Freedom of Movement: Why we need open borders

F O M O D E E FR T N E M E V O M Why we need open borders

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT Why we need open borders December 2020 Written by Sohail Jannesari, edited by Ed Lewis, with additional input from Nick Dearden, Aisha Dodwell, Zoe Gardner, Dorothy Guerrero, Alex Scrivener and Jonathan Stevenson.

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CONTENTS Introduction

4

1. Why we need open borders

7

2. Achieving free movement

16

3. Addressing challenges

24

Conclusion

32

References

33

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INTRODUCTION Even in the middle of a global pandemic, few days go by when migration is not in the news. Migrants have become the perpetual scapegoat, to distract from the damaging anti-social policies of the elite and to boost the votes of demagogues – in the UK and around the world.

Under constant assault, even those who normally support human rights can be forced onto the back foot.

Rather than big visions – of a world in which all enjoy equal rights to move freely around the globe with equal protection – we are forced into defensive campaigns. Migrants battle to meet their most basic needs in the face of threats of destitution, arrest and deportation.

In this, we face an uphill struggle, as even the limited system set up to protect the rights of refugees is being unwound at an alarming rate, by authoritarians and populists who pretend that the victims of our global economic system are actually the cause of our problems.

So we need to do something more: to change this narrative we must get back on the front foot. We must speak

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with hope and energy about the sort of world we want to see. After all, really big changes have always come about when those campaigning and organising have been ‘unrealistic’ in what they’re calling for; when we have demanded the impossible.

How else would the slave trade have been defeated? How else would women and working men have won the vote? How else would the NHS, social housing or comprehensive schooling have come into being?

It cannot be right that the place you are born dictates whether you will live a life of poverty or plenty, of freedom or imprisonment. It cannot be right that while the richest move around with ease, the poorest are imprisoned in geographical poverty.

That’s why Global Justice Now is proudly calling for for the right to free movement of all people in the world.

We know this will not come about overnight – and indeed, Covid-19 has brought about necessary

temporary restrictions on freedom of movement even within countries.

But freedom of movement is a long term struggle. It will require many years and decades of persistent work. Huge movements will need to be built, with those most deprived of the right to move at the forefront.

The scale of the challenge should not prevent us from starting, here and now. After all, the ethical case for free movement is strong: it cannot be right that the place you are born dictates whether you will live a life of poverty or plenty, of freedom or imprisonment. It cannot be right that while the richest can move around with freedom, the poorest – those who have most to benefit from such movement – are imprisoned in geographical poverty. This is a form of apartheid on a global scale.

The injustice is particularly acute when we remember that the very reason so many people need to move is the result of economic and political decisions made in the richest part of the world. For hundreds of years, Europeans have run empires, conducted one-sided trade, allowed their big businesses to pillage the planet. Our countries have created environmental and social disaster. They drew the lines on maps which created the ‘nations’ that still dictate the fates of most

people in the world. And then they prevented people from leaving those nations to come and share in the wealth which was stolen from them.

Here, then, we need to be clear what we mean by free movement.

We reject entirely the free market notion that ‘free movement’ is about people being forced to move so that they can produce a greater profit for someone somewhere else.

Our starting point is that movement is not ‘free’ until people have the choice not to move as well.

There is a myth that the last few decades – the era of neoliberalism – have seen unprecedented openness, tearing down the barriers of old. This isn’t true. Neoliberalism has been about the dismantling of barriers to capital, so that big business and big finance can accumulate ever more money. But this same period, with a few notable exemptions, has also seen the borders faced by most people in the world multiply. The barriers to movement have become harder and more brutal, from an environment so ‘hostile’ that migrants are persuaded to ‘deport themselves’ here in the UK, to incarceration in concentration camps in Texas, torture in North Africa, and mass death in the Mediterranean. Even the border industry that implements this system generates big profits for

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a few – a quasi-military economic sector worth £15 billion in Europe alone – and misery for the many.

about keeping resources and power in the hands of the few, and controlling and dividing the many.

If we want to create a more equal world, we must reverse this logic.

We must create barriers so that big business and big finance cannot exploit at will, so that people are not forced to move in search of a decent life. But at the same time, we must lower the barriers which prevent the great majority of humanity from being able to achieve their rights and live the lives of dignity that we all deserve.

This pamphlet is our small contribution to making the vision of free movement a reality. We look at the major reasons why borders are unjust, at some previous and existing examples of free movement around the world, and at some steps governments could take to bring this vision a step closer. And we show how this vision is not nearly as impossible as we might believe.

Photo: © Jess Hurd/Global Justice Now

The truth is that people have always moved, and those in control of society have often tried to stop them in order to control them. Throughout history, borders are fundamentally

On its own, this pamphlet will hardly change the world. But we hope it might begin to change minds, to inspire, to mobilise. And we present it in the certain knowledge that, like all systems of apartheid, this one must eventually fall.

March 2016: Global Justice Now, with the help of guerrilla projectionists Feral X, project “Refugees welcome” across the white cliffs of Dover, just before an alliance of far-right groups were due to hold anti-migration protests in the town.

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1. WHY WE NEED OPEN BORDERS Borders are violent The first argument for opening borders is simple: by doing so, we would end the violence of border controls.

In November 2019 the British public were shocked by the discovery of the bodies of 39 Vietnamese migrants in a refrigerated lorry, who had paid traffickers to be smuggled into the UK. While this tragedy rightfully led to public shock and dismay, it is among thousands of cases of migrants dying while attempting dangerous journeys.

Between 2014 and 2019 almost 20,000 people died in the Mediterranean while attempting to cross the EU’s external border with Turkey and North Africa. These deaths primarily occurred because border controls forced people to take dangerous routes, often via sea on ill-suited vessels. The situation deteriorated in 2016 following the EU-Turkey deal, in which Turkey agreed, in exchange for €6 billion, to seal its border with Greece to prevent migrants travelling into the EU. This led to an increase in the number of migrants who were driven to try and reach Europe by sea, significantly increasing the number of fatalities from sea crossings.1

Those attempting dangerous journeys are typically moving because of poverty, conflict or persecution. The UN refugee agency estimates that over 70 million people were forced to flee their homes in 2018 alone – the highest numbers on record.

But in response to rising numbers of people attempting to move, around the world states have been clamping down on irregular migration. There are now over 50 border walls across the world, a phenomenon almost unheard of in the middle of the 20th century, and the sums being spent on border enforcement have surged in recent years.2 Mainstream reaction to the deaths of migrants on precarious journeys often points the finger at the callousness of smugglers.3 But this narrative is deeply flawed. It fails to acknowledge that if movement was unrestricted by border controls, people would not be forced to resort to such desperate measures.

And when states impose greater barriers to movement, the resulting suffering is often made worse.

This suffering is not merely caused by the dangerous routes migrants

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have been forced to take. Today’s increasingly militarised borders all too often produce violence directly.

Consider, for example, the long and tragic list of people killed by border guards the world over. Since 2003, along the US-Mexican border 97 people have been killed as a result of encounters with the US border force.4 Between 2001 and 2017, 936 people have been killed along the Bangladesh-India border by the Indian Border Security Force and other state forces.5 Human Rights Watch has reported numerous incidents of Turkish border guards shooting at and killing Syrian refugees as they try to cross the border.6 Murders at the US-Mexico border include those of 16-year-old Mexican Jose Rodriguez, killed by a US border patrol agent in 2012, shot from behind by 10 bullets as he ran away.7 They include the murder of 15-year-old Bangladeshi Felani Khatun shot by India’s border security force in 2011, her dead body left hanging on the barbed wire border.8 Or a group of at least 15 migrants travelling from Morocco to the Spanish enclave of Ceuta who died after being shot at by the Spanish Guardia Civil, unable to stay afloat in the water.9 Murders at the border almost never result in convictions. The killer of

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Jose Rodriguez was acquitted of murder and manslaughter,10 the killer of Felani Khatun found not guilty due to insufficient evidence,11 while a Spanish judge deemed that the case against the killers of Larios Foto, one of the Moroccan migrants, had no merit.12 Instead, the institutional and legal response to these murders is, typically, to deny, cover up and lie.

In the US, border patrols have justified their violence by faking statistics to show a sharp rise in the number of assaults against them.13 And after the 2014 Ceuta shootings, the Spanish Interior Minister Fernández Díaz initially denied that shots were fired; the lie was quickly exposed through private footage. The Spanish police then released propaganda footage of a large number of people approaching the border fence in a bid to deflect criticism.14 A further dangerous trend in border control in recent years is the way in which rich countries have outsourced this violence to other countries whose state institutions are even more repressive. The EU is particularly guilty of this. Beyond driving migrants to dangerous sea crossings, a further consequence of the 2016 EU-Turkey deal was that thousands of migrants faced human rights abuses at the hands of Turkish authorities.15 The EU has agreed similar arrangements with Sudan, Morocco and Libya,

leading to abuses in all cases. The case of Libya is particularly troubling – with joint support from the EU and Italy, the Libyan Coast Guard and Ministry of Interior have been implicated in the abuse, extortion, torture, sexual violence and forced labour of migrants.16

in the Mediterranean Sea.18 In 2018 Hungary passed a law making it a crime to assist any migrants in acquiring a residence permit.19 In the US, four women have been charged for leaving food and water along the US border for migrants crossing the desert in the baking heat.20

The violence of borders is not confined to those attempting to journey to another country, however.

Repressive immigration controls continue within the territory of states.

For borders to be enforced, states must have the power to snatch migrants from their homes, imprison them in detention centres and forcibly deport them. This often involves brutal treatment – for example, the UN observes that in all regions of the world migrants are detained in “appalling physical and hygiene conditions” which violate international human rights law; and physical and sexual abuse is widespread in detention centres.17

Despite the huge architecture of repression designed to control the movement of people, the fact remains that people still move in huge numbers, ‘legally’ or otherwise. Indeed, the migration of groups of people is a constant feature of human history. Border controls impose upon a natural and inevitable process a huge dose of fear, insecurity, suffering and death.

In their attempts to double down on border control, states have resorted to criminalising those acting in solidarity with migrants against border violence. At the time of writing Pia Klemp, a German boat captain of the charity Sea Watch, is awaiting trial in Sicily, threatened with up to 20 years in prison after rescuing more than 1,000 people from drowning

Borders are a form of global apartheid Borders may be violent, but what is their function? Most directly, today’s borders serve to exclude people from the global south moving to countries in the global north. As author and academic Reece Jones points out, this is part of a long historical trend dating back many centuries – it is the world’s poor whose movement is controlled, from master-serf relations in the middle ages through to the electrified fences and walls of today’s national borders.21

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Excluding people from the global south from moving to the north prevents them from having the opportunity to significantly increase their income. It is worth noting the scale of this phenomenon.

A professional earns eight times more in the UK than in Mali,22 even accounting for the UK’s higher cost of living. Around 50% of the variation in personal incomes across the world can be linked to a person’s country of residence.23 Calculations at the time of the study found that “compared to living in the poorest country in the world (DR Congo), a person gains more than 350% if she lives in the United States, more than 160% if she lives in Brazil, but only 32% if she lives in Yemen”.24 Each country has a range of potential incomes, from which it is very difficult to escape.

Further, the income disparities resulting from this exclusion relate to a whole raft of socio-economic disadvantages. For instance, compared to those in wealthier countries, people born in the poorest countries are “five times more likely to die before the age of five”, “ten times more likely to be malnourished” and much less likely to have access to clean water, shelter and basic education.25

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There is a further dimension to this problem. Borders don’t merely prevent people from poorer countries moving to richer ones. They also compound the disadvantage experienced by workers in poor countries. This is because, by limiting the ability of workers from those countries to move, they compel them to accept poorly paid, dangerous work. The era of neoliberal globalisation has intensified this problem – as capital has become able to move around the globe more freely, businesses are able to locate themselves where labour is cheapest and least well protected. Notoriously, industries such as the garment industry are concentrated in countries where poorly paid workers are faced with often horrendous conditions.

This was tragically revealed by the Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh in 2013 in which 1,134 people ere killed when a factory ceiling collapsed.

Media reaction focused on the failings of the company and its owners. But this was not simply a case of ‘bad apples’. In a situation of free movement, the dramatically increased bargaining power of workers would raise wages and standards, making such outcomes significantly less likely. However, when labour is immobilised by border controls, workers often have

little option but to provide cheap labour to unscrupulous employers.

In excluding, disempowering and impoverishing millions of people from poor countries, overwhelmingly from formerly colonised countries, today’s border regime effectively maintains a system of global apartheid.

The fundamental feature of South African apartheid was to construct a social order based on keeping the black population both separate and unequal. Black workers were compelled to labour under poor conditions and low wages, enriching South Africa’s white elite, and access to the white parts of South Africa was governed by a regime of identity documentation and mobility controls, backed up by militarised authorities. The same basic dynamic operates between the populations of the global south and the global north today. And just as the ending of apartheid was marked by the end of mobility restrictions on the black population, so too is free movement required to end global apartheid today.

The apartheid analogy extends further, in fact. A crucial element of South African apartheid involved granting limited access for black workers to white areas, but ensuring such workers lacked economic and

politics rights and were therefore easily exploitable. And of course, South African apartheid rested on deep-rooted racism. Today’s border regime reproduces both of these features of apartheid as well.26

Borders exploit migrant workers In May 2019, hundreds of people took to the streets of Beirut, Lebanon, to protest the ‘Kafala’ system and demand a change in labour laws.

The workers from countries such as Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Kenya marched with the slogans “I am not your property”, “our lives matter” and “include us in the labour law”.27 The Kafala system, present in many high-income Arab countries, ties foreign workers to their employers while denying them the same labour protections as citizens. Workers need the permission of their employers to change employment and even to leave the country and can be deported if they complain about their work conditions.28 Under the Kafala system, employers commonly withhold payment and confiscate identity documents such as passports.29 This policy has therefore given employers absolute power over migrant workers, leading to numerous reports of physical attacks

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and torture, 30 sexual abuse31 and even murder.32 The system amounts to a form of modern-day slavery with many dying in an attempt to escape their employees. The situation is so intense that Lebanese activists have built an underground railroad, like the ones used to transport slaves in North America to free states, to get people to safety.33 The Kafala system is an extreme manifestation of the third reason to oppose border controls: that they are intimately bound up with the exploitation of workers. By limiting the rights of workers, borders skew the power balance between worker and employer further in the direction of the employer. Millions of migrant workers the world over are tied to their specific employer in the host country and vulnerable to deportation if their employment contract is terminated or changed in significant ways. The sponsorship scheme in the UK is one example of this. Under this system, skilled workers from outside the EU are able to work in the country provided their employer, their sponsor, has been granted a work permit by the Home Office. The employer has the right to withdraw this sponsorship at any time, or refuse to renew the sponsorship, and significant increases in a worker’s salary might also affect the conditions of their sponsorship and result in non-renewal.34 The 12 | FR EEDO M O F M OV EM EN T

withdrawal of sponsorship often leads to deportation. Similarly, ‘guest’ worker visa programmes in East Asia allow foreign workers to temporarily fill dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs.

Workers can only live in the country for the duration of their employment.35 Visa conditions do not allow guest workers to change employment. This system is similar to many of the guest worker programmes Western European countries instituted after World War II, and, just as with the Kafala system, leads to abuse from both employers and employment agencies.36 In addition to these legal forms of exploitation, border controls create a class of undocumented, ‘illegal’ migrant workers, who lack the most basic rights and are therefore highly vulnerable. Undocumented workers’ lack of legal status undermines their pay – in the US, the ‘wage penalty’ for being undocumented is estimated at between 6% and 20%.37 Minimum wage violations are much more likely for undocumented workers than others; in Italy, undocumented workers in the agricultural sector earn less than half the minimum wage established by collective agreements.38 Undocumented workers are also subject to some of the most dangerous working conditions faced by any workers. In the US, undocumented workers are vital to

the agriculture industry, one of the country’s most dangerous sectors in which hundreds of workers die each year and 100 workers a day lose time at work due to injury. The systemic mistreatment of agricultural workers is enabled by the huge proportion of undocumented workers in the industry. It has been estimated that fully 53% of farmworkers are undocumented, though the true number could be even higher.39 Lacking legal status, undocumented workers have very limited means to challenge workplace violations.

And evidence suggests that when immigrant workers, and especially those who are undocumented, die at work, their deaths are less likely to be investigated.40 Given the limited rights and bargaining power of undocumented workers, it is no surprise that it can be highly profitable for businesses to employ them. For example, one 2012 study found that across all firms in the state of Georgia, employing undocumented workers decreased the risk of going out of business by 19%.41 Where businesses do support giving legal status to undocumented workers, what is often proposed is the expansion of ‘guest worker’ programmes, which as we have seen keep migrant workers disempowered and easy to exploit.42

By creating groups of workers who are easier to exploit – whether undocumented, guest worker or other – border controls thus divide workers, making it harder for them to organise to defend their interests.

Attitudes towards immigration have long been a contested issue within the labour movement, with support for exclusionary policies by some trade unions all too prominent. Others, however, have recognised that the workers movement cannot succeed without overcoming divisions among workers. 100 years ago, the anarchist North American union the Industrial Workers of the World clearly recognised this, declaring that: The Industrial Workers of the World is an INTERNATIONAL movement...

We realize workers have no country…

As long as we quarrel among ourselves over differences of nationality we weaken our cause, we defeat our own purposes…

In our organization, the Caucasian, the Malay, the Mongolian and the Negro, are all on the same footing.

All are workers and as such their interests are the same. An injury to them is an injury to us.43

As the writer Suzie Lee argues, it is not enough simply for trade unions to advocate for stronger rights for migrant workers in their country of residence. Under a system of border controls, the risk of deportation or detention renders those rights less

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enforceable and has a chilling effect on migrant workers’ organising. This in turn weakens the entire workers’ movement, which depends on unifying the largest number of workers possible.44 If we are to overcome worker exploitation, therefore, we need to fight for free movement.45 Free movement liberates migrant workers from the vulnerability and exploitation that comes with the limited rights conferred on them by border controls. And it ends the division of workers into camps with different rights and freedoms, undermining the solidarity needed to rebuild a powerful labour movement.

Borders have racist roots “It’s not racist to want controls on immigration”. We hear this a lot from everyone from cynical politicians looking to signal their support for an anti-migrant agenda to well-meaning people who perhaps understandably wish to avoid labelling vast swathes of the population as ‘racist’. But whether we like it or not, the evidence suggests that racism is embedded in the very idea of immigration control.

We have already talked about borders as being a ‘global apartheid’ separating people on the basis of the accident of birth. This isn’t just

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a divide between people holding different documents, or even solely a divide between rich and poor.

There is also a racial dimension.

While we must be careful to avoid the simplistic categorisation of whole countries or continents along racial lines, the global border regime means that the predominantly black and brown people of the global south are excluded from the wealth of a largely white global north.

The reasons for this go back to before the origins of modern immigration control and reflect the underlying economic reasons why the global north-south divide is also a rich-poor divide. This divide is closely linked to European colonialism and slavery, in which the plunder of the global south formed the basis of the inequality between south and north today.46 This was justified at the time (and by some even today) by ideologies of racial and cultural supremacy.

Modern border controls in the global north, first introduced in the late 19th century, were built on the same racist foundations as colonialism, aiming to exclude populations seen as racially inferior. The first immigration controls in the US included the Asian Exclusion Act of 1875 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which aimed to drastically curtail immigration by Chinese people, while European

migrants continued to travel freely to the country. In the early 20th century British Canada introduced immigration restrictions based on race: Chinese immigrants required $500 before entry was permitted, South Asians $200 and white migrants only $25. In the UK, the Aliens Act of 1905 aimed to restrict Jewish immigration, which was compared by one Conservative MP to the entry of diseased cattle to the country.47 Meanwhile in Australia the ‘White Australia Policy’, introduced in 1905 and remaining in force until after the Second World War, aimed to achieve exactly what its name implied: to prohibit “all alien coloured immigration” and secure a white society.48 The politics of border control have continued to work in racially discriminatory ways since then. The recent wave of nationalist right-wing world leaders has invoked the need for draconian immigration policies on the basis of overt racist rhetoric.

Donald Trump notoriously branded Mexicans as “rapists” and “drug dealers” in order to stoke support for an expanded border wall with Mexico.49 Italy’s Matteo Salvini, leader of the far right Lega party, branded migrants as “an army of benefit thieves and criminals” during the country’s 2018 general election campaign, 50 before proceeding to

prohibit migrant rescue boats from docking at Italian ports when in office.51 In other cases, immigration controls may be justified by less inflammatory and overtly racist rhetoric, but produce racist outcomes nonetheless. The ‘hostile environment’ legislation introduced by Theresa May in 2014, ostensibly to crack down on ‘illegal immigrants’, has had racially discriminatory effects, for example leading landlords to discriminate against tenants (whether migrants or otherwise) on racial grounds.52 The language used by Trump and Salvini points to a key feature of the connection between borders and racism. Racism is often fuelled by notions of the ‘other’ or ‘outsider’ who is dangerous, subversive and threatening. Border controls offer a means of fulfilling the desires of racists to keep ‘disturbing’ groups of people out of one’s own community.

This helps explain why immigration control is always a pre-occupation of far right movements and parties, along with deportation of unwanted groups within the nation. And while these fears are most explicitly articulated by the far right, they are nonetheless given oxygen by xenophobic and racist media outlets, such as the Daily Mail’s depiction of migrants as rats53 and the Sun running articles about ”cockroaches” during the surge in Syrian refugees in 2015.54 FR EEDOM OF MOVEM ENT | 15

2. ACHIEVING FREE MOVEMENT Is free movement a pipe dream?

Any argument for global free movement must recognise the enormous challenges of arguing for this goal in the current political context. The idea has few vocal supporters in the political mainstream, being largely confined to circles of sympathetic activists and intellectuals.

Moreover, the rise in right-wing nationalist political parties and movements, deeply imbued with anti-migrant politics, make the task more difficult still. Far-right parties won around 25% of the vote in the 2019 European elections, and in South America a ‘conservative wave’ has brought to power Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Mauricio Macri in Argentina and Sebastian Piñera in Chile in recent years, all of whom have described refugees as disease-ridden or criminals.55 The anti-immigrant attitudes of Trump in the US are well-documented, and Australia recently voted in Scott Morrison, a man who promised to drastically cut migration56 and used unlawful measures to prevent asylum seekers arriving in Australia

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by boat.57 In the UK, the party which introduced the ‘hostile environment’ for migrants was last year re-elected with 44% of the popular vote.

In this context, it may seem that free movement is simply not a viable political project. However, this conclusion is too hasty. Without downplaying the above challenges, the current political attitudes regarding migration are by no means uniformly negative. In the 2019 European elections, the rise of the far right was accompanied by a ‘green wave’ of broadly pro-migration parties, winning around 20% of the total vote coming second in Germany and third in France.58 In the US, despite Trump’s repeated attacks on migrants in recent years, polling data shows that almost a quarter of people want to see immigration increased and 40% would like it to stay the same. The centre ground has moved significantly on this issue with 34% of Democrats wanting an increase compared to around 20% in 2014.59 Most strikingly of all, almost a quarter of people in the US believe that we should have ‘basically

open borders’.60 During the ‘migrant crisis’ of 2015-17 in Europe, huge mobilisations in support of admitting more refugees took place in London (attended by around 100,000)61 and in Barcelona (attended by around 150,000), 62 with hundreds of thousands of people marching against the far-right in Berlin.63 Furthermore, demographic shifts are likely to lead to increasing support for free movement, with young people holding more progressive views on migration.64 It is also important to recognise how dramatically political attitudes and social structures can shift in the space of a few years or decades. At the turn of the millennium, for example, there was not a single country on earth where same sex marriage was authorised by law. At the time of writing, there are 27 countries that have legalised the practice, 65 including the vast majority of western European countries. In Europe, these changes happened partly due to a European wide network of determined LGBT activists, academics and policy makers working in tandem.66 Similarly, at the start of the 20th century women’s suffrage was extremely limited – now women have voting rights in every country in the world aside from Vatican City.67 To achieve suffrage, women in the UK used

tactics of hunger strikes, vandalism and civil disobedience.68 In Iran, women went on strike and organised counter-protests in 1963 in order to maintain their suffrage and right to stand for political office.69 While these legal developments do not represent panaceas for the emancipation of LGBT+ people or women, they attest to the possibility of major progressive change in unpredictable ways.

For free movement to be achieved, it will require a powerful, coordinated global movement. And of course, many elements of such a movement are already in place and being led by migrants themselves. In recent years we have seen hunger strikes from migrants detained in UK and South African detention centres; protests from migrant workers on the streets of Beirut; in France, the Gilet Noirs movement of undocumented people campaigning for better living conditions;70 anti-deportation protests in Israel, led by Sudanese and Eritrean women; in Hong Kong, campaigns by domestic workers from Indonesia and the Philippines for better wages and working conditions. A particularly striking example was the ‘caravan’ of thousands of migrants that left Honduras in October 2018, heading for the US-Mexico border. En route they were joined by migrants from

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other Central American countries, such as El Salvador and Guatemala.

The caravan transformed the often isolating process of trying to migrate to the US into a collective one, with positive political consequences.

Observing the caravan, Martha Balaguera and Alfonso Gonzalez described the consciousness-raising process that took place, as those involved came to see their experiences through a political, structural lens. In the words of Boris, one member of the group: Before coming in the [caravan], I thought of myself as an individual.

But through the journey, I learned that any of us could have to migrate one day and that we are living a collective problem. When I get out of here, I will struggle for my detained compaĂąeros, and I urge people to struggle in solidarity with us as well.71

Around the world, then, there exist significant currents of support for migration and greater migrant rights, and a powerful migrant-led movement already exists. That is not to deny the range of obstacles and objections to free movement – which we return to in the final section of this pamphlet. But first, we must consider in more detail what kind of political and structural changes could bring us towards a world of free movement, and what demands the movement for open borders should make.

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Short-term measures to strengthen migrant rights The path to free movement requires short-term measures which strengthen the rights and well-being of migrants.

Given the wide variety of national policies regarding migration around the world, the demands which bring this about will naturally be varied.

However, one vital step in most countries would be to make it easier for people to immigrate by liberalising the rules governing entry. For instance, in the UK there has been a push to remove the minimum income threshold for migrant workers to bring over family members;72 this law was only introduced a few years ago and could easily be reversed.

Reducing the exorbitant visa fees and improving accessibility to visa fee waivers would also make a huge difference. Over 70% of those who claim they are facing destitution, and a similar proportion of child applicants, are turned down for financial help with visa fees by the Home Office.73 Encouraging the proliferation and institutionalisation of humanitarian visas, which can allow people to apply for asylum without having to take hazardous journeys across borders, would also be an important step in this regard.

Humanitarian visa policies already

exist in countries such as Brazil, where they have been issued in response to crises in neighbouring countries.74 A full defence of the right to freely move must go beyond removing barriers to entry by also strengthening the rights of migrants living in host countries. This could be achieved by granting undocumented migrants an amnesty or regularisation, allowing them to acquire legal status, a demand currently being made in the UK by groups including Migrants Organise.75 Similarly, migrant communities in the US have also been demanding an amnesty for several decades, ever since the last amnesty in 1986.76 Evidence suggests that the 1986 US regularisation programme increased wages and job opportunities as well as helping with social integration.77 In 2005, a Spanish amnesty regularised around 600,000 migrants, with each person adding on average ₏4,400 to the Spanish tax coffers.78 However, amnesties can come in many different forms; in order to bring us closer to free movement they need to be part of a consistent set of policies, with broad eligibility criteria and accompanied by measures to enforce workers’ rights.

In 2014, Morocco regularised almost 18,000 undocumented migrants, in what was seen as an assertion of

independence against EU demands for a crackdown on irregular migrants attempting to travel into Europe from the country. Unfortunately, Moroccan policy has since become increasingly draconian at the behest of the EU, with thousands of violent removals of sub-Saharan Africans.79 Thus, though the amnesty may have provided momentum towards free movement, it was ultimately not sustained. Moreover, many NGOs complained that the eligibility criteria of the Moroccan amnesty were too strict. Applicants required a valid employment contract and proof of at least 5 years continuous residence, both very difficult to prove for people on the margins of society working illegally.80

Regional free movement zones Over the longer term, one route to universal free movement could be built through regional free movement zones. Existing free movement zones could be expanded and new ones created, leading eventually to their being merged into a single global system operating without border controls. Many such zones already exist: the European Union, the Caribbean Community, the MERCOSUR agreement in South America, and the Trans-Tasman

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Travel Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand. Other moves are underway elsewhere.

For example, in 2018 the African Union agreed a protocol aiming to facilitate “the progressive implementation of free movement of persons, right of residence and the right of establishment in Africa”.81 For some, the idea of an African free movement zone is a core anti-colonial demand – in the words of Cameroonian political theorist Achille Mbembe: “If we want to conclude the work of decolonisation, we have to bring down colonial boundaries in our continent and turn Africa into a vast space of circulation for itself, for its descendants and for everyone who wants to tie his or her fate with our continent”.82 Free movement zones could grow gradually, allowing countries to adapt to the changes brought about by population changes, as governments do within existing borders today.

Although we should be sceptical of the assumption that global free movement would necessarily create unsustainable population flows (see part 3), increases in migration to some countries could lead to short-term challenges. It is important, however, to emphasise that with good planning, even such short-term challenges can be overcome. For example, the Turkish city of Gazaintep is today hosting 20 | FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

around half a million refugees from Syria, which has caused its population to grow by 30%. After an initial period of pressure on housing stock, wages and drinking water, the local government embarked on a series of infrastructural reforms benefiting both refugees and the local population, with the city now considered a model for migrant integration.83 Working towards a world of free movement through gradually expanding regional free movement zones carries huge challenges. Firstly, free movement zones often overlap with areas of economic cooperation between states that are skewed towards the interests of big business.

The European single market, for example, guarantees the free movement of goods, capital and services, alongside freedom of movement for workers. Since the 1980s, when some European countries began to embrace neoliberal economic policies, the EU has contributed to weakened unions, reduced wages and lower rates of employment by pursuing a “labor market flexibility agenda… having a monetary policy focus on inflation instead of full employment and imposing fiscal austerity and central bank independence”.84 This trend has continued in recent times with the EU imposing austerity on countries such as Greece, Italy,

and Portugal; the case of Greece occurred in spite of a national referendum rejecting austerity.85 To be truly emancipatory, free movement needs to go hand in hand with a levelling up of workers’ rights and a fairer distribution of wealth.

Secondly, free movement zones in the rich parts of the world can undermine the rights of those coming from beyond the zone’s borders. For example, the development of free movement in Europe has been used as a justification for the development of ‘Fortress Europe’ and repressive policing of the EU border. Furthermore, those coming from outside of the free movement zone are vulnerable to exploitation. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for instance, has free movement between member states.

However, this free movement coexists with a regime of extreme exploitation and abuse of migrant labourers from outside the GCC, many of whom are tied to their employers (see part 1).

We need to ensure that free movement is intimately linked to a push for workers’ rights.

Anti-racist groups in high-income countries must also be strengthened if regional free movement zones are to expand effectively. In the free movement zone in West Africa, ECOWAS, many people have been murdered in xenophobic attacks,

having gone to work or start businesses in other countries.86 Similarly, some of the public opposition in the EU to Turkey’s accession is due to the fact that it is a predominantly Muslim country.87 The UK’s vote to leave the EU, and reduce a free movement zone, was partly linked to a backlash against immigration and was starkly divided across racial lines. A 2016 poll found that 67% of Asian voters voted to remain, as did 73% of black voters, compared to 47% of white voters.88 The referendum result was followed by a rise in hate crime against black and brown people, as well as Eastern Europeans.89

Free movement: past and present There have been numerous examples of free movement between states in the post-war era. None is perfect, but together they point to the possibility of one day dismantling border controls altogether.

Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies Dates: 1948–1962 Member states: United Kingdom and all its colonial territories The 1948 British Nationality Act granted 600 million Commonwealth citizens not only the right to migrate to the UK, but equal legal rights with

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all British-born citizens including access to work and social and political rights. Whether a person was born in Colchester, Colombo or Kingston, they had the same citizenship and the same rights.

Despite the theoretical equality of Commonwealth citizens, when they came to the UK discrimination in employment and housing was widely and openly practised. This was not prohibited until 1965, when the UK introduced its first Race Relations Act. However, this act was introduced in tandem with harsh immigration legislation, with Labour MP Roy Hattersley infamously claiming that “integration without limitation is impossible”. In 1967, Indians living in Kenya were forced to leave the country and came to the UK on account of their British citizenship.

However, the UK government quickly introduced emergency legislation, the 1968 Commonwealth Act, to stop them arriving based on the colour of their skin.90 This discrimination against British citizens from the colonies has continued to the present day, most recently through the Windrush scandal in which the British government actively illegalised, excluded, and in some cases detained and deported those who moved from Caribbean former colonies before 1973, and were therefore entitled to effective rights of citizenship.91

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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Dates: Treaty agreed 1979–present Member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Following the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, the 1979 Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment envisioned the creation of a region of free mobility to be implemented in three phases. The first phase, removing visa requirements for travel for up to 90 days between ECOWAS states for citizens, has been fully implemented. The second and third phases, providing for the right of residence and establishment, including equal treatment with local citizens regarding economic and social rights, are in the process of implementation. There is a common ECOWAS travel document, issued by the governments of all member states and recognised across the region.

A notable feature of the ECOWAS model is the provision for the integration of refugees displaced across the region by the war in Liberia and Sierra Leone. As ECOWAS citizens, as well as refugees, these populations should theoretically have

the right to residence and labour market access on a non-discriminatory basis. Although significant hurdles remain, the UNHCR has developed a framework for the integration of refugees in ECOWAS host countries.

The Nordic Passport Union Dates: 1952–present Member States: Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Faroe Islands, Iceland (joined 1966) In a series of treaties and agreements concluded between 1952 and 1958, restrictions on mobility between citizens of the Nordic countries, including requirements for visas, work-permits or passports in order to travel, settle and work, were removed.

This was accompanied with the Nordic Convention on Social Security of 1955 which ensured equality of treatment for all Nordic citizens in receipt of all social welfare including pensions, sick-pay and unemployment benefits among others.

The Passport Union was motivated by a widely shared desire for closer political and economic ties across the Scandinavian bloc. However, its implementation nonetheless generated opposition motivated by racism and protectionism.

In particular, concerns over the possible free movement of Finnish

Roma communities into Sweden were an initial stumbling block. This group had been previously explicitly excluded from entry to Sweden under a Roma immigration ban.

Throughout the 1960s and ‘70s, under the new mobility rights of the Union, proportionately significant numbers of Finnish Roma did move to Sweden, drawn not only by the booming labour market and higher quality of life, but also fleeing the intense social exclusion and discrimination they faced in Finland.

The Passport Union created the circumstances whereby Swedish and Finnish Roma populations came into regular contact and thus were able to begin to mobilise and radicalise, demanding equal treatment and an end to assimilationist policies in both countries.92 Riding the wave of this political momentum, the international Nordic Roma community that had taken shape thanks to the Passport Union and relaxation of mobility rights was able to emerge as a new form of transnational minority politics, forming pressure groups and forcing through a more rights-based approach in education and integration policy among others. Although unintended, this is a striking example of the benefits of free movement for enabling subordinate groups to defend and extend their rights.

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3. ADDRESSING CHALLENGES In this final section we address some of the key concerns about the ultimate goal of global free movement.

Would free movement reduce jobs and wages?

The argument is intuitive and simple: more migrants means more competition for jobs and fewer jobs for native workers. Moreover, if migrants are willing to work for longer hours or for less money they will push wages down. It’s an argument used by anti-migration politicians across the world from Nigel Farage in the UK (“What we have got is a massive oversupply in the labour market which has driven down wages”),93 to Donald Trump in the USA (“They’re taking our jobs. They’re taking our manufacturing jobs. They’re taking our money. They’re killing us”),94 to Tony Abbott in Australia (“It’s a basic law of economics that increasing the supply of labour depresses wages”).95 Many on the left also repeat this logic.

For example, in the UK former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has expressed concerns about “employers being able to import cheap agency

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labour to undercut existing pay and conditions”96 and in the US, Senator Bernie Sanders has argued that “there is no question in my mind that [open borders] would substantially lower wages in this country”.97 There is, however, a large body of evidence on how migrants affect jobs and wages, with the consensus being that migration typically has a small or neutral effect. In the UK, a key report is a government-commissioned review of 12 studies.98 It found that migration has “no or little impact” on employment, and “the evidence shows that it as a small short-term negative effect on low-paid workers”.

The report suggests that those on medium and high incomes enjoy a small positive increase in wages.

This is because new workers can be complementary, stimulating new work, innovations and productivity among native workers.

Similarly, recent work in Australia99 and the US100 has not found any profound impact of migration on wages or unemployment. The US study examined hundreds of papers, finding a positive impact

of immigration on the US economy in the long-term. Among its findings that skilled migrants might increase wages for some citizens, it also found that existing immigrants and high school drop-outs could see a very small wage reduction. This is partly because new migrants often work in the same low-paid jobs as these groups. Existing migrants are most likely to be affected by any negative wage shifts partly because newer immigrants have a similar set of skills and provide direct competition.101 Nonetheless, even the small effects identified by academics are expected to dissipate in the medium to long term.102 We should also note the overall economic benefits that can be expected from free movement.

The economist Michael Clemens has argued that the introduction of global open borders could as much as double world GDP, adding trillions of dollars to the global economy.103 Although rapidly increasing global GDP would come with many issues, not least in terms of environmental impact, the significance of Clemens’ study is to challenge the view that increased migration is economically harmful. Many have emphasised the positive net economic contribution migrants can make, and the economic damage reducing migration might cause.104

Thus, the existing evidence suggests that claims about the negative impacts of free movement on jobs and wages is typically hyperbolic and misleading, while free movement also presents an opportunity to increase overall prosperity and well-being.

Does free movement create ‘brain drain’?

Concerns around ‘brain drain’ are often used as an argument against free movement. The idea is that poorer countries tend to lose some of their brightest and most skilled people to rich countries through migration, thus depriving the sending countries of vital human resources.

The sending countries shoulder the costs of training and education, while seeing few of the benefits.

There is some evidence behind this argument. For example, around 70% of all university graduates in the Caribbean migrate to rich countries.105 These migrants come from some of the lowest income countries in the world such as Haiti. Similarly, one study found that the UK is home to almost as many Malawian doctors as Malawi, with the majority of Malawian doctors moving abroad to work.106 This contrasts with the severe shortage of doctors in Malawi, with only one college of medicine in a country of around 17 million people.107 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT | 25

But there are several strong counters to the brain drain argument, too. Firstly, migrant workers send huge amounts of money back. In 2018 alone, $529 billion worth of remittances (money sent by migrant workers to family or friends in their country of origin) were sent to lower and middle income countries – a comparable figure to the total foreign direct investment into the global south of $671 billion.108 Unlike foreign investment, which under many liberal investment rules is often repatriated as the profit of foreign companies, remittances largely go directly into the pockets of people living in developing countries and are spent on crucial areas.

For example, studies show that remittance money is largely spent on education and healthcare in India109 and education in Ghana.110 Likewise, remittances have been shown to lead to a slight reduction in inequality and poverty in 10 Latin American and Caribbean countries.111 Moreover, the stark figures around the emigration of skilled workers only occur in a minority of countries. The majority of large labour exporting countries, including Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Brazil, send less than 10% of their university graduates abroad.112 What’s more, the emigration of skilled workers, such as health workers, does not necessarily do detriment to the sending country and the results are 26 | FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

more of a mixed picture. For some countries, the export of health workers, even at a rate of 40%, does not appear to affect child mortality or other health indicators such as measles vaccination rate, prevalence of respiratory infection or HIV infection rates in the long term.113 Indeed, emigration of health workers has been found to lead to a greater production of health workers and is indicative of a ‘brain gain’ effect resulting from emigration.114 The Philippines, for example, exports the highest number of nurses in the world – but has more nurses per capita at home than Britain.115 A variety of factors have been suggested to explain these findings, which may seem counter-intuitive.

First, foreign demand is likely to encourage more people to go into training and more institutions to offer it. Some countries, such as the Philippines, have an active and explicit policy of training skilled workers so that they can work abroad and send back money.116 Furthermore, the prospect of emigration can encourage people to stay in education for longer in order to boost their chances of success in their new country. For example, one study in Cape Verde finds that the more likely someone is to migrate, the more likely they are to complete primary education.117

Free movement may even encourage a ‘brain circulation’ effect where those who have been working abroad create the networks and knowledge needed to inspire new types of economic activities in their countries of origin. For example, one study found that “a 10% increase in immigration from exporters of a given product is associated with a 2% increase in the likelihood that the host country starts exporting that good ‘from scratch’ in the next decade”.118 However, because the costs of training skilled workers are high, sending countries would still stand to lose a significant amount of income under free movement. For instance, just nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa collectively lose around $2.2 billion in training costs for doctors who work abroad. At the same time, the UK gains $2.7 billion in doctor training bills it doesn’t have to foot; low-income countries are effectively subsidising the health service of high-income ones.119 One proposal to mitigate this damage is to have the high-income countries compensate low-income countries for training costs. This could occur through a “restitution fund”, paid for by the receiving country, for the “reconstruction and support of health care” in the sending country.120

Would everyone come at once?

Global free movement would represent such a dramatic transformation of our society that there is no way of confidently stating the levels of migration it would lead to. However, the concern that wealthy countries would be ‘flooded’ with migrants does not rest on rock-solid foundations. Historically free movement has seldom led to an immediate mass movement of people. This fear did not come to pass in Germany in 2012 when restrictions on Polish migration were lifted, the US in 1986 when its borders opened to Micronesia and the UK in 2014 when restrictions on Romanian migration were lifted.121 While it is true that Polish migration to the UK was greater than predicted after Polish accession to the EU in 2004, the numbers need to be kept in perspective: net Polish migration to the UK was under 30,000 per year from 2004 to 2012 – substantial, but not a ‘flood’.122 It is also worth noting that much of the world’s migration today occurs within, rather than beyond regions, including 63% of all African migration and 55% of that in Europe and Central Asia.

Roughly a third of migrants in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia also remain within their regions.123 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT | 27

If anything, it is a sudden closing of borders that can result in mass migration. For instance, in 1975 Suriname became independent from the Netherlands, stopping free movement between the countries.

In the run up to independence, there was a surge in migration with around 40% of the entire Surinamese population migrating.126 A policy of permanently open borders, by contrast, would contain no such spur for a rapid surge of people moving.

Global Justice Now CC BY 2.0

A 2018 global Gallup poll found that, while large numbers of adults worldwide (15%) would like to move to another country if they had the chance, the majority would move within their region.124 Meanwhile, in 2017, the International Organisation for Migration found that less than 10% of the people who express a general desire to migrate actually have any plans to do so within the next 12 months. Of these, even fewer, only 3%, have taken any kind of steps to make that plan a reality.125

To coincide with the inauguration of Donald Trump as president of the US, people around the world hung banners on 200 bridges with messages of peace, equality and tolerance. This banner was hung from North Bridge in Edinburgh.

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Could our public services cope with open borders?

A frequent misunderstanding concerning migration and public services is that it is a zero-sum game, that there is a simple equation where more people necessarily means increased demand and pressure on public services. Actually, migrants are often crucial to the running of public services, particularly in high-income countries with ageing populations placing increased demand on health and social services. One study found that migrants consisted of 25% of UK public sector workers between 2008 and 2010 and 40% in health and social work.127 Immigrant workers in the public sector tended to be younger and better educated than native workers. The need for migrant workers in health and social care in countries with ageing populations will only increase with time. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the UK’s NHS has been pressuring the government to ease restrictions on migrants.128 Moreover, while many migrants staff public services and pay taxes to ensure they keep running, they are often less likely to use them.

EU migrants have been found to contribute on average £2,300 more

to UK public finances than they use per year.129 Though non-EU migrants contributed less than they consumed, these figures will be skewed by the high proportion of forced migrants among them. Similarly, hospital admission rates in England were found to be lower for international migrants than the native population, even when age is considered.130 In Australia the government’s own report states that “migrants are estimated to have a positive fiscal impact since they are predominantly of working age when they arrive”, contributing around 9.7 billion Australian dollars (£5.4 billion) to the Australian economy.131 Humanitarian migrants and the family of skilled migrants were the categories which, understandably, proved an exception to this trend.

In addition to these points, it is important to recognise that free movement means abolishing the category of the ‘illegal immigrant’, which may well reduce pressure on public services as they would be able to access the full range of primary health care. The European Agency for Fundamental Rights looked at what would happen if Germany, Greece and Sweden allowed undocumented people full access to health services related to high blood pressure, as opposed to

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only emergency access. They found that it would result in a 9% cost saving after one year as it would help prevent many hundreds of strokes and heart attacks.132 Similarly, allowing women full access to prenatal care would result in savings of up to 48% in Germany and Greece. This is because it would help prevent many health issues related to low birth weight.

What about nationalism?

To build support for free movement, we need to develop persuasive arguments and methods of communication to win people over in large numbers. This is no easy task. Thus, the ideas presented in this report are beginnings, and better approaches may well be developed through more research and experience.

One of the key changes needs to be in how we see nations and citizenship. Arguments for free movement need to encourage people to primarily identify and make decisions through non-exclusive communities which transcend nations; communities which new migrants are free to join and help shape.133 This already happens to a limited extent, with cities such as

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London where it is not uncommon for people to identify themselves as a Londoner first, and British/English/ European second.134 Thus, free movement advocates can usefully use arguments around the devolution of power from the centre and capitals of countries to regions and other cities. This line of argument is related to the attempts by activists in 1949 in France to set up a network of global towns and cities. Their movement enjoyed some short-term success with 300 small ‘global cities’ established in the province of Lot.135 Nation states are set up to protect the privileges of their citizens, to be exclusive and to violently enforce their borders.136 Arguments for free movement need to move people beyond this exclusionary politics.

In 2008 the socialist president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, enshrined in the constitution “the principle of universal citizenship, the free movement of all inhabitants on the planet and the progressive extinction of the status of alien or foreigner”.137 This article was part of efforts to resist racism and xenophobia. The constitution itself was wide-ranging, including articles on gender, the environment, economic resources, fair trade, and food sovereignty.138 Correa won the argument for

the constitution, and hence free movement, by arguing for people’s autonomy to live their lives as they wanted. And he promised to provide people the social assistance and opportunities needed to realise this. The focus on economic justice may have helped win the argument against exclusionary politics. So too, might the framing of autonomy, a natural counter to nativist worries about globalisation.

In a more visionary vein, in a world of free movement national citizenship might be superseded by a global citizenship and ideas of universalism. Promoting ideas of global citizenship can help win the argument as well as prompt practical changes. A world passport does currently exist in a limited form.

It is issued by the World Government of World Citizens, a campaign for free movement. Almost 750,000 have been distributed, they are accepted in Mauritania, Tanzania and Togo, and have been used by forced migrants as identification documents to open bank accounts or to rent accommodation.139 We also need to guard against the rise of nationalism in left-wing and progressive movements. In Germany, the new left-wing Aufstehen (‘Stand Up’) movement formed

in 2018, has adopted a nationalist and anti-migrant politics. Its leader, Sara Wagenknecht, has criticised Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to accept more than 1 million refugees and argued that anti-capitalist politics requires border controls: “All successes in restraining and regulating capitalism have been achieved within individual states, and states have borders.140 Meanwhile Jean-Luc Melenchon’s latest political vehicle, La France Insourmise, has been critical of mass migration, with Melenchon claiming that migrants are “stealing the bread” of French workers.141 And in the US, Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders explicitly came out against open borders, citing familiar right wing arguments about being overrun by migrants.142 Ultimately, we need to reach a point where progressive politicians can confidently state the reasoned case for more open borders. Social movements have a key role to play in creating the conditions for that to be possible. The youngest ever female US senator, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, points the way. She argues that people have to “respect the right of human mobility”, stating that all Latinx people should be able to freely migrate to the US.143

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CONCLUSION This pamphlet is aimed at persuading, inspiring and mobilising activists and campaigners behind a vision of what a different world could look like. Only by starting to free our imaginations can we begin to really see how things could be otherwise.

The next step is down to you.

Campaigning, protesting, discussing and more generally ‘spreading the word’ can really change attitudes, and can lay the path for a different sort of world. If you agree with us, get involved and get active.

Change will only come about when sufficient people demand it, loudly enough and for long enough.

Mstyslav Chernov/Unframe CC BY-SA 4.0

On its own, though, vision is not sufficient. We need to discuss and debate, both with those who tend to agree with us, and those who have genuine concerns about our vision. In so doing, we will make our

arguments more effective and begin to build the movement necessary for the radical transformation we require.

A child refugee paces a camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, January 2016.

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Jung, J, Choi, H, Rowell, C and Phelan, J (1999), The Rhetoric of Inclusion: The I.W.W. and Asian Workers. Ex Post Facto, 8, https://history.sfsu.edu/sites/default/files/ EPF/1999_Jennifer%20Jung%20Hee%20 Choi.pdf Lee, S (2019), The Case for Open Borders, The Catalyst Vol 2 Issue 4, Winter 2019, https://catalyst-journal.com/vol2/no4/ the-case-for-open-borders

45 For example, when 2.5 million undocumented workers were legalised in the US in 1986, as they would be under free movement, union membership surged. Within five years of campaigning there was, on average, a 15% increase in wages for the newly legalised workers, with citizen workers also benefitting (Department of Labor cited in Chacon JA and Davis M (2018), No One Is Illegal: Fighting Racism And State Violence On The U.S.-Mexico Border, Haymarket Books 2018).

46 Hickel, J (2017), The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions, William Heinemann 2017.

47 Corporate Watch (2018), The UK Border Regime: A Critical Guide, Corporate Watch 2018, p. 17.

48 National Museum Australia (2020), White Australia policy, https://www.nma.gov. au/defining-moments/resources/whiteaustralia-policy 49 Neate, R (2015), Donald Trump announces US presidential run with eccentric speech, The Guardian, 16 June 2015, https://www. theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/16/ donald-trump-announces-run-president 50 Reynolds J (2019), Matteo Salvini: Can Italy’s populist leader return to power?, BBC News, 24 September 2019, https://www. bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44921974 51 Sciorilli Borrelli S (2020), Matteo Salvini: Italy’s ports are closed to migrant vessels, Politico, 19 April 2019, https://www.politico. eu/article/matteo-salvini-migration-italyports-closed-to-migrant-vessels 52 JCWI (2019), JCWI: how we beat the hostile environment in court, Free Movement, 1 March 2019, https://www.freemovement. org.uk/jcwi-right-to-rent-high-court 53 Hopewell Barreda, T (2017), The Horrible History of the Daily Mail, Global Justice Now, 31 October 2017, https://www. globaljustice.org.uk/blog/2017/oct/31/ horrible-history-daily-mail 54 Martin, J (2015), Katie Hopkins Wrote This In The Sun About Migrants And Now Everyone Is Really Angry, Huffington Post, 18 April 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost. co.uk/2015/04/18/katie-hopkins-russellbra_n_7091674.html 55 Rodríguez, E (2018), The Coloniality of

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65 Perper, R (2019), Countries around the world where same-sex marriage is legal, Business Insider, 14 June 2019, https:// www.businessinsider.com/where-issame-sex-marriage-legal-world-2017-11 66 Kollman, K, and Patermotte, D (2013), Regulating intimate relationships in the European polity: same-sex unions and policy convergence, Social Politics, 20 (4). pp. 510-533, https://doi.org/10.1093/ sp/jxs024 67 Aspinall, G (2018), Here are the countries where it’s still really difficulty for women to vote, Grazia Daily, 6 February 2019, https:// graziadaily.co.uk/life/real-life/countrieswhere-women-can-t-vote 68 British Library, Explore the campaign for women’s suffrage in the UK, https://www. bl.uk/votes-for-women 69 Hamideh Sedghi (2007), Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

70 Butterly, L (2019), The ‘Gilets Noirs’: The Undocumented Migrant Movement in France, Verso, 4 June 2019, https://www. versobooks.com/blogs/4341-the-giletsnoirs-the-undocumented-migrantmovement-in-france 71 Balaguera M and Gonzales A (2018), A Refugee Movement Emerges, ZNet, 30 January 2018, https://zcomm.org/ znetarticle/a-refugee-movement-emerges 72 Migrants’ Rights Network (2017), The family migration income threshold: Pricing UK workers out of a family life, Migrants Rights Network, 23 February 2017, https://migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/ 017/02/23/family-migration-incomethreshold-pricing-uk-workers-family-life 73 Mohdin, A (2019), More than 70% of UK immigration fee waiver requests by destitute are rejected, The Guardian, 4 April 2019, https://www.theguardian. com/uk-news/2019/apr/04/over-70-ofuk-immigration-fee-waiver-requests-bydestitute-are-rejected 74 Branco, M (2018), Brazil to grant Haitians humanitarian visa, Agencia Brasil, 10 April 2018, http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/ en/internacional/noticia/2018-04/brazilgrant-haitians-humanitarian-visa 75 Weber-Ballard, E (2018), Amnesty, Not

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85 Devine, C (2017), The trouble with being both anti-austerity and pro-EU, Red Pepper, 12 December 2017, https://www. redpepper.org.uk/the-trouble-withbeing-both-anti-austerity-and-pro-eu 86 Lar, J (2007), Free Movement, Migration and Xenophobia in ECOWAS, in Perspectives on West Africa’s Future (pp. 23–26).

87 Azrout R, Van Spanje JHP and De Vreese CH (2011), Talking Turkey: Anti-immigrant attitudes and their effect on support for Turkish membership of the EU, European Union Politics 12(1): pp. 3-19.

88 Ashcroft, M (2016), How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday... and why, Lord Ashcroft Polls, 24 June 2016, https:// lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-theunited-kingdom-voted-and-why 89 Booth, R (2019), Racism rising since Brexit vote, nationwide study reveals, The Guardian, 20 May 2019, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2019/may/20/ racism-on-the-rise-since-brexit-votenationwide-study-reveals 90 Lattimer, M (1999), When Labour played the racist card, New Statesman, 22 January 1999, https://www.newstatesman.com/ when-labour-played-racist-card 91 Guardian (2018), ‘It’s inhumane’: the Windrush victims who have lost jobs, homes and loved ones, The Guardian, 20 April 2018, https://www.theguardian. com/uk-news/2018/apr/20/its-inhumanethe-windrush-victims-who-have-lost-jobshomes-and-loved-ones 92 Nita, S (2017), Migration, free movement and regional integration, United Nations 2017, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ ark:/48223/pf0000260669 93 Graham, G (2014), Nigel Farage: ‘Massive oversupply’ of foreign labour is forcing British wages down, The Telegraph, 5 January 2014, https://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10551704/NigelFarage-Massive-oversupply-of-foreignlabour-is-forcing-British-wages-down.html 94 Washington Post (2016), Full text: Donald Trump announces a presidential bid, Washington Post, 16 June 2015, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donaldtrump-announces-a-presidential-bid/

95 Abbott, T (2018), Speech at the Sydney Institute, February 2018, http://tony abbott.com.au/2018/02/address-sydneyinstitute-governor-phillip-tower-sydney 96 Schofield, K (2018), Jeremy Corbyn: Brexit will stop cheap foreign labour undercutting British workers’ pay, Politics Homes, 9 March 2018, https://politicshome.com/ news/uk/political-parties/labour-party/ jeremy-corbyn/news/93495/jeremycorbyn-brexit-will-stop-cheap 97 Haberman, M (2015), Bernie Sanders Again Links Low Wages With Immigration, New York Times, 30 July 2015, https://www. nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/ 2015/07/30/bernie-sanders-again-linkslow-wages-with-immigration 98 Ruhs, M and Vargas-Silva C (2018), The Labour Market Effects of Immigration, The Migration Observatory, 14 December 2018, https://migrationobservatory. ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/the-labourmarket-effects-of-immigration 99 Breunig, R, Deutscher, N, and Thi To, H (2017), The relationship between immigration to Australia and the labour market outcomes of Australian-born worker, Economic Record, 93(301): pp. 255-276.

100 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017), The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, The National Academies Press 2017, https://doi.org/10.17226/23550 101 Manacorda, M, Manning, A and Wadsworth, J (2006), The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain, Journal of the European Economic Association, Volume 10, Issue 1, https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1542-4774.2011.01049.x 102 Jaeger, D, Ruist, J and Stuhler, J (2018), Shift-Share Instruments and the Impact of Immigration, National Burean of Economic Research Working Paper No. 24285, https://www.nber.org/papers/w24285 103 Clemens, MA (2011), Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 25, Number 3, pp. 83-106.

104 Financial Times (2018), A dose of common sense on UK immigration, Financial Times,

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112 Adams RH and Page, J (2003), International migration, remittances, and poverty in developing countries, Policy Research Working Paper Series 3179, World Bank, http://documents.worldbank. org/curated/en/991781468779406427/ International-migration-remittances-andpoverty-in-developing-countries

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113 Clemens, MA (2007), Do visas kill? Health effects of African health professional emigration, Center for Global Development, Working Paper Number 114, https://assets. aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/ content/images/file_Clemens_Do_visas_ kill_3_.pdf 114 Clemens, MA (2007).

115 Clemens MA and McKenzie D (2009), Think Again: Brain Drain, Foreign Policy, 22 October 2009, https://foreignpolicy. com/2009/10/22/think-again-brain-drain 116 Haas, H De (2007), International migration, remittances and development: myths and facts, Third World Quarterly, 26(8), pp.1269-1284, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01436590500336757 117 Batista, C, Lacuesta, A, & Vicente, PC (2010), Testing the ‘Brain Gain’ Hypothesis: Micro Evidence from Cape Verde Catia Batista, Institute of Labor Economics, IZA DP No. 5048.

118 Bahar and Rapoport (2018), p. 1.

119 Mills, EJ et al (2011), The financial cost of doctors emigrating from sub-Saharan Africa: human capital analysis, BMJ, 24 November 2011, https://doi.org/10.1136/ bmj.d7031 120 Mensah, K, Mackintosh, M and Henry, L (2005), The ‘Skills Drain’ of Health Professionals from the Developing World: a Framework for Policy Formulation, MedAct, February 2005, https://www.medact.org/ wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2.-the-skillsdrain-of-health-professionals.pdf 121 Boeselager, M (2015), An Expert Lays Out the Case for Europe Opening Its Borders to Migrants, Vice, 29 April 2015, https:// www.vice.com/en_us/article/avyzmb/ we-asked-an-expert-happen-if-euopened-borders-to-everyone-584 122 Okólski M and Salt J (2014), Polish Emigration to the UK after 2004; Why Did So Many Come?, Central and Eastern European Migration Review, December 2014, pp.1-27, https://www.geog.ucl. ac.uk/research/research-centres/ migration-research-unit/pdfs/Okolski_ Salt_Polish_Emigration_to_the_UK.pdf 123 Nita, Sonja (2017), Free movement of people within regional integration processes: a comparative view, UNESCO 2017.

124 Gallup (2018), More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could, Gallup, 10 December 2018, https://news. gallup.com/poll/245255/750-millionworldwide-migrate.aspx 125 International Organisation for Migration (2017), Measuring global migration potential, 2010-2015, Global Migration Data Analysis Center Data Briefing Series, Issue No. 9.

126 Amersfoort, H Van (2013), How the Dutch Government stimulated the unwanted immigration from Suriname. International Migration Institute, 1 October 2011, https://www.migrationinstitute.org/ publications/wp-47-11 127 Dustmann, C and Frattini, T (2011), Impact of migration on UK public services, Migration Advisory Committee, December 2011, https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/the-impact-ofmigration-on-uk-public-services 128 National Health Executive (2018), Government relaxes visa rules, allowing more overseas staff to join NHS, NHE, 14 June 2018, http://www. nationalhealthexecutive.com/healthcare-news/overseas-doctors-and-nursescan-come-into-the-uk-with-relaxed-visarules-says-jeremy-hunt 129 Oxford Economics (2018), The Fiscal Impact of Immigration on the UK, June 2018, https://www.oxfordeconomics.com/ recent-releases/8747673d-3b26-439b9693-0e250df6dbba 130 Steventon, A and Bardsley, M (2016), Use of secondary care in England by international immigrants, Journal of Health Services and Research Policy, 16(2), pp. 90–94, https://doi.org/10.1258/ jhsrp.2010.010097 131 Australian Government (2018), Shaping a Nation: Population growth and immigration over time, https://cdn. tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/107/2018/04/ Shaping-a-Nation.pdf 132 European Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014), The Cost of Exclusion from Healthcare to Migrants in an Irregular Situation in the EU, European Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014.

133 Balibar, E (2001), We, citizens of Europe?

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134 O’Sullivan, F (2018), Why Do Londoners Identify With Their City More Than Their Country?, CityLab, 7 May 2018, https:// www.citylab.com/life/2018/05/why-dolondoners-identify-with-their-city-morethan-their-country/558431 135 Mayault, I (2019), The globalization of the lot in 1949/50, Lotiosdumonde, http:// lotoisdumonde.fr/cahorsmundi/trads/ anglais.html 136 Johnson, KR (2003), Open Borders?, UCLA Law Review, 51(1), pp. 193265, https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/296948834_Open_borders 137 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (2008), Article 416, Paragraph 6, http:// pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/ Ecuador/english08.html 138 Ramírez, JPG (2016), Migration policy in the new Ecuadorean constitution, Latin American Perspectives, 43(1), pp. 175–186. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X15586563 139 World Government of World Citizens, https://worldservice.org/docpass.html 140 Adler, D (2019), Why Labour is dangerously foolish to turn against freedom of movement, New Statesman, 8 February 2019, https:// www.newstatesman.com/politics/ brexit/2019/02/why-labour-dangerouslyfoolish-turn-against-freedom-movement 141 Adler, D (2019), Meet Europe’s Left Nationalists, The Nation, 10 January 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/ archive/meet-europes-left-nationalists/ 142 Morin, R (2019), Bernie Sanders says he does not support open borders, Politico, 8 April 2019, https://www.politico.com/ story/2019/04/08/bernie-sanders-openborders-1261392 143 Kwong, J (2019), Alexandria OcasioCortez Sheds Tear, Says ‘We Are Standing on Native Land’ As She Calls to Defund ICE, Newsweek, 7 February 2019, https:// www.newsweek.com/alexandria-ocasiocortez-ice-native-land-1322850

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