I. Terms and concepts

IT IS sufficient to take a careful glance at the world map to understand why the common usage of the term “Eastern Europe,” as the region where the post-communist system transformation continues to take place, is wrong. There never was, nor is there today an Eastern Europe, that stretches from the Elbe to Vladivostok. Those who pretend that such an Eastern Europe exists simply seek to avoid the differentiation of the affected regions, a task which is absolutely necessary and inevitably laborious in the analysis of the transformation of the post-communist system.

As a reminder, geographically two-thirds of Russia are located in Asia, while the last third is situated in Eastern Europe. This undeniable fact, incidentally, is one of the most important reasons as to why Russians themselves often speak of “Eurasia” when (not only) geographically positioning their country. Poland, Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, the successor states of communist Yugoslavia, Albania, and Hungary are not part of Eastern Europe. Geographically seen, they belong to either Central or South-Eastern Europe. Even Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as the Russian Kaliningrad region, cannot be assigned to Eastern Europe. They are located in Europe’s north-eastern part. Similarly, Belarus and Ukraine are also only partly in Eastern Europe, while being partly in Central Europe. Taking into account the prior mentioned fact that Russia, likewise, is by no means fully situated in Eastern Europe, it can be boldly asserted that most “Eastern European” states, as taken for granted in the West, cannot be found on any map of Eastern Europe.

In the early fifties, Oskar Halecki introduced the term “East Central Europe” regarding the aforementioned countries – in other words, the eastern portion of Central Europe.1 This term

1 Oskar Halecki, Borderlands of Western Civilization. A History of East Central Europe, Safety Harbor 1993 (2nd Edition).

Central, Eastern, NorthEastern and SouthEastern Europe

communism

“Eastern Bloc” has found its way into Anglo-Saxon literature while it was subsequently introduced in Germany under confusing translations such as “Mittelosteuropa” or “Ostmitteleuropa.” Thus, some interpret its meaning in Germany as “Eastern Europe plus Central Europe” and others simply as “Eastern Central Europe.” Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the post-communist system transformation takes place in Central, Eastern, North-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe as well as in large parts of Asia.

The states that used to belong to the so-called Eastern Bloc, i.e. those states whose successors have been undergoing a system transformation, are usually defined as “communist.” This designation is correct, although these states were not communist in the original sense of the word. Initially, adopted from Marxism, “communism” essentially means “communal.” Marxism and Marxism-Leninism each specified in their unique way what they meant by this: namely, “classless and (consequently) stateless.” From the Marxist perspective, communism and the nation-state are to be regarded as contradicting. Moreover, Marxism claims that human development, or rather progress, by virtue of the universally applicable historical laws, will head towards the communist order in which human society will find its perfection.

Why is it still justified to call an imperfect state order, which has been overcome, “communism”? It is justified because it concerns states and systems that were undoubtedly dominated by political parties that defined themselves as “communist.” Parties that devoted themselves with the greatest, indeed with unbearable seriousness, to Marxist doctrines. Due to this seriousness, the legitimacy of their self-designation as “communists” was very rarely questioned. Hence, it is safe to label these countries as communist states and systems, solely due to the fact that communist parties dominated them.

Similarly, the use of the adjective “socialist” to designate the communist systems appears to be “ideologically unbiased.” The communists who ruled in the “Eastern Bloc” until 1989 considered themselves socialists in the sense that they only intended to establish communism – the ultimate goal of human history – after socialism had been successfully implemented. For them, it was beyond question that they were “in the socialist evolutionary phase” on the road to communism. Moreover, it cannot be denied that socialism as a social order had so far been attempted only

in the countries governed by communists. This circumstance additionally justifies the interchangeable use of the terms communism and socialism for the analysis of the political systems of the “Eastern Bloc.”

To distinguish state socialism from socialist ideas or from other voluntarily practised forms of socialism (communes, kibbutzim movement), it is advisable to use the more definite term “Soviet socialism.” In this context, it must be emphasised that the soviets (councils), as organs of power, played a subordinate role in the exercise of rule in the communist states. However, they were crucial for the legitimacy of these states. For this reason, the most important communist state called itself “Soviet Union” (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – the USSR). Even before its dissolution, people had begun to talk about the end of communism and the transformation of this system.

To set the post-communist system transformation in motion, communism had to collapse. The “fall of communism” and the “collapse of communism” are certainly the most popular phrases used to describe the system change that was initiated in the communist world in the 1980s. However, these terminologies commonly lack critical reflection to the extent to which “communism” is related to these definitions.

But the fact, that only experts know about the aforementioned incompatibility between communism and the nation-state, facilitates the ill-considered use of the ordinary saying “fall” or “collapse of communism.”

In some cases, the collapse of communism is indirectly addressed by “the events of 1989.” It is prejudged that every individual knows about the meaning and the development these historical events; they are simply referred to as the time “before 1989” and the time “after 1989.” For those who know history – in the hedonistic society, this information already requires conveyance – this date implies the reference to the year of the French Revolution. This effectively allows fascinating reflections on the similarities of Western history on the one hand and the history of Central, North-Eastern and Eastern and South-Eastern Europe on the other.

The end of socialism seemed to signal the end of the dispute over concepts that had decisively shaped the political landscape– science and journalism – of the Western world throughout the previous decades. By 1989 thick volumes had been published and

“fall of communism”

“fall of communism” countless debates had been fought over which term should be

used to describe the political and social systems of the com-

munist-ruled states.In this context there were – roughly speaking – three disputing schools of thought.

The first school claimed the socialist idea exclusively for itself. Not only when analysing this school, it is helpful to describe the attitudes directed towards the political system which are based on the affirmation of the most important ideological foundations (i.e. the legitimacy) of the respective system as “immanent.” The members of the first school displayed this immanent approach towards the communist states.

This school consisted of (1) the ideologues and, in general, the functionaries of the communist parties in the “Eastern Bloc,” and, naturally, (2) the strongly indoctrinated social sciences of these states (the “functionaries of science”), which themselves had degenerated into a mechanism of state indoctrination, as well as (3) the authorized followers of the communist states in the non-communist world. The latter group included the communist parties of the West and their supporters.

This “official socialist” school respectively classified states and societies dominated by communist parties as “socialist.” However, the semi-official term “real-existing socialism” originated from this school, a term which was originally intended for the West. This notion was used to indicate that Soviet socialism had been transplanted into a thoroughly imperfect, i.e. “real-existing” world, resulting in hard to solve problems. It is no coincidence that this term was first introduced at the time of the Prague Spring in 1968.

The term “real-existing socialism” has repeatedly been rephrased to “real socialism” and taken up by the other two schools, albeit each with their own interpretation. These two schools consisted of all those analysts of communism who did not belong to the communist propaganda machine and were not official (authorized) representatives of the communist states; meaning most Western social scientists and intellectuals, including those individuals who, in the communist-ruled countries, had maintained their independent judgement. At times both schools bitterly expressed mutually conflicting opinions.

The second school can be described as “socialist.” In this case, the affirmation of the ideas of socialism did not always go

hand in hand with the confirmation of the communist systems. Respectively, an immanent and a non-immanent attitude towards these systems was present in this school. A significant difference to the immanent-socialist functionaries was that the free socialists allowed themselves a greater deal of freedom in interpreting the communist ideology and contemporary political affairs. Thus, they occasionally spoke of a “bureaucratic socialism” or – for instance like sectarian Trotskyists or Maoists – considered the functionaries of the communist states as traitors to socialism when referring to “real-existing socialism” as “Stalinism” or – much less frequently – as “totalitarian socialism.”

Lastly, the third, “anti-socialist” school united all those who clearly rejected the socialist idea. This means that this school pooled those who had a non-immanent attitude towards socialism. They regarded socialism as a dangerous utopia that inevitably led to miserable results wherever and whenever attempts are made to realise it. It was the socialist idea that was ultimately responsible for a cleverly disguised enslavement of the subjects of the communist states. This line of argumentation was, among others, advocated by Friedrich August von Hayek, in his work “The Road to Serfdom” – already published in English in the 1940s – which he dedicated to “the socialists in all parties.”2 Although not all anti-socialists thought as unrelentingly consistently as von Hayek, all members of this school shared the opinion that the communist-ruled states were based on false ideas.

Consequently, in this school, the term socialism was most often used to describe the communist systems. In spite of this, the terms “real-existing socialism,” “real socialism,” “communism,” “Soviet socialism,” “communist totalitarianism,” “society of the Soviet type,” “communist dictatorship,” and “Bolshevism” were used as well (see Table 1).

“Stalinism”

“totalitarian socialism”

“communist totalitarianism,” “society of the Soviet type,” “communist dictatorship,” and “Bolshevism”

2 Friedrich A. Hayek, Der Weg zur Knechtschaft. Published and initiated by Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Röpke, Erlenbach–Zürich 1969.

criterion of immanence

Table 1: “Schools” in the dispute over communism

school

official-socialist socialist anti-socialist

attitude towards basic principles of the official ideology those who belong to the school immanent

officials of the systems

term describing the system officially: “socialism”; unofficially (outwardly): “real-existing socialism”, „real Socialism” immanent or nonimmanent non-immanent

all those who are not functionaries of the system

„real-existing socialism,” „real socialism,” but also „Stalinism,” „totalitarian socialism” „socialism,” „socialist totalitarianism,” „communism,” „communist dictatorship,” „bolshevism,” „Soviet socialism,” „society of the Soviet type.”

The dispute over the proper naming for the communist systems is only the tip of the iceberg. The iceberg itself is the dispute concerning the concepts, theories, models and approaches that were designed to analyse the communist system. For the sake of simplification, these are subsumed here as “analytical concepts,” although strictly speaking this term only applies to a few of them.

Altogether there are three analytical concepts that have been used repeatedly to explain the origins and functioning of the communist systems: the concept of class, the concept of modernization, and the concept of totalitarianism. It is almost redundant to emphasise that the respective supporters of the different concepts were in constant conflict with each other. An often-overlooked circumstance is that after 1989, the discussion about post-communist system transformation was not readjusted to meet the debate about the proper concept of communism.

The criterion of immanence is also helpful in the classification of analysis concepts. As explained above, a stance towards the analysed system is considered immanent if it is based on the affirmation of the ideological principles of this system. In the case of communist systems, the principle of historical determinism performs the decisive role. Hence, socialism must replace “capitalism” by the virtue of “historical laws.” In an increased normative

version, this principle states that “capitalist injustices” must be corrected by establishing socialism. Of the three concepts mentioned here, only totalitarianism lacked an immanent variant. By means of the second criterion – critical distance – a spectrum of analytical attitudes against the communist system can be outlined, ranging from apologetic affirmation to resolute rejection. It should be mentioned in advance that among the concepts listed only totalitarianism does not know an apology of the communist system (see Table 2 below).

Table 2: Analysis concepts of the communist system

concepts socialist (marxist) not socialist (not marxist)

class struggle

immanent nonimmanent modernisation

immanent nonimmanent

critical distance to the communist system

apologetic (MarxismLeninism) critical to hostile critical to apologetic critical totalitarianism

non-immanent

rejecting

The concept of class struggle (be it the socialist or Marxist concept) is fundamentally connected with socialist ideas. It is based on the central assumption of Marxism that – as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels expressed in 1848 in the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” – the “history of all previous societies … [is] the history of class struggle.” Social classes are large groups of people with a specific relationship to the means of production. Class interests ultimately result from the relations of production, i.e. the dependence of each class to its capital. Thus, class struggles are based on economic inequalities. Economic determinism is one of the most striking weaknesses of the Marxist thought.

The official doctrine of the communist states – understood as a theory of the communist systems – had to be, obviously, immanent. Additionally, it set standards with regard to the apologetic attitude towards the scrutinized subject, which is why it can be considered an “immanent-apologetic” theory. This doctrine, in its unshakable principles, was developed during the reign of Joseph V. Stalin, codified and coined as

Economic determinism

“dictatorship of the proletariat”

socialist theories of Soviet socialism “Marxism-Leninism.” In Marxism-Leninism, socialism, as it had been established under Vladimir I. Lenin and Stalin, was praised as the first social order that would move beyond antagonistic class contradictions. In the era of socialism, a politically controlled transition from so-called capitalism to communism – understood as a completely classless and stateless social order – was to take place.

Marxism-Leninism described the development of socialism as follows: after the “revolutionary seizure of power” by the communist party, the socialist order was established during the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” For this purpose, private ownership of the means of production, including the “owning classes” were “eliminated.” This was done in order for the economic foundations – the “basis” – of a society without “antagonistic class contradictions” to emerge. Subsequently, the “socialist society” was increasingly “perfected” until it reached the stage of the “developed socialist society,” i.e. the direct precursor of communism. At the time when the socialist systems gradually collapsed during the 1980s, the leadership of the communist states announced that they had long ago created a “developed socialist society.” Such misjudgement teaches us how worthless it is to thoughtlessly believe state ideologies.

Admittedly, Marxism-Leninism was distinctly apologetic affirmative toward the communist system. However, it dawned on the state ideologists of communism, the latest during the socalled thaw of 1956, that it was not always politically convenient, at least vis-à-vis the outside world, to continuously praise the reality of the socialist order in the highest terms. After all, it was inevitable that a system that drew an arch between “capitalism” on one hand, that is private property and individualism, and communal, collective communism on the other, was to be burdened with many problems of the epoch. It is specifically the realisation that self-criticism increases one’s credibility that has, since 1968, led to the growing popularity of the term “real-existing socialism” among the Marxist-Leninist ideologists.

Slightly deviating from Marxism-Leninism the socialist theories of Soviet socialism were common among Western social scientists and so-called dissidents in the communist states. Within both groups, socialism was frequently not considered a dangerous utopia per se, but rather an interesting or even worthwhile

“social project.” Ultimately, “capitalism” also had its shortcomings: above all structural unemployment and social inequality.3

Marxism does not by nature have to lead to the immanent analysis of real socialism. This is proven by those analysts who reject Marxist-Leninist determinism but use the analytical tools of Marxist class-struggle theory for an unbiased analysis of the communist systems (e.g. Milovan Djilas, Leszek Nowak, or Mikhail Voslensky). Interestingly enough, these Marxists did not shy away from the concept of totalitarianism when it came to be classifying the political system of communist-ruled societies.

Not far from critical Marxism lie the immanent concepts of modernisation, which with particular zeal underscored the modernisation intentions of the communists. The intersection of the immanent modernisation concepts with Marxist theories is inevitably broad, since combating illiteracy, urbanisation and industrialisation – which not only for Ernest Gellner make up modern society4 – were the crucial, major goals of the communist social transformation.

However, any reasonably attentive observer can assert that the communist rulers considered securing domestic power and the victory in the global competition of systems to be more important than the successful modernisation of their societies. In addition, it is difficult to use the concepts of modernisation for the analysis of those countries that have rightly been considered modern even before the communist takeover. Did Czechoslovakia, for example, which was well industrialised and hardly destroyed during the Second World War, need communist modernisation at all? Did former “Mitteldeutschland” (“Central Germany”) really require communist rule in order to modernise?

The real problems of modernisation under communism have not been analysed yet: the catastrophic state of the infrastructure (such as the evident lack of high quality roads and the decay of buildings in the GDR), the archaic education system subjected to political guidelines, the endurance of the traditional or even archaic political culture in many regions of the communist-ruled world, etc.

immanent concepts of modernisation

3 Gerd Meyer, Bürokratischer Sozialismus. Eine Analyse des sowjetischen Herrschaftssystems. Stuttgart 1977. 4 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca/New York 1983.

industrialisation

urbanisation

pathological path ofmodernization

Why has post-communist transformation research placed all these analytical concepts and theories that prevailed before the collapse of communism on hold?

As for Marxism-Leninism, the answer is simple. Such a dogmatic and authoritarian concept could, understandably, not gain a foothold in scientific discourse of the open Western societies. Meanwhile, those in the West who, despite everything, were inclined to believe in or stand up for Marxism-Leninism until the late 1980s, were eventually disillusioned by the historical events that led to the collapse of communism.

The failure of politological research on communism is most evidently expressed in the popularity of the modernisation concept to date. Modernisation theorists consistently overlook the fact that the modernisation processes in communist-ruled territories have had a completely different quality than those in pluralistic societies.

Firstly, industrialisation under communism was technologically delayed because it was based on the imitation of Western inventions that were commonly outdated. As far as urbanisation is concerned, it undoubtedly progressed in those countries that had adopted the communist system as agricultural countries, whereupon satellite towns were built. The rural population that had resettled there had little chance of developing into an urban citizenship, given the rudimentary urban infrastructure. Finally, literacy, which had made great progress in the communist area, did not primarily serve the higher levels of education in a system of omnipresent censorship and state surveillance, but rather the indoctrination of the subjects. Thus, under communism, certain modernisation processes were carried out, but their shortcomings indicate a pathological path of modernization.

It was not until the political changes in the second half of the 1980s that doubts were finally sown in the West about the justness of the communist modernisation.

The departure of the critical Marxists from the socialist theories of communism has little to do with the fiasco of their own analysis, in particular since specifically some of those socialist theorists were part of the tiny minority that had predicted the collapse of the communist order. Milovan Djilas for example, wrote as early as 1956 that the “new class” would one day step down from the stage of history: “By suppressing everything that

was not conducive to its selfishness, it has condemned itself to defeat and shameful ruin.”5

The critical Marxists experienced their ideological disillusionment as early as the 1970s and 1980s, with the result that the remnants of their ideological faith disappeared in 1989-91. The demand of the people for Western democracy, which they only superficially had knowledge about, and for the modern Western market economy, which was almost completely foreign to them, was an expression of their desire not to have to mess with an unfamiliar order for a brighter future, but to have a tested order in the present. This desire, which had always been at least latently present in every communist-ruled society, contributed decisively to the overthrow of the communist regimes, thus finally manifesting the absurdity of Marxist determinism.

Although, the concept of totalitarianism has neither failed, like the concept of modernisation, nor has it been challenged like Marxist theories due to their loss of their state infrastructure or their ideological foundation, its role is only marginal in the analysis of post-communist system transformation and has found almost no further theoretical development in the transformation research. Why is this the case? Here one must possibly resort to a psychological explanation. This curious circumstance can be explained by the fact that totalitarianism was not only the most controversial concept but also the most controversial term of the Cold War.Those who had fought it fiercely during the previous decades simply did not want to admit their mistakes.

Prior to the collapse of communism, the attempts to define totalitarianism itself created the greatest controversy. In the recent past, this term had been repeatedly belittled as a “political fighting word”, which in the West had been allegedly used to exclusively defame the communist states. Communist ideologists and scientists,6 as well as many Western political scientists, assumed – firstly – that the term had degenerated into an instrument of anti-communist propaganda.7 The accusation of the use of totalitarianism as a political fighting word was – secondly – linked to

5 Milovan Djilas, Die neue Klasse. Eine Analyse des kommunistischen Systems, München 1958, p. 102. 6 Gerhard Lozek, Die Totalitarismus-Doktrin im Antikommunismus. Kritik einer Grundkomponente bürgerlicher Ideologie, Berlin (East) 1985. 7 Gert-Joachim Glaeßner, Sozialistische Systeme. Einführung in die Kommunismus- und die

DDR-Forschung, Opladen 1982, p. 47. concept of totalitarianism

the insinuation of a political bias, in the sense of partisanship for the “capitalist” position in the global competition of the systems.

Thirdly, the concept of totalitarianism was criticised for not taking into account the changes in the communist world after 1956, especially the “thaw” and the so-called de-Stalinisation.8 The hidden assumption behind this was that the communist systems had lost their totalitarian character after the death of Stalin in 1953.

The most frequent criticism – fourthly – referred to comparisons between National Socialism and communism often drawn by theorists of the totalitarianism concept. According to the critics, the fundamentally distinct ideological foundations of both systems hindered such comparisons, namely since National Socialism was based on a criminal racial ideology which called for the extermination of allegedly inferior races and peoples, whereas the socialist ideology called for a socially just order in which all people, regardless of race and ethnicity, should harmoniously live together.

Of a different kind was – fifthly – the accusation that those theorists of totalitarianism who drew comparisons between communism and National Socialism essentially aim to trivialise the Holocaust.

Such accusations and defamations did not fail to succeed to the extent that in the middle of the so-called era of the détente policythe definition and the concept of totalitarianism were virtually taboo in Western social sciences. Arguments refuting criticism on the concept of totalitarianism9 were hardly noticed. They are the following.

Concerning the first accusationof totalitarianism as a political fighting word: in principle, every political and politological concept can mutate into a political fighting word without the concept itself being to blame (terms are not known to be capable of bearing the blame) and without losing their analytical value. The list of analytically useful terms that are nonetheless used in political struggle are endless: “democracy,” “direct democracy,” “bourgeois democracy,” “socialism,” “authoritarianism” or “authoritarian,” “nationalist” and “nationalism,” “scandal,” “corruption,” etc.

8 Günter Trautmann, Die Sowjetunion im Wandel. Wirtschaft, Politik und Kultur seit 1985,

Darmstadt 1989, p. 12. 9 Peter Graf Kielmansegg, „Krise der Totalitarismus-Theorie?”, Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, No. 4:1974, pp. 311–328.

Although the second accusation – concerned with the anti-communist bias – is not very substantial, it requires a detailed refutation because it idealizes the role of scientists. It is an acclaimed statement of critical rationalism that scientists cannot discard their political attitudes and value preferences with the aim of maintaining “pure objectivity.” Moreover, this objectivity expresses a value preference, which addresses why the demand to abandon all value preference is illogical. Hence, when evaluating social science theories or concepts, assessing whether they express political preferences or not is unimportant. They inevitably do so. If, nonetheless, one was to make a judgement about a theory, the validity, i.e. the degree to which this theory was to agree with reality should be the centre of interest.

However, if one intends to appraise the political disposition of scientists, it must be possible to assess their political and ideological preferences as socially legitimate or illegitimate. Thus, from this point of view, anti-communism represents a political attitude that is certainly more legitimate than an attitude that is benevolent or indifferent, which is very widespread. Anticommunism is based on intellectual and moral foundations which are to be found not only in the cultural context of the Occident, but in every major culture, namely the rejection of mass murder and genocide, as well as of militant atheism. In the West, this is characterised on one hand by the rejection of political collectivism, which is the willingness to sacrifice individual freedom and life on the altar of abstract ideological goals, and on the other by the scepticism towards historical determinism.

Scholars of totalitarianism have never made a secret of their preference for social and political pluralism over Soviet socialism’s monistic system of rule. One may certainly ask whether specifically this preference is actually detrimental to the results of social science research.

The third accusation, that theorists of totalitarianism rejected the change of the communist systems after 1956, cannot be refuted without referencing historical facts. The claim that the essence of the communist system changed fundamentally after the death of Stalin first appeared as a reaction to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. The Soviet party leader, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev held his famous speech at that time, which was intended exclusively

the anticommunist bias

for the delegates and leaders of the Communist parties in the Soviet satellite states.

In this so-called secret speech, he accused Stalin, who had died almost three years prior, of having perverted the basic features of the socialist system as it had been created by Lenin. Khrushchev attributed the horrid harassment of Soviet society under Stalin and many economic and military misdevelopments in the Stalin-era to Stalin’s weakness of character, whereby he bemoaned the loss of many innocent members of the communist party.

In his speech, Khrushchev was embarrassingly attentive not to address any structural problems of Soviet socialism, because he wished to avoid provoking a discussion about the communist system. Using the term “Stalinism,” he intended to distract from questions concerning the nature of the communist system. According to Khrushchev the “Stalinist” system disappeared following the death of Stalin and the elimination of Lavrentij Berija, the last chief of the secret service under the autocrat from Georgia.

Theorists of totalitarianism did not adopt Khrushchev’s distinction between “evil Stalinism” and “good Leninism” because, in their assessment, the fundamental principles and basic structures of totalitarian socialism had not changed after 1956 either: the communist party’s unrestricted claim to power, the legitimation with Marxism-Leninism, the rejection of both political opposition and social pluralism, etc. At the same time, the adherents of the totalitarian concept did not question the alteration of most communist states in conformity with the system after 1956. This is plainly demonstrated in the renunciation of the permanent use of mass terror by the state which undoubtedly represented an extremely important adjustment of the system, at least from the point of view of the affected population. Nevertheless, it was not a change of system, as exemplified by later events which testified to the persistent unwillingness of the communist parties to fundamentally change the structures and legitimacy of their regimes, including to refrain from the massive use of force in times of crisis: the bloody crushing of the Hungarian Revolution particularly in 1956, the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the forced strike settlement by the military and further unrest taking place at the Polish coast in December 1970 or the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981.

Fourthly, with respect to the “reproach of comparability,” it must be mentioned that the prohibition of comparisons is detrimental to social sciences and to analytical thinking in general. Incidentally, it is particularly nonsensical to refrain from making comparisons precisely because the objects to be compared are not sufficiently similar to one another. The undoubtedly existing ideological differences of the regimes described as “totalitarian” should encourage comparisons, since one of the basic tasks of comparative studies is to investigate the question of why systems that use different legitimation can function in a similar way. The comparison between communism and National Socialism is therefore just as legitimate and useful as the comparison of fascism and democracy or of democracy and totalitarianism.

Finally – fifthly – with regard to the accusation of relativization, it should merely be noted here that the comparison between Auschwitz and the GULAG helps to recognise the singularity of the respective mass murder. Every mass murder is unique. It is true, nonetheless, that the comparison of Auschwitz and the GULAG is frequently made by some, usually by not very decent and/ or too prudent individuals, for the sake of relativizing the respective crime. However, the hope that the ostracism of comparison as a method of thinking will reveal the uniqueness of the National Socialist or Communist mass murders is incomprehensible.

The popular understanding of “totalitarianism theory” generally includes the assumption that National Socialism is a variety of fascism. It is advisable to briefly deal with the relationship between National Socialism and fascism, because the differences between these two are unfortunately often ignored, partially due to the fact that politicians of National Socialism explicitly referred to fascism and drew from its ideas. Furthermore, Italian fascism in particular was an important ally of National Socialism. However, the differences of the two systems outweigh their affinities.

The first difference is the ideology. Fascism is an ideology of the state, National Socialism – despite all fascist borrowings – is one of race. The second difference is the extent of state rule, which is much greater in National Socialism than in fascist systems. This is connected – thirdly – with the fact that fascism did not reach the same level as National Socialism with regard to the use of violence and mass murder.

extent of state rule

theory of totalitarianism

Marxist scholars, in particular, were consistently inclined to overlook these differences, a practice which was not only factually wrong but also morally questionable. This is the case because the ill-considered equation of fascism with National Socialism undoubtedly amounts to a trivialization of National Socialism and its crimes; a trivialization which usually does not cause indignation. In general, Marxist theories on fascism contain numerous statements concerning fascism which scholars of totalitarianism have formulated about communism and National Socialism. Marxist concepts on fascism frequently serve as totalitarianism theories without using the respective term of totalitarianism. Like many critics of the totalitarianism concept, they equally subsume National Socialism and Mussolini-, Salazar- and Franco-fascism within their understanding/interpretation of fascism, i.e. all those authoritarian systems of the post-war period that were at least temporarily hostile to communism.

The aforementioned popular assumption about the existence of a theory of totalitarianism par excellence, according to which communism and fascism (including National Socialism) are equal, is wrong.

On the one hand, there does not exist one singular theory of totalitarianism in general, but rather numerous concepts, theories and models of totalitarianism, which may considerably differ in terms of their analytical fruitfulness and their research object. On the other hand, the theorists of totalitarianism by no means agree on the point that communism and National Socialism are identical. They do, however, consistently indicate the permissibility and the necessity of comparing these two systems. Carl Joachim Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzeziński, probably the best-known analysts of totalitarianism in the fifties and sixties aside from Hannah Arendt, were frequently criticized for the alleged equation of communism and fascism. This occurred despite the fact that it was this very same academic team that published the statement that ultimately clarified the issue, albeit not too clearly formulated: fascist and communist regimes are

in the sense of organization and functioning basically the same. What does this mean? It means ... that they are not the same [emphasis added

by the authors]. The popular and journalistic interpretation have oscillated between two extremes.10

The theories of totalitarianism that most distinctively emphasise structural and functional similarities between fascism and National Socialism on the one hand and communism on the other hand are usually labelled as analogizing theories. The vast majority of theories concerned with totalitarianism, including those of Friedrich, Brzeziński, Hannah Arendt, and Raymond Aron, belong to this category. In contrast, only cheap journalism invokes the alleged equality of National Socialism, fascism, and communism, which is why it is sometimes possible to speak of the identifying concept of totalitarianism. Even in Hannah Arendt’s “Origins of Totalitarianism”11 one can discover traces of such a relating identifiying understanding of totalitarianism.

In contrast, the communism-related (socialism-related) understanding of totalitarianism is very rarely adopted, i.e. the assumption that only the communist system of rule is totalitarian, whereas fascist states and National Socialism fall under the authoritarian type of rule. Since the term totalitarianism was used as a swearword rather than an analytical category in intellectual circles in the West until 1989, hardly anyone dared to defend this understanding. Most analysts were afraid to be labelled as profascist anti-communists as a result.

However, the crucial fact that the empirical basis for the comparisons between National Socialism and communism is extremely narrow speaks for the socialism-related concept of totalitarianism. As Hitler’s troops went to war in 1939, he had only been building his state for six and a half years. At the same time, Lenin’s successor could already look back on twenty years of successfully “building socialism” in the Soviet Union. Hence, from this perspective it is deceptive to eagerly equate twelve years of the Third Reich, a little more than a full decade, with seven decades of communism. The accelerated “totalitarianisation” of National Socialism took place during the war, although it should not be forgotten that even democratic states claim extraordinary powers during

10 Carl J. Friedrich/Zbigniew Brzeziński, “Die allgemeinen Merkmale der totalitären Diktatur,” in: Bruno Seidel/ Siegfried Jenkner (ed.), Wege der Totalitarismus-Forschung,

Darmstadt 1968, p. 606. Also, Aron, Raymond, Demokratie und Totalitarismus, Hamburg 1970, pp. 205f. 11 Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, New York 1951. identifying concept of totalitarianism

the socialism-related concept of totalitarianism

war; essentially, becoming “more total” as their scope of rule increases while their respect for human and civil rights decreases. Here, it is worth noting that during the Second World War the BBC deliberately broadcasted simple lies because the state considered this convenient.

Neither in times of peace nor in times of war did National Socialism reach the “totalitarian maturity” that characterised communism, which remarkably pushed back specifically the totalitarian ideology of all things during the war. The scope of National Socialist rule is similar to that of the Bolshevism of the New Economic Policy that Lenin had initiated in 1923, after the failure of “war communism.” While independent producers were (re) admitted, the state ruthlessly proceeded against political opposition. Since 1926, Stalin graduallyabolished the relative autonomy of the economy once more. In 1931, Waldemar Gurian stated in the preface of his excellent analysis of Bolshevism that the

turn towards a total state, which no longer knows the old 19th century separation of state and society of the 19th century, (...) has been realised in the Bolshevik empire for years. There the state is indeed a total state, which in principle knows no area in which it cannot intervene decisively. Compared to this, how important is it then, that the term ‘total state’ comes from fascism?12

There are many reasons why fascism and National Socialism should not be lumped together. It would be wrong to attribute both systems to the totalitarian type. They are to be classified as authoritarian, although National Socialism in particular appeared to be on the path to totalitarianism. Totalitarianism must be clearly conceived as an ideal type, to which only institutionalised – not transforming – systems of rule can be assigned to. Leszek Kołakowski formulated this in 1977:

It must be said that an absolutely perfect totalitarian system never existed. However, we know societies with a strong, constantly effective, secure tendency to ‘nationalise’ all forms of human community and private life. Soviet and Chinese societies are or were in certain periods very close to this ideal. This was also the case in Nazi Germany, even if it did not last long enough to be fully realized and was content with

12 Waldemar Gurian, Der Bolschewismus. Einführung in Geschichte und Lehre, Freiburg im

Breisgau 1932 (2. Edition), pp. 6f.

economic activity being forcibly subordinated to the objectives of the State, instead of nationalising everything.13

Only institutionally completely nationalised societies, in which social pluralism has been abolished, have crossed the threshold from authoritarianism to totalitarianism. Thus, totalitarianism does not naturally mutate to authoritarianism as soon as, for example, social resistance or systemic crisis prevents the effortless governing of society by the communist authorities. This requires both the renunciation of totalitarian legitimation and the systematic dismantling of those state institutions that crush the autonomy of society. In fascist Italy, the latter was only limited, as is illustrated by this almost desperate statement by Mussolini in a conversation with an old friend, Alberto Acquarone, from the trade union movement:

If you could only imagine the effort it took me to seek a possible balance and avoid the clash of those antagonistic forces that touch each other and jealously distrust each other: government, party, monarchy, Vatican, army, militia, prefects, provincial party leaders, ministers, the Confederazioni functionaries and the huge monopolistic interests, etc. You would understand that these are the indigestible things for totalitarianism, the ‘inheritance’ that I had to accept without restrictions in 1922, which I could not achieve to melt down. It is an almost pathologically linked tissue, linked to the traditional and present-day shortcomings of these great little Italian people, where a persistent therapy lasting over 20 years has only managed to change something on the surface.14

Since totalitarianism can be understood in different ways, those assumptions regarding its concept which are shared by all of the theorists of totalitarianism will be formulated here first. The first assumption is that totalitarianism is a type of rule sui generis and in this respect can be clearly distinguished from other basic types of modern rule – democracy and authoritarianism. Linz expressed this in one of the most influential books on

13 Leszek Kołakowski, “Marxistische Wurzeln des Stalinismus,” in: Leszek Kołakowski (ed.), Leben trotz Geschichte, München 1980, pp. 257–281, p. 260. 14 Juan J. Linz, Totalitäre und autoritäre Regime. Raimund Krämer (ed.), Berlin 2000, p.137. Original: Juan J. Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in: FredI.Greenstein/ Nelson W. Polsby (ed.), Macropolitical Theory (Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3), Reading (Mass.) 1975, pp. 175–411.

totalitarianism: “In my opinion, it is intellectually imperative to distinguish a certain historical form of a regime or society that is not democratic from other non-democratic forms of rule.”15 The second assumption of the concept of totalitarianism relates to the scope of rule and legitimacy; this problem is already indicated by the term “totalitarianism,” for this term expresses the absolute, the “related to the whole,” the complete, resulting in the fact that totalitarian rule knows no limitation.

Recommended literature

Arendt, Hannah, Origins of Totalitarianism, New York 1951.

Djilas, Milovan, Die neue Klasse. Eine Analyse des kommunistischen Systems, Munich 1958.

Friedrich, Carl J. and Zbigniew, Brzeziński, Die allgemeinen Merkmale der totalitären Diktatur, in: Bruno Seidel/ Siegfried Jenkner (ed.), Wege der Totalitarismus-Forschung, Darmstadt 1968.

Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, Ihtaka/New York 1983.

Gurian, Waldemar, Der Bolschewismus. Einführung in Geschichte und Lehre, Freiburg im Breisgau 1932 (2. Edition).

Halecki, Oskar, Borderlands of Western Civilization. A History of East Central Europe, Safety Harbor 1993 (2. Edition).

Kielmansegg, Peter Graf, Krise der Totalitarismus-Theorie?, in: „Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft“, No. 4/1974, pp. 311–328.

Kołakowski, Leszek (ed.), Leben trotz Geschichte, München 1980.

Linz, Juan J., Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, in: Fred I. Greenstein/ Nelson W. Polsby (ed.), Macropolitical Theory (Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3), Reading (Mass.) 1975, pp. 175-411.

Lozek, Gerhard, Die Totalitarismus-Doktrin im Antikommunismus. Kritik einer Grundkomponente bürgerlicher Ideologie, Berlin (East) 1985.

Raymond, Aron, Demokratie und Totalitarismus, Hamburg 1970.

15 Ibid., p. 6.