VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy
Is Fake Nature Less Valuable than the Real Thing? By Rob Nightingale
A
round the world there have been attempts by hu-
manity to undo the harm caused by population growth and industrialization. This takes many forms, for example the reintroduction of species or restoring landscapes. In the future it is likely that such actions will be more frequent still. Various philosophers hold that no matter how convincingly an area of nature is restored or recreated, there will always be a loss of some kind of value that would have remained had it not been for man’s interference. However, as Belshaw asks, ‘do we have reason to value things just because they are old, or natural?’ (Belshaw, 2001, p248). What follows will examine why we often place value on ‘old’ or ‘natural’ entities and whether we are right to do so, I hope to show that value is irretrievably lost in fake nature, and that we are indeed right (all things being equal) to value areas, objects and phenomena of natural origin over those of man-made origin. 22
It is helpful to clarify what is meant by ‘fake nature’ and ‘real nature’. ‘Fake nature’ shall mean land, objects, or phenomena that have been openly constructed or restored by man without deceitful intention. It will be assumed that the genesis of any land, object or phenomena is known. By ‘real nature’ I shall mean: nature that has not had its natural processes dominated over or widely interfered with by man. Elliot posits that an ‘origin value’ is irretrievably lost in fake nature. The story and genesis of a modified tract of land is altered, and this is the lost value that cannot be rekindled even when an area of nature is perfectly restored. He does not ‘want to be taken as claiming that what is natural is good and what is non-natural is not’ (Elliot, 1982, p4); sometimes other forms of value will override origin value. Elliot is arguing that something will always be lost, and that ceteris paribus, fake nature will indeed be less valuable than real nature because of its altered genesis.
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These claims largely rely on Elliot’s proposal that ‘what is significant about wilderness is its causal continuity with the past’ (Elliot, 1982, p7) and through man’s interference we lose this continuity and distance nature from its valuable origins. As an analogy, an exact copy of Whistler’s Mother may be visually indistinguishable from the original, but with the original the stroke on the lips of the subject was made with an emotion only Whistler felt. The copy only replicates the emotion as opposed to holding it like the original seems to. The point is that given the choice real nature is of a higher value than fake
nature because of its seemingly richer, fuller story and genesis, as opposed to fake nature’s shallower content and genesis. So fake nature is not the direct result of purely natural processes and it is because of this that value is lost. Katz gives another perspective. Fake nature has different value to real nature because ‘once we begin to create restored natural environments, we impose our anthropocentric purposes on areas that exist outside human society…they will be anthropocentrically designed human artifacts’ (Katz, 1992, p98). It is held that these artifacts have an intrinsic function, as a playground does, whereas nature has 23
VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy
no such function, restored nature is a mere artifact, not nature. We can never recreate nature; we can only satisfy our anthropocentric desires by manipulating and dominating nature to create artifacts that merely appear natural. These views explain differences between fake nature and real nature. Both attack the restoration thesis, which says that we are able to restore nature to its previous value through recreation and restoration. Nevertheless, Belshaw’s question remains: ‘Do we have reason to value things just because they are old, or natural?’ ‘We will regret the loss of the original world, but it isn’t clear to me that anything of value is lost’ (Belshaw, p248). So we might ask Elliot, though we often value entities based on origin, are we right to do so? To Katz, what gives natural entities significance over artifacts? Monet said ‘The richness I achieve comes from nature, the source of my inspiration’ and Carson said ‘It is a wholesome and necessary thing for us to turn again to the Earth, and in the contemplation of her beauties know of wonder and humility’. These quotes exemplify the importance we often ascribe to nature, but seem to apply to real nature. If we gaze into the distance of a man-made savanna, can it really be said that we will feel the same ‘wonder and humility’ that we would feel while gazing over the wholly natural Serengeti? Belshaw says, ‘I agree that we will value the un24
touched woodland more highly than the restored’ (Belshaw, p248), but cannot see a solid reason for us valuing it more. The fact remains that we do, I shall look at why this is so. The value ascribed to real nature is extremely vague, but a possible solution can be found in the Works of Rolston. In Valuing Wildlands, he puts forward various types of value that nature holds, and the three most poignant seems to be historical, character-building and religious value. These values seem to be most present in real nature, while less so in fake nature.
...the awe and intense wonder we would feel through real nature would be replaced with an aesthetic appreciation and impressiveness of man’s capabilities. Historic value can be understood as a parallel to Elliot’s origin value. It seems harder for us to picture a wildland as it would have been several millennia ago if we know it was recently planted by conservation workers. Its story seems tarnished and its history degraded by man’s interference. Religious value seems more spiritual. Witnessing something as majestic as the Aurora Borealis is often the trigger for a ‘peak experience’. Maslow said these experiences were rare moments in a person’s life when one is
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filled with wonder and awe; where one feels more connected with both oneself and the world. Such an experience, rare as it is, seems to be much less likely if the Aurora Borealis were manually created. In such a situation, the awe and intense wonder we would feel through real nature would be replaced with an aesthetic appreciation and impressiveness of man’s capabilities. We would miss out on peak experiences that, once had, are extremely valuable. Character-building value, to Rolston, is the providing by nature of ‘a place to gain humility and a sense of proportion…integrated into character, they increase well-being, and the social good is benefited by having such citizens’ (Rolston, p186). This is the case when nature is real. Being immersed in fake nature seems mainly to build respect for one’s species, possibly creating an overly important image of oneself and humankind. If every forest were planted, and every desert directed by man; if every storm was controlled, and every wave propelled by machine, we would feel not a wonder and awe, and a sense of humility and proportion, but rather a sense of immense self-importance and domination. Man may once again become the centre of the universe, only to leave us without the sense of respect for nature , and the humbling feeling of our proportion that provides us with such positive virtues. It is for these reasons that we
do, and should, value real nature over fake nature. The more fake nature we allow into our surroundings, the less humility we feel and the more our sense of proportionality is lost. The connected positive psychological effects are reasons we should value real nature. This line of thought matches our inclinations. It provides an explanation why, given the choice, we would usually prefer to build a house on a replanted area of woodland as opposed to an adjacent area of completely untouched woodland. Although there is arguably no true intrinsic difference between the two, it is the psychological effect of understanding nature, its story, and our place within it that ascribes this additional value. Applying this to Elliot’s argument, we see that through understanding the origin of an area, our position in nature becomes clearer, and we are humbled by the impressiveness and complexities of real nature. Attempting to look at fake nature in the same way brings man to the forefront, removing the humbling effects. Katz’s argument can also be seen from this angle. By creating human-centred artifacts, and ascribing functions to everything, we lose interest in the natural world. Our domination seems to dampen nature’s inspiration. Allowing wildlands to have no function and merely remain natural instead of converting them into something artificial leaves scope for us to 25
VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy
search for the historic, character-building and religious value in these things. Once we introduce mankind into the picture through fake nature, this value is more challenging to discover - man’s power seems to override nature’s. It seems that the reason we ascribe higher value to real nature is because of the values mentioned above and the psychological effect they have on many people educated and enlightened to the power of nature. Nature may be replicated so precisely that it is indistinguishable from the rest of the natural world, but our perception of nature, and the effects of this perception on our psychological state are very real yet immaterial, and these should be taken into account when decisions are made to restore land. So, if asked again, are we right to value things just because they are natural? I say yes, for the effects of knowing something is natural seem to be rational. Knowing real nature keeps us grounded in a way knowing fake nature never could, giving real nature value that fake nature does not have. We should take these values into consideration when attempting to recreate the natural.
ited, Chesham Carlson, A, ‘Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature’ Elliot, R, (1982) ‘Faking Nature’, Inquiry, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 81-93 Katz, E, (1992), ‘The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature’, Research in Philosophy and Technology 12, pp93107 Kagan, S, (1998), ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’, The Journal of Ethics 2: pp227-297 Maslow, A. (1970), Religion, values and peak experiences. New York: Viking. O’Neill, J, (1993) ‘Nature, Intrinsic Value and Human Well-Being’, Ecology, Policy and Politics, London and New York, Routledge Rolston, H, (1989) Philosophy Gone Wild, ‘Valuing Wildlands’, Buffalo, Prometheus Books Scott, R, ‘Obligations to Future Generations’ in Environmental Ethics and Obligations to Future Generations,(Sikora R, Barry B, 1978) Philadelphia, Temple University Press Taylor, P, (1986) ‘Having and Expressing the Attitude of Respect for Nature’ in Respect for Nature, Princeton, Princeton University Press
Bibliography:
____________________________ Rob Nightingale is a third year undergraduate reading Philosophy at the University of York
Belshaw, C, (2001), ‘Environmental Philosophy’, Acumen Publishing Lim26
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