The Greenhill Approach and the Taxology of Instrumentalized Migration in the Belarusian Migration
2024/07/19
RÓBERT GÖNCZI
The deliberate use of migration as a geopolitical instrument has attracted a lot of attention lately, especially when viewed via Kelly M. Greenhill’s taxonomy of engineered migration. This complex phenomenon shows how states and non-state actors control migratory patterns to achieve political, territorial, and military goals. Greenhill divides it into coercive, dispossessive, exportive, and militarized forms. The Belarusian migration management experiment is a noteworthy case study that illustrates the subtleties and complexity of engineered migration. This article touches on the larger ramifications of military migration strategies in modern geopolitics and examines how Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka’s actions fit the traits of exportive and coercive manufactured migration. This discussion tries to shed light on the strategic interaction between foreign relations and migration management through a thorough analysis of the Belarusian case and comparison with other examples of instrumentalized migration.
Introduction
Since 1994, Belarus’s head of state, Alexander Lukashenka, has presided over an authoritarian government characterised by stability in the country’s economy (Leshchenko 2008, pp. 1420–1422). His leadership faced substantial challenges following the divisive 2020 presidential election, which provoked widespread demonstrations and international censure because of a violent response (Human Rights Watch 2021). The hijacking of Ryanair aircraft 4978 in 2021 caused even more controversy and resulted in harsh EU sanctions (Council of the European Union 2023). The Lukashenka administration turned to migration as a political instrument to address internal unrest and economic problems. Belarus contributed to a migratory crisis on the Schengen frontiers, worsening the humanitarian situation and seeking to deflect attention from domestic
turmoil by streamlining visa procedures and providing travel incentives through official channels (Sari 2023, pp. 11–14). Although not unique to the region, Belarus’s use of migratory flows for political pressure resulted in a geopolitical crisis in Central Europe (Ho and Wijnkoop 2022, pp. 1-41; Fakhry et al. 2022a, pp. 11–12). The research question that emerges is: based on Greenhill’s methodology, what kind of instrumentalized migration is the Belarusian migration management experiment? Combining this strategy with more general geopolitical tensions – particularly considering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – highlights how interwoven world politics are and how they affect regional stability. According to the theory, two types of engineered migration take place in Belarus: exportive and coercive.
Coercion and the Analysis of Instrumentalized Migration by Kelly M. Greenhill
Kelly M. Greenhill is a notable expert in security policy and international affairs (Tufts University 2023). Her work focuses on “emerging security challenges” such as transnational crime, insurgencies, civil wars, and the use of migration as a political tool, as well as information policy, military force, and foreign and defence policy. Greenhill is a graduate of Harvard, the University of California, Berkeley, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) with a doctorate. Her knowledge of the instrumentalization of migration is especially impressive because she has authored several influential books on the topic.
The ultimate explanation of the instrumentalization of migration is still found in Greenhill’s book “Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy” (Greenhill 2010, pp. 12-74), even though numerous scholars have studied the subject, frequently expanding upon, or supplementing her framework. As it channels the processes required for this approach to succeed, coercion is the main method by which migration is utilized as a tool of political pressure, according to Greenhill’s writings.
Coercion is regarded as a hybrid approach since it goes beyond conventional techniques like military
force and involves pressure, threats, or intimidation to cause or prevent changes in political behaviour (Cambridge Dictionary 2023). Hybrid warfare solutions include military and non-military techniques, according to US Marine W. J. Nemeth (Nemeth 2002, pp. 2-4). Propaganda, coercion through the economy, deceit, sabotage, and disturbance are a few examples. Another hybrid instrument is the instrumentalization of migration. Actors that employ this approach blend traditional and non-traditional military manoeuvres to accomplish social, political, and economic goals. Instigating a migration and refugee crisis is a particular kind of pressure that is more frequent and potent than is frequently acknowledged. The instrumentalization of migration is a specific coercive technique that uses migration as a means of applying political
pressure.
Whether one uses migration as an instrument or any other natural phenomenon, instrumentalization is an intricate process. To accomplish a certain goal comprises planning, directing, and modifying an action (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2023). When it comes to migration, this theory deals with how people’s movements are organized and manipulated through compulsion (Ho and Wijnkoop 2022, pp. 10-11). This tactical strategy seeks to actively direct and manage the migration process in addition to inducing or preventing changes in political behaviour. Instrumentalization is a strategy used by individuals who want to use coercive tactics to manipulate or take advantage of natural processes, including human movement, to further their objectives.
The History, Available Resources, Benefits, and Challenges of Instrumentalized Migration
The intentional creation or manipulation of cross-border population migrations with the express purpose of obtaining political, military, and/ or economic benefits from targeted countries is known as the instrumentalization of migration (Ho and Wijnkoop 2022, pp. 9–12). Various actors – typically but not exclusively states –use this tactic. Examples of such actors include Libyan militias since 2011 (Fakhry et al. 2022b, pp. 3–4), Jean-Bertrand Aristide from 1992 to 1994 (Jefferies 2001, pp. 71–94), and ISIS in 2014 (UN Habitat 2015, pp. 12–15; Amnesty International 2014, pp. 8–17). The Biafran War (1967–1970) (Ugorji 2022, pp. 317–337) and the Bosnian War (1992–1995) (Hageboutros 2016, pp. 53–57) are two examples of conflicts where this strategic approach was used. Other examples include
positive, occasionally financial incentives, as demonstrated by U.S. support for North Vietnam in 1954–1955 (Allard 2008, pp. 40–58).
The strategy also includes innocuous activities, such as reopening restricted borders. For example, in the 1980s, East Germany under Erich Honecker successfully employed this tactic against its Western neighbour (Vicuña 1994, pp. 375-377). The goal of instrumentalizing migration is usually to instigate and take advantage of a crisis for gains in the political, economic, and/ or military spheres. With its plausible deniability, this approach provides the ideal cover, hides real motivations, and allows organized parties to further their own goals behind the pretence of managing a migratory problem.
The expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 by the notorious tyrant Idi Amin serves as a stark illustration of this engineered approach’s nature (Desai 2012, pp. 446-458). When Amin’s action is analysed via the lens of instrumentalization, its true motivation becomes evident, even though it is conventionally perceived as an attempt to seize financial wealth and a racist policy. Many of the fifty thousand Asians driven out by Amin held British passports (Desai 2012, pp. 446-458). Uganda was violating human rights and the rule of law; thus, the UK was considering stopping military aid. Uganda and the UK were engaged in negotiations at the time. Amin gave the expelled Asians ninety days to go, implying to the British that they would have the same amount of time to change their minds about military assistance or else 50,000 Asian civilians with British passports would be arriving.
This case highlights the subtle and intentional exploitation of population movements for political and strategic gain, demonstrating that
the deliberate manufacture of migration crises with meticulous planning is a more prevalent activity than it might originally appear.
Greenhill (2010) has compiled a comprehensive set of cases that illustrate the instrumentalization of migration, covering the years 1951 through 2006. Her thorough research is complemented by my discoveries that I added to this compilation, bringing developments from early 2007 to the end of 2023 into the dataset (Ho and Wijnkoop 2022, pp. 1-41; Fakhry et al. 2022a, pp. 11–12; Parikh 2023; MTI 2015; Hale and Ma 2023; Mascareñas 2022, pp. 23–27; Ridgewell 2023; Amnesty International 2014, pp. 8–17). A thorough compilation of seventy-seven cases is the outcome of this cooperative endeavour. Greenhill’s historical research is expanded upon in this dataset by adding more contemporary cases (2006–2023), which provides a thorough understanding of the phenomena of instrumentalization of migration. Since 1951, the interactions between Greenhill’s recorded examples and the
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more recent additions offer a more comprehensive framework for analysing the frequency, trends, and effects of this phenomenon.
Of the seventy-seven cases that were found, the actor coordinating the migration was successful, either completely or partially, in 65% of the situations. This success rate supports the claim that instrumentalizing migration is a powerful political tool for applying pressure, even when partial successes are taken into consideration. Therefore, it may be said that using migration as a tool for political compulsion works quite well.
At first, weaker states (e.g., Haiti 1979–1981 [Crosette 1981], Austria 1981–1982 [Gehler and Kaiser 1997, pp. 95–96], or Albania 1990–1991 [Campani 1992, pp. 8–9]) were the main ones to use migration as an instrument of pressure on larger, militarily stronger countries. There has been a noticeable change over time, with major nations now understanding and utilizing this hybrid strategy as well. Successful use of the instrumentalization of migration has been demonstrated by nations including Pakistan (Human Rights Watch 2023), Iran (Moghadam and Jadali 2021, pp. 33–36), and Russia (Fakhry et al. 2022a, pp. 20–25). This change highlights how the field of international relations is changing and how even strong countries are realizing the value and efficacy of employing migration as a pressure tactic. Major and regional powers’ deployment of migration techniques highlights its growing relevance on the international diplomatic scene and demonstrates its adaptability.
However, even when it works, the instrumentalization of migration has the potential to intensify hostilities. One prominent example is the building of the Berlin Wall in the early 1960s (Glorius 2010, pp. 2-4), which was done mostly in preparation for a potential threat rather than in response to a direct attack, like the instrumentalization of migration. This emphasizes how using migration as a tool of coercion can have unforeseen consequences that can exacerbate geopolitical
tensions to an extreme.
Instrumentalization carries a significant danger as well because the people directing the crises can lose some control over the procedure. The complexity and inherent risks of such operations are increased by several factors, such as the individual choices made by irregular migrants and their tendency to self-organize, the involvement of profit-driven traffickers and criminal organizations, and the possibility of migrants being diverted to other locations.
Furthermore, the attempt to instrumentalize migration is irreversible, and the messages that the organizers hope to communicate can have unintended consequences that run counter to their stated objectives, undermining the entire process. One prominent example of this is the attempt to instrumentalize North Korean migration (during the 1990s and from 2002 to 2006), which unintentionally made it easier for individuals to migrate and weakened the legitimacy of the government (Greenhill 2010, pp. 227–261).
Since such efforts may have unforeseen consequences, the aftermath adds even another complex layer to the organizer’s awareness of the dangers involved in instrumentalizing migration. For example, the US-managed migration flow from North Vietnam to South Vietnam (1954–1955), which was first intended to use emigration to put pressure on the pro-Soviet government in the North, ultimately undermined the South Vietnamese government and produced unexpected results (Statler 2007, pp. 117–154).
The findings confirm that, despite these obstacles and other complexities, the instrumentalization of migration continues to have a high enough success rate to be considered a feasible means of political compulsion. This demonstrates the strategic advantages and natural attraction of using migration as a tool for manoeuvring in geopolitical strategy for those governments that manage to do so.
The term “engineered migration flows” refers to a range of techniques that are employed systematically to accomplish military, political, or territorial goals. These actions provide a manipulative toolkit for using migration as a means of coercion. To start, pressure can be created by threatening decision-makers in the target country. This entails sowing dissatisfaction among important followers, which could undermine the leadership’s political stability. The intention is to soften the decision-makers stance and increase their openness to the organizer’s suggested alternatives. The objective of this strategic approach is to utilize migration as an instrument for geopolitical influence and negotiation, in addition to being a demographic phenomenon.
A methodical approach is used in the planned strategy of engineered migratory flows to accomplish geopolitical objectives by indirect coercion. First, the organizer creates a climate of discontent within the target system by deliberately cultivating discontent. This can take many different forms, like emphasizing problems that erode trust in the political class or escalating internal
divides. Second, by using methods that render the target country’s leadership vulnerable and more amenable to suggestions for compromise and solutions, the strategy aims to undermine their sense of security. Thirdly, the objective is to deliberately undermine the target nation on an economic, political, and social level to create circumstances that make controlling organized migration seem essential. Finally, the organizers stick to international rules and preserve plausible deniability by avoiding direct military action and instead applying pressure through unconventional means.
When taken as a whole, these actions provide a comprehensive approach to instrumentalizing migration, emphasizing its deliberate and complex implementation. The orchestrator seeks to force essential concessions by concentrating on influencing decision-makers, creating discontent, undermining security perceptions, and causing strategic weakening of the target state using non-military means. One of the most advanced tools for geopolitical manipulation is engineered or instrumentalized migration.
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The Engineered Migration Classification System Developed by Greenhill
While any attempt to say that instrumentalized migration is inherently coercive, Kelly M. Greenhill, author of “Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy,” contends that contemporary trends offering alternative approaches to deploy this hybrid method have emerged in response to evolving challenges and unique toolkits. Coercive, dispossessive, exportive, and military engineered migration are the four main subtypes of instrumentalization of migration that Greenhill describes, and which have been widely accepted. Greenhill’s framework is not the only classification approach, though, for grouping migration-related initiatives. Tsourapas presents an alternative viewpoint, suggesting that migration can function as a diplomatic instrument that is employed in a cooperative or coercive manner (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019, pp. 115-118). Under the cooperative approach, documents such as readmission agreements, deportation guidelines, and immigration statutes are examined. One of the main criticisms of Tsourapas’s methodology is that, instead of improving the analysis of current instances, it combines coercive and previously non-instrumental migration devices. To effectively develop state protection frameworks, current coercive cases must be categorized, identified, and understood.
In contrast to Tsourapas, Steger added three more groups to the Greenhill framework to further expand on the classification of instrumentalization of migration (Steger 2017, pp. 11-44). These consist of the political, fifth-column, and economic groups. By categorizing the third new group as the political/propaganda group, Başer expanded on Steger’s work and advanced this
idea (Başer 2022, pp. 178–179). However further research is needed to fully understand the consequences of these new classifications.
Manipulating or generating migrant flows for financial gain is the economic component of instrumentalizing migration, or the “economic engineered migration” (Başer 2022, pp. 178–179). This type of instrumentalization can be divided into four distinct practices: a) using migrants as cheap labour, as demonstrated by the 1990s US garment industry’s exploitation of Asian labour (Chaganti 2004, pp. 2223-2224); b) exporting labour from the organizer’s population for profit, as demonstrated by the organizing of Indonesian labour abroad under the Sixth Five-Year Plan 1994-1999 and the Second Long-Term Development Plan 1994-2018 (Hugo 1995, pp. 275-277); c) inflating refugee numbers for financial gain, as evidenced by the 2018 investigation in Uganda, where the government and UNHCR discovered discrepancies indicating 300,000 fewer refugees than reported (Okiror 2018); d) imposing taxes on emigrated populations for economic benefit, known as the “emigration tax,” practiced by countries like the United States (IRS 2024), Eritrea (DSP-groep Amsterdam, Tillburg School of Humanities, Department of Culture Studies 2017, pp. 79-103), and Myanmar (The Irrawaddy 2023).
The term “fifth-column” refers to yet another group in the range of attempted instrumentalization of migration (Başer 2022, pp. 176-177). The strategy of “fifth-column engineered migration” entails the planned infiltration of covert supporters or sympathizers of an enemy to allow them to conduct sabotage or espionage operations.
The fifth-column subset of engineered migration includes a tactic in which the coordinator sends migrants into the targeted state’s territory to cause harm. One case in point is the Lisa Case in Germany when a rumour that spread via Russian disinformation networks caused internal turmoil and integration issues in a country that was a member of the EU. 1 Russia had to send a network of saboteurs into Germany to ignite this catastrophe.
The political/propaganda subcategory of migration instrumentalization refers to the promotion of migration to increase legitimacy, reduce the political influence of the adversary or justify future actions (Başer 2022., pp. 178179.). “Political engineered migration” is also given the label “propaganda” by Başer because the organisers who use this variant use propaganda to increase regional and/or international legitimacy. There are numerous subcategories of this category, but one of the most used is the so-called “passportization” technique. Passportization is a technique whereby the organising country issues large numbers of passports to increase the number of its citizens, typically in contested regions, allowing a group of newly naturalised citizens to be used to legitimise various operations. Such was the case with Russia’s naturalisation campaign in the occupied eastern Ukraine, which allowed them to justify their full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 (Yale School of Public Health 2023). (The official state explanation of the invasion included, among other things, the cause of “Ukrainian airstrikes against Russian civilians in Donetsk”, which omitted that the Federation had previously effectively used the passportization technique on the local population. [Mackinnon 2021])
The Steger-Başer framework gives Greenhill’s taxonomy new and interesting dimensions,
although the validity of their three new categories – which seem to overlap with Greenhill’s original four subgroups – can be questioned scientifically. The use of migration to destabilize other governments for military objectives is an example of the fifth-column instrumentalization of migration, which is closely related to militarized engineered migration. Dispossessive engineered migration, which focuses on how governments employ migration to reduce the economic potential of other states, such as through the influx of cheap labour, is a subset of economic engineered migration. Greenhill’s taxonomy is primarily innovative in that it recognizes forceful engineered migration, which includes a range of scenarios that may concurrently fall into the other subgroups. Although any subgroup can be considered a subset of coercive engineered migration, this paradigm makes it easy to classify individual cases. Even with all its subgroups, political/ propaganda engineered migration does not have a clear enough basis to be distinguished from coercive engineered migration; rather, it should be understood within the coercive engineered migration subgroup.
A unique taxonomy for classifying the instrumentalization of migration was introduced by the Fakhry-Parkes-Rácz method (Fakhry et al., 2022b, p. 4). Four sub-groups were identified by this framework, which attempted to categorize cases according to the organizing entities: strong states (like Morocco), proxy states (like Belarus), weak states (like Ukraine), and non-state actors (like Libyan militias). This approach’s Eurocentric viewpoint, which focuses mostly on issues and solutions within the European Union, is a major drawback, too. This taxonomy helps recognize concerns that are specific to the EU, but it falls short in addressing the global character of migration’s instrumentalization, which allows for
1. The “Lisa Case ” is a made-up story about a Russian-German girl who was allegedly raped by Arab migrants. It exposes a concerted effort by Russian organizations to influence public opinion in Germany. This incident highlights Russia’s strategy of utilizing social media diffusion, media manipulation, and cooperation with right-wing political factions. It emphasizes how easily misinformation may spread throughout Germany, particularly when Chancellor Angela Merkel was in office. This has led to a great deal of political debate and attempts to lessen Russian influence in Germany (Meister 2016).
coercion to occur both inside and outside of the EU. To increase support for physical barriers, Hungary, for example, attempted to exert pressure on Western European governments by rapidly transporting undocumented migrants across borders (Aljazeera 2015). Furthermore, within this framework, it is difficult to interpret attempts to instrumentalize migration outside of the EU, as demonstrated by instances such as Papua New Guinea in 2011–2012 (World Bank 2023, p. 248), Haiti in 2004 (Buss 2013, pp. 4-6), and Nauru in 2004 (Dastyari 2015, pp. 669–672).
I also wish to draw attention to Nye’s particular viewpoint, which questions the systemic classification of instrumental migration (Nye 2004, pp. 12-32). Nye claims that it is difficult to classify instances of instrumental migration since they all lie on a spectrum between extremes of hard power and soft power. Nye presents an interesting point of view, but it is still important to approach every issue methodically using a framework so that preparation and analysis go smoothly. Because most players using instrumental migration take cues from earlier organizational tactics and adapt them into their toolbox, a methodical approach is necessary (e.g., as shown in the cooperation between Belarus and Russia inside the Union State). It is also critical to acknowledge that, like other facets of international relations, every instance of instrumentalizing migration is distinct, underscoring the need to recognize and comprehend these variations to conduct insightful analysis and provide appropriate responses.
Upon examining other ways to categorise, I have chosen to use Kelly M. Greenhill’s taxonomy going forward in my research. Greenhill’s methodology is notable for being the most meticulously designed and easily comprehensible framework. As a result, my main objective will be to thoroughly explain Greenhill’s initial four subgroups, giving a synopsis of their approaches, historical backgrounds, and practical applications.
Coercive engineered migration is a tactical approach in which migratory patterns are altered to obtain economic, military, or political benefits from the intended recipient (Greenhill 2010, pp. 12-74.). This type of instrumentalized migration, especially coercive engineered migration, shows how effective it can be in international relations by using actual or potential human migration to pressure the destination nation into changing its laws or making concessions in the political, economic, or military domains.
To effect a change in policy or behaviour within the targeted nation is the main goal of coercive engineered migration. From a strategic standpoint, the initiator uses the migration of people or the possibility of migration to exert pressure on the recipient country, in the form of political concessions. This method shares coercive characteristics with dispossessive, exportive, and militarized engineered migration, but it also sets itself apart from these other forms of instrumentalized migration.
International agreements and protocols that regulate refugees and migrants, as well as more general international legal frameworks, are the instruments utilized in this strategy. Among these are foundational texts like the 1951 Refugee Convention (United Nations 1951, Articles 4, 7, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25) and its 1967 Protocol (United Nations 1951, Articles 4, 7, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25), as well as the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948, Article 13). These frameworks outline the rules and values that control how refugees should be treated. The Refugee Convention protects refugee rights, including the crucial principle of non-refoulement, which forbids refugees from being expelled or returned to countries where they face serious risks due to factors like race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion (United Nations 1951, Article 33). These rights are highlighted, including the right to seek asylum in foreign countries.
Ironically, ratifying states unintentionally become more vulnerable because of these very international human rights standards, which increase the power of instrumentalizing migration. Targeted nations face a difficult paradox because of these norms and regulations. Respecting international law necessitates that the state protects the rights of migrants and refugees as specified in these accords, which may include making concessions to the state that organized the event. However, putting national interests – like border security – first could mean ignoring some of your human rights duties.
The strategic entrapment techniques inherent in the instrumentalization of migration are best illustrated by this situation. It limits the state’s ability to respond quickly in emergencies, creating a difficult moral and geopolitical conundrum: upholding international legal commitments or putting domestic interests first. The nation that is the target of coercive migration faces tremendous pressure to make complex decisions that necessitate weighing moral and legal obligations against geopolitical imperatives.
Coercive engineered migration is a sophisticated tactic that uses international legal frameworks to create a crisis in the country of interest. This strategy highlights the complex dynamics of utilizing migration as a tool of coercion, illustrating the interplay between geopolitical tactics, human rights considerations, and the complex field of international diplomacy.
Turkey’s policy since 2014, which has involved using Syrian migrants as leverage to force the EU to provide financial support, is an example of a coercive migration strategy (De Martin 2023). In a similar vein, Russia has used migration movements as political leverage along its borders with Finland, Norway, and Estonia in northern Europe. This strategy seeks to undermine the cooperation efforts of EU and NATO members by sowing mistrust among them and convincing Western states to loosen sanctions against Russia
(Fakhry et al. 2022b., p. 4).
The goal of dispossessive engineered migration is to acquire land, or appropriate property owned by another group, or drive out perceived threats – typically national or ethnic groups – from possessing that land or property (Başer 2022, pp. 174–175). The main objective is to take resources or desired land that is currently possessed by another country, entity, or ethnic group. Although this is not always the case, this strategy frequently involves ethnic cleansing, which is the expulsion of a community from a region because it poses a real or imagined political, ethnic, or economic threat.
Dispossessive engineered migration is one of the most common ways that migration is instrumentalized. Crucially, non-state actors such as the Islamic State (ISIS) serve as examples of how this tactic is not limited to state actors (Amnesty International 2014, pp. 8–17). In 2014, ISIS used ethnic cleansing to target Yazidis and other Sunni Muslim populations in Iraq, thereby instrumentalizing migration. Around a million individuals were forcibly relocated from the area at this time, demonstrating how non-state entities use this coercive technique to further their ideological and territorial goals.
The Israeli settlement enterprise in the West Bank, which began after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, is another relevant example of dispossessive engineered migration, which is different from ethnic cleansing (Lein 2002, pp. 11–37). Supported by the Israeli government, this strategy combines strong military actions to control the disputed region with tax breaks, aid for agriculture, and promotion of tourism. The goal of the dispossessive engineered migration of Jewish settlers is to alter the demographics of the West Bank by taking over agricultural territory.
Exportive engineered migration is a strategy that has two goals: it undermines targeted foreign governments and strengthens the organizer’s home
political position (Greenhill 2010, pp. 12-74.). This strategy involves driving out opponents or dissidents, inciting a strategic crisis for regime security, and trying to topple foreign governments. Using narratives of “opposition” or “anti-state,” governments that use exportive engineered migration frequently use these labels to consolidate control against dissenting groups. This strategy encourages foreign destabilization while simultaneously undermining the opposition’s political standing by inciting migrant flows.
The administrations in Sudan, Congo, and Zimbabwe have extensively used this tactic to bolster their power (Steger 2017, p. 29). Engineered migration is frequently used to reorganize domestic demographic trends during times of revolution. In these situations, governments plan the forcible removal of opponents or dissidents to undermine political rivals and influence demographic trends in their favour.
The manipulative function of the orchestrating actor is a key component of exportive engineered migration. This persona, who is frequently the head of state or government of the state that is organizing the event, presents themselves as a “saviour” and frames their intervention as a conceivable way to resolve the problem that they started. By manipulating the story, the organizer tries to show that they can bring things back to normal while neatly avoiding taking accountability for starting the issue. By highlighting the manipulative nature of exportive engineered migration and its effects on both internal and international dynamics, this method adds nuance to the coercive technique.
One example of this type of orchestrated migration is the forced return of Afghan refugees from Iran to Afghanistan (Steger 2017., pp. 29–30.). Iran periodically sent Afghan refugees back to their country after the Soviet invasion to sow discord and undermine the authority in Kabul. Central Asian states frequently used this tactic in the years following communism. Iran
brought this strategy back to life in 2007 to topple President Hamad Karzai’s government, which made it easier for NATO to maintain a permanent presence in Afghanistan. By controlling the refugee influx, Iran demonstrated its capacity to apply pressure on the Afghan government.
Militarized engineered migration is a strategy that is extensively used in armed conflicts to achieve both strategic advantage and disruption (Greenhill 2010, pp. 12-74). This type of instrumentalization takes the form of various tactics meant to create migration flows to obstruct enemy military operations or prevent military support for opposing troops.
A prominent variant of this tactic is the forced enlistment of people to support armed forces or the infiltration of terrorists into the targeted state through regular or irregular migration. When Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24M fighter bomber on its border with Syria in December 2015, it was a notorious example of militarized engineered migration (BBC 2015). As retaliation, Russia escalated its bombardment of Syrian areas close to the Turkish border, resulting in a fresh influx of migrants and undermining Ankara’s standing (Letsch et al. 2016). Another case in point is Thailand in the 1980s: amid the Cambodian conflict, Thailand took in a sizable influx of refugees and stationed them close to the border to prevent any potential spillover from the conflict in the neighbouring country (Greenhill 2008, pp. 9–10).
These deliberate migration tactics provide an example of the numerous ways in which migration can be controlled to accomplish military, political, or territorial goals. The examples given highlight the distinct strategies and objectives connected to each kind, highlighting the complexity of these kinds of strategic moves and their wider ramifications for international diplomacy. Greenhill’s position on militarized engineered migration is important to consider since it poses the question: is migration
considered militarized if it occurs during an open military conflict? Even in non-violent situations, the instrumentalization of migration may include violence or aggressiveness as crisis managers may face migrants or the target country’s border security authorities with great force. Managing migration frequently attempts to
deflect focus from military operations by inciting a conflict that would distract the target country. As a result, I suggest that the term “militarized engineered migration” be reinterpreted in the field of migration studies as “violent engineered migration,” so expanding the scope of this subcategory.
Engineered Migration Management in Belarus: Using the Greenhill Taxonomy
Classifying the Belarusian migration management program using the four categories that Greenhill proposed is the main objective of my research. According to my theory, it can be classified as such because President Lukashenka’s planned crisis complies with the characteristics, strategies, and instruments of both coercive and exportive engineering migration. To support this theory, I will carefully examine the characteristics that set each group apart and try to determine the underlying motivations for Belarus’s attempt to control migration. The goal of this analysis is to provide readers with a thorough grasp of how this planned migration attempt fits into the larger scheme of engineered migration techniques.
The migration dilemma in Belarus serves as a clear example of the characteristics of coercive engineered migration, a method in which migratory patterns are manipulated to achieve advantageous positions in politics, the military, or the economy. We can gain a clearer understanding of the purposeful planning behind the events taking place in the region by analysing this crisis through the prism of its three distinguishing features.
The first part deals with the manipulation of migratory paths. According to a Belsat investi-
gative report, President Aleksandr Lukashenka himself is actively involved in the state-sponsored migration route, which is organized by organizations like the state tourism corporation Tsentrkurort (Scieszyk 2021). The initiative began mostly with Kurdish cities in Iraq; waves of migrants arrived by flights from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, thanks to the efforts of Belarusian officials (Reality Check 2021). This operation was made possible by the active participation of national airline Belavia, travel agents, and officials from Belarus. According to reports, the state gave twelve travel businesses in Belarus unofficial permission to capitalize on the migrant inflow, highlighting the methodical and commercial aspects of the migration policy (Volkova 2021).
The second crucial requirement is that the organizing state’s ability to resolve this forced migration must depend on making sacrifices. Belarus’s aims are remarkably like those of coerced, engineered migration. It is primarily an intentional attempt to weaken the positions of nearby EU members (Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia), partly to put pressure on the EU and partly in reprisal for their acceptance of opposition figures and other political refugees from Belarus (Slunkin and Valodskaitė 2023). The crisis also serves to deflect
attention from domestic political issues in Belarus, such as the imprisonment of political prisoners (Viasna Human Rights Center 2024), the ratification of undemocratic constitutional amendments (European Commission for Democracy Through Law [Venice Commission] 2021, Article 81), and the continued strengthening of Belarus’s Union State Treaty integration with Russia in the face of the conflict that has been escalating in Ukraine since early 2022 (Dyner 2023). Belarus wants the Western sanctions to be loosened while simultaneously seeking to demoralize EU border protection services through artificial pressure on migration.
The utilization of human rights as a crisis weapon is the third crucial component. A moral conundrum facing Europe, because Belarus manipulated migration, is focused on the migrant population that is stuck at the border in the bitter cold without Schengen visas and unable to go back to Belarus (Valcárcel 2022). Belarus has utilized disinformation tactics to spread stories about the suffering endured by migrants, including fatalities from drowning in the Bug River or freezing to death in border forests (Żaryn 2021). Belarus has been using Russian and state-run media, as well as disinformation channels including social media sites VKontakte and Telegram, to spread misinformation and manipulated content (National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine n.d). The extensive distribution of information in several languages and sources, including RT’s Arabic-language news sites, contributes to the effectiveness of these disinformation campaigns (Gönczi 2023).
This complex policy of forced migration can be interpreted as a carefully planned geopolitical manoeuvre by Belarus. Through the manipulation of migration patterns, the pursuit of geopolitical objectives, and the exploitation of human rights vulnerabilities, the crisis is presented as a coercive tool used to extract concessions and alter the political landscape of the region. The way this issue is developing highlights how closely
migration, geopolitics, and human rights interact in today’s world.
Because the Belarusian attempt to orchestrate migration lacks the essential intention to take, occupy, or control territory or assets belonging to another group, it does not meet the criteria of dispossessive engineered migration. Upon examining this crisis from the prism of the characteristics that distinguish dispossessive engineered migration, it becomes evident that it is unlike any other crisis that falls into this category.
To hold and govern land or property that belongs to another group is a basic component of dispossessive engineered migration. There is no evidence of such an intention in the case of the migrant crisis in Belarus. The purpose of the planned migratory movements was to achieve geopolitical goals by coercive tactics, not to take any area or resource.
Ethnic cleansing, or the forced removal of ethnically diverse groups to create areas of ethnic homogeneity, is another feature of dispossessive engineered migration (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect n.d.). Even while the migratory issue in Belarus led to the expulsion of opposition politicians and activists, no attempt was made to ethnically cleanse any one community (Worsch 2023). Since the expulsions lacked an ethnic motivation, Belarus’s handling of controlled migration precludes any accusations of ethnic cleansing.
Targeted expulsion is one way to describe the deportation of opposition figures from Belarus; nevertheless, this does not meet the definition of ethnic cleansing, which usually entails violence, rapid expulsion, looting, arson, arrests, and oftentimes crimes against humanity motivated by ethnicity (e.g. genocide). Regarding the migration situation in Belarus, political considerations predominate over ethnic ones.
The treatment of migrants by Belarusian authorities has occasionally involved ethnic prejudice, although this behaviour does not amount to ethnic cleansing (Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 2022). This is partly because the migrants, who are mostly from the Middle East and North Africa, are not citizens of Belarus, an Eastern European nation, and the authorities actively assist in their passage. It is crucial to remember that Belarus has not been accused of ethnic cleansing because of its efforts to manage migration. Instead, any abuse that is noticed could be the result of racial prejudice (Amnesty International 2024).
In conclusion, the characteristics of dispossessive engineered migration are not present in the management of migration in Belarus. This crisis differs from the specific type of coercive approach targeted at territorial or ethnic redistribution in that it is not motivated by intentions of territorial or ethnic cleansing. Rather than being focused on goals related to ethnic or territorial reconfiguration, the Belarusian approach is motivated by geopolitical ambitions.
The characteristics of exportive engineered migration are present in the Belarusian attempt to control the flow of people, suggesting that the organizers hope to undermine other governments while also strengthening their domestic political position.
The goal of exportive engineered migration is to increase the orchestrator’s domestic political strength. Lukashenka strengthened his deteriorating internal political position by taking advantage of the migratory issue in Belarus. Due to several issues, notably the mishandling of the COVID-19 crisis (Krawatzek and Sasse 2021), economic hardships (Kłysiński 2023), and dwindling popular support for alignment with Russia (Kowal 2023), Lukashenka’s influence had diminished by 2021. The migrant crisis has served as a means of deflecting focus from domestic problems, resulting in a crisis perception that
demands a strong presence from the leadership.
The goal of this strategy also includes overthrowing foreign regimes. There is an implicit goal behind the Belarusian migrant problem, which is to weaken the political authority of some foreign governments, including those of Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. These regimes were represented through disinformation operations as transgressing human rights and European standards. Furthermore, public opinion in Belarus was shaped by the portrayal of NATO member states’ actions, such as their deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, as the main causes of the migrant crisis. This damaged the reputations of these countries, EU institutions, and their border security officials while sparking discussions about refugee reception in the targeted countries.
A further characteristic of exportive engineered migration is the demonization of a group to strengthen the organizer’s position of authority. The manipulation of migration in Belarus has resulted in the stigmatization of opposition groups, especially those connected to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the previous presidential candidate, by designating them as “foreign agents” (Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.org 2023). By stifling dissent and removing internal challenges to his dictatorship, this surge of arrests and indictments directed against opposition activists and politicians has strengthened Lukashenka’s position of authority.
One final feature is the organizer’s function as a “saviour.” From the beginning of the migratory crisis, Lukashenka has kept a distance from it and, despite copious evidence to the contrary, he has denied any role in its orchestration. He has been able to strategically use this to present himself as a hero and ask the European Union for financial support to oversee the situation that he caused. By using this strategy, Lukashenka has created a narrative in which he is shown as a responsible leader facing an unexpected obstacle while also subtly warning Western allies that if they do not
help, stranded migrants may be released and headed toward their borders (Smith 2021).
In conclusion, there are characteristics of the migration management system in Belarus that align with the general objectives and techniques of exportive engineered migration. It serves as a comprehensive plan to strengthen political authority at home, weaken foreign governments, crush opposition forces, and present Lukashenka as a saviour.
The characteristics of militarized engineered migration are not shared by the migration management strategy used in Belarus. I will go into more depth about the reasons why this management approach deviates from this subcategory’s characteristics below.
The link to military conflicts is the main characteristic of militarized engineered migration. There was never an open violent conflict resulting from the migration crisis in Belarus. Rather, it has functioned as a sort of hybrid warfare, combining elements of media warfare, lawfare, political warfare, and economic warfare (Bachmann 2021). Although there have been accusations of hybrid aggression and border tensions, there have not been any actual military conflicts between Belarus and other EU members.
Using migration as a tool to subvert or outmanoeuvre adversaries during armed engagements
is known as militarized engineered migration. Despite charges of hybrid aggression and border incidents involving Minsk, the situation surrounding the migration crisis in Belarus did not escalate into open warfare. Rather than relying on direct military action, the strategies used mostly focused on hybrid aspects including disinformation campaigns, controlled migratory patterns, and diplomatic pressures.
To summarise, the migration management experiment implemented in Belarus does not meet the primary requirement of being deployed in an armed conflict. As such, it cannot be classified as a kind of militarized engineered migration. Rather, it functions as a kind of hybrid warfare, utilizing a combination of economic, political, media, legal and informational tactics to accomplish its goals. It should be noted, nevertheless, that the Belarusian instance may fall under this categorization if militarized engineered migration is understood to involve aggressive behaviours that have the potential to escalate military conflict in addition to only occurring in armed conflicts. Distracting attention from military plans in Ukraine and using the fear of armed forces to manipulate migratory flows was one of the main goals of Belarusian migration management. Although the Belarusian situation does not fall inside the purview of militarized engineered migration according to the Greenhill paradigm, it does provide an interesting context for more thought.
Conclusion
n summary, my theory has been verified: the migration management experiment conducted by Belarus falls within the categories of exportive and coercive engineered migration. The Belarusian experiment, like all migration management plans, is categorized as coercive engineered migration in Greenhill’s taxonomy. Still, it mostly fits under this framework because of its unique exportive engineered migration features. The military aspects of Lukashenka’s experiment must be acknowledged, even though the Greenhill framework does not classify the Belaru-
sian example as militarized engineered migration. Less than a year before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian government implemented a migration management plan that actively involved its armed forces to drive migrants and worsen the situation. This was done to deflect NATO’s attention. Consequently, it may be said that the migration issue in Belarus, which started in 2021 and continued unresolved into 2022–2023, is a rare example of manufactured migration, falling into not one, but two different Greenhill categories on the spectrum.
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Author:
Róbert Gönczi graduated from the National University of Public Service in 2021 with a BA in international security and defense policy. He also completed the non-degree education program of the School of Social Sciences and History at Mathias Corvinus Collegium. He worked as a foreign policy reporter for news websites Neokohn and Mandiner. He was also employed at the Warsaw Institute in Warsaw, Poland. He served as Academic Vice President of the Security Policy College for over a year. He is currently studying for an MA in international studies at Corvinus University, Budapest while working as an analyst for Migration Research Institute.
