DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADOUARTERS. UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERA TI ONS CO MMAND FORT BRAGG . NORTH CA ROLINA 28307 -5200 AEPI,.'f TO
ATTENTION OF:
April 7 , 1 999
Administrative Programs Division Mr . John Green e wald , Jr .
Dear Mr . Gre e n ewald : This le t t e r i s in fi na l response to your Freedom of Inf orma ti on Act (FOIA) reque s t , U. S . Ar my Spe cia l Operations Comman d (USASOC ) Case Number 99-13. Yo u reques t ed a copy o f the d o cument "Final Dr a ft, Executi ve Summary, Volume 3 Psy cholo g i ca l Op e ra t ions - 75 , Specia l War f are - 75 , Basic Der i vative St u dy (BDS) .N The do cument has been declass i f ied a nd is being released to yo u in i t s entiret y. We ap ologize f o r the de lay in pr oce ssing your r e qu e s t and hope it has n o t i ncon venienc ed you . Thank you for yo u r i nter est in the Freed om o f I nfo r mati o n Act Pr ogr a m. Sincerely ,
/(j!(
~_ Ste~.
~~/) Kinder
~ Co lonel , U.S . Army
Deput y Chief o f St aff f or In fo rmati on Management Enc l osu re
D\
SECREf-
ADC058145
Final Draft, Executive Summary. Volume 3 Psychological Operations-75, Special Warfare-75, Basic Derivative Study (BDS). (U)
ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND INST OF STRATEGIC AND ...
15 NOV 1968
Distribution: Further dissemination only as directed by US Army Combat Developments Command, Inst. of Strategic and Stability Operations, Fort Bragg, NC 28307,10 J ul 97 or higher DoD authority.
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STRAr~GIC AND STA81UTY OPERATIONSWL3
FO~:_:!:~~G'
NORTH
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FIN'AL DRAFT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
VOLUME
•
m- PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS-75
SPECIAL WARFARE -75 BASIC DERIVATIVE STUDY (BDSHu) IleclllB61fy- OADK ":"" , .AutbOJ'lty' DoD 5Z00.l.R, !'aM ~''-
.,
15 NOVEMBER 1968
19970715 120
- -- .. - - - - -- -.-
THIS DRAFT IS FOR REVIEW PURPOSES ONLY AND DOES NOT REflECT FINAL APPRO ....AL OF THE OE'PARTMENl OF THE A
of 50 copies
CDCISSO-S-I015-68
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ASDIRS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
\ Thi__ tudy haa been approved by the Commanding Officer, United State.
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~. I ~'
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~
Combat Developments Command Inatitute of Strategic end Stebility Operatio.e, for publication and distribution. of Headquarters, United States
Army
It does _DOt nece••arily ba•• the .ppro.al Combat Devalop..nt. eo..&Dd or Head,uartar.,
Department of the Army. Th. conclusiona and recommendations are based upon infor.ation .ather.d and analy.i_ performed primarily by the Instituta of Strata.ic a.d Stability Operationa.
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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES
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FINAL DRAFT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VOLUME III - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS-75
SPECIAL
WAR~'ARE-75
BASIC DERIVATIVE STUDY (BDS)
(U)
TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE
PARAGRAPH
Secti on I.
•
INTRODuCTION
PROBLEM
I
III-I
GENEkAL
2
III-I
Sec ti on II.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1II-2
FINDINGS
3
III-2
CONCLUS IONS
4
III-3
Section Ill.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Section IV.
III-3
DISCUSSION
III-4
DOCTRINE
13
III-4
EMPLOYMENT
14
1II-6
COMMAND AND CONTROL
15
111-7
15g (1)
III-9
High-1Il!:en sit:y conflic t
15g (1) ( a)
III-9
Mid -intens ity conflic t
15 g( l ) (b)
Ill-IO
Low-intensity , types I and II
I5 g(l) (c)
III-ll
Militc. .cy c.id tu US civil authorities
I5g(l) (d)
III-12
Ir.[e1Iigence
•
III-I
•
•
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(This page is
uncl Q ~siHf:ci
PARAGRAPH
PAGE
lSg(2)
IU-12
Force model 1
lSg(2)(a)
IIh12
Force model 2
lSg(2)(b)
III-14
Force model 3
lSg(2) (c)
III-1S
Force model 4
lSg(2)(d)
III-1S
Force model S
lSg (2) (e)
III-16
ORGANIZATION
16
III-1S
MATERIEL
17
III-1S
TITLE -- Concept of operations
)
Annex A
IlI-A-l
.Annex B
III-B-l
Apnendix I. Anpcndj x ) J.
III-B-I-l
FORCE MnDEL 1
III· .p. ·II-l
FCT .l. E :~0)lEL 2
II I -F.·- n 1·-1 lII --E· 1"·1 !'
ppellc1 i x V,
App 2nd ix Y 1.
III-£-Y· 1
Fer.CE HODEL 4
III ··B-VI·-1
FORC E MODEL S
III- C-l
Annex C.
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VOLUME III FINAL DRAFT EXECUTIVE SlimlARY
~)
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS-7S OF SPECIAL WARFARE-75
Section I.
INTRODUCTION
(U)
(U)
PROBLEM To develop United Srates Army Psychological Operations doctrine, concepts, organization, and materiel to support US Army missions and responsibilities during the period 1970-1975.*
•
2.1
(S-NOF
O~~
GENERAL
The basic mission of the PSYOP organization is to plan and conduct PSYOP in support of operations for which the US Army has responsibility; and to provide command and control, administrative and logistical support, and operational supervision over organic and attached units.
*The problem of the amalgamation of PSYOP and CA in the G5/55 section is not addre s sed in detail in the Basic Derivative Study of PSYOP-75 because of the lack of timely DA approval of this concept.
EXCL~ D~~D~~~
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o__=-o_o·.G REOUIRED NOT ~ml~TO ' FOREIGN NATIONALS E T None TY OF '-;;C_:-:::0-;;CyD"'C::"1""S;-;;SC;;O~:::E~1""5--:N"'o-v-;06-;;-S Copy No. TIC REGRADING 0 DOES NOT APPLY
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M AUT
CDCI5S0-S-10l5-68
of 50 copies
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~ Section II. 3. ~ a.
• FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
(U)
FINDINGS
The use of aULomatic. data processing equipment will provide a more
efficient and rapid means of storing and retrieving PSYOP intelligence. b.
Mobility of PSYOP will improve with the development of improved power
sources and the miniaturization of PSYOP equipment. c.
Studies indicate the feasibility and desirability of continuing
efforts to investigate mental conditioning and ideological reform of the individual.
•
d.
Television combines in one form many of the advantages of other PSYOP
media . e.
The addition of a short wave radio transmitter to the current mobile
radio team will provide a capability to reach all audiences within the theater and field army. f.
Because of the anticipated increase in low-intensity conflict, a PSYOP
staff function for the battalion should be considered. g.
US Army PSYOP organization is capable of playing an increasingly
active role in supporting operations to prevent and control civi l disturbances.
h.
US Army PSYOP resou!"c"s ara also capable of assisting in civil defense
planning.
i.
Fav<;rable audience rea c tion to PSYOP messages through subliminal
sugge stion is pos sible.
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UI-2
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•
• 4.
9
(5 NGFGRN)
a.
CONCLUSIONS
The PSYOP organization will continue to rely on the Military
Intelligence (MI) organization to obtain the maj ority of information for PSYOP. b.
Revolutionary methods of influencing behavior is of critical importance
to the PSYOP effort. c.
The use of television in PSYOP should be developed further.
d.
The addition of a short wave radio transmitter to the current mobile
radio tean will j rrcraase the effectiveness of PSYOP programs. e.
•
A PSYOP staff function for the battalion is necessary during low
int.ensity conf11ct.
f.
US Army PSYOP expertise and resources should be employed in preventing
and combating ci vil disturbance. g.
US Army PSYOP resources should be employed in support of civil defense
planning. h.
Subliminal suggestion in PSYOP is both practical and feasible from a
technical standpoint.
~
5.} (S NeF9RN)
Section III .
RECOMMENDATIONS
(U)
The doctrine acd concepts developed in this study should be
approved and implemented.
•
6. ~
The personnel and mater i el r equirements in this study should
be approved and
irr:pl~mented.
LING REQUIRED LE TO A.lfY FOREIGI IIl-3
S
•
• 3(£
7.
•
N8F8RN}- The G5/SS staff section should be reorganized to accommodate
the PSYOP staf f organization.
8.~
Further studies should be conducted to determine the revolution
ary methods of influencing human behavior.
9(8
9.
lIOFO~
A study should be conducted to determine the best methods of
employing televis ion by PSYOP units.
10
0(3 NOFORNr
A high power . short wave radio transmitter should be added to
the mobile radio ·c eam. ll.~. NGFORNr
Doctrine should be developed to support the use of PSYOP in
civil disturbance.
•
12. /(8 NOFORNj PSYOP organization should have input/output capabilities for access to ADP system.
13.
9" a.
9NOEOllJl.)
(5 1I0FEJiffi)
Section IV.
DISCU SSION
(U)
DOCTRINE
The US Army PSYOP organ i zation is structured to accommodate high-
intensity
~onflict,
mid-intensity conflict, low-intensity conflict, type I,
and low-i ntensity conflict, type II . b.
Whatever the ope¥aticn, re t ention of the cellular concept of organiza-
tion for PSYOP units provides the necessary flexibility to meet the threat of any conflict intensity within whi.ch US forces may be committed.
SPE
LING REQUIRED SABLE, TO ANY NALS
•
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lII-4
Ii ·
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saucture.
•
The organizat ior. is cellula:: and can be tailored to support the
miss ion of [he commat!d t c. \. I}"·:. ch assig:'l'SC' o r
attachf::d ~
The unit G5/S5 officer
has staff responsibility f0r PSYO? Wit !::;T. the command.
Command relationsh,ip
is from conmlande.r of supported un it to commander of supporting PSYOP unit.
In
order to insure an intH(::ated and coordinatsd. f' SYOP effort, organic PSYOP staff elements are s'ssi.gned a t v arious conunand levels.
Duri ng low- i ntensity
conflict it wil l be neces sar y to assign an S5 to selected batallions while i n higher intensities of con flict a steff ele.ment will be required down to
i nterior brigade IGveL .
•
The G5/ S5 officer exercises staff supervision over
assigned and attached teams through the assigned PSYOP staff officer .
d.
(See
Spe cifically, the Army's PSYOP mission is: (1)
To organize and
[rair~
US Army PSYOP units to plar.., conduct t and
support overt and covert PSYOP in S\'!,'i.' lOrt of unified and specified commands,
US country (2)
tea~s,
and other US
a g e~cics.
To deplo y "" d maintai n trained PSYOP units or elements capable of
rapid deployment on a
vr0 r l d ·..:r,~:teE:
basis t o support cold ~ limited, and general
war operation:? :
(3)
To support up2rat.ioa s, as directed, against covert and indirect
aggres s ion, subversion,
~nd ~.nsu:cge::,cy Q
SPEcr
•
NOT RELE FOREIGN N IlI-5
NG REQUIRED E TO ANY ' ALS
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(4)
To assist in de17eJ ooment of PSYOP unit s and capabilities in ground
forces of our Allies.
(5)
To assist US civil authorit ies, within available resources, it:
civil defense, disaster, and disturbanc.a cictivities by providing advice and assistance through rnE:!dia,. equipme.nt, and personnel. 1 4 ) ( . \IlQFGRNj-
a.
EMPLOYMF"IT
The increasing
tre~d
toward political restraints and considerations
imposed on comoat forces committed to all intensities of conflict requires an
increasing awareness on the part of all commanders of the psychological impact
•
of t.heir operations.
This i s bee.t ecc.ompJ ished by having a PSYOP staff
officer participate in the planning phase of all operations. of
org~nic
The assignment
PSYOP staff elements to all levels of command down to brigade is
proposed. b.
Although current PSYOP concept is geared primarily to support tactical
operations, the possibility of general war requires that VS Army PSYOP organizations retain the c2pabiliLY and equipment to conduct strategic operations. c.
PSYOP capa.bilities ,-:"i II b;:: inc rea3ed by providing a 8hort wave radio at
fi€:ld army and theat.E.:" &.rrrl:'" l~veJ.~: :.< end 1:y t~)E. use of television for propag&nda
dissemination.
The use ci TiT i5 con si dered t o be the second most effect i ve
PSYOP method ... the most effec.tivE: bF.:illg fac.e-to-face communications.
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r:1· "''''{;-:(--:-.':~ ~~~."
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.
h~
,.;
;."
';tit.., li '
"
•
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d.
PSYOP
capabilitif;~
(",r, aid friendly and allied a::med forces by providing
advice and assistance in building their mm PSYOP capability. e.
US Army PSYOP resources can be used to assist state and federal
authorities in preserving law· and o :tde:::· .
15.
J(S N8FBI<N7-
a.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
A competent PSYOP staff element at each command level can exploit fully
the use of psychological operations. with the
s~aff s onc ~ =ni .. g
The commander would be able to consult
psychological/political aspects of army operations.
The cO!Ilmander ,\:_JQuld be provided measur. es. iJf the psychological climate in the areas of operat1o:ls to i nc.lu.dE: dOTI'lina:lt is-s::..!.e s among the people , attitude toward
US forces, the morale of the indigenous government, and other similar matters.
...
b.
At the theater level, US Army PSYOP forces are under operational command
of the commander of the unified command.
With approval of this commander,
PSYOP units may be placed under the operational control of other US military service elements and· civilian crganizations.
Command less operational control
of US Army PSYOP units is r otained by theater army. is responsible that assi gned PSYOP for c es
me€~
Theater army headquarters
the requirements for support
of the forces uni fied command, c.
When op e.rationel [; 8:,:,:t ::.' ::-. J. c f US for .:<.e s is- passed to Allied commandsrs,
the commander of the. unified under direct. US command.
cOrntrl{-- t Hi
a:rranges fo r retention of US PSYOP forces
In combi n.ed operat i.ons, PSYOP remains a national
responsibility.
...
SPECIAL LING REQUIRED NOT RELr-_...."LE TO ANY FOREI NATI~ IIl-7
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p
• d.
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A joint theacer ?SYOP agency (or command) may be established by the
commander of the unified command to control and direct the total US PSYOP effort i!l the theater in accordance ;lith the provisions of appropriate inter departmental agreements. e.
In the event the commander of the unified command elects not to
establish a joint theater PSYOP agen cy (or command), selected PSYOP elements of the assigned PSYOP group are retained at.theater level for conducting strategic PSYOP; other elements are assigned ·or attached to field army; and designated elements are retained by theater .army. f. •
In the Joint Unconventional \,arfare .Task Force, a PSYOP element i s
included wi thin the joint operations and plans section.
This element supports
evasion and escape, subversion, guerrilla warfare, and special operations.
It
concerns itself with explo i ting the military, political, psychological, and economic vulnerabilit ies of the enemy .
These operations may be covert (sponsor
concealed), clandestine (operation concealed), or overt (no attempt to conceal) . g.
PSYOP, properly applied, can creace unity, maintain morale, and add to
the determinacion of resisca!lce forces; it can develop sympathy for the res istance and acc eptance of their methods and objectives among uncommitted
segments of the population, and, i t can Heaken the resolve of the enemy by inducing fear and doubts as to the correctness or eventual success of <he ene.my cause.
•
LING REQUIRED ,y...,"<C'LE
FOREI IlI-8
TO ANY
NALS
•
•
• thro gh information, c.
education~
and
Speci p..l:!.sts to
behavior ~ and accomplishments of a.
4. mobile
(2S
In
corr.T:iun i c2.tior~.
~: ~. udy
contim.l 8u;ly the emotions, attitudes,
cC!lntr~T,
l:i~(h-intensi ty
conflict , not all PSYOP teams are completely
shown on TOF; 33-5uOG).
DesIgnated teams are airborne qualified and
their equipment is capable of parachute delivery.
To attain the high degree
of mobility required for general war, the PSYOP organizetion requires transportation augTllentatior. <
5. •
personal
PSYOP can be classified in four general categories:
(face~to-face)
Inter
communication, printed communication, audio-visual
communication, and audio communication.
6.
Commanders evaluate the potential psychological impact of
operations in the development of all plans.
The commander also considers
what effect operations will have on the overall PSYOP campaign and hDl" PSYOP units can assist in the accompltshment cf the mission.
(b)
Mid-int:ensH y _S.~~f..:\ i c!..
outlined in high-intenSi'LY conf '· :Let .s.r"e exc.ept those related to
•
tb~
M002 of or-e>:ation and problem areas C1 p p-~
lcab.lp. to mid-intensity conflict
"lu:e of nucle.ar we5.pons.
NDLING REQUIRED R . SABLE TO ANY GN NA ONALS
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• (1)
Intelligence.
.. . _
--- -
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Few substantial differences exist in the conduct of
PSYOP in the various intensities of conflict. remain valid in all phaseA. areas of intelligence,
.'"
Operational concepts generally
The following paragraphs examine the different
mobi lity ~
firepower, command, control, communications,
and service support .
(a)
High-int~nsity
1.
conflict.
Ber.e.U8e of the nature of PSYOP and its mission of influencing
human behavior, intelligence on population acquires importance in addition to
the three traditional considerations of enemy, weather, and terrain.
•
Informa
tion used in the development of PSYOP intelligence is divided into two categories'
current data, and area and background studies.
2.
Intelligence support of PSYOP requires special capabilities
in language, cultural information, and a familiarity with the principles of behavioral science similar to those required for strategic intelligence support. 3.
Psychological operations units will require an increased
capability for research and analysis, intelligence processing, development of propaganda content , and the conduct of face-to-face PSYOP.
US Army specialists
will be needed to perform the va': ious related functions of a broadening PSYOP concept .
a.
Analysts and planners for political and economic programs
at national as well as community level.
•
SPE NOT FOREI III-9
NA
NALS
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r--------------------------------------------------------------- - -----
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fi
Low-in::ensicl' , cypes 1
1.
"-~~.-i!.
PSYOP in lr.t-T.... intensit:.;
in g2.ining support of the
c-:.'~·~flict.
in .:1 J. g fJ~~O..i~ p::,i)'.... 14~.::
insurgent frorr. his st.!.?pc r.t
b~s£ ~T::: thin
tho?
is of particular significance
':'liJ thsreby separating the
~:.?ulation.
PSYOP, because of its
ability to El!pport alJ. .f.spa(; ts of tdctical and nc,n-to.ctical operations, plays a vit21 role in internal
stab11:~ ~ } o~ er ati on s
develoFmer~ t
G ~ e.ration8.
Use of indigenous information sources is
acc~8sibility.
more common because of their
2.
g".:--d G1:her 5.spects of internal defense and
With the pre.ssnce of
fiXEd bCi3e c~mps
J
there Is less require
ment for mobility of heavy propaganda production facilIties . •
Nevertheless,
the high degree of mobility of tactic;;l "nics engaged in counterguerrilla operatlons requires a corresponding mobility capability for accompanying PSYOP teams.
3.
BecaUSe of th a r .:.. t l:.re &. ;-~d env J ro nme.nt of low- ~ n[ensi(y
conf lict, interpersonal i3
ccnur.::!"'\ "V2B t 10):' 25E.UmEE.
Lhe indigenous popula.tion, c·...
direction and de:cent'r a l..:tzea
•
t ~ t~~.
everyone's job, not li-nited
f"S YOP unit.
i.nC'(~a3sd
cy~ e cut.L(:I~
J
incI eased sign1ficance ..
Through daily
r ':. ; ·;:~ -! .s~ . t. .iJ.ir. y
PSYOP
con"(dCC
with
f :.r lnf .luencing bEhavior
c..',)f.d i GS t o tbe. c onduct or PSYOP .
. - - .-
•
•
• 1.
t o assist i::l
The
IT,o s !.:
i.n;msdi.e:te
~ ontrol li ng ~ivil
'I'he US Army has both
<~ ct. lv;:.
a nd
•
2.
_ ~, c.i~.: :"'l
:CI">:"21.' 7€:
fa"!. rrilitary assi st ance to civil
D~
L. rd t s {"".aDa-hIe of ass i.st1.ng in preventing n r.y PS'iOP ur!its (an support operations
.j•.
':!:'r.::rc. is no pc.licy
diGc:c t:-:: .
ty~_i c.h
precludes the
PSYOP personns l ca n playa significant role in tr a ining US
Army forces to cope with civil this nature.
.
t:i.. · t.. ·. ~rl:.o.;~c: 2::. -o.:.1.d fe-establishing civil control.
and suppressing civil a:i;:;t:uI.!:.3nc.e::.. . to preven!:: and .::.:::: :.
r ~ ..., .:·:.. :;:f·.gnt
"
di:.. t t.: r}·.~r.c.€.::-
>
c"!.nd cau suppo rt operations of
In the preventativ e E:t.s ge , thE US Army PSYOP organization is
capable of participating in devel<'ping prs-packs of pri nted and audio material to support contingency plans .
Foyc e IT•.;·-1-:: 1 .l -----_. ----...--
EUJ: or.!:.
durL~.g
J97L~,
2;.r,1 IS75 .
is t o pIa!"', a.nd conduct
•
Ti-:~
St:!'RtF.~, :C
b;· ;:
f"" ! · :..---:~ r,
!: S·{ .t" n .
~f
S : :·'~ tHJ r t.
l he str ategic PSYOP hartalion (",f the.ater operations and ro
SP _,
111-;l.2
NCT RE FOREI
L HAe
ING REQUIRED
ABLE TO ANY NA NALS
•
•
•
t actical PSYOP battal:i.on. ' s .ds ,s:im~ is r ,~' ~ 1an an rl c(l7'du ct tactical PSYOP in
for subordin Bte PSYOP 2.
other US Armed
elc~en~s.
Fo rceE ~
T~f.'_
operational c!J!ltr(',l rf a inr.ernational t reaty
•
corrunande~
~pe r2 tiDn:?
Field an::y
1~J(!2r:c -~-C
f ield 2: '-::' : ·')nclu-:'.t ",
cOIDb~_'.1ec.
agr e8.TIH~nts _
retains 9pera t io~a 1
3.
i :t
Europe wilJ. be conducted with CCrr.~1t
h~a rl ~'..l1 rt. aJ:-3
for ce
operations under the
p rov ided for in NATO
In c.or,1Dine.d ':>p,o;rA ti0ns, the US component.
co n:r:'·'3.~: d
..)f US PSYOP resout":.es.
The field army contains sufficient PSYOP resour ces to support
tactical and non-t.act ical operati oll£ .
PSYOF, an element of combat power,
re i nforces the firepower of the fi.e Id a~ ,""0V .
in lowering the morale of enemy
fD~ce3
PSYOP' s greates t contribution is
i n ord e r to des troy their will to
cont i nue fighting. 4.
Effe.::t iv6 p s "'.r:)')?
area and background data.
d .::::·!-::,-",:~
Au tGiD?t:.~~·:-:n ";f-
Ot1
c.u.:r.:nt inr:e: ll ig enc€ re i nforced
?,SYOP in':~?llige!1ce
by
inc reases the
in Annex B, Appendix I.
•
SPEC ,. -
NOT REL FORE I GN
ING REQUIRED LE TO ANY
•
•
•
.:) ::: :-. .:1.:.: ~ -Forc - ----.-. --.-
(b )
1. Arms and Support (CAAG-75) Kore~
"il') :i..c 1~ i A ()' ~ \1 .;-,1 ,)~) ~d
during 1974 and 197.5.
Ff8-id army
f,'F
op e r.~tio:0..s
~
nri.c.-i,ntensity W,:H in in Karea
~rill
be conducted
as part of an internat:J.o:-:la1 for c p. under t J,P' ausnice.s of the Unlted Nations, or
as a major elcnent of
force.
The
c.s"Jlb :Ln2(1 Ur. 5.1' F3 St3!:.es ,. . Republic of Korea (US-ROK)
&.
operattvn~. l
..:'t Nironment will be that of mid-intensity cor,flict eSC'..?)>3.tion
alchough allied forces must be pre-parerJ f(lr
the event of cmm!mnist
C h inesE._~
to hi.gh-intensity in
o r S0\ti e f:lnp l oY'Tll8Clt of nuclear weapons.
The
conduct of strategic and tactical PSYOP is similar to that of general war .Within a combined force structure.
US Arr,\y PSYOP resources are retained under
the command and contrcl of the US cornpt)n£:nt. c.ommander.
2. America
Strategic support of opeIEtions in Korea will include Voice of
'World~wide
radio
br'oadc.as~,
strat:egic support will be prcwj .-1.e d.
In thn active theater of operations, iYV
r. rip. 7 r.h PSYOP Group located in Okinawa.
Althougn the density of radio rec.t?:i.v/E":!" :-.
use in PSYOP is in t:he eflrl y
~(;.i~ ~..s
of f c.;' l \ :;,:i v~.
included.
As thE UN
to air-dI op
inex1-';S.Y"!. siv f: ~
may be possible 'w ith TV
;:,r€.e= ,=:t.
<If
15 10\0.') (f F · I.::o
1( ,
! ~ · , r r, h
i. :',~'
rec. £ iv ~ rs d.l..~.Lt }:f> t h ~~
frame, in which case mobile 1\-' capF.lh Jl·i :-:::'
•
1 ~.,... ~ - ..... ;.-.
p:r'( - ~". ,. 3," i.· t. ,_, y,~-:,~ :, '. ':~ ; . ,
iII-lll
and television deployed for
nt.~ ·'t
th ~2 ~
cap..:ibi lit i es are
Ko r:ea, it may be necessary
p o puj.a t ion.
The same operation
l&.tr.-er sta.ges of the 1970-75 time he &n1ed .
•
• 3.
The US Ar,:r./ PSYOP
contained in Annex B,
1.
•
Ap~ler.d i.}.".
Ol.g.:. i"l:~. 2a t i(Jr_
Arms and Suppo rt (CAAS,, ·75' whi ch
~.£
I in Thailand during IS?4 ar.d 1; ;'5,
•
0:-~
.Volume II ~ Annex H o f Combined
de\rt:; },:-.:..2.d f o~< lOI".l-iTl t e:-~::;:U.:y conflict, typE: "e.Q che .Special Warfare (SW-75), Low-
S~ ~::.-.:.::i,:) t.;:'_~':.~..
II, prior to November 1975, PSYOP
situation.
s :Jpport this force model is
II .
Thi s iorce m(;d.·d is
Intensity ConfliC":t \ 'iFf- a II
'(!;,
SU p?c.~i::
'::'3.
.;._~
adde::td'uID to fercE model 3.
.is phased according to the escalating
(See Annex B, Appenci.x I II fo:: o rganization.) Joint US Public Affaire
3.
Of fi c~
(JUSPAO), whos e chairman is the
Chief of USIS in Thailand, advise s the us Ambassador, the Thai government, and the US military cGlmnand en the. psych ?logi ca l as pect of politica l and military
activitie s .
The overall
agencies and US milj,ta-ry
s:.!bsequf':.nr t o (d )
N c. \n:rd: 0 ~·
Fo rc€.
F -.~. ic y i':L ' v~j,.::hoJ.ogica,l f (l~~c e E:.
..'1- ~).... - '_ . I
. .'-
i !' j' :'i '- -~ l.,::r!c
j
activities by US government
s p:u:.mttlgated by Jl'SPAO .
-, '
iIlC.l(, ~. ~ . - -----
Arms and Suppc O't (CAAS-75 ) .·hl.ch j s r'e',' ,·;,, ·' ,'" foo mid-intensity war in Iran
•
during 1974 and
197 ~<
SPEC I HAND/, REQUIRED NOT RELEA LE TO ANY FOREIGN LS nI -l~
•
• 2. combined
f ~)r::e
Forces .
The
Field
f or~:.:,,:
• ope:-atior":
strategic. PS YOP strategic
•
2. "~!1~ ~lc:te d
effo~ t 3~
;'.~(:7".j.c~! l
\oT5.1 J.
elp.re~~1 rE
conflict s with di ssj.c!::r1t t:::-ibal are,~ s.
IrR~
y,- ill be conducted with i n a
i!)f: ~ ~' ~~ f .1~~~n,t n ~ . 2ry~
structure t:1-:.i(·r.
o~e;'2.~ :ion2.1 env:'rQ-"':I,~ . . . t
friend::'y re2.r
.',0;
b~
.
!r!pe.ri?l I l"anian Armed
pri m8.r i ly t.hat of mid-intensity
CCmdl!rt ing inp.urgent activities in
PRYCe C'o::!dl.1cted i.n Iran are supported by
f rom outside the _country.
i s dE:te:>.lu!ined by
Proponency for the
th ~ ~re e.i.defl. t".
BecausE: of the. n?'.rrow p0rJJer-
b .-;.3~
and authoritar:i.an role of t h:
Shah, extreme c aution must be exercised in the developlI\ent of propa ganda themes .
The bulk of the propagac,da
toward the ene",), fo rce .
.,iJ.'
be. af a tactical natu r e, directed
The pr"l,o:gand.2 directed inwar.d will emphasize the
traditional un ify ing force s -- the mona r chy and cultura l heritag e -- and exploit the traditional
B ol~
a"£ltagcP~_8;.!l ef:1 ii~.Z': t;:'.P.
!:..
The us A=y ?S!O?
1.
This faye-?. m-:,)1.p..l
during 1974 en::! 1975 .
"force for deployment in Bo1J "!ia
~r o "-"'t'~ti'·':,
"i ~·.. t-.::-;~::-- ..;
CAp.S ·- 7S
C':--'
Soviets and Ar abs .
to s"pport this force mod el 1.S
Vr.lume
del!.~lops
Ir:.(~
Annex J of Combined
an independent division size
<.
-,
•
•
•
•
2. Stability op" rE,tions-.)·",·;:'c ted ,', ». Iklivi8. under the operational command of CINCSOUTd will bE;
.JJ.).:'r8.t i on,
8. ',)"ja;f; :~
PSYOP company of the
o'O_,~
PSYOP battalion assigned to the 1,1tin American Strategic Army (STAR) Brigade deploys by air with e.leh,.ooots of tho; STAR ,HE: on order. placed
ED.d 2 Y
the
country fot" the
ope re !: L~.n~ l 81;:;:~, O !:::
ccn:t r"o t
C3 f
Chie::,
l""~.AG,
Deployed elements are
Bolivia, upon arrival in-
Df iJ.1te-cnal defense .and .internal development operations.
3. Per Bor,,,,,1 in the PSYOP "ompany assigned to Latin American STAR Bde will be area orJ.~,'.:i. !::. ed and. lan~'..li.lg{~
Canal Zone.
-Co" d1.".1e:".
prior to deployment for the
Background studies and intel l igence are automated through ADPS
located in the Canal Zone for ,,-arid rcoric'lal upon ale~t for deployment.
•
Initially, the PSYOP company in Bolivta will not have ADP.
Upon arrival of
the task force, however, PSYOP data will be transferred to data banks located within the forc8 o
4. The Bolivian force TIt,dEl facps an inter.:"nal threat brought
about by poo r economic cO!'iui tion~ c.. nCl than by communist-insp:::"red
~_nE";Jyg8"i.1.':-'Y..
ir1C.~l't
gove.rnme.nt'.al programs, rather
'Ih'~l:'(-'" :1re.:.
e:"Lvlc: action programs will
Th·:. . Ch2.':~ C ·~:. 8
integration
wi~h
5.
•
contair:.ed in
for suce;ess of these
the PSYOP eifort_ The US Army FSYUP 01:' E , '): lXi~a.t ion to support th i s force model is
Ar_D.SX
B, A?ptn/i.~;, v "
G REQUIRED
FOREIGN HI .. 17
E TO ANY S
•
•
•
16. ~(s N9fQ~u,-. . ORGlINIZAnON
a.
For the time frat!,e 19?O-19?5 , r::a ? SYOP c,r ga'., ization w111 remain
cellular i n structure ap..d units will De tailored. to These celles will pro'.7.i..ie su?,por.t t o
th~atet
Spe ci a l warfare-75.
specific situations.
a::-my, field army,
Draft Plar. TOE 33--S0::m c,as a total of 23 .. tf'..aJ\lS. to the present TOE j3-500G "re ljsten.
me~t
al"~d
other
Significant proposed changes
i,' A.:!; ajl in Appendix I of Volume III
A 5ull1ffi1'.r y of s i gntficant propos ed changes is outlined in
Annex C of Vdlume III S?ecial Warfare-75 . •
b.
The general missi on Ls to plar. and con.duct psychological operations and
to p rovide co;m;la.nd and 2onj;i'~' l ~' :·bjmill is t.'~;~~ti~'!~:Lst;i,Cal:' support, and operational supervision over organic and attached units. operations organizat io:is are:
aS8~.~ 'led
component of a unif :i.ed com..n 8.r~ ,~;.
:1A
attached to subordinat e, ccmmcndo or
Psychological
to a field army, t.heater army, or army
-c':':(f1i::.-e.d . :'~ S,~}.-.
SuitablE elements may be
.rorC28,
83
required.
of S\,-75,
17 . ~,. S-"tv,"....ji'("'\R1Sy a.
l1A'!'Er-~I E~
Anne x p. of Sl-!- 75 provid es r:r i e.f desc.r ip tions of all USACDCISSO's current
and planned propnnent mat €.:r::ie: l
•
de-vclop:·;·~:0.t
projects 't;.7ithin the Army-75 program
L~l.:;,:i:i ~·..:t~·:: ~·£~j2 CtS
e !"E-. identified by USACDC by
S1'ECI.AJ:;--..HlOOl NATION
•
•
• ac[ior~
h. be
c ontrol numb-er s (A(;N) ;,
Ne.\.,
:;,(~:p.2.~ --2m6n t. p
identif ied dlJring preparati on
Art in.dex to PSYCP prcjf;t'. '::.':"; is lia-ced be lm.!.
ref ere~H~ed
in
Vol"!!~:t,":-
FurthEr deSCLiption can
I II c..i SW-·7 S.
AeN 00716 00726
OS056
•
06644
Mobilia Aadio-Visual Unit
00720
Tact::ce.l LeAfle t
12300
Re co:!'de.r/Repr\1du{":2Y~
12301
Mobile Area Languege Traini ng Center
13093
Pr.oj G ,::'C ) :.. r. System,
D::~~ 3eIninat clr
I Air-to-Ground
Audio , General Purpose
1 6~
Slides
1}713
•
SPEC lA, WlNpt'.ING REQUIRED
'
.'
.....!' ~ -
.
•
Ci ) H':': ~ Div isiun Eth\" i£.io1~\$d G5 '/S5 r.O!1(:(:·~:-;:
'-'1 I
..-,-~-"-~
II I
ACofS , G5 LTC -il
i
_ ___1 r
---~
•
~ .. ",
_------..L-I -. "._-_______--. L
-~
I
t-~.L..--
i
PSYOP Off I-'.&T
9305
i ~--~\
I
Fgn Lang ?ropag Off CPT
9306
•
.
'
Civil Af ,,, i ,.-s 'If, l".AJ 8105
I
i
I
I
r·-~ I ,.
CPT 8104
**The desirability of the r,a:;:u.ty G5 ha~ b"ec1 determined since the prepar ation of the Basic ~~= :~.:r,:;.tt.ve S ~:':.!~,- ,:,~.::- PS:'~i'? 7:'" ~t...1. is t!:!;~ 2'ef()re" in-:.lud(;Xi in th:::: envisioned G5!S-::' ccm.c~pt ~ t ti-:i.s l evo:-;l ,
•
• A~pendix
•
•
Y.
F01:ci::
H...,,:Qel
-.
1
Appendix II.
Force H.::..del Z
App end i x III.
Force. Mode::' 3A
Appendix I V.
Force !1;)del :>E
"ppendix V.
Force M<Y.iel
..
Appendix Vi.
Force
5
Moa~l
•
•
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c.
••
,_ __ __....____ __ __ __ _. ____ __2
NnTF!=i; 1, ClNCSOUTHCOM Backup
I-
r~'-~~l'i;.
, '.~ ~--·~ ""-'-- ·-¥ --'·-T · -- ~"~"" "-,
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Anne:!! C
Off
I iffl~
_~
1.
NEW ORGANIZArICNAL COllCEPTS - PSYOP-75
(U)
The staff supervision of I'SYOPhas been transferred from the
G3 to the G5 with tha,G5 staff section reorganized to include an amalgamation of the CA 2.
an~'rSYOP
-(S _NOiOlW)
etaf! functioas,
A TV team with
Ii
production, transmission, and instant replay
capability has been createa. 3.
•
~
A PSYOP illterrogatio<l team -.has ·.been designated to employ the
most modern, advanced techniques in exploiting the propaganda potential of selected prisoners and detainees • 4.
{S-N8F9RN}
The light, medium, and heavy printing teams have been
consolidated into a single PSYOP printing platoon.
Operational functions
remain the same. 5.
fS-NOF0Rlf}
team.
The capability will include intruding into enemy broadcasts.
EXCLlIDED FROM ~
DOD DIR. 5200.
,
The TV intrusion element will also be a capability of the TV
TIC REGRADING
OES NOT APPLY
SPECIAL QUIRED . NOT RELEA FOREIGN NATIONALS ExCE None BY AUTHORIT OF~CO~C~D~~S~O~DATE 15 Nov 68
NOFORN-
/
SECREF
足
[ This page is intentionally left blank.
~C R ET--
1
'-
DEH"NSE INFORMATIOl\ SYSTeMS <\GENCY DEJ-E.'1SE TECIINICAL INfORMATlON CENTER 8725 JOHN J KlNGMAK RD STE 09-1-1 ITI3ELVOlR, VA ~2060-6218 CllTlrlA I BUSJ" bSS Pl-.r. ALTY FOR ~RJ \"n L'Sh, ;3011 PuST.\1 i\ST~R ~
DO I'or FORW ,\RD
Pr,"nl~'
AO ~ mllht:r
Rcrelv~c
To;
Doli,:!
!
32
A D C()5~ 1 4'
fir I
II
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~ - M A [{- 9Y
87691
Requested By. FAYE WHENCH/ADlM路APD Ann: P D Sl\ryDER ARI\.1Y SPEC OPS COMO
DEP CHIEF OF STAFF-DPS BG E-2929
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307-0000
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199707151 20