W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS
1
Spring 2018
03 07 10 12 16
Strike Now & Suffer Later: The Case for Coexistence with a Nuclear Iran Mitchell Morris
Globalization: A Threat to Liberalism Jack McCool
Social Media and the Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution Ben Beiers
Climate Change: A Battle Against Ourselves Sam Holmes
Sinking Hopes and Rising Tides: The Rohingya Climate Refugee Crisis Nathaniel Munson-Palomba
Editor-in-Chief Korina Neveux '19 Creative Director Angela Chan '19 Associate Editors Kevin Silverman '19.5 Ben Beiers '20 Sponsored by the Stanley Kaplan Program in American Foreign Policy 2
W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS
W
Spring 2018
MITCHELL MORRIS
ith President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA), it’s unclear how the U.S. will respond to advances in Iran’s nuclear program. Many of the President’s most influential advisors, including National Security Adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have made it clear that they view a nuclear Iran as a “uniquely terrifying” threat and an unacceptable risk to U.S. regional interests and national security.1 These advisors warn that Iran might act irrationally with a nuclear weapon; that they might give their nuclear weapons to terrorist groups; that a nuclear Iran might be too difficult to contain; that they might trigger a regional arms race; or that they might use their new weapons as a license to act aggressively in the region. These concerns have led them to argue that the U.S. must “strike now or suffer later,” and execute a series of “surgical” strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities to prevent them from developing a nuclear weapon.2 If Iran develops a nuclear weapon certain dangers are inherent. Nuclear weapons are some of the most deadly tools on Earth, and each new addition to the nuclear club adds a layer of complexity and risk to foreign policy. However, to suggest that a nuclear weapon in Iran’s possession presents a “uniquely terrifying” threat to the United States, and that a campaign of preventive strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities is therefore necessary,
is dangerously short-sighted.3 Strikes like these would inevitably result in enormous amounts of death and destruction, and Iran is unlikely to allow such an affront to go unavenged, causing a spiral of escalating violence that could end in outright war. Considering the recent examples of the quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, this is not a risk worth taking. Outright war with Iran would require enormous human and financial sacrifices; containing a nuclear Iran, on the other hand, might not. Instead of a campaign of preventive strikes, the U.S. should work with regional allies to build a coalition capable of containing and deterring a nuclear Iran, and thereby maintaining U.S. national security without plunging the Middle East further into violence. Before considering the consequences and implications of a successful preventive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities one must first grapple with the very real possibility that such a strike would be unsuccessful. After watching Iraq and Syria’s nuclear programs fall to preventive strikes the Iranian regime has taken concrete steps to prevent their program from sharing the same fate. American intelligence indicates that Iranian nuclear facilities are “buried deep underground, hardened against attack, and ringed with air defenses,” and those are just the facilities that American intelligence has successfully located.4 Considering Iran’s history of hiding its nuclear facilities, such as its uranium-enrichment facilities in Natanz and
3
“
Qom, it is entirely possible that Iran operates facilities that the U.S. intelligence community is unaware of, and that a bombing campaign would therefore leave intact. Even if a preventive strike was successful, advocates of the strategy underestimate the amount of collateral damage that would result, and the magnitude of the Iranian response to be expected. Proponents of the preventive strike option paint a tantalizing picture of an operation that would be “quick and clean,” able to be
With Iran’s facilities being so widely dispersed, so deeply buried, and located so close to population centers, even a minimal bombing campaign would need to be a large and complex affair if it were to succeed, and hundreds of civilian casualties would likely result. This wanton violence and destruction would inevitably be met with a stiff response from the Iranian regime. Iran’s nuclear program is a major source of the regime’s legitimacy, and in the wake of such an attack the regime would have no choice but to respond in order to shore up their deterrence and save face domestically. Some proponents of a preventive strike acknowledge this likelihood, but believe that the U.S. could diminish the magnitude of the Iranian response by publicly stating the attack’s limited aims and by drawing red-lines. However, after being betrayed by the U.S. in the JCPOA and suffering a devastating surprise attack on their nuclear facilities Iran would have little reason to trust America’s stated goals or red-lines, and would likely respond with similar force. American troops and ships across the region would have to brace for a devastating retaliation from Iran’s arsenal of short and medium-range ballistic missiles, and America’s regional allies, especially Israel, would be left vulnerable to terrorist attacks from Iranian sponsored groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. In the worst-case scenario Iran could also close the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow pass through which over 20% of the world’s oil is shipped, sending an “oil shock” through the economy that could cause a global recession.7 Proponents of a strike have argued that the U.S. could
Even if a preventive strike was successful, advocates of the strategy underestimate the amount of collateral damage that would result, and the magnitude of the Iranian response to be expected.
”
carried out by American air power at a moment’s notice with minimal collateral damage or casualties.5 But this is a dishonest representation of what a preventive strike would actually look like. Iran has strategically dispersed their nuclear facilities across the country and situated them near civilian populations, and although advocates of a strike say that casualties and collateral damage could be mitigated by striking at night, a 30,000 pound bunker buster dropped into an urban area can only be so ‘“limited” or “surgical.”6
4
W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS
anticipate and brace for these military and economic consequences. While it is true that American troops could be evacuated or ordered to stay in bunkers to minimize casualties, the global economy could not brace as easily for a sudden oil shortage. The oil shock caused by a closed Strait of Hormuz would likely result in an economic downturn similar to the 1973 Oil Crisis, and despite what some proponents have argued, neither opening America’s strategic petroleum reserve nor a boost in Saudi Arabia’s oil production could make up the difference.8 Facing such a dire economic threat, the U.S. would be under immense domestic and international pressure to counter, or even preempt, Iran’s response to prevent an economic disaster. However, even a limited U.S. counterattack would represent a further escalation of the conflict, prompt another salvo of Iranian missiles, and further increase the risk that the “limited” campaign of preventive strikes spiral into a full-fledged war with Iran. After sacrificing eight years, trillions of dollars, and tens of thousands of lives in a war in Iraq predicated on similar logic, such a war is an unacceptable prospect. Therefore, strikes that might inadvertently pull the U.S. into such a war should be used only as a last resort. All of these risks are far too substantial to justify what would ultimately be an insubstantial reward. Even if the U.S. manages to execute a perfect preventive strike that disarms Iran’s nuclear program and avoids triggering a massive retaliation or a global economic crisis, the only prize would be setting Iran’s nuclear ambitions back a year or two, according to U.S. Defense Department estimates.9 Proponents of the strikes ignore this crucial fact, arguing instead that preventive strikes can convince countries to give up their pursuit of the bomb entirely, citing the Israeli strikes on Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 as proof. However, these examples quickly cripple when considered
Spring 2018
in their proper context. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein did in fact restart Iraq’s nuclear weapons program after Israel’s 1981 strike, which required U.S. military action in the Gulf War, as well as a decade of sanctions and intrusive inspections in order to finally eliminate it.10 In addition, in Syria, anyone who watches the news could tell you that conditions in the country since the 2007 Israeli strike have not lent themselves to the expensive and timeconsuming pursuit of nuclear science. Since 2011, Syria has been engulfed in a brutal civil war which has collapsed the Syrian state, rendering the development of nuclear weapons completely unnecessary and infeasible. While it is true that the 1981 and 2007 strikes succeeded in destroying their targets and extending Israel’s nuclear monopoly, these short-term gains came at serious long-term costs. Israel’s ‘shoot first, ask questions later’ approach has played a major role in keeping Arab-Israeli relations tense, and has inspired widespread condemnation from the international community, narrowing their pool of potential allies. Israel’s enemies, meanwhile, were given all of the justification they needed to continue their efforts to wipe the embattled country off the map, and the strikes did nothing to prevent them from simply rebooting their nuclear programs towards that end. If the U.S. moves forward with a campaign of preventive strikes against Iran, they can expect a similar result. Iran’s nuclear program might get set back a year or two, but the international community would be outraged by America’s flagrant breach of international law, and nothing would prevent Iran from simply building new nuclear facilities. As Thomas Schelling famously said, “Short of universal brain surgery, nothing can erase the memory of weapons and how to build them.” Even after a successful preventive strike the U.S. would remain on a collision course with Iranian nuclear ambitions for the foreseeable future.
5
Absent the JCPOA, the best strategy to prevent Iran from threatening others with nuclear weapons in the long-term would be the construction of a robust containment apparatus. Containment would not be simple or cheap; it would need to involve an increased investment in intelligence to monitor Iran’s nuclear program, a significant troop presence on Iran’s border for deterrence and, in the event of a crisis, intervention and a regime of carefully targeted sanctions that act as both carrot and stick, impeding Iran’s nuclear development while incentivizing them to end the program altogether. However, if the United States shows restraint and refrains from striking Iran preventively, an international consensus could be established around containment, and a coalition for the cooperative containment of Iran could be formed. International cooperation would not only increase the effectiveness of the aforementioned military, intelligence, and sanctions regimes, but it would significantly reduce the cost of the endeavor for the United States while virtually eliminating the risk of sparking outright war. Obviously, the first goal of containment would be to prevent Iran from producing a nuclear weapon, but if that proves impossible, the apparatus would serve the vital function of deterring Iran from using their weapon or otherwise threatening the stability of the Middle East. Critics of containment argue that deterring a nuclear Iran would be impossible; they say that it would act irrationally with a nuclear weapon, possibly giving their weapons to terrorist groups and triggering a regional nuclear arms race, or using their new weapons as a license to act aggressively in the region, curtailing American freedom of action in the Middle East.11 These fears are natural, but the actual threat posed to the United States and the Middle East by a nuclear Iran is overblown. Iran’s leaders may talk tough but they are nevertheless rational, and no rational leader is immune to the logic of deterrence. With American and Israeli nuclear weapons at the ready, Iran will never use a nuclear weapon because the result would be their own nuclear annihilation. Similarly, after paying the enormous costs and navigating the many risks of developing a nuclear weapon, Iran’s rational leadership would be unlikely to make the irrational decision of gifting their nuclear weapons to terrorists groups they cannot trust or manage.12 As for the risk of a regional arms race, there is good reason to believe the U.S. can prevent the nuclear domino from being tipped. The only countries in the Middle East who could conceivably pursue nuclear weapons of their own are Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, but U.S. security promises made to Saudi Arabia and Turkey would likely provide enough deterrence to keep them satisfied without a native nuclear program and American foreign assistance to Cairo would make it vulnerable to the intense international pressure to refrain from going nuclear.13 This leaves the threat of Iran using nuclear weapons as a shield, allowing them to act
aggressively across the region without fear of retaliation. This concern is justified, as this was the strategy that Saddam Hussein wanted to employ if he were able to obtain nuclear weapons. However, the logic of deterrence and the strength of American security guarantees should be enough to stop Iran from acting aggressively in the Middle East. Many of Iran’s neighbors are U.S. allies, and the U.S. has demonstrated its resolve to defend its allies and interests in the region with decisive military actions like Operation Desert Shield. Iran hasn’t invaded another country in over 200 years, and with the proven reliability of U.S. security guarantees in the Middle East, this fact is unlikely to change, even if Iran has nuclear weapons. Whenever a new nation joins the nuclear club, U.S. foreign policy has become more complex, but the world has not necessarily become more dangerous. With weapons so powerful, some risks are inherent, but the United States, its allies, and the international community have the ability to manage, contain, and deter a nuclear Iran without further destabilizing the Middle East. A preventive strike should be reserved as a last resort because even if a strike were a success, the magnitude of the Iranian response and the history of American action in the region suggests that such an operation would be neither quick nor clean, but instead could draw the country into another intractable conflict from which it could not escape without enormous sacrifice. ∆ **************************************************** 1 Waltz, Kenneth. “What if Iran gets the bomb?” Reuters, May 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ idUS162656304720120622. 2 Bolton, John. “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran.” The New York Times, March 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/ opinion/to-stop-irans-bomb-bomb-iran.html. 3 Waltz, Kenneth. “What if Iran gets the bomb?” 4 Kroenig, Matthew. “Time to Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs, February 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middleeast/2012-01-01/time-attack-iran. 5 Kahl, Colin. “Not Time to Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs, April 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-01-17/ not-time-attack-iran. 6 Kroenig, Matthew. “Time to Attack Iran.” 7 Kahl, Colin. “Not Time to Attack Iran.” 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Kroenig, Matthew. 12 Mueller, John. “Why Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter.” Foreign Affairs, December 2018 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclearweapons-dont-matter. 13 Posen, Barry. “We Can Live With a Nuclear Iran.” The New York Times. February 2006. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/opinion/we-can-live-witha-nuclear-iran.html.
6
W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS
I
Spring 2018
JACK MCCOOL
n its purest form, the rise of globalization should be a major boon to the liberal project. The ability of labor to flow freely throughout the world should allow for economic growth wherever possible. Immigrants filling these jobs should be able to find a new start for themselves as well as integrate into their new host nations rather quickly. With globalization, Western liberal nations like the US, Germany, and others should be able to become “melting pot” nations, comprised of people from different races, religions, cultures, and ethnicities, living and thriving together as one secular democratic nation. In short, globalization should allow Western liberal states to become a cliché “big, happy family.” However, in the United States and Europe, this does not seem to be the case. Globalization has had the exact opposite effect on nations. Instead of bringing people together, globalization has driven them apart. Many countries have done their best to keep migrants outside of their borders. Many countries that have let people in have had trouble getting them to integrate. States like the United States, Hungary, and France have seen the rise of right-wing populist groups with the goal of eradicating this very phenomenon of globalization. Instead of supplementing liberalism and allowing it to thrive, globalization has become increasingly threatening to liberalism itself. So where has globalization gone wrong? Is it simply a good idea that needs time to develop? Does it need
better salesmen to help pitch it to the masses, or is there something inherently contradictory in the liberal idea of globalization? The economic histories of Indonesia and Greece are prime examples of the failure of globalization in realizing the liberal project. In his The New York Times article, former chief economist of the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz recalls “the picture of Michael Camdessus, the managing director of the I.M.F. at the time, standing over President Suharto as Indonesia surrendered its economic sovereignty”.1 Stiglitz claims that the I.M.F. “ruined” Indonesia’s banking system, going on to note the riots that broke out in Jakarta five months later. The global economy did not save Indonesia; it ruined Indonesia. The Greek story is not much different. The story of Greece begins with the implementation of “The Stability and Growth Pact” by the European Union. The pact, designed to help create fiscal austerity for all member nations, stipulates that member nations must have a government deficit below a threshold of 3 percent of their GDP. Furthermore, states must not hold debt that exceeds 60 percent of their GDP. Greece, desperate to ratify the pact and adopt the Euro, came nowhere close to meeting the economic standards laid out by the EU. Instead of taking measures to improve their economy to meet these standards, the Greek government simply manipulated their numbers in order to pass inspection
7
by the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). While there is some evidence that suggests that countries like Germany knew that Greece was lying all along, Greece had already signed its death warrant anyway. In October of 2009, when Greece announced that it had been understating its deficit for years following the 2008 stock market collapse, the country was completely shut off from
of its altruistic nature, but because it had its own separate interests. The cases of Greece and Indonesia are examples of the failure of globalization. Instead of stepping in to help save the economies of countries in dire need of saving, foreign entities stepped in and took control of the countries themselves. According to Politico, “No serious economist believes Greece will ever crawl out from its more than The lack of integration experienced in major €300 billion debt without serious forgiveness from its creditors”.4 Its Western liberal nations should be seen as a biggest creditor? Germany, which major threat to globalization. Without integration, Politico describes as a “de facto colonizer” of Greece. The Greek globalization is fundamentally broken. The economy is tied almost entirely liberal project is to ultimately reach the Kantian to decisions made by the German idea of “perpetual peace.” This is not possible government. That is domination, not globalization. without integration. A lack of integration not Another problem that only disincentivizes countries from bringing in globalization faces is the problem of integration. Integration immigrants, but it also gives rise to perhaps the is essential to the success of biggest threat to liberalism: populism. globalization. In order for countries to(Reuters/Philimon want to welcome Bulawayo) borrowing through financial markets. When the country migrants that they so desperately need in order to enjoy faced bankruptcy in the Spring of 2010, the International sustained economic growth, they must have some sort Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the of idea that immigrants will be able to integrate into European Commission- known as the “troika”- stepped domestic society. However, in many countries, this has not in with bailouts that totaled more than €240 million.2 At been the case. Take Germany, for example. As far back as first glance, the Greek bailouts by the troika seem to be 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has expressed globalization at its finest, with the global economy helping the vitality of integration on the part of immigrants in to stabilize a weak economy. However, the troika had order to create a functioning society. In a story by BBC motivations outside of bailing out Greece. The bailouts in 2010, “She said the so-called ‘Multikulti’ concept came with harsh conditions, such as tax increases, budget where people would ‘live side-by-side’ happily - did not cuts, and an overhaul of the Greek economy; all done work, and immigrants needed to do more to integrate with the intention of “making Greece an easier place to - including learning German”.5 In 2016, Germany 3 do business”. The troika bailed out Greece not because introduced an integration law that effectively mandated
“
”
8
W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS
immigrants to “learn the language, get accustomed to Western values, and find a job” at risk of losing the ability to gain permanent residency.6 Germany is not alone in enacting integration laws, as France and other European countries have employed similar ones. The lack of integration experienced in major Western liberal nations should be seen as a major threat to globalization. Without integration, globalization is fundamentally broken. The liberal project is to ultimately reach the Kantian idea of “perpetual peace.” This is not possible without integration. A lack of integration not only disincentivizes countries from bringing in immigrants, but it also gives rise to perhaps the biggest threat to liberalism: populism. Populism, and specifically right-wing populism, might be a fairly new phenomenon, but it is not an insignificant one. Populism has experienced some fairly major victories recently, as is evidenced by elections in France, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, The United States, and especially Hungary. Populism was born out of many things, most notably a distrust of elites, a nationalist sentiment and a division in culture. The anti-immigration, and therefore anti-globalization, sentiments expressed by populist groups are results of these three things. The rise of these groups has created a much more polarized political climate, with people like the “Never Trumpers” on the left and “Obama Truthers” on the right acting as direct threats to democracy, attempting to delegitimize the opinions of their political opponents. As Pierre Manent notes, this phenomenon is “departing from democracy as it has thus far been known”.7 This polarization is not bringing the world towards Kant’s “perpetual peace.” Rather, it brings the world much farther from it. The rise of populism is direct evidence that globalization is not advancing the liberal project, it is destroying it. The rise of globalization and its ideals of integration, economic growth and secularism are the motivating factors behind the objections of populist groups. The evidence suggests that globalization is having the exact opposite effect of its intended one on the liberal project. It is not bringing the world towards perpetual
Spring 2018
peace. It is not even keeping the world where it was. It is bringing the world away from perpetual peace. At its core, the idea of globalization is one that should bring the world towards perpetual peace. However, it ultimately makes too many false assumptions. It assumes that countries will not take advantage of things like international debt, which the cases of Greece and Indonesia have proven false. It assumes that immigrants are willing and/or able to integrate into their new societies. Laws enacted in Germany and other Western nations have shown that this does not hold true. It assumes that people living in these host countries are receptive to these ideas in the first place. The rise of right-wing populism in the United States and elsewhere has proven that this is not true, either. These false assumptions are the reasons why globalization has not served to supplement the liberal project of perpetual peace, but instead has begun to destroy it. ∆ **************************************************** 1 Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Greece, the Sacrificial Lamb.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 25 July 2015, www.nytimes. com/2015/07/26/opinion/greece-the-sacrificial-lamb.html. 2 The New York Times. “Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis.” The New York Times, 17 June 2016, www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2016/business/international/greece-debt-crisis-euro. html. 3 The New York Times. “Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis.” The New York Times, 17 June 2016, www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2016/business/international/greece-debt-crisis-euro. html. 4 Karnitschnig, Matthew. “Why Greece Is Germany’s ‘De Facto Colony’.” POLITICO, 16 June 2017, www.politico.eu/article/ why-greece-is-germanys-de-facto-colony/. 5 Evans, Stephen. “Merkel Says German Multicultural Society Has Failed.” BBC News, 17 Oct. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-11559451. 6 Delcker, Janosch. “Angela Merkel to Refugees: Integration Is a Must.” POLITICO, 27 May 2016, www.politico.eu/article/ angela-merkel-to-refugees-integration-is-a-must-germany/. 7 Manent, Pierre. “Populist Demagogy and the Fanaticism of the Center.” American Affairs Journal, 26 May 2017, americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/populist-demagogy-and-thefanaticism-of-the-center/.
9
I
BEN BEIERS
n 2010, Khaled Said published photos to social media sites that captured police brutality in Egypt. Days later, Said was infamously pulled from an internet cafĂŠ in which he was working and publicly beaten to death by Egyptian police. Images of Said were broadcasted on social media sites, helping spark a movement aimed at overthrowing Hosni Mubarak, replacing him with a democratic government. This revolution happened in the context of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring began with the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia in January 2011, and its spirit quickly moved to Egypt. Citizens were fed up with the status quo and wanted democracy. Demonstrators began to gather in Tahrir Square, demanding legal and political change. Mubarak fought back with security and police forces, but ultimately was forced to cede power in early 2011 due to the sheer size of the movement. The overthrow of Hosni Mubarak was seen internationally as a huge victory for democracy in the Middle East. Predictions were made that Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak were the first dominos to fall in a democratic wave that would strike the Middle East. However, in the eight years following the overthrow of Mubarak, these predictions have not held up. In 2014, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took power after winning democratic elections. In the years since, el-Sisi has consolidated power and transitioned Egypt into a military state. His government suppresses opposition by jailing its critics and
refusing to allow any legitimate opposition candidates to rise. Because of these tactics, El-Sisi won the 2018 election by a landslide. El-Sisi has not fulfilled the democratic goals that the Egyptian Arab Spring revolution sought, but instead built a harsh autocratic regime that in many ways resembled Mubarak’s. The Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution showed the capacity for social media to move and unite people around a common cause. This was one of the first revolutions that was primarily organized online, and Mubarak did not know how to respond. In just a few days, hundreds of thousands of people were reached with simple messages, and massive protest events were organized. This was a leaderless movement in which the people of Egypt congregated online to organize a social movement with massive consequences. Mubarak tried reacting to these threats to his regime with violence, as he would to a coup. However, violence against those participating in peaceful protests in and around Tahrir Square only caused further international broadcasting of the atrocities he was committing, spurring greater resistance. This revolution also showed the pitfalls of social media. Scial media poses both an enormous opportunity and a risk to burgeoning social movements. This has been shown by Egypt’s failure to fully democratize following its Arab Spring uprising. The Egyptian Arab Spring model of revolution was immensely successful in achieving
10
W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS fast change, especially given Mubarak’s ineptitude in responding to a networked revolution. However, the Egyptian Arab Spring revolution lacked a clear power structure and capacity which would allow it to control the political path of Egypt after Mubarak. Although its status as a leaderless movement was a source of strength for causing change, the Egyptian Arab Spring revolution rendered the movement unable to guide that change. By remaining leaderless, the movement was able to engage all citizens and remain legitimate in their eyes. Everyone was seen as equal, joined in a battle against a cruel regime. Further, anointing a leader or group of leaders would cause the movement to lose some democratic authority, as it would necessitate replicating the very regime which it sought to replace. Rallying behind a leader forms an autocratic power structure, which could be dangerous when the primary goal of the movement is to overthrow an autocrat. However, a leader is able to negotiate on the behalf of the movement and can both prioritize and elucidate its demands. So, a clear power structure could have helped ensure a democratic shift after Mubarak was forced from office. Having a group of leaders could have yielded substantive democratic outcomes from its elections, rather than reverting the country to its former state. Now, was this movement a success? While Egypt has seen its government revert to autocratic military ruling under el-Sisi that resembles Mubarak’s regime in many ways, I still view this movement as a success. The people of Egypt came together and expressed their views in the face of extraordinary violence, and initially influenced the change they sought. Social media enabled a rapid
Spring 2018
revolution to occur, perhaps so rapid that an image of post-Mubarak Egypt was not fully fleshed out. This led to democratic elections that re-instituted autocracy in Egypt. The issues with the revolution stem from mismanagement of the transition from Mubarak’s power, rather than with the revolution itself. The revolution could have, however, avoided this by developing political capacity and structuring itself.
“
The Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution showed the capacity for social media to move and unite people around a common cause... This revolution also showed the pitfalls of social media. Scial media poses both an enormous opportunity and a risk to burgeoning social movements.
”
Social media is able to catalyze revolution and social movements by allowing people to reach others, instantly. It can build near-instant communities with shared goals, which form the backbone of a social movement. Zeynep Tufekci discusses three measures of capacity in her novel, Twitter and Teargas. She argues that social movements must build electoral, disruptive, and narrative capacity in order to effect change in their image. These measures of capacity effectively capture the multi-dimensional nature of social movements. Whereas size of a movement is generally used to relay that a movement had been meticulously developed, now size is a far less reliable signal of capacity. These measures of capacity are what revolutions and social movements must look to when pursuing their goals, rather than merely trying to increase their size. Building capacity as defined by Tufekci would have helped the Arab Spring revolution in Egypt fully reach their goal to democratize after the overthrow of Mubarak. ∆
11
T
SAM HOLMES
welve years. T-minus twelve years until the fight against climate change is all but lost. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), humanity most likely has only 12 years left to act on climate change before global temperature rises more than 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels and the adverse effects of global warming and climate change exact their revenge on the planet.1 In an age of human versus human conflict-world wars, political party conflicts, trade wars, cyber warfare, and intercountry espionage-the fight against the world’s changing climate should stand paramount as a unifying fight. The conflict with climate change is not human versus human or country versus country. It is a battle between humanity and our own actions, specifically between humanity and the repercussions of our actions past and present. Climate change is anthropogenic, caused by humanity since the beginning of the industrial revolution. This change has been caused by increased levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) in our atmosphere that was created by the burning of fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas, beginning in earnest in the late 19th century. The continued usage of fossil fuels by humanity has brought the atmospheric CO2 level above 400 ppm for the first time in recorded history.2 The issue with having this much CO2 in the atmosphere is that CO2 is a greenhouse gas. These gases trap infrared radiation from the sun and absorb its heat,
raising Earth’s temperature. CO2 and other greenhouse gases are necessary for life on Earth because without them the Earth would be too cold, yet the current level of CO2 in our atmosphere is far past the necessary life-sustaining amount and is excessively heating the atmosphere. As increased CO2 levels warm our world, a line in the sand has emerged. Climate scientists have warned that if global warming continues and the global temperature rises more than 1.5ºC above the world’s pre-industrial levels then the results will be increasingly deadly for hundreds of millions of people. When the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015, there was a decree to keep the global average temperature to “well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels.”3 This set up the possibility for the global temperature to rise higher than 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels, which has since been discovered to be the threshold temperature, after which the effects become even more drastic. According to the IPCC’s special report titled the “Global Warming of 1.5ºC” the global warming of 2ºC compared to 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels will have hazardous effects in the contexts of human poverty, global biodiversity, and climate change. Humans with a higher risk of adverse consequences due to climate change include indigenous peoples, people living in agricultural and coastal areas, and people living in the Arctic, drylands,
12
W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS
small island developing states, and least economically developed countries (LEDCs). Keeping global warming to only 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels could reduce the number of people exposed to climate risks by several hundreds of millions by 2050.4 Many regions will experience increased water shortages with any amount of global warming, but keeping the temperature to only 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels instead of allowing it to creep up to 2ºC above will help reduce the proportion of the world population exposed to water shortages by up to 50%.5 Additionally, people living on small islands or in low-lying areas by oceans or rivers will be exposed to water intrusion, flooding, and damage to infrastructure. If warming is kept to only 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels there is a much higher chance of human and ecosystem adaptation to manage and avoid major water related catastrophes that would occur at 2ºC.6 The effects on other animals, not including humans, will also be catastrophic if the global mean temperature rises to 2ºC above pre-industrial levels. 18% of insects, 16% of plants, and 8% of vertebrates would lose over half of their geographic range. The marine ecosystem will also lose much of its biodiversity due to
Spring 2018
“
increased ocean acidity and decreased oxygen levels. If the temperature is kept to only 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels, less than half of those species will lose their geographic range and much of the ocean’s biodiversity
In an age of human versus human conflict-world wars, political party conflicts, trade wars, cyber warfare, and inter-country espionage-the fight against the world’s changing climate should stand paramount as a unifying fight.
”
will be saved.7 Risks of drought, extreme precipitation and temperature, and warm weather and extreme weather events will all be much lower at 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels than at 2ºC.8 The global community, led by the United Nations and its Environment Program, have been working to fight against global warming and climate change. In the past there have been some victories in this fight, including
13
the Montreal Protocol, the Paris Agreement, and most recently the Katowice Rulebook. The Montreal Protocol in 1987 was one of the first times that the international community came together and agreed that there was an anthropogenically caused environmental problem that needed solving.9 The ozone layer was shrinking as ozone depleting substances such as CFCs were breaking it apart, allowing harmful UV radiation to reach the earth, and cause negative effects to humans and natural cycles. The Montreal Protocol was the first treaty in the history of the United Nations to receive universal ratifications with 197 countries signing on and banning the use of CFCs.10 The fight against the depletion of the ozone layer now seems to have been won with the Montreal Protocol as there has been a 98% elimination of ozone depleting substances, the hole in the ozone layer has closed, and 135 billion tons of CO2 equivalent emissions were prevented from reaching the atmosphere between 1990 and 2010.11 Next, attempting to continue the international push against climate change, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) convened the UN members in 1997 and created the Kyoto Protocol, which included targets for countries to aim for when decreasing their emissions of greenhouse gases, including for CO2. N2O, and CH4 levels.12 The shortcoming of the Kyoto Protocol was that there was no punishment for not achieving the targets that each country agreed to and the United States, Afghanistan and Sudan never signed on. The next major international push in the fight against our changing world came in 2015, when the UNFCC convened its members in Paris and reached the first landmark agreement to combat climate change and work towards a “sustainable low carbon future” with the Paris Agreement.13 The goal of the Paris Agreement was to keep the global temperature from rising higher than 2ºC above pre-industrial levels and aimed to keep the temperature
increase to only 1.5ºC above those levels. It did this by having each country put forth their own “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), strengthen their efforts each year, and report their emissions and efforts regularly.14 184 countries ratified the Paris Agreement to this date, but recently the President of the United States has decided to pull the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement, threatening to endanger the treaty as the U.S is one of the highest emitters of greenhouse gases and was a driving force in the creation and continued funding of the Agreement.15 When the United States began to pull out of the Paris Agreement in 2017, the international fight against climate change seemed to hit a roadblock. The trajectory of the Earth’s warming, even after the Paris Agreement, has been essentially the same as it was beforehand. Even if the world was to stop emitting carbon dioxide today, the carbon dioxide that we have already released is in our atmosphere forever, or essentially that in terms of human years, and will continue to warm the Earth. The problem is that even though the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says that all “scientific evidence for warming of the climate system is unequivocal”16 there is still a significant portion of the world’s population that does not believe in climate change or instead believes that its effects are so far off that they do not need to worry right now. In fact, only about 51% of people around the world think that climate change is harming people now, while 28% believe we have a few years before harm even begins.17 Countries that have high overall carbon dioxide emissions, such as the United States, China, and Australia, are still minimally concerned about climate change.18 Therefore, our worldwide fight against climate change seemed to have hit a roadblock that would be incredibly difficult to get around. Yet late last year, when the 24th Conference of the Parties to the
14
W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS
Spring 2018
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. United Nations Environmental Program. Global Warming of 1.5ºC. Switzerland: IPCC, 2018. 1-32. 2 “Graphic: The Relentless Rise of Carbon Dioxide – Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet.” NASA. November 08, 2016. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_ resources/24/graphic-the-relentless-rise-of-carbon-dioxide/. 3 United Nations. Framework Convention on Climate Change. Adoption of the Paris Agreement. 4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5ºC, 1-32. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 United Nations. United Nations. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. 1987. 10 “International Actions - The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer.” EPA. September 26, 2018. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://www.epa.gov/ozone-layerprotection/international-actions-montreal-protocol-substancesdeplete-ozone-layer. 11 Gray, Alex. “30 Years Ago the World Pledged to Fix the Ozone Layer. And It Worked.” World Economic Forum. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2017/09/ozone-action-worked-environmental-progress/. 12 “Kyoto Protocol - Targets for the First Commitment Period.” UNFCCC. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://unfccc.int/ process/the-kyoto-protocol. 13 “What Is the Paris Agreement?” UNFCCC. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/theparis-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement. 14 United Nations. Framework Convention on Climate Change. Adoption of the Paris Agreement. 15 “President Donald Trump Has Pulled the U.S. out of the Paris Climate Agreement.” NBCNews.com. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trumppulls-u-s-out-paris-climate-agreement-n767066. 16 “Climate Change Evidence: How Do We Know?” NASA. December 04, 2018. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://climate. nasa.gov/evidence/. 17 Wike, Richard. “What the World Thinks about Climate Change in 7 Charts.” Pew Research Center. April 18, 2016. Accessed February 02, 2019. http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/04/18/what-the-world-thinks-about-climate-changein-7-charts/. 18 Ibid. 19 “Success of COP24 – We Have the Katowice Rulebook.” COP24. December 15, 2018. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://cop24.gov.pl/news/news-details/news/success-of-cop24in-katowice-we-have-a-global-climate-agreement/. 20 Sinha, Amitabh. “Katowice Delivers Paris Rulebook, but Not Everyone Is Happy.” The Indian Express. December 16, 2018. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://indianexpress.com/article/ world/paris-agreementglobal-warming-climate-change-polandparis-rulebook-5495687/. 21 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. 2013. 22 “Climate Change Evidence: How Do We Know?” NASA. December 04, 2018. Accessed February 02, 2019. https://climate. nasa.gov/evidence/.
Paris Accord met in Katowice, Poland, the fight against climate change was renewed once again. This time, without the support of President Trump or the United States, 200 nations came together, reaffirmed their support of the Paris Agreement, enhanced their commitments to reducing carbon emissions, and created the Katowice Rulebook as the newest attempt to bring the world towards achieving its climate goals.19 The Katowice Rulebook is nowhere close to perfect. Even though it has finally created a framework under which the Paris Agreement can be put into action, many countries are not happy with what it was able to accomplish. A group of countries led by Egypt have publicly been critical of the Katowice Conference because it did not go far enough in addressing the difference between developed and developing countries, treating the two sets of countries similarly. Another group of countries, led by India, is upset that the Rulebook attempts to put all the world’s countries in the same position and does not discuss the individuality in each country’s situation. The carbon market that was supposed to be set up by the Rulebook was not finalized due to disagreements between a group of developing countries, led by Brazil, and many developed nations over carbon credits carrying over from the Kyoto Protocol.20 Basically, the Katowice Rulebook, which is supposed to be the next great step in the international fight against climate change may be too flawed to function correctly or may not have been created in a way that it will not function at all. The fight against climate change may have hit another roadblock with no way around it in sight. The effects of global warming have already become more horrific than ever before, as “each of the last three decades have been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850”21 and there have been a record number of high temperature extreme weather events in the world in the past decade.22 Humanity is already on the losing side of the fight against climate change and if we are not able to come together as an international community, the Earth will warm past 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels and past 2ºC above preindustrial levels and there will be little to nothing that we can do to stop the devastating effects. The international conferences and treaties only do so much and when major power-players decide to discredit changing climate and refuse to even go to the summit, these agreements mean even less. The climate is changing. The facts are undeniable. The Earth is heating up and if something is not done about it soon it will be too late. Time to fight back against climate change in this war of humans versus the repercussions of our actions is running out. For our own sake and that of future generations and the Earth as a whole, we as people must come together, bring our shared scientific and political ingenuity, and find a way to put a stop to it. ∆
15
“W
N AT H A N I E L M U N S O N - PA L O M B A
e have been caught between the devil and the deep sea,” responded Kurban Ali, a Rohingya living in a Bangladeshi refugee camp, when asked about his family’s two relocation options: Myanmar, or to an uninhabited and often inundated island off in the Bay of Bengal.1 Ali is one of between 500,000 and one million muslim Rohingyas living in Bangladesh, many without formal refugee status, after fleeing forty years of ethnic cleansing and systematic expulsion in buddhist Myanmar.2 About half of these refugees live in a collection of official and unofficial refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar District, a strip of land in southeastern Bangladesh, where they face deadly flooding and inhumane living conditions.3 The government of Bangladesh (GoB), after ending refugee registration in 1992 and continually pushing for repatriation into Myanmar,4 proposed relocating 32,000 refugees, including Kurban Ali, to the island of Thengar Char. The GoB first put forth this proposal in 2015 and, after the UN mooted the plan citing the fact that Thengar Char is completely submerged during high tide, reintroduced it in 2017.5 Moving beyond the abhorrent situation of refugees like Kurban, problems like the severe flooding in refugee camps and solutions like relocation to land that barely rises above the sea represent the intersection of Bangladesh’s two major crises: the Rohingya refugee crisis of today and the impending climate crisis of tomorrow. Bangladesh is
home to the fifth-largest number of individuals that will be directly affected by sea level rise, outpaced only by larger countries which, not coincidentally, are Bangladesh’s neighbors.6 More than one million Bangladeshis living in the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta will be affected by sea level rise by 2050. There are 13 million people living on Bangladeshi land that will be lost to the sea by the year 2100.78 To put it bluntly, the GoB is faced with an inconceivably large refugee crisis for which it is woefully ill-prepared. The current Rohingya refugee situation is inextricably linked to the climate crisis, often actually exacerbating the problems on the ground. Environmental historian John Wennersten articulates this relationship by explaining how refugees are increasing the pace of sea level rise. He writes that “the majority of the Rohingya [refugees] reside on the quickly degrading coast of the Bay of Bengal, where sea level rise is a daily reality. Many refugees are the destruction of their communities.”9 Leaving aside the environmental and socioeconomic changes that, if made, will mitigate some of climate change’s damage, the GoB must wrestle with a distinct political question: how will Bangladesh and the region as a whole manage the millions of climate refugees that are soon to exist throughout the Bay of Bengal region? Although the future holds immense uncertainty, the Rohingya refugee crisis is an ongoing case study into what the political dynamics of the future will look like for
16
W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS nations like Bangladesh. It is, in effect, a small scale trial run for the GoB. The Rohingya refugee crisis foreshadows the climate refugee crisis of the late 21st Century, giving regional actors a glimpse of the challenges the future holds. If carefully examined, the Rohingya crisis can shed light on the refugee management strategies that will be employed and the future political landscape of the region before the wave of climate refugees crests on the shores of Bangladesh. The prevalence of buck-passing and repatriatory urges in the ongoing refugee crisis is a perfect example of how current refugee challenges give clues to how the region will address the climate refugee challenges in the future. Following the Myanmar Citizenship Law of 198210 and the refusal to recognize Rohingya migrants as refugees,11 the Rohingya people are stateless, landless, and stuck in “legal and humanitarian limbo.”12 Other potential “host nations” in the region have reacted in a similar manner. In other words, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and others have fled from the Rohingya crisis, each passing the responsibility to another, leaving the Rohingya unprotected. The clearest example of the buck-passing phenomenon in action is the emphasis Bangladesh has consistently put on Rohingya repatriation into Myanmar. A GoB statement early in the Rohingya crisis puts it clearly: “voluntary repatriation is the only durable solution available to refugee[s]...”13 Yet such repatriation efforts have yielded little to no success, with few refugees repatriating of their own accord due to legitimate fear of persecution. Forced repatriation has been met with significant, and justified, resistance on the part of the Rohingya.14 In fact, many of those Rohingya that did repatriate to Myanmar have since been forced to return to Bangladesh. Still, a policy of repatriation and relocation is logical for Bangladesh from a geopolitical perspective. Without an international organization or agreement (Bangladesh is notably not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor is any other nation in the Bay of Bengal region) to balance against the option to
Spring 2018
17
pass responsibility off to another nation’s taxpayers, even fraught repatriation and senseless relocation schemes are preferable to taking responsibility for more than half a million impoverished people. In over-laying the current, hard-line repatriation strategy pursued by the GoB onto the not-so hypothetical climate refugee crisis, a stark irony emerges: in this refugee crisis, repatriation is simply not an option. There is no land to return to. Integration into the host country becomes the only humane option for governments like the GoB. Yet at the present, Bangladesh is not able to effectively manage the relatively small integration that is taking place on a domestic political level. Ever-growing local resentment towards Rohingya moving into Bangladesh, stemming from fears of overcrowding, a lack of resources, and job insecurities encourages Bangladeshi political leaders to scapegoat the Rohingya population and frame their presence as a national burden.15 Unfortunately, these fears are grounded in a hard truth: in many ways, Bangladesh struggles to insure basic human rights for its citizens, nevermind Rohingya refugees. Surveys of both groups near Cox’s Bazar indicate that while Bangladeshis are experiencing superior living conditions to refugees, such differences are relatively small and point to a lack of state capacity to provide basic education and health care services regardless of a group’s status.16 Not only does the political environment encourage leaders to align themselves against the Rohingya, it dissuades the same leaders from increasing the level of Bangladeshi aid given to refugees, a step that could potentially ease the human rights concerns in the refugee camps.17 Put simply, without a political counterweight to the local domestic pressure, it appears unlikely that the GoB will act to improve conditions. The GoB therefore feels both international and domestic political pressure to act against refugee integration, thus further incentivizing buck passing in the forms of repatriation and/or relocation away from mainland Bangladesh.
As has been detailed, the GoB’s reaction to the Rohingya refugee crisis illuminates the conundrum of the climate refugee crisis: the status quo domestic and regional political dynamics as well as the logistical realities push rational government actors to resist and prevent refugee integration, yet for the climate refugee crisis alternatives are either physically impossible or include an immense death toll. The GoB must use knowledge gleaned from its “trial run” and act now to alter the political status quo both regionally and domestically in order to incentivize the integration of refugees and/or migrants. With the need for an international counterweight to buck passing readily apparent, it is time for Bangladesh and its counterparts to strengthen the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and sign on to the 1951 Refugee Convention. These institutions must develop the strength to withstand the political urge to run from the next refugee crisis, to spread out the economic and social sacrifices of integrating refugees amongst all nations in the region. Although liberal steps such as these amount to no more than political crisis management and do not address the larger issues that have caused the refugee crisis in the first place, they are frankly the best options available. With the next crisis on the horizon, it is time for developing countries like Bangladesh to embrace the benefits that the liberal order offers in times of chaos and change and address the consequences of that order in the future. Without a regional identity that fosters a shared cultural understanding and political unity amongst the coastal nations around the Bay of Bengal, individual nations will continue to pull away from refugee and migrant integration, a disastrous outcome for the refugees and the region alike. The dichotomy between the repatriation/relocation response and the integration response to a refugee crisis is but one lens with which to use the crisis of today to seek insight into the crisis of tomorrow. The arcs of these two tragedies intersect in more ways than can be discussed here. Although the stakes in the Rohingya refugee crisis are inarguably high, they are about to escalate to levels that will test the political staying-power of nations like Bangladesh. Today, some Rohingya like Kurban Ali who are faced with a choice between “the devil [Myanmar] and the deep sea [Bangladeshis relocation efforts]” are choosing a different option: thousands of Rohingya refugees drift for months in the Bay of Bengal, searching for safety and finding rejection on the shores of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.18,19 It is up to regional leaders to hear Ali’s story and ensure that when the next, larger crisis does come, the next “Ali”s of our world are not forced to survive on the rising seas that have claimed their homes. ∆
1 Shaikh Azizur Rahman and. “Plan to Move Rohingya to Remote Island Prompts Fears of Human Catastrophe.” Guardian News and Media, 2 Feb. 2017. 2 Bhatia, Abhishek, et al. “The Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar: When the Stateless Seek Refuge.” Health and Human Rights, vol. 20, no. 2, 2018, pp. 105–122. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/ stable/26542064. 3 International Organization for Migration. “Two Days of Heavy Rain Hit Bangladesh’s Rohingya Refugee Camps – Over 31,000 at High Risk from Flooding, Landslides - Bangladesh.” ReliefWeb, 11 June 2018. 4 Bhatia, Abhishek, et al. “The Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar: When the Stateless Seek Refuge.” 5 France-Presse, Agence. “UN Concern at Bangladesh Plan to Move Thousands of Rohingya to Flooded Island.” The Guardian, 14 June 2015. 6 “Asia: THE LOOMING CRISIS.” Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-First Century, by John R. Wennersten and Denise Robbins, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 2017, pp. 189–216. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j. ctt200617d.12. 7 Nicholls, R.J., P.P. Wong, V.R. Burkett, J.O. Codignotto, J.E. Hay, R.F. McLean, S. Ragoonaden and C.D. Woodroffe, 2007: Coastal systems and low-lying areas. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 315-356. 8 “Sea-Level Rise in Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta, Bangladesh | Global Warming Effects.” Climate Hot Map, Union of Concerned Scientists, 2011. 9 “Asia: THE LOOMING CRISIS.” 10 Uddin, Nassir. “State of Stateless People: The Plight of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh.” The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept, edited by Rhoda E. HowardHassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015, pp. 62–77. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/ stable/j.ctt15hvz7q.7. 11 Bhatia, Abhishek, et al. “The Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar: When the Stateless Seek Refuge.” 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Bennett, James. “‘They’re a Problem’: Rohingya Refugees Face Increasing Hostility in Bangladesh.” ABC News, 27 Sept. 2017. 18 Shaikh Azizur Rahman and. “Plan to Move Rohingya to Remote Island Prompts Fears of Human Catastrophe.” Plan to Move Rohingya to Remote Island Prompts Fears of Human Catastrophe, Guardian News and Media, 2 Feb. 2017. 19 “Asia: THE LOOMING CRISIS.”
18
W I LLIA M S FO REIG N AFFAI RS
For more information or to submit to the next issue, email kaplanfpj@gmail.com. To view this issue or previous issues online, visit issuu.com/williamsforeignaffairs.
19
Spring 2018
20