SPECIAL REPORT: Ukraine's Approach to Russian-Linked Orthodox Church

The authorities in war-torn Ukraine must be wary of an array of internal threats, including institutions affiliated with Russia, and not Ukraine, that carry out their instructions from Moscow. With recent raids conducted at the premises of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) last fall, top state agencies seem to have grown aware of this institution as a security threat. After Ukraine’s Security Service searched the facilities and premises of the church last November and December, the true intentions of the UOC-MP became clear. Ukraine clamped down on the Orthodox Christian denomination historically linked to Moscow, competitive with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has not yet made any radical steps but chances are the Moscow-affiliated church will be banned in Ukraine.

On the second day of Orthodox Christmas, January 7, Mass was celebrated in the Dormition Cathedral in central Kyiv, part of the UNESCO-listed Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra complex, which was retaken from the UOC-MP. That marked change of course in the Ukrainian state’s approach toward Ukrainian Orthodox churches. The Ukrainian culture ministry terminated the Moscow-linked church’s lease at the end of 2022, returning the properties to direct state control, or the rival church––the OCU. This was one of many efforts to clamp down on the Moscow-affiliated church that began last November. In doing so, Zelensky takes into account public concerns. Asked if they approved of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, more than 50 percent of Ukrainians answered no, adding this church should be completely banned in Ukraine 1. The stronghold of Russian influence in Ukraine, the Orthodox Church has been considered a Moscow-loyal––thus hostile––institution.

Восьме загальнонаціональне опитування: Україна в

April 8, 2022, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/vosmoy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina_v_usloviyah_voyny_6_aprelya_2022.html [accessed: January 28, 2023].

Ukraine’s splintered church

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, or UOC-MP, has grown from some post-Soviet structures, a legacy of the Soviet era in Ukraine. An unrecognized church also emerged in exile during Soviet times. After Ukraine regained independence in 1991, the UOC-MP was the only formally recognized branch of Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine, with 52 dioceses split into 12,000 parishes. The other, established in 1992, declared itself an independent Ukrainian church, forming the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate. It had 35 dioceses and some 5,000 parishes. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church also came into existence shortly after Ukraine’s newly found independence. The only canonical church was that affiliated with Moscow, though.

After Russia annexed Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Ukrainian government backed the church’s efforts to gain autocephaly and thus no longer be organizationally subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate. The second phase began in 2019 when Bartholomew provided a formal letter, or tomos, of approval of the church’s autocephaly. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church unified into it. Consequently, there are two Orthodox churches in Ukraine––the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), formally recognized by the Patriarchate of Constantinople and other Orthodox churches, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchat (UOC-MP)––a branch of the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church, which claims jurisdiction over Ukraine. Neither the

Russian Orthodox Church nor the UOC-MP recognized the autocephaly of the OCU. The UOC-MP has been the biggest Orthodox church in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has so far stayed away from religious issues, seeing no threat to national security. Shortly after taking office, the new president met with Metropolitan Onufriy, among other church leaders. Zelensky has long remained somewhat skeptical of the autocephalous OCU, considering it a brainchild of his predecessor Petro Poroshenko. In addition, two of Zelensky’s close associates––Ivan Bakanov, former head of the Security Service of Ukraine, and Serhiy Trofimov, deputy head of the presidency––backed the UOC and its canonical relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate. Bakanov himself is a UOC-MP parishioner. 2 Trofimov resigned shortly after while Ukraine’s former SBU head Ivan Bakanov was dismissed in July 2022. After the war broke out, the authorities in Kyiv did not change their course toward the UOC-MP.

UOC-MP during the war

The authorities merely overlooked the fact that Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, blessed Russian soldiers who were killing Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, whose structures were formally subordinated to the patriarch, prayed for his well-being. Indeed, in March 2022, many UOC priests themselves stopped including Patriarch Kirill in their public prayers as soon as Russia invaded Ukraine. As more evidence emerges about traitors in the clergy, public clamor was growing for a ban on the Russian-linked UOC. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian atrocities that followed have prompted some Ukrainian priests and parishioners to cut ties. In March 2022, a poll found that 63 percent of respondents were in favor of severing ties with Moscow against 74 percent in April. In August, about 54 percent of Orthodox believers in Ukraine identified with the main Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Only 4 percent of Ukraine’s Orthodox community are members of the UOC-MP. 3

As public clamor was intensifying, Metropolitan Onufriy issued a regular condemnation of Russian crimes as part of efforts to shake off any taint of complicity with the aggressor. In May 2022, the UOC-MP removed all mentions of the Moscow Patriarchate from its statute due to Patriarch Kirill’s support of the invasion of Ukraine. Many Ukrainian Orthodox condemned Kirill’s war stance but said nothing about the war

let alone its initiation by Russia. Many questioned the autocephaly of the OCU, accusing its leaders of seizing parishes forcibly. On May 29, 2022, at the service in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, Metropolitan Onufriy did not mention Patriarch Kirill during the liturgy as someone who had authority over him (like before), instead he commemorated all heads of churches, similar to primatial divine liturgies.

etropolitan Epiphanius, who is the primate of the OCU, said this was just for the show while the UOC-MP was still loyal to Patriarch Kirill. Any such statements, he added, are delivered to appease parishioners. However, these changes have not altered the canonical status of the church and are thus void. Despite that, the clergy unanimously announced that it was no longer possible for them to function within the Moscow patriarchate. They yet pledged to maintain a liturgical communion with the church. However, it refrained from using a key technical term in the Orthodox church — autocephaly. The UOC also attempted to push the responsibility for starting the war on the OCU and Petro Poroshenko, former president. The UOC believed this was a reason behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine 4.

State officials believed the problem had been solved after the UOC had cut its ties with the Moscow Patriarchate. Meanwhile, state agencies––including the SBU––helped the UOC gain money so that it was not donated to the au-

[accessed: January 28, 2023].

da.org/a/induljgentsiya-na-ubiystvo-voyna-i-tserkovj-v-anneksirovannom-krymu/32227598.html [accessed: January 28, 2023].

3. J. Rogoża, P. Żochowski, Kijów kontra Kościół Prawosławny Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, December 1, 2022, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2022-12-01/kijow-kontra-kosciol-prawoslawny-patriarchatu-moskiewskiego

SLUZHBY-VIJSKOVOGO-KAPELANSTVA-ZSU/

tocephalous church 5. Perhaps there was a sort of informal arrangement between the UOC and Ukrainian officials, under which the latter would help the church provided that it broke all ties with Moscow. The war has forced some parishioners to weigh the difficult decision of whether to stay or leave, choosing the second option. Areas that fall under control of the UOC-MP see Moscow’s most cruel atrocities. Four regions of Ukraine, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia were its stronghold before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Now many Ukrainian Orthodox churches and parishioners have cut their ties to the Moscow-governed branch of the church.

More than 400 parishes have left the UOC-MP in the first three months since the invasion began. As Ukrainian forces reclaimed more areas, the pro-Russian Orthodox Church started losing more and more parishes, with more people turning against the institution. The UOC has meanwhile lost another major foothold. After the occupation of Crimea in 2014, the dioceses of the UOC remained in formal subordination to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

WHEN RUSSIA INVADED UKRAINE, THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALOUS ORTHODOX CHURCH DID NOT HESITATE TO THROW ITS SUPPORT BEHIND UKRAINE.

[ACCESSED: JANUARY 29, 2023].

Ukraine’s new policy on the UOC-MP

According to the Ukrainian special service head, the UOC-MP has an ideal environment from which the enemy can function. That coincided with the first raids on church premises. “If we take the period since the beginning of the fullscale war, SBU has opened 23 criminal proceedings against potential Russian agents in UOC-MP, and there are already 33 suspects – from classic agents of collecting in-depth information to simple fire adjusters in cassocks,” SBU Head Vasyl Maliuk reported in late October 2022 6.

Ukraine’s security service on November 22, 2022, carried out raids at Russian Orthodox Christian monasteries and churches to counter suspected subversive activities by Russian special services. On December 2, the SBU raided the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra among other monasteries in the country, such as the Korets Holy Trinity Monastery and the premises of the Sarnenskyi-Polska Eparchy.

6. G. Kuczyński, Ukraiński kontrwywiad uderzył w prorosyjską Cerkiew. Są sankcje, będzie delegalizacja?, i.pl, December 3, 2022., https://i.pl/ukrainski-kontrwywiad-uderzyl-w-prorosyjska-cerkiew-sa-sankcje-bedzie-delegalizacja/ar/c1-17097035 [accessed: Janaury 29, 2023].

SOURCE: G. KUCZYŃSKI, UKRAIŃSKI KONTRWYWIAD UDERZYŁ W PROROSYJSKĄ CERKIEW. SĄ SANKCJE, BĘDZIE DELEGALIZACJA?, I.PL, DECEMBER 3, 2022., HTTPS://I.PL/UKRAINSKI-KONTRWYWIAD-UDERZYL-W-PROROSYJSKA-CERKIEW-SA-SANKCJE-BEDZIEDELEGALIZACJA/AR/C1-17097035 [ACCESSED: JANUARY 29, 2023].

The security service along with the National Police and National Guard searched more than 350 buildings as part of security measures across Ukraine. Measures implemented found cash totaling $150,000 and Russian documents 7. Law enforcement also found Moscow’s manuals on conducting services after the start of the fullscale invasion. Representatives of the church were instructed to misinform parishioners about the socio-political situation in Ukraine and the situation at the front, according to investigators.

The SBU said the individuals detained included some Russians and other foreigners, including some without valid passports or with damaged

or forged documents. Searches also revealed literature used in teaching at the seminary and parish schools, including those containing “propaganda of the ‘Russian World’ 8.” Agents raided the Svyato-Pokrovskiy Monastery in the center of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, on December 10 as well as 14 other monasteries and cathedrals in the region. The SBU claimed it had found a library with pro-Kremlin agitation as well as cash in various currencies, including Russian roubles 9.

9. Ukraine’s SBU Conducts More Raids At Churches Formerly Under Moscow’s Jurisdiction, Radio Free Europe, December 10, 2022, https://www. rferl.org/a/ukraine-sbu-raids-churches-moscow-jurisdiction/32170873.html [accessed: January 28, 2023].

7. J. Rogoża, P. Żochowski, Kijów kontra Kościół Prawosławny 8. G. Kuczyński, Ukraiński kontrwywiad

SOURCE: G. KUCZYŃSKI, UKRAIŃSKI KONTRWYWIAD UDERZYŁ W PROROSYJSKĄ CERKIEW. SĄ SANKCJE, BĘDZIE DELEGALIZACJA?, I.PL, DECEMBER 3, 2022., HTTPS://I.PL/UKRAINSKI-KONTRWYWIAD-UDERZYL-W-PROROSYJSKA-CERKIEW-SA-SANKCJE-BEDZIEDELEGALIZACJA/AR/C1-17097035 [ACCESSED: JANUARY 29, 2023].

BISHOP NIKITA (IN THE MIDDLE) WAS ORDAINED BISHOP OF IVANO-FRANKIVSK AND KOLOMYIA

SOURCE: ВІДБУЛОСЬ ПРЕДСТАВЛЕННЯ НОВОГО ΜПАРХІАЛЬНОГОАРХІІРЕЯ, ΜВАНО-ФРАНКІВСЬКА ΜПАРХІЯ, 11 XII 2022, HTTPS://IVANO-FRANKIVSK.CHURCH.UA/2022/12/11/VIDBULOS-PREDSTAVLENNYA-NOVOGO-JEPARXIALNOGO-ARXIJEREYA/ [ACCESSED: JANUARY 28, 2023]

A series of SBU raids and inspections made it clear that no ties were cut off back in May, but were just carefully concealed. Top UOC clergy seemed shocked, believing there was a kind of „non-aggression pact” between them and the state. The UOC has protested the raids, calling accusations of alleged collaboration by monks and priests „unproven and unfounded.” It warned the SBU against „inciting an internal war.”

A new scandal broke out around the UOC-MP in Ukraine after the Ukrainian special services conducted a search in the Chernivtsi-Bukovina, finding a priest together with a naked underage boy. The scandal delivered a bigger

blow to UOC-MP than its collaboration with Moscow. The priest was Archimandrite Nikita, a close friend of UOC-MP Primate Metropolitan Onufriy. He was not discouraged, though. Two weeks later Nikita was ordained Bishop of Ivano-Frankivsk and Kolomyia 10. Chances are top UOC-MP officials have no intention of giving in.

[accessed: January 20, 2023].

Новый архиерей

SOURCE: ВИДЫ ЗИМНЕЙ ЛАВРЫ, СВЯТО-УСПЕНСКАЯ КИЕВО-ПЕЧЕРСКАЯ ЛАВРА, HTTPS://LAVRA.UA/GALLERY/ZIMNYAYA-LA

Zelensky’s crackdown on Moscowaffiliated Orthodox Church

Following raids and searches, in December 2022, top Ukrainian state agencies made a number of decisions, including those rather symbolic. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree enacting a National Security and Defense Council decision to impose personal sanctions against representatives of religious organizations associated with Russia, including Pavlo, the abbot

of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra monastery11. Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council instructed the government to submit a bill banning the activities of religious organizations “affiliated with centers of influence” in Russia, a plan submitted by Zelensky. The bill has been approved by a Ukrainian parliamentary committee 12. And on December 27, 2022, the Constitutional Court

11. УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ №863/2022, Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України, https://www.president.gov.ua/ documents/8632022-45265 [accessed: January 20, 2023].

12. Н. Берг, Индульгенция на убийство...

WINTER VIEW ON THE KYIV-PECHERSK LAVRA

upheld 2018 legislation that could require the UOC to include the words “Russian Orthodox Church” or “Moscow Patriarchate” in its name––something it does not want to do, arguing that it is a Ukrainian institution and is based in Kyiv 13.

However, National Security Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov said the UOC-MP should not conceal its affiliation to Moscow or break ties with the Moscow Patriarchate while condemning both Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill. The head of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra monastery, Metropolitan Pavlo Lebed, turned to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with criticism and a request to stay. “We never get involved in politics or the economy. We ask only that God preserve our Church in the state,” the abbot said 14.

“If you have no relations with Russia, then officially say goodbye, say that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is Satan,” National Security Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov demanded of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on television. Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill is also a devil, Danilov added 15.

The Orthodox Church of Ukraine received a special permit from the government to hold a Christmas service at Lavra’s Dormition Cathedral on January 7. Kyiv’s Pechersk Lavra monastery complex is a UNESCO world heritage site revered as the cradle of Orthodox monasticism in the region. Since the 1960s, it has been a museum while the monastery was reopened in the 1990s. The entire Lavra complex is state-owned while the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine is its primary manager. In 2013, the former Ukrainian government passed a total of 79 premises and facilities in Lower Lavra to the UOC-MP. The agreement was revoked in late 2022 when the lease was no longer extended

на решение КС: название менять не

, Украинская правда, December 27, 2022, https:// www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/12/27/7382628/ [accessed: January 28, 2023].

14. Обращение к Президенту Украины по поводу соборов ВерхнейЛавры, Свято-Успенская Киево-Печерская Лавра, December 28, 2022, https://lavra.ua/obrashhenie-k-prezidentu-ukrainy-po-povodu-soborov-verhnej-lavry/ [accessed: January 28, 2023].

15. Секретарь СНБО Украины призвал УПΜ откреститься отПутина- „сатаны”, Радио Свобода, December 28, 2022, https://www.svoboda. org/a/sekretarj-snbo-ukrainy-prizval-upts-otkrestitjsya-ot-putina--satany-/32196778.html [accessed: January 20, 2023].

Russia firm to defend the UOC-MP

Evidence of churches being treated as instruments of Russian aims is commonplace. After a series of raids Moscow will surely seek a tit-fortat response. Russia requested a meeting of the UN Security Council on the situation with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Moscow has in the past used the church as one of its more destabilizing tools to sow chaos in Ukraine. Alleged repression of Ukraine’s “only canonical Orthodox

church” was what Russia claimed would be a reason for launching a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Moscow has portrayed the Ukrainian state as a perpetrator of the church and thus democracy. Russia’s UN Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia alleged that Ukraine is attempting to “destroy” the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is canonically linked to the Moscow Patriarchate 16.

SOURCE: PATRIARCH KIRILL AWARDED THE ORDER OF ST ANDREW THE APOSTLE THE FIRST-CALLED, PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA, NOVEMBER 20, 2021, HTTP://EN.KREMLIN.RU/CATALOG/PERSONS/445/EVENTS/67150 [ACCESSED: JANUARY 29, 2023].

The authorities in Kyiv could be wary of further clamping down on the UOC amid possible reactions worldwide and thus providing Moscow with a tool for information warfare. The organization’s searches last November and December yet spared senior officials, including Jonathan, the ruling hierarch of the Tulchin diocese (Vinnytsia Region), notorious for his pro-Russian sympathies. Perhaps the authorities in Kyiv seek to undermine the reputation of the Moscow-affiliated UOC to make some of its clergy break ties to Moscow and possibly merge with the OCU.

Back in March 2022, two legislative initiatives calling for the activities of the Ukrainian Patriarchate to be banned and its property to be confiscated were tabled in the Ukrainian parliament. Yet these remain ‘frozen’ at present. This could yet serve to intimidate Church leaders, including Metropolitan Onufriy. In another effort to continue the crackdown on the UOC, in December 2022, 17 Ukraine’s government appointed Viktor Yelensky as head of the body,

a scholar and expert in religious studies who has long made critical comments about the UOC. He has ties to Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Ukraine’s former prime minister, but he somehow managed to convince Zelensky despite ideological differences. Perhaps he was appointed upon submitting a plan to thwart the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine. Does this mean banning the UOC-MP? That would be a drastic change, somewhat a nuclear option. Instead, it is about a different strategy. Perhaps Kyiv will launch a crackdown on pro-Russian Orthodox leaders affiliated with Moscow to break all ties with Moscow. In any case, it would be impossible to ban the UOC entirely, but Ukraine could indeed impose a ban on the institution’s most pro-Russian branches upon some collected evidence.

About the author:

Grzegorz Kuczyński -majored in history at the University of Bialystok and graduated from specialized Eastern studies at the University of Warsaw. An expert on Eastern affairs, he long worked as a journalist and political analyst. He is the author of many books and publications on the inside scoop of Russian politics.