Williams College Journal of Foreign Affairs (Vol 4, Spring 2018)

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Right-Wing Populism as a Reaction to Identity Politics Ben Beiers

Return of the Russians: Subversion of Global Democracy David Han

How Autocracies Outperform Democracies Jacob Shuman

The Long View of History Kevin Silverman

The M-26-7’s Failed Attempt at Creating Racial Equality Ashley Villarreal

Deadly Words Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio

Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan Hae On Yoon

“Critical Critics” of Human Rights Julie Geng

Editor-in-Chief Korina Neveux '19 Creative Directors Angela Chan '19 Jason Liu '20 Associate Editors David Han '19 Kevin Silverman '19.5 Ben Beiers '20 Taran Dugal '20 Jake Rinaldi '20 Hae On Yoon '21 Sponsored by the Stanley Kaplan Program in American Foreign Policy

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RIGHT-WING POPULISM AS A REACTION TO IDENTITY POLITICS

(nathanmac87 / wikimedia commons)

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BEN BEIERS

fter the Soviet collapse, the United States and Western Europe, the nexus of liberal democracy, took the mantle as the most stable governments in the world. Liberal democracy had waged ideological war and emerged victorious by such convincing margins that political scientist Francis Fukuyama declared the arrival of “the end of history.”1 This promise has since dimmed, and liberal democracy has entered troubled times. Faith in democracy is at an all-time low, and permissiveness towards authoritarianism has risen drastically. Right-wing populist parties have seen substantial gains in popularity both in Europe and the United States. These gains have coincided with an increase in party alignment based on socio-political positions and group identities which make up “identity politics.” Identity politics involves political alignment based on perceptions of socio-economic, social, racial, and ethnic identity. In this sense, the fact that identity politics and right-wing populism have risen simultaneously is no coincidence. The core issues of right-wing populism involve inter-group conflict, including anti-elitist, anti-immigrant, and anti-liberal tendencies. In this light, right-wing populism can be seen as an extension of identity politics, and even as an identity itself. The primary issue with liberal democracy to which right-wing populism points is the prevalence of identity politics. First, this paper will define identity politics in the context of western liberalism. Then, it will link right-wing populism and identity politics with a discussion involving group psychology, immigration, and economic globalization. Finally, it will isolate the population, which can reverse this trend.

Identity politics occurs when the electorate in a democratic system identifies with parties aligned to their social, ethnic, and racial identities, rather than substantive policy positions. Both the United States and Western Europe have seen notable increases in voting by identity politics in recent years. In the United States, the electorate has begun to vote based on social issues rather than economic policy: “today, an American’s economic status is a bad predictor of his or her voting preferences. His or her views on social issues – say, same-sex marriage – are a much more accurate guide to whether he or she will support Republicans or Democrats.”2 This phenomenon of voter alignment by social views has coincided with a convergence of economic policy on the right and left in the United States. Trump, despite his use of classical Republican rhetoric around tax cuts and “small government,” has promised an economic package which mimicked that of Hillary Clinton's, even boasting that “his infrastructure program would be twice as large as hers.”3 A similar shift has occurred in Europe, with centrist economic policy taking hold. In Britain, the “difference between Blair’s policies and David Cameron’s was real, but in historical perspective, it was rather marginal.”4 This led to the formation of parties which align themselves based on social platforms rather than economic policy. In Amsterdam, large party politics has factionalized into smaller parties which focus on narrower issues: “worried about animals? Join the Animal Welfare party. Feeling middle age? Try the 50+ party.”5 Parties in both Europe and the United States have aligned themselves based on notions of identity.

Identity politics and party alignment based on social

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identity has direct ties to right-wing populism, which is largely predicated on exclusionary notions of an in-group and out-group, and conflict between the two. Trump was able to construct a coalition of support by embracing and manipulating identity politics. From a social psychological perspective, Reicher and Haslam argue that Trump won the 2016 election because he provided a “categorical grid – a clear definition of groups and intergroup relations – that allowed many Americans to make sense of their lived experience, to understand their problems and to entertain the hope of being

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a clearly defined “us” and “them” based on identity.

Race plays a central role in identity formation and identity politics, and greatly influences right-wing populist mobilization. Ivarsflaten finds that right-wing populist parties in Western Europe are united in their ability to rally around “grievances arising from Europe’s ongoing immigration crisis.”8 Further, their ability to mobilize around immigration issues is greater than that of other parties, which suggests that right-wing populist parties’ commitment to mobilizing around racial and ethnic identity politics pays dividends.

Similarly, in an analysis of the United States 2016 election, Schaffner et al. find that racism and sexism were the best predictors of which voters supported Trump: “moving from one end of the sexism scale to the other produced a 30-point increase in support for Trump,” with the same movement along the racism spectrum also resulting in a 30-point increase.9 Globalization has greatly impacted and increased anti-immigration sentiment. The deteriorating economic conditions of the ethno-nationalist working class have caused members to blame immigrants, global trade conditions, and the liberal elite, fairly or unfairly, for their circumstances. The ethno-nationalist working class has experienced stagnation and decline while the fortunes of the elite and immigrants have steadily improved. Globalization’s negative economic impact on the working class further enhances right-wing populist parties’ ability to mobilize around race and antielitism. Right-wing populist parties’ ability to build a coalition around a restricted “true people” to whom exclusivity of race is essential rests on conceptions of racial identity and inter-racial interaction, which is aided by globalization.

Identity politics is the variable which can fully explain the rise of right-wing populism. Deterioration of economic

Right-wing populists serve only an exclusive constituency rather than an entire nation, and seek to increase the power of their constituency relative to other, supposedly illegitimate, members of the nation. Because right-wing populism is an exclusive, reactionary identity, it cannot constitute an answer to identity politics. It can merely expose issues, and force liberal democrats’ hand. able to deal with them.”6 In this “categorical grid,” Trump labeled the liberal elite and immigrants as internal enemies who sought to harm the “ordinary” white, working-class American. This belief in an exclusive, “true people” is a central part of populism: populists claim that “they and they alone represent the people… anyone who does not support them is not properly part of the people.”7 In his “categorical grid,” Trump defines “the people” based on socio-economic, ethnic, and racial identity, casting all outsiders as illegitimate internal enemies. Trump mobilized a coalition of support by creating

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Nigel Farage, pictured above, embodies the British backlash to globalism, ultimately helping lead the "No" campaign to victory.

(AP Photo / Alastair Grant)

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The key figure of right wing populism in America, President Trump, has engaged in identity politics while co-opting populist policies. (Gage Skidmore)

conditions is too narrow a factor, as there is a clear racialized element to the rise of right-wing populism. However, racism and xenophobia alone cannot sufficiently explain right-wing populism, because socio-economic class plays a definitive role. All of these factors are encompassed within identity politics, as right-wing populism combines notions of identity from many spheres. Support for right-wing populist parties results from a coalition voting for an exclusive group identity, and right-wing populism has experienced unprecedented levels of support because of the unparalleled presence of identity politics in western democracy today. Democracy is built to function on compromise, and when parties cannot compromise, democracy is ineffective: “the future of Western democracy looks bleak if American politics harden into two racially hostile camps.”10 Democracy must be renovated in order to survive the formidable challenge posed by right-wing populism.

When discussing a potential solution to identity politics, it is crucial to first discuss its cause. Identity politics have become prevalent largely because of liberal democrats and the negative effects of globalization. Liberal democrats have defined politics as moralistic discourse over identity, and right-wing populism can be seen as a malevolent backlash against this. Edward Luce supports this argument: “by giving a higher priority to the politics of ethnic identity than people’s common interests, the American left helped to create what it feared. The clash of economic interests is about trade-offs. Ethnic politics is a game of absolutes.”11 This same phenomenon of the liberal democrats prioritizing politics around identity has taken place in Europe, with a rightwing populist backlash occurring. In Britain, liberal efforts at establishing a diverse, multicultural society were met with “rising apathy among working-class voters, who felt Labour put more energy into promoting multiculturalism than to addressing their concerns.”12 Thus, right-wing populism can be seen as a reaction to the liberal democrats’ efforts to shift political discourse towards issues of identity.

While liberal democrats caused the shift towards

identity politics, they must also find the solution to lessening the prevalence of identity politics. Right-wing populists are not the answer, but rather a manifestation of identity politics: “when identity politics predominates, populists will prosper.”13 Right-wing populism exists as an identity and as a reactionary force, rather than as a set of substantive policy stances. Right-wing populists serve only an exclusive constituency rather than an entire nation, and seek to increase the relative power of their constituency relative to other, supposedly illegitimate, members of the nation. Because right-wing populism is an exclusive, reactionary identity, it cannot constitute an answer to identity politics. It can merely expose issues, and force the liberal democrat’s hand. Liberal democrats must de-escalate the moralistic identity rhetoric that has become the norm in the 21st century, and strive to return to policy-centric discourse. The party system as it exists must be altered so that the electorate votes based on policy stances in which compromise can be accomplished, rather than on identity. ∆ ************************************************************************************************************** Francis Fukuyama, “The end of history?” National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 3-16.

2 Fareed Zakaria, “Populism on the March," Foreign Affairs (2016).

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Joshua Chaffin, “Amsterdam in pieces: why Dutch voters rejected politics as usual,” Financial Times (2017).

6 Stephen D. Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, “Trump’s appeal: What psychology tells us,” Scientific American Mind, March 2017.

7 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? 2016 8 Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, “What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe?”

Comparative Political Studies 41 (2008), 3-23.

9 Brian F. Schaffner et al., “Explaining white polarization in the 2016 vote for president: The sobering role of racism and sexism,” Conference on The U.S. Elections of 2016: Domestic and International Aspects. January 8-9, 2017, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.

10 Edward Luce, The Retreat of Western Liberalism, 2017.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? 2016.

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RETURN OF THE RUSSIANS

SUBVERSION OF GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Vladimir Putin vs. the World (Platon / Trunk Archive)

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DAVID HAN

fter the fall of the Soviet Union, Russians suffered under a ruinous economy, the rise of crime, and an overwhelming sense of uncertainty. While Russia continues to suffer from a number of political, economic, and financial issues, the Russia of the 90s is nowhere to be seen. Overseeing all this is Vladimir Putin, whose rise brought the centralization of power and backsliding into authoritarianism. Putin has overseen the invasions of Crimea, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, as well as the marriage of the church and state. While Putin’s foreign policy often defies international norms, and his domestic policy is highly conservative and nationalist, Russia and Putin are not the root cause of the subversion of global democracy.

The process of democratic undoing is caused by larger, systemic issues rather than one man.

Russians entered the new millennium with uncertainty, but Vladimir Putin assuaged those fears by stabilizing and growing the economy. While the degree of Putin’s popularity may be inflated at the polls or on surveys, it is not by much.

Even without ballot stuffing or increased wages before elections, Russians who remember the 1990s and Putin’s role in reversing the damage are bound to have a favorable view of him. In fact, researchers have found that “Putin’s approval ratings largely reflect the attitudes of Russians.”1 However, to say that Russia is on the rise would simply be false. There are indeed some positive trends, such as the fact that Russia became the largest exporter of grain and that startups are soaring.2 However, macro trends demonstrate a less optimistic view. Russia lacks manpower, has a low retirement age that burdens the federal budget, has difficulty

attracting investments, cannot diversify the economy away from oil and gas, and has an inefficient economy.3 Moreover, the top decile of wealth-holders owns 89% of all household wealth in Russia.4 Corruption also runs rampant, causing Russia to rank 135 out of 180 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2017.5 Finally, the Russian economy has been experiencing stagnation, with last year’s GDP growth at 1.5% compared to the Eurozone’s 2.5% and the US’s 2.3%.6 For the West, Putin’s biggest accomplishment in Russia is elevating Russia’s status on the international level as a great power. Though Russia’s economy is smaller than that of Texas, Russia has been playing the role of a great power by engaging in foreign policy strategically and deliberately. In order to maximize its effectiveness, Russia has engaged in “hybrid warfare,” which economizes the use of force, is persistent, and is population-centric.7 Because hybrid warfare is a grey zone in armed conflict, it is difficult for the opposition to respond in a proportionate way. Since elements of “hybrid warfare,” like hacking and information operation are so new, the theories and norms simply do not exist yet. Nevertheless, it’s true that Russia’s use of a select, elite group of soldiers and cyberwarfare has made Russia a formidable adversary capable of punching well above its weight.

Putin’s foreign and domestic policies, though unpalatable to the US, are not the main tipping points for the decrease in liberal democracy around the world. While Putin’s primary motivation in any foreign policy is to secure Russian interests and to spur nationalism within the electorate, his foreign policy does have an effect on Western liberal democracy.

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For example, in 2007 Estonia was hit with a “torrent of crippling distributed denial-ofservice attacks that took down critical pieces of the government, banking, and media infrastructure” because Estonia removed a Soviet-era statue from Tallinn.8 Because Estonia’s government and society are heavily wired, this was an attack on their democracy.

However, as a whole global democracy is a system built, recalibrated, and rebuilt over many centuries. It is a system that has survived wars, disasters, and international fascism. The argument that one man, even with the resources of an entire state, can somehow undermine an entire system, is a difficult one to make.

Regardless of Putin, many democracies have backslid into authoritarian or populist territory. The rise of Viktor Orban and Fidesz in Hungary, Jaroslaw Kaczynski and the Law & Justice Party in Poland, and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines are all recent examples of democratic backsliding.

These examples show that global democracy is indeed being threatened. However, the geographic and cultural diversity hint that there are other factors than Putin.

Aside from Putin and Russia, there are larger, more systemic issues that undermine democracies. In Europe, these issues include increasing economic inequality and the inability for governments to respond to citizens’ concerns and needs. Often, the rise of the populists is attributed to the influx of refugees, which can change the social fabric of the nation. These causes often lead to deepening polarization, backsliding into authoritarianism, and right-wing populism.

Establishing and maintaining a liberal democracy is by no means an easy endeavor. It is a not a right but a privilege that was built by great thinkers, decent politicians, and brave soldiers. Given how difficult it is to build a liberal democracy, it is a recent phenomenon in the history of humanity. It requires elements such as the rule of law, economic security of the country and the financial security of the people, and a vibrant civil society to uphold.

Democracy is an endeavor worth pursuing. It is not a perfect system, but it is the least bad option that protects the liberty of the individual. It is also a system that has endured through international wars, industrial revolutions,

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Aside from Putin and Russia, there are larger, more systemic issues that undermine democracies.

and many economic collapses. The United States in particular has maintained its democracy through an existential Civil War, times of severe economic inequality of the Gilded Age, the Great Depression, the World Wars, and the Cold War. However, this is not limited to the United States. France, Estonia, and South Korea have all experienced similar difficulties but have built and maintained their democracies.

It is unlikely that one man will subvert a system that can endure such hardship. However, if indeed global democracy is underminable by Vladimir Putin, then the world has a bigger problem to deal with. ∆

************************************************************************************************************** 1 Timothy Frye, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle L. Marquardt & Ora John Reuter (2016) Is Putin’s popularity real?, Post-Soviet Affairs, 33:1, 1-15, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2016.114 4334.

2 More Medetsky, “Russia Becomes A Grain Superpower As Wheat Exports Explode”, Bloomberg, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-06/russiaupends-world-wheat-market-with-record-harvest-exports.; Henry, Zoe. “Like It Or Not, Startups Are Soaring In Russia. Here’s Why”. Inc.com, 2018. https://www.inc. com/zoe-henry/inc-5000-europe-moscow-startup-ecosystem.html.

3 “Putin’s Election Win: Five Economic Challenges Facing Russia”. The Straits Times, 2018. http://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/putins-election-win-five-economic-challenges-facing-russia.

4 Credit Suisse Research Institute. Global Wealth Report 2016. Zurich: Credit Suisse AG Research Institute, 2016. http://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index. cfm?fileid=AD783798-ED07-E8C2-4405996B5B02A32E. 5 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017”. Www.Transparency.Org, 2018. https://www. transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017.

6 Sonin, Konstantin. “Russia’S Economic Stagnation Is Here To Stay, By Konstantin Sonin”. Project Syndicate, 2018. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-economic-stagnation-structural-reform-by-konstantin-sonin-2018-02.

7 Chivvis, Christopher S., Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: And What Can Be Done About It. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand. org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html. I use quotes because all warfare is hybrid. Catapulting infectious cow carcasses into fortresses was hybrid (biological-armed) warfare.

In this technological day and age, this happens to be the future of armed conflicts.

8 Kinstler, Linda. “How To Survive A Russian Hack”. The Atlantic, 2017. https://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/russia-disinformation-baltics/515301/.

Right-wing populism is perhaps a bigger threat to liberal democracy than Putin or Russia.

(Xinhua News Agency / PA Images)

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HOW

AUTOCRACIES OUTPERFORM

DEMOCRACIES (kremlin.ru)

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JACOB SHUMAN

uthoritarian regimes are fundamentally challenged to convince their people that they are a better alternative to democracy. While repression permeates authoritarian societies, it cannot sustain a regime. Repression alone is insufficient because it prevents regimes from accurately gauging public sentiments, and it incites insurrection from citizens who will not tolerate repression without tangible, if not perceived, benefits to their relinquished liberties.1 In a Brookings Institute paper entitled The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains, Anders Olofsgard theorizes a bargain struck between authoritarian elites and their citizens, which involves a compromise between state spending and authoritarian control.2 However, authoritarian regimes cannot simply provide measures of social welfare; their citizens must believe that they gain more prosperity under autocracy than under democratic rule. At times, regimes are capable of providing compelling services for their people. However, even in times of inferior domestic performance, authoritarian regimes can legitimize their rule by diverting citizens’ attention towards existential threats that demonstrate their superiority as national protectors. In order to portray themselves as superior to democracy and justify their repressive tactics, authoritarian regimes must rely on either bona fide public service or diversionary conflicts.

In some cases, government expenditures translate into beneficial, and more importantly, popular social programs that validate authoritarian repression. For example, the Nazi regime instituted widespread social safety nets that protected its people and promoted their prosperity.3 Gotz remarks that

“concern for the people’s welfare—at any cost—was a mark of the Nazi system from its inception.”4 Indeed, Hitler’s regime accustomed its people to a high standard of living by investing so heavily in domestic expenditures that it nearly drove Germany to bankruptcy. However, the regime’s popular social programs sustained morale during an otherwise unpopular war by making German citizens “amenable to Nazi propaganda” and giving them “a vested interest in the Third Reich.”5 As a result, Germans under the Nazi regime became complicit, if not supportive, of rule by genocidal roving bandits. German citizens could overlook and even support human rights violations against their fellow citizens in part because the Nazis ensured their personal wellbeing.

Similarly, China justifies its repressive tactics—including media censorship, subversion of political opposition, and encroachment on private enterprise—by citing its economic dominance. The Chinese economy has grown rapidly over the past few decades, and common indicators of living standards have improved in tandem.6 China’s CCP points to these improvements as justification for its repressive policies, and, more importantly, Chinese citizens accept this tradeoff.

One pundit from The Diplomat explains that repression and authoritarianism are tolerable to the Chinese people “as long as China continues to prosper.”7 Both historically and contemporarily, the provision of public welfare is a powerful method of ensuring domestic authoritarian legitimation.

However, public services are only effective for a dictator as long as they provide more welfare than citizens would expect under a democracy. This has concerning implications for the

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WILLIA MS FOREI GN AFFAI RS sustainability of China’s authoritarian regime. While China’s economic growth rate is impressive, it is also declining, and it may converge with the US growth rate in as few as 15 years.8 If China’s growth does not continue to exceed that of democratic regimes, then the CCP may struggle to validate its repressive methods as it does now. Without exceptional domestic performance, how do authoritarian regimes maintain their legitimacy?

Inadequately-performing regimes maintain popular support by diverting public attention toward foreign conflicts and existential threats that legitimize their role as protectors of the state. This tactic has been especially prominent under Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia. In the aftermath of the 2009 recession and the 201113 protest waves, Putin’s popularity dropped precipitously as frustrated Russian citizens became dissatisfied with Putin’s domestic negligence and rejected his projection of blame onto the legacy of Russia’s post-communist transition. As a result, they were reluctant to accept Putin’s overarching authority since he did not provide them with personal welfare. Shortly thereafter, Putin invaded and annexed Crimea, which effectively redirected the attention of the Russian people away from his inadequate domestic policies. “After the Crimea annexation, Putin instantaneously reclaimed his status as an indispensable leader,” and his performance-based support increased as Russians emphasized foreign prowess and stability over their initial domestic grievances.9 In the absence of competent governance, diversionary conflicts can justify authoritarian rule.

Diversionary conflicts also provide dictators with acceptable justifications for domestic misfortune and for authoritarian repression. The diversionary conflict in Ukraine legitimized Putin as a stabilizing force for Russia. Moreover, it allowed him to blame domestic austerity on trade sanctions imposed by Western interlopers and to repress dissidents by labeling them as foreign spies. In the midst of foreign conflict, people are willing to comply with extreme social and political measures. Diversion can both distract citizens and foster acceptance for a repressive system. However, if foreign threats provide such a safe guarantee of regime legitimation, why do all regimes not resort to such tactics?

While diversion temporarily sustains inadequate dictators, its use is fundamentally detrimental to a dictator’s enduring viability. Most concretely, diversionary conflicts are costly endeavors, which dictators cannot afford during times of crisis. According to a BBC analysis, Putin’s recent State of the Union Address conveyed the message “vote for Putin, and you’ll be voting for national security.”10 This is undoubtedly Putin’s intention, as national security and international prowess are the primary tangible factors sustaining his popularity.11 However, his speech was also riddled with promises to his constituents, including a monumental investment in nuclear capabilities to deter potential aggressors. Amidst crippling economic sanctions and ubiquitous poverty, Putin is in no position to increase government spending, and he is certainly not equipped

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to fund his nuclear-backed posturing against the United States. Nonetheless, Putin is compelled to promise glory to his people and expand his diversionary efforts in order to justify his strongman authoritarian rule. When dictators use diversionary conflicts to distract from their domestic dereliction and repression, they are forced to undertake increasingly brazen wars, arms races, and conflict escalations that undermine their country’s socioeconomic interests.

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Without exceptional domestic performance, how do authoritarian regimes maintain their legitimacy?

Moreover, diversionary conflicts are misguided, as “regimes justified as protectors against an existential threat lose their legitimacy both when they succeed and when they fail in dealing with that threat.”12 Foreign conflict is inherently risky, and escalation only increases the odds of eventual failure or defeat. If a regime founded on providing national security fails to protect its citizens, then its existence is no longer justified. Even if regimes successfully defend their people, they must continually predicate their authority on protection by fabricating, initiating, and escalating existential threats in order to sustain popular legitimacy. In so doing, however, they further undermine the domestic capacity of the state, resulting in an eventually irreversible trend of foreign escalation and domestic decay. This, in turn, makes it increasingly difficult for regimes to ever revert to a system of legitimation based on public services. Therefore, a regime’s decision to engage in diversionary conflicts can be seen as myopic or, alternatively, as a sign of true desperation. ************************************************************************************************************** 1 Ronald Wintrobe. “How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist’s view.” Economics of Governance, no. 1 (2001): 35-58.

2 Desai, R. M., Olofsgård, A., & Yousef, T. M. (2009). “The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains.” Economics & Politics, 21(1), 93-100. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ the-logic-of-authoritarian-bargains/.

3 Gotz Aly, “Preface,” in Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007).

4 Ibid., 3.

5 Ibid., 4.

6 “Country Profile: China,” World Bank Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/country/ China.

7 J. Michael Cole, “Just How Far Will Chinese Tolerate the CCP’s Authoritarianism?” The Diplomat, July 21, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/just-how-far-will-chinesetolerate-the-ccps-authoritarianism/.

8 Wayne Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,” Congressional Research Service, 2018.

9 Aleksander Matovski. The Logic of Vladimir Putin’s Popular Appeal. Unpublished Manuscript, Williams College, Williamstown, MA. 2018.

10 “Russia’s Putin Unveils ‘Invincible’ Nuclear Weapons” BBC, March 1, 2018, http://www. bbc.com/news/world-europe-43239331.

11 Matovski, 19.

12 Aleksander Matovski, “The Roots of Authoritarianism.” Authoritarian Politics - 2/8/18 Lecture Slides.

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THE LONG VIEW OF

HISTORY

Pope Francis and His Gamble Against Liberalism

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(Halazhang / Wikimedia Commons)

KEVIN SILVERMAN

he forthcoming Papal agreement with the Chinese government, which would restore diplomatic relations and allow for freedom in evangelization at the expense of the Beijing-backed Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CPCA) approval in Bishop Investiture and Chinese relations with Taiwan, is a textbook example of compromising ideological purity for political gain.1 Many influential Catholic leaders, led by Cardinal Joseph Zen, call it a break from the long, storied tradition of Church autonomy and a betrayal of the devotion of the heavily persecuted Chinese Catholics.2 The Pope is indeed parting from twentieth century Church doctrine, but, since the Middle Ages, the Church has worked with regimes of all sorts to find acceptable bishops and this deal still provides the Holy See right of refusal.3 Such criticisms in the specifics of Church doctrine also miss the forest for the trees; Pope Francis is making a realpolitik bet against liberalism, informed by his understanding of Catholicism in the liberal world order and the Church’s recent struggles against Protestantism in the Global South.

George Weigel, a noted Catholic conservative intellectual, views this project as “a prescription for both diplomatic and ecclesiastical failure” and “a bad signal to the rest of the world about the Vatican’s commitment to Catholicism’s own social doctrine.”4 Throughout the early twentieth century, the Catholic Church toed the line between supporting liberal democracies and negotiating with totalitarian states, yet ultimately served as a pivotal force in the fight against Communist ideologies in Latin

America and the Soviet Bloc. By choosing to do what is politically expedient, Pope Francis is realigning the Church geopolitically under the assumption that the Church does not require liberalism to flourish.

But what’s in it for Rome? For starters, the Church sees a huge market of souls to be saved in China. Though the number of Catholics rounds to about ten million (many of whom worship in churches outside the auspices of the CPCA), there may be upwards of fifty million Chinese Christians and, more concretely, 150 million bibles in circulation as of 2016.5 However, Protestant sects are growing quickly, surely alarming Francis, who saw the rise of Protestantism in his native Latin America over the last two decades throughout Central and South America.6 Pope Benedict XVI expressed interest in an agreement with the Chinese government in 2007, but the deal fell through when he refused to compromise on the issue of Investiture.7 On the other hand, the Chinese government views this as an opportunity to augment their own soft power.

It is no secret that Xi Jinping is positioning himself as a global leader, so this move would further legitimize his international outreach project. It is an added bonus that the Vatican is willing to potentially cut relations with Taiwan, further isolating what China views as a renegade province.

Domestically, China already has its hands full in Tibet and with the Muslim Uighurs.8 Removing a potential threat to their sovereignty - ten million loyal Catholics strong would allow China to focus on what it perceives as more imminent threats. The CPCA has struggled to attract many

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Cardinal Joseph Zen is leading the against the Sino-Vatican deal, basing his concerns on the abuses of totalitarian regimes in the 20th Century and the continued persecution of Christians in China.

(Alberto Pizzoli—AFP/Getty Images)

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of the faithful yet has succeeded in bleeding out the clergy in China, forming a powerful negotiating position against the Church. In sum, the Church is operating from a position of relative weakness, as it must compromise some institutional integrity to engage with the Chinese, but China also has more pressing issues to deal with.

The Church’s positioning thus marks a turning point from a status quo of perpetual decline. As Ross Douthat puts it: “They take this risk at a time when neither Chinese Communism nor Western liberalism seem exactly like confident, resilient models for the human future - the former sliding back toward totalitarianism, the latter anxious and decadent and beset by populist revolts.”9 Before looking at this future point, we must examine what the Church is turning from - this accord must be read in the context of the Holy See’s influence in Latin America and the Soviet Bloc at the end of the Cold War. Pope John Paul II viewed civil society as an “essential moral core” instead of as a merely institutional structure and as necessary to the advancement of the Catholic nucleus in states.10 Under his shepherdship, groups like the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile and Solidarity in Poland became key

drivers in not only toppling totalitarian regimes but helping establish the liberal governments that came after. Pope Benedict the XVI, though more of an academic, maintained

If the Church, a foundational Western institution, shifts in its bedrock and proclaims its willingness to make illiberal bargains, who’s to say how far the reverberations against liberalism will reach?

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the same emphasis on freedom and morality as core teachings of the Church. Many of the agreement’s opponents also cite a document from the highly influential 1965 Second Vatican Council, the Christus Dominus, which meditates on the unity of the Church and the Bishop’s key role in it.11 By invoking Vatican II as their foundation, they are suggesting a worldview of an uncompromising Catholic social doctrine, allowing for some degree of flexibility yet refusing to relinquish the moral high ground. This contextual analysis

Pope John Paul II embraces then-Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio. A Luke 22:48 Moment?

(ANSA / Vatican Pool / Landov)

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underscores the disruptive significance of the Pope Francis’s negotiations with China.

But even doctrinal sticklers might begrudgingly agree: if his gamble succeeds, Pope Francis is setting the Vatican up well for the future. The Church will sustain soft power, open relations with an important and growing global leader and, most importantly, grow its ranks. Though Francis’s social doctrine has made rounds for his rhetoric and focus on social and environmental issues, his decision signifies a selective invocation of Church doctrine. The Church he offers is much more malleable to local geopolitical realities, thus making it a more confederated institution. Perhaps this is necessary in a more regionally focused world, but it does come at the expense of a visionary moral and political view of the Church and its role in the world. We should not understate the political influence a Pope can have: “As a truly global body with over a billion members, the world’s oldest diplomatic service, and a vast network of humanitarian aid organizations, the Catholic Church is arguably able to frame foreign policy in a way no other institution can.”12 But if his move fails, such influence will work in reverse, damaging the Church’s legitimacy in moral prerogatives and disillusioning the many loyal followers.

More so than the mere worldly success or failure of Francis’s gamble, we should explore its Faustian nature to understand Francis’s worldview. While he was a priest in Argentina, Pope Francis witnessed how the Military Junta’s Dirty War was met with little resistance in the Church, with some journalists and jurists even dubiously claiming that then-Bishop Jorge Bergoglio participated in the kidnapping of two Jesuit priests.13 In many ways, Pope Francis is operating via the history he lived through, not the idealistic vision he presents outwardly. His vision may appeal to many across the globe, yet this deal pushes us towards societies where the Church will have to, as he claims, “get [its] hands dirty.”14 If the Church, a foundational Western institution, shifts in its bedrock and proclaims its willingness to make illiberal bargains, who’s to say how far the reverberations against liberalism will reach? ∆

************************************************************************************************************** 1 Leshan, “Love thine enemy: The pope and China may be close to a deal on appointing bishops,” The Economist, (April 2018): Accessed via https://www.economist.com/news/ china/21741213-some-catholics-will-find-hard-swallow-pope-and-china-may-beclose-deal.

2 Will Inboden, “Will Pope Francis Surrender to China?” Foreign Policy, (February 15 2018): Accessed via http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/15/will-pope-francissurrender-to-china/.

3 Francis X. Rocca, “Even the Pope’s ‘Supreme’ Power Has Its Limits,” The Wall Street Journal (April 29 2018): Accessed via https://www.wsj.com/articles/even-the-popessupreme-power-has-its-limits-1525003200.

4 George Weigel, “Pope Francis is Playacting Realpolitik,” Foreign Policy (February 15 2018): Accessed via http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/15/pope-francis-is-playactingrealpolitik/.

5 Jamil Anderlini, “The Rise of Christianity in China,” The Financial Times (November 7 2014): Accessed via https://www.ft.com/content/a6d2a690-6545-11e4-91b100144feabdc0; Ian Johnson, “10 Million Catholics in China Face Storm They Can’t Control,” The New York Times (February 14 2018): Accessed via https://www.nytimes. com/2018/02/14/world/asia/china-catholics-vatican.html.

6 Francis X. Rocca and Eva Dou, “Pope Francis to Bow to China With Concession on Bishops,” The Wall Street Journal (February 1 2018): Accessed via https:// www.wsj.com/articles/pope-francis-to-bow-to-china-with-concession-onbishops-1517507751.

7 Christian Fraser, “Blueprint for Vatican-China talks,” BBC News (March 6 2007): Accessed via http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6425177.stm.

8 Erica Pardney, “China is Afraid of Its Ethnic Minorities,” Axios (May 4 2018): Accessed via https://www.axios.com/china-communist-party-tibet-uighurs-refugees-472cca75124d-4fd3-b21d-b78bd1d99bfb.html.

9 Ross Douthat, “Pope Francis is Beloved. His Papacy Might Be a Disaster,” The New York Times (March 16 2018): Accessed via https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/opinion/ pope-francis-vatican-disaster.html.

10 George Weigel, “Pope John Paul II and the Dynamics of History,” The Foreign Policy Research Institute (May 2 2000): Accessed via https://www.fpri.org/article/2000/05/ pope-john-paul-ii-and-the-dynamics-of-history/. Originally a lecture.

11 Alex Lo, “It’s time to put faith in rapprochement,” South China Morning Post (February 19 2018): Accessed via http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/ article/2133759/its-time-put-faith-rapprochement; Second Vatican Council, Christus Dominus, Vatican website, (October 28, 1965): Accessed via http://www.vatican. va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651028_ christus-dominus_en.html.

12 Edward Pentin, “The Pope as Diplomat: How the Vatican Does Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs (February 27 2013): Accessed via https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/2013-02-27/pope-diplomat.

13 Gustavo Morello, The Catholic Church and Argentina’s Dirty War, (New York City: Oxford University Press, 2015), 80, 171.

14 Pope, “Christians Must Get Their Hands Dirty In Order To Do Good,” Rome Reports ( June 26 2015): Accessed via https://www.romereports.com/en/2015/06/26/popefrancis-christians-must-get-their-hands-dirty-in-order-to-do-good/.

President Xi stands to gain politically from the Sino-Papal accord, which would eliminate a potential subversive threat and further legitimize his global ambitions. (http://en.kremlin.ru)

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WILLIA MS FOREI GN AFFAI RS

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THE M-26-7'S FAILED ATTEMPT AT CREATING RACIAL EQUALITY T

ASHLEY VILLARREAL

he subject of Afro-Cubanidad has always been a sensitive one for Cubans of all races.

Though colorist and racist sentiments are deeply embedded throughout the fabric that composes Cuban culture and the collective consciousness of non-black Cubans, they are often left unaddressed and perpetuated through the persistent employment of discriminatory rhetoric and the condonation of inhumane action. With the triumph of the 26th of July Movement, Afro-Cubans began to acquire new freedoms that they were previously denied, and discourse about race gained significant relevance. However, these changes, though momentous, were not enough to suppress racist attitudes throughout the nation. The regime’s socialist initiatives did not suffice, and with the government’s decline during the Special Period, its tendencies towards color-blind approaches not only served to hinder social progress but to exacerbate the racial conflict within the country.

Though the problem of racial discrimination persists in Cuba today, it is important to note the successes that Castro and his regime managed to achieve through their early championing of Afro-Cubans. Castro intelligently and fortuitously synthesized racism with counter-revolutionary sentiment. In speeches given towards the beginning of his rule, Castro asked the people to redefine Cuban patriotism.

He insisted that “not only was racism anti-communist or counter-revolutionary; it was also anti-national and a perilous sign of ideological ‘backwardness.’”1 Some scholars, such as Carlos Moore, call into question the intention behind Castro’s words and argue that “Castro was forced to tackle the

issue in order to avert a racially motivated civil war.”2 Others give the dictator the benefit of the doubt and have defended Castro’s motives as honorable and genuine. Regardless of his intentions, Castro did effect positive change for blacks in Cuba. According to Alejandro de la Fuente, Castro “mounted an unprecedented attack on one of the central tenets of Cuba’s complex system of race relations: the separation of public and private spaces.”3 The government desegregated a number of public spaces and implemented policy changes that benefited blacks. The nationalization of private schools, in addition to literacy campaigns, exponentially increased the number of literate and private school educated black Cubans. Another tremendous effort was the seizure of hiring processes by the state. The Ministry of Labor’s involvement in hiring new employees opened new opportunities for blacks, as its new socialist approach benefited poorer civilians who tended to be black. The government made a lasting impact on national culture as well: “Public lectures and roundtables discussed the importance of African influences in Cuban music, visual arts, and other forms of expression.”4 By stressing the relevance and enormous influence of African diasporic culture on the Cuban identity, the regime further integrated blacks into the Cuban social sphere and assigned patriotic value to their traditions. In this way, Castro affirmed the notion that African influence was an intrinsic component of the Cuban national culture.

Castro also successfully employed his fusion of racism and anti-nationalism against what he considered to be his regime’s two greatest enemies: the United States government

13

(SOCIALIST EAST / YOUTUBE)

and the Cuban exile community in Miami. Knowing well that African Americans and the U.S. government were in heated conflict, Castro welcomed black militants and activists to the island. As Fuente describes: “The Cuban authorities wanted to embarrass the U.S. government internationally and promote social conflicts at home.”5 These activists, many of whom were members of the Black Panther Party, possessed

this obstacle, the regime exploited the news of a 1980 riot in the city and astutely combatted this threat by controlling the narrative and (correctly) painting the Miami exile community as unwelcoming and oppressive towards the Marielitos.

The victory of the revolution might have created an abundance of opportunities for blacks and more equity within the public sphere, but blacks in Cuba still undeniably faced and continue to face a tremendous amount of discrimination. Although blacks in the country are just as literate and educated as whites, non-black Cubans continue to consider them to be less cultured.

Afro-Cubans lack representation throughout a number of areas such as the media, government, and the tourism sector. Those who are represented in the media, for example, achieve success by catering to white tastes and exploiting themselves by acting out stereotypical roles; “for the black image to be funny, the black has to have little education so as to fit the vernacular stereotype.”8 By doing so, a vicious cycle is created within which blacks continue to be placed under the same discriminatory archetypes. This unfortunate situation has fed into the notion of prostitution as an “element in the current definition of social blackness;”(Reuters/Philimon Afro-Cubans are also Bulawayo) often wrongfully prosecuted and convicted of crimes.9 Focos delictivos, or neighborhoods that police defined as criminal centers, were typically areas with a large black, low-income population. Ironically, Fuente points out, crime rates were actually higher in neighborhoods considered ‘better’ by police authorities.10 The inception of the policy of peligrosidad social, where “a person whose conduct was deemed to be ‘manifestly against the norms of socialist morality’ could be deprived of freedom even without committing acts defined as crimes in the law,” also propagated institutional racism.11 In the area of culture, Afro-Cubans are abused as well.

Even though Santeria and other religions originating in the African continent are considered to be primitive rather than progressive and therefore anti-socialist, they continue to be exploited for touristic entertainment. Rogelio Martinez Furé argues that this unfortunately creates a “pseudo-folklore that, instead of exalting the positive values of popular traditions, simply presents the most superficial, the most deformed, and

“

”

Afro-Cubans will continue to face oppression if the nation does not rid itself of its facade as a color-blind society.

overlapping perspectives with the Cuban dictator. They, like Castro, “believed that capitalism engendered racism.”6 Castro offered them a paradise where they could escape oppressive and racially fueled American capitalism and enjoy an accepting space for their political ideologies. Castro also threatened the United States by repeatedly granting American fugitives political asylum. Cuba currently harbors a number of these fugitives, such as Assata Shakur, the aunt of famed rapper Tupac Shakur and former member of the Black Liberation Army, who was accused of murder and victoriously escaped prison. The Cubans have used and continue to use Shakur and other fugitives as leverage in negotiations with the United States. Most recently, during the Obama presidency, Raul Castro offered an exchange of Shakur for Ana Montes, the Cuban spy whose operations have been the most devastating to American intelligence efforts to date.

The Cuban government also antagonized another threat through its strategic condemnation of racism. By forging a strong bond with the African continent and its people, the regime seized “the opportunity to construct a notion of Cubanness that was in stark contrast with that of its archenemy: the exile community in Miami.”7 This proved to be an effective maneuver, as the majority of this community was white and incredibly racist. However, this operation faced some difficulties with the inception of the Mariel Boatlift.

The introduction of Marielitos into the Miami social realm contradicted the homogeneous identity that the Cuban government used to alienate and vilify white exiles. In spite of

Santería is a system of beliefs that merge the Yoruba religion with Roman Catholic and Native Indian traditions. This ceremony is called "Cajon de Muertos." ( Jorge Royan)

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WILLIA MS FOREI GN AFFAI RS

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Although revolutionary, Castro’s M-26-7 movement failed to foster an environment of racial equality in Cuba. (Periódico Vanguardia)

of course that negative attitude to our cultural heritage leads many people, who were already prejudiced where popular culture is concerned, to reaffirm and strengthen their rejection of popular culture.”12 Thus, much like during the revolution, the work and effort of blacks in Cuba are taken advantage of, uncompensated, and underappreciated.

Castro’s framing of the fight against racism through a socialist lens as well as the government’s “color-blind” attitude proved to be ineffective in granting rights and a voice to the black community in Cuba. The severity of social conditions for Afro-Cubans was undoubtedly aggravated during the period of economic decline known as “the special period.” Because the Castro regime used the socialist process of eliminating economic classes in order to combat racism, demonstrated by the hiring process implemented by the Ministry of Labor, the special period placed immense economic strife upon blacks. One of Castro’s failures was that he placed too much emphasis on employment “as the ‘truly cruel and inhuman’ variant of discrimination.”13 For this reason, when the economic system began to rapidly deteriorate, the structures that the Cuban government created, which allowed for some mobility for blacks in the workplace, began to crumble as well. Additionally, the regime and the island’s “color-blind” character did not stimulate social progress, but instead terribly deterred it. By negating the plurality of the Cuban identity, the state created more harm than good. Black affinity groups geared towards political activism were looked down upon and considered “reverse-racist” and “counter-revolutionary.” Speaking out against racism was also considered to be an anti-national activity because, in the eyes of the regime, race was no longer an issue. In conditioning the Cuban public to consider racial discourse a taboo, Castro, though somewhat alleviating the conflict in the public social sphere, incited the proliferation of racism within the private social sphere: “What disappeared from public discourse found fertile breeding ground in private spaces, where race continued to influence social relations among friends, neighbors, coworkers, and family members.”14 In short, Castro’s errors lie in his failure to allow blacks to unite and advocate for themselves, his focus on a socialist mode of activism, and his belief “that racist attitudes would be changed through education and persuasion,” rather than through “anti-discrimination legislation and fighting racism

through legal means.”15 Had Castro facilitated the way for groups such as Atenas, and had he been more transparent about racial issues and more open to discuss them as he did towards the beginning of his rule, Cuba could have truly become the progressive socialist paradise he had hoped it would be.

Today, Cuba faces many of the same issues it did during the late 20th century. Many on the island fail to understand that “indeed, racism is a self-fulfilling prophecy: it denies opportunities to a certain group due to their alleged insufficiencies and vices initially used to justify exclusion.”16 Afro-Cubans will continue to face oppression if the nation does not rid itself of its facade as a colorblind society. Castro missed the momentous opportunity to set Cuba apart from the rest of colorist Latin-America. Instead, he, his regime, and non-blacks continue to deny the racist sentiments that course throughout the country and strip blacks in Cuba of the rights and the respect they deserve as citizens of the island who have contributed so much to its rich and beautiful culture. Ironically, Afro-Cubans have proven to be the most patriotic members of society, despite the fact that the nation they so adore repeatedly exploits them and their traditions without restitution. ∆ ************************************************************************************************************** Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in TwentiethCentury Cuba (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2011), 278.

2 Ibid., 261.

3 Ibid., 265.

4 Ibid., 286.

5 Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All, 299.

6 Ibid.

7 Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All, 303.

8 Sarduy, Pedro Perez, Jean Stubbs, and Nancy Morejon, Afro-cuban Voices: On Race and Identity in Contemporary Cuba (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2000), 165.

9 Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All, 327.

10 Ibid., 314.

11 Ibid., 315.

12 Ibid., 139.

13 Ibid., 266.

14 Ibid., 322.

15 Ibid., 266.

16 Ibid., 329.

1

15

DEADLY WORDS

The Spike in Killings of Mexican Journalists

(ProtoplasmaKid / wikimedia commons)

GIULIA MCDONNELL NIETO DEL RIO Mexico is the third deadliest place in the world to do journalism — and the U.S. is making things worse.

Several high-profile journalists have been killed and wounded in conflict zones like Syria, Iraq, and Libya in the past couple of years, but Mexico features a different kind of conflict — less about artillery and aerial bombing, which kill indiscriminately, and more about targeted individuals being “disappeared” or subject to assassination. Still, the death toll in Mexico approaches war-like heights.

“Let them kill us all, if that is the death sentence for reporting this hell. No to silence.”

That was Mexican journalist Javier Valdez’s defiant reaction to the brutal killing of his journalist colleague Miroslava Breach, who was gunned down in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico this spring.

A Climate of Impunity In many cases, human rights advocates say, the journalists targeted were investigating links between criminal syndicates, local politicians, and law enforcement authorities. The sinister connections between government and criminal groups with access to vast amounts of cash has long plagued Mexico and undermined democracy south of the border.

Less than two months later, on May 15th, Valdez himself was shot and killed in the streets of Culiacán, capital of the northern state of Sinaloa. The state is home to the powerful Sinaloa Cartel, long headed by the legendary Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, now jailed in New York awaiting trial on U.S. charges.

In 2011, Valdez received the International Press Freedom Award from the Committee to Protect Journalists in New York. The prestigious award honors journalists who have done commendable work across the globe. And if a figure as wellknown and respected internationally as Javier Valdez could be targeted, it seems, so could any journalist working in Mexico.

Valdez is the sixth journalist killed in Mexico just this year.

According to Reporters Without Borders, Mexico is now the third most dangerous country for reporting, just after Syria and Afghanistan. Shortly before Valdez’s murder, The New York Times reported that since 2000, at least 104 journalists have been killed in Mexico, while another 25 remain disappeared.

Of course, journalists are only a minority of those affected by crime in Mexico. Since 2006, more than 80,000 people have been lost due to violence in the country, according to a 2015 Congressional Research Service report. The situation will only worsen if journalists investigating and reporting on these crimes are silenced.

Although almost all of the journalists attacked in recent years have been Mexican nationals, the escalation of killings raises questions about the safety of all media workers in Mexico.

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WILLIA MS FOREI GN AFFAI RS Human rights groups, such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, have for years been calling on the Mexican government to punish those responsible for the violence.

According to a recent article published in The Intercept, the Mexican government’s human rights commission reported that in 2016, 90 percent of crimes against journalists were either unsolved or the perpetrators faced no consequences.

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The murder of Valdez, a man working tirelessly to expose the inner abuses of drug cartels in Sinaloa, is a tremendous loss for the international human rights community.

Valdez was known for lending a hand to U.S. and other journalists who arrived in Sinaloa to write about Mexico’s drug wars. He was always generous with his time, according to many in the international and Mexican journalist community. At the end of the day, however, the foreign journalists went home. Valdez stayed in Sinaloa, vulnerable to the crime bosses and crooked politicians.

Washington Adds Fuel to the Fire Meanwhile, the U.S. may be making the problem worse.

Washington, after all, is funding the Mexican government’s failing fight against drugs — regardless of the extremely high levels of corruption in Mexico’s security institutions.

Often the very policemen investigating these crimes against journalists are involved with the drug cartels themselves.

In 2011, Valdez’s acceptance speech for the International Press Freedom Award reflected the unparalleled dangers of working as a journalist in Mexico.

In June, The New York Times reported that the Mexican government has been using spyware to retrieve private information from human rights lawyers, anti-corruption figures, and journalists through their smartphones — information that some worry could be used to track and target human rights defenders.

“Where I work, Culiacán, in the state of Sinaloa, Mexico, it is dangerous to be alive, and to do journalism is to walk on an invisible line drawn by the bad guys — who are in drug trafficking and in the government — in a field strewn with explosives,” he said. “This is what most of the country is living through. We, the citizens, are providing the deaths, and the Mexican and U.S. governments, the guns.”

But Washington continues to send semi-automatic weapons, helicopters, and armored vehicles, among other amenities, to a government in which some sectors appear implicated in an effort to silence the free press. Under a program called the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. has sent more than $2.6 billion worth of this assistance to Mexico, in many cases funding corrupt officials who are often involved in violence against the very people they are meant to protect.

His words still resound today and every day. It’s up to both Washington and Mexico to ensure that Valdez — and human rights defenders like him — doesn’t become just another number in the casualty count. ∆ ************************************************************************************************************** 1. Ahmed, Azam. “In Mexico, ‘It’s Easy to Kill a Journalist’.” New York Times, April 29, 2017. Accessed May 6, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/world/americas/ veracruz-mexico-reporters-killed.html.

2. Ahmed, Azam, and Nicole Perlroth. “Using Texts as Lures, Government Spyware Targets Mexican Journalists and Their Families.” New York Times, June 19, 2017.

Accessed May 6, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/americas/ mexico-spyware-anticrime.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphoneshare&_r=2&referer.

3. Congressional Research Service, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, H.R. Doc., at 32 (2017). Accessed May 6, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/ crs/row/R41576.pdf.

4. Franzblau, Jesse. “The Murder of Mexican Journalists Points to U.S. Role in Fueling Drug War Violence.” The Intercept, June 15, 2017. Accessed June 15, 2017. https:// theintercept.com/2017/06/15/the-murder-of-mexican-journalists-points-to-u-s-rolein-fueling-drug-war-violence/.

Adding to the chaotic situation, illegal gun trafficking across the U.S.-Mexico border has supplied both drug cartels and police officials with weaponry to continue human rights abuses.

“A Field Strewn with Explosives” Unfortunately, not enough is being done to find justice for the lives of so many great journalists lost. Both the U.S. and Mexican governments should be doing more to ensure that journalists’ lives, like those of others, are protected in this violent and lengthy conflict.

A memorial for slain Mexican journalist Javier Valdez. (Liliana Nieto del Rio)

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Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan (Vyacheslav Oseledko / AFP / Getty Images)

To what extent this tradition be accepted by the International community despite its violations against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and what, if any, interventions should be carried out?

T

HAE ON YOON

he current paradigm of marriage in the West reflects the American legal definition of marriage, echoing rhetoric of “mutual promise” and “consent,”1 leading to Western outrage due to the resurgence of bride kidnapping in rural Kyrgyzstan, where men abduct young women off the streets and force them to be their wives. Almost 12,000 women and girls are kidnapped every year in Kyrgyzstan alone, causing a steadfast rise in spousal abuse rates, divorce rates, and suicide rates among women. Furthermore, they often sacrifice their education and careers to take care of their new families. However, does the international community2 have the right and obligation to impede on the sovereignty of this nation and preach Liberal values to local communities? Can cultural defenses be made to legitimise a practice that humiliates and degrades women?

I find that there is a fine line regarding Liberal feminist movements between empowerment and colonialism. This paper will examine why intervention, though desirable, should be carefully approached. In a deeper level, the problems of universalizing western definitions onto other traditions will be explored. This article will offer a comprehensive and nuanced model that encompasses complex problems.

One socioeconomic explanation for this resurgence is in Kyrgyzstan’s movement away from a socialist state, leading to a decline in its economic security. Bride kidnapping prevails mostly in rural areas with poor standards of living where men feel burdened by wedding costs and are in need of a bride to take care of his parents. These men are motivated by economic hardships if they are not able to afford a bride

price (Kalym) — a gift livestock or a form of cash payment to the bride’s family — or a formal wedding.3 To them, kidnap marriage rushes the wedding process and offers an easy way out. This might call for economic policies that could provide employment and raise the standards of living for these families to ease the resurgence of this practice.4 Though bridal kidnapping is condemned by Kyrgyz laws, local authorities are not aware of these laws and simply accept it as a part of their tradition. Perhaps a viable solution would be to establish methods to enforce these pre-existing laws by pressuring the government to take proactive initiatives and, consequently, restore the public’s faith and trust in the legal systems.

In regards to the question of intervention, anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod argues that American justifications for intervening in Afghanistan were wrongfully covered by the rhetoric of saving the “veiled women.” To draw some similarities, American discourse surrounding the development of repressive regimes in the Middle East engaged in cultural and religious framing instead of a deeper and serious examination of political and historical explorations. This was also reflected in the Soviet justification for its rule over Kyrgyzstan. Just as the Bush administration was quick to blame the cultural rituals and the Islamic religion as the oppressor and the “enemy,” Soviet colonists believed that Kyrgyz women were in need of saving, thereby undermining the women’s role as the proletariat. Videos and articles from CNN regarding bride kidnapping never fail to mention the practice of Islam in Kyrgyzstan.5 The need for news outlets to religiously frame and politicise a practice seems

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WILLIA MS FOREI GN AFFAI RS not only irrelevant to the discussion of the tradition of bride kidnapping, but also implicitly establishes an adversary “us vs. them” mentality. Therefore, Abu-Lughod calls for the need to be suspicious when “neat cultural icons are plastered over historical and political narratives.”6 Here, the cultural icon is the tradition of kidnap marriages being used to guise Kyrgyzstan as a politically backward country. NGOs should therefore focus on nuanced explanations of the practice, encompassing the nation’s post-Soviet context, struggle to retraditionalize, and its socio-economic problems.

While it is easy for Western media and Liberal institutions to condemn and shun this practice for failing to align with their own understanding of ‘popping the question,’7 I wonder whether we ought to tell these brides and grooms that their understanding of marriage is flawed and oppressive.

A contrasting perspective is offered by the famed director of Boz Salkyn, a movie that popularized and mediatized bride kidnapping. He argues that “the west condemns bride kidnapping but they offer us nothing that we can follow, [...] except violence, drugs, divorce.”8 This demonstrates the Anti-Western rhetoric that is prevalent in these cultures and offers a new perspective on the notion of marriage that is different to the American definition. Here, the practice of bride kidnapping is used as a tool to convey the Kyrgyz rejection of the spread of foreign, Western, and American ideology. I find this to be enlightening, as Western human rights traditions are arrogantly deemed to hold universal truth.9 This form of ethnocentrism is demonstrated in a Vice documentary that makes frequent comparisons to a typical Western wedding to highlight the absurdness of the tradition. At one moment, the producer comments on the similarities between the Kyrgyz ceremony and a typical

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Western wedding, claiming it cannot be reconciled with the unfathomable practice of bridal kidnapping.10 Both cases are clear indications of how each party is guilty of perceiving the world in a monolithic, ethnocentric lens — judging another culture solely by the values and standards of one’s own culture.11 Standardizing one’s own cultural norm as a universal norm prevents a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the practice of bride kidnapping from being reached.

“

The implications of the mere passive acceptance of bride kidnapping by simply regarding it as Kyrgyz tradition, and therefore neglecting its disempowering effects on women is problematic. Instead, I find that this calls for a more culturally specific and holistic assessment of the context and background of the situation before addressing the case of bride kidnapping.

”

The cultural defense argument rejects the universalization of Western values and recognises the importance of culture in framing our normative values.

This was echoed among practitioners of bride-kidnapping.

When interviewed, the groom justified the kidnapping by owning everything to his ancestors: “It’s a tradition, it’s in our blood… This is a tradition and you can’t change it.”12 Here, it is unclear whether the Kyrgyz groom is referring to the Liberal West or the Soviet rulers in the past, who both tried to implement policies to change and abolish the tradition.

Nevertheless, the arguments against intervention founded on the unbending rhetoric of the cultural justifications were made clear — tradition is static and seminal.

While cultural defense has its merits and offers a perspective that is more sympathetic towards cultural

A newlywed Kyrgyz bride and groom. ( Jackie Matthews)

19

differences, it could result in cultural relativism, the “philosophical notion that all cultural beliefs are equally valid and that truth itself is relative, depending on the cultural environment.”13 The implications of the mere passive acceptance of bride kidnapping by simply regarding it as Kyrgyz tradition and therefore neglecting its disempowering effects on women is problematic. Instead, I argue for a more culturally specific and holistic assessment of the context and background of the situation before addressing the case of bride kidnapping. Projects of saving “other” women and brides must not depend on Western norms and, as AbuLughod claims, this form of Western liberal arrogance deserves to be challenged.14 Rather than solely condemning the Kyrgyz tradition of marriage, problems such as rising suicides, depression, illiteracy, and poverty among women15 must be addressed primarily.

The resurgence of bride kidnapping after the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrates the failures of short-sighted and undeveloped policies, reflecting the flaws inherent in universalising Western values to solve culturally intrinsic problems — much like the pitfalls of Liberal Feminism. The first step to eradicating the problem might potentially take the form of modifying laws so that bride kidnapping can only be condoned if it is consensual, or if the girl has given a ten days’ notice prior to the kidnapping. Also, education projects could be implemented to discourage students from perceiving kidnapping as a means to pursue Kyrgyz identity,16 and even conduct widespread education of the Epic of Manas to provide an alternative to bolstering national pride.

Projects established by NGOs should not impose Western values of marriage in an attempt to replace the practice of bride kidnapping, but should take caution in accepting it as a permanent tradition that should be entirely respected. Rather, there should be an effort to raise awareness of specific Kyrgyz legislation that makes bride kidnapping illegal and promotes the idea that it does not provide a positive image of Kyrgyzstan to the international community.

This could be done by operating public service campaigns

via radio, television, and posters.17 Economic development and growth policies could also be implemented to combat socioeconomic problems that confine women into the home.

Though the above proposals may seem to be asking for too much from NGOs, I am offering a multidimensional, long-term solution that will hopefully cater to the unique needs of Kyrgyzstan. Perhaps a combination of solutions will be able to give rise to an effective compromise between the conservation of Kyrgyz tradition and the prevention of nonconsensual bride kidnapping. ∆ ************************************************************************************************************** 1 LII Staff, “Marriage,” LII / Legal Information Institute, August 06, 2007, accessed December 12, 2017, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/marriage.

2 The International community will be denoted in this paper as NGOs. 3 Girls Not Brides, “Bride kidnapping and land rights in rural Kyrgyzstan,” Girls Not Brides, January 25, 2017, accessed December 12, 2017, https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/ bride-kidnapping-and-land-rights-in-rural-kyrgyzstan/.

4 Azhar Yerzhanova, “Bride Kidnapping,” The Gazelle, April 1, 2017, accessed December 8, 2017, https://www.thegazelle.org/issue/109/in-focus/bride-kidnapping.

5 “Women kidnapped and married off in Kyrgystan,” Online Posting, July 12, 2012, CNN, accessed December 10, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3CVciBdMoY. 6 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” American Anthropologist 103, no. 3 (2002): 784, doi:10.1525/aa.2002.104.3.783.

7 Ibid.

8 Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, prod. Jason Mojica, Vice, December 11, 2011, accessed November 25, 2017, https://www.vice.com/da/article/qbwb3x/bride-kidnapping-inkyrgyzstan-full-length.

9 Yves Beigbeder and Dennis Dijkzeul, Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology And Promise (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006).

10 Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, prod. Jason Mojica, Vice.

11 John T. Omohundro, Thinking Like An Anthropologist: A Practical Introduction To Cultural Anthropology (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2008).

12 Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, prod. Jason Mojica, Vice.

13 “Cultural Relativism,” Cultural Relativism, accessed December 12, 2017, https://www. cultural-relativism.com/.

14 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” 786.

15 Mark Malloch Brown, ed., Globalization With A Human Face (New York: Oxford Univ.

Press, 1999).

16 L. M. Handrahan, “Implications of International Human Rights Law and Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan,” The Fletcher Journal of Developmental Studies 16 (2000): accessed December 11, 2017, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/ praxis/xvi/Handrahan.pdf.

17 Ibid.

An illustrative photo by the Kyz Korgon Institute, an NGO that advocates against this practice. (Kyz Korgon Institute)

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WILLIA MS FOREI GN AFFAI RS

spring 20 18

"CRITICAL CRITICS"

OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Problem is More Than the Language

(Thom

T

JULIE GENG

here are many pitfalls and flaws with human rights language and advocacy: the framing of human rights can be easily distorted to serve certain capitalist or political interests and perpetuate extant power structures; political alliances with stronger states can shield weaker violator states from the consequences of naming and shaming; and interventionism justified in the name of human rights does more damage than good. Still, Landy warns us against becoming “uncritical critics” of human rights, a term used by Stammers to refer to scholars who “uncritically accept that human rights can be reduced to their institutionalized forms” while ignoring the formative role of social struggles as well as the complex relationship between human rights and power.1 In this essay, I aim to be a “critical critic” of human rights by pointing out the lack of awareness and respect with regard to the subjectivity of the people whose rights we advocate for, the insufficiency of the universalist approach of human rights, and the importance of orienting social activism towards concrete, long-term policy changes. By doing so, I hope to offer constructive ways to work towards global justice and to mitigate human suffering without completely abandoning the human rights language.

First, there needs to be a stronger self-awareness among human rights actors and scholars – specifically, a consciousness that we are working with or studying human subjects rather than objects, subjects whose experiences are uniquely multifaceted and whose plights originate from deplorable dehumanization and disenfranchisement. Sikkink begins her chapter with the poignant stories of Nadia and

Murad and makes a powerful claim that no matter how optimistic we can be based on the data and evidence and no matter which framework we, the people of the global North, decide to adopt, the human experience of suffering cannot be reduced to analytics and demands attention, empathy, and action.2 More importantly, whether we employ the language of human rights or not, the actions we take must empower the suffering people rather than “reinforce their invisibility, lack of political subjectivity, and fix their status as objects to argue about.”3 Using the case of Jewish activists, Landy furthers Sikkink’s concern and suggests that we prefer to use the humanitarian modality of human rights because it allows us to decide what demands we feel comfortable with while maintaining the glorified status of a “moral rescuer.”4 After all, when human rights are tied more closely with politics, we tend to view the situation as a zero-sum game. By increasing political solidarity and advancing projects of liberation, human rights actors start to harbor some uneasiness in their subconscious. Such phenomenon is especially prominent in the Israel/Palestine case because, for Zionist Jews, granting Palestinians right of return necessitates the displacement of the Israelis. Hence, the labeling of Gaza as a political problem is purposefully and carefully avoided. Nonetheless, the political modality of human rights language ought to be de-linked from realpolitik because human rights promise coexistence if nothing else.

Moreover, the pessimism with regard to human rights sometimes stems from criticism of their validity because they were originally stipulated by the global North as a soft

21

imperialist tool to further control the global South.5 Such criticism has been debunked by Sikkink, but clarifications of the story of origin remain insufficient. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) has not been updated since 1948, but defining what human rights mean for the entire world is not only unproductive but also prone to cultural insensitivity and ethnocentrism. Nevertheless,

“

describe, and the “localized moment of cognition” takes place not when we recall the clauses in the UNDHR but when we, the viewers, relate to the prisoners’ palpable pain as we realize our own vulnerability to torture and abuse.8 In order to bridge the gap between the “distant issue movement activists and the distant objects of activism,” localized contention, struggles, and discourse can highlight the constructive attributes of human rights while remaining in touch with the universalism that ties many social movements together.

Lastly, while one can be critical of the role governments play in global human rights practice, governments and the private sector play an important role in enforcing actual changes. The limited use of the political modality of human rights language does not only originate from the threats felt by distant activists, but also stems from the cynicism about working with existing institutions and structures. In spite of the increased number of human rights treaties ratification by countries, implementation, and improvements are not guaranteed. More troublingly, such ratifications are used to maintain a façade of conforming to and upholding human rights laws for hybrid and democratic states, rendering them less vulnerable to naming and shaming by international organizations and transnational advocates.9 However, in Sikkink’s six effective methods for human rights, five of them are tied to state and international efforts.10 Moreover, she disproves the legal fiction that states are solely responsible for compliance with or defiance of human rights laws, and instead she emphasizes that “diverse actors are responsible for abusing or fulfilling rights.”11 Systemic changes are crucial to sustained human rights progress, and identifying the specific actors and interest groups who are responsible renders tasks more manageable and makes the targets more accountable.

In the case of Israel/Palestine, the abusers include the Israeli government, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), as well as Israel’s biggest political ally, the United States. Policy changes ought to take place at different levels: the Israeli government needs to grant full rights to its Palestinian

”

We cannot resort to becoming “uncritical critics” of human rights, as it reflects a lack of self-awareness of our responsibilities that come with our privileges. human rights have to be universal because they aspire to provide a common language that “[transcends] particularistic nationalist narratives.”6 As a result, actors can derive legitimacy from these universal values, some of which are more constructed than inherent, and can use them to form their own adversarial framing. For the former Zionists and now advocates for Palestinian rights, such universal language was quintessential in coming to realize the human rights violations committed by Israel since before its birth as well as in forming a new identity that opposes Zionism and resonates with the fight for global justice.7 But universalism is inadequate, and effective, sustainable human rights improvements can only be made when the local context is taken into consideration and when the local actors are engaged. Also, the universalist notion of human rights diminishes the agency of human actors, including those whose rights are violated, to define human rights through their own social struggles. In Jenny Holzer’s exhibition, human rights and their violations refer to rather specific experiences for a specific group of people. For the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, violations involve extensive torture, lack of due process, arbitrary arrest, and violent deaths. These unique experiences are even more specific than what my words can

Tear gas canisters fired by Israeli forces at Palestinian demonstrators, May 4.

(Ibraheem Abu Mustafa / Reuters)

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WILLIA MS FOREI GN AFFAI RS

spring 20 18

Damascus skies erupt with surface-to-air missile fire as the U.S. launches an attack targeting different parts of the Syrian capital on April 14. (Hassan Ammar / AP)

citizens; the IDF must terminate the occupation and brutal oppression that violates the physical integrity of Palestinians in the West Bank; and the U.S. needs to stop its massive financial and military assistance to Israel. These objectives can be further broken down to a more local level by including anti-settlement protests in the West Bank, boycotting Israeli products, and electing congress members who support the Palestinian political cause. We cannot exclude the public and private sectors in human rights advocacy because even if we succeed in empowering the people who need to be empowered, they still need to fight to bring about policy changes that will promise themselves a safe and stable future.

The reason why I am not satisfied with the “uncritical critics” is that we as college students living in the developed world can afford to be pessimistic, can choose to be an ally or not, and can move on with our lives when we step out of the classroom. However, many cannot do the same. They have to face these violations head-on, like the Palestinian protesters risking their lives and marching in the Gaza Strip as we speak. Nadia and Murad will continue to carry painful narratives of their relatives and friends being tortured and radicalized by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Therefore, we cannot resort to becoming “uncritical critics” of human rights, as it simply reflects a lack

of self-awareness of our responsibilities that come with our privileges. I cannot promise hope or the assurance that things will definitely get better and, as suggested by Sikkink, people will continue debating the effectiveness of human rights.

Nevertheless, we must not give up on human rights and advocacy work simply because we can afford to do so. ∆ ************************************************************************************************************** Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 103.

David Landy, “Talking Human Rights: How Social Movement Activists Are Constructed and Constrained by Human Rights Discourse,” International Sociology 28, no. 4 (2013): 422, doi:10.1177/0268580913490769.

2 Kathryn Sikkink, Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 181-3.

3 David Landy, “Talking Human Rights,” 422.

4 Ibid., p. 422-3.

5 Kathryn Sikkink, Evidence for Hope, 55-93.

6 David Landy, “Talking Human Rights: How Social Movement Activists Are Constructed and Constrained by Human Rights Discourse,” 417.

7 Ibid., 415-420.

8 Ibid., 424.

9 Cullen S. Hendrix and Wendy H. Wong, “When Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses,” British Journal of Political Science 43, no. 03 (2012): 572-651, doi:10.1017/ s0007123412000488.

10 Kathryn Sikkink, Evidence for Hope, 183-4.

11 Ibid., 213.

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The UN has called the current exodus of Rohingya "the most urgent refugee emergency in the world." (Showkat Shafi / Al Jazeera)

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