W
Volume 1 Issue 2 January 2002
To r Sea each far ou er r s
avelength centrofin@centrofin.gr
Seamanship
CENTRO-NEWS
What is seamanship? It is certainly more than knots, bends and hitches and it really does have a considerable relevance to 21st century shipping. The preface to Nicholls "Seamanship and Nautical Knowledge", a book that instructed generations of ships' officers as they learned their craft, offers a helpful guide: "seamanship‌includes with its limits more than a passing knowledge of mechanics and physics‌ the structure of the vessel, her stability, equipment, internal organization and mobility; the conveyance of cargoes and the working of the ship as an economic unit, together with a general knowledge of many nautical trainings which the seaman may never be called upon to exercise in practice." "The ideal seaman is he who says and does the proper thing in just the proper way and at the proper time, a man who has developed sea sense and nautical sagacity."
Insufficient experience Too often, in accident reports or court cases, one hears evidence of the failure of people to exhibit sufficient seamanship when the going got rough. Older seafarers brought up in a harder world, where a four year apprenticeship was served entirely at sea, often express their doubts about their more academically inclined cadets of today. These cadets will be deemed able to receive their first certificates after quite literally just a few months
aboard ship away from the classrooms in the colleges where they gain most of their knowledge. It's just not long enough to gain sufficient experience, they say, no matter how many entries there are in the cadet's record book. The modern seaman is computer aided and wholly computer literate, electronically assisted and e-mail connected, satellite guided but, it is often suggested, increasingly disconnected with the hazardous natural world he inhabits. He sits inside the climate controlled wheelhouse, carefully insulated to protect the precious instrumentation and equipment from the salty world outside, which he tends to view remotely. Electronics rather than sounding lines tell him the depth of the sea and the contents of his tanks. The officer of the watch does not feel the wind in his hair or the salt spray on his lips, such phenomena being anathema in the enclosed bridge or control centre in which he spends his lonely vigil.
At this issue pg2
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation pg4
Life Boats pg6
Science and Art A deck below, the shipmaster is hunched over his computer, manuals, and the piles of paper at his elbow as, hour after hour, he wades through the bureaucracy that has become his lot. What was meant by seamanship when he came to sea 35 years ago might seem rather remote to him, too. Only a splash of spray whipping over the bow and the occasional
!
H.E. U.S. Ambassador Thomas Miller hands over to Centrofin's Q & S Manager Anthony Lambros (l) the AMVER award.
Pilot onboard a delicate matter pg8
Types of modern oil tanker
...cont'd to pg 2
Bosphorus Strait
The Bosphorus is a strait of increasing importance. This 17-mile long half a mile wide waterway divides Asia from Europe and connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea oil flows. The 2000 estimated oil flow through this strait was 1.6 mbd. Destination of oil exports: Western and Southern Europe; Main Concerns: Bosphorus is one of the world's busiest straits with some 50,000 vessel's annually (the same as the Strait of Malacca), including 5,500 oil tankers. Increasing exports from the Caspian Sea region will mean increasing tanker traffic through this strait.
TO THE MASTER: Please circulate this Bulletin to the CREW.
International Tanker Owners
ITOPF T
he International Tanker Owners
evolved into the maritime industry's primary
environment assimilates spilt oil through the
Pollution Federation Limited or ITOPF
source of objective technical advice, expertise,
long-term process of biodegradation.
is a non-profit making organization. About 90 per
assistance and information on effective response
cent of its income comes from subscriptions paid
to ship-source pollution.
Persistence of Oil
by P&I insurers on behalf of their shipowner
In considering the fate of spilled oil at sea, a
Fate of Marine Oil Spills
distinction is frequently made between non-
Members or Associates. This gives them access
When oil is spilt at sea it spreads and moves on
persistent oils, which tend to disappear rapidly
to the organization's full range of technical and
the surface while undergoing a number of
from the sea surface, and persistent oils, which
information services, usually at no cost.
chemical and physical changes, collectively
in contrast dissipate more slowly and usually
ITOPF's Membership compromises over 4,000
termed weathering. The diagram below
require a clean up response. The definition of a
tanker owners and bareboat charterers, who
schematically represents the different processes
non-persistent oil developed in relation to
between them own or operate more than 8,000
involved.
compensation is given on later. However, this
members, who they enroll in ITOPF as either
definition is based on distillation characteristics
Weathering Processes
of oils under standard laboratory conditions. It
Most of the processes,
an oil in the environment, where factors such
such as evaporation,
as burial in sediments can lead to the long-term
dispersion, dissolution
persistence of oils that would normally be
and sedimentation,
defined as non-persistent.
may not, therefore, fully reflect the behavior of
lead to the disappearance of oil
Models
from the surface of
The main oil properties which affect the
the sea, whereas
behavior of spilt oil at sea are specific gravity
others, particularly
(its density relative to pure water often
tankers, barges and combination carriers with a
the formation of water-in-oil emulsions
expressed as API); distillation characteristic (its
total gross tonnage of almost 190 million GT.
("mouse") and the accompanying increase in
volatility); viscosity (its resistance to flow); and
This represents virtually all the world's oil and
viscosity, promote its persistence. The speed
pour point (the temperature below which it
chemical tank vessel tonnage and so it is
and relative importance of the processes
will not flow).
extremely rare for the owner of any such ship
depends on factors such as the quantity and
Since the interactions between the various
engaged in international trade not to be a
type of oil, the prevailing weather and sea
weathering processes are not well understood,
member of ITOPF.
conditions, and whether the oil remains at sea
reliance is often placed on empirical models
Since its establishment in 1968, ITOPF has
or is washed ashore. Ultimately, the marine
based upon the properties of oil types. For this
...cont'd from pg 1 thump as the vessel butts into a bigger wave reminds him of the world outside and the cruel sea his ship is crossing. The parameters of what we mean by seamanship have not changed in the slightest; it is just the tools of the seaman which have become updated, along with the ship and its equipment.
Prudence Seamanship is prudence, which is a lovely term, but one that is severely practical. Prudence anticipates the worst, and when the worst happens as it inevitably does, has an immediate strategy to allow for it. Prudence is the assumption that things invariably go wrong, it is the ingrained ability of spatial awareness and the need for sea
room, the likelihood that the person on the other bridge does not comprehend the collision rules and is mad, blind or drunk. Prudence tests every item of equipment before using it, always has an eye on alternatives and never takes anything for granted. Prudence would never dream of relying on a single source of navigational information, checking and double checking. Prudence
- pg 2 -
would recall that even the best radars fail to detect sizeable targets, such as that glass fibre yacht or wooden fishing boat that the mark one eyeball is more likely to discover after it has crept unnoticed among the clutter, under the guard rings of the radar.
Knowledge & experience Seamanship is indeed prudence, but
Pollution Federation purpose, it is convenient to
the oils, the expected rates of
classify the most commonly
dissipation can be predicted.
transported oils into four main
These are shown in the graph,
groups, roughly according to their
where account is also taken of the
specific gravity. Having classified
competing process of
emulsification which, for most
might generate.
oils, leads to an increase in
Whilst the term persistent is not
volume and viscosity.
precisely defined in any of the
Group I oils (non-persistent) tend
Conventions, the IOPC Fund have
to dissipate completely through
developed guidelines which are
evaporation within a few hours
widely accepted. Under these
and do not normally form
guidelines, an oil is considered
emulsions. Groups II and III oils
non-persistent if at the time of
can lose up to 40% by volume
shipment at least 50 per cent of
through evaporation but, because
the hydrocarbon fractions, by
of their tendency to form viscous
volume, distill at a temperature
emulsions, there is an initial
of 340 C (645 F), and at least 95
volume increase as well as a
per cent of the hydrocarbon
curtailment of natural dispersion,
fractions, by volume, distill at a
particularly in the case of Group
temperature of 370 C (700 F),
III oils. Group IV oils are very
when tested in accordance with
persistent due to their lack of
the American Society for Testing
volatile material and high
and Materials' Method D86/78 or
viscosity which precludes both
any subsequent revision thereof.
evaporation and dispersion.
Oils which are normally classified
It is important to appreciate the
as persistent include crude oils,
assumptions upon which such
fuel oils, heavy diesel and
models are based and not to place
lubricating oils. Non-persistent
too much reliance on the results.
oils include gasoline, light diesel
However, they can serve as a
oil and kerosene.
useful guide to understanding how a particular oil is likely to behave and help in assessing the scale of the problem which a spill
Courtesy ITOPF
Guess the artist or the museum and a EPIRB watch will be yours
seamanship is also a craft heavily based on knowledge and experience, of watching and listening. Some might suggest that things go wrong less often these days, and those who should be anticipating disaster are less attuned to it. There is probably something in this explanation. It does take discipline to exhibit seamanship. For all the science and technology, it is the walk around the deck at the end of
the watch that reveals the deck cargo starting to come loose, the frayed guy, the undogged door. The keen ears of the experienced engineers that first detect the menacing vibration of an overheated bearing, the senses of the engineer-seaman which smells the oil mist from the fracturing hydraulic or fuel line before it has become critical. It takes discipline and regular procedures to emerge from the
insulated cocoon of the wheelhouse or control room, to make the checks rather than make assumptions, which might be tragically wrong.
By Michael Grey (Extracts) Courtesy BIMCO Bulletin Editor's Viewpoint: "Seamanship is to have the Intelligence of what to Expect and the Knowledge of how to Respond"
- pg 3 -
SALOME by....................
Life Bo Throughout the marine industry, over the past few years there have been a large number of accidents with davit-launched totally enclosed lifeboats. Most of these involve injury to crewmembers of some nature and, particularly disturbing, death in a significant number of cases. With few exceptions the incidents investigated have involved "on-load release hook mechanisms". Although there are many variations to the causes of these accidents due to human error and the happening of secondary or tertiary failures, the root causes can be summarized under four headings:
! !
Poor original design of lifeboats and hook release mechanisms or mechanical failure ! Poor maintenance, or maintenance unrelated to the specific design of hook release mechanisms. ! Little attention paid to lifeboat operations. ! Lack of training in the various types of hook release mechanisms (this relates to ships crew and dry-dock staff) or improper use. It should be noted that the Safety of Life at
Sea Convention (SOLAS) is only a guide to sea-goers providing them an envelope of safe practices within which to work. The responsibility for applying it and detail design is in the hands of the owners, classification societies, and equipment designers.
LIFEBOAT DESIGN Lifeboats are designed, and are tested, to fall from a height of 3 metres with a full compliment of crew each having an average weight of 75 kg. Various incidents have shown that:
- pg 4 -
LOSS PREVE
The boat hull is strengthened in the keel area to withstand the impact forces, assuming the boat falls straight downward onto the keel. In some cases where the boat has turned during its drop to the water, the areas of the hull near the keel have broken open due to the impact. The seating in many boats has been provided to meet the basic requirements of SOLAS.
HOOK RELEASE MECHANISMS The design, operation and maintenance of these mechanisms are the area that has to be addressed in detail by all parties concerned. Many types of lifeboats have hook release mechanisms that enable the crew to release the falls when the boat is on the water. The objective of on-load hook release mechanisms for totally enclosed lifeboats is to enable the hooks to be released from within the boat in the event that some problem occurs with lowering. These boats are designed for the complete complement of crew to enter the boat at the embarkation deck, close the hatches, and operate the davit break from within to lower the boat to the water, and then cast off the hooks. This system is to enable ship's crew to leave a burning vessel and protect them from smoke, fumes, and flames while being lowered to the water and moving away from the ship. It should be noted that the majority of incidents happen when the boats are being lowered to the water during lifeboat drills. These are normally carried out when a tanker is waiting for cargo and therefore is ballasted when the height of the lifeboat above the water is much more than when the tanker is fully loaded.
DESIGN
> In order to prevent flame entering the
boat and compressed air from leaking, out some hook mechanisms are totally enclosed. This prevents visual inspection and maintenance to being carried out > In many cases it is not possible to clearly obtain good visual or body access to these mechanisms to enable proper maintenance, resetting of the hooks before recovering the boat. Whether the mechanisms are operated by rod or cable it is difficult to adjust them at the adjust-
oats > > > > > > > > > > >
ENTION
ment point, and see the positions of the hook release pawls. It is essential that when the mechanism is operated both hooks release at exactly the same time, and when the hooks are reset the pawls lock at the same time. >Many of the hooks, pivots pins, and locking pawls are made from carbon steels so that corrosion plays a big part in preventing release of the hook mechanisms. This can also cause one hook to release before the other. They should either be made from stainless steel (316L), or galvanized. >These lifeboats are designed so that they can be lowered to the water immediately the crew is on board. As a result the weight of the boat is hanging on the davits all the time. This means that the only time the hooks can be properly maintained or completely overhauled is when the vessel is at anchor or at the dry-dock, the boat has been lowered to the water, and the hooks released. >Some mechanisms, due to wear of their parts or fastening methods of operating rods or cables, have lost motion when operating them. This once again is a cause of one hook being released before the other, and the cause of difficulty in resetting them. >Injury has also been caused due to coxswain having to remove his safety harness so that he could move his body to operate the hook release mechanisms. In this case the boat was above water level and the coxswain's seat was so poorly constructed it broke when the boat hit the water. >In many cases the designers or manufacturers of the lifeboats do not give sufficiently detailed information on the construction of the mechanisms and the maintenance of them.
:)
> > Our > Joke: > Being on a ship is like in jail; > only the chance of with > getting drowned! > > MAINTENANCE
Many maintenance problems are due to poor design as mentioned above, but there are others that are due to poor practices.
1. SOLAS states that the falls shall be
turned end for end not more than every 30 months and replaced at intervals of not more than five years. "The falls" refers to the wire ropes. There is no legislation for the replacement of the other components that form part of the davit systems. Incidents have happened where the bottle screws at one end of the falls and the chain connecting the other end of them to the boat hooks have failed due to corrosion, and lack of inspection during dry-dock periods.
2. Depending on the capability or attitude of the crew, and owners or managers procedures, the maintenance of some boat hook mechanisms have been neglected by one crew and when found to be corroded by the following crew they have been partially greased and then hit with a hammer until free. In these cases the mechanisms should have been completely stripped down, repaired properly and then reset.
3. Lack of maintenance training has caused some incidents. Starting with poor maintenance manuals from the manufacturer and then lack of specific training by the owners/managers in the maintenance and setting of hook mechanisms. This also applies to dry dock companies who are responsible for overhauling the lifeboats during the fouryear dry dock.
closed, the lifeboat lowered by the coxswain from within the boat, and the hook release mechanisms operated when the boat is on the water.
3. The traditional method for the crew to enter the lifeboat has been that they muster, put on their lifejackets and enter the boat. With totally enclosed lifeboats this is not good practice for, when using the permanent buoyancy type of lifejacket, it is difficult or impossible to fasten the safety harness. SOLAS refers to this.
SUMMARY Ship owners and managers should review their loss prevention procedures in light of lessons learned from incidents.
!
!
OPERATION In a number of cases incidents happen and injuries to crew can be made worse due to
lifeboat operations.
1. In surprising number of cases incidents have been caused, or made worse, by lifeboat painters having been fastened off too short or caught on something while the boat was being lowered during lifeboat drill. This is due to lack of fore thought or attention being paid to such an important function safety drills. 2. When a lifeboat is being lowered with crew on board during a safety drill it is important to emulate a real situation. This means that the lifeboat hatches should be - pg 5 -
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
Hook release mechanisms must be kept maintained and adjusted so that boats can be lowered to the sea at the five minutes' notice required in SOLAS. Lifeboats should be able to be recovered, the hook mechanisms locked and the boat hoisted back to the embarkation deck; this is without crewmembers being injured. No system is 100 per cent fool proof. Therefore it is necessary to protect crewmembers in the event of the boat falling after the on-load release mechanism has been activated. This means that each seating position should have a headrest support for the lumbar region of the back, plus a padded seat. Harnesses should be used as opposed to a lap belt, and crew should not wear permanent buoyancy
lifejackets when entering the lifeboat. Detailed manuals regarding construction, operation and maintenance from lifeboat or release mechanism manufacturers, and detailed training given to crew by owners and managers on hook release mechanisms and lifeboat operations. It is also believed that classification societies should become more deeply involved in the whole aspects of loss prevention related to ship safety equipment and particularly on-load release mechanisms.
The
Master
(Officers)
& Pilot Relationship
A DELICATE MATTER
INTRODUCTION
necessary before the master arrives.
Many navigational incidents leading to grounding and collision involve pilots. The primary problems involve the role, responsibility and authority of the pilot on board. As per STCW 95 - section A-VIII/2-Part 3-1: Navigation with pilot on board. Art. 49 Despite the duties and obligations of the pilots, their presence on board does not relieve the master or officer in charge of the navigational watch from their duties and obligations for the safety of the ship. The master and the pilot shall exchange information regarding navigation procedures, local conditions and the ship's characteristics. The master and/or the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall co-operate closely with the pilot and maintain an accurate check on the ship's position and movement. Art. 50 If any doubt as the pilot's actions or intentions, the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall seek clarification from the pilot and, if doubt still exists, shall notify the master immediately and take whatever action is
Pilot on the Bridge Role, authority and responsibility
Some masters and deck officers might have other views on how to deal with pilots; these range from handing over the ship totally to them to a complete lack of trust and confidence-none of these two extremes is desirable. Pilots are generally engaged where they have an advantage over the ship's bridge team, namely in the confined waters of port approach, berthing and departure. Although they are more familiar with their own port and its facilities and with this type of navigation, the ship's team is more familiar with the ship.
Both sides need to work together to ensure a safe passage. A good master / pilot relationship is the best basis for a safe passage through the busy, confined and perhaps hazardous waters. To form such a relationship quickly requires both sides to have mutual respect and to understand each other's point of view.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED (1).-The Master is in command of the
Disposing of the waste mountain.
Be aware!
- pg 6 -
vessel's navigation at all times. Therefore, it is always the duty of the Master and OOW to keep a situational awareness of all activities of the pilot. Although the pilot is most knowledgeable about local waters, it is the responsibility of the Master / OOW to check the vessel's position through proper use of charts, radars and other position fixing devices and to follow local rules on speed and routing. (2) Voyage planning is crucial in all situations, including when pilots are on board. Sufficient time should be allowed for proper discussions between the Master, pilot and OOW. The voyage plan should include every important activity starting from the embarkation of the pilot, in and out of the berth, and finally the disembarkation of the pilot. (3) If the pilot is to command tugs and/or personnel at a berth in a language that is foreign to the crew, the Master must demand that the pilot communicates with the Master and/or OOW in a common language. (4) Charts should be marked with "wheel-over" points so it can be seen where and when (and with reference to what navigational points/aids) the vessel is required to start her planned course alterations. Radars can also be utilized for this purpose. This helps
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the pilot, Master and OOW to keep a better situational awareness. (5) The Master and the OOW are normally more knowledgeable of the manoeuvring capabilities of the ship than the pilot. Detailed descriptions of the ships manoeuvring characteristics should be communicated to the pilot during the voyage planning stage. In addition, the Master and/or OOW should discuss with the pilot manoeuvring capabilities during the voyages, as necessary. (6) Ensure that the vessel is equipped with the necessary updated charts for the intended voyage. It is not acceptable to rely on the pilot to provide this information (7) The OOW should always closely monitor the activities of the pilot. Often the pilot will not necessarily communicate with the OOW regarding the vessel and/or voyage. The OOW should not hesitate to communicate with the pilot on any relevant matters regarding the vessel or the voyage. (8) The OOW should not only be diligent with regard to ensuring that the pilot's orders are properly followed but also monitoring the pilot's activities. If the OOW has concerns regarding the pilot's activities, he should contact the Master immediately. (9) The vessel should have clear procedures and instructions to the Master and OOW on what is expected of them when a pilot is on board. These should be included as a part of the vessel's safety management system (SMS). (10) BRM is important for ensuring the vessel's safety. Any BRM training should include how to handle the change in communication, command, and control when a pilot takes over navigation of the ship.
PILOT TRAINING & LICENSING NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (?)
The Intertanko "Sydney Tanker Event 2001" last April in depth addressed the pilotage, the pilot's liabilities and
QUOTATIONS The only way OUT is THROUGH A good woman inspires a man; a brilliant woman interests him; a beautiful woman fascinates him; and a sympathetic woman gets him You can be a genius - if you can put your mind into it. TRY IT!
the management of risk through realistic allocation of accountability. The modern pilot today is required to work in close cooperation with the bridge team but at the same time to exercise independent judgment when the vessel is exposed to risk. The role of the pilot is developing from being a provider of local knowledge to a manager of high-risk operation on behalf of the community that has licensed him. The traditional training programmes based on technical skills and experiences have reached their limitations of effectiveness. The airline-industry's research into the human factor element in accidents resulted in the training of airline pilots being built around this. There are three human factor issues: (1) Selection (2) Binding Codes of Ethics and Professional Conduct and (3) Training. The subject is enormous with a legal argument. The Pilots' international body, IMPA, is believed (ought to) to have taken a lead role in developing, implementing and consolidating an international standard under the auspices of IMO. A BRM / SAS course for pilots will definitely help the industry too. Most incidents are related to: Contact with the dock / berth / dolphin; Grounding at anchorage; Grounding whilst underway. Dear Master, Chapter VIII of STCW-95 after thoroughly being studied should be the subject of an extensive SAFETY MEETING among all the watchkeeping personnel of your vessel.
Experience, the name men give to their mistakes
MURPHY's LAW (Edward Murphy - American born 1917)
Anything that can go wrong will go wrong Everything goes wrong all at once. Smile...tomorrow will be worse (Can you name another of Murphy's Law? Are you exercising enough prudence on you daily life; home /onboard? The Editor)
WINNERS vs LOSERS The Winner is always part of the answer; The Loser is always part of the problem. The Winner always has a programme; The Loser always has an excuse. The Winner says "Let me do it for you" The Loser says "That's not my job". The Winner sees an answer for every problem; The Loser sees a problem for every answer. The Winner says "It may be difficult but it is possible"; The Loser says "It may be possible but it is too difficult" BE A WINNER; for your self first!
Remember our "Photograph Contest" as per Issue 1
- pg 7 -
Types of modern oil tanker Panamax tankers Ships in the 55-70,000 dwt size range. 70,000 dwt being approximately the maximum size tanker able to transit the Panama Canal. The need to pass through a series of Canal locks dictates a maximum length of 274.3 meters and maximum breadth of 32.3 metres. In the Atlantic Basin trades Panamax vessels have a competitive advantage over larger tankers due to physical trading and local port depth restrictions. North American imports of crude and fuel oil comprise the bulk of Panamax tanker business. Typical double hull ship of 60,000 dwt 228.6 m length overall x 32.2 m breadth x 12.6 m drafts Lightship 11,000 tons of steel
Aframax tankers Tankers in the 75,000-120,000 dwt size range AFRA is Average Freight Rate Assessment. At one time Aframax was used to refer to ships up to 79,999 dwt, the upper limit of one of six deadweight groups for which the AFRA rate is assessed. Aframax has since become a general term for ships in this overall size range. Aframax ships are traditionally employed on a wide variety of short and medium-haul crude oil trades. The biggest tanker that can be accommodated fully laden in the ports of the U.S the world's largest importer of oil is 100,000 dwt, and this only at a limited number of ports. Many of the more modern ships in the Aframax size range are built as long-haul product tankers with epoxy-coated tanks. Typical double hull ship of 100,000 dwt 253.0 m length overall x 44.2 m breadth x 11.6 m draft Lightship 14,850 tons of steel
Suezmax tankers Suezmax tankers are ships in the 120,000-200,000 dwt size range and are generally identified as those capable of lifting one million barrel cargoes. The name was originally bestowed on such ships because from 1980, when a development project which deepened the waterway to 16.1 metres was completed, the largest tankers able to transit the Suez Canal fully laden were those of 140,000-150,000 dwt. This association will effectively become redundant when a project to deepen the Canal to 18.9 metres is completed. The Canal may be further deepened to 20.1 metres by 2005 and 22.0 metres by 2010. Typical double hull ship of 150,000 dwt 274.0 m length overall x 50.0 m breadth x 14.5 m draft Lightship 20,000 tons of steel
Very large crude carriers (VLCCs) VLCCs are tankers in the 200,000 320,000 dwt size range. Ships of this size were prompted by the rapid growth in global oil consumption during the 1960s and, in 1967, closure of the Suez Canal, necessitating voyages around the cape of Good Hope. Today, VLCCs are the most effective way of transporting large volumes of oil, including 2-million barrel cargoes, to customers over relatively long distances. Relatively simple ships. VLCCs are subdivided into a number of cargo tanks by two longitudinal and several transverse bulkheads. Typical double hull ship of 280,000 dwt 335.0 m length overall x 57.0 m breadth x 21.0 m draft Lightship 35,000 tons of steel
Ultra large crude carriers (ULCCs) Tankers in excess of 320,000 dwt. Most ships of this type were built in the mid to late 1970s and are now approaching 25 years of age. Ordered to take advantage of the economies of scale in a buoyant market, they were delivered as oil prices skyrocketed and demand collapsed. They are now under 40 of these ships remaining. Rather inflexible and limited to serving a few deepwater ports. ULCCs never achieved their full potential. In early 2000 a tanker owner ordered two 440,000 dwt ULCCs with 2 options, the first ULCC order in 20 years. Typical double hull ship of 410,000 dwt 377.0 m length overall x 68.0 m breadth x 23.0 draft Lightship 45,000 tons of steel
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Articles written in this bulletin do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of CENTROFIN. DISCLAIMER. The contents provided herewith are for general information purposes only; not intended to replace or otherwise contradict the detailed instructions issued by the owners, flag etc.
CE
(Courtesy INTERTANKO)
Editor: Cmdr Nicholas A. Iliopoulos Staff Captain Manning & Training Tel: +30.0108983305 Fax: +30.0108983231 E-mail: nai@centrofin.gr Design-Production : Paradox Adv. +30.0106560832