Issue XII - Summer 2010
SNAPPING THE CROOKED TIMBER CONTROL AND THE ENDS OF LIFE
By Dan Iley-Williamson
G
REAT STRIDES TOWARD PROGRESSION CAN BE SEEN IN TWO
lights – the determined pursuit of a utopian ideal, or the comparative and pragmatic betterment of affairs. Each side of the debate has great thinkers in its heritage – Plato, Rousseau and Marx in the former; Hume, Smith, Mill and Sen in the latter. I shall argue that state control exerted over the individual to achieve utopian ideals – what shall be called the ‘transcendental approach’ (Sen, 2009) is both incorrect and fundamentally incoherent. In its place, state control should be limited to helping individuals choose their own ends, in their own individual manner. What is call the ‘comparative approach’ is that which attempts to improve lives, not perfect them, for it recognises that perfection is beyond humanity (Sen, 2009). I shall begin by outlining what the transcendentalists hope to achieve. I will then argue that this approach is fundamentally flawed – it views questions posed by political philosophy in the manner of mathematical problems, where there is a single and definitive truth, when in fact humanity does not conform to such rigidity (Berlin, 2003). For transcendentalism, extensive state control is necessary for the ‘correct’ realisation of human
existence. However, I propose that state control must be limited, and pluralistic life choices allowed. Instead of state control moulding individuals to fit a desired end, liberty must be preserved to allow people to flourish in their own individual manner. Some hold that the ends of life are single, knowable and universal. It is found within each and every individual, rationalising can, and moreover must, result in this one undeniable truth. Such is the theory of transcendentalists, Plato and Rousseau amongst others. They state that once this truth is recognised, humanity is awakened to the knowledge of how to lead a harmonious, utopian life. Rousseau’s general will and Plato’s ideal republic are both expressions of this search. For Rousseau, man comes to be truly free once he reasons correctly, comes to understand the truth, and sees that life has one goal – that of obeying the general will. Submission to reason not only creates ‘absolute liberty’, it also brings equality, justice, knowledge, happiness, mercy. All restrictions - slavery, the chains of passion - are removed (Berlin, 2003, p.47). Life becomes harmonised, balanced perfectly – all pieces of the jigsaw puzzle of life fit together 27
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faultlessly. This is the utopianism of transcendentalism. Once knowledge of this utopia is acquired, where all human goals are achieved, there are no costs too great; nothing should stand in the way of the true, perfect and everlasting human existence. Yet it is this dogmatic certainty that there is a definitive answer to all of life’s problems that has caused more bloodshed and misery than any other idea.
Nazi Fascism and Soviet Russia’s Communism are the failed attempts at achieving Rousseau’s dream. The 20th century is the tale of this certainty colliding with reality. The notion of a ‘final solution’ is what transcendentalists seek, and all the historical connotations of this phrase are entirely appropriate (Berlin, 1990). Nazi Fascism and Soviet Russia’s Communism are the failed attempts at achieving Rousseau’s dream; he, along with Plato, is the forefather of the pursuit of freedom through violence and coercion, from the French Revolution to the modern day – for as he says, people must be ‘forced to be free’ (Rousseau, 1994, p.58; Russell, 2009; Popper, 2002). This theory has caused unimaginable horror, and this is the ideal that I shall argue is so drastically far from what it purports to uphold: individual liberty. 28
Rousseau claims that obeying the general will not only provides freedom, it also guarantees equality, ‘absolute justice’ and fairness – in sum, everything that we have reason to value. This ignores what Berlin calls the ‘tragedy of choice’ – that genuine and ideal goals do not harmonise into a perfect and single truth, for they are in conflict (Gray, 1996, p.63). Liberty and equality are in constant tension; democracy and security do not perfectly correlate; mercy and justice diverge; these truths are ignored by Rousseau and his ilk, for they take it to be that any loss of a good must be the result of an error. Rousseau maintains that life must have a single and reasoned answer, for all genuine questions have genuine answers – ‘truth is one, error alone is multiple’ (Berlin, 2003, p.28). Yet one sees liberty curtailed in the name of security, equality promoted in preference to freedom. These are necessary choices, but what is essential is that they are recognised as being choices – they are not a failure of human reason, but a result of the necessity of trade-offs, of different desires, characters, interests and beliefs. Transcendentalism ignores the pluralistic and divergent interests and desires of individuals. It supposes that humanity is a being that can be shaped into a perfect form. Yet as Kant said, and Berlin echoed, ‘out of the crooked timber of humanity nothing entirely straight can be carved’ (Berlin, 1990, p.19), and attempts to carve individu-
Issue XII - Summer 2010
als perfectly result in snapping the timber. It is therefore essential to recognise the known imperfection of the comparative approach, to realise that different opinions are not necessarily the result of incorrect reasoning, because it is only this approach that can serve the incommensurable nature of human interests. In place of utopian ideals, comparative and pragmatic attitudes must be adopted. Striving for improvement neither requires nor finds transcendentalism helpful; instead discourse must be allowed, people must be given room to pursue their pluralistic ends (Sen, 2009). The ‘experiments in living’ (Mill, 1991, p.63) that Mill called for are continually necessary, for people are continually different. Consequently, when humanity
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is seen as having incommensurable values, what is necessary is not control to apply a uniform end of life, which ‘reason’ dictates is correct for all, for no such truth exists. Instead, state control must be minimised, allowing a pluralism of life choices and ensuring the liberty to lead the life one thinks is best. It is this approach that serves the ‘progressive being’ of man. To conclude, the transcendental approach sees all human dilemmas in the same light as mathematical questions, where one and only one answer is conceivable. However, this fails to appreciate the tragedy of human choice; of the need to trade-off ideals in order to create an environment suitable for the varied paths of people. Transcendentalism tries to correct the ‘crooked timber of humanity’, but instead, snaps it. The ideals proposed do not lead to utopia. Instead they lead to dogmatism and the tyranny of certainty. Control of the individual, the shaping of his life in accordance with supposed reason, creates this danger. As captains of their boats, to use Plato’s analogy, Rousseau and Plato dictate that there is one, and only one, destination (Plato, 2007). They hope to steer the people to this absolute end. Yet this boat is not hoping to sail on the sea, their target is to ascend to heaven – this is their desired end, and this is their failure. For the ends of life cannot be controlled, instead they must be allowed to flourish in all appropriate areas. One must recognise the plural29
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ism of human ends. This is captured by the comparative approach that does not seek perfection. Perhaps it is not so inspiring for revolutionaries at the barricades, but it suits the nature of humanity. It does not attempt ascention to heaven; instead it recognises that man is diverse and grounded, and it allows him to stand on his own two feet.
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Bibliography available online at www.voxjournal.co.uk _____________________________
Dan Iley-Williamson is a first year undergraduate student reading Politics, Philosophy and Economics at the University of York.