The Warsaw Institute Review qr. 3/ 2022 by Warsaw Institute

qr. 3. 2022 no. 22 ISSN 2543-9839 A New NATO Strategic Concept

issue also includes a thread related to the growing tensions between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Professor Salvatore Babones from the University of Sydney told us about his view on the geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific and Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. In the latest issue you will also read a more in-depth analysis of Taiwan's technological importance to the World.

Dear Readers,

Editorial 33/2022

Observing the integrated response of the Free World countries to the developments on the front line in Ukraine, we decided to analyze in detail the latest NATO plans. Our experts took a closer look at the issues related to the latest military prospects of the Russian Federation, and also indicated the directions of actions of the Three Seas countries in the face of Russia's criminal invasion of TheUkraine.latest

Iam proud to present you the third issue of The Warsaw Institute Review quarterly. The latest edition of our magazine comprehensively discusses the most important geopolitical events of recent months.

Jan TheEditor-in-ChiefHernikWarsawInstitute

I wish you a pleasant read!

Publisher Warsaw Institute Wilcza 9, 00-538 Warsaw, ISSNHeritageMinistryofofbetheWarsawheldThewww.warsawinstitute.orgwww.warsawinstitute.reviewPolandopinionsgivenandthepositionsinthematerialspublishedintheInstituteReviewsolelyreflectviewsoftheauthorsandcannotequatedwiththeofficialpositiontheMinistryofForeignAffairstheRepublicofPolandandofCultureandNationaloftheRepublicofPoland.2543-9839

I believe that the diverse range of topics will make each of our readers find something interesting in this issue.

Review

ReviewInstituteWarsawThe

Editor-in-Chief Jan jan.hernik@warsawinstitute.orgHernik Translations Aleksandra Iskra Aleksandra Tomaszewska DTP and Printing www.sindruk.pl

Editorial The Warsaw Institute Review4

The Warsaw Institute Review Warsaw, Poland

Rafał Zgorzelski, PhD

Szymon Polewka

American Foreign Policy

A New NATO Strategic Concept

The Importance of the Świnoujście LNG Terminal in Light of the Energy Crisis in Europe

Poland Is Not A Place For Innovation

Eufracio

Transpacific Tech Rift: From Trade War to Chips War? Taiwan Is Now at the Heart of the Semiconductor Industry amidst the U.S.–China Trade War

enerGY CrIsIs In eUroPe

Jan ProfessorHernikSalvatore Babones

Russian hypersonic weapon - an ace up Putin’s sleeve

American Foreign Policy

Challenges in the Face of Growing Tensions in the Pacific

tHree seas InItIatIve

IntervIew

Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress: the Analysis of the Legal Answer for Mass Shootings in the United States

Challenges in the Face of Growing Tensions in the Pacific

armaments

InternatIonal relatIons

Us PolItICs

PolIsH teCHnoloGY

armaments

relatInternatIonalIons

Mirosław Rogalewicz

Three Seas Initiative: Towards Common Security and Economy

Russian hypersonic weaponan ace up Putin’s sleeve

Szymon Polewka

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3/2022 5 CONTENTS

IntervIew Professor Salvatore Babones

Benedek Sipocz

Katja-Elisabeth Herrmann

Mariusz Patey

Mirosław Rogalewicz

A New NATO Strategic Concept

Jan Hernik

Its member states are bound together by common values: individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. NATO states pledged to fulfill three core tasks:

In the preface to its newest white paper, NATO allies listed the bloc’s core purposes and principles. It says that NATO is deter mined to safeguard the freedom and security of allies, with its key purpose and greatest responsibility to ensure collective defense against all threats from all directions. NATO allies said they would strengthen the alliance based on indivisible security, solidarity, and ironclad commitment to defend each other.1

NATO leaders met in Madrid

The Warsaw Institute Review International Relations 6

Mirosław Rogalewicz

1 NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, p. 3. https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/[online]

A NEW NATO CSTRATEgICONCEPT

nato’s PU r P oses and P r I n CIP les

on June 29-30, 2022 where they adopted a new strategic concept, the bloc’s major guiding document. In the paper, NATO states ensured the bloc’s enduring ability to guarantee the defense and security of all members. What the Western military bloc identified as top threats were Chinese activities, Russia’s aggressive policy, terrorism, crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and threats that countries of the Middle East, Africa as well as North Korea might represent to the defense alliance and its nations. The paper also emphasizes the cross-cutting importance of investing in technological innovation.

deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, cooperative security.

The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept 1991. [online] concept-2010-eng.pdffl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-2010,Members54texts_23847.htmhttps://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_TheAlliance’sStrategicConcept1999.[online]https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htmStrategicConceptfortheDefenceandSecurityoftheoftheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization,p.16.[online]https://www.nato.int/nato_static_

integrity. In its post-Cold War era white pa pers, NATO claimed unlikely a conventional attack targeting any member state. The new document shows a novel approach to Rus sia that NATO had seen as its partner till 2014. The 1991 defense white paper outlined continuous efforts to cooperate with former Soviet states, including Russia.3 A similar approach was echoed in the 1999 and 2010 editions.4 5

The 2022 guiding paper says Russia seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct

rUssIa as a major seCU r It Y tHreat

The alliance’s guiding document pinpointed continuous efforts to individual and col lective resilience and to integrate climate change and technological advantage into the bloc’s core tasks.

Russia is the most significant and direct threat to security and peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, according to the white paper.2 The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that con tributed to a stable and predictable Europe an security order, as the guiding document further stated. Interestingly, NATO allies do not discount the possibility of an attack against the bloc’s sovereignty and territorial

2 Ibidem, p. 4.

3/2022 7 A New NATO Strategic Concept © Source: Flickr

The Warsaw Institute Review International Relations 8

Chinese disinformation campaigns are also another threat to the alliance and its members. The document’s Paragraph 13 outlines the Chinese threat, saying that its [Chinese] “malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security.”8 Beijing, the document reads, strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. Chinese au

8mgly.pdfpl/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Sledz_Ostry_cien_https://wnpism.uw.edu.NATO2022StrategicConcept,p.5.

These were amplified as soon as the Co vid-19 pandemic broke out. As early as in December 2019 when some first Covid-19 infections were reported in Wuhan, the au thorities in Beijing systematically prevented a transparent and thorough investigation into the outbreak, which delayed efforts to contain its further spread across the globe.6 China then stepped up a campaign to de flect theories that the novel coronavirus originated from China by suggesting the pandemic started on U.S. soil. As soon as the disease began, China spread rumors that U.S. soldiers had unleashed the virus in Wuhan while the U.S. government had con cealed the real scale of the pandemic within U.S.

The new NATO strategic concept says China might be another threat to collective security, saying Chinese ambitions and co ercive policies challenge allied interests and values. Beijing, the document says, employs a broad range of political, economic, and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy or intentions. The paper sets out the alliance’s concerns over Chinese Fordisinformation.China,asit is for Russia, disinforma tion efforts are essential to its foreign policy.

a different strategy in Europe, seeking to promote common interests7 amid cooperation schemes between Beijing and some European states. China sought to boost its popularity ratings in European countries, also through regular medical sup plies to Europe. Chinese officials spread an erroneous message saying the country had overcome the outbreak, thus blaming other countries for new waves of Covid amid their irresponsible containment policies.

7 P. Śledź, Ostry cień mgły: antyzachodnia dezinformacja ze strony Chin i Rosji w związku z pandemią COVID-19, Rocznik Strategiczny 2020/2021, p. 394. [online]

6 A. Legucka, M. Przychodniak, Dezinformacja Chin i Rosji w trakcie pandemii COVID-19, PISM, 2020.

control through coercion and subversion while using an array of conventional, cyber, and hybrid means to target NATO states. The Kremlin’s coercive military posture, rhetoric and proven willingness to use force to pursue its political goals undermine the rules-based international order. According to the document, Russia is upgrading its nuclear forces and expanding its novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems, while employing coercive nuclear signaling to destabilize countries in the east and south. Moscow’s military build-up, including in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Sea regions, challenges the bloc’s security and

not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia, the document reads. The bloc’s member states pledged to respond to Russian threats and hostile ac tions in a united and responsible way while strengthening deterrence and defense for all allies. Importantly, in light of its hostile policies and actions, NATO states can no longer consider the Russian Federation to be their partner. Notwithstanding that, NATO allies remain willing to keep open channels of communication with Moscow to man age and mitigate risks, prevent escalation, and increase transparency. NATO, however, seeks stability and predictability in the EuroAtlantic area and between the bloc and the Russian Federation.

Chinaborders.applied

NATOinterests.does

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“A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,” according to Paragraph 25 of NATO Strategic Concept. NATO attaches great importance to cyber threats.

NATO also fears close ties between Russia and China.

CY berse CU r It Y and new te CH nolo GI es

The European Union is a unique and es sential partner for NATO, according to the military bloc’s guiding document. NATO recognizes the value of a stronger and more capable European defense that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to the bloc.9 The doc ument sets out some plans to boost NATOEU partnership and dialogue on the ground of their common purposes and interests. Theseimpactresilience,militaryinclude:mobility,ofclimate

thorities seek to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains.

change on security, emerging and disruptive technologies, Ibidem, p. 10.

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Cyber space is contested at all times, NATO’s strategic concept says. Malign actors seek to degrade critical infrastructure, interfere with government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property and impede the bloc’s military activities. Strategic competi tors and potential adversaries are investing in technologies that could restrict the al liance’s access and freedom to operate in space, degrade its space capabilities, target civilian and military infrastructure, as well as impair its defense. Emerging and disrup tive technologies bring both opportunities and risks. They are altering the character of conflict, acquiring greater strategic impor tance, and becoming key arenas of global competition. That is why NATO leaders pledged to expedite its digital transforma tion, adapt the NATO Command Structure for the information age and enhance their cyber defenses, networks, and infrastructure.

NATO and the EU started cooperating in the late 20th century. In 1999 the European Union formed what is known as the Com mon Security and Defense Policy that was the bloc’s course of action in the fields of defense and crisis management.10 Between December 2002 and March 2003, NATO and the EU negotiated a package of agree ments named Berlin Plus following the Joint NATO-EU Declaration of December 16, 2002.11 The document set out the capac

10 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced the present name—the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).11EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 2002. texts_19544.htmhttps://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_[online]

ity to conduct EU-led military operations, stressing equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO.12 Those were extended by the Berlin Plus agreement. It has been only recently that the EU and NATO forged closer ties. Within the objec tives set in the July 2016 joint declaration, the EU and NATO leaders agreed to boost cooperation in various domains, expanded further in 2017.13 In July 2018, NATO and the EU adopted a new declaration, in which the two blocs aimed for swift and demon strable progress in military mobility, coun ter-terrorism, cyber threats, and promoting the women peace and security agenda.14 Furthermore, NATO and the EU teamed up to fight hybrid threats in the Helsinkibased new European Center of Excellence (CoE) for Countering Hybrid Threats.15

12 NATO, The NATO-EU strategic partnership, 2004, pp.3–4. [online] https://www.nato.int/docu/ comm/2004/06- istanbul/press-kit/006.pdf

13 EU-NATO Cooperation. [online] press-releases/2018/07/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration/[online]nato-cooperation/consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/defence-security/eu-https://www.14JointdeclarationonEU-NATOcooperation,2018.https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/15A.Hagelstam, Współpraca przeciwko zagrożeniom hybrydowym, NATO Review, 2018. [online] https://

Initiatives to increase defense spending and develop coherent, mutually reinforc ing capabilities, while avoiding unnecessary duplications, are key to NATO and EU joint efforts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer, according to the document.

The Warsaw Institute Review10 human Women,security,Peace,and Security agenda, countering cyber and hybrid threats, challenges that China represents to EuroAtlantic security.

Con C lU s I ons

Mikołaj Rogalewicz

The bloc’s deterrence and defense capa bilities, the document reads, consist in unrestricted access to cyber space. NATO could soon use available tools to enhance its cyber capabilities to accurately identify and neutralize threats. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO secretary general, said during a signing cer emony at the close of the alliance’s Madrid Summit the first-of-its-kind fund will invest €1 billion in startups and deep-tech funds, also to promote AI solutions. Investing in cutting-edge technologies is key to retaining military

3/2022 11

In its recent guiding paper, NATO shifted its threats that now pertain to the Russian inva sion of Ukraine. The document identifies Russian and Chinese cyber threats, which are of utmost concern for the defense bloc.

Accordingadvantage.tothedocument,

portunities to boost deterrence and defense capabilities, both conventional and nuclear.

the EU is a key partner of the alliance and the two blocs will extend their cooperation. These also share common values and face comparable threats and challenges. Most NATO allies are EU member nations. Both blocs have enormous potential for cooperation, which should be encouraged notably for combatting hybrid threats.

In its post-Cold War era guiding documents, NATO allies identified as top threats ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, state dissolution, crises outside the bloc, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc tion, terrorism, and uncontrolled migration schemes. They also remained committed to cooperating with Russia. The Madrid docu ment says Moscow can no longer be the bloc’s partner.

In its recent strategic concept, NATO says it reevaluated its 1997 founding act with Rus sia, in which these two did not consider each other as adversaries and pledged to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. The deal has long been applied to curb the bloc’s presence along its eastern flank. With the alliance’s new stance on Russia, the paper offers some fresh index.htmlwspolpraca-przeciwko-zagrozeniom-hybrydowym/www.nato.int/docu/review/pl/articles/2018/11/23/op

September 2022 © Source: Wikimedia Commons

ARMAMENTS The Warsaw Institute Review12

uP PuTIN’S SlEEvE

The ongoing intensification of hostilities in Ukraine since 24 February 2022 is changing our postCold view of the world. One of the most significant changes occurred related to the perceptions of the combat capabilities of the Russian army. Before the full-scale invasion, some analysts assumed that the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, would be overrun in hours if Russia set that as an objective.1 Reality has shown that despite its status as the world’s second army, the Russian Federation is unable to achieve a decisive advantage over Ukraine. However,

Despite the recent dominance of the United States, the modern security system is still a remnant of the Cold War nuclear balance. Understanding this, Russia has been successively working on a new type of hypersonic weapon. The introduction of a new type of “invincible” intercontinental hypersonic missile2 and its test in 2018,3

Szymon Polewka

despite all this, the Russian Federation has recently developed a new hypersonic technology that poses a viable threat to the West.

1 Mike Eckel, How Long Could Ukraine Hold Out Against A New Russian Invasion?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 17, 2021: scenarios/31614428.htmlhttps://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-invasion-

WEAPONHRuSSIANyPERSONIC-AN ACE

“National pride is at stake”

w ea P on of tomorrow

2 Vladimir Putin: Russia boasts new missiles in state of the union address, Deutsche Welle, address/a-42780312boasts-new-missiles-in-state-of-the-union-https://www.dw.com/en/vladimir-putin-russia-01.03.2018:3Russiatest-fireshypersonicKinzhalmissile,

combined with the use of the Kinzhal missile (Kh-47M2) in Ukraine on 18 of March 2022,4 set a date for a new ongoing arms race. Currently, multiple countries are trying to develop hypersonic weapons, describing them as „game changers”, but only Russia has successfully launched and used hypersonic missile attacks against a target.

Commons

Hypersonic aero-ballistic are dropped from an aircraft, accelerated to hypersonic speed using a rocket and then follow a ballistic trajectory.6

Deutsche Welle, 11.03.2018: 4missile/a-42929754dw.com/en/russia-test-fires-hypersonic-kinzhal-https://www.IainBoyd,Howhypersonicmissilesworkand the unique threats they pose – an aerospace engineer explains, The Conversation, April 15, 2022 aerospace-engineer-explains-180836missiles-work-and-the-unique-threats-they-pose-an-https://theconversation.com/how-hypersonic-

Russian hypersonic weapon - an ace up Putin’s

sleeve.©Source:Wikimedia

Theremissiles.are three main categories of hypersonic weapons:

wH at I s a HYP erson IC wea P on?

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Hypersonic weapons are described as weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound) and are highly manoeuvrable and able to change

course during a flight. They differ from ballistic missiles, which can also travel at hypersonic speeds but have set trajectories and limited manoeuvrability.5 The new hypersonic weapons are able to fly much higher than slower subsonic missiles but much lower than intercontinental ballistic

5 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Updated July 20, 2022 https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ 6R45811.pdfIainBoyd, op. cit.

The main face of Russia’s hypersonic programme that took world’s attention after the attack on 18 March 2022 in Ukraine, is the rocket called Kinzhal (rus. dagger). Kinzhal is a nuclear capable manoeuvring air-launched ballistic missile based on Iskander structure. The weapon is designed to be carried on an aircraft MiG-31 (1 missile) or strategic bomber Tu-22M3 (4 missiles). Russian reports that Kinzhal’s top speed is Mach 10 (3430 m / s), with a range of up to 1,200 miles (2000 km) when launched

In addition to Kinzhal, Russia is developing two other types of hypersonic weapons. First, Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), with an “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”. Tested in April 2022 and scheduled to be

Figure 1: Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Updated July 20, 2022: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf

Hypersonic glide vehicles (Hgv) are launched from a rocket before separating and gliding to the target.

8 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, op. cit. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ 9R45811.pdfBradLendon, What to know about hypersonic missiles fired by Russia at Ukraine, CNN, Updated May 10, 2022: intl-hnk/index.htmleurope/biden-russia-hypersonic-missiles-explainer-https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/22/

rU ss I an HYP erson IC wea P ons

7 https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf

from the MiG-31. The Kinzhal is capable of manoeuvrable flight, as well as of striking both ground and naval targets.8 The missile is especially designed to target U. S. and NATO warships and aircraft, posing a threat to the strategic missile system in Russia’s European part. Furthermore, it is capable to overcome and destroy NATO defence systems, such as MIM- 104 PATRIOT, THAAD or AEGIS COMBAT SYSTEM. The weapon can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads. Joe Biden in March 2022 described it as „a consequential weapon... it’s almost impossible to stop it. There’s a reason they’re using it.”9

Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines or “scramjets”.7Themostsignificant advantages of hypersonic weapons are their speed and manoeuvrability, which make potential missile detection possible only in the final phase of flight.

ARMAMENTS The Warsaw Institute Review14

14 Shannon McDonald, Defense spending act makes hypersonic a top priority, calling for billions in investment, Cnbc, Dec 29 2021: missile-this-week-sources-2022-07-13/defense/us-successfully-tested-lockheed-hypersonic-2022:Lockheedpriority-calls-for-investing-billions.htmlcom/2021/12/29/defense-act-makes-hypersonic-top-https://www.cnbc.15MikeStone,U.S.successfullytestspairofhypersonicmissiles,Reuters,July14,https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-

Introduction of hypersonic weapons drastically reduces the time to travel between the US and Russia. Several disarmament agreements such as SALT I, SALT II or NEW START guaranteed that the potential conventional nuclear missile from the Russian/USSR would reach the United States in approximately 30 minutes.12 These 30 mins assured both sides sufficient time to detect hostile action and potentially respond. Moreover, this fragile nuclear construction used to keep both sides in check by not allowing global conflict to erupt even at the most sensitive moments. Erosion of the postCold War security system combined with a reduction of the missile flight makes the risk of a potential nuclear attack more likely than ever. Using a new type of hypersonic weapon can reduce the time of reach of Russian nuclear hypersonic missiles to about 10-15 minutes.13 In addition, for the moment, there is no

10 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, op. cit. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ R45811.pdf11IsabelVan Brugen, Putin to Give Navy Hypersonic Missiles as Russia Beats U.S. in Arms Race, cruise-missiles/weapons-uk-australia-russia-ukraine-what-they-are-https://fortune.com/2022/04/06/us-hypersonic-Here’sAustralia,developinghttps://www.state.gov/new-start/hypersonic-missiles-zircon-1725426https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russian-navy-7/18/22:12NewSTARTTreaty,U.S.Departmentofstate13RoxanaTiron,TheU.S.justannounceditwashypersonicweaponswiththeU.K.andandRussiasaysitusedtheminUkraine.whattheyare,fortune,April6,2022

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Cat CHI n G UP

sIG n I f ICant of HYP erson IC wea P ons

Russian hypersonic weapon - an ace up Putin’s sleeve.

deployed by the end of 2022, Avangard is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Furthermore, Russia is developing a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile called Tsirkon, which can travel at speeds between Mach 6 and Mach 8 with a distance up to 625 miles. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of striking both ground and naval targets.10 The Russians sources say that the weapon will become operational by the end of 2022.11

adequate defence system capable of stopping a hypersonic missile. The speed of these weapons increases the precariousness of the situation because the time for any diplomatic solution would be reduced severely.

tH e new I nternat I onal order

Knowing the strategic advantage Russia has gained, the West, led by the United States, is pouring huge sums into its own hypersonic programmes. Starting in 2021, the United States is set to spend $770 billion on hypersonic research and development, making them a top priority.14 Hypersonic technology has been known since around 1980. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the advent of the “End of History” caused the United States to no longer consider hypersonic technology a priority, resulting in a drastic cut in funding for the programme. Despite all this, the United States is catching up at a rapid pace. On 13 July 2022, the U.S. successfully tested two Lockheed Martin Corp hypersonic missiles.15 This event brings the West closer to achieving full operational capability in hypersonic technology. Additionally, the United States is trying to develop an effective defence system against hypersonic. These measures aim to erode the recent Russian advantage that has developed and bring Russia and China to the table to work out new security mechanisms.

Some analysts believe that civilian casualties will decrease with the development of precision hypersonic

Szymon Polewka 2022

September

weapons. They acknowledge that using precise and expensive tactical weapons should manifest in using them to neutralise militarily strategic targets. However, knowing the nature of the war that the Russian Federation is waging, it is safe to say that Russia will not hesitate to use these weapons against civilians. The Russians, knowing their weaknesses, base their war doctrine on fear and suffering. These are consistent actions carried out in Chechnya, Syria, of which Ukraine is the latest instalment. The threat posed by hypersonic weapons is particularly important because hypersonic weapons can carry nuclear warheads and are able to bypass all current anti-missile defence systems. All of this makes the possibility of a potential nuclear attack more likely

than ever. It is also worth mentioning that the present Russian Federation is very different from the Soviet Union, which was a collective dictatorship, unlike the tsarist authority that Putin has now.

The rapid development of hypersonic weapons is an event without parallel since the Cold War, marking the beginning of a new arms race. The hypersonic race, combined with the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, sets a date for a new global rivalry taking the shape Cold War of the 2nd generation.

ARMAMENTS The Warsaw Institute Review16

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The aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows how crucial it is for nations located between Russia and Germany to team up. Despite some discrepancies that are rooted in history and should not drift into oblivion as they still influence people living between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas, now the priority is their common interests..

Rafał Zgorzelski, PhD

ETINITIATIvE:OWARDSCOMMONSECuRITyANDCONOMy

THREE SEAS

he past thirty years have unlocked a great potential in Central European countries that have achieved so much in such a short period. Notwithstanding some flaws, the region has undergone a successful transformation, or a serious challenge after the decades-long and Soviet-imposed communist regime. Yet paradoxically, nations of Central Europe resist ideology-tainted efforts to rebuild the world, as urged by the Western leftwing milieu. The painful experience of communism must have created a climate of Meanwhile,skepticism.the

region’s economic growth could bring to mind that of Asian tigers in the second half of the

20th century. Three Seas nations have shown how much good they can do once managed on their own. Living standards have risen while their crime rate dropped, compared to other European countries. But nations of Central Europe still lag behind their Western European peers while no effort should be spared to clear a backlog.

Three Seas Initiative The Warsaw Institute Review18

What binds most is common security. Once Russia seized Ukraine’s Crimea and part of Donbas in 2014, some states that fell intimidated by the authoritarian imperialism of the Kremlin vowed closer cooperation. One example of this could be the Bucharest Nine group of eastern flank NATO allies. Coordinated efforts and a

Source:

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Although political and economic, the Three Seas Initiative matters for security along NATO’s eastern wing. Diversified energy supplies and their unrestricted transport now matter more than ever before. Digital infrastructure can boost cyber security levels. No effective deterrence or—worse enough—defense is possible without the proper infrastructure to move troops quickly. Although much has changed, railway connections and seaports will continue to serve their purposes, as the war in Ukraine has shown.

Three Seas Initiative: Towards Common Security and

common stance at the NATO summit allow them to articulate their years-long fear of Russia. The U.S.-backed Three Seas Initiative was established back then to make Central European nations independent of Russian-sourced energy. What came to light was that the lack of energy link was only part of the problem as countries at the same time struggled with patchy transport and digital infrastructure. With decades-long dependence on other states, there was a delay in constructing relevant links running from north to south and between the region’s most important cities. The twelve-member Three Seas Initiative is seeking to foster energy, transport, and digital infrastructure to bring together all states. This should

exploit the untapped potential and offer fresh opportunities for economic, social, and political partnerships.

Economy

The Three Seas Initiative comprising twelve EU states should remain open to a whole range of countries. These include the United States and Germany, the former greatly involved since the inception of the forum than the latter. Another country that evinces interest in forging ties with the Three Seas Initiative is Greece. New infrastructure facilities matter for the Western Balkans. But given economic ties and efforts to counter the Russian threat, it is worth envisaging a cooperation platform between the Three Seas Initiative and Nordic countries––Finland, Sweden, and

Weefficient.areat

AnotherNorway. country that might contribute to the Three Seas Initiative is Ukraine, a non-EU state. The Three Seas Initiative member states have granted Ukraine participating partner status to the group, which makes it possible for Kyiv to participate in their projects. When Ukraine is added to the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and new investments are made in standard-gauge tracks, Three Seas nations could think to integrate adjacent countries, notably Ukraine. Not only would this create more efficient railway links between the Polish Baltic Sea port of Gdańsk and the Black Sea ports in Ukraine, Romania,

Western unity could stop the aggressive Russian policy and thus Moscow is so willing to fuel existing chasms or spark new ones. Indeed, there are differences and no one should overlook this mere fact. What resumes the rift is how Three Seas nations have reacted to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Three Seas nations cannot neglect the pressure that Brussels exerts on them in such fields as climate policy or their domestic affairs, which are competencies remaining with these countries. Just as introducing the euro as a monetary unit had distinct consequences for some member states,

a different point now, though. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine goes on; no one knows whether it ends and for whom it would be victorious. What mattered was a multi-layer scheme of support that Western countries threw to Ukraine as soon as the latter was invaded by Russia. Meanwhile, some countries perceive security differently. At the Three Seas summit in Sofia last year, it was clear that the Biden administration restrained its participation, somewhat giving more space to Germany. Nonetheless, as Washington and Berlin follow distinct policies while some eastern NATO members doubt whether as to the German stance, the U.S. administration is again likely to become the number one partner of the Three Seas Initiative.

and Bulgaria. Furthermore, Three Seas nations could gain rapid and convenient access to Greek ports and Turkey. How crucial Black Sea ports are was evidenced by the recent Three Seas investment in the Bulgarian port of Burgas. But to use them properly one needs efficient links, notably by rail. Inviting Ukraine into Three Seas infrastructure projects could boost the region’s economy, making them far more

Three Seas Initiative The Warsaw Institute Review20

One example of an infrastructure project to enhance connectivity is Rail Baltica, an railway infrastructure project now under construction to link Poland and the Baltic States with Finland. What Central Europe needs is Rail Carpatia, a railway link that could alter connections within Three Seas countries from Poland in the north and Bulgaria in the south, also invite others, including non-EU Western Balkan nations. Such infrastructure projects matter economically and militarily to encourage mobility along the eastern flank of NATO.

Three

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Seas Initiative: Towards Common Security and Economy

Are Three Seas nations unanimous? Of course not—it is clear for such various countries that reveal distinct pursuits and conditions. One example could be how Hungary responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is key to agree on

Rafał Zgorzelski, PhD September 2022

sometimes putting them into an uneasy financial situation, the same is now the case of the ideology-tinted climate policy. Those most concerned could be Three Seas nations, including Poland, to consolidate the dependent-development model, widespread in this region. Three Seas nations value highly sovereignty and independence thus being wary of EU-promoted federalist tendencies. This is an important area where cooperation would bring real value.

strategic projects despite differences, seeking to offer solid support while remembering some members could remain hesitant about some ideas. The dynamic political landscape favors closer ties between states running along an axis from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Seas. Now it is just time to push such initiatives as that of the Three Seas. If Three Seas countries do not learn to achieve common goals, Central Europe will yet again depend on its strong neighbors, losing the chance for a better future.

security. The second pillar is European integration, which meant joining the European Union (EU) and deepening ties with its member states. The last of such pillars is the focus of Poland on its eastern neighborhood. As the war in Ukraine is demonstrating or the orchestrated migration crisis at the Belarusian border has shown, the eastern neighborhood offers the most significant challenge and danger to Polish security. Ultimately, the three pillars complement one another and are applied simultaneously. Accompanying the three pillars of Polish foreign and security policy is the matter of energy security, which means having reliable, affordable, and sufficient levels of energy to sustain the economy and households.

Benedek

prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union Poland was formally sovereign, being a satellite state meant its economic and foreign policy was actually controlled by the Soviet Union. The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 meant Poland could finally decide the fate of its geopolitical orientation. Since 1989, Polish foreign policy has had three main pillars. The first one is navigating towards and deepening transatlantic relations embodied in the relationship with the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States of America. The principal foundation of this pillar is maintaining the commitment of the United States towards European, and thus, Polish

ASipoczlthough

Energy Crisis In Europe The Warsaw Institute Review22

T HE I MPORTANCE OF THE ŚWINOu JŚCIE l Ng T ERMINA l IN lIgHT OF THE E NERgy CRISIS IN Eu ROPE

3/2022 23 The Importance of the Świnoujście LNG Terminal in Light of the Energy Crisis in

©EuropeSource:Wikimedia

the Russian Federation convinced governments that getting gas from other importers was unnecessary. It was only in 2005, with the signing of a contract for the building of the Nord Stream Pipeline by German and Russian companies that Poland’s energy security policy changed. 2 The signing of the contract for the North Stream project threatened Polish interests and plans. First of all, the Nord Stream pipeline directly connected Russia with Germany, thus bypassing transit countries like Poland. This not only deprived Poland of transit fees but also planted an idea of uncertainty over scenarios if the Yamal Pipeline were to be placed offline for some reason.

Commons

Stemming from historical consequences and the strive to decrease dependence on Russian energy, namely natural gas, the first of such ambitions was born in 1990.1 It was during these years that the first concept of building a terminal on the Polish coast for receiving liquefied natural gas (LNG) was prepared. The idea was to be able to receive nonRussian gas and thus diversify gas supplies. The slowing down of economic growth, however, meant that the plan was ultimately postponed. The fulfillment of the Yamal contract with

1 Kamola–Cieślik, Małgorzata. “LNG Terminal in Świnoujście as an Element of Poland’s Energy Security.” Polish Political Science Yearbook 44, no. 1 (2015): 268–82. https://doi.org/10.15804/ ppsy2015018

wHY b UI ld an ln G term I nal?

2 Ibidem.

AtŚwinoujście.thesame

time, in 2005–2006, there was a gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which saw the halting of gas deliveries to customers in the EU, including Poland as well. The conflict erupted over payments for deliveries, as well as the diverting of gas that was meant to be supplied to Europe. It became clear that Russia is willing to use energy as a geopolitical tool. It was because of the high dependence on Russian gas imports, accompanied by the concerns caused by the signing of a contract for the construction of the Nord Stream Pipeline and the effort to prevent future cutting of deliveries that Poland was given a wake-up call about its energy security. Therefore, it is for such reasons that Poland decided in 2005 to restart the planning of a project to build an LNG terminal on its coast. The goal was to decrease Poland’s dependence on gas imported from Russia by increasing the imports of non-Russian gas. Poland has formally decided to build an LNG Terminal.

Energy Crisis In Europe The Warsaw Institute Review24

a terminal. This meant planning and overseeing the implementation of such plans. PGNiG had to decide between Gdansk and Świnoujście as the location of the terminal. In the end, the decision fell on the latter as tanker ships would need to travel less, meaning the cost of travel is lower. In addition to the strategic importance of building the LNG terminal, the government also set out to secure long-term LNG supplies. In 2009 a long-term gas deal was signed with Qatar, agreeing to 1.5 billion m³ of deliveries for 20 years that begin in 2014. Since then, Poland has been consistently receiving deliveries from Qatar, receiving a symbolic 100th delivery in May 2022. 3 Poland has also signed long-term gas deal contracts with American companies, such as Sempra Energy or Venture Global LNG. The total value signed by US companies currently stands at around 9 billion m³.

a bo U t t H e Św I no U j ŚCI e ln G t erm I nal

In the summer of 2006, Poland’s government commissioned PGNiG, the national gas and oil corporation, to build

Second, the underwater pipeline endangered, at the time hypothetical, plans to interconnect Poland with Denmark for the ability to purchase Norwegian gas. Despite postponing earlier plans to diversify away from Russian gas, the idea of executing the plan has not been discarded. The newly built pipeline by Germany and Russia meant that building a new pipeline between Poland and Denmark would need to take into account additional matters. And, ultimately, the pipeline also decreased the safety of navigation to and from the ports in Szczecin and

Poland consumes more than 20 billion m³ of natural gas yearly.4 The consumption of natural gas is expected to increase further year on due to the growing demand caused by economic growth, and the energy consumed during the transition from nonrenewable sources, such as coal. Of the 20 billion m³, 4 billion m³ is from Poland’s own domestic production of natural gas. 5 Until the end of April 2022, about 10 billion m³ of natural gas was imported from the Russian Federation through the Yamal Pipeline. The remaining amount was transported through the Świnoujście LNG Terminal. The growing demand for natural gas means Poland is upgrading the 3 54swinoujscie/of-lng-for-pgnig-from-qatar-has-arrived-in-https://www.polandatsea.com/the-100th-shipment-https://www.forum-energii.eu/en/dane-o-energetyce/za-rok-2021https://www.iea.org/articles/poland-natural-gas-security-policy

In April 2022, after refusing to pay for the import of gas in Rubles, the Russian Federation suspended gas deliveries to Poland through the Yamal pipeline. The next month, Poland invalidated the agreement, which is set to officially expire at the end of 2022. The Yamal contract was first signed in 1993 and was renewed afterward. As energy analyst Maciej Zaniewicz at The Polish Institute of International Affairs notes, the Yamal contract was Poland’s worst energy deal ever. 8 First of all, the contract prohibited Poland from re-exporting the gas, thus making it harder to coordinate energetically with countries in the region. Second of all, the price of gas was linked to that of oil, meaning Poland did not pay a market price for the raw material resulting at times in costlier deliveries. Following the withdrawal 8 koniec-kontraktu-jamalskiego/https://dziennikzwiazkowy.com/warsaw-institute/©Source:Wikimedia

3/2022 25

The Importance of the Świnoujście LNG Terminal in Light of the Energy Crisis in Europe

Commons

capacities of the terminal in Świnoujście, as well as investing in new ones. Today, the terminal can handle 6.2 billion m³ of gas yearly. The amount is going to increase to 8.3 billion m³ once the expansion of the terminal is finished at the beginning of 2023. Furthermore, Poland is planning the construction of a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) terminal near Gdansk on the Baltic Sea. The terminal will be able to unload, process, regasify and store natural gas. 6 The terminal was initially planned to have a yearly capacity of 6.1 billion m³, however, Polish Minister of Climate and Environment Anna Moskwa stated the amount was doubled due to high demand from neighboring states such as the Czech Republic and 76Slovakia.7https://www.gaz-system.pl/en/transmission-system/investment-projects/fsru-terminal.htmlhttps://www.offshore-energy.biz/poland-to-build-2nd-fsru-due-to-czech-and-slovak-demand/

Overall, PGNiG will have 8 such tankers at its disposal, with two of the vessels entering service in 2023. 2024 will see the delivery of another two carries and in 2025 the remaining four. Since the contracts for LNG shipments from the 12 polands-first-gas-tankers-to-enter-service-next-year/https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/07/27/

on the other hand, are rising. As the Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 estimates, the LNG market will expand, thus its imports will increase, as well as its overall share in gas usage.10 For example, in May 2022 Poland imported a record quantity of LNG through its terminal in Świnoujście.11 Complementary to the strategic development of the LNG terminals, to further increase the amount imported, but also to secure 9 poland-to-buy-spot-gas-once-gazprom-contract-endshttps://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2253551-10https://www.gov.pl/attachment/62a054de-0a3d-444d-a969-90a89502df94#:~:text=Poland%20sets%20a%20national%20target,in%20almost%20the%20entire%20economy.11https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/pgnig-rekord-dostaw-lng-do-terminalu-w-swinoujsciu/newsGroupId/10184

Energy Crisis In Europe The Warsaw Institute Review26

shipments, Poland has also ordered gas tankers (LNG carriers). These tankers will be chartered by PGNiG from Knutsen OAS Shipping and the Maran Gas Maritime shipping companies.12

from the contract, Anna Moskwa emphasized the action does not affect exports to Germany via the same pipeline. Poland’s decision to leave the contract only a few months before the official termination period has not come as a surprise, as the country already indicated in 2019 that it has no plans to renew the contract after its expiry. Instead, Poland will replace and import the amount from Norway via the Baltic Pipe. The pipeline connects Norway with Poland via Denmark and will come into service in October 2022. Once operational, the pipeline will transport 10 billion m³ to Poland each year, replacing the quantity previously imported via the Yamal pipeline.9 The LNG Terminal in Świnoujście and the Baltic Pipe, as well as the FSRU unit being built in Gdansk, contribute to Poland’s ability to diversify imports of natural gas, thus decreasing dependence on Russian gas. In fact, with the halting of gas deliveries through the Yamal pipeline to Poland, the country is not importing any more raw materials from LNGRussia.imports,

3/2022 27

Europe© Source: Twitter

Świnoujście

The Importance of the LNG Terminal in Light of the Energy Crisis in

By having more gas suppliers and investing in infrastructure for its delivery, Poland ultimately reduces the likelihood of major disruptions in the 13 bring-gas-to-poland-expands/https://www.polandatsea.com/us-lng-terminal-to-

United States are FOB (free on board), PGNiG will be able to decide whether to resell the imported gas or transport it home upon receiving it.13

wH at does t H e ln G term I nal Św I no U j ŚCI e mean for Poland?

case of a reduction in one of its imports. In other words, by having various suppliers, Poland is creating a safety net for its energy security should there be a cut in one of them. As the global energy crisis rages, especially in Europe, many countries are rushing to find alternative natural gas supplies to increase imports to fill gas storage for the winter. For example, if Poland had not diversified its suppliers in time, the halting of gas deliveries from Russia via the Yamal pipeline would have hurt Poland significantly more. The elimination of

Energy Crisis In Europe The Warsaw Institute Review28

dependence on Russian gas also means Poland is free from any blackmail over the halting of deliveries. This gives Polish diplomacy a bigger weight, a better position at the table, as well as more room to maneuver in its foreign

to reducing dependence on Russian gas and decreasing threats of gas shortages, the LNG terminal in Świnoujście also allows Poland to emerge as a regional gas hub. This essentially means that Poland will have a crucial role in the distribution of gas to neighboring states, contributing to efforts to decrease or even phase the import of Russian gas. To achieve becoming such a hub in the region, Poland needs to further increase the capacity of the terminal in Świnoujście. Ultimately, the more capacity that LNG Poland can provide, the larger its role in the region. All of the above also means that Poland is a driving force in the REPowerEU plan of the EU, which seeks to end the dependence on Russian fossil fuels while working towards the EU’s climate goals.

wH at does t H e ln G term I nal Św I no U j ŚCI e mean for t H e re GI on?

One of the prominent projects to increase interconnectivity is the construction of the Poland – Slovakia Gas Interconnector. Once operational - which is scheduled for the second part of 2022 - the interconnector will have a capacity of 4.7 billion m³ per year towards Slovakia, and 5.7 billion m³ towards Poland.14 The interconnector is significant, as it will not only be one of the backbones of the North-South axis

Being the region’s sole port of this capacity, the terminal in Świnoujście, and later in Gdansk, will be able to increase the energy security of neighboring states as well. The latter is important for various reasons. First of all, it allows neighboring states to import LNG, or regasified gas, from Poland, thus diversifying their supply of gas. Second, by enhancing energy cooperation with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, one of the most prominent goals of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) can be achieved. This energy cooperation ultimately

focuses on reducing dependency on Russian gas. This means through the deliveries and reselling of non-Russian gas to neighboring states, Poland is playing a key role in contributing to the diversification of gas supplies. The collaborative effort that the 3SI seeks to create is a North-South Gas Corridor that aims to link the gas pipelines in the region, from the LNG terminal in Świnoujście to the one in Krk, Croatia. The creation of a new axis not only aims to decrease the dependence on the East-West axis which has created and symbolizes the reliance on Russian gas but also increases the interconnectedness of the CEE region. Today, the countries in the CEE region are much less interconnected than their western allies. Increasing interconnectivity in the CEE region, not only in energy but also in transportation and economy, means that the region’s development will also be less dependent on the development of allies in the West. To interconnectivityincreaseinthe CEE region, Poland is working on the development of interconnectors with the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Slovakia. The goal is to create the ability to distribute excess gas to immediate neighbors.

14 Poland,cubic%20metres%20per%20year%20inhtml#:~:text=The%20aim%20of%20the%20projects/pl-sk-interconnector/pl-sk-interconnector.network-development/incremental-capacity-https://www.eustream.sk/en/transparency/

s lovak I a

Inpolicy.addition

but will also reduce Slovakia’s dependence on Russian gas. Being one of the most dependent on raw materials from Russia, the pipeline gives Slovakia a great opportunity to diversify the import of gas. The latter also means that Poland’s role in doing so increases.

The Importance of the Świnoujście LNG Terminal in Light of the Energy Crisis in Europe

lIt HUan I a

The gas interconnectivity between Poland and Lithuania, the GIPL, started operating in May 2022. Prior to the completion of the pipeline, the three Baltic states and Finland were not part of the EU’s gas transmission system. This essentially meant that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland could only import natural gas from Russia, resulting in high dependence. With the completion of the GIPL, Lithuania, along with the other Baltic states and Finland, is now an integral part of the EU’s gas market through interconnected pipelines. This allows the aforementioned countries to

appeal-81210energy-independence-boosts-lithuanias-fdi-https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/news/

Con C lU s I ons

Cze CH r e PU blIC

Benedek Sipocz September 2022

The so-called Stork projects, the CzechPolish interconnectors are another set of ambitious plans. The first Stork project was finalized in 2011 when the CzechPolish interconnector officially became operational. The project was a big step toward creating the North-South gas corridor and increasing the energy security of the respective countries. However, talks have been stalling for years about Stork II, which intends to further increase interconnectivity between the two states. In April 2022, Poland and the Czech Republic agreed to restart previously stalled negotiations on building the Stork II gas pipeline. The Czech Republic also expressed its interest in securing capacity in the Świnoujście terminal or the FSRU unit being built in Gdansk. Securing imports from either would contribute significantly to the diversification of Czech gas imports.

3/2022 29

diversify their gas imports, thus decreasing their dependence on Russian gas and increasing energy security. Lithuania, for example, has fully stopped importing gas from Russia in April 2022 and is instead satisfying all of its gas consumption through LNG imports to its terminal in Klaipeda. The GIPL can further strengthen the energy independence of Lithuania, as any delayed LNG shipment can be replaced. Since becoming independent of Russian gas, the number of Foreign Direct Investments in the country has risen.15

The strategic decision to construct and expand the Świnoujście LNG terminal is starting to pay off for Poland. On the one hand, it serves as a crucial lifeline since the halting of the gas supplies from Russia and helps to achieve the longtime aspiration of becoming independent from Russian gas. This increased Poland’s energy security and gave its foreign policy the ability to navigate without fear of being blackmailed over the stoppage of deliveries. Second, the terminal made Poland the backbone of the EU’s REPowerEU initiative by contributing to the effort of neighboring states to diversify gas supplies. The Świnoujście LNG terminal is therefore the gateway for Poland for increasing energy security and becoming a regional gas hub. The work, however, is far from over.

Interview The Warsaw Institute Review30

Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei in August 2022 contributed to a stir in relations between Washington and Beijing. China has organized the largest military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait in years, and the United States, as Joe Biden said at the QUAD summit in Tokyo, is ready to provide military response to the island in the event of a full-scale conflict being unleashed by the Xi Jinping regime. Jan Hernik, editor-in-chief of The Warsaw Institute Review, talked with Professor Salvatore Babones from the University of Sydney about Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, the prospects for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the foreign policy of Joe Biden's administration and his predictions for the 2022 midterm election in the US.

Jan Hernik’s Interview with Professor Salvatore Babones (University of Sydney)

A MERICAN FOREIgN POl IC y CHA ll ENgES IN THE FACE OF gROWINg T ENSIONS IN THE PACIFIC

m an Y P eo P le t H o UGH t t H at It m IGH t be somew H at of a be GI nn I n G of a ser I o U s C onflIC t between t H e Un Ited s tates and C HI na, and t H e I r relat I ons HIP G ett I n G I nto a more ser I o U s PH ase. I wanted to ask Yo U

Professor Salvatore Babones: First, China made it an important event in U.S.–China relations. I do not think it is an important event. Nancy Pelosi is a legislator, not part of the executive branch, and although she is a Democrat, she has no formal role in the Biden administration. I think that from a diplomatic standpoint, her visit should not have been seen as

something particularly noteworthy by the Chinese government. This government is notoriously prickly, and anything can be considered as compromising its sovereignty. That is why China made a very big fuss about this visit. However, I do not think we should necessarily accept China’s anger at face value. Perhaps we should be a little more skeptical because, frankly, Beijing claims that virtually anything that any country does, of which it disapproves, is some kind of provocation to World War 3 – and that is simply not the case.

American Foreign Policy Challenges in the Face of Growing Tensions in the Pacific

jan Hern I k: o n tU esdaY, aUGU st 2, 2022, U. s . Ho U se of r e P resentat I ves sP eaker n an CY Pelos I arr I ved I n ta I wan. tHI s I s an I m P ortant event I n t H e C ontext of t H e on G o I n G r I valrY between t H e U. s . and C HI na I n t H e Indo-PaCI f IC and b e Ij I n G maY GI ve a to UGH res P onse to It. How do Yo U assess H er de CI s I on to v I s It t HI s P laC e, and H ow w I ll all t HI s affe C t ta I wan?

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Interview The Warsaw Institute Review32

We should remember that there were some 30 years of martial law and wide terror under the KMT government in Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek.

abo U t ta I wan be CaU se t H e P eo P le of formosa are mostlY of Han-C HI nese H er ItaG e. tHI s means t H at t H e Y H ave a stron G CU lt U ral baC kG ro U nd I n C HI na. wHY do Yo U t HI nk t H at des PIte t HI s faC t, ta I wanese I n t HI s area do not want re U n I f ICat I on w It H ma I nland C HI na?

First, I think we should remember that although Taiwan might be mainly Han-Chinese ethnically, the cultural connections are not as strong as many people believe. First, there is a large indigenous population in Taiwan. It is a minority – an actual one. Secondly, the majority of the population are descendants of people who left China some 400 years ago, mainly from Fujian China, mostly from the south of this country, to settle in Taiwan, and have had very little connection with China for several hundreds of years. It is similar in many ways to the Chinese diaspora in South-East Asia and even more similar to those that are maybe mainland Chinese families. Then there was an additional influx of some 2 million refugees from mainland China due to the civil war and the aftermath of the national party’s civil war. For a long time, there were uneasy relations between the 1949s, those who came in the wake of the defeats of the war – Chiang Kai-shek’s brutal military dictatorship in Taiwan, which many people perceived as an external force that occupied Taiwan for many years. There was a lot of tension between militarycentric semicolonial force occupying Taiwan and the local Taiwan Chinese who spoke a different dialect, not standard Mandarin, who had very little connection to China and, in many cases, had more connections to Japan as the metropole.

When people say that they are HanChinese, that means that they forget that ethnicity is not everything. It would be like me saying that Poles are Slavic, so why don’t you want to be ruled by Russia? Being Slavic does not mean that you want to be controlled by Moscow, even if the people in Moscow believe you should. So, I think that the analogy between the Poles and Russia is probably parallel to the relationship between most Taiwanese people who consider themselves ‘Taiwanese’ and mainland China. They may be from the same general ethnic settings, but they come from different historical backgrounds and heritage. In the last 20 to 30 years, a lot has changed – there are new generations, there have been more intermarriages you can no longer realistically separate, the blue families, those connected to the KMT and the green families, and those connected to local Taiwan heritage. That distinction has now broken down and at this point, the vast majority of people in Taiwan view themselves as Taiwanese, not having a strong connection to mainland China. However, there are strong business ties with China. Many business families have strong and prosperous connections, but that is business, and not culture. I find it rather surprising that people in Taiwan, a country that has been separated from China for 400 years, came to be ruled by China for 30 years by a military dictatorship. This country would not have any desire to reunite with China. I do not think this is surprising at all.

tH e C om Par I son Yo U U sed between Poles and rU ss I ans I s C erta I nlY verY U sef U l for t H e P eo P le H ere, I n o U r Part of t H e world, to U nderstand t HI s s It Uat I on w It H C HI na. Yes, sure, and maybe also between Ukraine and Russia. Similar sort of dynamic.

Wikimedia Commons

The One-China policy is a historical legacy. It rose because the U.S. insisted that Taiwan remained the center of a united China and until 1971 held a UN–SC seat including a veto power as a representative of United China. Because of this legacy, the U.S. continued to recognize a single China until it passed to the people’s democratic China as the internationally recognized government.

3/2022 33

This policy has not changed; it is still written in the U.S. Department policy. Frankly, I think it is long past its use –now there are rather two Chinas. The U.S. is very conservative when it comes to its doctrine, and so this doctrine remains in place, although is no longer operative. I am a comparativist, I am not a Taiwan expert. I might point out, for example, the Interamerican Treaty, which has the same provisions on collective defense – as NATO does – yet everybody knows that this treaty is essentially nonoperational. The U.S. is never going to intervene in a war involving Brazil, this would not be part of active U.S. foreign policy. However, it is still on paper, so I think we should understand the One-China policy in the same way. It is still there on paper, but, in practice, the U.S. treats Taiwan as a sovereign country even to the point of selling weapons to them. Even by law, it is stated that the U.S. is to sell weapons needed to defend itself. So, yes, formally there is still a One-China policy and when some official is pressed on this issue,©Source:

Yes. a not H er q U est I on I s related to j o H n kI rbY, w H o sa I d t H at t H e U. s ., des PIte Pelos I ’s v I s It to ta I wan, st I ll s UPP orts t H e o ne-C HI na P olICY. I wo U ld lI ke to ask w HY t H e Un Ited s tates st I ll ma I nta I ns t HI s formal relat I ons HIP w It H b e Ij I n G , b U t t H e Y Cannot re C o G n I ze ta IP e I as t H e Ca PItal of ta I wan. It m IGH t not be U nderstandable be CaU se Pelos I went to t H e Ca PItal of ta I wan, s H ow I n G some de G ree of re C o G n It I on of t HI s C o U ntrY w It H t HI s v I s It.

American Foreign Policy Challenges in the Face of Growing Tensions in the Pacific

No, I disagree. Semiconductors are just the latest excuse for supporting Taiwan. The U.S. support for Taiwan has been consistent for the last 70 years. The only time it wavered was during the prodemocracy movement in Taiwan in the 1980s when the U.S. support for the KMT dictatorship was quite questionable. Once Taiwan became a democracy, there has been consistent U.S. support for Taiwan.

Taiwan has become America’s Abkhazia; in many ways, it is also a conflict that will never be resolved. The U.S. will provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself as well as implicit security guarantees – the same way that Russia has Abkhazia as its client state. It is de facto an independent state that will never become part of Georgia again, but which will not be recognized by other countries. It is not an exact parallel, but in many ways it is similar. China will never recognize an independent Taiwan, and as long as China does not, other countries will not. But the U.S. will not give up its client state,

Now, people try to justify this kind of support in many ways. Originally, before Taiwan became a democracy, the rationale was ‘well, Taiwan is anticommunist’ and then ‘Taiwan is a democracy’. Now, this country is just an important semiconductor manufacturer. This is not going to change; it is a frozen conflict. Again, if I can make another interesting international analogy, it is similar to what one would say about the situation in Abkhazia, in the Black Sea region.

Interview The Warsaw Institute Review34

they refer to this notion. This encourages a peaceful settlement for prosperous relations. Of course, everyone wants such a settlement, but, as realists realize, it comes down to Taiwan’s independence.

wH en Pelos I was I n ta I wan, s H e sa I d t H at s H e adm I res t H e demo C rat IC valU es of t H e ta I wanese, and t HI s I s I m P ortant to t H e U. s . d on’t Yo U t HI nk t HI s I s not t H e onlY reason for t H e faC t t H at t H e U. s . s UPP orts ta I wan, and t H at t H ere I s also an I nterest I n t H e sem IC ond UC tors b U s I ness s UPP lI es?

Taiwan. As a result, we will remain with this permanent frozen conflict.

sI n C e we talked H ere I n warsaw abo U t a mont H aG o, I know t H at Yo U do not take a t H reat of a P otentI al war between t H e U. s . and C HI na verY ser I o U slY, b U t I wanted to ask Yo U abo U t t H e s o U t H C HI na s ea re GI on, w HICH H as been a P laC e of C onflIC t for Y ears. m an Y ex P erts saY t H at t HI s m IGH t be t H e P laC e of t H e P otentI al so U r C e of C onflIC t, w H ere t H e C onflIC t m IGH t start. I wanted to ask Yo U abo U t Yo U r assessment of t HI s Case, and I f Yo U d I saG ree w It H t H at, w H ere wo U ld Yo U sear CH for P otentI al waYs or P o I nts of C onflIC t? If an Y.

close to American aircraft and sailing dangerously close to American warships. China even once stole a submersible oceanographic pod from an unarmed U.S. oceanographic investigation ship. So, China has been very confrontational, but let us not elevate that to a level of war. What China has done is inappropriate, unwise, and provocative.

I would like to start by questioning the assumption of the question. You, like many international relations experts, take it for granted that the Southern China Sea has been a source of conflict for many years now. First, I would try to consider how many people have been killed in the South China Sea in the last 20 years. I don’t know if anyone has been killed in the China South Sea conflict, I might be missing a Filipino coast guard or a fisherman – there might be one or two people, I don’t know. However, in any case, the intensity of any conflict in the South China Sea has been extremely low. It is a site of confrontation, which is not the same as conflict. China has been confronting its neighbors very aggressively, but neighbors have shrunk to confront China in any way. Similarly, the U.S. has asserted its rights under international law to transit in the South China Sea, it is done so very aggressively by sailing ships and flying planes very close to Chinese installations near the Sea with only minor incidents. There have been situations in which China has acted inappropriately, flying dangerously

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American Foreign Policy Challenges in the Face of Growing Tensions in the Pacific

Yes, b U t t HI s m IGH t be a sY mbol of C HI na’s ex Pans I on I sm Yes, it has certainly been a symbol of Chinese expansionism, but there has been no conflict in the South Chinese Sea, nor will there be a conflict there. We always hear quotes about a certain percentage of world trade that passes through this sea. People know these enormous numbers, but, of course, the vast majority of that is traded to and from China. Therefore, all other countries in the region can circumvent the South Chinese Sea, if necessary. Oil shipments from the Middle East to Japan can simply go around the first line of island chains instead of going through them. It would add a few pennies per barrel of oil for Japanese trade to avoid the South Chinese Sea. The same applies for Korean trade; for Taiwan, it would be slightly more complicated, but even for this country, it would not be a big deal. It is China that would have a catastrophic economic collapse if trade through the South Chinese Sea suddenly cut off. If oil tankers could not navigate the South Chinese Sea, the Chinese economy would be ground to a halt. If Shanghai and Guangdong could not be used as export ports, the Chinese Yuan would collapse again, and Chinese exports would fall. The only country that is vulnerable to a conflict in the South Chinese Sea is China. Thus, I think it is almost inconceivable that Beijing would allow the sea to become a site of major warfare. By that, I mean, it is inconceivable that China would attempt to sink an American aircraft carrier with a hypersonic light missile.

and a lot of increased military efforts put into the region would not result in an all-in war in the South China Sea. Although the South China Sea is indeed a very confrontational environment, I do not think there is a serious risk of outright war there and I always press international relations scholars when they use the word ‘war’. A minor confrontation, in which 1 missile is fired, is not a war. War is an all-out national effort to confront another nation to defeat it militarily, and this is not going to happen in the South China Sea, nor is it going to happen in Taiwan. Again, I remind people that the last successful amphibious assault was in Incheon in 1951. We learned from World War 2 and the Korean War that amphibious assaults require absolute air-enabled supremacy to succeed. No major amphibious assault has ever been made, I believe, in a contested air-sea region. There is no chance China can enforce absolute air-sea supremacy in Taiwan right away. They can contest it, but to have the full superiority or supremacy

Interview The Warsaw Institute Review36

Because if it did, forget about World War 3, certainly the entire South China Sea and Taiwan would be instantly closed to maritime traffic. This would lead to an economic collapse in China that would barely be noticed in America. That is, the United States would have some shortages of consumer goods, but it would not have a major impact on the U.S. or the rest of the world. It would be catastrophic for China. Now, I do believe that China will continue to behave irresponsibly in the South Chinese Sea. This has the potential for dangerous escalation. Therefore, China could behave in such a way that might result in an accidental downing of an American combat jet. With the loss of life of a pilot and the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in equipment and technology, and property damage. And if something like this were to happen, it would certainly be an international crisis, but it would not be a war. If China accidentally causes the death of an American pilot, there would be sanctions,

You know, since the Obama administration, the “Pivot to Asia” was a catchphrase that was reflected in the advanced deployment of marines to Darwin, Australia on a rotational basis. So, the marines in Australia are not fixed. Other than that, the “Pivot to Asia” has had little practical importance concerning important deployments. The Trump

American Foreign Policy Challenges in the Face of Growing Tensions in the Pacific

to launch an amphibious assault is inconceivable, at least in this century. Where would conflicts occur? I think exactly where these have occurred. That is on the China-India border – it is a very dangerous place and a place where conflict might erupt in the future. Looking further ahead, the China-Vietnam border and sea border, where I could potentially see a conflict erupting. But no, no conflict in the South Chinese Sea and Taiwan strait region, it would be very tense, yes. They might have conflict-including incidents, but they will not have wars.

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a lr IGH t, P rofessor, let U s s P eak abo U t anot H er do C tr I ne of t H e U. s . fore IG n P olICY P erta I n I n G to a s I a. I wo U ld lI ke to ask Yo U abo U t bI den’s adm I n I strat I on and Its a PP roaCH to t HI s do C tr I ne be CaU se, as we see, t H e U. s . I s b UI ld I n G Its advantaG e based on m U lt I lateralI sm and b I lateral allI an C es I n t H e re GI on. How Can we ex P la I n It? b e CaU se we see I n aU k U s t H at t H ere are Partners I n t H e b lU e PaCI f IC w HICH were done mostlY bY t H e bI den adm I n I strat I on I n It I allY, we also H ave t H e q Uad I n It I at I ve, b I lateral relat I ons for I nstan C e w It H t H e r e PU blIC of korea. I wo U ld lI ke to ask Yo U H ow to ex P la I n t HI s r U s H I n t H e Indo-PaCI f IC , I s It a ra PI d reaC t I on to t H e e C onom IC , m I lItarY, and naval G rowt H of t H e P r C?

administration pushed the Indo-Pacific doctrine instead. The idea of creating a single Indo-Pacific security, a space connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, but the Indian Ocean as far as the Pakistan border. Pakistan and Afghanistan were always outside the Indo-Pacific. So, everything to the east of Pakistan counted as Indo-Pacific and the QUAD was a centerpiece of the U.S.–Indo-Pacific expansion, but also improved relations with India in an attempt to sell advanced American weapons to India, which is fairly a new thing. India has historically had access to U.S. weaponry. Defense cooperation goes beyond just weapons. In joint operations, the new Indian light fighter uses General Electric engines. Therefore, there has been increased cooperation between India and the U.S. that we can reasonably call ‘Indo-Pacific’ because it refers to U.S. support to India to confront China. Therefore, it draws India to the U.S.–Pacific strategy. QUAD became a centerpiece of that, and it is the cooperation between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. But the incoming Biden administration seriously downgraded this initiative. As with many things in the U.S. foreign policy, the names remained, the members remained, but they simply are hollowed out. So, it is very rare in the U.S. for an institutional form for it to simply be reversed or bent. Instead, an institutional form that had previously been very important becomes relegated to a low budget and a low priority. I think that was signaled right at the beginning of the Biden administration. It was in January or February, during his first months in office in 2021, when Joe Biden announced that his priorities for the QUAD were climate, coronavirus, and economic cooperation. In my opinion, it was a signal that he was pulling back from confronting China with the QUAD since the only reason for this cooperation to exist is maritime security cooperation and a framework to confront

tH at I s, t H e C oo P erat I on I s U nderwaY. w e H ave been talk I n G abo U t aU k U s , n UC lear s U bmar I nes…

Interview The Warsaw Institute Review38

Well, AUKUS again has been and was a Trump administration effort. It will go forward because there are strong economic and security reasons behind

China. Nothing more ties together these four countries in particular, except for the fact that they have meaningful naval resources dedicated to maintaining the freedom of navigation across the IndoPacific. That is why these four countries are in the initiative, not South Korea, not Singapore, not Indonesia, not Bangladesh. These four countries because these are meaningful naval powers aligned – if not necessarily against China – at least aligned towards maintaining freedom of the seas in the face of Chinese pressure. When Biden signaled QUAD would be cooperating on coronavirus and climate, this downgraded the whole alliance. Because there is no reason why these countries in particular should focus on coronavirus policies and cooperation. It was either him or Blinken [I would have to go back to my notes], but certainly, somebody in the Biden administration gave a speech saying that India would use its pharmaceutical industry, that the U.S. would use its research, and Japan its manufacturing strength, and that Australia would provide support to them (because it was impossible to find something Australia could do as far as coronavirus cooperation is concerned) to promote vaccination in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. I think it was quite a stretch to try to find something in which these countries could cooperate. Now, since then, we have seen John Kerry, the U.S. climate ambassador, insisting that solving the world’s climate emergency can only be done with China’s cooperation. So when we have Kerry talking about this, we have to bring China into the climate effort. When we see the QUAD doing maritime security, we see its mission being redefined away from military security. I think we need to reinterpret that as the Biden administration de-emphasizing a popular Trump-era policy. The Biden administration does not want to eliminate the policy because it is a real policy-people like it. But he can make it an empty shell

tHI s I s one of t H e reasons t H e bI den adm I n I strat I on b UI lds or PU s H es forward ot H er allI an C es.

Well, I am not sure whether or if they have been pushing for other alliances.

that doesn’t do anything. That was already happening, I think in January 2021. When Anthony Albanese was elected Prime Minister of Australia, in May 2022, I think that was a definite for the QUAD because the Labor Party in Australia does not support open confrontation with China, is not into maritime security, and Albanese himself reiterated after being elected that his priorities for the QUAD were climate cooperation, coronavirus cooperation, and economic cooperation/development. Again, not mentioning maritime security and China. Since then, there have been some statements by the QUAD leaders at several summits. At the most recent summit, it was stated that the QUAD, of course, supports the free transit through the Indo-Pacific, there was a statement that they support counterterrorism, which was insisted on by India. India’s top priority is countering terrorism practiced and sponsored by Pakistan, so they put a status during the leader’s statement about countering terrorism. Anthony Albanese was very lukewarm about the QUAD, and Japan’s former prime minister who just passed away, Shinzo Abe, was a strong proponent of the initiative right from the beginning. Without Joe Biden pushing the QUAD, I do not see it having a real future as an anti-China or as a maritime security actor.

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American Foreign Policy Challenges in the Face of Growing Tensions in the Pacific

vote. Not just in the electoral vote, but also in the popular vote. If the elections were held today, Trump would have even more support in beating Harris, should she be the Democratic candidate. In light of that and the stress on the U.S. economy, GDP decline, whether the National Bureau of Economic Research wants to declare an official “recession”, the fact is that the economy has been declining for six months now. There is inflation hitting rapidly, as it has not been seen since 1980 or 1981. There is a lot of economic stress in the U.S. There is also a lot of social stress over issues in the Supreme Court like abortion, gun control, and continued allegations of institutional racism. It is hard to imagine that the Democratic Party can survive these midterms. Now, the structure of the elections means that every single seat is up for grabs in the House of Representatives. Everybody expects a massive Republican victory in the House of Representatives. It is worth remembering that although Donald Trump lost the 2020 elections, Republicans actually won in the House of Representatives, which is extremely rare. This means they have a strong president in the House. It is almost inconceivable that, given the national trends, Democrats retain the majority in the House. The Senate is more up for grabs because only 1/3 of Senators are reelected every 2 years for the 6-year cycle, and most of these Senators are Republicans. So, you cannot replace a Democratic Senator if Democratic Senators are not up for reelection. So, I am not a close enough expert/observer on U.S. state-by-state political races to know what will happen in the Senate. But it would take an absolute act of God for the Democrats to retain control of the House of Representatives. It is virtually inconceivable at this point that it would happen. This has major implications because getting control of one House of Congress will give the Republicans control

let U s t U rn It I nto U. s . domest IC P olICY. b e CaU se we H ave U. s . m I dterm ele C t I ons C om I n G , I wo U ld lI ke to ask Yo U H ow Yo U assess t H e s It Uat I on before t H e ele C t I ons. a re t H e r e PU blICans G o I n G to w I n t H e rema I n I n G seats, as P eo P le ex P e C t, or C o U ld we see t H e d emo C rats st I ll C om P et I n G for t H e seats I n t H e Ho U se and t H e s enate? The midterm elections are of course Congressional elections, but it still must be noted that Joe Biden is the least popular president in U.S. history. As for Kamala Harris, she is the least popular VP in American history. Incredibly, Joe Biden is less popular at this point in his term than Donald Trump in his time. The most recent poll in May shows that Trump easily beats Biden in the popular

moving forward with the agreement. But again, I do not think this is a major priority for the Biden administration. It was a Trump-era plan. It will continue, yes. But again, Biden is not pushing off AUKUS, and Albanese in Australia is not pushing it either because it is associated with his predecessor Scott Morrison. Now, remember that we now even have Britain’s Boris Johnson going out of office- and he was too strong a supporter of AUKUS. So, will AUKUS continue after these leaders have turned over? Yes, I think it will continue, but I do not think it will be a centerpiece strategy. I think it will just continue in the background as a legacy policy of former administrations. The Biden administration is much more focused on Europe, Blinken himself, the Secretary of State, is a Europeanist who grew up in Europe. I think he is much more comfortable with Europe than with Asia. I think that in any case, the Biden administration has had a pivot to Europe, also reflected in its support for Ukraine. It has not prioritized the Indo-Pacific in the way that the Trump administration did.

Interview The Warsaw Institute Review40

of the committees and the investigative machinery of Congress. So, we will see an enormous number of investigations started by Republicans investigating the Biden administration and greater scrutiny of the Biden administration in House committees. This will definitely change the tenor of the dynamics for the next 2 years up to the 2024 presidential elections.

No, no, that is guessing too much about the end of the conclusion. It might lead to much more aggressive scrutiny of the Biden administration. Right now, the Biden administration faces very little scrutiny in Congress and very little scrutiny in the press. The only major news organization that puts any pressure at all on the Biden administration is the

Murdock News Corp. So, Fox News, the New York Post, and to some extent, but less, the Wall Street Journal. The rest of the U.S. media fairly supported the Biden administration out of fear over the return of Donald Trump, who is lying low. But once a Republican-controlled House is bringing out subpoena powers bringing out actual evidence related to potential malpractice even in the policy area, that will dramatically change the news environment in the U.S. Everybody knows that there will be an investigation over the Hunter Biden connections with the Chinese businesspeople. But there is also going to be an investigation of the withdrawal from Afghanistan that has not been properly analyzed because Congress, you know, has no incentive to hold the Biden administration accountable. Once the war in Ukraine is over, there will be an investigation of the conduct of the war and whether it was conducted

s o, t H e s UCC ess of t H e G o P I n t H e 2022 m I dterm ele C t I ons m IGH t lead t H em to t H e s UCC ess of t H e P res I dent I al ele C t I ons?

It is my firm opinion that the Democratic Party has intended ever since 2020 that Kamala Harris would take over after the 2022 midterms. That is, the Democratic Party promoted Kamala Harris as their VP candidate because many people in the Democratic Party wanted to ‘make history’ by having the first African American female president and also a Democrat. They have been surprised by Harris being so wildly unpopular, yet I still believe that sometime between November 2022 and January elections, Joe Biden is likely to resign, and it is likely that Harris will become president despite her unpopularity. I think this that has been planned in the works, as I said, since 2020. I think it will still happen and that we might see President Harris by January, for good or for bad, in 2023. I am pleased to go on the record with you with this. We should be thinking about what Harris as president might look like. I think the Democratic Party had the decency to make this move to prove in the 2 years her ability to run the country. Clearly, the Democratic Party is now concerned by that prospect and views her as not being their best potential candidate. And there have been many calls for her to step down as VP, quiet calls, but nonetheless, people floating the idea. I think this is simply

Yes, C erta I nlY t HI s I s t H e Case for U. s . P olIt IC s. a lr IGH t, P rofessor, t H ank Yo U verY m UCH for t H e I nterv I ew.

American Foreign Policy Challenges in the Face of Growing Tensions in the Pacific

Can I go on record with one other thing?

w e w I ll make s U re to PU t It I n wr It I n G . tH ank Yo U verY m UCH for Yo U r ex P ert I se and for Yo U r t I me, P rofessor. It was an H onor for me to talk w It H Yo U abo U t t H e Indo-PaCI f IC , t H e U. s . P olICY, and all t H e to PIC s we d I s CU ssed todaY. tH ank Yo U verY m UCH .

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properly and effectively. You know there will be a series of investigations bringing information to light that right now is kept in the darkness because there is no political interest in bringing it into the light. I personally think it is the best, the U.S. system works the best when different parties control the different branches of government and are therefore able to act as a check on each other.

inconceivable. Kamala Harris will not step down. And if she does not step down, the only alternative is for her to step up, and so I do sincerely believe that in January, Harris will be the president of the U.S.

It is very flattering that you consider my opinions to be noteworthy and I appreciate your interest.

Yes, of C o U rse.

The Entity List is a trade restriction list published by the United States Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).

n May 2019, the U.S. government placed Huawei on the Entity List1. The List had originally been designed to deal with firms violating American trade sanctions. However, it was, by and large, a commercial strategy sought by the Trump administration to counter the increasing dominance of Chinese technological growth. The U.S. government later imposed 25 percent tariffs on Chinese semiconductors on June 15, 2018. Effectively, these and other

The Warsaw Institute Review International Relations 42

TTHEISEMICONDuCTORNDuSTRyAMIDSTu.S.–CHINARADEWAR

Katja-Elisabeth Herrmann Eufracio

TRANSPACIFIC TECH R IFT: FROM TRADE WAR TO CHIPS WAR? TAIWAN IS NOW AT THE HEART OF THE

subsequent commercial and political responses brought both sides into a standing trade war.

Over the past three decades, the global semiconductor industry has grown due to technological innovations and economic expansion. Today, the semiconductor industry lies at the heart of the “strategic competition” landscape between China and the United States. These developments have fostered the use of restrictive trade practices to gain advantage in high-tech industries that are of national importance. The

it is undisputed that the crisis in Ukraine in 2022 spells more

Taiwan

In 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic made the global network supply chain’s powerful interconnection tangibly evident. Felt in households, businesses, and states, the semiconductor shortage cost the US economy around $240bn last year3. In particular, the automobile industry faced a major loss of $ 210 billion in revenues in 2021. In short, amid the pandemic, demand dropped, and orders were canceled. The chain was

Transpacific Tech Rift: From Trade War to Chips War? Is Now at the Heart of the Semiconductor Industry... Source: Flickr

2 UBS Editorial Team, “Security takes centre stage” UBS (March 15, 2022). Available at news/article.1560913.ht,com/us/en/wealth-management/insights/market-https://www.ubs.accessedJuly2022.

Moreover,halted.

3 Rowsell Juliette, “How much has the semiconductor shortage cost?” Supply Management (May 5, 2022). Available at year,semiconductor,economy%20%24240bn%20last%20cost/#:~:text=Intel%20has%20warned%20the%20how-much-has-the-semiconductor-shortage-org/supply-management/news/2022/may/https://www.cips.accessedJuly2022.

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consequences of which have affected the majority of global supply chains. This change in commercial practices and the dynamics of legislative entrepreneurship has given rise to ‘silicon nationalism’. Defined as a political-economic trend in the semiconductor space – ‘silicon nationalism’ ensures “the recognition by major global powers that semiconductor manufacturing is increasingly a strategic imperative” 2 . The application of semiconductors in modern technologies plays an outstanding role in almost everything from defense technology to the internet of things (IoT), automated technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), and transformative networks such as 5G.

At the heart of this commercial dispute lies the semiconductor industry that has driven concerns for the past four years due to its military application in many of the current technologies that are employed today. For instance, “TSMC’s success in cornering this vital market has become a geostrategic migraine. TSMC’s dominance has been one in the rise “that its chief rivals are not companies but governments” 7

According to the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) in its 2021 report, “the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity eroded from 37% in 1990 to 12% today”5. This is largely explained by the outsourcing of manufacturing processes to third countries. Despite

4 See Library of Congress – Congressional Records, “CHIPS for America Act” (Executive Calendar);

this fact, the U.S. remains at large in a position of advantage. According to Deloitte’s Insights “The United States provides nearly three-quarters of the world’s electronic design automation and IP cores, which are some of the most highly technical aspects of the semiconductor manufacturing process”6 . Notwithstanding, companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) located in Hsinchu, Taiwan currently dominate more than half of the global semiconductor market, with clients including Apple and Sony. As such, Taiwan has now become more than a strategic ally. Given its position as the U.S.’s eighth-largest trading partner, Taiwan’s economic bonds with the U.S. have equally raised geopolitical concerns in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond the relation of tension between China and Taiwan over the territorial and sovereignty dispute, the presence of the U.S. in the region has exacerbated the already present tensions between the U.S. and China. As such, Taiwan remains in the middle of a contested commercial, and currently geostrategic confrontation swiping across the Pacific.

trouble for the correct functioning of semiconductor manufacturing and supply chains across the globe. The contemporary war in Ukraine has progressively inflicted disruption in the supply chains costing millions to the automobile industry but more importantly, to the households across the globe. For the U.S., the semiconductor shortage is a direct threat to America’s economy and national security4 Predominantly, this concern is guided by the disproportionate distribution of the semiconductor manufacturing industry mostly concentrated in Asia, especially in Taiwan. According to research conducted by the Henrich Foundation, “single-source supply chains are fragile and highly vulnerable.” Taiwan alone accounts for 92% of the global market share of the production of chips under 10 nm. Such a high concentration of this critical technology in a country that China claims as its own and to which the United States provides military capabilities creates a suitable environment for transpacific rifts between China and the United States.

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Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 22 (Senate, February 3, 2022). Available at: 5D%7D&s=3&r=1,22chips%22%2C%22for%22%2C%22america%22%5arch%22%3A%5B%22chips+for+america%22%2C%issue-22/senate-section/article/S512-1?q=%7B%22secongress.gov/congressional-record/volume-168/https://www.accessedJuly2022.SemiconductorIndustryAssociation“2021StateoftheU.S.SemiconductorIndustry”,p.10,https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2021-SIA-State-of-the-Industry-Report.pdf.

6 Michael Wolf and Iran Kalish. “Supply chain resilience in the face of geopolitical risks. Preparing for the tumult ahead” Deloitte Insights. (December 3, 2021).

7accessedeconomy/us-china-trade-war-supply-chain.html,https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/July2022.CharlieCampell,“InsidetheTaiwanFirmThatMakestheWorld’sTechRun”TIMEMagazine(October1,2021)https://time.com/6102879/

semiconductor-chip-shortage-tsmc/, accessed July 82022.Charlie Campell, “Inside the Taiwan Firm That Makes the World’s Tech Run” TIME Magazine (October 1, 2021) semiconductor-chip-shortage-tsmc/,https://time.com/6102879/accessed July 2022.

chip production. Consequently, U.S. competitiveness has felt threatened. In this context, questions are raised about the extent to which the progressive expansion of China’s silicon ambitions has generated foreign industrial policies to counter China’s own policies.

Transpacific Tech Rift: From Trade War to Chips War? Taiwan Is Now at the Heart of the Semiconductor Industry...

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The auto-industry shortage was just a wake-up call for policymakers amidst the pandemic and trade war. For instance, The Pentagon is pressing the Biden Administration to invest more in advanced chipmaking, so its missiles and fighter jets are not dependent on a self-ruling island that China’s strongman President Xi Jinping believes is a breakaway province and has repeatedly threatened to invade”8 . For its part, China has perceived these movements as pervasive to both its territorial integrity and economy, and as such, has propelled state-led industrial policies, aiming to achieve self-sufficiency in all stages of

Certainly, the entrepreneurshiplegislativepursued in this industrial sector was pushed in the U.S. Congress during the early months of 2020, after the reconnaissance that the supply chains on which the semiconductors industry operates are extremely vulnerable and prone to external pressures. Led by Virginia Senator Warner (D) and Texas Senator Cornyn (R), the ‘CHIPS for America Act’ was introduced to ‘re-shore’ semiconductor manufacturing in the United States. According to the American narrative, there is a wide

Both legislative proposals were introduced amidst the global shortage of semiconductors. In particular, the ‘CHIPS for America Act’ received greater attention in July and August 2022. After being on hold for Congress’ approval over the course of several months, the U.S. Senate pushed its final bit and Congress approved the USD 280 billion package on the 28th of July 2022. The Act is composed of a stunning $52 billion package for manufacturing grants and research investments and a 25% investment tax credit (ITC) to incentivize semiconductor manufacturing in the U.S. among other benefits11. Jointly, this package is aimed Semiconductor Industry Association “CHIPS for America Act & FABS Act – Congress Passes Investments in Domestic Semiconductor

9 European Commission “European Chips Act” (Updated February – May 2022) 2022.digital-age/european-chips-act_en,eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-(Updated10digital-age/european-chips-act_en.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-https://ec.europa.EuropeanCommission“EuropeanChipsAct”February–May2022)https://ec.europa.accessedAugust

The Warsaw Institute Review International Relations 46

the aspiration to strengthen Europe’s technological leadership.

observance of a Chinese state-driven and state-controlled technological rise. There is no doubt that, indeed, Chinese technological dominance has resonated across the globe. In its response, the European Union has equally introduced a legislative proposal for a Regulation – the “European Chips Act” – which has had as its core objective, to “bolster Europe’s competitiveness and resilience in semiconductor technologies and applications” 9. Currently holding around 10% of the global chip market10, the EU’s stated objective is driven by

Transpacific Tech Rift: From Trade War to Chips War?

to Taiwan on August 2, 2022, sparked a new source of tension between the United States and China. Once more, Taiwan seems to remain in the middle of these transpacific exchanges without any real possibility of challenging either of them. In such instances, China’s military doctrine under Xi Jinping has strongly sought to flex a national muscle outside the country. This rapid evolution of events has pushed both sides to enhance their military presence in the IndoPacific. On its side, Chinese military exercises have sought “both a deterrent and a stage” objective.

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It is no coincidence that days before Representative Speaker Pelosi’s visit to the Indo-Pacific began on Sunday the 31st of July, she released a statement on the 27th of July praising the Senate’s passage of the CHIPS and Science Act. The interest transition of events concluded with a dinner between House Speaker and the chip industry leaders in AsTaipei.such,

what can be observed is the conduct of strategy-building that aims to create a network of alliance members to pit the U.S., the EU, and now Taiwan against China, as highlighted by Texas Senator Cornyn (R), “what we should be talking about is countering threats from China, not helping China”14 . Now, the Chinese government plans to boost its domestic production using government subsidies and tax preferences as these actions are seen as a blatant provocation

at facing the gaps and vulnerabilities in the semiconductor supply chain, posing significant risks to the U.S. economy and national security.

A statement delivered by President Biden on the 27th of July on Twitter signaled the “good news for America” of onshoring the manufacture of chips to the country13. Sustained by a democratic sentiment of widening the labor market, it is true that the implications of such a significant investment to incentivize the production of chips at home will be felt as a tactical move to detach the U.S. economy and industry from China.

14 Library of Congress – Congressional Records, “CHIPS for America Act” (Executive Calendar); Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 22 (Senate, February 3, 2022). Available at: D%7D&s=3&r=1,22chips%22%2C%22for%22%2C%22america%22%5arch%22%3A%5B%22chips+for+america%22%2C%issue-22/senate-section/article/S512-1?q=%7B%22secongress.gov/congressional-record/volume-168/https://www.accessedJuly2022.

The House approved the bill by a solid margin of 243–187, including 24 Republicans who voted for the legislation. Texas Representative Michael McCaul, a former top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, declared that passing the legislation formed a vital step in the protection of not just American industries but also of national security12 . In the meantime, the Act awaits the president’s signature. However, this might proposal has more politics than just its success. The U.S. midterms might challenge the signature of the bill in the next months if Democrats aim to gain popular support amidst the party having currently a thin 220–211 majority in the lower chamber of Congress.

However, the visit of U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi Manufacturing, Research & Design” Available at: v4BNg&s=08.s/1552361079212220417?t=NwSfwa6Kg9PWYgCkXto-boost-u-s-chip-production,newshour/politics/watch-live-house-votes-on-bill-(Julyto12Sheet.pdf,uploads/2022/07/Pass-the-CHIPS-Act-of-2022-Fact-https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/accessedAugust2022.Retrievedfrom:FrekingKevin,“HousepassesbillboostU.S.chipproduction”PBSONewsHour28,2022)Availableat:https://www.pbs.org/accessedJuly2022.13Retrievedfrom:https://twitter.com/POTUS/statu

Taiwan Is Now at the Heart of the Semiconductor Industry...

• Capri, Alex, “Semiconductors at the Heart of the US-China Tech War. How a New Era of Techno-Nationalism is Shaking up Semiconductor Value Chains” Heinrich Foundation

17 Idem. © Source: Wikimedia Commons

tariff-targeted exports to the rest of the world”17. As witnessed, now Taiwan has strategically chosen to couple with the U.S. to handle China later.

Certainly, decoupling the economies might slow innovation and increase costs of production. However, as Columbia Business School Professor Amit Khandelwal finds, the U.S.–China trade war has led to an increase in global trade by inducing diversification and economic change in third countries16 . This way, “many countries reallocated tariff-targeted exports to the U.S. and away from China and increased their

of the U.S. to Chinese interests in the region and its ‘one-China’ policy15.

SOURCE

• Campell, Charlie, “Inside the Taiwan Firm That Makes the World’s Tech Run” TIME Magazine (October 1, 2021), accessedsemiconductor-chip-shortage-tsmc/,tsmc/”semiconductor-chip-shortage-https://time.com/6102879/https://time.com/6102879/July2022.

15 To read further consult: Herrmann Eufracio KatjaElisabeth, “Tensions spark in Asia over Pelosi’s tour in the Indo-Pacific” Polish Express (August 8, 2022), available at: by-katja-elisabeth-herrmann,spark-in-asia-over-pelosi-s-tour-in-the-indo-pacific-https://en.polishexpress.co.uk/tensions-accessedJuly2022.16AmitKhandelwal,“U.S.-ChinaTradeWarIncreasesGlobalTrade”ColumbiaBusinessSchool(February17,2022),availableat:https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/newsroom/newsn/12435/us-china-trade-war-increases-global-trade,accessedAugust2022.

Katja-Elisabeth Herrmann Eufracio September 2022

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• Khandelwal, Amit, “U.S.-China Trade War Increases Global Trade” Columbia Business School (February 17, accessedtrade-war-increases-global-trade,newsroom/newsn/12435/us-china-https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/trade-war-increases-global-trade”newsroom/newsn/12435/us-china-https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/2022),August2022.

(January 2020), JulyJanuary%2031%202020.pdf,and%20semiconductors%20-%20-%20US-China%20tech%20war%20Hinrich%20Foundation%20report%20Capri%20Report%20-%20Jan%202020/hinrichfoundation.com/hubfs/https://research.accessed2022.

• Freking, Kevin, “House passes bill to boost U.S. chip production” PBSO News Hour (July 28, 2022), production,house-votes-on-bill-to-boost-u-s-chip-pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-https://www.accessedJuly2022.

Julyerica%22%5D%7D&s=3&r=1,22chips%22%2C%22for%22%2C%22amaccessed2022.

• Semiconductor Industry Association “2021 State of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry”, SIA-State-of-the-Industry-Report.pdf.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2021-https://www.semiconductors.

“CHIPS for America Act & FABS Act – Congress Passes Investments in Domestic Manufacturing,SemiconductorResearch& CHIPS-Act-of-2022-Fact-Sheet.pdf.wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pass-the-pdf”the-CHIPS-Act-of-2022-Fact-Sheet.wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pass-https://www.semiconductors.org/Design”,https://www.semiconductors.org/

• McKinnon, John D., and Natalie Andrews, “Tech Bill Aims to Block U.S. Aid for Companies That Build Advanced Chips in China”, The Wall Street Journal (July 18, 2022),

•

• Experts Contribution “Global semiconductor shortage likely to last through 2023” The Economic Times (June 1st, 2022), 2022.articleshow/91931828.cms,shortage-likely-to-last-through-2023/biz/trade/exports/insights/global-chip-economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-https://accessedJuly

• Rowsell, Juliette, “How much has the semiconductor shortage cost?” Supply Management (May 5, 2022), July%24240bn%20last%20year,semiconductor,economy%20has%20warned%20the%20shortage-cost/#:~:text=Intel%20how-much-has-the-semiconductor-management/news/2022/may/https://www.cips.org/supply-accessed2022.

• accessedhas-chinese-guardrails-11658167925,https://www.wsj.com/articles/chips-bill-July2022.

• European Commission “European Chips Act” (Updated February – May 2022), age/european-chips-act_en.priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/

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Taiwan Is Now at the Heart of the Semiconductor Industry...

• Semiconductor Industry Association

• Wolf, Michael, and Iran Kalish. “Supply chain resilience in the face of geopolitical risks. Preparing for the tumult ahead”, Deloitte Insights (December 3, 2021), supply-chain.html,insights/economy/us-china-trade-war-html”us-china-trade-war-supply-chain.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/https://www2.https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/accessedJuly2022.

UBS Editorial Team, “Security takes center stage” UBS (March 15, article.1560913.htmanagement/insights/market-news/https://www.ubs.com/us/en/wealth-2022),accessedJuly2022.

• Library of Congress – Congressional Records, “CHIPS for America Act” (Executive Calendar); Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 22 (Senate –February 3, 2022), A%5B%22chips+for+america%22%2C%article/S512-1?q=%7B%22search%22%3volume-168/issue-22/senate-section/congress.gov/congressional-record/https://www.

Transpacific Tech Rift: From Trade War to Chips War?

• Fuller, Douglas B., “China’s CounterStrategy to American Export Controls in Integrated Circuits” China Leadership Monitor, Spring 2021 Issue 67, (March 1, 2021), https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3798291” https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3798291, accessed July 2022.

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gu N CONTROl

lEgISlATION IN THE 113TH CONgRESS: THE ANAlySIS OF THE lEgAl ANSWER FOR MASS SHOOTINgS IN THE uNITED STATES

Jan GunHernikcontrol and possession have been an important and vivid topic for American citizens throughout history. Initially, the reason was gaining sovereignty from the British crown, then, as a result of the Declaration of Independence of 1776, a collectively formed nation was believed to be a land of free and independent people who treated the right to bear arms as a guarantor of their autonomy. It is a direct confession of the ideas of John Locke, who, in his work “Second Treatise of Government,” laid down the foundations of the theory of natural law that guided the Founding Fathers of the United States.

he 2nd amendment, which has granted the citizens of the United States the right to keep and bear arms since 1791 remains unchanged in the Constitution until today. Therefore, it has also been a bone of contraction, and a subject of discussion throughout American society. The discussion is usually evoked after unexpected and shocking crimes persecuted with the use of any kind of firearm causing social unrest and a lack of trust in public safety. The most dramatic examples of the rising topic of gun control are mass shootings, which happen in the United States often, and are used mostly by the left, Democratic side of the political scene to interfere with regulations, thus limiting the legal frames of the 2nd amendment and pro-gun legislative rules defended by definitely

more conservative Republicans. The distinction between political parties and their supporters leads to the heart of the American legislation, which is the United States Congress. After a series of notorious mass shootings in the years 2011–2012, a huge number of protesters demonstrated throughout the country with the main protest taking place in front of Capitol Hill on December 17, 2012. People demanded that both the newly formed at that time 113th US Congress and President Barack Obama take an official stance on the subject of gun control and embrace a legislative action toward restrictions within the gun law regulations. Responding to the phenomena of mass shootings, the latter introduced the proposal of reform; however, the 113th Congress did not significantly improve gun control laws keeping the voices of

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Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress: the Analysis of the Legal Answer for Mass Shootings in the United States

The first initiative of gun law restriction came from the President of the United States, Barack Obama, who established a Task Force on Gun Violence under the leadership of Vice President Joseph R. Biden six days after the Sandy Hook shooting. On January 16, 2013, the

1 Lacey, Marc; David M. Herszenhorn (January 9, 2011). “In Attack’s Wake, Political Repercussions”. The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on January 10, 2011 Retrived on May 17, 2020

All of these crimes restarted the national gun control debate that was about to happen in the 113th Congress, which lasted from January 3, 2013, to January 3, 2015, during the fifth and sixth years of Barack Obama’s presidency. It was based on the 2012 House of Representatives and Senate elections. In the House of Representatives, the majority was held by Republican Party, with its speaker John Boehner (R-OH), while the Senate was taken over by Democrats with President of the Senate Joseph Biden and President Pro Tempore Patrick Leahy (D-VT).

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of protesters around the country

which happened in the United States in the years 2011–2012 were especially cruel and uncovered gaps in both federal and national legislation regarding gun control. The very first of the cases mentioned cases happened in Tucson, AZ. On 8 January 2011, U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords (D, AZ) and 18 other people were shot during a constituent meeting in a supermarket parking lot in Casas Adobes, AZ. As a result of the attack, six people died, including federal District Court Chief Judge John Roll; Gabe Zimmerman, one of Giffords’ staffers; and a nine-year-old girl, ChristinaTaylor Green1. Gifford was holding a meeting when Jared Lee Loughner aimed his pistol at her and shot her in the head before opening fire at other people. The perpetrator was arrested at the crime scene and sentenced to life in prison. Another massive-scale shooting happened more than one year later in Aurora, CO where on July 20, 2012, during a screening of the film The Dark Knight Rises, James Eagan Holmes, using tear gas grenades, set off the scene of mass murder shooting into the audience with multiple firearms. The results of that were twelve people killed and 70 others injured, 58 of them from gunfire. It was the deadliest shooting in Colorado since the Columbine High School massacre in 1999. Holmes was arrested in his car outside the cinema minutes later, and as a result of his crime, he got sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He also received 3,318 years for the attempted murders of

those he wounded 2 . The last major event with the biggest impact on the awakening of the people was Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in Newtown, CT. December 14, 2012. It was when a 20-year-old male entered Sandy Hook Elementary School and shot 20 first graders and 6 adult staff members to death. Before the massacre at school, he also shot his mother to death. According to press accounts, the firearms he used in the shooting included a 5.56 mm Bushmaster (M16-style) semiautomatic rifle, and two semiautomatic pistols, a 10 mm Glock and 9 mm Sig Sauer3 Firearms used by the shooter were reportedly owned legally by his mother and were registered under Connecticut state law.

2 O’Neill, Ann (August 26, 2015). “Theater shooter Holmes gets 12 life sentences, plus 3,318 years”. CNN Retrieved August 26, 2015.

Massunanswered.shootings

united

3 Emily Flitter and Dan Burns, “Connecticut Gunman Had Hundreds of Rounds; Obama to Console Newtown,” Reuters, December 16, 2012.

known as the ‘universal background checks’ proposal; increased penalties for gun trafficking; and reinstated and strengthened an expired federal ban on detachable ammunition magazines of over 10-round capacity and certain ‘military-style’ firearms commonly described as ‘semiautomatic assault weapons,’ which are designed to accept such magazines5

5 Krouse, William J. “Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R42987, January 8, 2015, p.4

113 th Congress United s tates h oU se of representatives 113 th Congress s enate CommonsWikimediaSource:CommonsWikimediaSource:©©

4 White House, Now Is the Time: The President’s Plan to Protect our Children and Our Communities by Reducing Gun Violence, January 16, 2013, http:// www.wh.gov/now-is-the-tim

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Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress: the Analysis of the Legal Answer for Mass Shootings in the United States

White House released a document entitled: Now Is the Time: The President’s Plan to Protect Our Children and Our Communities by Reducing Gun Violence 4 Three of most prominent legislative proposals included in the President’s plan would have required background checks for intrastate firearm transfers between unlicensed persons at gun shows and other venues, otherwise

2. Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013 (S.374) – background checks for private firearms transfers, and encouraged states to provide the FBI with greater access to prohibited persons for background check purposes;

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• Senator John Barrasso who reported an amendment S.Amdt.714 which would have required a 5% reduction of Community Oriented Policing Services grants to state and local governments that release information on gun owners. The amendment was adopted by a yea-nay vote: 67–30 (roll call vote no. 104).

8 S. 649 — 113th Congress: Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013.” www.GovTrack.us. 2013. May 16, 2020

4. Assault Weapons Ban of 2013 (S.150) – ban for the further production or importation of certain semiautomatic firearms, as well as high-capacity magazines 6 .

The votes on S.374 and S.150 cleaved out party lines 10-8. Senator Charles E. Grassley (the Committee’s ranking minority Member; R-IA) voted for the gun trafficking bill (S.54) establishing the vote on the measure 11-7. The bill S.146 was approved by vote 14-47 Ibid,4 Ibid,4

• Senator Tom Herkin, who offered an amendment S.Amdt.730 that would have expanded grant programs

1. Stop Illegal Trafficking in Firearms Act of 2013 (S.54) – straw purchasing and gun trafficking prohibitions and increase related penalties;

In response to the Newtown shooting and the proposal of Obama’s administration, the US Senate worked on various legislative proposals. The bills that would have required universal background checks for firearms transfers increased criminal gun trafficking penalties and restricted certain types of firearms. According to President Obama’s initiative, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the following four bills related to gun control:

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The bills came out from the Committee to be tested by the Senate floor action on April 17–18, 2013. The bills S.54, S.374, and S.146 were introduced to the floor by Senator Harry Reid on March 21, 2013, as the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 (S.649)8 However, it did not include the Assault Weapon Ban Act, which was offered by Senator Dianne Feinstein as an amendment to the previously mentioned S.649. The bill introduced by Feinstein and 24 Democratic cosponsors assumed a one-feature test for a firearm to qualify as an assault weapon (it would stop the average gun owner from wanting to purchase a neutered rifle), which, as mentioned above, banned such firearms from purchase and transportation (it was defeated in the Senate on April 17, 2013, by a vote of 40 to 60)9. Altogether, the Senate took into consideration and voted on nine amendments concerning various aspects of gun control policy. The chamber declared unanimity that in the adoption of those amendments the 60-vote threshold will be required. Of the nine amendments voted, only two were adopted by the Senate. Those were:

3. School Safety Enhancement Act of 2013 (S.146) –appropriationsannualofupto $40 million for the next 10 years for the Secure Our Schools grant program under the Department of Justice (DOJ) Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS);

9bills/113/s649><https://www.govtrack.us/congress/S.150—113thCongress:AssaultWeaponsBanof2013.”www.GovTrack.us.2013.May16,2020<https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s150>

United s tates s enate floor

10 Krouse, William J. “Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R42987, January 8, 2015, p.6

Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress: the Analysis of the Legal Answer for Mass Shootings in the United States

The Senate amendment tracking system says that there were an additional 20 amendments regarding bill S.649 and ready for possible consideration. However, the Senate did not come back to the floor action on the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013. William J. Krouse comments in his paper “Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress” that the report of the Senate amendment tacking system “includes discussion of most, but not all, of the major provisions in these amendments; however, it does not include any discussion of the Harkin amendment and related mental health and substance abuse programs, which arguably fall outside of the scope of federal gun control”11

A salient role in the Senate legislation was played by the advocacy, or interest groups such as Gun Owners of America or Institute for Legislative Action “Stop the Gun Ban”. Most of them support the second amendment and put pressure on

related to mental health and substance abuse, was not pleased with the decision. The amendment was adopted by a yea-nay vote: 95–2 (roll call vote no. 105)10

11 Ibid,6

fact, Senator Pryor was the only Democrat elected from that state. He, as a representative of the mostly conservative Arkansas constituency, took a responsibility to vote accordingly to the will of the people of his state, not

12 Roll call list of the vote on S.649, te=00097,call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1&vosenate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_https://www.accessedMay22,2020.

Senators to make sure they withdraw from proceeding with the gun control legislation, which might have put them at the risk of not getting potential reelection. The failure of S.649 in the Senate could have been the same time a political failure of the legislators. The majority of the Senate in the 113th Congress was affiliated with the Democratic party (53+2 D to 45 R), so it was vividly interested in restricting gun policies. Why did the bill not get accepted then? The answer to that could be the background of some of the Democratic Senators. Despite the official party line, along with President Obama supporting gun control laws, some Democratic senators voted against it to satisfy their constituents. Such a situation happened for instance for Senator Mark Pryor (D-AK), who voted against S.64912 . He got elected to the US Senate from Arkansas, the place which, as the 2012 House and Senate elections show, was almost purely Republican. In

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his party line. He did what James M. Buchanan in the book “The Calculus of Consent” calls an ‘individual ethical decision’. The author says: “However, in order to describe this function, some individual must make quite explicit his own value judgments. There is no escape from the responsibility of individual ethical decision13 .” The ethical decision in Pryor’s case was to vote in the name of the majority of constituents of his state, however, it was also aligned with his political interest. Other senators who broke the Democratic party line and voted for non-nay were, for instance: Harry Reid (D-NV); Max Baucus (D-MT); Mark Begich (D-AK). The final vote on the S.649 bill also did not take place. It means that the bill was not enacted, and therefore it died in the 113th

understanding of gun violence14 Original co-sponsors of the bill are Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ), Rep. Lois Capps (D-CA), Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Rep. Doris Matsui (D-CA), Rep. Grace F. Napolitano (D-CA) and Rep. Danny K. Davis (D-IL)15. The legislative project was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, from where it was directed to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade; the Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education, and the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions. No further action took place after that, therefore the bill died in the 113th

13 Buchanan, James; Tullock, Gordon The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy Vol.3; Liberty Fund, 1999, p. 284.

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AnotherCongress.legislative

united States of America

TheCongress.House of Representatives also resumed deliberations on the topic of gun control in the United States. The very first bill concerning gun control was introduced in the chamber on August 1, 2013. It was the response to another mass shooting that occurred in Santa Monica earlier that year. Ranking member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) introduced the new legislation titled the Gun Violence Prevention and Reduction Act of 2013 (H.R.2910). The bill was intended to protect American children and their families from the epidemic of gun violence. H.R2910 was offered to ban access to assault types of guns and assault firearm kits. It also made it unlawful to market or advertise those kinds of weapons. The legislation offered to strengthen the Nation’s mental health infrastructure and improve

initiative in the House of Representatives came from Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY). He offered a successful amendment to the Financial Services and General Government appropriations bill (H.R.5016). As a background for Massie’s action was the District of Columbia vs. Heller case from June 26, 2008. The dispute covered the topic of the constitutionality of a DC law that essentially banned handguns for 32 years. What is more, the DC law required all firearms within the district to be registered and all owners to be licensed; it also prohibited any further registration of handguns after September 24, 1976. With a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found the district’s handgun ban unconstitutional, thus violating the Second Amendment. Since then, the DC Council has implemented several rights to adjust to

14 H.R. 2910 — 113th Congress: Gun Violence Prevention and Reduction Act of 2013.” www. GovTrack.us. 2013. May 16, 2020, act,introduce-gun-violence-prevention-and-reduction-press-release/rep-waxman-and-house-democrats-web/20140207030028/https://waxman.house.gov/Presgovtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2910https://www.15Forfurtherinformation,seeRep.WaxmanReleasehttps://web.archive.org/accessedMay18,2020.

a person who is a beneficiary of disability compensation and pension programs administered by the VA, who is mentally incapacitated, deemed mentally incompetent, or experiencing an extended loss of consciousness could not be considered “adjudicated as a mental defective” for the purposes of federal firearms eligibility determinations, without the order or finding of a judge, magistrate, or other judicial authority of competent jurisdiction that such person is a danger to himself or herself or others17.

• Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 2008 (D.C. Law 17-372),

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16 Krouse, William J. “Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R42987, January 8, 2015, p.9

FlickrSource:©

The Massie amendment was taken into consideration and adopted on recorded vote 241–181 (roll call vote no. 425). The House passed H.R. 5016 with the Massie amendment (§922 of the engrossed bill) on July 16, 201416 . The House did not

debate any wider gun control proposals such as, for instance, universal background checks (it took place in the Senate), however, the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs approved Representative Jeff Miller’s (R-FL) bill called the Veterans 2nd Amendment Protection Act (H.R.602), by voice vote.

17 “H.R. 602 — 113th Congress: Veterans 2nd Amendment Protection Act.” www.GovTrack. us. 2013. May 18, 2020 congress/bills/113/hr602><https://www.govtrack.us/

It says:

U s h o U se of representatives (fli C kr)

• Firearms Amendment Act of 2012 (D.C. Law 19-170), or

• Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 2008 (D.C. Law 17-388),

• Administrative Disposition for Weapons Offenses Amendment Act of 2012 (D.C. Law 19-295).

the Supreme Court decision. The Council also proceeded to address other elements of the DC gun law. Some Members of Congress found those DC laws to be not parallel with the spirit of the Heller decision or otherwise objectionable and have sponsored proposals to block the implementation of those DC laws. Thomas Massie worked along the way and offered an amendment (H.Amdt. 1098) to the H.R. 5016 that would have prohibited the use of any funding provided under this bill to enforce any provision of the:

Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress: the Analysis of the Legal Answer for Mass Shootings in the United States

Of the similar content consisted Grassley GOP substitute, Manchin-Toomey, or Burr amendments to already mentioned S.649, which was considered in the Senate, but rejected. The bill (H.R.602) was reported to the House Committee

metal detector. According to congressional sources, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has apparently constructed a security exemplar, which the law imposes on the manufacturer to be made of 3.7 ounces of stainless steel and in a shape resembling a handgun19. Prolonged H.R.3626 was signed into law by President Barack Obama and is valid until December 10, 2023.

united States of America

The last response of the legislative branch of the United States federal government in years 2013-2015 was bills concerning gun trafficking and straw purchases. The importance of public safety and responsibility for the 2nd amendment right that affects not only American citizens but also countries bordering with the US, for instance, Mexico (it is estimated that 253,000 guns purchased annually in the US trafficked to Mexico)20 was a reason for Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand (D, NY) to introduce a proposal titled Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013 (S.179) that would establish a federal law tackling ‘trafficking in firearms’ under two clauses. The bill reserved that:

20 Topher McDougal et Al., Igarape Inst.&Univ. Of San Diego Trans-Border Inst., The Way of The Gun: Estimating Firearms Traffic Across The U.S-Mexico Border, 5 (2013).

The last important piece of gun control legislation in the House of the 113th Congress was related to the subject of hunting, fishing, recreational shooting and firearms carry on so-called ‘public lands’. Promotion of these activities has always been a vivid intention of the gun rights community. The House passed the proposed Sportsmen’s Heritage and Recreational Enhancement Act (H.R. 3590) on February 5, 2014, by a recorded vote: 268–154 (roll call vote no. 41). The one provision of this bill related to gun control says that “under this act of any component of any firearms ammunition (shot, bullets, and other projectiles, propellants, and primers) and sport fishing equipment (e.g., lead sinkers) that are subject to federal manufacturer excise taxes, namely the PittmanRobertson Wildlife Restoration Act (16 U.S.C. §669a) and provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §4161(a)), respectively.”18

1. It would be illegal to receive, transfer or otherwise dispose of two or more firearms that had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, having known, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the receiver of the weapon would break the law obtaining the firearm.

The 113th Congress action, which undoubtedly should be marked as a legislative success of both chambers, was passing a 10-year extension of the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 (H.R.3626). The bill makes it illegal to manufacture, sell, ship, import, possess, deliver, transfer, and receive any firearm that after the removal of its grips, stocks, or magazines, is not possible to detect as a ‘security exemplar’ by a walk-through

18 Krouse, William J. “Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R42987, January 8, 2015, p.8

19 Ibid, 7

on July 19, 2013. The Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs offered a nearly identical legislation proposal – S.572 on September 14, 2013. However, neither bill was considered on the House or Senate floor. Looking at history, in the three previous Congresses, comparable legislation has been considered and passed by either one or both chambers.

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2. It would be unlawful to consciously direct, promote, or facilitate such conduct. Violations of either provisions would lead to a

president of the U s BaraC k oBama

punishment executed in fine and/or not more than 20 years of imprisonment. What is more, the legislative proposal reserves that anyone, who committed a crime acting as an organizer, supervisor, or any other management position in co-operation with five or more persons would have been subject of to not more than 25 years of imprisonment 21. S. 179 — 113th Congress: Gun Trafficking

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The bill would have denounced gun trafficking (under the first provision) or would have made any form of conspiracy unlawful as well (under the second provision). Similar legislative action was introduced in the House, where Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY) offered a bill H.R.452 . Coming back to S.179, it was approved by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, nevertheless, it has Prevention Act of 2013.” www.GovTrack.us. 2013. May 19, 2020 bills/113/s179https://www.govtrack.us/congress/

Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress: the Analysis of the Legal Answer for Mass Shootings in the United States

The instance of bills marginalized, and defeated in the Senate, such as Assault Weapon Ban Act (S.150); Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act (S.649); Gun Trafficking Prevention Act (S.179), or bills that died in The House like Gun Violence Prevention and Reduction Act (H.R.2910); Straw Purchaser Enhancement Act (H.R. 404) proves that the gun control policy of the 113th Congress was not successful and did not enhance much positive change to efficiently protect the American people from deadly effects of mass shootings in their country. The reason why there is no significant change in gun control law in the 113th Congress is based on the struggles of legislators to define a ‘public interest’ believed to be represented by the majority of American society. It happened because Senators like Mike Pryor (D-AK), despite representing Democrats, voted against his party line but, at the same time, in the name of the conservative majority of his state constituency. The conflict of interests caused gun control legislation to be stuck in both chambers or committees and not get any powerful support; therefore, it led to the disappearance of ‘public interest’ and the failure to get the bills enacted. Political scientist, James M. Buchanan sees that kind of case and says that if the ‘public interest’ cannot be identified, then it becomes impossible to determine and because of that progress in the ‘general welfare’ of the society is impossible to achieve23. The 113th Congress was able to pass a 10-year extension of the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 (H.R.3626) or accept some of the gun control amendments, such as Rep. Thomas Massie’s (R- KY), but it cannot be compared to the vast majority of legislation, which has been grounded by both chambers of the Congress. Few

united States of America

Gun control policy in the 113th Congress can be analyzed in various ways because it offered legislation proposals approaching many different aspects of gun control. The center of American legislation, which met from January 3rd, 2013, to January 3rd, 2015 was put into a defensive position after a series of mass shootings overwhelmed the entire country. Shootings in Tucson, AZ; Aurora, CO, and Newtown, CT, delivered a clear signal to both the legislative and executive branches of the government. Shortly after the Sandy Hook Elementary School massacre, President Barack Obama announced that his second term would be dedicated to battling crimes committed with the use of firearms. In reality, he did not execute any significant change in the area of gun control, appointing the new ATF director, starting a national safe and responsible gun ownership campaign, or proposing a few legislative projects that after being advocated by some of his fellow Democrats either in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, mostly died in the 113th Congress.

Buchanan, James; Tullock, Gordon, The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy Vol.3; Liberty Fund, 1999, p. 283.

22 Krouse, William J. “Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R42987, January 8, 2015, p.37

The Warsaw Institute Review

never been a subject of Senate floor action and died in the 113th Congress. Another action took place in the House, where Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) reintroduced a proposal of the Straw Purchaser Enhancement Act (H.R. 404) guarantying a two-year mandatory sentence for straw purchasing or making a false statement concerning the transfer of firearms. It was introduced as an amendment to the GCA (the Gun Control Act)22 . The bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, however, it has never been directed to further consideration.

— 113th Congress: Gun Violence Prevention and Reduction Act of 2013.” www.GovTrack.us. 2013. May 16, www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr602.GovTrack.us.AmendmentH.R.hr2910.https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/2020,602—113thCongress:Veterans2ndProtectionAct.”www.2013.May18,2020,https://

, Now Is the Time: The President’s Plan to Protect our Children and Our Communities by Reducing Gun Violence, January 16, 2013, http://www.wh.gov/ now-is-the-tim.

promising seeds are unable to cover a huge piece of legislation that leaked through both chambers of the 113th Congress and kept the voices of numerous protesters unanswered. Respecting the fact that constitutional right contained in the Second Amendment should be inalienable for every righteous citizen, it should also be a vivid desire for every American resident, especially legislator, to secure it with the law preventing unauthorized use of any kind of firearm towards other people. Therefore, the execution of this constitutional law shall be used according to its purpose, which is to ensure the sovereignty of the nation and the safety of individuals’ households. By not acting on most gun control acts of 2013-2015, the 113th Congress not only weakened the power and sense of the Second Amendment, but also put the next generations of American citizens in the danger of repeating the same experiences all over again.

Buchanan, James Tullock, Gordon The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy Vol.3; Liberty3; Liberty Fund, 1999, pp. 283–284

Krouse,18,prevention-and-reduction-act,democrats-introduce-gun-violence-gov/press-release/rep-waxman-and-house-web/20140207030028/https://waxman.house.https://web.archive.org/accessedMay2020.WilliamJ.

Flitter, Emily, Dan Burns, “Connecticut Gunman Had Hundreds of Rounds; Obama to Console Newtown,” Reuters, December 16, H.R.2012.2910

Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress: the Analysis of the Legal Answer for Mass Shootings in the United States

Jan Hernik September 2022

“Gun Control Legislation in the 113th Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R42987, January 8, Lacey,2015., Marc; David M. Herszenhorn (January 9, 2011). “In Attack’s Wake, Political Repercussions”. The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on January 10, 2011 Retrieved on May 17, 2020.

O’Neill, Ann (August 26, 2015). “Theater shooter Holmes gets 12 life sentences, plus 3,318 years”. CNN. Retrieved August 26, Roll2015.call list of the vote on S.649, WhiteAcrossTheOfTopherus/congress/bills/113/s649.2013.SafeS.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s179.us/congress/bills/113/s179”2013.PreventionS.bills/113/s150.16,BanS.202022,2020.session=1&vote=00097,lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_https://accessedMay22,150—113thCongress:AssaultWeaponsof2013.”www.GovTrack.us.2013.May2020,https://www.govtrack.us/congress/179—113thCongress:GunTraffickingActof2013.”www.GovTrack.us.May19,2020,https://www.govtrack.https://www.649—113thCongress:SafeCommunities,SchoolsActof2013.”www.GovTrack.us.May16,2020,https://www.govtrack.McDougaletAl.,IgarapeInst.&Univ.SanDiegoTrans-BorderInst.,TheWayofGun: EstimatingFirearmsTrafficTheU.S-MexicoBorder ,5(2013).House

referenCes:

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Mariusz DecadesPateyof partitions and those of communist rule in Poland have contributed to imitation culture. People in Poland believe anything of Western origin is better than domestic goods. What gave rise to this state of affairs was propaganda efforts of partitioning states to belittle Polish statecraft and culture. Poles were instilled with a sense of inferiority while decades of communist rule perpetuated this view.

Polish Technology The Warsaw Institute Review62

POlAND IS NOT A PlACE FOR INNOvATION

The Polish army also failed to develop a set of mechanisms for innovation support. Whether the military acquires a new product depends on individuals and not a cohesive Goodwillsystem.people

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What has now become a synonym for success is a well-limited music genre developed in the United States, France, Italy, or elsewhere where societies enjoy high self-esteem. Customers in Poland look for foreign brands while domestic manufacturers seek to lurk them as their products tend to take foreign names—like Poland-based Reserved, Cropp, or Gino Rossi. Seeking to make the domestic economy flourish, it is vital to develop a domestic-oriented mindset to brush aside a servant-like mentality.

But the project itself is never implemented for free. Those who make money off them are state clerks and contractors. The originator is under pressure to waive intellectual property rights.

Unfortunately, many vital projects have been dropped. Below are a few examples.

helped develop such weapons as Piorun man-portable airdefense system, Pirat anti-tank guide missile, Krab 155 mm tracked gunhowitzer, or Grot modular assault rifle.

evidenced by their attitude toward what is referred to as participatory budgeting. Originators of any interesting solutions hand them to the local government for free.

State officials also fear domestic solutions as they opt for foreign-made goods and services instead of selecting domestic Culturalproduction.hindrance goes hand in hand with institutional shortages—as no state institution in Poland is now in charge of investing in innovation. Indeed, Poland is home to some emerging funds eager to support startups yet their capital seems scarce while their return on investment is negative. Neither state nor privately held capital can sustain innovation.

It was indigenously developed by a consortium comprised of the Institute of Aviation in Warsaw, the Military Aviation Works No. 1 in Łódź, and the Polish

1. I lx-27 HIGH - Ca PaCIt Y U nmanned H elIC o P ter

State offices in Poland fail to acknowledge the importance of intellectual capital, as

“Theaerostat.development

Althoughvehicle.theprototype

to Dr. Robert Dwilinski, co-inventor of gallium nitride crystal production technology, “despite declarations of betting on innovation, the state is still reluctant to invest in technology on a long-term basis due to risks. No one can do it otherwise. Either you risk or you bet on already-tested solutions to avoid risk-taking.”

Polish research institutions are trapped in a publish-or-perish scheme, driven by topdown regulations. What obstructs efforts to implement innovation in Poland is the fact that research papers contain some technical details, which is not necessary.

received ministry funding, its serial production was eventually dropped as state officials believed the Polish army would assist only in foreign military missions. No one could even think a war might break out in Europe.

Anders was a series of multirole, tracked combat vehicle designed by OBRUM, a research and development centre. With its 120 mm unmanned turret, the tank could perform a role of a combat support vehicle. Its modular solutions allow for a multitude of possible configurations. It could carry eight fully equipped soldiers. The Hitfist30P turret could be used as an infantry fighting

unmanned vehicles been produced, they now could carry out a mission in war-torn Mariupol to deliver medicine, food, and other commodities. They could be used to evacuate people from the besieged Azovstal steel plant. The ILX-27 unmanned helicopter has never seen the light of day due to some erroneous political decisions. The purchase cost stands at some PLN 10 million, which is a fifth of the purchase cost of a multipurpose helicopter such as a Black Hawk.

Polish Technology The Warsaw Institute Review64

3. t wo- I n CH G allIU m n Itr I de C rYstals

high-power LEDs rely on gallium nitride. It could enable better vehicle performance and efficiency for both plug-in hybrids and battery electric vehicles. Power density is greatly improved in gallium nitride devices compared to silicon ones. Gallium nitride-based technology could double an electric car’s driving range. Furthermore, it is used in a broad spectrum of radar

Poland-based tech company Ammono was building up its stock of superhigh-quality gallium nitride crystals. Blu-Ray discs and

4. t et H ered H elIU m aerostats

Adaptronica, a Poland-based company, has teamed with the Institute of Fundamental Technological Research of the Polish Academy of Science to introduce innovation it had developed for fourteen years. One example that could boost safety is the tethered helium aerostat. It could monitor a targeted area with high-end cameras, operating at a ground distance of 100–300 meters and 24 hours per day. As helium is released into the atmosphere, two-hour breaks are required once several days to pump more helium into the

of innovation requires systemic, long-term cooperation between all actors involved in the process of funding research and implementing its results,” according to Adaptronica CEO.

2. a nders P rotot YP e lIGH t tank

Accordingsystems.

scientific and research organization Air Force Institute of Technology. In late 2009, Poland’s science and higher education ministry channeled R&D financing into its research program, labeled 0048/R/ T00/2009/08 “Unmanned multi-purpose helicopter.” A prototype was unveiled, but no further research continued while the project team fell apart. The entire project cost the Polish taxpayer some PLN 25 Hadmillion.these

modest, what tips the scales is effective management and cooperation.

It is high time Poland scrapped the concept of leapfrogging. If the Central European state seeks to turn into a technology-based economy, there is no choice but to channel public funds into innovation.

Poland is also home to large coal deposits. Coal costs too much to be just burnt— it is used in many industries. Despite the country’s rich mining traditions, there are just a handful of companies able to develop advanced coal-processing technologies.

What is just part of the truth is a lack of capital and an immature market. The biggest headache Poland faces with innovation is that state and private institutions are poorly prepared to support innovation projects. No one can schedule a thought-induced project. Nor can they control when or where it is created. This is why the fastest-developing nations are those that grab new technologies aptly and incorporate them into their economies.©Source:

Wikimedia Commons

let’s bemoan f I rst State offices that handle mostly EU funds usually do a poor job. Perhaps the biggest enemy of innovation in Poland is bureaucracy and its strict rules on research financing and settlement. And yet like no other branch, this one is desperate for a flexible and ambitious approach.

Efforts to develop new technologies yet involve financial outlays. As those remain

Poland has materials that it extracts yet does not process. One example is KGHM, Poland’s state-run mining company that produces copper and silver. But there is no company responsible for producing cutting-edge copper goods.

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Those that reap benefits are foreign-based Polishbusinesses.companies, on the other hand, are oriented toward a product that brings profit rather in the short term, which discourages or even prevents the perception of innovation development in the long term.

Perhapsanalysts.aKGHM-held

First, let’s develop those institutions that might detect promising solutions to sell them onto the market. Unlike other grants, such institutions should account for the value increase of their assets. Whether they notch up success depends on whether they can bring together knowledge across different fields, including finance, science, or market studies.

the state into some fields could end up in establishing an innovation-friendly environment.

A hypothetical Polish National Railways (PKP) fund could raise the quality of Polish railway companies. Rail industry specialists would be a better choice to assess innovation potential rather than bank

For example, a Defense Ministry fund could back the country’s defense capabilities and attract money to the state budget. This would unleash the potential for private defense firms. Present in the fund, military officials would ensure that its offer boosts the army’s competitiveness.

Amarket.Polish

Coal Agency fund could invest in many coal-related projects to retain jobs, thus spurring the coal-processing field that runs independently of the energy sector.

fund could invest in copper-based products and thus extend the material’s value chains on the Polish

should be taken to break the glass ceiling of the impossible and build a knowledge-based economy?

Polish Technology The Warsaw Institute Review66

Cities can tap many local funding sources to pay for urban infrastructure projects. It would be more convenient to ask urban engineers, city planners, and architects to discuss whether a city needs such a solution or not. Perhaps a Warsaw Fund, once established to pay for urban innovations, could place this responsibility onto the city hall. One success will bring on another.

I can easily imagine a like-funded fleet of hovercrafts to transport passengers across the Vistula River to ease road congestions in suburban towns.

could be included within a mezzanine fund affiliated to Poland’s Armaments Agency.

Poles have to step out of their comfort zone and learn how to cooperate. Universities now launch some innovation funds that provide incentives and promote innovation among students and teachers. What seems problematic is the amount of capital and a stable source of funding for higher-budget innovation projects. Unfortunately, only a handful of funds attain the targeted rate of return. The problem is that Polish startups lack knowledge of the niche market they aspire to Surprisingly,target.inviting

Mariusz Patey September 2022

An Interior Ministry fund could promote solutions for internal security.

The simplest way to export Polish technological thought is through embracing it by domestic users, both institutions and privately held businesses.

Poland’s considerable albeit untapped intellectual potential involves thousands of engineers, IT specialists, researchers, and designers. Labour is also becoming more expensive, which could eventually scrap Soleapfrogging.whatsteps

Let’s foster creative thinking capabilities to make money.

Full-grown solutions that require some substantial medium-term expenditure

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