The Issue of Engaging the Global South in an Effort to Form a Global Consensus Against Russia

— SPECIAL REPORT —

2023/10/25

THE ISSUE OF ENGAGING THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN AN EFFORT TO FORM A GLOBAL CONSENSUS AGAINST RUSSIA BENJAMIN BARDOS

THE ISSUE OF ENGAGING THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN AN EFFORT TO FORM A GLOBAL CONSENSUS AGAINST RUSSIA

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The global south To understand the issues at hand, it has to be understood why it is inherently so difficult to address the elements of this problem. Prior to the unjustified Russian invasion of Ukraine, the global south was plagued with food insecurity, political instability and general economic difficulties. This raises a constant tug of war in between the multipolar world leaders and contenders of the US, EU, Russia, India, and China. Now

more than ever it is important to recognize that the global south “[is] not black and white”, says Dymtro Kuleba1, and that more needs to be done.

Furthermore, the problems in engaging the global south are acutely visible in UN voting patterns, at the onset of the war 35 countries abstained and 5 voted against condemnation, now it stands at 7 voting against and 32 abstaining2.

1. https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2023/07/31/behind-the-global-souths-hesitancy-to-criticize-russias-invasion-of-ukraine 2. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/24/un-ukraine-resolution-vote-countries/

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Key issues Key areas of this debate have surrounded the following areas, and will be looked into accordingly, food, political and economic support, and disinformation. These are key areas which the Russian federation through means of hybrid warfare and political interference exploit to hinder the formation of a global consensus. Additionally, there are cases as well where due to simply the distance some countries have from

the war the problems stemming from Russians invasion of Ukraine are not questions of morality or principles, but rather see the problems in more of a transactional manner. Additionally, separate from the activates of Russia, is the issue of engaging India and China. In either case the west will to devisee new approaches in order to achieve a consensus against Russia in the global south.

Food security The issue surrounding food security requires a little more understanding, as the Black Sea Grain Deal (“BSGD”) did directly physically alleviate food demand in the global south and specifically the MENA region but rather, and more importantly, helped to calm the markets 3and lower the price of food albeit it is at still very high levels says a late 2022 report by the Leibniz Information Center for Economics. Additionally, a rise in fertilizer prices also made the food security situation more difficult, but a trend in rising prices for fertilizers preceded the outbreak of the war. However, the fact remains that through simple manipulation of supply and demand Russia in a very crude and cold, yet effective manner, can directly influence market prices

and thus sway pro-western support in the global south. This problem will continue to persist until the west decides decisively on the matter, more importantly, the problems in engaging the global south are not stand-alone issues, they feed into each other and exasperate negative implications for the wests ambitions in forming a consensus against Russia. Existing concerns are only further exacerbated with the breakdown of the BSGD and Russia’s systematic targeting of Ukrainian port infrastructure, aimed and cutting the country’s ability to export food in the first place.

This resulted in a 1.3% increase in Food Price Index4, still not comparable to the price levels of July 2022, but it shows the precarious position at which the global food market currently is in.

3. https://www.intereconomics.eu/pdf-download/year/2022/number/3/article/the-war-in-ukraine-agricultural-trade-and-risks-to-global-foodsecurity.html 4. https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2023/08/04/business/fao-global-food-prices-grain-deal/index.html

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Moreover, any attempt at reviving the BSGD in a manner that would calm global markets and solve food security concerns of the global south in a reliable would need to meet the Russia demands5, asking for numerous concessions from the West with regards to sanctions. Even more so it would need Russia as a willing partner, for which there has yet to be any indication thereof 6. Regardless

of the approach, if the West intends to consolidate support in the global south against Russia, curbing food inflation whether by increasing supply through an agreement with Russia or by raising domestic production for export, must happen as without it Russia can continue to weaponize hunger.

Political instability Political instability has been a key characteristic of the global south readily exploited by the Russian federation and its proxies such as Wagner Group 7 in both the physical and information domains. A key region in Africa rampant with instability is the Sahel region, which currently is where the ECOWAS dispute regarding a coup in Niger is taking place which has recently sought for support from Wagner Group 8 as it faces the threat of intervention. Although, with the reported death of Pirgozhin, Utkin and many more leaders within Wagner 9, its activities and any future commitments are in doubt and internal tensions within Russia are on the rise.

Russia seeks to capitalize on this instability in the region by opening a host of new embassies10 to fill

the void left by the French. Moreover, a worrying case is Mali, which has voiced support for the military Junta in Niger 11 and at the same time has changed its position in the UN from initially abstaining in condemnation against Russia, to now voting against it12. Likewise in North Africa in Libya and in the middle east in Syria. Albeit an interesting exception is South Africa, which until the Wagner mutiny in Russia was actively examining legal routes to facilitate Putin’s visit in spite of the standing ICC arrest warrant against him. Furthermore, key Latin American and Caribbean states such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, of which the latter allowed in 2022 the deployment of Russian military forces and is the other country in the UN which has

5. https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/20/what-was-the-black-sea-grain-deal-and-why-did-it-collapse 6. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-says-signals-russia-prepared-return-black-sea-grain-deal-talks-2023-08-01/ 7. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa?amp 8. https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0 9. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/presumed-death-prigozhin-removes-one-problem-may-create-new-ones-putin-2023-08-24/ 10. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/russia-moves-to-fill-void-left-by-france-in-west-africa-4340352?view=htmlamp 11. https://www.africanews.com/amp/2023/08/08/mali-burkina-faso-sends-delegation-to-niger-in-solidarity/ 12. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/24/un-ukraine-resolution-vote-countries/

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changed its vote in the UN from abstaining to coting against condemning Russia in 2023 13.

Brazil and Bolivia, although claiming neutrality are also important partners for Russia, especially Argentina which has now been invited to join BRICS 14. Nevertheless, political instability is a factor that the Russians aim to and have already in the last exploited to further their foreign policy objectives.

Many nations in the global south echo South Africa’s position towards the war in Ukraine in their neutrality towards Russia under the logic

that an emergence of a new multilateral world might get them “more control on the global stage” 15. This underlines the importance of a renewed global south strategy that must contain constructive dialogue from regional partners in the creation of a new approach. Therefore, it is imperative for the west to develop a solution catering to regional politics to address these problems by engaging in constructive dialogue and acknowledgment of mutual strategic interests to foster good will cooperation.

13. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/24/un-ukraine-resolution-vote-countries/ 14. https://www.politico.eu/article/brics-summit-south-africa-six-new-countries-join-alliance/amp/ 15. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/features/2023/6/2/a-russian-love-affair-why-south-africa-stays-neutral-on-war

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DILOK KLAISATAPORN, SHUTTERSTOCK

Russian malignin aid Russian loan forgiveness and a masked altruistic approach of the Russian federation has allowed Russia to solidify political support in key states in the global south. The effect of the loan forgiving done by the Russians, albeit to the tune of 23 billion USD 16, alone does not make for a particularly influential factor, however, paired with disinformation and weapon used elements of food security, it becomes a potent tool at political coercion. It has sought to exploit political turbulence from financial instability, which in some cases even directly stems from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. However, there is another perspective to examine, IMF loans recently have become very high interest loans for African countries due to

the strength of the dollar, in which oil importers pay or borrow, squeezing low-income countries17.

Moreover, after COVID and economic slowdowns debt repayment of IMF loans conditions are very strict forcing public programs such as education and health to be cut to afford repayment. Already 17 out 41 African countries who took COVID-19 loans are already in debt distress or run a high risk of it18.

Importantly loan forgiveness is merely a tool, but it plays into the grander scheme of economic pressuring, manipulation, and entrapment.

Moscow will continue to utilize such hybrid manners to consolidate an opposition against

16. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/07/russia-writes-off-23bn-debt-for-africa-putin/amp/ 17. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/01/africa-debt-crisis-yellen-georgieva-imf/ 18. https://peoplesdispatch.org/2022/06/23/imf-loans-continue-to-undermine-health-in-africa/

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the west, and it will do so until the west can and is willing to present a viable alternative to the African states, and in a grander meaning the global south. This goes to show than in the absence of tangible western proposals in the most vulnerable countries of Africa will and does allow for Russian influence to proliferate 19, exponen-

tially complicating the challenges of forming a consensus against Russia in the global south. Any actions taken to counter Russian influence have to also encompass long-term plans to foster and facilitate the interests of partners in the global south.

India and China India despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has capitalized on Russia’s battered economy by buying cheap Russian oil and gas. Although in a study by the Jamestown foundation20 steep discounts have recently shrunk from around 30 USD to 40 USD per barrel, according to estimates India still saved around 7.17 billion USD by purchasing Russian energy at a significant discount compared to traditional middle eastern sellers such as Saudi Arabia. Instead, year on year, Indian imports from 2022 of Russian oil amounted to 16.5% while in 2023 it sits around 40%21. More importantly is how India has started to pay for Russian oil in the Yuan denomination. The situation is similar energy wise for China for whom Russia is now the biggest crude oil supplier22 equally in Yuan denomination. The shift from the dollar is notable as Yuan based transaction favor Moscow

as it has been frozen out of the dollar and euro financial networks23. However, the cases of India and China are different to that of any other global south state, due to their sheer economic power the favorable terms offered by Moscow for trade are not ones soon to be replaced by western alternatives. Although, currently India is only an economic partner with Russia, it should be the collective west’s objective to keep it that way and preserve India’s ‘strategic ambivalence’ 24.

The same cannot be said about China. The CCP has been seen to allow sale of dual use technologies and possibly military 25 equipment to Russia, therefore, the engagement of China in a consensus against Russia for now is out of the question but should rather look at minimizing the amount and extent to China facilitates or actively aides Russia’s war effort.

19. https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/vulnerable-african-states-continue-to-cut-deals-with-sanctioned-russia-4327416 20. https://jamestown.org/program/india-losing-its-steep-discount-on-russian-crude-oil/#:~:text=The%20discount%20enjoyed%20by%20India,to%20remain%20higher%20than%20normal 21. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/india-refiners-start-yuan-payments-russian-oil-imports-sources-2023-07-03/#:~:text=India’s%20imports%20from%20Russia%20rose,from%20Iraq%20and%20Saudi%20Arabia.

22. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-oil-commodities-import-russia-2023-05-11/ 23. https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/vast-china-russia-resources-trade-shifts-yuan-dollars-ukraine-fallout-2023-05-11/ 24. https://abcnews.go.com/amp/Politics/india-remaining-neutral-russias-invasion-ukraine/story?id=97891228 25. https://amp.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/apr/14/china-agreed-secretly-arm-russia-leaked-pentagon-documents-reveal

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BRICS With the newly invited members to BRICS 26; Argentina, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, Iran and Egypt starting their membership on January 1st, 2024, it begs the question how their membership influences their attitude towards Russia.

Currently with the new expansion BRICS+ will have under its territory, according to statistics27, 29% of the world economy and 46% of the world population, importantly, BRICS+ will now have consolidated a major part of the world’s energy supply with its expansion in the middle east,

amounting to some 43% with the new members.

Interestingly, the simultaneous invitation of Saudi Arabia and Iran poses the question of what this will mean for their rivalry. In any case, expansion of BRICS and its economic area and its aim to reshape global governance into a multipolar world order should be acutely observed by western policy makers and should serve as motivation for engaging the global south on meaningful mutual interests to be able to show that there is an alternative to BRICS alignment.

Russian disinformation Russian disinformation ties together all aforesaid factors as through intense implementation of state sponsored propaganda all positive events stemming from Russian inf luence cement Russian influence in these regions and states.

It is important to recognize the significance of Russian disinformation as not doing so runs the risk of potentially helpful actions working against western objectives. Yet again dismantling the decades old, soviet inherited 28, Russian intelligence, influence, and coercion apparatuses in the global south will take time and the recognition

of some uncomfortable facts about the current reality. Namely, that Russian disinformation taps into long held anti-west frustrations 29. It will probably pose one of the most significant challenges, especially changing how receptive people in various states in the global are to Russia disinformation due to them capitalizing on existing grievances against the west and amplifying them.

Namely, concerns as such 30, western hypocrisy with to aid to Ukraine in the amount of assistance and its care for Ukrainian refugees compared to cases in Africa and Africa’s more conservative

26. https://www.politico.eu/article/brics-summit-south-africa-six-new-countries-join-alliance/amp/ 27. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-brics-expansion-in-4-charts/ 28. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/global-south-united-states/ 29. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/global-south-united-states/ 30. https://ecdpm.org/work/russias-war-propaganda-disinformation-recentring-african-agency

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attitude has left a lot of grievances with the west’s progressive agenda whereas, Russia is seen as a more suitable partner due to their conservativism.

Moreover, The way in which Russia typically conducts information warfare can be categorized under the Gerasimov doctrine 31, however, financial constraints following sanctions against Russia has limited the growth or spread of disinformation into new countries 32 and has instead transformed into “Firehose of Falsehood” 33 coined by a report done by the RAND Corporation, wnder which Russian disinformation aims to engage through “high number of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disse-

minate partial truths or outright fictions”. These means become effective due to they’re sheer quantity as African countries lack clear legislation34 on cybercrimes and clear definitions of disinformation. However programs like LEXOTA, are a clear first-step towards addressing Russian disinformation by allowing for analysis on government responses to online disinformation.

Additionally, financial aid like the 120 million USD to counter disinformation 35 is a good start to erode Russian influence, however, any effort should aim to incorporate diplomatic discussion on joint coordination in tackling disinformation.

A new approach Difficulty arises for western nations in engaging the global south due to the comprehensive, deliberate, and systematic efforts of the Russian federation to undermine western influence. Therefore, any attempt at trying to engage the global south in an effort to form a consensus against Russia has to address institutional misunderstandings in the west’s approach to the global south. First and foremost, is the mentality the surrounds the issues arising for global south states from the war in Ukraine which is predominantly transactional. Moreover, rekindling sentiments from the 1961 non-alignment movement (NAM) must be

avoided as African states have voiced that they do not wish to be drawn into a proxy war 36, meaning any engagement must follow national interests of cooperating countries instead of being led by western interests to ensure willing cooperation. Therefore, when addressing any element of Russian influence, the solution for it in the interest of forming a consensus against Russia, should not be attempted to be sold on western ideological merits or fixations. Instead, it will require significant work and research on regional interests, even more so constructive dialogue, to be able to develop mutual strategic interests to the

31. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20220720/115002/HHRG-117-FA07-Wstate-MartenK-20220720.pdf 32. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20220720/115002/HHRG-117-FA07-Wstate-MartenK-20220720.pdf 33. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE198/RAND_PE198.pdf 34. https://ecdpm.org/work/russias-war-propaganda-disinformation-recentring-african-agency 35. https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/policy-responses/disinformation-and-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-37186bde/ 36. https://www.chronicle.co.zw/africa-must-not-be-drawn-into-proxy-wars-vp-chiwenga/amp/

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detriment of Russian influence. Moreover, highlighted by the BRICS expansion, countries are willing to approach and align with direct competitors of western institutions when the collective west fails to engage and work together with the global south, therefore, there is a time constraint on the west to act as countries will consider other

geopolitical alignments in pursue of their best national interests. Overall, changing institutional positions and perspectives in the west towards the global south will require significant political and financial capital but failure to do so runs a bigger risk in the long-term than the short-term costs of combating Russian influence.

Autor: Benjamin Bardos Benjamin Bardos is a core writer in the Transatlantic Perspectives journal at European Horizons, focusing on transatlantic security and defense issues. Furthermore, he is currently doing an L.L.M degree of Global law at Tilburg University. He is also apart of the Hungarian Youth Atlantic Association, focusing on NATO military policy and European security architecture.

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