Uzbekistan Times

The Uzbek Times www.uztimes.com

Claude Salhani

How real is the Islamic Militant Threat to Central Asia? p. 7

March-April 2013 Issue 1

Uzbek needs extend beyond oil and natural gas Daniel Graeber

p. 10

John C.K. Daly

Central Asian water woes – international convention best way forward p. 14

Central Asian water WOES

$4.99

– international convention best way forward

From the Editor Welcome to the premier edition of The Uzbek Times, a bimonthly journal intended to bring to a global readership articles about the exotic, yet still largely unknown, region of the five former Central Asian Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as other neglected Central Asian nations, including Afghanistan and Mongolia.

For 74 years, Central Asia was immured behind perhaps the thickest section of the Iron curtain until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. In the past 22 years, the “Stans” had had to cope with myriad problems. These included the rampant hyper-inflation that ravaged the post-Soviet space, the collapse of traditional inter-republic trading patterns, the legacy of the centrally planned Soviet economic directives intended to turn Central Asia towards supporting Moscow’s directives, from designating Uzbekistan the USSR’s “cotton plantation” to the ill-advised efforts of the 1953-1960 “Virgin Lands” program begun under Khrushchev to turn millions of hectares of Kazakh steppe into the USSR’s wheat producing zone.

In 1992, the region’s most pressing problems were overcoming inflation, establishing new national policies and stabilizing new currencies disconnected from the Soviet ruble, along with coping with the consequences of a major loss of specialists as many ethnic Russians departed.

Longer term, the Stans’ biggest problem was restructuring their economies from a Soviet centrally planned model to nationalist, free market ones evolving towards integration to the needs of the global market.

There have been many successes along the way, but substantial problems remain.

What is not in doubt are the resources of the region. Kazakhstan is now a rising oil exporter and the world’s leading uranium producer. There are numerous other examples of the region’s economic potential. To give but one example, a single site in Uzbekistan, the Muruntau gold field, contains an estimated 4-6,000 tons of recoverable gold. With current gold prices hovering at roughly $1,600 per ounce, Muruntau contains $20-30 billion of recoverable gold.

Quite aside from mineral riches and traditional luxury items such as silk, perhaps Central Asia’s greatest asset is its population. One of the Soviet legacies that has continued is the region’s emphasis on education – according to the authoritative CIA World Factbook, Uzbekistan has a higher adult literacy rate (99.3 percent) than the U.S. (99 percent).

To be sure, larger regional problems beyond Central Asia’s borders remain, with the most serious external concern being terrorism, an ongoing issue with the instability in Afghanistan. Political development in the Stans has also been uneven, but in this context it is important to remember that until 1991 the region suffered under a Communist dictatorship, and democracy and free market economies took decades to develop in the West.

What is clear is the dynamism of the region – The Uzbek Times is intended to provide a window into the region’s development, and we hope that you will join us on a journey along the new Silk Road.

1

Table of contents

March-April

Uzbek needs extend beyond oil and natural gas

Uzbekistan open for business

4

7 14 18 22 26 29

How real is the Islamic Militant Threat to Central Asia?

10 Publisher: Farhod Sulton Editor-in-Chief: John C.K. Daly Deputy Editor: Celia Pesce

Central Asian water woes – international convention best way forward

Executive Director: Shokhrukh Kenjaev

Azerbaijan in Central Asia - Future and perspectives

Contributors: Claude Salhani Daniel Graeber Stephen Ulph Zhulduz Baizakova Roman Muzalevsky Anar Valiyev

“We turn the deserts into gardens:” Turkmenistan’s “Golden Age” lake’s viability

Kyrgyzstan seeks to improve its investment climate after years of instability Jihadi internet literature and its potential impact on Central Asia

Editorial and Executive office: 2667 Coney Island Ave. Brooklyn. NY. 11223 Phone: (212) 372-3050

All materials in this magazine have been copyrighted and are the exclusive property of The Uzbek Times, Inc and cannot be reproduced without the due consent of the publisher. The views and opinions expressed by our columnists do not necessarily reflect the editors’ point of view. © 2013 The Uzbek Times

www.uztimes.com

Uzbekistan open for business

by John C.K. Daly

T

he sudden and peaceful implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991 caught most of its citizens by surprise, not to mention western intelligence agencies.

Hidden behind the Iron Curtain for 74 years, Eurasia’s vast resources and markets were suddenly open to foreign direct investment (FDI), with significant caveats, as fifteen new nations attempted to cope with their sudden independence, attempting to convert their republics’ central planned economies, heavily oriented towards the defense sector, into market economies capable of integrating with the global marketplace.

Now, one of the most conservative post-Soviet states, Uzbekistan, is cautiously seeking foreign direct investment, though FDI will be on Tashkent’s terms, not the “wild East” terms that marked foreign investment in the wild and wooly years when Western free market advocates flooded the debris field of the former USSR with wildly unfair offers.

The contract available at the time included terms that promulgated Western “shock therapy,” but that were nevertheless embraced by post-Soviet states 4

THE UZBEK TIMES

desperate for capital, including the Russian Federation.

The subsequent “sticker shock” became evident when, on 17 August 1998 the “Ruble crisis” or the “Russian Flu” hit Russia, the year before President Vladimir Putin became Prime Minister, resulting in the Russian government devaluing the ruble and defaulting on its debt.

Uzbekistan, which had retained tight central fiscal control, was largely unaffected.

Twenty years later, the financial recession, which began in August 2008, triggered a global fiscal slowdown, which again, Uzbekistan’s fiscal policies largely avoided.

But, to understand the disparate fiscal policies of the 15 nations that emerged from the peaceful December 1991 collapse of the USSR, one must turn to history, as virtually all the post-Soviet leadership lived through the Soviet Communist experiment, providing an insight into current policies.

Actually, during the Soviet era a number of Western companies penetrated the USSR market, including American, German and British firms.

Following the Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war, Soviet authorities quickly set out to reestablish trading links and the initial Soviet priority, even before the New Economic Policy was established in 1921, was refurbishing the railways. Substantial orders were placed in Britain with Armstrong-Whitworths for locomotive repairs and orders for new locomotives were placed in Germany and Sweden. The problem was how to pay for them. As the economy was exhausted, the USSR it was forced to use gold, which saw Soviet Russia exhaust more than half of its gold reserves by 1922, with railway equipment accounting for much of it.

From 1926 the Soviet regime was committed to rapid industrialization, as Soviet economic priorities shifted from recovery from the ravages of World War One and the subsequent Russian civil war to new investments, many of which were to be in the form of imported capital equipment.

American exports to the USSR as a result grew 300 percent between 1924 and 1929, at a time when there were still no diplomatic relations between the USSR and US. American companies like McCormicks led the way in mechanized reapers and International Harvester and Ford became involved in tractor production, though their ventures were barely profitable.

Textile machinery had gone to Germany’s Deutsche Werke, while German businesses were important in chemicals, with I.G. Farben being described at the time as having a virtual monopoly after 1926.

By 1928 oil and oil product exports exceeded pre-war levels in both volume and value, a market in which the British predominat-

controlling share, allowing Western firms modest but not extortionate profits, with all the attendant problems of corruption, difficulty of repatriating profits and an uncertain investment climate where the government could unilaterally change contract terms.

The largest concession in terms So, why did foreign firms stay?

Simple – to enter the of investment was, however, closed Soviet market could a British concern – the Lena establish something nearly Goldfields Co. Ltd. impossible in the West, a de The agreement was signed in facto monopoly, bereft of compe1925 and applied not only to the tition. goldfield on the river Lena but The 1991 implosion of the a number of other non-ferrous USSR changed everything, but metal mines in the Urals and Far elements of the previous system East as well as an ironworks in remained throughout the post-Sothe Urals. This company and an- viet space.

For the newly independent naother British mining concession, Tetyukhe, were responsible for tions, the new governments’ first producing significant quantities priority was to tackle the hyperinnot only of gold but also copper, flation that raged throughout the lead, zinc and other non-ferrous post-Soviet space. metals which in turn played a viFor the newly independent tal role in export earnings. The Central Asian nations of KazakhLena concession produced 33 per stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, cent of Soviet gold in 1925/26, 37 Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, per cent in the following year and an added burden was how to cope 28 per cent in calendar year 1928. with the sudden loss of subsidies By the end of 1930, however, the from Moscow. company was in arbitration with Further hobbling the newly inthe Soviet government over se- dependent states’ economic recovquestrated property and its refus- ery was the fact that the USSR al to allow profits to be exported. functioned as a centralized econoThe activities of the United my entity, rather than for the benStates suggest that there was no efit of each republic, a situation necessary contradiction between that the collapse of the USSR strong diplomacy and good com- tore apart. Two give but two exmerce. Indeed during the world- amples – all of the Soviet Union’s wide slump after 1929 the Soviet electric meters were manufacUnion was one of the few growing tured in Lithuania, while Russia’s markets, virtually essential for textiles mills were totally depenthe survival of German and U.S. dent on imports of Uzbek cotton. machine exports.

The economic chaos would take Accordingly, the 1920s set the years to resolve. general parameters as to how the Such problems were particuSoviet Union would interact with larly acute in Central Asia, which western concerns until 1991. Con- had been heavily isolated behind tracts in which the USSR held a the Iron Curtain. Each of the five ed. The British firm Vickers was a major supplier of equipment for drilling, cracking and refining oil.

British companies tended to be prominent in extractive industries such as mining and forestry, while German, American and Swedish companies dominated the USSR’s nascent manufacturing sector.

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

5

neighboring “Stans” attempted to grow beyond their Soviet legacy in different ways, and the quintet gradually adopted differing approaches to economic issues.

For Kazakhstan, the way forward was deemed to be to develop the country’s vast hydrocarbon reserves by enticing in FDI through the offer of joint ventures and progressive tax structures.

In cash wracked Kyrgyzstan, similar offers were made to foreign investors, with the crown jewel of Western investment becoming the Kumtor gold mining concession.

Unfortunately for Tajikistan, following independence in 1992 the nation descended into a brutal civil war dominated by diehard Communists and Islamic militants. When it ended five years later with a UN-brokered agreement, more than 50,000 Tajiks had been killed in a nation of only 7.5 million, and more than onetenth of the population had fled the country.

Following independence Turkmenistan quickly evolved into a closed state led by “Turkmenbashi” (“father of the Turkmen”) Saparmurat Niyazov, who until his unexpected death in Decem-

ber 2006 fostered a “cult of personality” that Stalin would have envied. Since then, foreign energy companies have been tripping over the corporate jets in Ashgabat to cut deals to participate in the development of what the U.S. government’s Energy Information Administration has described as “some of the largest natural gas reserves in the world.”

Which leaves Uzbekistan, whose government has proceeded cautiously with economic reform.

With a population of 27 million, Uzbekistan is Central Asia’s most populous and dominant power. A conservative fiscal policy since 1991, including inconvertibility of the national currency, the soum, has shielded its citizens from the hyperinflation that ravaged other former Soviet republics, but the policy has stymied massive potential foreign investment up to now.

Since the global recession that began in late 2008, however, Uzbekistan’s fiscal conservatism, previously dismissed by the foreign investment community, has looked more and more like a pragmatic policy that isolated the country from the worst aspects of

the recession in stark contrast to other post-Soviet states that fervently embraced free market capitalism like Lithuania, whose economy contracted 18.1 percent this year. The authoritative CIA World Factbook noted, “Uzbekistan has seen few effects from the global economic downturn, primarily due to its relative isolation from the global financial markets.”

In contrast, according to statistics quoted by the CIA for February 2012, “Uzbekistan has posted GDP growth of over 8 percent for the past several years, driven primarily by rising world prices for its main export commodities natural gas, cotton and gold - and some industrial growth.”

But this fiscal caution has resulted in less FDI than Tashkent would like. Accordingly, Elyor Ghaniev, Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, Investment and Trade at the 17th session of the Uzbek-British Trade and Industry Council in London on 10 December 2010 told his audience that Uzbekistan plans to attract over $50 billion of foreign investment in next five years in over 500 projects.

And the rewards for companies negotiating the Uzbek bureaucracy can be immense – U.S. firm General Motors made a stunning 94 percent of all new cars sold in Uzbekistan in 2011.

In a move certain to be welcomed by the foreign investor community, Uzbekistan is slowly moving towards making its currency convertible but whenever it happens, for the present the country offers a fiscal stability unmatched by many of its more free-market neighbors.

Time for savvy foreign firms with an appetite for risk to investigate the possibilities there.

Claude Salhani is a journalist, author and political analyst based in the Middle East and Washington, DC, specializing in Middle East politics, politicized Islam and terrorism. Salhani is the former editor of the Middle East Times and a former International Editor with United Press International, who ran UPI’s Terrorism & Security Desks. Salhani has provided political commentary for CNN, French radio and TV, Canadian radio and TV, al-Hurra and other Middle East media. Salhani’s journalism has been published worldwide in journals including The Times (London), The New York Times, The Foreign Service Journal, The Middle East Policy Journal and Salon.com, Salhani’s latest book, Islam without a veil, on Islam in Kazakhstan, was published in 2011.

How real is the

Islamic Militant Threat

to Central Asia?

O

by Claude Salhani

ne moment they were there, the next they were gone. A handful of Arab dictators were brought down by the unexpected events of the Arab Spring, events that caught the Middle East with the full force of a desert tsunami. The events of the Arab Spring were so sudden and unexpected that they even surprised the region’s most ruthless secret police forces whose job was to keep their respective regimes in power. There must be a lesson here for others to heed.

In truth these events may have caught the special police forces unaware but anyone who had deeper understanding of the region could have predicted what was to come. In fact this author did exactly that in 2009. “One day there will be an awakening in the region. The Middle East cannot continue to stagnate as it is doing today while the world overtakes it in every aspect, from education to the sciences and from the arts to women’s rights and where individual freedom continues to be ignored.

www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

7

A country whose people have no – to the extent that is possible today say in its governance cannot suc- - that their investments will not be ceed.”(Claude Salhani, Islam With- compromised by Islamist moveout a Veil: Kazakhstan’s Path of ments, more active in some countries Moderation, Potomac Books, Inc., in the region than in others.

Dulles, VA: 2011, 228 pages.)

Islam in Central Asia is however The causes behind the intelligence somewhat of a paradox. The religion failures were numerous but one pre- has survived 60-plus years of Soviet dominant reason was that the lead- dominance and Marxist-Leninist atership became so far removed from tempts at eradicating it, along with the people they governed that they other religions. Of course, as we failed to see the reality through the know, the communists failed in that web of lies they had weaved. As attempt and both Christianity and John Porter, a notable New England Islam not only survived, but grew settler stated more than 400 years stronger during the Soviet era. And ago: “A leader’s job is to help people again paradoxically, it was an unhohave vision of their potential.” In ly alliance between the West and Ismany Arab countries it was the op- lam that contributed to the downfall posite philosophy that applied; the of Soviet Communism. leadership believed their job was to Islam resurfaced in Central Asia use the people to increase their own in a sort of a two-pronged “attack.”

From one side came those who had potential. Sic semper tyrannis.

The Arab Spring shook the Arab survived the Soviet clampdown on world in a similar manner that the religion, for the most part regular fall of the Berlin Wall had on the people who just wanted to practice former Soviet space. Just as the their religion. Then on the other side downfall of communism changed was the incursion by the neo-Islathe lifestyle of millions of people mists, those spearheaded by Saudi in the former Soviet Union, so too Arabia and Qatar, the salafist and did the Arab Spring forever change takfiri. Those included imams who the face of the parts of the Middle were on Saudi Arabia’s payroll who East it touched, albeit at a far slower traveled throughout the countrypace. But the ripple effect from the side offering $100 per month to any Arab Spring will – without a doubt woman willing to don the hijab, or to – be felt far beyond the borders of any man who would grow a beard. the Arab world. Especially vulnera- That may not sound like much but ble will be the countries of the for- to those earning $100 a month, it mer Soviet republics of Central Asia doubled their intake. And while due to the common bound they have these may appear as relatively bewith the Arab countries of the Mid- nign signs they are nevertheless the beginning of Islamist infringement dle East and North Africa: Islam.

And this is where potential for- on relatively open societies in efforts eign investors eager to do business to Islamize them. This is a long and in the rapidly expanding markets slow process that will take decades if of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyr- not centuries to implement. gyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – will require some It is important to underassurance before they invest in that neighborhood, a region that stand that time is not an issue for the Islamists who plan is expanding economically as rapidly today as the Arab Gulf states forward some 300 years. did in the early 1970s. At the same Long term for al-Qaida and their time they are also seeing an expansion of militant Islam attempting to associates holds a very different implement itself in the region. For- meaning than long term for US planeign investors will want guarantees ners who are incapable of planning

8

THE UZBEK TIMES

anything beyond the four years of their current presidential administration.

Countries such as Kazakhstan however are well aware of the perils of politicized Islam and have taken concrete steps towards reconciling religion with the peaceful aspect it was intended to have. Again here one can refer to a two-pronged plan. On the one hand is the public face of the campaign. A number of multi-religious forums and initiatives pushed through by the Kazakh government aims to bridge the cultural divides between Islam and the West.

On the other hand is the more stealth aspect of the campaign, the one being fought in the shadows and of which not much filters out for public consumption. So far both initiatives appear to work.

But the drive from the Islamists is relentless and will not stop unless the issues are addressed at the core.

Again, Kazakhstan seems to have understood that threat and is pushing for the only plausible solution: addressing education. This of course is something that will require time and financial resources. The countries of Central Asia have time and resources; oil and natural gas, for example, which are abundant in the region. The West meanwhile will have to learn how to accept to look at time through a different prism and to accept that some of the financial gains must be reinvested in the region.

Meanwhile, the other Central Asian republics have been less fortunate than Kazakhstan in terms of curbing Islamist activity. Perhaps the fact that Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan all share a border with Afghanistan, and they all know that they need to remain extra vigilant because of the fluid frontiers where Islamists can easily slip across borders that remain difficult to police. Furthermore, the fact that that the economies of the other Central Asian countries are less robust than that of Kazakhstan makes them more fertile potential breeding grounds for the Islamists.

Kyrgyzstan has seen its fair share of troubles, with not one, but two revolution since the end of Soviet rule. They have had to face corrupt leadership and continuous ethnic unrest in the southern part of the country. Tens of thousands of ethnic Uzbeks were forced to flee their homes in the city of Osh a few years ago and hundreds of people lost their lives in the violence.

In Tajikistan there have also been clashes between government troops and Islamist fighters loyal to a local warlord close to the Afghan border, that left about 30-40 killed on either side last July. The authorities called it the worst violence in recent years.

Tajikistan also remains one of the most dangerous countries for journalists with anywhere between 5080 journalists killed between 1990 and 2001. International agencies place the number of civilians killed in a civil war that raged from 19921997 anywhere between 50,000 and 100,000. The effect on the economy was equally devastating.

In Turkmenistan Islam was practically wiped out during the Soviet years, but after independence reli-

gion has tried to resurface, pushed by the Islamists who have not been very successful.

Unlike much of Central Asia where the broad process of re-Islamization that occurred in the post-Soviet era of the early 1990s and that was accompanied by the emergence of political movements espousing greater adherence to Islamic tenets, in Turkmenistan, however, there has been no movement to introduce elements of Islamic sharia law or to establish parties based on Islamic principles. The vast majority of the population appears to prefer to disassociate religion from politics, and would be unlikely to support any attempt to replace secular with religious rule, especially if it were to involve a political struggle.

More active among the Islamists has been the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, formed in 1988 with the intent of replacing the government of President Islam Karimov with an Islamic state. In February 1999 a string of six car bombs exploded in Tashkent as the IMU tried to kill Karimov.

Ashgabat, Tashkent and Dushan-

be are also looking over their shoulders into Afghanistan and at the Taliban. Turkmenistan shares a border with Herat Province, a hotbed of Taliban activity. The question being asked in the three neighboring capital cities is, what would be the repercussions of a Taliban victory in Afghanistan on the Central Asian republics? And how equipped are they to deal with it. Further complicating the situation for Ashgabat, Tashkent and Dushanbe is the fact that they all participated in one form or another in helping the US military campaign in Afghanistan. Memories live long in this part of the world and the Taliban for one are not about to forget that.

In the final analysis the threat of militant Islam remains real in Central Asia, as it does in other parts of the world. But in the end, in a free market economy and democratic societies there will be no place for extremists, be they Islamic or communists. Just as communism was defeated by the ideas of open societies, so too will militant Islam follow in the footsteps of what was once a global threat.

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

9

by Daniel Graeber

Uzbek needs extend beyond oil and natural gas

H

undreds of exhibitors from the regional oil and natural gas sector, along with more than 400 international delegates, are expected to descend on the Uzbek capital Tashkent in May for an annual oil and natural gas summit. Last year, Deputy Prime Minister GulomjonIbragimov, who serves as board chairman of state-energy company Uzbekneftegaz, said modernization was vital for an energy sector struggling with a lack of foreign investments and aging infrastructure.

10

THE UZBEK TIMES

Recently, Uzbek leaders said a series of government reforms have made it possible for the country to showcase its commercial opportunities to foreign investors. Modernization last year was supported by the opening of hundreds of new oil and natural gas fields. With reforms in hand, and isolation from the European debt crisis, the World Bank expects the Uzbek economy to grow by as much as 8 percent.

With few options to get reserves out of the country, and a policy of energy self-sufficiency, all but the usual suspects may stay on the sidelines come May, however.

The country’s oil sector remains isolated from much of the international community because of a general lack of pipeline infrastructure.

According to the BP World Energy Outlook for 2012, Uzbek oil production has been on a steady decline for most of the last decade. The country has proven oil reserves of around 600 million barrels, though production has declined steadily from around 171,000 barrels per day in 2001 to just 87,000 bpd for 2010. The assessment is even lower for the U.S. Energy Department’s Energy Information Administra-

Daniel Graeber is a Michigan-based analyst assessing geopolitical aspects of the global energy sector.

His works on issues ranging from U.S. shale developments to Iraqi disputes over hydrocarbon laws have been featured in publications ranging from NASDAQ’s news portal to the United Press International wire service, as well as the Huffington Post. He currently teaches media literacy courses at Michigan Grand Valley State University. Graeber is also a senior analyst for Oilprice.com.

tion, which states Uzbekistan’s production was around 59,000 bpd in 2010, a 60 percent decline from 2000 levels.

Apart from ageing infrastructure, the U.S. government’s report states the lack of foreign investment is in part responsible for declining oil production in Uzbekistan. EIA expects oil production there to continue its decline through 2013.

Uzbek oil reserves are on par with its neighbors and the government has said it aims to reduce its dependence on imports as it works toward becoming a net exporter. The government,

meanwhile, said it hopes to attract as much as $850 million in foreign and domestic investments to support shale oil exploration campaigns.

New technological developments for shale have redefined market dynamics, placing the United States and Canada in leadership positions in terms of oil production. The shale oil boom in the United States, growing largely from the Bakken play in the Northern Plains states, is such that companies are turning to rail because production has surpassed regional pipeline capacity. The Associa-

tion of American Railroads reports that, for the last week of January, rail deliveries of petroleum products were up 60.9 percent compared to the same time last year.

Uzbekistan, through joint ventures with Asian companies, namely Japan Oil, Gas & Metals National Corp., is seeking to tap into as much as 47 billion tons of its own oil shale deposits.

With the government looking to become a mid-tiered industrialized economy by 2050, oil shale developments may be at the top of the agenda at this year’s oil and natural gas conference.

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

11

A drilling technology subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corp. in 2006 signed a contract with state-owned Uzbekneftegaz to supply it with roughly two dozen rigs and supplementary equipment. CNPC entered the Uzbek market in 2006, where it’s been providing oilfield services ever since.

In 2008, CNCPC joined the state-owned company at the country’s onshore Mingbulak oil field along the northern rim of the Fergana Basin. That marks a recovery for the field after millions of barrels of oil spilled when a blowout occurred there in 1992. Developers closed the field because of the oil spill, the worst of its kind in Asian history, but it could wind up yielding the equivalent of 219 million barrels of oil for Uzbekistan. In 2009, CNPC said it started looking at ultra-deep onshore reserves at the same time that it began to look offshore in the Aral Sea. Meanwhile, companies like Russia’s public oil company Lukoil, second only to U.S. super-major Exxon Mobil in terms of oil and natural gas reserves, aim to take advantage of Uzbekistan’s conventional oil reserves.

By its own admission, however, Lukoil’s focus in Uzbekistan has been largely geared toward natural gas.

Natural gas production in Uzbekistan has held steady or increased marginally since 2001, according the BP’s annual report. Production peaked in 2008 at 2.2 trillion cubic feet and has since hovered at around 2.1 trillion cubic feet, the British energy company stated. The figures are somewhat different from the U.S. Energy Department’s EIA, which finds the 2008 production

12

THE UZBEK TIMES

level peaked at 2.4 trillion cubic feet per year.

Nevertheless, at 65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, Uzbekistan is ranked fourth regionally in terms of reserves and 13th in the world in terms of production.

In its latest assessment, BP estimates that Uzbekistan consumed 1.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, however, meaning the country’s electricity and heating sectors consume most of the natural gas produced.

Deputy Prime Minister Ibragimov said one of the focal points for this year’s energy summit was foreign investments. The country manages its energy sector through various production sharing agreements or joint ventures with the likes of Lukoil, energy monopoly Gazprom or CNPC. Focusing predominately on natural gas, Lukoil said it aims to increase its investments in Uzbekistan from $1.5 billion in 2010 to $5 billion by 2017. Loans secured by foreign energy companies working in the country may help finance the development of the Kandym group of fields. Those fields could provide as much as 390 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year for Uzbekistan this year. Lukoil aims to get around 47 million barrels of oil equivalent per year from the region by 2018.

Uzbekneftegaz, for its part, said it was financing some of the developments planned for deposits in the Gazli region, which is expected to cost around $1 billion. While a substantial investment, that project could yield another 176 billion cubic feet of natural gas for the country.

Still, as with oil, the country’s aging infrastructure may be a limiting factor to development

when compared with its gas-rich Caspian neighbors. Pipeline developments there have the support of a European government eager to break the Russian grip on the energy sector. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, expects to get its gas riches to Asian markets by way of a pipeline that could stretch to India with financial support from the Asian Development Bank.

Uzbekistan enjoys few of those benefits.

The Uzbek economy is expected to grow by around 7 percent through at least next year on an export market driven by non-petroleum commodities like cotton, copper and gold. The World Bank said it expects to see modest growth there in part because of favorable trade terms and because Uzbekistan’s economy is isolated somewhat from the global economic crisis. Tight regulations, however have limited some of the foreign investments needed to invigorate what could be a more vibrant energy sector.

Lukoil, a gold sponsor for this year’s oil and gas conference, has plans to increase natural gas production in Uzbekistan, with a goal of getting some of those reserves into an expanding Central Asia-China pipeline. As is the case with Turkmenistan’s pipeline ambitions, however, the security situation in neighboring Afghanistan could present near-term challenges as international forces head for the exit doors next year.

While the Afghan north is relatively stable, trans-boundary issues over water resources and general regional tensions could add to Uzbekistan’s landlocked limitations. With few of the options available to Azerbaijan or other littoral states, isolation, while shielding the overall econo-

my, may prevent Uzbekistan from getting its resources to growing Asian economies. With aging oil fields and a domestic economy hungry for gas, Uzbekistan may find itself in a rough neighborhood for economic growth given growing domestic energy woes.

Modernization may be the central theme for this year’s oil and natural gas conference. While rich in reserves, the country may have a long way to go before it’s able to break its dual landlocked situation and tap deeper into foreign economies with transnational pipelines. Meanwhile, if modernization is indeed central to Tashkent’s long-term agenda, it may need to attract more foreign investors to help develop a renewable energy sector.

The regional wind regime, according to the World Wind Energy Association, is considered modest. The World Bank, however, states the country has no installed wind power. According to the WWEA, members of the Commonwealth of Independent States have only about 178 megawatts of installed wind capacity but a “huge” wind potential.

While Tashkent can tout a relatively stable economy and showcase reforms meant to attract more investments, it appears only the usual suspects have signed up for this year’s energy summit.

With Western and Chinese economies taking steps toward a low-carbon future, Uzbekistan could not only address local energy concerns, but free up some of its reserve potential by directing much-needed foreign investments into building a renewable energy sector.

Central Asian water woes – international convention best way forward

by Dr. John C.K. Daly

Dr. John C.K. Daly, The Uzbek Times editor in chief, is an international correspondent for United Press International and a non-resident scholar at the Central Asia Institute of the Paul H. Nitze School of International Studies, Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC., as well as chief analyst for oilrpice.com. Daly’s book, Russian Sea Power and the Eastern Question, dealt extensively with Russian-Turkish relations. In 1999, while at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Daly founded The Cyber-Caravan, which continues today as, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. Daly’s writings have appeared in Jamestown’s Spotlight on Terror, Eurasia Daily Monitor, China Brief and Terrorism Monitor, along with Jane’s Defense Group’s Intelligence Watch Report, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Terrorism Watch Report, Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor and Islamic Affairs Analyst, Caspian Crossroads, ISN and the Christian Science Monitor. Daly received his Ph.D. in Russian and Middle Eastern Studies from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London.

T

he unexpected and largely peaceful sudden collapse of the USSR in 1991 left fifteen nations in the place of a single unitary state. The Russian Federation’s current President, Vladimir Putin, has made no secret of how he felt about the issue, remarking, “First and foremost it is worth acknowledging that the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

Be that as it may, the collapse of the USSR severely disrupted the economies of all fifteen former Soviet republics, destroying tradition-

14

THE UZBEK TIMES

al patterns of trade and leaving the new nations scrambling, both the stabilize their economies and modify their Soviet inheritance to benefit their nations.

As the USSR had a centrally planned economy directed from Moscow, the result was to develop industries directed towards benefiting the Union as a whole, rather than its constituent republics.

This is nowhere more evident than in Central Asia after authorities in Moscow decided to turn the region

into the USSR’s cotton plantation, in order to feed the textile industry that began to spring up around Moscow. The dolorous effects of this decision continue to reverberate to this day, more than two decades after the fall of the USSR, as the five “Stans” – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan spar over the region’s most precious yet increasingly rare resource – water. While regional coordination efforts to develop equitable water policies began soon after the fragmentation of the USSR, issues about water usage continue to impact relational relations, often for the worse.

The major bones of contention are two rivers, the 1,500-mile-long Amu Darya and the 1,380-mile-long Syr Darya, whose combined flow before massive Soviet agricultural projects were implemented equaled the Nile. The Amu Darya, Central Asia’s longest river, rises in Tajikistan’s Pamir mountain range along its border with Afghanistan, while the Syr Darya originates in Kyrgyzstan’s portion of the Tien Shan mountain range and eastern Uzbekistan.

The Syr Darya flows south and westward across Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before draining into the Aral Sea, while the Amu Darya flows on a more southerly route through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan before entering the Aral.

The rivers together contain more than 90 percent of Central Asia’s available water resources. Their headwaters are initially controlled by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two poorest ’Stans, even as Uzbekistan’s extensive cotton and agricultural irrigation alone account for more than half of the region’s water consumption. Water issues accordingly stretch from Turkmenistan bordering the Caspian in the west to the mountainous alpine glaciers and rivers of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, whose waters are now initially used to power hydroelectric stations in the two energy-poor nations before being released to agrarian nations downstream.

As Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan seek to increase their hydroelectric potential by constructing yet more dams, the issue is not one of the Stans’ making. While Soviet efforts to divert Central Asian water toward agriculture

began in 1918 to grow cotton off increasing amounts of the trade, the building of a mas- Amu Darya’s and Syr Darya’s sive network of irrigation proj- waters into inefficiently irrigatects began in the 1940s, which ed fields, as increasing demands launched a sustained agricul- for diverted water for cotton protural development program that duction occurred in Kazakhstan, was to last to the end of the So- Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and viet era and beyond.

Uzbekistan. The rising diversion Shortly after independence, of the rivers’ waters eventualthe five countries agreed to ly shrank the Aral Sea to apmaintain the Soviet-era wa- proximately 8,920 square miles, ter quota system, but compet- separating it into the northern ing national needs rendered the “Small Sea” in Kazakhstan and agreement unworkable. Further the southern “Large Sea” in Uzaggravating problems surround- bekistan, while the toxic saline ing the headwaters of the Amu and fertilizer-laced wastelands Darya and Syr Darya, in the uncovered by the sea’s retreat wake of the 1992–97 Tajik civil blew throughout Eurasia. The war and the decline of Kyrgyz- amount of water taken from stan’s economy, the two coun- the Amu Darya and Syr Darya tries’ aquatic facilities fell into doubled between 1960 and 2000, disrepair. In 1993 Central Asian allowing cotton production to leaders recognized the problem nearly double in the same period, of developing a new, post-Sovi- paralleling the Aral’s decline. et regional water policy and the Kazakh, KyrThe rising diversion of the gyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek presidents es- rivers’ waters eventually shrank the Aral Sea to approximately tablished the Interstate 8,920 square miles.

Commission for Water Coordination to harmonize their water policies.

Not that the newly indepenBut while the ICWC has since held more than 50 meetings, lit- dent Stans were oblivious of the tle has been accomplished. In Aral’s ecological problems; far the ensuring vacuum, each na- from it. In the same year the tion has increasingly developed ICWC was founded, the Stans nationalist policies, often to the also created the Interstate Coundetriment of its neighbors. cil for the Aral Sea, which in The failure to develop a coor- turn produced the International dinated approach while remain- Fund for Saving the Aral Sea to ing wedded to fraying Soviet-era seek funding for restoration acwater policies is most dramati- tivities under the rubric of the cally illustrated in the shrinkage Aral Sea Basin Program 1. While of the Aral Sea. The Aral was ASBP 1 initially attracted some once the world’s fourth-largest foreign investment, the scale of inland sea with an area of 28,000 the problem subsequently comsquare miles. Its slow demise bined with charges of poor manbegan in the early 1960s, when agement, resulting in a drying up new, massive Soviet Central of foreign funding. The program Asian canal projects siphoned is now essentially moribund,

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

15

leaving it with a track record as inefficient as the ICWC’s.

While the Aral Sea’s ecological trauma is the region’s bestknown aquatic disaster, other problems are increasing. Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya state biological inspection chief Ablyakim Abirov told a regional news agency that in 2008 the Syr Darya’s water flow was a mere 10 percent of its 2007 level, endangering aquatic biodiversity because shoals of river fish could not swim to their spawning grounds. The sentiment was echoed by Tajikistan’s Soghd environmental committee member Gafurdzhon Karimov, who estimates that nearly half of the Syr Darya’s fish population was unable to reproduce because of lowered water levels.

Unfortunately for Central Asia, Western governmental interest in the region has primarily focused on its energy and military resources (especially the U.S., traumatized by the 9-11 terrorist attacks), leaving developmental issues such as water largely in the hands of international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. International organizations such as the International Water Association are valuable forums for discussing Central Asian needs, but unfortunately they must compete for funding with other worsening situations in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

Regional tensions have been rising as water-rich but energy-poor Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the weakest of the regional economies, attempt to barter their aquatic resources for energy imports, a dilemma described in an article in the Kyrgyz Vechernyi Bishkek newspa-

16

THE UZBEK TIMES

per as “a box with valuables on a powder keg.” As Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan seek payment for their water assets or energy barter arrangements with their downstream neighbors, energy shortfalls force them to use more water for power generation in the winter months, causing releases which produce flooding downstream and leave less water to be released during the vital spring and summer growing seasons.

Nor are the problems of trans-boundary rivers limited to Central Asia. Difficulties exist on every continent, as the streams shared by neighboring countries provide an estimated 60 percent of the world’s freshwater. Worldwide there are 260 international river basins, covering nearly half of the Earth’s surface, along which 40 percent of the world’s population lives. With water demand rising in every nation, so are tensions over the limited resource.

So, how to resolve the dilemma? Two things are needed – an international framework to which all five parties can agree, and more international funding.

As for the former, international legislation exists - the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1997 after 27 years of negotiation. Tashkent has been urging the other four Stans to consider using the Convention as the basis for new regional negotiations, but is meeting resistance from both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, both of which are seeking to construct massive hydroelectric barrages first proposed in the Soviet era, which would provide a desperately needed source of foreign

funds via electricity exports.

According to CIA World Factbook, in 2011 a third of Kyrgyzstan’s population lived below the poverty line. Kyrgyzstan, which for years unsuccessfully sought funding on the international market to complete the 900 foot tall, 1,940 megawatt Kambarata-1 hydroelectric cascade, has now received Russian soft loans to complete the project, with Russian firm RusHydro as builder.

Tajikistan has significant hydropower potential ranking eighth in the world after China, Russia, the U.S., Brazil, Congo, India and Canada. Its proposed Sangtuda-1 HPP is the largest investment project and the first hydropower facility in joint use and operation to have been implemented by the Russian Federation in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

It is the 3,600 megawatt Rogun hydroelectric facility, currently under construction, which most concerns Uzbekistan, which argues that the dam is located in a seismically active area.

If finished, Rogun would be the world’s tallest dam with a height of 1,099 feet.

The prospective trade in electricity envisioned by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan targets primarily South Asian countries. In 2006 the Central Asia/South Asia Regional Electricity Market program was launched with assistance from the Asian Development Bank to develop the sub-regional electricity market. The CASA-1000 (Central Asia/South Asia) project was launched in the framework of the program, providing for the export to South Asia of electricity produced in the summer by Tajikistan’s and

Kyrgyzstan’s active hydropower plants. CASA-1000 creates a system to transmit electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will make it possible to export up to 1,000 megawatts during the first phase with subsequent increase in supplies.

But, as Uzbekistan rightly points out, the massive upgrading of upstream hydroelectric facilities has potentially enormous consequences for downstream nations’ agriculture and the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses represents the best international legislation to resolve outstanding

water issues between the Stans.

International funders should insist that the Convention be fully implemented before agreeing to any funding for hydroelectric projects affecting transnational Central Asian rivers, so all concerns can be equitably addressed.

What is certain at this stage is that the ramshackle rivers’ basin structure is already stretched to breaking point, no further water is available, and if Afghanistan becomes peaceful, yet another regional actor will be vying for a scarce resource. International lending institutions and governments should view the region’s water issues as an organic entity and allocate aid accordingly,

extending its scope to include conservation, agricultural improvements and assisting Central Asian nations to diversify their agricultural output beyond cotton to include lower water use crops, while carefully evaluating all concerns surrounding potential power projects before providing funding.

According to an Aral proverb, “In every drop of water there is a grain of gold.” Too many drops have already been lost, and the international community should assist Central Asia in conserving the region’s most precious resource, its liquid “gold.”

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

17

Azerbaijan in Central Asia future and perspectives Dr. Anar Valiyev

S

Dr. Anar Valiyev is the Dean of the School of International Affairs at ADA. He received his Bachelor’s degree in history from Baku State University in 1999 and his Master’s degree in history two years later from BSU. In 2001-2003 Valiyev studied public policy at School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University in Bloomington, where he received his second Masters degree. In 2007 Valiyev successfully defended his doctoral dissertation at the University of Louisville’s School of Urban and Public Affairs. In 2007-2008 Dr. Anar Valiyev worked as an assistant professor at Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic.

ince the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Central Asian countries have not been a high priority for Azerbaijan, as the newly independent nation looked westwards towards the United States or European Union rather than towards the eastern shores of the Caspian. Following independence, Central Asia was a low priority for Baku, both politically and economically, a situation that lasted for some time, for better or worse. The following article analyzes the reasons for such policies as well as future possibilities for upgraded relations.

18

THE UZBEK TIMES

Politics It would be wrong to analyze the relations of Azerbaijan with Central Asian countries from purely geographical perspectives, as Azeri relations with each country are unique and not affected merely by geographical factors. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia, which erupted in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and regional economic cooperation, was the major factors defining Azerbaijan’s priorities in the region in the immediate post-independence period.

Despite the breakup of the USSR, Azerbaijan, along with all five former Soviet Central Asia republics, are all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Within the framework of the CIS, member states signed numerous multilateral documents and treaties, and many issues of political cooperation were frequently solved at annual meetings of the CIS heads of states. Beyond the CIS, many former Soviet Caucasian and Central Asian republics are now members of other organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Three Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - are also members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), along with Russia, Belorussia and Armenia. Uzbekistan, which originally joined CSTO in 1994, suspended its membership in 2012.

The CSTO charter obligated its members to assist each other militarily in case of aggression by a third party. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan did not intend to trespass upon Armenian territory, Yerevan nevertheless sought to use

CSTO as a tool to counterbalance Azerbaijan’s growing military might. In its conflict with Armenia Azerbaijan eventually concluded that Kazakhstan’s, Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s membership in CSTO would be of little assistance in redressing its claims, deciding that, whatever the potential relative merits of its case, none of the Central Asian countries, in the case of the reemergence of an Azerbaijani-Armenian war, would intervene in such a conflict.

Of all five Central Asian post-Soviet countries, Azerbaijan has always regarded Uzbekistan as its most stable partner. In comparison with the region’s other post-Soviet nations, Tashkent openly supported Azerbaijan’s position in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and recognized Armenia as the aggressor. Further political cooperation between the two countries did not go beyond the declarations however, as Uzbekistan did not want to bind itself via treaties or a strategic partnership to a country in conflict with a Caucasian nation largely regarded as a Russian client state. For its part, Azerbaijan did not initially actively seek a further deepening of political relations with Uzbekistan. While the pair were members of the post-Soviet GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, founded in 2001, Uzbekistan, having found no benefits in the organization, withdrew in 2005, but maintained warm relations with other member states, including Azerbaijan, which became another vehicle for stabilizing Azeri-Uzbek relations.

Azerbaijan relations with another Central Asian state, Kazakhstan, developed along similar

lines. The two countries, both Caspian states, were more interested in economic cooperation rather than deepening political ties, with both countries supporting one another’s position on the delimitation of the Caspian’s offshore waters and seabed, among other political issues. Nevertheless, as with Uzbekistan, Astana did not press for deeper or strategic political cooperation with Azerbaijan.

Similarly, Azerbaijan’s relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan did not develop far beyond its pro forma relations within the Commonwealth of Independent States framework. The CIS, a loose political affiliation that succeeded the Soviet Union, contained all former Soviet republics except the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, while Georgia withdrew from the organization in 2008, following its border clashes with the Russian Federation.

Turkmenistan’s relations with Azerbaijan in the initial period of post-independence blew hot and cold. Since the death of former Turkmen “Turkmenbashi” President Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006 years of mutual mistrust and mutual accusations ended, and the two countries are now deepening their political and economic relations.

Business and Economics During the Soviet era Central Asia was a substantial market for Azeri goods, with products manufactured there, such as petrochemical products, air-conditioners and machinery being traded. However, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 led to a disruption of national transportation networks, decreasing trade turnover. Azeri oil and petrochemical products continue

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

19

Azeri exports to Central Asia (all figures in $$$) Countries Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan 2 Uzbekistan 4 Tajikistan 5 Turkmenistan

2007 127,594.3 ,698.2 ,454.7 1,564.7 13,599.7

2008 290,248.5 3,585.1 4 7,454.1 45,602.1 21,002.2

2009 142,154.1 ,558.5 5,769.3 8,094.2 37,477.5

2010 44,591.4 40,541.2 20,301.4 8,181.1 200,678.0

2011 58,281.5 21,151.3 21,881.7 13,212.1 43,921.6

Azeri imports from Central Asia Countries Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Tajikistan 5 Turkmenistan

2007 222,294.2 924.1 19,131.5 14.6 40,294.0

2008 200,052.1 1,342.5 7 22,439.0 500.3 51,559.0

2009 63,617.7 51.6 1 12,365.8 742.9 1 26,172.3

2010 293,552.9 ,006.5 12,332.7 ,256.1 13,918.4

2011 217,307.9 923.4 50,555.1 2,773.5 12,913.6

Source: Azerbaijan State Statistical Committee, 2013 to be the country’s major exports to Central Asia. Azeri imports from Central Asia are diverse, ranging from cotton to machinery.

The above tables illustrate that even today, multilateral economic relations between Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries is unstable and depends on market forces, but Azerbaijan’s intention to become a regional energy hub will increase doubtlessly increase this trade. In 2018-2020, Azeri energy expansion plans include constructing a natural gas processing plant capable of processing 40 billion cubic meters per year, a 300,000 barrel per day oil refinery, and additional chemical, petrochemical, and power plants. With such complexes operational, Baku will need additional oil resources for operating its infrastructure and accordingly would be happy to purchase oil at market prices from all the sellers in the region – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – along with helping them to solve transportation logistics. Furthermore, constructing new ship-building facilities on the shores of the Cas-

20

THE UZBEK TIMES

pian would help Azerbaijan and other littoral states to break the current Russian monopoly on the supply of tankers and merchant ships.

Russian regional domination is also impeding the implementation of one of the Caspian’s most ambitious projects - the Trans-Caspian pipeline, intended to deliver natural gas from Turkmenistan, and possibly from Uzbekistan in the future, to European markets. The project, approved by the European Union and actively supported

by Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, would help to break Russia’s monopoly on transporting Caspian and Central Asian natural gas to lucrative European markets. Moscow opposes the construction of the Caspian seabed pipeline, citing the unresolved legal status of the Caspian. Despite Moscow’s disapproval however, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are nevertheless rushing to launch the project that could be of immense benefit to the entire region.

Besides aspiring becoming a regional energy hub, Azerbaijan is also interested in developing its potential to become an important transportation network point in Eurasia. The U.S., China and the EU currently account for roughly 60 percent of the world’s trade, including 45 percent of global imports and 42 percent of the world’s exports. For Azerbaijan, located between the EU and China, its potential to capture a percentage of their trade via transportation links is a crucial concern. Baku is an important location astride the trade routes of EU commerce with China, India and the ASEAN countries. Azerbaijan is already building an International Logistics Center at Alyat, 40 miles south of Baku that is intended to play a pivotal role in international transportation for Eurasian commerce.

Furthermore, with the launch-

ing of Baku-Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad, a rail link between Europe and the western shores of the Caspian will be realized. For Azerbaijan to become an international transportation hub however, it will need more than infrastructure.

Most importantly in this scheme is the willingness of Central Asian countries to transport their goods via Azerbaijan to Europe. For the landlocked countries of Central Asia, Azerbaijan represents a reasonable alternative to overland routes via the Russian Federation, and utilizing faster and cheaper Azeri routes for the delivery of goods from Central Asian markets to Europe and back could significantly help economics of all interested parties.

Until recently Azerbaijani business interests in Central Asia were limited to the transportation of Kazakh or Turkmen oil to the

world market via tankers and railroads. Azerbaijan was not involved in any major business project in the region due to the absence of financial resources and opportunities. Beginning in 2012 however, the crown jewel of the Azeri economy, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic began to expand its presence in the region.

Last year SOCAR announced plans to build a $250 million oil refinery in Kyrgyzstan with an annual capacity of 2 million tons, with construction planned for completion by the end of 2013 or the beginning of 2014. It is interesting that the oil for the refinery would come from Kazakhstan, which in turn would receive the same amount of oil from Azerbaijan either on the shores of the Black Sea or Mediterranean. Kyrgyzstan’s current annual consumption of oil is 1.3 -1.5 million tons, with 75 percent of the

market being supplied by Russian imports. The SOCAR Kyrgyz oil refinery could then significantly reduce the Central Asian country’s energy dependence on Russia.

Conclusions Azerbaijan has only recently begun to understand that the country’s future economic opportunities lay more in Central Asia rather than anywhere else. Central Asian countries have untapped natural resources and businesses opportunities for Azeri businesses, which face difficulties operating in Europe and elsewhere because of stiff competition. Having a competitive advantage in Central Asian markets would allow Azeri businesses to thrive and expand here, while building business connections would strengthen political cooperation as well, bringing the family of Turkic speaking countries closer again.

“We turn the deserts into gardens”

Turkmenistan’s “Golden Age” lake’s viability

by Zhulduz Baizakova

22

THE UZBEK TIMES

Zhulduz Baizakova is a graduate of Kazakh National University and has a M.Sc. degree in International Security and Global Governance from Birkbeck College, University of London. She served for 7 years in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which included a foreign posting to the United Kingdom. Baizakova defended her MA candidate dissertation on NATO peacekeeping activities at Kazakh National University and currently specializes in Central Asian security and environmental issues.

I

rrigation issues present constant challenges for Turkmenistan, as 80 percent of its territory is desert. Accordingly, most of the rivers flowing inside and across the country are used for irrigation purposes.

In such an environment, the value of clean drinking water parallels that of gold in the extremely dry and hot climate of the country.

Apart from the booming gas industry, the economy of Turkmenistan is mainly focused on agriculture, in particular cotton production. During the Soviet era, Turkmenistan became the world’s tenth largest producer of cotton, which some Turkmen officials claim it still is. And as widely known, cotton needs significant amounts of water.

Cotton’s water requirement is determined by the location and environment where it is being grown. The dryer and hotter the environment, the more water the plant requires. A desert environment with high temperatures and low humidity will result in high water requirements from 40-50 inches of water per year.

Water issues accordingly still retain a high priority in Turkmenistan.

Driven by the ambitious goal of growing cotton, beginning in the early 1960s the Soviet leadership had built up a solid infrastructure of drainage systems covering Turkmenistan’s main river basins, including the pride of the country’s irrigation infrastructure – the Garagum (“Black Sand” in Turkmen) Canal.

Started in 1954 and completed in 1988, the Garagum Canal

is navigable over much of its 855 mile length, and carries 3.1 cubic miles of water annually from the Amu Darya river across the Garagum Desert in Turkmenistan.

Unfortunately for Turkmenistan, beginning in the Soviet era and extending through the country’s independence, the Amu Darya suffers from both inefficient and uncontrollable usage for irrigation and other purposes. The drainage water (DW) that is not being used floods the agricultural lands and pastures, acquiring pesticide residues and creating salt marches, harming the country’s fragile ecology. Despite the polluted nature of the runoff, these waters are what the Turkmen government is proposing to use to create its new Altyn Asyr (“Golden Age”) artificial lake. There are also unsettling accounts that sewage water might be diverted to the Altyn Asyr reservoir as well.

The idea of reusing agricultural drainage waters by diverting them into the Caspian first appeared in the 1960s during the Soviet period. In the 1970s the USSR developed the project of collecting the waters in Turkmenistan’s natural Karashor depression, where the Uzboy old riverbed would carry water from Dashoguz to Karashor passing

by Sarykamish lake and from Turkmenabad to the center of the Garagum desert, where an artificial reservoir would be created. The project was abandoned after the 1991 collapse of Soviet Union. The same project has now been revived by the Turkmen government to create the Altyn Asyr reservoir.

As envisaged, Altyn Asyr will

be 64 miles long and 11.5 miles wide, with a storage capacity of 31.6 cubic miles of water and a surface area of about 740 square miles. Altyn Asyr will be located roughly 220 miles from the Turkmen capital Ashgabat and the project’s budget is estimated

by Turkmen authorities at $4.5-6 billion.

Turkmen officials claim that the lake would facilitate biodiversity, bird migration, the growth of salt tolerant plants, fish and cattle farming and even facilitate the development of eco-tourism.

Another great ambition is to free from flooding and/or irrigate roughly 1,550 square miles for agricultural use.

To develop the project the Turkmen government is doing its utmost to attract foreign investment and advertise their enterprise by arranging numerous international conferences and workshops involving the Global Water Partnership, he United Nations Environment Program, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Global Environment Facility and other international entities.

The question remains, however - what kind of healthy eco-tourism and farming might develop around a lake containing polluted, salty and sewage-laden drainage waters diverted from all over the desert, some of it diverted through ancient riverbeds?

Due to poor maintenance and post-Soviet dilapidation of Central Asian irrigation systems, more than 50 percent of the state’s irrigation waters do not reach the crops. The same

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

23

situation can be observed also in Uzbekistan. Some amount of the irrigation water flows back into the Amu Darya, but with an increasing mineral and pesticide content, which affects the local population in both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as they also use it as drinking water.

By some accounts out of the total amount of DW, only 13 percent is reused for irrigation, while 51 percent is discharged back into rivers, along with 110120 million tons of salt. The rest is simply lost in the desert, either through evaporation or seeping into the soil.

Due to the inefficient functioning of Central Asia’ drainage system and DW being wasted on an unprecedented scale, 73 percent of the region’s irrigated 24

THE UZBEK TIMES

land is already considered to be salinized. Most of those canals transporting the DW were built in Soviet times and are unlined, meaning that the water constantly seeps away during its passage.

Turkmenistan already has one natural DW collector, Sarykamish lake, which contains roughly two cubic miles of water, along with about 80 other smaller lakes where DW is collected. Sarykamish lake is located roughly 125 miles southwest from the Aral Sea. Nowadays Sarykamish is primarily used as a discharge collector for saline irrigation water.

Scientists estimated that its salinity had increased rapidly from 12-16 grams per gallon in the 1960s to 48-52 grams per gallon by 1987. Current rates are esti-

mated to be even higher.

The new Altyn Asyr reservoir is not far from Sarykamish lake.

Environmentalist and ecologists are darkly imagining what the possible impact might be from having three of Central Asia’s largest water reservoirs (the Aral Sea, Sarykamish and Altyn Asyr) filled with salty and pesticide-laden waters on the local ecology, not only of the neighboring Aral region, shared by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but the entire Central Asian region and its population. Another factor to bear in mind is that DW from all three basins keeps constantly evaporating, due to the harsh climate.

Turkmenistan’s Minister of Water Industry Myratgeldy Akmammedov himself acknowledg-

es that the biological productivity of artificial lakes containing drainage water will gradually deteriorate and decrease because of the salinization process.

In contrast, among the goals Turkmen officials promote for constructing the Altyn Asyr reservoir are: stopping the drainage water flow into the Amu Darya, which would reduce its mineralization level; improve water sanitation; stop grazing lands from flooding; the creation of a single unified system for collecting DW; the creation of a water reservoir for developing new agricultural lands; extend water access for local farmers and a reorientation of the infrastructure of the entire Garagum desert. As noted above however, many specialists think differently.

Turkmen specialists in favor of the project argue that there have as yet been no comprehensive studies conducted concerning the efficient use of water resources and defining the amount of waste as well as the quantity and quality of drainage water and its implications for the environment. Nevertheless, since most Turkmen drainage water now has a salt concentration of more than 40 grams per gallon, it cannot be used for watering the traditional crops grown in Turkmenistan, such as cotton, wheat and sugar beet without treatment.

Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov claims that “as practice shows, water will undergo purification to be used again both for irrigation and other purposes.” There exists as yet however there no practice known in the world

dealing with such a large amount of water to be maintained and purified. Nevertheless the Turkmen government maintains that the Altyn Asyr lake will be the world’s first experiment to collect drainage water in a special reservoir for eventual recycling and reuse.

The major issue is - how a country that already wastes so much water for irrigation plans to recycle it later, after the same waters have undergone an increasing amount of salinization and mineralization?

Another of Berdymukhammedov’s statements about the disappearance of Caspian and Aral wetlands and saline sites since the start of the project collapses after one observes the increasing amount of white saline spots along the path of canals and riverbeds from satellite monitoring photographs produced by the P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology and Geophysical Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, together the Ukrainian Marine Hydrophysical Institute as recently as July 2011. The visual evidence is undeniable.

The satellite imagery clearly shows that drainage waters are being spilt and wasted on their way to the Altyn Asyr reservoir, leaving behind the traces of salt marches. Moreover, it is not only salt that remains: there are pesticides and various other agricultural chemicals. Dust storms splay them out at a distance of up to more than 300 miles from their point of origin, potentially harming the health of local population and the development of vegetation and crops.

Turkmen World Wildlife

Fund director Timur Berkeliyev believes that the contaminated Altyn Asyr lake will eventually turn into an “artificial Dead Sea.” Many other experts worry that the collected drainage water might not be enough to fill the lake, because of the rapid evaporation and its soaking into the sands. Berkeliyev also confirmed that the national project has never been publicly discussed before its launch. In 2004 Turken authorities banned the country’s only independent environmental body after its members inquired whether any ecological study had been conducted on the Altyn Asyr reservoir.

Meanwhile Ashgabat is trying to attract $1 billion in foreign investments to expand its cotton industry up to 2016, which will necessitate the expansion of irrigated land, increasing demand for water. According to the Minister of Textile Industry, Saparmuray Batyrov 2,100 square miles were sown with cotton in 2012. There are also plans to increase grain harvests.

While it is highly doubtful that the new lake might be of some help in supplying the water, no one in the Turkmen government doubts the fact that it must be clean water in order to grow high quality marketable cotton to produce “made in Turkmenistan” jeans that would lead the country into its bright and shining future.

As Nurgozel Bairamova in her article, “The Great Lake or Turkmenistan’s Dead Sea?” suggests “the more deserts we turn into the gardens, the more gardens we turn into the deserts.”

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

25

Kyrgyzstan seeks to improve its investment climate after years of instability

by Roman Muzalevsky

Roman Muzalevsky works for iJet Intelligent Risk Systems, Inc., focusing on security analysis and risk assessment. He is also a Contributing Analyst on Eurasian Affairs and Security at the Jamestown Foundation and a contributing analyst on the Russia, Central Asia, and Globalization desks at the geopolitical and security consultancy Wikistrat. Muzalevsky received his MA in International Affairs concentrating on security and strategy studies from Yale University.

E

nergy resource poor yet mineral rich Kyrgyzstan has long struggled to attract investment due to prevalent corruption, red tape, and a lack of infrastructure. For many investors, the country’s two domestic “tulip” revolutions in the last eight years and ethnic clashes in 2010 have made that task even harder. However, recent domestic and regional economic dynamics and the growing interests of outside potential investors in the country’s favorable location and lucrative mining, transport, and hydropower sectors, have provided potential opportunities for the government to advance reforms to improve its investment climate as it seeks to expand the economy.

After Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s government was overthrown by the country’s second “tulip revolution” in April

26

THE UZBEK TIMES

2010, the interim government headed provisional President Rosa Otunbayeva announced an ambitious “100 days” program of reforms, intended to cut the number of public employees and improve conditions for business, agricultural and foreign investment. The provisional Kyrgyz government, headed by then Prime Minister Omurbek Babonov, subsequently reported a 90 percent completion rate by 30 March 2012. Many economists questioned the initiative, reportedly quipping that it should be better called a program of “100” problems for investors.

The results of the program are under debate, but the government has since undertaken other initiatives amid lingering concerns of investors about the country’s ongoing political instability.

Former businessman and Prime Minister, President Alma-

zbek Atambayev views political and fiscal stability as critical for improving investment climate in the country that saw a peaceful transfer of power in 2011 and now boasts Central Asia’s first parliamentary system of government.

In January 2012 Omurbek Babonov unveiled a five-year national economic development strategy, which sought to advance reforms, improve the investment climate, and double the country’s gross domestic product. Kyrgyz authorities are confident that $7 billion in aid and investments will eventually become available to fund 15 energy projects ($5.5 billion), transport and communication programs ($900 million), and agriculture initiatives ($400 million).

However, many both inside and outside the country remain skeptical about the plan, particularly given the country’s ongo-

ing poor investment climate, that many say has become even more tarnished due to ongoing disagreements between the government and the Canadian-based Centerra Gold mining venture at Kumtor in Kyrgyzstan. For better or worse, the Centerra Gold company is the country’s largest gold producer, responsible in 2012 for 70 percent of all gold production and 12 percent of GDP in Kyrgyzstan. In February 2013 the government fined Centerra Gold $315 million for environmental damages and demanded renegotiation of the contract that it says was concluded unfairly back in 2009 under the regime of the former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, now in exile in Belarus after the 2010 country’s second “tulip revolution.”

In 2012, protests by opposition groups demanding environmental compensation and larger taxes from Centerra Gold caused a halt in its operations, resulting in lost production equivalent to 1-3 percent fall in the country’s economic growth rate. The issue remains unresolved.

According to the 2012 Survey by the International Business Council in Kyrgyzstan, companies more often currently view the Kyrgyz investment climate as more negative rather than positive, pointing to taxes, customs control and the lack of qualified personnel as particularly burdensome for businesses, despite noting major improvements in areas such as public regulations and access to finance. The companies surveyed in the report also highlight concerns with investing in southern regions that saw ethnic clashes in June 2010, three months after the popular uprising that toppled former President Bakiyev.

Following Bakiyev’s downfall,

the provisional government took control over a number of enterprises that allegedly had a share of foreign capital and shady ties to the Bakiyev family and its close associates. For some, the government’s actions prompted fears of nationalization and concerns about lack of due legal process.

Others, who saw Bakiyev’s and his family’s corruption infecting the country’s business practices, the provisional government’s actions produced a sense of justice and cleared a path for less corruption in the country’s business practices. Among the major outside business interests affected by the provisional government’s reform efforts were mobile operator MegaCom and AsiaUniversalBank, the latter which was apparently deeply involved in the Bakiyev regime’s corruption, wiring millions of dollars of assets out of the country in the waning days of the Bakiyev administration.

Widespread corruption however has persisted in Kyrgyzstan.

In 2011 the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranked Kyrgyzstan 164 out of 182 countries surveyed. High corruption levels have prompted the government to establish an anticorruption service within the State Committee on National Security. The government has also sought to reduce the share of the country’s underground “shadow” economy that reportedly represents about half of the total economy, viewing further improvements to the tax system as one of the most effective ways to achieve this.

Over the past two years Kyrgyzstan has made some progress nonetheless. In 2012, it ranked 70 out of 183 countries in the Ease

of Doing Business rank, according to the World Bank’s “Doing Business” report. Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s most dynamic and largest economy, ranked 47, while Uzbekistan ranked 166. The report identified “paying taxes” as a reform making it more difficult to do business in Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan’s other rankings are: paying taxes – 162, as opposed to Kazakhstan’s 13 rating and Uzbekistan’s 157.

On the issue of protecting investors Kyrgyzstan rated a 13, Kazakhstan - 10 and Uzbekistan - 133. As for enforcing contracts Kyrgyzstan achieved a rating of 48, versus Kazakhstan with 27 and Uzbekistan - 43. Trading across borders? Kyrgyzstan scored 171, Kazakhstan - 176 and Uzbekistan - 183. In the category of starting a business, Kyrgyzstan received a rating of 17, Kazakhstan - 57 and Uzbekistan - 96.

The reforms have enabled the country to prepare some favorable ground for FDI, which today is concentrated in food processing, banking, manufacturing, and extractive industries. According to the 2012 Investment Climate Statement of the U.S. Department of State, the largest sources of FDI in Kyrgyzstan in 2011 were Canada (48 percent), China (14 percent), UK (7 percent), and Germany (6 percent). A year earlier, Canada was Kyrgyzstan’s leading investor (37 percent), followed by the UK (16 percent), China (12 percent), and Russia (10 percent).

Investments by China and Russia in 2013 and beyond are expected to increase their share relative to other countries.

Besides mining, tourism is another growing sector, accounting for $210 million, or 4.8 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP. Last year Kyr-

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

27

gyzstan removed visa restrictions for citizens from 44 states, which facilitated a 14 percent increase in the number of tourists visiting the country. As a result, Kazakhstan and the Russian federation are among most prominent investors in the country’s tourism sector.

It is the development of the country’s mineral resources that remains a major priority for the government, seeking to mitigate the country’s excessive reliance on Kumtor by auctioning five mines this year: Jerooy (gold), Togolok (gold), Tegenek (coal), Chaartash (marble), and Akkart (marble).

The projects are expected to bring in $480 million in revenues. Kyrgyzstan is rich in mercury, uranium, tin, antimony, lead, rare earth minerals, and other deposits and has more than 430 tons of proven gold reserves, 1 billion tons of coal and 340 million tons of aluminum reserves.

Kyrgyzstan finds itself in the midst of geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics that enable the government to link the country’s development with regionally significant projects spearheaded by Russia and China. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan’s neighboring major actors are seeking to enhance their economic and political influence in the changing Central Asian landscape as U.S-led coalition forces leave the war-torn Afghanistan in 2014.

The Russian Federation is a growing source of remittances from hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz laborers. Last year, remittances by Kyrgyz workers from the Russian Federation grew by 18 percent, accounting for about 29 percent of the country’s GDP, making Kyrgyzstan the third largest recipient of remittances in the world. In 2012, Moscow provided

28

THE UZBEK TIMES

Bishkek with a significant military and economic aid package, with planned investments worth more than $4.2 billion, according to some reports.

The Russian Federation’s InterRAO and RusHydro energy companies are considering funding the construction of hydro power stations, even though they are opposed by downstream Uzbekistan, while Russian Federation state-owned natural gas monopoly Gazprom is seeking to purchase Kyrgyzstan’s state gas company and modernize the country’s collapsing gas distribution system.

Some media sources allege that Moscow’s aid is tied to Kyrgyzstan’s decision not to extend the lease for the U.S. base at Manas airport in Bishkek beyond 2014.

The Russian Federation operates its own airbase at nearby Kant and has reportedly promised help with the government’s plan to redevelop the airport at Manas as a region’s civilian air hub following the departure of U.S. forces.

China, already Kyrgyzstan’s second largest investor, has in turn announced loans worth over $1 billion in the coming months.

Chinese companies plan to develop Kyrgyzstan’s Kuru-Tegerek poly-metallic reserves, Ishtamberdy gold deposits, Tegene coal reserves (585 million tons of recoverable coal deposits), and rare earth mineral deposits. Beijing is also considering participating in the construction of a proposed China-Kyrgyzstan- Uzbekistan railway line, the Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-China oil pipeline and a natural gas pipeline that would extend from Turkmenistan through Kyrgyzstan. Besides pipelines and railway lines, landlocked Kyrgyzstan is looking to the world’s second biggest econo-

my to expand its trade infrastructure by focusing on its Dordoi and Kara-Suu markets. These trade centers are Central Asian’s largest and serve as gateways for booming Kyrgyz-Chinese trade that currently stands at about $5 billion annually.

As a World Trade Organization member, Kyrgyzstan however has to navigate uncertain terrain, as it seeks to benefit from China’s expanding global trade even while being enticed by the prospects of joining the Moscow-led Customs Union comprising Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. While Bishkek is certainly concerned about China’s growing economic presence in the country, it also understands that Beijing’s regional economic plans can help Kyrgyzstan develop its own economy and become a critical link in Eurasia’s Silk Road networks powered by China’s global ambitions.

As Kyrgyzstan seeks to capitalize on both its modest domestic successes and the region’s dynamics, it must not lose sight of the importance of advancing major reforms across the board.

This should not only enable the domestic economy to attract capital from nearby investors but also entice FDI from countries in the West, whose technologies and business practices are critical for the country’s post-Soviet economy that has long suffered from pervasive corruption, red tape, and political instability. Planned investments from nearby countries may be a welcome sign, but attracting more investments from the West would make the country’s investment climate and its progress on reforms look more credible, generating even more opportunities for the country’s economic development.

Jihadi internet literature and its potential impact on Central Asia

by Stephen Ulph

Stephen Ulph specializes in the analysis of jihadist and Islamist ideology and regularly lectures on aspects of Islamist and Jihadist ideology impacting on Western democracies and the course of the war on terrorism. His publications include an analysis on the course of jihadism in Syria for the CTC, an ideological analysis of the ‘Virtual Border Conflict’ (the online arena for Islamist extremism) for The Borders of Islam, an indepth examination of the relationship of Islamism to other totalitarian systems of thought in Fighting the Ideological War and a 4-part reference work Towards a Curriculum for the Teaching of Jihadist Ideology available online at the Jamestown Foundation.

www.

A

nyone making even a cursory perusal of the Islamist and Jihadist sites on the web is soon struck not only by the sheer size of the endeavour, but by the range and quality of the websites in circulation, ranging from simple discussion forums to fullscale, media-savvy productions that combine visual impact with high technological competence.

Analysts have long agonised over how important the internet has been to jihadists, whether the risk is primarily in terms of the cyber-terrorism threat, as a conduit for operational information or as a barometer of future intentions, but there is one element that remains of undisputed use for the mujahideen: the element of education and propaganda. For what is clearly in evidence, from all the proliferation, is the value of the Internet for promoting a common jihadist culture.

This is strategically more significant than it sounds. In the Central Asia region of the “Stans” the mujahideen have failed so far to threaten the state structures – due to the jihadist preoccupation with Afghanistan and the ability to date of Central Asia’s strong, centralized governments to clamp down on militant activity or expression of support for Islamists.

But the jihad, perhaps more than any other ideologically-founded conflict, is a war of hearts and minds that is working to a much longer timescale. Its proponents are convinced that the logic of a 1,400-year long history and faith is on their side and believe that every death evidences a personal triumph for the “martyr,” every reverse on the field a step towards the final victory.

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

29

Maintaining this perception is the strategic function of the jihadist internet endeavour, as the mujahideen await the onset of suitable political conditions – political turmoil, economic collapse, ethnic conflict or any other crisis – so as to step in and launch their offensives over the ruins, as laid out by the strategist AbūBakrNājī in his work, The Management of Savagery. Recent history has shown how patient jihadist militant groups can be and – given the example of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s 1999 invasion of the Batken and Osh oblasts of Kyrgyzstan – how willing they are to seek the vital bridgehead for the reestablishment of the Caliphate, beginning with Uzbekistan, one of the historic centers of Islamic culture.

How could distant Central Asia fit into this scheme? Jihadist ideologues are nothing if not diligent. The region was early identified as an arena of considerable importance, both religiously and strategically. For example, the famous strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Sūrī elaborated on the significance of “Khorasan” (conceived as embracing parts of Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) in his 1999 work Muslims in Central Asia and the Coming Battle of Islam: “The glad tidings from the Prophet’s ahadith are never changing, and prophecies of the People of the Book concur ... The forces of Imam Mahdi will be victorious in Khorasan and will then get help from Yemen, Iraq, Syria. Then the centre of Imam Mahdi’s kingship will be transferred to Damascus.”

Fantasies aside, his practical observations on the prioritisation of Central Asia focused on the area being the “weakest spot of the enemy” and a “prudent epicentre for operations.” He noted the natural geography of the countries, which “form a strategic natural fortification against the militaries of the world,” defying siege and control, and where “overall poverty in the population and other factors and specifications make this populace suitable for jihad at this

30

THE UZBEK TIMES

time.”

While the core Arab Middle East occupies the lion’s share of jihadist focus, jihadis have long been at pains to underscore the Central Asian region’s contribution to the overall cause. For example, an Arabic language statement was put out in November 2000 by the IMU as an expression of solidarity for the Palestinian intifada, and also as an argumentation of the central importance of Central Asia in the cause of jihad: “As for the sons of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Central Asia, our movement is global and we experience the hopes and pains of all Muslims. We have contracted ourselves to aid Muslims in every place without respect for nationality or location ... We see the conquest of Uzbekistan as lying on the road towards the liberation of the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] ... For it is all one single vital effort along a single path ...

Every one of us is manning an outpost of Islam.”

Keeping the Middle East centre informed was certainly the priority behind the production of Arabic-language online newsletters. Such a task was carried out by Talā’Khurāsān, the “Vanguards of Khorasan” publication which featured regular updates on the Afghan field operations, interviews with mujahideen famous for successful operations, eulogies of martyred mujahideen and the correction or denial of news reports put out by the regional and international media. This was for the use not only of Arab speakers in the Afghan field, but also designed to promote the cause back home amongst their funders in the Middle East. Just how important the media message was to fighters in the field was underscored by the development of specialist media wings designed to take the militants’ propaganda war onto the offensive.

But the most important function by far is the propagandistic one, where the maintenance of morale is assured through the fostering of a comprehensive “culture of jihad.”

This is indicated by the proliferation of jihadist discussion forums and organisation websites. In a typical example of a jihadist forum the constituent sections divide themselves equally between pro-active reader communication and elements of education and scholarship. Significantly, the more comprehensive the site, the greater space is given to doctrinal discourse motivating and justifying the actions of the mujahideen.

A good example of the genre is the IMU website Furqon, which features all these elements, providing not only articles and commentaries but also hosting an all-purpose jihad cultural center. The slick production features a Kutubkhona (“library”) section featuring works of a doctrinal nature underpinning the jihadist view with the copious materials on ‘aqīda (“creed”), on hijra (“migration”) from the impure, infidel community), on al-wala’ wal-barā’ (the polarizing, hostile “Loyalty and Renunciation” doctrine codifying the repudiation of contact with infidels), morally improving tales on the pious ancestors (al-Salaf) and selections from the Qur’ān that emphasize the propriety of jihad.

The idea of “libraries” on jihadist forums might surprise many, and particularly libraries stuffed almost exclusively with doctrinal treatises.

But the mujahideen are fighting a war conceived in a religious perspective, and therefore doctrinal propriety is the crux of their every action. This endeavour has generated by now a considerable corpus of literature. Indeed, the striking quantity and quality of materials making up the body of the ideology indicates how much of an abiding preoccupation this endeavour is for them.

All mujahideen aspire to doctrinal legitimacy, and those that lack the training make continuous deference to their supportive, like-minded scholars. For these extremists who are engaged in constructing a subculture, the internet is of crucial importance in enabling sympathizers to bypass the established community

institutions and infrastructures.

Reflecting the fluidity of the field of operations of the IMU leadership and the fact that Afghanistan is a Pashto-dominated arena only in the country’s center and south, there is an obvious need for a multi-lingual approach. The website caters to this with its highly developed Filmlar section featuring videos from the “Jund Allah studio” and “Ummat studio” in Uzbek, Arabic, German, Russian, English, Farsi, Urdu and Pashto on subjects ranging from interviews, sermons, to filmed jihadist operations in the field in Pakistan and India.

Other features include aNashīdalar (“poetic composition and address”) section and a radio department, which offers downloadable broadcasts by the JundullahOvozi (“Voice of the Jund Allah”) alongside sections on shahīdlar (“martyrs”), which hosts uplifting accounts of the ultimate sacrifice of mujāhidīn in the various arenas of combat.

What is notable in the Central Asian online arena is the space given to Arabic-language materials. Arabic remains the lingua classica of jihad and there is still a sense of needing to present the importance of the region to Arab readers, even as its requirement to be fluent in Arabic fortunately limits its Central Asian readership.

This is particularly in evidence in the polished production of the Arabic-language online magazine Turkistān al-Islāmiyya (“Islamic Turkestan”) of the Turkistan Islamic Party, the Uyghur jihadist group operating in the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

Its founding edition in July 2008 focused entirely on presenting what it calls the “Eastern Turkestan” region – its history, its place in the early Islamic annals its orthodox Sunni credentials, reminding scholars of Islam of their responsibilities to preach the defence of the region and urging them to “save Turkestan before it is too late.” The latest edition, published last December, features the full complement of political articles highlighting the “criminality” of the Chinese government, notable arenas of militancy,

martyrologies of the fallen and biographical literature on notable Muslim heroes of the region, alongside protreptic advice addressed to the Turkestan mujāhidīn from Abu Yahyā al-Lībī who, until his death in a drone strike last summer, was one of the leading successors to Bin Laden in al Qaeda. The production values call to mind the pioneering online Arabian jihad magazines of Mu’askar al-Battār and Sawt al-Jihād, and indicate the growing media professionalism of its exponents.

Indeed, the production quality of the jihadist sites continues to advance by leaps and bounds, as does the comprehensiveness of the vision that they are promoting: a surfer of jihadist sites has enough material to live an entire lifetime without ever having to stray from its cultural “curriculum.”

And this is perhaps the greatest danger that the jihadist fluency with the Internet poses to the Central Asian region, as it may soon find itself wrestling with elements of a younger generation, Internet savvy but seduced into an alternative Islamist mental universe, one whose Salafist doctrinal underpinning denigrates the region’s deep historical weft of tolerant, pluralistic Islamic cultures, abasing their traditional latitude and pushing a purist Islamic identity that is founded upon an alien, peninsular Arab model, at odds with the region’s deep contributions to Islamic culture.

Doctrinal purism of this nature immunizes its advocates from nuance and harmonization, and fosters a radicalism that will not easily respond to alternative visions of how to lead a Muslim life, all too easily acquiesce to the employment of indiscriminate violence and terrorism in the name of “religion.”

For better or worse, the fate of Central Asia was inextricably bound up in the USSR for more than 70 years and the region’s populations, while rejecting Communism, will be far more reluctant to embrace a fundamentalist vision that rejects some of the more constructive legacies from the Soviet period, from womens’

rights to industrialization, increasing integration into the world economy, universal education and a standard of living that post-Soviet Central Asians need only compare to Afghanistan to thoroughly reject.

While the jihadist websites profess to impart knowledge about how to restore the “dignity of the Muslims,” the message that they convey up to date has been accompanied by terrorist violence, from the daily carnage taking place in Iraq and Pakistan to the February 1999 car bombings in the Uzbek capital Tashkent, which killed dozens and wounded many more.

The indiscriminate murder of innocent Muslim civilians in the name of advancing Islamic values is a cynical Islamic parallel to the civilian “collateral deaths” from claimed by Western military operations in Muslim lands.

It is essential that authorities in the region, political and religious, do not overlook the central role played by the Internet in jihadi radicalization efforts and would be well advised not only both to keep a watch at least as much on the quietly accumulating traffic of nuanced doctrinal discourse as on the bombastic political commentary splashed over the home page, while coordinating efforts with its allies to mitigate the dolorous effects of such xenophobic, polarizing literature amongst its most impressionable citizens.

Central Asia’s Islamic past is a distinguished one and it has made major contributions in its own right to the world of Islam – its future should be built upon this heritage, not upon agendas promulgated by outsiders foreign to its culture.

The spread of jihadi Internet ideological viruses is far from solely a concern of Central Asian post-Soviet and Muslim nations, but ultimately China, the Russian Federation and the West as well, which should intensify its efforts to assist secularist Muslim allies in both secularist Central Asia and the Middle East in combating ideological attempts by jihadis to infect their nations covertly via the Internet in the name of “true” Islam.

Visit www.uztimes.com

THE UZBEK TIMES

31

The Uzbek Times courtesy: shutterstock.com