late 1946 yet another missile program was established at the Utah range. The Tiamat, officially designated the JB-3, was a follow-on to the JB-2 program. As preparations to accommodate this weapon development program were being completed the decision to end missile testing and development at the Utah range was announced on March 16, 1947, as an economy measure by the air force to consolidate all similar activities at a single location. That site was the White Sands Proving Ground near Los Alamos, New Mexico, where a much larger research infrastructure was already in place as a consequence of the wartime Manhattan Project Although the Boeing contractors conducting the GAPA program worked on the Utah range until September 1947, after March 16 the test facilities drifted into semi-use.
In March 1947 the Utah range was assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC), not for weapons testing but as a site for training. Approximately six weeks after being assigned to SAC, the 43 d Bomb Group, a unit of the Eighth Air Force based at Davis-Monthan Field, Arizona, came to the range with thirty B-29 aircraft for training. Since the 43 d was using the range on a temporary basis, special arrangements for the stay had to be made. SAC shipped fuel in from California and bombs from the Tooele Ordnance Depot, in nearby Tooele, Utah. The 43d sharpened its skills by dropping 500-pound demolition bombs on the western Utah desert during its two-week temporary training assignment The effort was so successful that SAC began to schedule units to use the range on a regular basis, and the facility was in almost constant use for the next several years. One of the first to follow the 43 d onto the range was the 509th Bomb Group, which in 1944 and 1945 had trained on the Salt Flat ranges of Utah to drop the atomic bomb. The 509th returned at the end of May 1947 from its permanent base at Roswell Army Air Field, New Mexico, to its birthplace, so to speak, for an additional two-week training period. In addition to the units deployed to the range for training, bombers flying from and returning to their home stations throughout the western United States used the Utah range for practice missions.
Use of the Utah complex began slowly with one unit at a time; however, range areas soon became the sites of large-scale mock air battles. The first of these was conducted on August 21, 1947, when aircraft from four different SAC bomb groups flying from their home stations launched a simulated attack on targets at the Utah range. Another twist in this operation was that P-80 (later designated F-80) jet fighters, temporarily based in Utah, were used to intercept the B-29s, defending the range targets from the attack This type of training was thought the most realistic available, and this initial exercise marked a use for the range that would continue for several years.
With more aircraft using the Utah Bombing and Gunnery Range, control procedures took on added significance. For instance, all aircraft entering the range areas were directed to contact the Wendover Field control tower for permission to attack an already scheduled target area Wendover tower operators would then mark on a map the target assigned with pins indicating that aircraft were in the area Upon completion of the bombing or strafing runs, the aircraft would again call the Wendover tower to inform controllers that they were leaving the range area The pins would then be removed so that the target could be assigned to other aircraft Also, if the aircraft experienced any problems necessitating an emergency landing, Wendover tower would assign them to one of two strips in the range area for emergency landings. The first was Dugway Field located in the southeast corner of the range, and the other was Low Flight Strip located three miles north of Knolls on the range (approximately forty miles east of Wendover). Dugway Field had limited emergency services available, and Low Flight Strip had none.
While SAC controlled the Utah range and used it to support its aircrew training function a number of new facilities were installed. SAC established 100-pound practice bomb targets at several locations on the range with graded circular targets and well-defined bull's eye marks 50, 100, 200, 300, and 500 feet from the center. One of these had a center pyramid that was 30 feet square with bull's eye circles outward. SAC personnel also established demolition bomb targets on the range, some of which were quite elaborate. For instance, according to a 1947 description: "Demo T: Locate 37 miles east of Wendover (N 40' 39" by W 113' 19"). This target had a 30' X 30' triangle painted white at the center and circles of 100,200,300, 400 and 500 feet out from the center.
These circles were enclosed by two triangles formed into a six-pointed star." It was an excellent target for sighting from altitudes above 30,000 feet Another target was a radar scoring site located 90 miles northeast of Wendover on Carrington Island in the Great Salt Lake which consisted of a 200-by-50-foot white cross located at the geographic center of the island. In addition, SAC established gunnery ranges for fighter aircraft One of these, Gunnery Range Q, was located 49 miles east of Wendover and had four 36- by-10-foot rectangles spaced 50 yards apart for targets. Finally, a section of the range was reserved for air-to-air gunnery training in the southeastern part of the range. There either fighter or bomber aircraft could fire their guns at aerial targets towed by other aircraft.
Early in 1948 the uses of the range began to change. The Strategic Air Command's B-29s were long-range bombers and for the most part could operate from their home stations and still utilize the Utah range. Accordingly, the number and frequency of bomb group deployments to the site tapered off throughout the year. In early 1949, realizing that the range was not going to be utilized as much as previously, SAC began decreasing its personnel operating the facility. For example, in 1947 more than 300 military and civilian personnel had been employed at Wendover Field to support the range and the base, but by the summer of 1949 this number had been reduced to less than 100. In September 1949 SAC decided to rid itself of the range's management.
Until this point whoever controlled Wendover Field had also controlled the ranges, but by 1950 this could no longer be the case. The range complex at this time consisted of three designated areas: R-508, R-258, and R-259. Range 508 contained approximately 94,000 acres of land just west of Wendover, most of which was located in Nevada Range 258 comprised approximately 351,000 acres northeast of Wendover, stretching to the Great Salt Lake. Range 259, the largest of the range areas, possessed over I million acres southeast of Wendover. The ranges also had adjacent restricted airspace; the air and land space combined totaled more than 3 million acres.
By far the most heavily used range areas were R-258 and R-259. Range R-508 had been used primarily for air-to-air training and some ground activity such as explosive ordnance disposal, but it was not used for air-to-ground activities because of the proximity of cattle and sheep grazing land. Accordingly, SAC transferred R-508 to the Air Materiel Command in July 1950. SAC kept the other two ranges, R-258 and R- 259, and placed them under the direction of the Fifteenth Air Force, headquartered at March Air Force Base, California At the same time control of aircraft entering and using the range, which had been the responsibility of controllers at Wendover Field, became a function of the control tower at Hill Air Force Base, near Ogden, Utah. Under this arrangement, the western Utah desert continued to support the training of bomber crews, and the ranges were also used by other aircraft types from time to time. Beginning in 1950, and for the next several years, this was how the ranges were used.
This began to change in the spring of 1954 when the Tacticid Air Command (TAG) began showing increased interest in the Utah ranges. In May 1954 the 461st Bombardment Wing (Light), a TAG tenant unit at Hill Air Force Base, with the support of SAC and the Utah Air National Guard, built a bombing and gunnery target complex in the northeastern corner of R-258. In July 1954 the 461 st deployed from Hill to Wendover for Operation Sandstorm, a six-week training exercise involving competition in rocketry, bombing, gunnery, and low-level navigation. The operation proved to be quite successful as bare base training, something the unit might be faced with in a real deployment during a foreign crisis. The success of the 461 st deployment prompted TAG to use the range more often for other unit training. As a result TAG operations on the range expanded, and it took over control of R-508 and Wendover Field. An important activity at the range began in August 1955 when TAC s Ninth Air Force conducted a gunnery competition on the west desert ranges. The following month, the Ninth hosted the USAF gunnery competition at the range and continued to use the range for the next several years for this type of training.
In 1955 two major air force commands controlled portions of the Utah range, and the situation became unwieldy. TAC managed Wendover Field and R-508, and SAC operated R-258 and R-259. Other military organizations used various parts of the range for their own purposes: air national guard and reserve units were big customers for range services, and the army and the navy both launched missiles that landed on the Utah range For instance, the army launched its Mace missile from White Sands Proving Ground, and the Navy fired the Regulus Missile from Point Mugu, California, both impacting in the Utah desert In addition, Dugway Proving Grounds, adjacent to the southeastern edge of R-259, used sections for chemical munitions development and testing. It seemed obvious to senior government officials that something should be done to alleviate the confusion of who had what authority to manage military facilities in the Utah desert.
As a result, the Tactical Air Command was given responsibility for most of the Utah range. Accordingly, in April 1956 TAC began to control R-258, renaming it the Newfoundland Mountain Range. At the end of 1956, to sort this out, there were three separate military agencies managing and controlling air and ground space in the western Utah desert Tactical Air Command controlled Wendover, R-508, and R-258. Strategic Air Command officially controlled all of R-259, although it used only the northern portion. The army's Dugway Proving Ground, of course, controlled its own area but also held unofficial suzerainty over a lower portion of R-259. By this time the air force and army ranges in Utah were thought to be well organized and utdized.
An interesting sidelight in the history of the Utah desert range began in the summer of 1956 when the U.S. Navy attempted to secure the use of a bombing range (R-258) for its fighter pilot training program and sought to base a navy fighter squadron at Hill Air Force Base. These proposals ultimately involved top military and Cabinet officials as well as state and federal agencies. A strong media campaign and intense lobbying of the Utah State Legislature for a land lease brought matters to a head, and in March 1957 the secretary of defense directed the navy to drop its proposal for a Utah bombing range.
Throughout the controversy over the navy's proposed bombing range, TAC continued to use Wendover and the R-258 range, while SAC used the northern portion of R-259. By late 1957, however, these commands had decided that control of the ranges should be given to a central organization. On January I, 1958, Wendover and ranges 508 and 258 were transferred to the Air Materiel Command which assigned responsibility for their management to the commander of the Ogden Air Materiel Area at Hill Air Force Base. In addition, in March 1958 SAC gave control of R-259 to this same organization. This was the third time the Air Materiel Command and Hill AFB had been given authority over these facilities. In the past, neither organization had found a real use for them, and the assignments were made solely for convenience. But this time Hill officials believed they had a worthwhile purpose.
Maj. Gen. Pearl H. Robey, commander of the Ogden Air Materiel Area, believed that Wendover and the adjacent ranges offered unlimited possibilities for logistics support of the rapidly developing USAF missile force. Hill AFB had already been involved with the support of several types of missile systems such as Bomarc. Besides supporting the missile era, units at Hill had other uses for the range areas. The 2700th Explosive Ordnance Squadron used R-508 for handling, testing, and training with explosives and ordnance components. Although R-508 was not suitable for aircraft operations, it was ideal for this type of ground activity. In addition, R-258 was also used during flight tests of aircraft that had undergone maintenance at Hill, including firing aircraft guns over and on R-258. The Ogden Air Materiel Area air munitions function also used R-258 area for testing high-performance rocket engines, boosters, and other munitions items. Of course, the air forces' fighters and bombers continued to schedule training time on the range on almost a daily basis. By the beginning of the 1960s the modern Utah range emerged as longstanding airspace and ownership issues were resolved. It has been in continuous use since that time as a training and test site for a variety of air force units and weapons systems.
With the advent of manned space flight in the 1960s a new use of the western Utah range was contemplated In 1962 the recovery of United States space vehicles was accomplished by ocean landings, a somewhat risky business that tied up limited naval resources. Believing that reusable, land-recovered space vehicles would be developed in the not too distant future, the air force proposed the construction of facilities at the Utah range that would accommodate space missions. Plans developed in November 1962 called for ten major construction programs at a cost of $ 120 million at the Utah range or at Hill Air Force Base by fiscal year 1966. Perhaps the most spectacular project was the creation of a spacecraft launch and recovery center in the western desert The proposed launch site was to be ten miles northeast of Wendover, and a recovery area encompassing 350 square miles in the desert was also envisioned. The air force argued that the Utah range complex offered the best possible location for this type of operation. The area was desolate and barren and a good aerospace support infrastructure was already available at Hill This effort, however, never moved beyond the level of internal air force consideration.
As time progressed and space efforts by the United States took a more firm direction, the possibility of using the Utah range for spacecraft recovery reemerged. In 1965, for instance, the Utah Department of Employment Security published a full color brochure explaining the advantages of the range complex as an inland spaceport Indeed, it seemed that nearly every time a new space vehicle was announced during the next several years, the Utah range recovery prospect was revived. The most serious consideration of the range's use for this purpose came during the early 1970s when plans for the Space Transportation System were being developed. At that time it was envisioned that the air force would operate a small fleet of shuttles for Department of Defense purposes and that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) would also operate a fleet and develop the system for other purposes. The shuttle was designed to be reusable, recovering from a spaceflight on a runway rather than in a splashdown. Some officials saw the Utah range as ideal for this recovery area.
Utah business and government leaders also pushed for NASA's selection of Utah as an inland spaceport Members of the congressional delegation from Utah and Nevada urged a full study of the advantages of using the Utah range, but in the end their efforts came to nothing. In addition to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, where NASA already had a well-established infrastructure to support shuttle operations, only one additional launch site was feasible. The air force's primary missile launch site on the West Coast, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, was a leading contender, followed by the army's White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, Utah's range, and Clinton-Sherman Air Force Base in Oklahoma Based on both economic and technological considerations, Vandenberg was chosen as the second spaceport Ultimately, economic considerations cancelled Vandenberg's shuttle spaceport ambitions, and the Kennedy Space Center has remained the sole launch site for spacecraft. The Utah range did become a location for the testing of various space components, and in the 1970s it was used extensively for such activities as testing missile motors.
The Utah range has undergone a series of permutations since its establishment in the summer of 1941. Born of necessity during World War II and enjoying a heyday as a result of that crisis, the range evolved through several transfers of control and development by those organizations operating it in the Cold War era. Several major initiatives relative to it never got off the ground, but numerous minor alterations to the range were made. One important action took place on January 1, 1979, when the range complex in Utah was transferred with all assets and personnel fi'om management by the Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill Air Force Base to the Air Force Systems Command, the USAF organization charged with the development of new equipment for the service. With that change the facility was renamed the Utah Test and Training Range, an accurate description of activities there. The 6545th Test Group from the Air Force Systems Command, stationed at Hill AFB, handled the testing of equipment on the range. The high-speed flight test operations conducted from Edwards Air Force Base, Califomia, also routinely relied on the Utah range for some of the research. The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing and many other fighter units of both the active and the air reserve component of the air force also continued to use the range for training virtually every day.
One final issue of note should be discussed concerning the Utah range. As a result of a series of wet years in Utah in the 1970 s the level of the Great Salt Lake began to rise and flood areas near its shores that had been stable for more than 100 years. The highest recording ever made of the Great Salt Lake had been in 1870 when it covered 2,400 square miles and had an elevation of about 4,211.6 feet In the 1961-63 period it covered only 950 square miles and was more than 20 feet lower than in 1870. Since that low point, however, the lake had increased in depth by 9.5 feet and covered an area of 1,734 square miles, almost double the area under water in the early 1960s. By 1976 the rising lake alarmed Utah leaders, and they proposed a plan to pump thousands of gallons of saltwater from the lake over the western mountains onto the Utah range This threatened the integrity of air force operations in the range and led to a debate that ended when the situation abated because of a series of dry years in Utah in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The issue, and the same proposed solution, arose again in 1984 when the climatic cycle swung back the other way. This time the state adamantly pressed the air force for permission to build a pumping station that would flood parts of the range with water from the lake. Economic impact, environmental impact, and other types of studies were completed in the mid-1980s, and construction of the station took place in 1986-87. Although the air force was opposed to the plan it acquiesced in the state's initiative. In due time the Newfoundland Basin on part of the range was filled with saltwater and portions were lost to operational activity, though not irrecoverably. Adjustments were made and military activity on the range has continued to the present During the fifty years of its existence the Utah desert range, employed in training and testing, has provided a unique military resource that could not be duplicated elsewhere.
NOTES
Dr. Launius is chief historian and director of the History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
1 F.C Torkelson Co., Engineers, "Hill Air Force Range," December 1965, located in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History, Hill Air Force Base, UT.
2 Wesley Frank Craven and James L Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II: Men and Planes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 6:119-20, 171-73 On ranges in the prewar years see Maurer Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History-, 1987), pp. 381-85.
3 Office of Chief of Air Corps Station List, March 2, 1939; Memo from Lt Col Harold L George to Air Corps Chief of Staff, October 14, 1941; Lt Col M.F Davis, Executive Officer to Chief of Air Corps, to Commanding General GHO Air Force, September 29, 1938, with attachments; memo from Brig Gen Carl A Spaatz, to Chief of Air Corps, November 14, 1939, all in Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
4 Craven and Cate, eds. Army Air Forces in World War II, 6:129.
5 USAF Historical Division, " Brief History of Wendover Air Force Base, 1940-1956," July 1956, p 2, copy in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History; Craven and Cate, eds., History of Army Air Forces in World War II, 6:142-43. The base near Ogden was founded in November 1940 as Hill Field.
6 Craven and Cate, eds., Army Air Forces in World War H, 6:143; USAF Historical Division, "Brief History' of Wendover Air Force Base, 1940-1956," pp 2-5; AFLC Wendover Range Complex (Hill Air Force Base: Ogden Air Materiel Area, 1968), pp 23-24; O.N Malmquist, "More Than $52,000,000 Spenton Tooele County War Plants," Salt Lake Tribune, Sunday Magazine, July 11, 1943, p 4; Leonard J. Arrington and Thomas G. Alexander, "World's Largest Militarv Reserve: Wendover Air Force Base, 1941-1963," Utah Historical Quarterly 31 (1963): 325-26; Leonard} Arrington and George Jensen, The Defense Industry of Utah (Logan: Utah State University, 1965), pp 10-12.
7 History of Wendover Army Air Base, Installment 1, 1 January 1939 to 7 December 1941," August 16, 1943, pp. 1-2, Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of Hstory; Byron Dussler, "The Wendover Experience," United States Air Force in Utah Historical Record 1 (April-June 1984): 1.4.
8 On Dussler see Roger D. Launius, "One Man's Air Force: The Experiences of Byron Dussler at Wendover Field, Utah, 1941-46," Utah Historical Quarterly 54 (Spring 1986): 137-56.
9 Byron Dussler to Lulu Harrwig and Josephine Ivey, August 6, 1941, copv in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History.
10 Ibid., August 6, 1941, September 26, 1941.
11 USAF Historical Division, "Brief History,- of Wendover Air Force Base, 1940-1956," pp. 2-3.
12 Craven and Cate, eds. Army Air Forces in World War II, 6:600-601; USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover Air Force Base, 1940-1956," p 6.
13 History of Wendover Army Air Base and 315 the Base Headquarters and Air Base Squadron, 7 December 1941 to 31 December 1942," p 5, copy available in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History; USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover Air Force Base, 1940-1956," p 4.
14 History of Wendover Army Air Base and 315th Base Headquarters and Air Base Squadron, 7 December 1941 to 31 December 1942," pp 8-9.
15 Ibid.
16 USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover Air Force Base, 1940-1956," pp 5, 7-9.
17 Ibid., p 9; "History of Wendover Field, 1943,' pp 7-9, Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History.
18 Chronology of Wendover, 1941-1981, Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History; Maurer ed.. Air Force Combat Units of World War II. The bombardment groups trained on the Utah range were in chronological order 306th, 302d, 308th, 379th, 100th, 384th, 388th, 393d, 399th, 445th, 458th, 461st, 448th, 451st, 467th, 489th, 490th, 494th, and 457th.
19 lbid.; "History of Wendover Army Air Field, Jun e 1944," pp 3-4; "History of Wendover Field, July 1944," pp. 2-3, both in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History.
20 See note above; "History of Wendover Army Air Field, August 1944," pp 5; "History of Wendover Field, September 1944, " pp 1-4, all in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History.
21 History of Wendover Field, September 1944," pp. 1-4; USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover, 1940-1956," p 8; Michael Amrine, The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb {New York: G.R Putnam's Sons, 1959), pp 59-61
22 Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, D.C: Center for Military History, 1985), pp 520-21 The literature on the development of nuclear weapons is extensive For further information on this subject see, Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 7 WS-/9 561 (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1980): Daniel J Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modem America (New York Alfred A Knopf 1978); Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance [New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1977); Gerard H Clarfield and William M Wiecek, Nuclear America: Military and Civilian Nuclear Power in the United States, 1940-19,S0lNvw York: Harper and Row, 1984); Richard C Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985).
23 Training Camp for the Atomic Age: Wendover Field," Aerospace Historian, 20 (Fall 1973): 13738; Paul W Tibbets, "Twenty-Eight Years Ago: Training the 509th for Hiroshima," Air Force, August 1973, pp 51-54; interview with Brig Gen Paul W Tibbets, Jr., September 1966, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; Maurer, ed. Air Force Combat Units of World War II, pp 371-72, 482; USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover Air Force Base, 1940-1956," pp 9-10.
24 Tibbets, "Training the 509th for Hiroshima," pp 51-53; interview with Brig Gen Paul W Tibbets, Jr., September 1966.
25 Training Camp for the Atomic Age," pp 137-38; Tibbets, "Training the 509th for Hiroshima," pp. 52-53; Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II, No High Ground (New York Harper and Brothers, 1960), p 82; Roger D Launius, The United States Air Force in Utah The Case of Wendover Field (Salt Lake City: Fort Douglas Military Museum Monograph Series, 1985).
26 Maurer, ed.. Air Force Combat Units of World War II, pp 371- 72, 482; USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover Air Force Base, 1940-1956," pp 9-10.
27 Training Camp for the Atomic Age," pp 137-38; Tibbets, "Training the 509th for Hiroshima," pp 52-53; interview with Tibbets, September 1966; History of the 509th Composite Group, Activation-n August 1945 (Wendover Field: 509th Composite Group Office of History, 1945), pp 6369 On the debate over the use of this weapon see Michael Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), as only one example of the depth of scholarship on this subject.
28 A Pictorial Brochure of the Special Weapons Field Test Unit, Wendover Army Air Field, Utah (Wendover Special Weapons Field Test Unit, January 1945), pp. 6-11.
29 Stanley M Ulanoff, Illustrated Guide to U.S. Missiles and Rockets (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1962), pp 126-7.
30 Eugene M. Emme, A History of Space Flight {New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 97; Michael J Neufeld, "Hitler, the V-2, and the Battle for Priority, 1939-1943," unpublished address at Works in Progress Seminar, May 8, 1991, sponsored by the National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.
31 This effort has been described in James McGovern, Crossbow and Overcast (New York William Morrow, 1964); Clarence G Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York Atheneum, 1971); Walter Dornberger, V-2: The Nazi Rocket Weapon (New York Viking Press, 1954); Wernher von Braun, Frederick I Ordway III, and David Dooling, Space Travel A History (New York Harper and Row, 1985ed.); Peter G. Cooksley, Flying Bomb (New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979); Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945-1990 (New York St. Martin's Press, 1991).
32 Lt. Gen Barney M Giles to Vannevar Bush, February 20, 1945, as quoted in Delmar S Fahrney, "Th e History of Pilotless Aircraft and Guided Missiles," p 1958, p 811, located in the Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
33 Ulanoff, Illustrated Guide to U.S. Missiles and Rockets, pp 126-27: "History of Wendover Army Air Field, April-June 1946," pp. 8-9;"History of Wendover Army Air Field, July-September 1946," p. 15; "History of Wendover Army Air Field, October-December 1946," p 21.
34 GAPA: Holloman's First Missile Program,1947-1950 (Holloman Air Force Base, NM: Historical Branch, Air Force Missile Development Center, n d.), p 1;" Boeing Developing Supersonic Aircraft," Boeing News (Seattle, WA), 5 (August 15, 1946): 1-2.
35 Frederick 1 Ordway HI and R.C Wakefield, International Missile and Spacecraft Guide (New York McGraw Hill, 1960), p 179; Office of Air Force History to Gilbert Moore, "Request for Material—Project GAPA," November 27, 1979, Office of Air Force History, Boiling Air Force Base, DC; Air University Form 245," Request for Material GAPA," October 22, 1979, Air Force Historical Research Center.
36 History of Wendover Army Air Field, April-June 1946," pp. 6-7; "History of Wendover Army Air Field, July-September 1946," p 14; "History of Wendover Army Air Field, October December 1946," pp. 18-20; Kenneth H. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missle(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1987), pp 79-81.
37 History of Wendover Army Air Field, April-June 1946," p 8; "History of Wendover Army Air Field, July-September 1946," p 15 "History of Wendover Army Air Field, October-December 1946," p 18.
38 History of Wendover Army Air Field, October-December 1946," pp. 18-20. There is some evidence to indicate that when the decision to consolidate the test sites was under consideration the Army Air Forces might have been interested in establishing the primary missile proving ground on the Utah range rather than at White Sands. They agreed that the land of the range was abundant and that facilities were readily available. Also, there were indications that military officials met with Gov. Herbert Maw of Utah to gain his support for this development, but Maw did not support the program because of a concern for the welfare of the state's population in possible nuclear and other weapons tests, without that support the air force was forced to consolidate to White Sands where the political delegation was in favor of having them Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History files.
39 General Orders, Ogden Air Materiel Area, "Transfer of Wendover Field and 4145th AAF Base Unit," March 15, 1947, Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History-; Robert Mueller, Air Force Bases, Vol 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL Albert F Simpson Historical Research Center Research Division, 1982), pp 146-49; "Histories of Wendover Army Air Field, March 16 to April 30, 1947," p 1, May 1947, pp 9-15, June 1947, p 14, July through December, passim.
40 History of Wendover Army Air Field, August 1947," pp 12-32.
41 Ibid., October 1947, pp. 3, 16-17.
42 Standard Operating Procedure Q, Wendover General Bombing and Gunnery Range, Wendover Field, Utah, November 10, 1947, located in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History.
43 Histories of Wendover AFB, January to December 1948;" USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover AFB, 1940-1956," p 11.
44 USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover AFB, 1940-1956," p 11; "History of Ogden Air Materiel Area, Hill AFB, Utah, July-December 1958," pp 109-14.
45 History of Ogden Air Materiel Area, July-December 1958," pp. 109-114; USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover AFB, 1940-1956," p 11.
46 History of Ogden Air Materiel Area, Hill AFB, Utah, July-December 1952, p 18; "Chronology of Wendover AFB, 1941 -1981," located in Ogden Air Logistics Center of History;" Brief History of Wendover AFB, 1940-1956," p 11.
47 Chronology of Wendover AFB, 1941-1981;' USAF Historical Division, "Brief History of Wendover AFB, 1940-1956," p. 11; Leonard J. Arrington and Thomas G. Alexander, "Sentinels on the Desert The Dugway Proving Ground( 1942-1963) and Desen Chemical Depot( 1942-1955)," Utah Historical Quarterly 32 (1964): 32-43.
48 History of Ogden Air Materiel Area, July 1-December 31, 1958," pp. 109-17; "History of 4432d Air Base Squadron, January-June 1956," p 12.
49 Helen Rice, "A Lesson in Communications and Community Relations," April 1957, p 2; Commandant of the Twelfth Naval District to State Land Board, State of Utah, October 2, 1956; Minutes of the Los Angeles Regional Airspace Subcommittee, November 1, 1956, all in files of Ogden Air Logistics Center office of History; Brig Gen Pearl H Robey, commander of Ogden Air Materiel Area, to Gen E.W Rawlings, commander of Air Materiel Command , October 5, 1956, Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History; "Navy Asks State for Bomb Range," Ogden Standard-Examiner, October 9, 1956; "Navy Leases Box Elder Area for Bomb Range," Ogden Standard- Examiner, October II , 1956; Minutes of Los Angeles Regional Airspace Subcommittee Meeting, November 1, 1956, copy in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History; Harlen W Bement, director of Utah State Aeronautics Commission to C.H Vance, chairman of State Aeronautics Commission, Decembers , 1956, copy in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History; Transcripts of telephone conversations amon g Col L L Kunish, deputy commander of Ogden Air Materiel, Brig Gen Pearl H Robey, commander of Ogden Air Materiel Area, and Maj M.J Sommovlgo and Col Wilmot, Air Traffic Control Branch, DCS Operations, HQ USAF, January 14 and 16, 1957; personal message of commander of Ogden Air Materiel Area to commander of Air Materiel Command , December 22, 1956, both in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History; "Congressman William A Dawson Reports from Washington," Utah Statesman, March 15, 1957; personal message of commander of Ogden Air Materiel Area to commander of Air Materiel Command , December 22, 1956; message of HQ^USAF to commander of TAC, et al., "Joint Use of Wendover Range with U.S Navy," March 6, 1957, Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History; "House Passes Curbs on Land Grabs," Salt Lake Tribune, April 12, 1957.
50 History of Ogden Air Materiel Area, January 1-June 30, 1958," pp 40-45; "History of Ogden Air Materiel Area, July 1-December 31, 1958,"'pp 112-13.
51 Ibid., January l-June 30, 1958, pp. 40-47, July 1-December 31, 1958, p. 1.
52 Ibid.,July 1-December31, 1958, pp 109-15,January 1-June30, 1959, pp 118-24; Maj Gen, Pearl H. Robey, commander of Ogden Air Materiel Area to General S. E. Anderson, commander of Air Materiel Command, May 15, 1959; Gen S.E Anderson, commander of Air Materiel Command to Maj Gen Pearl H Robey, commander of Ogden Air Materiel Area, May 29, 1959, all in Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History.
53 Wendover Buzzes with Speculation about Space Port," Ogden Standard-Examiner, November 29, 1964; "Burton Says Flats Likely Space Site," Salt Lake Tribune, November 23, 1964; "A Desert Spaceport." Utah's in Running," Salt Lake Tribune, August 3, 1965; "Report Pins Wendover as Space Landing Site," Salt Lake Tribune, May 11, 1967; "Wendover Still in Space Blueprint?" Deseret News, ]u\y 23, 1969.
54 For Dry Land Recovery of /space Vehicles: The Great Salt Lake Desert (Salt Lake City: Utah Department of Economic Security, 1965)
55 Solon Urges W Utah Space Site," Salt Lake Tribune, ^a.nua.ry2S, 1971; "Utah Assets Good for Spaceport, Weber Native Says," Ogden Standard-Examiner, March 11, 1971; "Utahns Seek Spaceport Site," Utah Industrial Progress Report 6 (March 1971): I, 4:; "Wendover Field,"' Salt Lake Tribune, March 3 1971; "Bennett Asks Nixon's Help to Convert Wendover Field" Salt Lake Tribune, March 3, 1972 Raymond L Hixon, "Utah's Case—Spaceport," Utah Economic and Business Review 31 (May 1971) 1-6.
56 Jack Waugh, "Which Launching Site is Fairest of Them All?" Christian Science Monitor, February 1, 1971; Sen Wallace F Bennett to Dr George M Low, NASA acting administrator, December 28, 1970; memorandum from R.H. Curtin, NASA director of facilities, to NASA executive officer, "State of Utah Site visits by the Space shuttle Facilities Group," April 9, 1971; Rep Walter S Baring to Dr. George M Low, NASA acting administrator, April 26, 1971; memorandum from Fred J DeMeritte, NASA Entry Technology Office to director Office of Facilities, "Evaluation of Utah Spaceport Site Selection Studies," April 18, 197 1, all in NASA History Division Reference Collection, Washington, DC.
57 Helen Rice, Chronology of Ogden Air Materiel Area, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, 1970-1971 (Hill Air Force Base: Ogden Air Materiel Area Office of History, n.d.), p 3; P Susan Weathers, Chronology of Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, 1976-1985 (Hill Air Force Base: Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History, 1986), pp 18, 55, 76, 96.
58 Weathers, Chronology of Ogden Air Logistics Center, p 36; Ogden Air Logistics Center Public Affairs Office," Utah Test and Training Range Fact Sheet," January 1986, Ogden Air Logistics Center Office of History; Air Force Flight Test Center/Edwards AFB, California: Test Capabilities and Facilities (Edwards AFB: Air Force Flight Test Center, n.d.).
59 Weathers, Chronology of Ogden Air Logistics Center, pp 14, 107 One of the important activities that took place prior to the pumping of the Great Salt Lake was an archaeological expedition to locate and recover artifacts from the Donner- Reed wagon train that supposedly passed over the area in 1846 and cached some of its goods This activity is expertly chronicled in Bruce R Hawkins and David B Madsen, Excavation of the Donner-Reed Wagons: Historic Archaeology Along the Hastings Cutoff(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990).
