SPECIAL REPORT: Russian Disinformation Against Poland and Ukraine

Russia has been utilizing disinformation as a tool in its foreign policy for years, with Poland and Ukraine being particularly vulnerable to its effects. The goal of these efforts is to undermine the reputation and international standing of these countries, as well as to weaken their relationships with other nations. Russian propagandists use a variety of methods and techniques to deceive and manipulate, often covering a wide range of topics and appealing to emotions. This disinformation poses a significant threat to Poland and Ukraine. The article aims to shed light on the key disinformation narratives targeting these countries, as well as the methods used by Russian propagandists to disseminate them.

SOURCE: SHUTTERSTOCK

Disinformation as a Tool of Russian Foreign Policy

Disinformation has been utilized by Russia for years as a tool of its foreign policy, used to achieve political goals, increase influence, and weaken enemies. Its roots lie in Soviet propaganda, although it is now conducted differently, and, with the use of the Internet and social media, it can be much more effective. In recent years, Russian disinformation has evolved from a 4D strategy (Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay) to tactics based on new technologies 1 .

Currently, Russian propaganda relies on the use of social media and fake accounts to disseminate manipulated messages on the Internet. Trolling and bots are also instrumental in spreading them. In Russia, so-called troll farms have been created, employing people whose goal is to publish specific content online. The largest of these farms is based in St. Petersburg 2 . Furthermore, Moscow invests heavily in the operations of the website Sputnik , the multilingual television station RT, and the Russian News Agency TASS. False content is also distributed through various small news outlets, which often share the same information to increase its credibility and reach. These websites operate in different countries and publish in local languages. Following the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the activity of pro-Russian webpages in European countries was restricted and some were even blocked. Additionally, politicians from

Moscow also spread false information through their media statements.

Russian disinformation has different objectives depending on the country and institution it is aimed at. However, there are general objectives such as restoring Russian dominance in the post-Soviet countries, undermining the influence of Western democratic values, institutions, and systems to create a multipolar world, and increasing Russia’s political, economic, and military influence worldwide. The significance of disinformation in the foreign policy of the Kremlin has been highlighted by Russian information warfare theorist Igor Panarin, a professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, who stated that the success of geopolitical plans has long been linked to winning the information war 3

Russian disinformation targets various groups and has different goals for each. In terms of disinformation aimed at Poland and Ukraine, the most important target groups are:

z Russian society

z Ukrainian society

z Polish society

z Western societies

1. A. Pellegatta, Disinformation from Russia: Kremlin info-ops in Europe, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, June 3, 2020, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/disinformation-russia-kremlin-info-ops-europe-26796.

2. X. Kurowska, A. Reshetnikov, Russia’s trolling complex at home and abroad, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2018, p. 27.

3. O. Wasiuta, S. Wasiuta, Kremlowska dezinformacja w Internecie i reakcja społeczeństw zachodnich, Przegląd Geopolityczny 2020 (34), http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-fa9f1fc7-ca37-4e98-b76f-d7d08d86d7cb/c/XXXIV-07-Wasiuta2.pdf, p. 139.

Methods of Operation

Russian propagandists employ various methods of deception. The basic method is multi-vector narratives, which pertain to specific topics and are repeated regularly 4 . A key characteristic of this disinformation is continuity, meaning that a given disinformation narrative is regularly conveyed in different forms so that it stays in the memory of the recipient. In short messages, information is often emotionally charged, typically without providing a source. These messages are intended to provoke a specific reaction and distort the perception of events by recipients. Another method is false or manipulated article titles that do not correspond with the text. This method assumes that most recipients will not read the entire article, and will only obtain information from the catchy headline.

Social media has become a breeding ground for manipulation as users are often inundated with information and may not have the time to fact-check every piece of content they encounter. As a result, they tend to focus primarily on headlines and summaries, making them more susceptible

to clickbait tactics and misinformation. One tactic commonly used by Russian propaganda is the repurposing of old statements as new information, often by quoting words out of context to serve propaganda purposes. Another tactic is the fabrication of false quotes, which involves attributing words to someone who never actually spoke them. Russia also frequently disseminates conspiracy theories and suppresses facts that are unfavorable to the Kremlin. Following the outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022, Russia concealed from its citizens that during their “special military operation,” it also targeted civilian targets. As the war progressed, efforts were made to conceal any failures of the Russian army on the battlefield. A notable example of this tactic in the past was the Soviet Union’s long-term denial of the Katyn massacre. Another tactic is publishing false interviews with fictional individuals, in which the conversation is presented in written form, with the fictional person presented as an expert or valuable source of information from a specific area.

4. Wojna informacyjna w Internecie. Przeciwdziałanie prokremlowskiej dezinformacji w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, 2017.

SOURCE: SHUTTERSTOCK

Pre-War Russian Disinformation Tactics Aimed at Poland and Ukraine

Poland and Ukraine have long been the primary targets of Russian disinformation efforts. These efforts were amplified in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in the Donbas. Poland has been a strong supporter of Ukraine’s aspirations to join the European Union, and after the outbreak of the conflict, actively provided aid to Ukrainian refugees. Furthermore, Poland has urged Western countries to increase their support for Ukraine. For Ukraine, Poland is one of its most crucial allies in Europe, and as a result, Russia’s primary objective has been to weaken the relationship between the two nations.

Before the events of 2014, Russian disinformation aimed at Ukraine included spreading false information about the Orange Revolution and supporting the campaign of Viktor Yanukovych in the Ukrainian presidential elections of 2010. At the beginning of 2014, disinformation activities were focused on destabilizing the situation in Ukraine and exerting pressure on its citizens and authorities to adopt the constitutional solutions proposed by Moscow. This would have given Russia control over Ukraine, which would have remained in the Russian sphere of influence. However, in 2014, Viktor Yanukovych lost power and Ukraine chose a pro-European path. This led to an intensification of Russia’s disinformation activities aimed at the country.

After the events of 2014, Russian disinformation shifted its focus to painting a negative image of Ukraine in the eyes of the West. Russian narratives portrayed Ukraine as a totalitarian state, far

from Western values such as democracy, rule of law, and freedom. These efforts were particularly visible in the relationship between Poland and Ukraine. Russia aimed to create hostility between the two nations by portraying Ukraine as a fascist state in the perception of Polish society, thereby inciting feelings of threat among Poles towards that country.

On the other hand, Russian disinformation also sought to make Ukrainians feel that they could not count on Poland’s support for their European aspirations. These operations mainly centered around historical issues. Russian disinformation campaigns often reported on mutual territorial claims, suggesting that Poland plans to retake Lviv (in Ukraine) and that Ukraine plans to retake Przemyśl (in Poland). Russian messages also popularized information that negatively affected the image of Ukrainians, presented as “Banderites” (members of radical nationalist right-wing groups, “Bandera’s people” from the name of the leader of OUN-B). A recurring theme in Russian disinformation was also the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas. Since 2014, Russia has regularly disseminated disinformation narratives aimed at justifying the annexation of Crimea, such as:

z “The annexation of Crimea to Russia was carried out by international law,”

z “The referendum in Crimea was carried out by Ukrainian law,”

z “Ukraine never had the right to Crimea, and the peninsula has always been Russian.”

Since 2014, Russia has also intensified disinformation activities aimed at Poland. One of the main goals of these actions was to create a negative image of Poland and its society in the awareness of the Polish, Russian, and foreign audiences, as well as increasing polarization in Polish society and disturbing public debate 5 An important goal was also building a sense of

threat from Russia and its society from Poland and its allies. In addition, it was important from the Russian point of view to incite and maintain antagonisms between Poland and its neighbors and allies, which in consequence was supposed to lead to conflicts and the isolation of Poland on the international scene.

Russian Disinformation after the Outbreak of War in Ukraine

On February 24th, Russia initiated a full-scale war with Ukraine, accompanied by a coordinated disinformation campaign aimed at various audiences, including Russian, Ukrainian, Western, and even those from Asia and Africa. The main objectives of this disinformation were to justify Russia’s actions, create a negative image of Ukraine, and weaken the relationship between Ukraine and Poland and other Western countries.

In the early days of the war, Russian disinformation targeted primarily its society, to prevent access to accurate information about the war. As a result, false news was widely broadcast on Russian television. After the start of the aggression, Russian propaganda centers primarily reported that the “special military operation” was necessary to remove the so-called “Nazis” who were allegedly ruling Ukraine. The West was also accused of planning to attack Russia with the help of Kyiv. It was claimed that Ukrainians were torturing Russian civilians in the eastern regions of Ukraine and that Russia’s

actions were necessary to liberate them. There were even reports that Kyiv was planning to gas people in concentration camps, and Russia could not allow it. These narratives aimed to justify Russia’s actions and blame Ukraine and Western countries.

An important aspect of Russian disinformation efforts directed at Western societies was the denial of crimes committed by Russian military forces. At the onset of the war, disinformation was widely disseminated claiming that Russia was not targeting civilian objects or civilians, but only military targets, to overthrow the “Nazi government” in Ukraine. In reality, Russian military forces have been attacking residential buildings, schools, preschools, and hospitals, as well as committing crimes against the civilian population from the very beginning of the war. Additionally, they were bombing military-educational facilities, airports, and other vital infrastructure. A significant event that generated a lot of false information was the massacre in Bucha,

wojna dezinformacyjna przeciwko Polsce, CAPD, Warszawa 2017, https://pulaski.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/RAPORT-Rosyjska-wojna-dezinformacyjna-przeciwko-Polsce.pdf, s. 9.

5. K. Wóycicki, M. Kowalska, A. Lelonek, Rosyjska

committed by Russian soldiers. When this crime was exposed, Russian propaganda outlets claimed that the footage of dead bodies in the streets of the town had been fabricated by the Ukrainians and was being used to conceal previously disclosed video recordings that allegedly showed Ukrainians brutally torturing Russian prisoners of war. Another disinformation narrative suggested that the massacre was a psychological operation carried out by Great Britain. However, it is clear that the massacre in Bucha was committed by

Russian soldiers during their occupation of the town. They killed around 400 civilians, and this has been confirmed by reputable sources such as Bellingcat 6 , Atlantic Council 7, and BBC 8 . Evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine has been compiled by organizations such as Human Rights Watch. Its Director for Europe and Central Asia, Hugh Williamson, stated that the documented cases constitute unspeakable cruelty and violence against Ukrainian civilians and that rape, murder, and other acts of violence

6. E. Higgins, Russia’s Bucha ‘Facts’ Versus the Evidence, April 4, 2022, https://www.bellingcat.com/ news/2022/04/04/russias-bucha-facts-versus-the-evidence/.

7. Russian War Report: Kremlin claims Bucha massacre was staged by Ukraine, Atlantic Council, April 4, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-kremlin-claims-bucha-massacre-wasstaged-by-ukraine/#bucha.

8. Bucha killings: Satellite image of bodies site contradicts Russian claims, BBC, April 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/ news/60981238.

SOURCE: JAKUB SZYMCZUK KPRP

committed by Russian forces should be investigated as war crimes 9 .

About the Bucha massacre, Russian propaganda centers employed their usual tactic of denying facts and placing blame elsewhere. Another example is the statement of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who in March 2022, when interviewed after a meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba, stated that Russia did not attack Ukraine and does not plan to attack other countries 10 .

Another event around which Russian propaganda outlets regularly disseminate false information is the missile attack in Kramatorsk, which Russia carried out on April 8, 2022. Approximately 50 people were killed, and over 100 were injured 11 . Russia attempted to blame Ukraine for the attack, reporting that a Tochka-U missile, which is used by Ukrainian armed forces, was used in it.

Moscow stated that its forces withdrew Tochka-U missiles and are not using them anymore. It was argued that the attack was related to the fact that Ukraine considers the population of Kramatorsk to be disloyal. In reality, the Russian army still uses this missile system, as confirmed by video footage of transports passing through Belarus in March 2022. The BBC, among other sources, reported on the vast documentation of the use of Tochka-U against Ukrainian targets 12 .

One of the key areas of focus for Russian disinformation efforts is energy. In September of last year, when the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines were damaged, Russian propagandists sought to blame Poland, claiming that it was acting on orders from the United States. They suggested that the United States wanted European countries to import American LNG gas instead of Russian gas while ignoring the fact that Russia

9. Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas, Human Rights Watch, March 3, 2022, https://www.hrw. org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas.

10. S. Ankel, Russia repeats claim it didn’t attack Ukraine, saying it was forced to defend to pro-Kremlin regions, Business Insider, 10 III 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-repeats-claim-did-not-attack-ukraine-2022-3?IR=T.

11. The situation of human rights in Ukraine in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation, The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 February to 15 May 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/situation-human-rights-ukraine-context-armed-attack-russian-federation, p. 12.

12. Ukraine war: What weapon killed 50 people in station attack?, BBC, April 13, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/ news/61079356.

SOURCE: TOMASZ BIDERMANN SHUTTERSTOCK

had been using gas blackmail against Germany by regularly restricting deliveries 13. Likely, the damage to the pipelines was actually caused by Russia to exacerbate the energy crisis in Europe and increase uncertainty and chaos in the market.

Russian propagandists also frequently use false narratives about supposed Polish plans to take over the western part of Ukraine. These narratives have been repeated since the start of the war, including in a November 2022 speech by Vladimir Putin on Russia’s Unity Day. He claimed that some Polish political elites were supporting the idea of creating a large state from sea to sea, and emphasized that the idea of Poland absorbing Ukraine was still alive and well, with Russia as the guarantor of Ukraine’s security. This statement was later repeated on various pro-Russian websites.

In addition to these false narratives, these websites also claimed that Poland’s aid for Ukrainian refugees was merely a facade and that there were political discussions in Poland about borders, with some elites in power considering the territory of western Ukraine and western Belarus to be Polish, which could lead to attempts to reclaim those lands. Furthermore, they suggested that Poland was increasing the size of its army near the border with Belarus, which could pose a significant threat to that country. These narratives are primarily directed at Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians, and aim to create an image of Poland as a dangerous state. Similar messages have also been directed against Polish society, suggesting that Ukraine is striving to occupy eastern territories in Poland. However, these narratives are completely false, and in reality, neither Poland nor Ukraine have any territorial claims against each other.

One aspect of Russian disinformation targeting Poland is its alleged involvement in the ongoing war. In the latter part of last year, false information was circulated claiming that Polish special services had participated in the war. Specifically, it was alleged that a team of Polish special forces officers had appeared in the town of Marhanec in the Dniepropetrovsk region to identify and repress pro-Russian residents. These officers were said to be dressed in Ukrainian uniforms and operating under NATO command in cooperation with the Security Service of Ukraine. These baseless accusations against Poland and NATO are intended to depict the Russian-Ukrainian war as a confrontation with a „Russophobic” NATO and to portray the actions of Poland and NATO as aggressive towards Russia. By claiming that NATO is directly involved in the war in Ukraine, Russia aims to justify its actions as purely defensive.

Similar false reports had earlier emerged about the alleged involvement of Polish mercenaries in the war, with claims that about 1,200 of them had died. These claims stem from the fact that the International Legion of Defense of Ukraine (ILDU), to which more than 20,000 foreign volunteers, including Poles, have applied, is participating in the war in Ukraine 14. However, it is important to note that volunteers sign up to serve voluntarily, according to a special procedure, and their motivation is not financial, therefore they should not be classified as mercenaries.

In addition to these false claims, Russian disinformation also focused on the UN grain agreement, concerning the safe export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. In October, the President of Russia announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the agreement, only to tell about a return to the agreement a few days later,

13. M. Menkiszak, Rosja: przygotowania do wojny gazowej, OSW, July 22, 2022, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ analizy/2022-07-22/rosja-przygotowania-do-wojny-gazowej.

14. I.C. Tang, The Latest in a Long Line: Ukraine’s International Legion and a History of Foreign Fighters, Harvard International Review, 2 IX 2022, https://hir.harvard.edu/the-latest-in-a-long-line-ukraines-international-legion-and-ahistory-of-foreign-fighters/

warning that Moscow could withdraw again 15 . The reason for withdrawing from the agreement was the alleged use by Ukraine of the humanitarian corridor as a shield for an attack on Sevastopol, and it was also claimed that it was used to blow up the Crimean Bridge. These accusations were false, as the UN representative responsible for monitoring the humanitarian corridor stated that no ships were in the corridor during the air attack on Sevastopol and that drones could not have been launched from it 16 .

On November 15, 2022, Russia conducted a massive missile attack on Ukraine, during which it launched approximately 100 maneuvering missiles from the air and sea. Although most of

the missiles were shot down, some of them hit Ukrainian territory, particularly energy infrastructure objects, significantly escalating the situation in the country. On the day of the attack, two Russian-made missiles fell on Polish territory near the border with Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of two civilians. Initially, it was stated that they could have been stray Russian missiles, but later findings revealed that they were likely Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles that had been launched to destroy Russian missiles but missed their target and hit Polish territory.

The event was quickly exploited by Russian propaganda. Narratives then emerged suggesting that Poland was planning to drag NATO into a

15. I. Wiśniewska, Rosja wraca do porozumienia zbożowego, OSW, 3 XI 2022, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ analizy/2022-11-03/rosja-wraca-do-porozumienia-zbozowego.

16. T. Tvauri, Did Ukraine use the humanitarian corridor for a drone attack on Sevastopol?, Mythdetecotr, November 7, 2022, https://mythdetector.ge/en/did-ukraine-use-the-humanitarian-corridor-for-a-drone-attack-on-sevastopol/.

SOURCE: THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE FACEBOOK

war with Russia and that the West was trying to start World War III. This was commented on by, among others, the Vice Chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, who wrote on Twitter that “the incident with the alleged Ukrainian missile strike on a Polish farm proves only one thing: by conducting a hybrid war with Russia, the West is getting closer to a world war.” It was also suggested that Ukraine posed

a threat to Poland and other NATO countries. Meanwhile, according to another narrative, Russia was not conducting missile attacks on targets near the border with Poland at the time. The goal of the Russian messages about this event was to create panic and chaos in Polish society and weaken Poland’s support for military aid to Ukraine.

Disinformation about Ukrainian Refugees in Poland

Disinformation about Ukrainian refugees in Poland has been prevalent since the start of the Russian aggression. The conflict has led to a large number of Ukrainian citizens fleeing threatened territories and seeking refuge in Poland. Polish authorities and society have shown exceptional commitment to helping those in need, yet propaganda centers have been spreading false information in Poland about Ukrainian refugees to incite fear and create a negative image of Ukrainians, thus discouraging Poles from helping and supporting them.

At the onset of the war, when the first wave of refugees began to arrive in Poland, reports emerged falsely claiming that people of color were coming from Ukraine and attacking Polish women and children. False information was spread that crimes such as attacks, rapes, and burglaries had occurred in Przemyśl and the surrounding area, creating a sense of danger and calls for defense. These actions were aimed at inciting hatred and questioning the sense of accepting

people coming from Ukraine.

In May 2022, a tragic incident occurred in Warsaw when a young man was murdered on a popular street. Unfortunately, this event was exploited by Russian propaganda, which disseminated false information claiming that Ukrainians were responsible for the murder. Furthermore, it was falsely suggested that most crimes committed in Poland were committed by Ukrainian citizens 17. Old materials were also manipulated and presented as evidence of Ukrainian crimes, further fueling hostility between Poles and Ukrainians. It is crucial to be aware that any similar event that evokes strong emotions may be used by Russia to spread disinformation about Ukrainians.

Russia has been engaged in a sustained disinformation campaign targeting Poland and Ukraine for years, to undermine the relationship between the two countries and discredit them on the international stage. These efforts have accelerated

17. K. Lipka, Nie, podejrzanymi o zabójstwo na Nowym Świecie nie są obcokrajowcy, FakeNews.pl, May 20, 2022, https://fakenews.pl/spoleczenstwo/nie-podejrzanymi-o-zabojstwo-na-nowym-swiecie-nie-sa-obcokrajowcy/.

since 2014, with a particular focus on Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine. Initially, Russia sought to justify its actions and downplay the failures of its military operations. Currently, a significant portion of Russian disinformation is focused on discrediting Ukraine and accusing Poland and the West of hostile actions towards Russia. Additionally, there are dangerous false reports about Ukrainian refugees in Poland, aimed at stirring up hostility toward providing aid to Ukraine. Moscow will likely continue to use disinformation to target both countries in the future. Disinformation is a powerful and accessible tool with a wide reach and low costs, and with the advent of new technologies, it is becoming even more efficient.

To effectively combat the threat of Russian disinformation campaigns, both Ukraine and Poland

must take a proactive approach. This includes identifying and diagnosing these campaigns, understanding their methods and goals, and limiting their reach and influence. One important aspect of this approach is prebunking, proactively exposing and debunking false narratives before they have a chance to spread. The goal of prebunking is to educate the public and empower them to counter disinformation. Additionally, building trust and promoting transparency in government and public institutions is crucial in the fight against disinformation. Low trust in government makes disinformation campaigns more successful while fostering trust and transparency makes it more likely for people to recognize and reject false narratives.

SOURCE: THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE FACEBOOK

References

Ankel, S., Russia repeats claim it didn’t attack Ukraine, saying it was forced to defend to pro-Kremlin regions, Business Insider, March 10, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-repeats-claim-did-not-attack-ukraine-2022-3?IR=T.

Bucha killings: Satellite image of bodies site contradicts Russian claims, BBC, April 11, 2022, https:// www.bbc.com/news/60981238.

Higgins, E., Russia’s Bucha ‘Facts’ Versus the Evidence, April 4, 2022, https://www.bellingcat. com/news/2022/04/04/russias-bucha-facts-versus-the-evidence/.

Kurowska, X., Reshetnikov, A., Russia’s trolling complex at home and abroad , European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2018.

Lipka, K., Nie, podejrzanymi o zabójstwo na Nowym Świecie nie są obcokrajowcy, FakeNews. pl, May 20, 2022, https://fakenews.pl/spoleczenstwo/nie-podejrzanymi-o-zabojstwo-na-nowymswiecie-nie-sa-obcokrajowcy/

Menkiszak, M., Rosja: przygotowania do wojny gazowej, OSW, July 22, 2022, https://www.osw. waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2022-07-22/rosja-przygotowania-do-wojny-gazowej.

Pellegatta, A., Disinformation from Russia: Kremlin info-ops in Europe, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, June 3, 2020, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/disinformation-russia-kremlin-info-ops-europe-26796.

Russian War Report: Kremlin claims Bucha massacre was staged by Ukraine, Atlantic Council, April 4, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-kremlin-claims-bucha-massacre-was-staged-byukraine/#bucha.

Tang, I. C., The Latest in a Long Line: Ukraine’s International Legion and a History of Foreign Fighters , Harvard International Review, September 2, 2022, https://hir.harvard.edu/thelatest-in-a-long-line-ukraines-international-legion-and-a-history-of-foreign-fighters/.

The situation of human rights in Ukraine in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation , The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 February to 15 May 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/situation-human-rights-ukraine-context-armed-attack-russian-federation

Tvauri, T., Did Ukraine use the humanitarian corridor for a drone attack on Sevastopol?, Mythdetecotr, November 7, 2022, https://mythdetector. ge/en/did-ukraine-use-the-humanitarian-corridor-for-a-drone-attack-on-sevastopol/.

Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas, Human Rights Watch, March 3, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlledareas.

Ukraine war: What weapon killed 50 people in station attack?, BBC, April 13, 2022, https://www. bbc.com/news/61079356.

Author’s bio:

Mikołaj Rogalewicz

Wasiuta, O., Wasiuta, S., Kremlowska dezinformacja w Internecie i reakcja społeczeństw zachodnich, Przegląd Geopolityczny 34 (2020), http://cejsh.icm. edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-fa9f1fc7-ca37-4e98-b76f-d7d08d86d7cb/c/ XXXIV-07-Wasiuta2.pdf

Wiśniewska, I., Rosja wraca do porozumienia zbożowego, OSW, November 3, 2022, https://www. osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2022-11-03/rosja-wraca-do-porozumienia-zbozowego.

Wojna informacyjna w Internecie. Przeciwdziałanie prokremlowskiej dezinformacji w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej , Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, 2017.

Wóycicki K., Kowalska M., Lelonek A., Rosyjska wojna dezinformacyjna przeciwko Polsce, CAPD, Warsaw, 2017, https://pulaski.pl/wp-content/ uploads/2015/02/RAPORT-Rosyjska-wojnadezinformacyjna-przeciwko-Polsce.pdf.

Senior analyst at the Demagog Association, a fact-checking organization. Author of numerous articles and analyses devoted to international relations, fact-checking, and disinformation. Participant of Kremlin Watchers Movement project, in which he deals with Russian disinformation. At various conferences, he presented papers on disinformation, cyberterrorism, Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and efforts to solve it, as well as actions of the EU aimed at combating terrorism. He is a mentor of the Akademia Fact-Checkingu.