In 2021, some 2.3 million undocumented migrants landed in Europe from Asia and Africa. It was the first serious renewal of migration crisis since 2015. In 2022 and 2023, even more migrants arrived in Europe regardless of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that triggered one of the largest and fastest refugee movements in Europe. Consequently, EU institutions and nations took action to break the stalemate over unregulated migrant flows and the bloc’s migration policy as such. In June 2023, the EU Council voted by qualified majority to adopt a raft of decisions to address the EU migration crisis.
Most importantly, it introduced a fast-track border procedure that encompasses migrants who are least likely to be granted asylum. According to data from the European Commission, just 20 percent of undocumented migrants reaching the European Union are granted asylum 1. As part of the scheme, migrants are sent to detention-like centers. The fast-track border procedure was established to return non-EU migrants who had been denied asylum in any EU state. Moreover, the bloc agreed to add more states to the EU-wide list of “safe” countries where migrants could be returned. To stem migrant departures, the EU, notably Italy, addressed Tunisia, a departure point for thousands of migrants crossing the Mediterranean to Europe.
However, many origin countries simply refuse to take back their own nationals. Only 18.5 percent of people issued a return decision last year actually left 2 . The new border procedure is poised to slightly boost the EU’s efforts to send back irregular migrants.
The remaining elements of the scheme have been widely advocated by German diplomats. Under the new plan, the timeframe for migrants who fail to apply for asylum at the point of entry to the EU has been extended ––from 12 months up to three years. The authorities in Berlin could thus identify undocumented migrants in the country and then return them to Italy, Greece, Spain, Poland, or the Baltic States where they first crossed the EU’s external border. The solution favored most countries such as Germany and France as most migrants tend to reach these two––yet to the detriment of states in southern and eastern Europe.
What proved highly contentious was a new migrant relocation and settlement scheme. A voluntary relocation mechanism, promoted by France during its six-month presidency of the EU Council, was introduced in 2022. The mechanism works based on its 2015 version but now the scheme introduces some coercive measures to relocate migrants. Last year, the French EU pre-
N. Nielsen, EU creating new incentive for illegal pushbacks, Euobserver.com, June 15, 2023, https://euobserver.com/migration/157153 [accessed: July 27, 2023].
sidency attempted to get 10,000 pledges for a voluntary relocation plan. But only around 880 were relocated. France completed roughly 34 people from Spain and 75 from Cyprus––while zero from Italy and Greece 3
In 2023, a goal was to relocate 30,000 people every year––to be eventually upgraded to a target of 120,000 people. EU countries that refuse to host migrants or asylum seekers could be charged up to €20,000 a head. The €20,000 financial contribution for each migrant that a member state says it cannot host is a considerable sum of money––for instance, in 2022, Poland received just between €50 and €100 for each Ukrainian refugee who had arrived in the country. The charge per capita is
in fact a sanction for countries that cannot participate in the scheme. That is a tool of financial coercion––thus the scheme is not voluntary at all.
Poland and Hungary voted against the proposals, and four other countries abstained — Malta, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia 4 . In 2015, Western European states, notably Germany, triggered a scheme to relocate migrants landing in Europe fairly among all EU members and voted to launch the plan despite resistance from some Central European states. Voting in favor of the proposal could thus violate Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that calls for a common and unanimous policy aimed at treating economic migrants. 80
14, 2023, https://euobserver.com/migration/156922
percent of migrants from Asia and Africa do not seek asylum; they constitute a group of economic migrants in search of a better place to live.
The EU-wide compulsory relocation scheme refers to economic migrants so all EU states must reach a consensus within the Council of the European Union. However, the rule of unanimity was first violated in 2015 when a new EU-wide migrant resettlement scheme was triggered. The scheme sparked a great deal of controversy across the bloc whose members failed to implement it fully. One obvious shortcoming was that it did not live up to the expectations of countries on Europe’s migration frontline such as Italy and Greece or those EU members that constantly see the biggest migrant flows––like Germany and France. Nor did it address the root causes of undocumented migration from outside the bloc.
Surprisingly, the idea was revived in 2023. There are possible consequences still playing out for
EU nations, including a rise in Euroscepticism, diplomatic fallouts, and failed attempts to take measures about the migrant crisis. The EU’s centralized scheme once again proves to be an erroneous response to the crisis. As EU states no longer take unanimous decisions to address sensitive issues, they cannot operate smoothly as a bloc. Thus, Western European states are seeking to tackle the thorny issue to the detriment of Central European countries.
Failed efforts to handle the migration crisis inside the bloc have already sparked social discontent as well as a rise in Euroscepticism and support for far-right political parties. Mass immigration is often associated with increased terrorism and crime rate and thus deteriorates public safety. Social chasms appear as newly arrived migrant communities settle down in parallel enclaves and adhere to a distinct set of beliefs and values, often out of control of local authorities. That makes migrant communities highly vulnerable to im-
poverishment, social exclusion, and unemployment. They face violence and become prone to commit crimes and embrace religious militancy. One example is a wave of protests that France was rocked in late June and early July this year. Protesters have looted stores, lit thousands of cars and buildings on fire, attacked law enforcement agents and public officers as well as damaged public utility institutions. French riots have cost €1 billion in damage to businesses 5. Consequently, regular migrant flows into Europe could undermine political stability of the EU’s biggest members and the whole bloc. The consequences of the migrant crisis should no longer be downplayed.
There is one simple reason why the bloc is not efficient in tackling undocumented migration. The European Union does not want to or cannot safeguard its external borders. The European Commission would largely dismiss border walls, refusing to channel funds into building walls on the EU’s external borders. EU leaders in 2023 pledged funds to bolster cameras and personnel at the frontiers, but stopped short of directly funding wall-building 6. EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson criticized Greece for reportedly forcing migrants onto an emergency raft and abandoning them in the country’s territorial waters 7. Instead of tracking crimes and helping EU states combat undocumented migration, Frontex, an EU border agency, curbed the acti-
[accessed: July 27, 2023].
https://www.politico.eu/article/build-wall-
vities of border guards and served as a watchdog for human rights violations. Consequently, Greek officials denied cooperation with Frontex officers8
The EU has taken feigned action to handle the migrant crisis. One example was a migrant relocation scheme. Yet the mechanism is unable to adequately address the crisis and other issues in western and southern Europe. It is vital to stop mass movement of people from Asia and Africa into the European Union.
One example could be relocating an asylum procedure outside the European Union––to EU embassies or other facilities in some countries of Africa and the Middle East. Facing massive migrant pressure, EU nations shall be entitled to suspend their asylum procedures. One more solution is to introduce an asylum procedure ban for any person arriving in Europe illegally. Moreover, their family members of should not have the right to move to Europe. Another effort is to smash cross-border migrant smuggling rings. Criminal networks usually operate in EU countries so they could be dismantled by state authorities. The bloc and its nations could take tougher action to smash such rings outside it or sign relevant deals with some states in the Middle East and North Africa. Consequently, the European Commission announced two new “operational partnerships” with Morocco and Niger.
One more idea for the EU is to ban NGO ships from patrolling European shores and helping migrants arrive in the EU. Smuggling rings also take part in such operations. Any individual involved in helping undocumented migrants arriving in Europe should be punished––notably
if they are members of a migrant smuggling network.
Constrained by a set of common values and international commitments, the EU is not capable of reducing overall levels of migration. Consequently, the rights of migrants override those of EU nationals. That undermines the cornerstone of democracy––state authorities should respect the rights and will of their voters. Most EU residents seek to keep unwanted immigrants away from their countries. If this is what voters wish, state authorities should suspend or cease international commitments. That should be critical in an emergency amid soaring levels of irregular migration into EU states that eventually undermines public order.
One of the EU’s few actions to control migration flows is to start talks with neighboring states that host travel routes used by migrants. The EU usually grants billions in new funds to neighboring states to deal with migration. In 2015, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel gave her backing to an EU action plan aimed at encouraging Turkey to cooperate on tighter border controls 9. In 2023, the European Union was also considering providing more than €1 billion in aid for Tunisia to rescue state finances and deal with migration. The package also included €100 million to beef up Tunisia’s border patrol mechanisms, search and rescue capacities10. Eager to put a brake on migration flows, the EU is seeking to cooperate with Egypt and Morocco––as it in the past did in Libya. The EU’s policy of externalization in managing migration flows could work, albeit this has serious drawbacks. There is a clear indication that the Libyan coast guard is infil-
8. G. Sorgi, Greece to the EU: Come to help stop migrant boats before they get here, Politico, July 16, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/ article/3344121/ [accessed: July 27, 2023].
9. K. Strachota, M. Jaroszewicz, Unijny kryzys migracyjny: oferta dla Turcji, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, October 21, 2015, https://www.osw. waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-10-21/unijny-kryzys-migracyjny-oferta-dla-turcji [accessed: July 27, 2023].
10. G. Sorgi, J. Barigazzi, The EU has revealed its blueprint to curb migration, Politico, July 17, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/eutunisia-deal-blueprint-to-curb-migration-north-africa/ [accessed: July 27, 2023].
trated by criminal groups 11. EU assistance could consist in sealing the state’s borders. A more comprehensive solution is to deploy EU ships in the territorial waters of North African states to intercept smuggling boats and send them back to African shores.
The EU has failed to forge an effective migration and asylum policy that yet proved highly contentious. It is thus futile to further advocate a centralized migration policy. A debatable solution is the EU-wide compulsory relocation scheme that serves as a tool of financial coercion. Migration policy should be the responsibility of state authorities, not the EU as a bloc. The EU should thus comply with the principle of subsidiarity and help its nations seal the borders to reduce irregular migration.
The ongoing migration crisis could also send shockwaves to some state authorities who eagerly absorb economic migrants from non-European states. A rise in irregular migration could pose a major threat to all actors, not just an overwhelmed EU state.
AUTHOR: Tomasz Grzegorz GrosseTomasz G. Grosse is a sociologist, political scientist and historian. He is a professor at the University of Warsaw. Head of Department of European Union Policies at the Institute of European Studies. He specializes in the analysis of economic policies in the EU and the Member States, as well as in public management, geo-economics, Europeanisation, EU theoretical thoughts. He recently published: “Postcrises Europe” (The Polish Institute of International Affairs) “Searching geo-economics in Europe” (Polish Academy of Science, 2014) and edited the books: “European Union Policies at the Time of Crisis” (Scholar 2016) and “The Aspects of a Crisis” (with M. Cichocki, Natolin European Centre 2016).
The opinions given and the positions held in materials in the Special Report solely reflect the views of authors.
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