Rights & Duties

VOX

The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

Published termly by the Club of PEP at the University of York

voxjournal.co.uk

Issue XIV- Spring 2011

VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

EDITORIAL

C

IVIL SOCIETY IS A NECESSARY FEATURE OF MODERN LIFE. IT HAS BEEN A NECESSARY FEATURE OF LIFE SINCE THE Ancient Greeks. As social animals, human beings find it hard to live a life in complete isolation: as Mr. Hobbes says, life would be “Nasty, Brutish, and short�. However, civil societies can only function if they have certain rules and regulations, or institutions, which every member of that society tries to uphold.

To this end, most civil societies have a moral code, by which we are all expected to live, consisting of rights and duties.

This issue of Vox will explore these concepts as the fundamental features of society, considering their foundations, their applications within different societies, and whether they can transcend the boundaries of individual states into the international arena. We have articles discussing the foundations of rights and duties, and what this means for society (p5, p17, p32). There are articles further exploring how these duties may permit societies to progress: whether it is protesting as a check on the state (p10); educating citizens (p13); Protecting property rights of citizens (p28); or protecting a fundamental freedom of expression (p7). Finally, we examine whether these rights and duties extend to the level of interstate relations (p20, p24).

This will be our last issue as the current editorial team. Thank you to everybody who has been involved with Vox over the last year, we hope you have enjoyed it as much as we have. We wish the best of luck to the new editors, Dan and Firdaus, for the coming year. We are also delighted to announce their first initiative: The Vox Essay Award, which will go to the best essay published this academic year, awarded in the Summer term.

Elena Villarreal and Adam Czopp

EDITORIAL TEAM Editor: Elena Villarreal Co-Editor: Adam Czopp Layout Editor: Emily Coward External Liaisons: Fay Farstad

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Sub-Editors: Dan Iley-Williamson Firdaus Kader Clement Wee

Peer Reviewers and Proofreaders: Abir Ahmmed Risga Carson Alexa Mitterhuber Vicnan Pannirselvam Katherin Eichinger Dominic Falcao Tianyan Xu

VOX

The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

voxjournal.co.uk

ISSUE XIv - Spring 2011

rights & duties ESSAYS

PAGE

THE MISTAKE OF MENCIUS Nahi Zchang

5

THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION Jessica Yang

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WHAT SOLIDARITY? Andrew Cope

10

MARKET FORCES AND THE DUTY TO EDUCATE Laura Wise

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DIGNITY: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Emily Coward

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KANT’S NAIVE THEORY OF PERPETUAL PEACE Chiamaka Aniedu

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GLOBAL POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS Dr Kerri Woods

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THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY Dan Iley-Williamson

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DO WE HAVE ANY RIGHTS? Professor Matt Matravers

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VOX is a student academic journal that aims to provide a platform for the exchange of ideas and insight into the debates relating to Politics, Economics and Philosophy (PEP).

The Club of

PEP Journal

VOX is published triannually by the Club of PEP at the University of York and distributed on York’s campus as well as other universities world-wide.

VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

‘‘The most beautiful things in the universe are the starry heavens above us and the feeling of duty within us.’’

Indian Proverb

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Issue XIV - Spring 2011

the mistake of mencius

By Nahi Zchang “Every duty is a charge, but the charge of oneself is the root of all others.”

Mencius (4th BCE)

T

HE PRINCIPLE BEHIND THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHER’S idea suffers from a fundamental category mistake. A student of Philosophy, Politics and Economics might express the error as follows: 1. The fulfilling of the duty to oneself is an insufficient condition for satisfying duties to others.

2. A good citizen can live in a bad republic.

3. Macroeconomics cannot be deduced solely from microeconomics.

But this interpretation is subject to a category mistake itself, in that it is separating the thinking of Mencius as an ‘individual’ from the wider tradition of thought that he is part of. Chinese and, more generally, Asian philosophy tends to emphasise the whole over the parts, without neglecting the latter. So it is that Mencius should be understood as having a broader meaning about what this ‘self ’ is; a person is an integral whole, interconnected with other humans by virtue of its biological features. While the giraffe might be

able to stand on its own feet after its mother has given birth to it, the human child requires nurture and care.

Biology determines us to be social animals.

Necessity requires humans to live in a web of human relations. But sustainability causes further requirements. Individual and social psychology has supplied ample evidence that outcasts and pariahs suffer from mental disorders. Loneliness and lack of human warmth result in desperation, which is physically and psychologically similar to that suffered during deprivation of food. To live a healthy and sustainable life, we require human touch.

The connection between the micro and the macro is further felt when a human is understood to be a ‘species being’. While being an element of a set, the ‘self ’ that Mencius refers to can only be understood in concrete relation to what the essence of this subject is and how it differs from the other objects around it. For example, by virtue of being a member of the larger group of trees or woodwork, the object ‘tree’ can only be identified as such when it is related to the more general class of trees.

A further hint to why indeed the duty to oneself can be seen as the 5

VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

source of most ethics, including duties to others, is a clear understanding of death. Neither romantic infatuation nor pessimistic drapery will do.

The duty to oneself can, thus, serve as a source for duty to others in that human life is only comprehensible as being embedded in both a social context... as well as a natural context.

Shakespeare indulges in the latter by mystifying that unknown which lies behind that door. For him, death is that mystery that ends the “ slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” and the “sea of troubles” which life is (Hamlet, Act III, Scene I). Free from religious ideology, one can see that death is the mere return of ashes to ashes - a return home - a leaving through the door one has come through. The particles which make up one’s physical existence are sent back: Death is similar to the state where one writes down the instructions “Return to Sender” on a letter that has arrived at one’s flat with the original tenant being present no longer.

Far from being mystic or mythical, such a grasp of what life and death is will establish that humans are inherently connected to the earth they are living on. The duty to oneself can, thus, serve as a source for duty to others in that human life is only compre6

hensible as being embedded in both a social context (the family, the village, the county, the country, etc) as well as a natural context (the farmland used to growing wheat, the trees bearing fruit and the sun yielding warmth).

If this interconnectedness is neglected, the bearers of duty will indeed be charged. Gross negligence, if not malicious, wrong doing towards Nature over the past centuries have brought the wrath of the earth onto mankind - in the form of climate change. The Associated Press called 2010 “the year the Earth struck back.”

(Bell & Borenstein, 2010) The flooding in parts of Australia does not stop at any one of its borders, nor does the water distinguish between people of Haiti or its neighbours. Only the petty and persistent imbeciles will continue to uphold religious, racial, and nationalistic and other differences that prevent them seeing the connection between the “duties of oneself ” being connected to the “duty to others” in the most total sense.

In this vein, the three statements at the front of this article are incorrect. From front to back they should read: (iii) The separation

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between micro and macro is impossible, and if possible, then wrong anyway. (ii) Good citizens only exist in a rightly governed polity. And finally: (i) Satisfying the duty to oneself is a sufficient condition for satisfying the duty to others because this “oneself ” is only good and right if it is embedded and integrated in a greater entity, encompassing other “selves”, that itself is good. Sartre rightly maintained that you too are a war criminal as long as your protests fail to prevent that invasion. Merely going on rampage with placards and sticks without securing the result is wasted energy, indeed positively harmful in that protesters subsequently go home and feel a relax-

ation in their minds, thinking “at least we have tried”, while sipping their Earl Grey tea.

Bibliography Mencius, (1970) “Mencius Penguin Classics”, Translated by D.C. Lau (Penguin, London) Shakespeare, W. (2003) “Hamlet” (Simon & Schuster, New York) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40739667/ ns/us_news-2010_year_in_review/ Bell, J. and Borenstein, S. (2010) in The Associated Press 12/19/2010 ____________________________________

Nahi Zchang is a first year undergraduate in Economics at Free University Berlin, Germany.

the right to freedom of thought and expression

By Jessica Yang

T

HIS ARTICLE’S INTENTION IS TO AWAKEN OUR MINDS to the importance of not only our own right but other people’s right to freedom of thought and expression. In a world like ours, when religious minorities are silenced, when people are penalized for an expression of a single thought, when we are expected to think in a certain way, what we need to keep hold of, is this precious right to freedom of thought and expression. J. S. Mill fiercely defends this in Chapter

2 of ‘On Liberty’ which I believe to be an extraordinarily powerful defence of the right to freedom of thought and expression.

According to my interpretation of Mill’s arguments, freedom of thought and expression are defended from two directions: one is that reaching truth is in our interest and a free discussion maximises the chance of reaching truth; but not only is reaching truth good for us, the means by which we reach truth and how we par7

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ticipate in the investigative discussion is also important. Some have argued that Mill’s defence is too dependent on the existence of truth, and the value of human progress, which comes with the discovery of truth. They argue that Mill’s defence of freedom of thought and expression collapses when a discussion involves difficult topics within morality and philosophy. I hope to prove criticisms like these wrong by showing that, because reaching the truth is only one reason why the freedom of thought and expression should be protected, the fact that sometimes truth is not found does not undermine Mill’s defence. I also want to demonstrate that the capacity of each individual to think rationally is a powerful argument for Mill as it reduces the risk of blind belief in ideals without consideration.

Mill famously said: “if all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing [the rest of] mankind” (Mill, 1989, p76). What is so interesting about this quote is that, intuitively, we accept this line of thought. But in reality, many of us unconsciously believe that it is perfectly fine to silence this “one person” and not vice versa.

After the new wave of religious terrorism post 11 September 2001, our attitude towards tolerating other people’s thoughts and expressions has changed.

The West thinks that it has the cor8

rect method of doing things, and the Islamic world believes that they also hold the correct method of doing things. We all believe that we hold the ultimate true values, blinded by the belief that there exists a universal right way of doing things. Huntington says: “in the emerging era, clashes of civilisations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilisations is the safeguard against world war” (1996, p321). Many people object to this rather grim conclusion, however, unfortunately this is the outcome awaiting us if the world we live in allows the right to freedom of thought and expression to drift and fade away.

Given that we cannot be sure that truth exists in the area of morality and religion amongst clashing views, the best solution seems to be to enter into free discussions in which diverse and opposing views may be expressed, respecting the universal right to freedom of expression. Mill believed that free discussion is essentially an opportunity for individuals to make use of their ability to think rationally by evaluating opposing opinions within the discussion. To forbid some

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What we need to keep hold of, is this precious right to freedom of thought and expression. expressions of opinions would lead to two harms: first, the possibility of truth surfacing is diminished because some opinions are not allowed to enter the discussion; second, it deprives individuals the chance to exercise their capacity for reasoning (Mill, 1989). So even in cases where the truth cannot be discovered, there is sufficient reason for the protection of freedom of expression. Although Mill emphasises finding truth in all four of his arguments in Chapter 2, nowhere does he say that there will always be truth at the end of every discussion. Yet there is a need to protect free discussion because: “the reasons for protection are partly intrinsic, partly instrumental. I see no basis for deciding which is more fundamental.” (Cohen, 1993, p230) If Mill’s sole aim for protecting thought and discussion is to find the truth, then his method is an inefficient one; however, Mill does not only care for the truth. He also thinks that there is an intrinsic value in discussion itself because it enhances each individual’s rational capacities. Critics may reply to my defence by asking: why is the skill to think rationally so important? The capacity to think rationally contributes to Mill’s final goal: human progress, which “is served by the intermediate

end of the self-development of each individual” (Gordon, 1997, p238). By engaging in free discussions, individuals are given a chance to evaluate arguments on both sides, to decide which argument is stronger.

If only we could treat the right to freedom of thought and expression with more respect, I think the world we live in would become a more tolerant place, where people holding completely clashing views on life and religion can live peacefully side by side. We must strive to extend this right to those who come from different cultures, civilisations and religious backgrounds, because the value of free discussions involving all ideas is something that deserves our respect. I think nobody should be exposed to the fear of exchanging ideas with those who probably hold difference views, because the right to freedom of thought and expression protects everyone.

Bibliography

Cohen, Joshua (1993), ‘Freedom of Expression’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 207-263 Gordon, Jill (1997), ‘John Stuart Mill and the “Marketplaces of Ideas”’, Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp 235-249 Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World, (USA, Simon and Schuster) Mill, J.S. (1985) On Liberty, (UK, Penguin Group) ____________________________________

Jessica Yang is a third year undergraduate reading Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of York.

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VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

what solidarity?

The right (and duty) to protest

By Andrew Cope “The enemy of society is not error but indifference”

(Devlin, 1965, p114)

W

HETHER WORLDWIDE DEMONSTRATIONS against austerity measures, mass publication of leaked confidential US embassy cables, or satirical cartoonists shamelessly wielding the quill of pointed mockery, protest in its myriad forms is a “political resource” (Lipsky, 1968, pp1144-1158), and moreover an activity which at its core should be protected as a human right. The according freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, famously enshrined in the First Amendment of the American Constitution, as well as in the 1948 UN Declaration for Human Rights, establish the basic right to protest.

However, I argue that beyond just a simple right, we have a duty to protest against unjust laws – and not merely on behalf of ourselves, but (perhaps more importantly) on behalf of others as well.

The electrifying word ‘protest’, inasmuch as it conjures up vastly different images for different people, encompasses a broad range of activities – some of which are more legal 10

than others. So to set the boundaries of our discussion, first, a clarification: In order to sensibly defend the liberty to protest as a legal and inalienable right, evidently the subject of our proposition must remain protest in its orderly and non-violent forms exclusively (which unequivocally demand full cooperation with state bodies and law enforcement agencies).

Protest is defined as expressing opposition (vocal or otherwise) towards the state or those in other roles of governance regarding their policies.

“The right to protest plays an important role in free and democratic societies, providing individuals and groups with an opportunity to influence government action through means other than the electoral process” (Dunn, 2005, p328). In this way protest acts, not only as an alternative medium through which to express public opinion, but also as an exterior check and balance for the law-makers, albeit a somewhat unpredictable and unreliable one. Protest is sometimes criticized as being distinctly undemocratic, in its attempts to manipulate a nationally representative body with the wildly conspicuous actions of a few. This is an important consideration, reminding

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us that, where possible, a protest that garners wider diverse bi-partisan support (such as ‘The Wave’ during the Copenhagen climate summit last year) is always harder to ignore and stands far more chance of success in gaining credibility than the isolated stunts of individuals (notoriously, the politicised pranks of Greenpeace). Yet, it is clear that legitimacy of a protest is not determined by the volume of its participant base, for if it were, marginalized minorities would find it impossible to successfully express their grievances (Pech, 1969).

Rawls, in his pragmatism, declares that “our natural duty to uphold just institutions binds us to comply with unjust laws and policies, or at least not to oppose them by illegal means” (1999, p311). Needless to say, to comply with a law and yet be in constant peaceful protest against it is nevertheless a consistent position.

Indeed, deference to the law is arguably a clever tactic for demonstrators who face ceaseless new efforts by opposition to criminalise their activities

– for example, the Obama administration’s labelling of Julian Assange as a “terrorist”, (MacAskill, 2010).

Civil disobedience also buckles under the attack ‘But what if everyone did that?’ (Wasserstrom, 1969), however, the general right to protest as we have framed it here suffers no such defeat when challenged about prospects for universality (a basic essential test for any human right) .

Kant, (the typical champion of moral universality), establishes through the Categorical Imperative our imperfect duty to contribute to the happiness of others. Conventionally, we understand protest as a medium whereby we solely express our own grievances. Yet, the most glorified struggles against oppression are seldom of this nature. Such protests not only incorporate dissenters over a broad spectrum, but, more significantly, include the ‘oppressors’ themselves, over-riding their perceived complicity as the usual beneficiaries of the contested status quo. Was not part of the power of the civil rights movement the racial diversity spread across all of its advocates? Take person X and fellow citizens Y: If X campaigns for his ‘pursuit of happiness’ (see VOX previous issue XIII), and the justice of his society (upon which the former is dependent) through protest – the act of which is afforded the status of a right – and to protest as such is personally acknowledged by X as a duty, besides which X has an imperfect duty to see 11

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to the betterment of Y too and in the same fashion that X does so for himself, then X has a duty to protest on behalf of Y for their betterment also.

From here on I shall argue to this end; the extension of protest for oneself and for others from being a right to a duty.

It has been written that within the context of international law, “the violation of the right of any neutral nation is the violation of a right common to every neutral, and a claim to violate the right of one is in effect a claim to violate the right of any or all if the belligerent shall believe it to be to its advantage so to do” (Scott, 1916, p343).

This notion that if “one suffers, we all suffer”, articulated through Marshallian social citizenship, is at the foundation of the concept of solidarity: “the idea that ordinary people do not only claim rights for themselves, they also create and enforce them for others” (Gready, 2004, p2). And hence if we should campaign on behalf of ourselves, we must likewise do so for others. This builds on Durkheim’s original concept of ‘mechanical solidarity’ (1947) – that we are united by our resemblances (our universal deserving of equal rights) – but requires going further to self-construct, through personal empathy, an identification with the oppressed. (Appropriately, protests of non-violence nurture this solidarity, and vice versa – see Bruyn & Rayman, 1979).

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This notion that if “one suffers, we all suffer”, articulated through Marshallian social citizenship, is at the foundation of the concept of solidarity.

Amidst today’s ‘transnational civil society’ such solidarity has explosive potential. The Gramscian counter-movement of ‘globalisation-from-below’ (Falk, 2001) is arguably indispensible in the promotion of global justice: “In the absence of sustained campaigns and lobbying efforts by INGOs and particular individuals, probably not a single human right would have been written into international law” (Risse 2000, p.184). Obviously the extent of freedoms which can be enjoyed across our planet is tantamount only to the extent to which we meet our duty to protest. As one student scrawled on a UC Berkeley wall recently, “Your apathy = Your fees”. Ultimately, our right to protest is a right worth protesting to keep.

Bibliography

Bruyn, S.T. & Rayman, P. (1979) ‘Introduction’, in Nonviolent Action and Social Change, pp112, Irvington Devlin, P. (1965) The Enforcement of Morals, Oxford University Press Dunn, C. (2005) ‘Balancing the Right To Protest in the Aftermath of September 11’ in Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review, 40(2) pp327-357 Durkheim, E. (1947) The Division of Labor in Society trans. Simpson, G. The Free,

Issue XIV - Spring 2011 Press:Illinois Falk, R. (2001) ‘Resisting ‘globalization-fromabove’ through ‘globalization-from-below’’, pp45-56, in Gills, B. (ed.) Globalization and the Politics of Resistance, Basingstoke: Palgrave Gready, P. (2004) ‘Introduction’ in Fighting for Human Rights, Gready, P. (ed.), pp1-32, Routledge Lipsky, M. (1968) ‘Protest as a Political Resource’ in The American Political Science Review, 62(4), pp1144-1158 MacAskill, E. (2010) ‘Julian Assange like a hitech terrorist, says Joe Biden’ in The Guardian (online), Sunday 19th December 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/ dec/19/assange-high-tech-terroristbiden, accessed 20/12/2010 19:00 GMT Pech, B. (1969) ‘Radical Disobedience and its Justification’ in Civil Disobedience Bedau, H. A. (ed.), pp.263-268, Pegasus Rawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice, revised

edn., Oxford University Press Risse, T. (2000) ‘The power of norms versus the norms of power: transnational civil society and human rights’, pp177-209, in Florini, A. M. (ed.) The Third Force: the rise of transnational civil society, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, and Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Scott, J.B. (1916) ‘The Right of Neutrals to Protest Against Violations of International Law’ in The American Journal of International Law, 10(2), pp341-343 Wasserstrom, R.A. (1969) ‘The Obligation to Obey the Law’ in Civil Disobedience, Bedau, H. A. (ed.), pp.256-263, Pegasus ____________________________________

Andrew Cope is a third year undergraduate reading Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of York.

market forces and the duty to educate

By Laura Wise

T

HROUGHOUT ALL THE DEBATE, COMMENT AND discourse resulting from the recent government efforts to restructure higher education, from the right-wing media executive to the passionate student campaigner, one general consensus is clear: education is important.

Not only is it important, but it is important to everyone who is aware of the concept, and almost everyone possesses an opinion about the provision, function and purpose of education.

The sudden explosion of these opinions onto the streets, in universities and between people of all different ages and backgrounds demonstrates just how universally relevant people view education to be, regardless of your political affiliation. However, the reception of the newly active, anti-fees and cuts student movement by the government, the press and the general public has been one of confusion, dismissal and rejection. Not only is this disappointing, but it is also damaging 13

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to the society that these students are a part of, and in this article I will attempt to explain why members of civil society, in whatever capacity they can, have a duty to support and join the student movement.

At the advent of modern public education systems in the 19th Century, one of the aims and purposes of compulsory learning, which was free at the point of delivery, was to assist in the advancement of human and societal development. The Enlightenment ideal of progress is one which has not lost its relevance today and yet through the “conversion of genuine education into market-driven job training” (Hallward, 2010) achievement of human progress through education is being hindered.

The proposed reforms to the way in which higher education is structured, and the view that individuals approach a university degree with a purely materialist and capital gains purpose, both fail to take into account human limitations of foresight.

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By giving institutions the opportunity to charge up to £27,000 for an undergraduate course, the government is promoting the perception of universities as a method to gain a pass to the next level of life, on which there will be a high paying job that will recoup this investment and will utilise the knowledge you gain from doing such a course. However, we are regularly told that we live in times of unprecedented austerity. If that is the case, students will no longer look for a course that could improve their ability to critically engage and will instead choose courses which provide them with a narrower skill set of relevant knowledge, to improve their chances of getting a specific job in a specific sector. Although there is nothing wrong with this for students who know what they want to eventually do with their lives, for many school pupils applying to university this isn’t the case. Does this mean that in times of austerity, university is no longer for them?

The narrowing of our abilities to be critical and flexible with our knowledge is not only a loss to individuals, and an exacerbation of the modern day class struggle between the ‘highly educated’ and those who have left the education system at a younger age, it is also a devastating loss to civil society. As the possession of a degree becomes less of a guarantee of employment, and students choose courses based on their suitability for a particular career, we move closer and

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closer to a society in which those who have been educated lose their flexibility with regards to knowledge and skill, and more and more individuals become unable to adapt to changes in an uncertain marketplace. We also find ourselves in a society in which people are only trained to do what is economically rewarding. So rather than being a civil society rich in diversity of sciences, humanities and arts, all of which have equal merit for human development (Robinson, 2009), we become a civil society that is dominated by market forces. This society actively discourages its citizens from engaging with subjects that are not considered to be as economically beneficial to the individual on a short term basis, simultaneously withdrawing the support that made human development and diversity possible in the first place.

Members of civil society, in whatever capacity they can, have a duty to support and join the student movement.

If you combine this reshaping of the societal influence that the educated have, with the increasing difficulty of less privileged students of getting into top universities (Lampl, 2010), the result is a society which, rather than progressing, actually regresses in its development. For civil

society to function - let alone progress - we require diversity and educated individuals whose ability to critically engage has been given the chance to explore its potential in the direction that the individual chooses (Wollstonecraft, 2008). This potential cannot possibly be fully explored if individuals are not given the opportunity to attend the university they choose, regardless of their background, economic goals (or lack thereof) and unstructured ambition (Owen, 1841). Surely the desire to explore, engage and participate in the act of learning and personal growth is of more value to civil society than the ceaseless pursuit of profit? Even if you do not view human capacity as more than an economic resource, the ability of education to produce this resource is under threat. The fact that the proposed £150 fund to support ‘free school meal receiving’ students could only afford to support 5,555 students (if fees were raised to £9,000 per year) (Million, 2010) means that the most disadvantaged will not be the only ones who will be deterred from pursuing the dream of a university education. And there are very few economists who propose that a decrease in graduates is of benefit to society.

There are many who criticise and defame the student movement for being ‘selfish’ and ‘greedy’, whilst at the same time benefiting from the services that graduates such as doctors, engineers and lawyers provide. Rather than prejudice, perhaps acknowledg15

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ing what student activists are actually fighting for is the first step towards fulfilling a duty that every member of society has; the preservation of a system originally designed for the advancement of that society, and the protection of the chance for all to participate in that system.

Bibliography Hallward, P. (2010) ‘A new strategy is needed for a brutal new era’. Times Higher Education http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story. asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=414573&c=2 (accessed 13th January 2011) Lampl, P. (2010) ‘Private school pupils 55 times more likely to go to Oxbridge than poor students’. The Sutton Trust http://www.suttontrust.com/news/news/private-school-pupils-

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55-times/ (accessed 13th January 2011) Million, ‘Scholarship scheme ‘unworkable’, says university group’ BBC News http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/education-11928289 (accessed 15th January 2011) Owen, R. (1841) A Development of the Principles & Plans on which to establish self-supporting Home Colonies. London: The Home Colonisation Society Robinson, K. (2009) ‘Fertile minds need feeding’. Education Guardian (London), 9th February, p. 5 Wollstonecraft, M. (2008) A vindication of the rights of women. U.S.A: ICON Classics ____________________________________

Laura Wise is a second year undergraduate reading International Relations and the Third World at Aberystwyth University.

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dignity LAYING THE founDationS for human rights

By Emily Coward

H

UMAN DIGNITY: IT IS PROTECTED, CAN BE violated, but as we understand it to be inherent in everyone, it can be neither lessened nor eliminated (Streiffer, 2009). Often used within discussions of human rights, human dignity, so inalienable from humanity, could offer a foundation of human rights applicable to every person simply on account of their being human. If it were successful, it would offer us an option that is “less heavenly or lofty than religion... and less earth-bound or down-to-earth than just law” (Sharma, 2003, p70).

Religion plays an important role in the field of human rights, particularly with regard to the concept of dignity. However, this can be problematic: if we seek a definition of human dignity that is worthy of people’s confidence, it should not be founded on an idea less certain than the one we are seeking to justify. In light of this, I would like to find a secular account of dignity, to “[cohere] with plausible thinking” (Metz, 2010, p81) and avoid reliance on potentially contentious claims. A hypothetical, perfect argument justifying human rights and relying on the existence of God would be attacked on all sides for a dependence

on the uncertainty of the transcendent. Thaddeus Metz explained why we should look beyond religion when considering the morality of killing, and his logic can similarly be applied to dignity: many people are more confident in the existence of human dignity than they are in the existence of God (or gods, or any sort of “divine realm” (Metz, 2010)). A justification for human rights leaving no space for God or religion would be unacceptable to the vast proportion of the world’s population with religious inclinations. The justification of human rights likely to be most widely accepted is one that is indifferent toward religion, leaving space for it without relying on it.

Kant held that humans have an intrinsic value in virtue of their humanity (Johnson, 2010), but in Kant’s view it is because humanity grants them rationality, and this rationality is what gives us ‘dignity’. Kant’s view denies any intrinsic value to babies, the very mentally ill, the senile, and every other category of person that cannot be said to possess rationality. He denies them dignity as humans by denying their humanity. If it is to even be considered that human rights could be founded in human dignity, to fol17

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low Kant’s conception is to deny these people any human rights - a disagreeable notion if there ever was one.

If we are to cling to the notion of human dignity as a basis for human rights - and with it leave space for religion - we need a different answer to the question of human rights. I offer you a modified version of Kant’s conception: to define the dignity or value of humans as flowing from their potential for rationality. As we will see, this allows us to suggest a foundation for human rights that grants them to all humanity.

In this way, the dignity inherent in all members of the human race in virtue of their potential for rationality is what grounds the idea of human rights.

It is true that there is currently no ‘cure’ for some mental illnesses, vegetative states, etc., and we may never discover any – the human potential for knowledge is unlikely to be infinite.

However, given this, we cannot ever be certain that these conditions are necessarily permanent. The next person to enter a vegetative state may possess a new genetic mutation, meaning that they will remain in that state for a year, and yet on the 366th day, will wake up right as rain. It is not outside the realms of possibility that a scientist may soon discover a new medicine 18

that reverses the effects of dementia. There are many possibilities that thwart any certainty that these people will never again possess rationality. Following this train of thought we cannot deny their potential for rationality. The same can be said of babies and small children, who while alive, always have the potential to grow and develop into perfectly rational adults. While we are alive, we always have the chance, even if only a slim one, to realise our potential rationality. Consider our human dignity to consist in this potential, and you grant all those excluded on Kant’s account of rationality its advantage and protection. If we accept this, we can accept that while we live, our dignity may consist in this new value of potential rationality.

Active rationality allows us to recognise dignity in ourselves – to see our own intrinsic value, and then to see the same in others, even if they have not realised their own rational potential and thus cannot see it for themselves. If we can recognise the dignity of others, we are aware of their value. They are, therefore, to a greater or lesser extent, valuable, and things that are valuable are to be treated with care. Acceptable ways to treat others, in light of their human dignity, can be said to be in-keeping with their human rights; while unacceptable treatment of dignified beings is a violation of those rights. In this way, the dignity inherent in all members of the human race in virtue of their potential for ra-

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tionality is what grounds the idea of human rights. Therefore, as long as it would be possible for some rational human to recognise the potential rationality of all humanity, all humans have human rights. As all humans are potentially rational beings, this is potentially possible, and so where there are humans, there are human rights.

Human rights are universal (Sharma, 2003; Habermas, 2010).

However, it could still be argued that the diversity of conceived human rights causes a problem here: if dignity as the source of human rights is universal, how has this variation occurred?

In answer, consider that our new foundation for human dignity allows a wide variety of human rights to flow from the same source. It allows for the vast diversity of human rights between cultures. Humans may all share the same dignity that is the source of human rights, but it is only the source.

The path they take will shape the rights that result, just as a river is diverted by rocks, hard ground and vegetation.

The rights that emerge will be shaped by the culture in which they develop, the other values common to people in that environment, their working lives and occurrences in nature. These are our river’s rocks, hard ground and vegetation. And yet the similarities in conceptions of the most basic human rights, such as a fundamental right to life, to not be tortured, and so on can, still be explained by the shared source: the innate, inalienable dignity of human beings; their potential for rationality, possessed in virtue of their humanity. All people share humanity, and so will have shared interests, such as the desire for survival and to avoid pain (Hume, 1975), and so on. These shared interests cause the resemblances between the various opinions of what constitute human rights.

To ground human rights in a dignity based on the value of the potential rationality of all humanity is very appealing. It grants human rights to all humans, regardless of their states of development or consciousness. It allows for the variety of human rights between cultures, and yet also for the similarities between conceptions of basic human rights that have evolved across these cultures. It does not rely on the possibly contentious beliefs of any religion, and yet it does not deny religion either. It coheres with our human intuitions and with our experienc19

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es. In short, it is both a highly plausible and attractive foundation for human rights.

Bibliography Sharma, A., (2003) ‘The Religious Perspective: Dignity as a Foundation for Human Rights Discourse’ in Human Rights and Responsibilities in the World Religious, Runzo. J et al. (ed), Oxford Streiffer, R., (2009) “Human/Non-Human Chimeras”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (May 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/chimeras/#5/>.)

Habermas, J., (2010) ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the realistic utopia of human

rights’ in Metaphilosophy, Vol. 41, No. 4, July 2010 Metz, T., (2010) ‘Human Dignity, Capital Punishment, and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights’ in Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2010 Johnson, R., (2010) ‘Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2010/entries/kant-moral/.

Hume, D., (1975) ‘Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning The Principles Of Morals’, Oxford: Clarendon Press ____________________________________

Emily Coward is a third year undergraduate reading Philosophy and Politics at the University of York.

KANT’S NAIVE THEORY OF PERPETUAL PEACE

By Chiamaka Aniedu

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HIS ESSAY WILL CONSIDER THE COMPATIBILITY OF Kant’s Perpetual Peace with the history of political progress. I believe that it fails in many areas to attribute certain properties to international relations that have been demonstrated throughout history, thus making theoretical and practically unsound claims.

Kant’s requirements for perpetual peace include the use of vices, with the guiding arm of providence, to instruct states towards a peaceful end of history (Kant, 1970, p41), in which they submit the power they have come to 20

value in reverence of morality (ibid., p130). This is not practical or realistic in interstate relations. It is the conditions of reason and man’s ability to find the moral path that made Kant conceive such an optimistic end of history (ibid., p88). However, the course of history has shown that peace along Kantian lines, including universal disarmament, international federation with no coercive powers (ibid., p105; p127) and the use of morality to guide reason in international politics (ibid., p130), is not possible given the way in which the world has developed.

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In Kant’s political writings we are offered an incredibly optimistic account of inter-state relations, which are guided by providence and nature to secure man a positive cosmopolitan end (ibid., p105). Thus the endlessly conflicting nature of human beings and their state counter parts serve a positive end (Nussbaum, 1997, pp4344), while the rigours of war nourish our intellectual capacity, fostering it, giving the “resultant evils a beneficial effect” (Kant, 1970, pp48-49). Indeed, it is our natural disposition, “unsocial sociability” and slavery to our passions that both destroy and promote this end of history (ibid., pp44-45), so it comes to be that the continual misfortune and international social chaos instruct man’s “grubby ascent” (Hoffmann, 1965, p80).

This natural state of man that Kant both esteems and despises (Kant, 1970, p87; Galston, 1975, p235) and its tendency towards amour propre, a kind of self-love that depends upon the opinion of others, and arises only within society (Rousseau, 1987, p81), is not conducive to the end of history Kant writes of, but rather destruction as we continue to progress (Rousseau, 1987, p68; Gauthier, 1969, p208). For these qualities of amour propre in man, namely greed and ambition, come to bear on human actions and politics as they induce a lust for wealth and power (Galston, 1975, pp58-59) that overtakes our moral sense of duty to each other. This creates competi-

tion for wealth and fosters inequalities among men, which in turn breeds conflict (Rousseau, 1987, pp76-77). To this we know Kant agrees (Kant, p51), however amour propre has unforeseen consequences on human and interstate relations (Pierre, 1997, p202).

Amour propre at state level is much worse than it is in individuals (Pierre, 1997, p202). Inequalities create war on a domestic level which leads to conflict on a national and international level (Hoffmann, 1965, p68), which results in war for resources, to achieve national aims, and for the sake of security (Gauthier, 1969, p208).

Although in Kant’s view this means the promotion of economic interests above espionage and war, thus the end of the latter (Kant, p114), it is not the case in history. Instead, we find that common interests are not enough to limit aggression and conflict between states ambitious for resources (Forde, 1992, p63; Hoffmann, 1965, p68; Galston, 1975, pp58-59).

Kant’s ambitions for man’s aggressive faculties were indeed correct, though perhaps not as he envisioned. We have devised ways to profit from the gloom and misfortune that war brings - BAE Systems made an astounding £2.37bn in 2008 before tax and has good growth projections for the coming years (Hoffmann, 1965, p62) - using what Kant believed was a natural disposition of man (Nussbaum, 1997, p44) for man’s immediate gain (Hoffmann, 1965, p64). The un21

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abated development of these faculties, beyond what is necessary to survival (Rousseau, 1987, p47) places Kant’s theory of perpetual peace in severe doubt.

The progress rooted at the heart of Kant’s perpetual peace is the capacity for states to follow the duties prescribed by morality (Kant, p89), despite their inherent self interestedness and primary concern with self-preservation (Forde, 1992, p76). Kant relies on individual states following their own moral judgement to bring about his world federation, without any legal coercion in operation by any group of states or the world institution itself (Habermas, 1997, pp116-117).

However, the following of a state’s moral compass in international relations would only happen if a judgment perceived to be moral was in alignment with state interests (Pierre, 1997, p218; Gauthier, 1969, pp208211). If we believe, like the realist, that the function of the state is to secure its own people’s welfare (Donaldson, 1992, p153; Forde, 1992, p63), then no true moral action is strong enough to make the primacy of state interests in world politics redundant (Forde, 1992, p67). States are not directly analogous to the Kantian concept of the moral man (Donaldson, 1992, p145; Kant, pp112-113), but a conglomerate of interests and desires (Pierre, 1997, p202; Gauthier, 1969, pp210-211).

This is not suitable for Kant; morality is and should always be a 22

Kant’s perpetual peace is failing to be a reality because of the way in which history has unfolded. dictate of reason, not what happens to be in line with your foreign policy agenda (Donaldson, 1992, p142; pp153-154). But this denies states their essential nature (Gauthier, 1969, pp210-211): the interdependence of international relations (Pierre, 1997, p214), and the competitive conditions it engenders between states (Gauthier, 1969, p208). Furthermore, it imposes on states a kind of compassion that they do not have (Pierre, 1997, p202).

These conditions promote a state of affairs in which states utilize the concept of ‘human rights’ for their own benefit (Habermas, 1997, p136).

A federation of states was supposed to guard against this outcome, and maintain the appropriate balance and the use of positive international law for the good of world society (Kant, 1970, p130). Instead, as history has shown, a voluntary federation of states with no coercive powers is not enough to stop conflict or the illicit use of ‘human rights’ to moralize state action (Carson, 1988, p179; Habermas, 1997, pp136-140). As such, an organisation without its own military fails in these areas. However, one with arms would raise other questions, such as what the limit on this organisation’s powers should be to enable it to

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fulfil humanitarian objectives without becoming akin to a totalitarian world state (Carson, 1988, pp180-197).

Thus Kant’s perpetual peace is failing to be a reality because of the way in which history has unfolded.

The limits on the conduct of war and peace-time activity that would make peace possible (Kant, pp96-97; p170) is in itself impossible when faced with state interests (Hoffmann, 1965, p85). Furthermore the social conflicts (Habermas, 1997, p133) that increasingly cause war in the modern age are not resolved by Kant’s naive theory of world structure. For the conception that perpetual peace will ensue if all states were republics (Kant, p104; Carson, 1988, pp180-181) can only be called such. War is not a problem that needs to be solved; instead it is the result of divergent interests (Hoffmann, 1965, p60; Habermas, 1997, p133).

The guiding providence and reason behind human history that Kant provides is nothing but an attempt to make the world intelligible (Shell, 1997, p60), but it does not correspond to historical facts (Galston, 1975, pp42-43; p215). For if the world was intelligible in the manner Kant would have us believe, an effective world federation would have arisen after the events of the twentieth century (Pierre, 1997, p214). Instead we got two devastating world wars and two very weak world organisations (Hoffmann, 1965, p70; Habermas, 1997, pp129-130).

Bibliography: Carson, T. L. (1988) Perpetual Peace; What Kant Should Have Said (Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 14, No. 2) Donaldson, T. (1992) ‘Kant’s Global Rationalism’ in Nardin, T. and Mapel, D. R. (ed) Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Forde, S. (1992) ‘Classical Realism’ in Nardin, T. and Mapel, D. R. (ed), Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Gauthier, D. (1969) The Logic of the Leviathan, Oxford: Clarendon Press Glaston, W. A. (1975) Kant and the Problem of History, Chicago: Chicago University Press Habermas, J. (1997) ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace’ in Nardin, T. and Mapel, D. R. (ed) Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Hassner, P. (1997) ‘Rousseau and the Theory and Practices of International Relations’ in Orwin, C. and Tarcov, N. (ed) The Legacy of Rousseau, Chicago: Chicago University Press Hobbes, T. (1994) Leviathan, London: Hackett Hoffmann, S. (1965) State of War, London: Pall Mall Press Kant, I. (1991) Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Nussbaum, M. C. (1997) ‘Kant and Cosmopolitanism’, in Bohman, J. and Lutz-Bachmann, M. (ed) Perpetual Peace, London: MIT Press Rousseau, J (1987) Basic Political Writings, London: Hackett Shell, S. (1997) ‘Rousseau, Kant and the Beginning of History’ in Orwin, C. and Tarcov, N. (ed) The Legacy of Rousseau, Chicago: Chicago University Press ____________________________________

Chiamaka Aniedu is a third year undergraduate reading Philosophy and Politics at the University of York.

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Global poverty and human rights

By Dr Kerri Woods

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HE FACTS OF GLOBAL POVERTY ARE WELL-KNOWN and deeply alarming: Half the world’s population have less than US$3.50/ day, 24,000 children die of povertyrelated illness every day, over 1 billion people lack secure access to clean water, hunger, malnutrition and readily preventable diseases are endemic in the poorest countries of the world, many of which are in sub-Saharan Africa.

The conventional understanding of human rights is that they impose morally weighty duties upon us all. We ought not to violate a human right. If human rights ought to protect us against the worst indignities that we can suffer, or if they ought to guarantee us a minimally decent life, then it seems plausible to claim that we have human rights against absolute poverty.

Onora O’Neill (2005) doubts the usefulness of thinking about global poverty in terms of human rights. Her concern is that knowing that someone has a right to something does little to help secure the object of that right, unless we can also identify the relevant duty-bearer, who can be held to account if they fail to perform their duty.

This criticism holds if we think of 24

positive human rights obligations as imperfect duties; that is, as things that it would be morally good for us to do, but not morally obligatory. But one prominent human rights scholar, Thomas Pogge (2000), suggests that human rights should be understood as imposing a universal negative duty not to cause harm. Insofar as we accept the duty not to cause harm as a perfect duty in Kant’s sense – that is, as a duty that must always be honoured – then human rights impose very strong moral obligations on us all.

Pogge holds that our relations with distant others are mediated by institutions, such as corporations or trading systems like the WTO. Insofar as we support these institutions, and insofar as these institutions are coercively imposed and create conditions that foster the under-fulfilment of human rights, then we as individuals are complicit in the harm that results from the under-fulfilment of human rights in communities distant from our own.

So, on this understanding of human rights, if you own a pair of Converse trainers, or have ever shopped at Tesco’s, you have failed to honour your negative human rights duties.

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Pogge’s own example illustrates the point well: Imagine a slave owning society; you might think that as long as you do not own slaves, then you have done nothing wrong. But Pogge says someone in a slave owning society who contributes their taxes to the government that upholds property laws making slavery possible is also guilty of contributing to the harm of slavery (Pogge, 2002). By analogy, we all have a perfect duty not to participate in unjust institutions.

In practice, that is going to be quite difficult. Pogge suggests one might escape complicity in injustice in the slave-owning society by emigrating or becoming a hermit. Today, there is nowhere to emigrate to that would be isolated from global trade structures that are in Pogge’s view perpetrating injustice, so emigration is not an option. Becoming a hermit also looks practically impossible for most people.

So, what ought we to do?

If we fail to honour our universal negative duty, Pogge (2002) says we acquire derivative compensatory duties, which we can discharge in one of two ways, in direct proportion to our complicity in harm: (i) campaign for change, (ii) give direct monetary compensation. One way or another, then, it seems that we acquire a duty to get involved with organisations like Oxfam.

This is quite a strong demand.

It has gone from being ‘good but not obligatory’ for me to take action on global poverty (on the traditional view), to it being something I have to do because I failed to become a hermit!

But note that Pogge says the extent of our compensatory duties is proportionate to our complicity in harm, so if I minimise my indirect involvement in exploitative practices (e.g., by buying fair trade, having my savings with a cooperative rather than a corporate bank, and working in the public sector instead of for an arms company), then I minimise my compensatory duties.

But there is another problem that we should note. I do not imagine that Pogge really wants us all to become hermits, not least because it would not do the global poor any good if people in rich countries did; the global economy would collapse, and it is not at all obvious that the global poor would be better off.

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This thought raises difficult questions about what constitutes harm. The normative force of Pogge’s argument comes from the intuitive appeal of the universal injunction not to cause harm. Some contemporary economic practices are clearly exploitative, but it is not obvious how to move from where we are to a global economic system in ways that will better protect human rights. So we must ask ourselves, if we own Converse trainers, suppose they were made by someone working in sweatshop conditions, is it better over the long term that they have a job, and the chance of a developing economy and the opportunities that that offers, or is it better that I withdraw my purchasing power from the economy?

Where do all these questions leave us? Overall, a somewhat unsatisfied, I suspect. Recall that if we follow Pogge down the path of construing human rights obligations in negative terms, then they look like perfect duties. If we violate a perfect duty we do something that is unjust. Pogge needs that claim to generate the obligation to accept compensatory duties. But for a Kantian, this is not how duties are supposed to work: you do not get to the duty that is actually morally right by violating a perfect duty. And what Pogge is really interested in is justifying the compensatory duty to do something about global justice, because it is global poverty that strikes him as unjust.

So let us return to the claim that the extent of our compensatory 26

duties is a function of our complicity in injustice. This position assumes that some ethical calculus is available to measure (1) our complicity in harm, and (2) to convert that into compensatory duties.

On this understanding of human rights, if you own a pair of Converse trainers, or have ever shopped at Tesco’s, you have failed to honour your negative human rights duties.

What would this calculus look like – one pair of converse trainers = 4 letters to my MP? Or can two years working in the private sector be offset by giving 10% of my salary to Oxfam? It seems to be up to individual agents to decide this for themselves.

One final point is more troubling still. Assume I have worked out that I owe £50 of compensation to the global poor, where should I direct my funds? There are literally thousands of NGOs all working in the sector, competing for our attention and funds, some more effective than others, some committed to particular groups of people, or types of problems, or countries. How should I choose between them? Faced with these myriad practical questions, Pogge gives a really quite startling answer. He says “It is perfectly permissible for you to help one

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needy stranger and not another, even when the latter’s needs are somewhat greater. [...] And you may do this because you like the story of the one, or her face.” (Pogge, 2002, p90)

What I think this tells us, if anything, is that Onora O’Neill is rather right about human rights, they do very little useful work in helping us to identify the relevant duty-bearers with respect to global poverty. This is a troubling conclusion. Human rights have become the dominant moral language in which to advance normative claims, and yet that language, and the conceptual framework it offers

in terms of rights and duties, is inadequate to the task of confronting one of the most urgent moral problems we face.

Bibliography: O. O’Neill (2005) ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’, International Affairs, 81.2.

T. Pogge (2000) World Poverty and Human Rights, Oxford: Blackwell.

T. Pogge (2002) ‘Cosmopolitanism: A Defence’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 5.3. ____________________________________

Dr Kerri Woods is a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, teaching at the University of York, specialising in Political Philosophy.

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the right to property as told by Locke and hume

By Dan Iley-Williamson

“The first man who, having fenced off a plot of land, thought of saying ‘This is mine’ and found people simple enough to believe him was the real founder of civil society.”

(Rousseau, 1988, p34)

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HE RIGHT TO PROPERTY, AS JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU asserts, is central to the notion of a civil society; without it, without distinctions between ‘mine’ and ‘thine’, societal life would break down under the competing demands and strains of the multiple interests and wants of peoples. John Locke agrees: individuals need to leave the state of nature because “it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases… self-love will make men partial to themselves” (Locke, 1988, p275), and so too does David Hume: the “avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions… is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society” (Hume, 1978, p492). Both, then, see the need for government and the enforcement of property rights as being necessary in order to stop the mutual destruction of unrestrained interest. Yet they both justify property rights in radically different ways, and although they arrive 28

at not wholly different conclusions, the dissimilarity in approach reverberates throughout their political theory, and for that reason their respective accounts of the right to property is worthy of close attention.

Locke’s account of property rights begins with the premise of Godgiven self-ownership: “every man has a property in his own person. This no body has any right to but himself ” (Locke, 1988, p287). With the notion that God has left each individual the owner of his own being, and that God has given the earth to man for cultivation (Locke, 1988, p286), Locke believes that when an individual removes an item from the state of nature and has “mixed his labour with” it, he “thereby makes it his property” (Locke, 1988, p288). So, the idea goes, because each individual is the owner of himself, when he mixes his selfownership with an un-owned good, the individual in so doing extends his self-ownership over the item, making it his. But because God has given the earth to humanity as a whole, and commanded humanity to make maximal use of it, if anyone acquires such an amount that he is wasteful, and does

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not allow others to acquire a share, he goes beyond the “bounds, set by reason” and it is “more than his share” (Locke, 1988, p290), and so should be restricted by government.

Having built a rough outline of Locke’s theory of property it can be seen that one extends self-ownership to goods through one’s labour.

The only constraint on property ownership through labour-mixing is if an individual acquires more than he can use, or deprives others of the ability to enjoy property ownership. There are attractive elements to it: to the modern day reader, an argument for the redistribution of property is rare coming from the 17th century and, generally, a cherished thing. More fundamentally, however, the theory of labour-mixing ownership does not appear to be entirely convincing: it is not clear why, and in what way, one extends one’s self-ownership (itself a highly dubious

notion) over an object simply through labour. As Robert Nozick mockingly asks, “If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?” (Nozick, 1974, p175). It is not clear how Locke would answer (and nor, for that matter, is it clear what Nozick turns to in his similar theory, but that is a different matter). As such, it seems reasonable to say that Locke’s theory of property rights is, at the very least, unconvincing.

So too thought Hume. He alludes to Locke when commenting that “some philosophers account for the right of occupation, by saying, that every one has a property in his own labour; and when he joins that labour to any thing, it gives him the property of the whole.” (Hume, 1978, p505fn)

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We are left in the unhappy situation of, on the one hand, having an implausible theory of property rights, which prescribes something closer to what our modern sensibilities prefer (...), and, on the other hand, a plausible theory of property rights, which is oblivious to our egalitarian inclinations.

Hume rejects such Lockean thinking for two key reasons: Firstly, due to the vagueness as to what constitutes mixing property (he uses the example of cattle grazing on a meadow – does the cattle owner thereby also own the meadow?); and secondly, we only mix our labour with an object in a “figurative” sense: all we are actually doing is altering, not mixing ourselves with it (Hume, 1978, pp505-506fn). Consequently, Hume thinks that Locke offers an empty notion of property rights, and so he should – given Hume’s, at the very least, deep religious scepticism, he could not assent to a theory so reliant on faith to establish property rights, espcially considering how vitally important he thought they are to society’s well-being. Furthermore, in modern times, where secular arguments are all that carry weight, Hume’s secular theory of property rights may well be more relevant.

So, what is Hume’s theory of property rights? Ultimately, he thinks 30

that property, and its consequential social virtue, justice, are “artificial” (Hume, 1978, p484). This is because there is no natural inclination that determines the rules of justice (Hume, 1978, p496); instead the benefits of justice, i.e. the rules determining and enforcing property ownership, are found through experiencing the need for stable property ownership, eventually leading them to be established as “conventions” (Hume, 1978, p489).

Such conventions are formed when men gradually come to see that property rights are necessary to forming stable human relations, rather than the constant flux of anarchic avidity let loose, which he think is potentially true of all men (Hume, 1978, p492).

Hume therefore provides a naturalistic account of property rights; where they have been established through an evolutionary process, given the restraints set by humanity’s particular condition.

This is evident where he considers a situation where resources were severely limited: in such a case, justice could not be established, for each would be too desperate in seeking his own goals.

Equally, if resources were unlimitedly bountiful, then there would be no need of justice, for all would have exactly what they desired (Hume, 1978, pp493-495). But, as man is, and as his situation is, justice is necessary: the limited resources and limited generosity of man ensure division between possessions is necessary.

Thus far, the picture Hume

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paints seems quite plausible: through the particular condition mankind finds himself in, he must adopt certain patterns of behaviour that regulate and control potential societal conflict, namely, rules of justice. Yet these rules of justice are, for Hume, somewhat limited: property should be stable, and this means, for Hume, policies redistributing property are not considered.

Indeed, he does considers the possibility of complete equality in property ownership, but rejects it: such a policy would have to fight against the natural inequalities in ability between men, and in so doing, force all men into a state of impoverishment (Hume, 1975, p194). Although this rejection is plausible, Hume fails to consider any redistributive policies, and as such has been criticised by some modern commentators (for example, see Plamenatz, 1963).

Therefore, we are left in the unhappy situation of, on the one hand, having an implausible theory of property rights, which prescribes something closer to what our modern sensibilities prefer (a degree of egalitarianism), and, on the other hand, a plausible theory of property rights, which is oblivious to our egalitarian inclinations (no redistributive policies). However, although Hume says nothing of property redistribution himself, the framework he builds does allow us to import certain political values. This is because Hume says that property and justice are conventions that arise due to their

usefulness to mankind. We may well add that property redistribution is a highly useful way of ensuring all can have a degree of subsistence, rather than being faced with impoverishment. Consequently, although Hume does not say anything on this himself, the plausible framework he builds allows us to do the work, and prescribe that which we think is beneficial to society. From this, we have more reason to accept Hume’s account of property rights, for not only is it a more plausible argument, it can also be altered to say much of what we would like to say; namely, giving all a fair chance in life, whatever that may mean.

Bibliography Hume, D. (1975) Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press Hume, D. (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press Locke, J. (1988) Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Plamenatz, J. (1963) Man and Society, London: Longmans Rousseau, J-J. (1988) ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men’ in Rousseau’s Political Writings, London: W. W. Norton ____________________________________ Dan Iley-Williamson is a second year undergraduate reading Philosophy and Politics at the University of York.

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do we have any rights?

By Professor Matt Matravers

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N WHAT FOLLOWS, I OFFER SOME VERY GENERAL thoughts on the nature (if any) of human rights. My purpose is not to be comprehensive – or even particularly systematic – but rather suggestive and (I hope) thought provoking. In that spirit, I end with some undefended claims about where we might look to ground human rights practices.

In one sense to ask whether we have any rights is odd. Of course we do. As an adult, sane(ish), nonbankrupt citizen of the UK, I have the right to sign contracts, to walk in certain places, to forms of legal protection, and so on. Such rights are important. Their existence ensures all manner of things both for me as an individual and for me given that I live together with many millions of other people on a small island and we inevitably bump up against one another.

However, it is not these kinds of legal rights that are usually at stake when people express scepticism about the existence of rights. Rather, scepticism is aimed at further claims that are made such as that these legal rights are means to give form to other, more abstract, rights that I enjoy merely in virtue of being human. My right to sign 32

a legal contract gives form to a right to human dignity or equality that takes a certain shape given the community in which I live. Moreover, were I deprived of that right, or were my more abstract right threatened, I could appeal directly to my ‘human’ right.

Scepticism about human rights has a long philosophical pedigree. Bentham famously described natural rights as ‘nonsense’ and ‘natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts’ (Bentham, 1987, p53). Marx thought that the language of natural right hid the fact that rights can only be properly understood against the background of social and economic phenomena so that the famed rights declared in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen were only the rights of ‘egoistic man’; man ‘as he is in civil society’ (Marx, 1987, p147).

The contemporary moral and political philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre is even more direct: ‘the truth is plain’, he writes, ‘there are no [human] rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns’ (MacIntyre, 1984, p69).

MacIntyre’s way of writing is interesting because it captures some-

Issue XIV - Spring 2011

thing of the puzzlement of human rights sceptics. The assertion that all humans have rights just in virtue of being human looks to be very odd; at least as odd as the assertion that unicorns roam the forests. And both look odd simply because there is no reason to believe them.

Of course, there are those who have offered justifications of human rights. The American philosopher Alan Gewirth has argued over many years and publications that, since I have reason to value my freedom and wellbeing as prerequisites of my agency, I must recognize that the value of your freedom and well-being. However, few people find this convincing (although a form of it – ‘if you claim rights for yourself, you have to grant them to everyone else’ – is very common in ordinary discussions). Of course, I may value my freedom and well-being and you may value your freedom and wellbeing, but it does not follow from that that you and I have ‘value’ as such, or that you and I have reason to value one another’s freedom and well-being (unless we happen to want to do so).

Others, convinced that foundational accounts such as Gewirth’s cannot succeed, have taken the moral equality of human beings – and so their standing as human rights bearers – to be axiomatic (Brian Barry takes this view in Barry 1995), or have presumed that we have reason to wish to live together in a certain kind of relation (a relation of equality) with one

another (a sophisticated version of this argument can be found in Scanlon 1998). And perhaps this is the best way to proceed. That is, not to look for foundations for human rights, but to think of them as things we have, that people agree that we have, and that have the potential to make life better for everyone. Certainly, the rhetoric of human rights is politically important and its loss is, at present, unimaginable (even if in practice many people and States that use the rhetoric do not follow through in recognising the demands made by it).

Humans do not have rights in virtue of being human (...). But, human beings interacting with one another in social practices and conventions, may be able rationally to endorse a language of rights as providing the scaffolding on which those conventions rest.

If this is correct, then our worries about the expansion of human rights – to things such as relaxation or paid holidays from work – ought not to centre on whether such rights can be justified all the way down, but on whether the (perhaps consistent) extension of the argument from core rights (such as the right to life) to these less core rights will undermine the international consensus that presently 33

VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

holds. That is, if foundational justifications cannot be found, then, like monetary currencies, the value of a unit of ‘human rights’ depends on the agreement of those who use it. In such circumstances, devaluing the currency is a real threat (and note that is true whether or not the response of those who lose confidence in the ‘unit’ is justified).

Possibly, though, we should not despair of finding a justification of human rights. However, I do not think that the most likely path to justification lies in the kind of foundationalism exemplified by Gewirth and I do not think that the kind of ‘human’ rights that we can justify will be the kind with which we are familiar. Humans do not have rights in virtue of being human (like MacIntyre, I find the claim that they do just baffling). But, human beings interacting with one another in social practices and conventions, may be able rationally to endorse a language of rights as providing the scaffolding on which those conventions rest. Perhaps rights – including recognising the rights of others – advance

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our interests. If so, then they can be given some grounding. If not, my fear is that we will all realise that they are like unicorns, and the international consensus will collapse, before there has been time to turn them fully into the kind of dull, but easily grounded, legal rights with which I began.

Bibliography Barry, B. (1995) Justice as Impartiality: Volume 2 of A Treatise on Social Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press Bentham, J. (1987) ‘Anarchical Fallacies’, in Waldron, J. (ed) Nonsense Upon Stilts: Betham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, London: Methuen MacIntyre, A. (1984) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2 edn), Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press Marx, K. (1987) ‘On the Jewish Question’, in Waldron, J. (ed) Nonsense Upon Stilts: Betham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, London: Methuen Scanlon, T. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press ____________________________________ Professor Matt Matravers is Director of the School of Politics, Economics and Philosphy at the University of York.

Issue XIV - Spring 2011

VOX Call for Papers VOX - the Student Journal for Politics Economics and Philosophy is calling for articles to be submitted for the Summer Issue 2011, with the broad theme ‘The Rational Animal’.

Articles should be between 1,000 and 1,500 words in length, and fullyreferenced using the Harvard style.

If you would like to write on this theme, please e-mail your article to vox@clubofpep.org.uk by the 1st April 2011.

You may wish to write on a topic from the list below: • • • • • • • • •

Homo economicus: Just a model or a tangible possibility?

Must we always prefer the rational alternative?

An exploration of the State of Nature Is humanity nature in its conscious form?

The role of passion in religious sentiment Should the law be “reason free from passion” (Aristotle)?

The future belongs to reason. Discuss.

Where has reason led us: a critical evaluation of our civilisation ____________ (your own idea)

Undergraduates, graduates and academics all welcome. All undergraduate submissions will be conisdered for the Vox Essay Award.

Back issues and bibliographies are available at: www.voxjournal.co.uk.

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