On February 28, 2022, just days after Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine, the country submitted its formal application for membership in the European Union (EU). Ukraine’s bid for EU accession had been a long-awaited goal, but it had been hindered by the significant obstacle of Russia’s 2014 attack on Ukraine. It had been used as a pretext by Western European countries to delay the membership process. Historically, countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark have been reluctant to support Ukraine’s accession due to concerns about the potential economic consequences of its entry. These concerns included the risk of straining the EU budget and the likelihood of generous financial transfers from cohesion and agricultural policies to Kyiv. For example, in France, there have been concerns that Ukraine’s agricultural sector would pose significant competition for Western European farmers in the internal market.
Geopolitical issues have also played a role in Western European countries’ hesitance to support Ukraine’s accession. These countries did not want to irritate the Kremlin, and Paris and Berlin were apprehensive about a potential loss of influence in the EU once it expanded eastward.
Prior to 2022, most Western European elites had rejected Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Former European Commission President Romano Prodi epitomized this outlook when he famously compared Ukraine’s chances of joining the EU to as unlikely as New Zealand’s 1. In 2005, President Viktor Yushchenko was also persuaded that Ukraine should not apply for membership 2 , which arguably weakened the country’s pro-European aspirations and weakened its geopolitical
position towards the Russian Federation. This stance encouraged Moscow to intensify its efforts to regain its former sphere of influence.
The war with Russia had made it impossible for Ukraine to join the European Union, and the devastation caused by the conflict had likely discouraged support for accession from Western European elites. However, Russia’s invasion on February 24, 2022, resulted in far-reaching geopolitical, humanitarian, and media implications, making it difficult for countries to deny assistance to Ukraine, even if only in symbolic or declarative terms.
Given Ukraine’s location on the eastern flank of NATO, there was immense pressure for its accession to the European Union. As early as February 26, 2022, Polish President Andrzej Duda urged for expediting Ukraine’s admission to the EU. The following day, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, along with Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša, proposed a plan to accelerate Ukraine’s entry.
Within days of Kyiv’s formal application, eight Central European member states issued a joint letter supporting Ukraine’s application 3. A group of countries, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, expressed their support on the same day that Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó voiced his endorsement. Earlier, in 2020, Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine formed the Lublin Triangle, a trilateral political forum created to accelerate Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. The initiative arose from periodic meetings among parliamentarians from the three nations. Moreover, the United States strongly advocated for Ukraine’s accession to the
3. Presidents of 8 EU states call for immediate talks on Ukrainian membership, Reuters, February 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/presidents-8-eu-states-call-immediate-talks-ukrainian-membership-2022-02-28/.
European Union.
It can be argued that the war that broke out in Ukraine in 2014 might have been prevented if Western Europe had been more proactive in supporting Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and NATO. The omissions and misjudgments of Western Europe prior to 2022 are now increasingly apparent, and they likely played a pivotal role in the significant events that unfolded in February of that year. Notably, Germany’s decision to construct and subsequently expand the Nord Stream gas pipeline along the Baltic Sea created a formidable instrument of geo-economic coercion against Ukraine and Poland. By allowing gas to be transported to the EU while
bypassing both countries, it provided a strategic opening for Russia to attack Kyiv without disrupting the supply of this raw material to Germany.
In addition, as mentioned before, Western Europe also obstructed the entry of Ukraine and other Eastern European nations into the EU. Even the 2022 Russian invasion was used as a convenient excuse to postpone Ukraine’s accession, as former French President Emmanuel Macron openly suggested that such integration could take many years 4. Member states sought the European Commission’s opinion on the matter, and at least some of them may have hoped that EU officials would multiply obstacles to this accession. Another pretext for delaying this membership has tradi-
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61383632.
tionally been planning to include first Croatia and then the Balkan states 5. German diplomats and media, for example, pressed for talks on Ukraine’s future membership in the Union to take place only after the European perspective for the Western Balkans had been resolved 6 .
Nevertheless, it was crucial to acknowledge the pressing need for Ukraine’s accession, particularly in light of the mounting international pressure and the unapologetic disregard of European values and international law by the Russian military in Ukraine. The improvement in pro-Ukrainian sentiment in the western part of Europe was particularly noticeable. The societies of this part of the continent were increasingly supportive of Kyiv’s European aspirations. For many years, they were clearly supported by the nations of Central Europe (with the exception of Hungary) 7. As a result, the position of key decision-makers in Western Europe was slowly evolving, as evidenced by the visit of the leaders of France, Germany, and Italy to Kyiv in June 2022, accompanied by the Romanian president. In this manner, Western In response to the pressing circumstances, Europe deftly balanced its crucial economic and geopolitical interests while addressing the situation at hand. Moreover, the European Commission issued a report in June 2022 endorsing Ukraine’s accession, albeit with certain prerequisites that the country’s leaders must fulfill to meet the required standards 8
Shortly after, all member states agreed to grant Ukraine formal status as a candidate state.
The process of Ukraine’s accession to the EU may face obstacles and even abandonment due to the numerous requirements involved, including the possibility that policymakers in Western Europe may view it as too costly. Moreover, the negotiation of thirty-five “chapters” could prolong the process, as seen in the protracted accession talks with Turkey.
As mentioned earlier, French President Emmanuel Macron stressed in May 2022 that the accession process could span several decades. However, he also proposed the formation of a European Political Community that would encompass countries ranging from the United Kingdom to Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan 9 . Certain experts, alongside prominent Ukrainian politicians, argue that this scenario may weaken Kyiv’s accession prospects, or at least slow down the process 10. Notably, in 2005, the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rotfeld, acknowledged during similar debates that concrete measures towards Ukraine’s accession were more consequential than discussions concerning pan-European cooperation 11 .
Since the initial summit between the EU and Ukraine in 1992, numerous EU-Ukraine initiatives have been established that could both bolster Ukraine’s prospects for EU membership
A. Clavaud, J. Peltier, Les peuples européens derrière l’Ukraine. La guerre en Ukraine vue de France, d‘Allemagne, de Pologne et d‘Italie, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Paris, March 11, 2022.
8. Commission Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union, COM (2022) 407 final, Brussels, June 17, 2022, https:// neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/Ukraine%20Opinion%20and%20Annex.pdf.
9. European Political Community Summit, European Council, Council of the European Union, October 6, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/ meetings/international-summit/2022/10/06/.
10. P. Ricard, Ukraine wary of Macron’s ‘European political community’ project, “Le Monde,” January 20, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/05/13/ukraine-wary-of-the-european-political-community-project_5983395_4.html.
11. Gorzka lekcja [A Bitter Lesson], interview with Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld for “Der Spiegel”, 2005 (9), www.msz.gov.pl/files/file_library/29/ wywiad_spiegel_gorzka_lekcja_11472.html.
and serve as an alternative to formal accession by forging economic, regulatory, and geopolitical ties between Kyiv and Brussels. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which features the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement, is one such example. These agreements, which became effective on September 1, 2017, obligated Ukraine to adopt numerous EU regulations and granted Ukrainian businesses and service providers substantial access to the EU internal market.
One of the noteworthy developments in EU-Ukraine cooperation is the Eastern Partnership initiative that was launched in 2009 by Sweden
and Poland, among others. The partnership aimed to enhance the relations between the EU and the partnership countries, which included Ukraine, without explicitly hinting at the prospect of future EU membership. However, for Ukraine, this gave rise to disappointment with the community and discouraged public support for EU membership 12 . According to American experts, this was a serious mistake on the part of the European Union, with potential negative geopolitical consequences 13. Russia, on the other hand, saw the Partnership as a hostile encroachment into its sphere of influence and creating an increasingly pronounced lack of trust in the EU 14
http://www.the-american-interest.
The Euromaidan, a popular uprising against President Viktor Yanukovych in 2013, marked a significant turning point in Ukraine’s European integration aspirations. Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement blocked the country’s path toward the EU, which translated into widespread public discontent. The situation intensified, and Yanukovych was ousted from power, leading to a renewed push for EU accession. In 2014, Ukraine signed an association agreement and a deep free trade zone agreement with the EU. However, that same year, Russia intervened militarily in eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea, seeking to prevent closer ties between the West and Ukraine, and maintain its influence in the country.
Russia’s military intervention halted Ukraine’s
accession process, as many Western powers were hesitant to provoke Russia to escalate military action. In 2016, EC President Jean-Claude Juncker announced that Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership could take at least 25 years, though even that seemed like an unrealistic timeframe at the time. However, the outbreak of war in 2022 changed the course of events, leading to a significant shift in Western attitudes towards Ukraine’s accession 15
Berlin and Paris were concerned that Ukraine’s accession to the EU could upset the existing power balance of the Franco-German alliance within the organization. In order to address this, proposals were made by various parties, including Chancellor Olaf Scholz, to revise the voting patterns in the intergovernmental insti-
tutions of the European Union prior to its next eastern enlargement 16. As Ukraine continued to work towards its membership, it was expected that significant internal changes would also occur within the European Union to prepare for Ukraine’s accession. The reforms were projected to include sweeping changes to the EU’s existing cohesion and agricultural policies, as well as negotiations to determine special conditions for Ukraine that would allow the country to operate under different terms in the EU’s redistributive policies, distinct from other members of the organization.
The accession of Central European countries in 2004-2007 saw similar negotiations, which resulted in smaller financial transfers being
allocated to farmers in these countries compared to Western Europe. In addition, it was predicted that Ukraine would have fewer votes and representatives in EU institutions compared to other countries, particularly the more populous Western European nations.
The 2004-2007 eastern enlargement of the Union saw the replacement of the Nice voting system with the Lisbon double majority mechanism, which increased the decision-making power of France and Germany in the Union while limiting the influence of the new Central European member states, including Poland 17 .
22, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/
In addition, the Commission outlined a number of conditions 18 , on which it made the progress of the accession process conditional, including whether candidate status would be maintained (as it was not final, but only conditional). Among them, the most important were reforms of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, the introduction of changes in the judicial system, and the increasing scope of reforms aimed at systemically reducing corruption in Ukraine, including especially money laundering. In addition, the EC intended to weaken Ukraine’s economic elites, their influence on power, as well as their privileged position in the Ukrainian market. The oligarchs could also prove to be serious competitors for Western corporations in the EU’s internal market. Another EU expectation was that changes would be made to the media law
in accordance with EU regulations, which in practice could result in both an increased role for European capital in the media and a reduction in the Ukrainian authorities’ influence over the media. The Commission also made demands for increased rights for ethnic and sexual minorities in Ukraine.
Despite the ongoing war with Russia, Ukraine has remained committed to preparing for EU membership by implementing reforms, especially in the judicial system. One of these reforms included the abolition of the Kyiv District Administrative Court, which had been accused of irregularities in the past. This also involved separating criminal cases for the Kyiv region from administrative ones, particularly those related to government administration in the capital.
Another key reform aimed at meeting the EU’s expectations was the appointment of a new prosecutor to oversee anti-corruption cases. It is important to note that the European Commission is primarily interested in institutional solutions rather than individual ones, even in cases of alleged abuse like that of the previous anti-corruption prosecutor. In this regard, the institutional issue at hand involves implementing regulations that verify such accusations, introducing appropriate mechanisms for controlling and disciplining prosecutors, as well as regulations that prevent individuals with final convictions from serving as prosecutors. The criticism among EU experts and officials, however, was provoked by changes in the way judges are selected for the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 19. It is the case particularly due to the involvement of the “advisory group” in evaluating candidates, which raises concerns about political influence in the appointment of Court members.
The European Commission has made efforts to ensure that judges are politically independent and have maximum independence from national authorities (who are democratically elected). However, these measures have been controversial for three reasons. Firstly, in a democratic system, the judiciary should be separated from the legislative and executive powers but should not be excluded from democratic control and the influence of electoral democracy on the selection of the most important judges. An example of this is the way Supreme Court judges are appointed in the United States, where the incumbent president nominates them, but they should also represent the political values of the majority of voters who elected the head of state. Secondly, political
influence on judicial appointments is also present in many Western European countries 20. Secondly, the European Commission’s involvement in the organization of the judiciary in member or candidate states has raised significant doubt. According to the European treaties, this responsibility lies solely with nation-states, meaning that EU institutions should not interfere. The appointment of apolitical national judges, entirely independent of national democracy, aimed to weaken the loyalty of the judicial system to its own state and voters (the so-called demos). However, it also intended to create stronger political connections between national judges and EU institutions, particularly the EU courts. The primary objective was to implement the principle of the supremacy of EU law over national law, including constitutional law. This issue has been a point of contention within the EU for some time, as many member states and their supreme or constitutional courts have challenged the supremacy of EU law over national constitutions and judgments of national constitutional courts.
These contentious issues have come to light due to the European Commission’s expectations for a change in Ukraine’s constitutional court system. They prognosticated much greater requirements for accession compared to previous candidates and them becoming an opportunity for EU officials to increase their own powers within the EU.
19. V. Melkozerova, Ukraine takes two steps forward, one step back in anti-corruption fight, Politico, December 26, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/ article/ukraine-takes-two-steps-forward-one-step-back-in-anti-corruption-fight-constitutional-court-reform/.
