The Wilson Journal of International Affairs- Spring 2018 by Wilson Journal of International Affairs

Spring 2018

The Wilson Journal of International Affairs

Spring 2018

Wilson Journal

The Wilson Journal of International Affairs Spring 2018

Contents Editorial Staff

Information

From the Editor

Eric Xu

Normalizing the enemy: the impact of domestic business interests on american diplomatic and trade relations with china, vietnam, and cuba

Michael Kamer

The effects of religion and religiosity on individual attitudes towards domestic violence: an analysis of world values survey data 2010-2014

Thomas Ale

The fall from grace: a neuro-political investigation into the context and consequences of the american abuses at abu ghraib

Sabrina Kim

A "twin study" on development: the post-independence cases of rwanda and burundi

Ilana Shapiro

The legact of getĂşlio vargas' nation building policies and the resulting role of the white man in brazil's indigenous development policy

Mariana Brazao

Editorial Staff Editor-in-Chief

Eric Xu

Managing Editor

Sarah Corning

Program Coordinator

Vilas Annavarapu

Media Manager

Molly Magoffin

Production Chair

Madeline Swank

Special Projects Coordinator

Catherine Huang

Editing Staff

Brendan Novak Carly Mulvihill David Martineau Devan Keesling Ellie Beahm

Griffin Asnis Moriah Hendrick Richard Song Viashnavi Karimpuzha Victoria Farris

Information About the Wilson Journal The Wilson Journal of International Affairs is the University of Virginiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s preeminent publication for undergraduate research in international relations. The Wilson Journal is developed and distributed by the student-run International Relations Organization of the University of Virginia. The Wilson Journal is one of the only undergraduate research journals for international relations in the country, and aims both to showcase the impressive research conducted by the students at UVA and to spark productive conversation within the University community. The Wilson Journal seeks to foster interest in international issues and promote high quality undergraduate research in foreign affairs. The Journal is available online at wilsonjournal.org.

Submissions Interested in submitting to the Wilson Journal? The Journal seeks research papers on current topics in international affairs that are at least ten pages in length. Only undergraduates or recent graduates are eligible to submit. Submissions should be sent to thewilsonjournal@gmail.com.

Contact Please direct all comments to thewilsonjournal@gmail.com.

From the Editor Dear Reader, In an accelerating media world, where international breaking news travels faster than the mind can process, some of the best insights and conclusions can be obtained at a much more measured pace. The flash and dazzle of the 24/7 news cycle often obscures the historical background of international affairs, as well as the nuance characteristic of any worldchanging, global event. At the Wilson Journal of International Affairs, we take pride in the measured, well-researched, and academic perspectives of our selected student articles. We believe in the power of rigorous student research to contribute to established academic literature while also delivering real-world impact and lessons for the future. Our articles this semester cover a wide range of regions and subject areas. Michael Kamer investigates American foreign policy in China, Vietnam, and Cuba through the lens of domestic business interests. Thomas Ale uses world survey data from 2010-2014 in order to illustrate the relationship between religion and domestic violence worldwide. Sabrina Kim draws on contemporary political neuroscience research to investigate the atrocities committed at the Abu Ghraib prison facility. Ilana Shapiro employs Rwanda and Burundi as comparisons in investigating post-independence development in East Africa. Mariana Brazão traces Getulio Vargas’s policies in Brazil to negative developments in indigenous political rights in the late-20th century. The breadth of the Wilson Journal’s articles this semester demonstrates the prodigious research abilities of UVA undergraduates in the field of international affairs, and validate the mission of the Wilson Journal itself. As always, this semester’s Journal would not have been possible without the generous support of the Wilson Journal’s friends in the UVA community. First, I would like to thank the International Relations Organization for their continued financial support of the Journal. I would also like to thank the Miller Center for helping us plan and host our biannual

Journal Launch event. This yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s editorial staff was tasked to do more on a collective level than any editorial staff in the Journalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s past; they deserve recognition for the hard work they have put into making this Journal the best collection of undergraduate research available at this University. Finally, I would like to thank you, the reader, for your continued interest and support of the Wilson Journalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s mission. We are glad that you share our passion for international relations, and hope that this Journal furthers your understanding of the world and all of its myriad problems and solutions. Sincerely,

Eric Xiaohang Xu Editor-in-Chief

Normalizing the Enemy: The Impact of Domestic Busines Interests on American Diplomatic and Trade

Relations with China, Vietnam, and Cuba By Michael Kamer About the Author Michael Kamer is a 4th year undergraduate in the McIntire School of Commerce at the University of Virginia studying Commerce with a concentration in Accounting and Foreign Affairs in the College of Arts & Sciences. His research interests include the political interactions between business and government actors as well as the impact of interest groups on the policymaking process both domestically and internationally. When he is not reading Politico or hanging out in the Comm School, Michael loves to travel and studied abroad at the University of Saint Gallen in Switzerland during his third year. He is also a dedicated foreign language learner speaking French and actively learning German. After graduation, he will be joining PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Transaction Services practice in their New York office. Foreward I was very pleased to see that Michael Kamer’s paper on interest group influence on U.S. trade policy was accepted for publication by the Wilson Journal. Mr. Kamer’s article emerged out of my Fall 2017 fourthyear seminar on Domestic Politics & U.S. Foreign Policy, which analyzes the relative influence of domestic-level factors, broadly conceived, on U.S. foreign relations. It was the product of a semester-long collaboration between student, professor and class, in which the student designs and

executes an independent research project pertinent to the course. Mr. Kamer, as did all students in the seminar, held preliminary conversations with me-and separately with the class--about possible topics and sources; submitted a formal research proposal by the end of the first month; presented to the class in mid-semester on his research in progress; and submitted a draft of the paper for a “free” (no grade) critical reading by me with suggestions for revision before final submission at the end of the semester—all the while discussing his ideas and challenges with me during office hours. Mr. Kamer wrote a very strong paper and the revised version for publication in this journal reflects those strengths: a persuasive justification of the significance of the topic (i.e., the impact of the end of the cold war on the motivations and probability of success of business interest groups in influencing U.S. trade policy); a clear and convincing comparative method by which he analyzes factors shaping business motivations and those shaping business success in three relevant trade cases: i.e., China, Vietnam, and Cuba; defensible conclusions in which he explains the failure of business groups to end the trade embargo on Cuba as compared to their success in expanding trade relations with China and Vietnam (all three of which are, of course, communist countries); and finally, a fluent and clear expository style. I was involved with the establishment of the Wilson Journal some ten years ago and am delighted that, in selecting Mr. Kamer’s paper for publication, it has maintained the very high standards for which it is justly known. Allen Lynch Abstract The decisions of American policymakers are not made in a vacuum and are subject to a plethora of varying demands by entrenched interest groups, in particular from the powerful multinational business community. To achieve their policy goals, interest groups compete for influence over the presidency, the Congress, and the views of the voting public who hold electoral sway over policymakers in Washington. Since the end of the Cold War, business interests have been at work to eliminate American bilateral rivalries, specifically with China, Vietnam, and Cuba, in pursuit of the

economic opportunities possible in a rapidly globalizing world. In my research, I consider the impact of both the factors that motivate business interests to lobby for diplomatic and economic normalization of relations as well as the factors that help guarantee business interests success in their lobbying efforts. The paper concludes by underscoring how weaker interest group opponents, bipartisanship, and low electoral costs provide the critical distinction between success and failure for businesses seeking to overturn decades of American foreign policy precedent. I. Introduction For more than four decades after the Second World War, the United States sought to actively oppose the spread of communism advanced by its chief global adversary, the Soviet Union. Engaging in indirect conflict across the developing world in East Asia and Latin America, the U.S. discovered new opponents who fought against American dominance, including China, Vietnam, and Cuba. Because these countries associated with the widelyfeared communist model, the U.S. generally refused to engage with them both diplomatically and economically. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the U.S. found itself in an increasingly liberalized global economy with new business markets opening at a rapid pace. Confronted with the remaining legacies of the Cold War, American businesses embarked on a lobbying campaign to restore diplomatic and economic relations with former adversaries; these businesses sought to remain competitive in the new global economy against firms located in countries without restrictions on commercial operations. The lobbying campaign began with the case of most favored nation (MFN) status renewal in China in 1993 and 1994, and progressed to the restoration of diplomatic relations with Vietnam under President Bill Clinton in 1995 and establishment of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) under President George W. Bush in 2006. In these initial campaigns, American businesses were successful in gaining or maintaining access to previously closed export markets. Nevertheless, business efforts have not always been fruitful, as demonstrated by the current state of economic relations with Cuba. While President Obama was able to unilaterally normalize diplomatic relations in 2014, he was unable to lift the trade embargo as proposed in 2016. From a comparative analysis of the cases of China, Vietnam, and Cuba, it

appears that the factors motivating businesses to lobby for the restoration of diplomatic and economic relations with former adversaries are (1) the availability of commercial opportunities, (2) the absence of a national security threat, and (3) engagement from the executive branch. Moreover, their success is likely determined by (1) the strength of interest group opponents, (2) a high level of bipartisanship surrounding the issue, (3) persistent lobbying of Congress, and (4) potential political and electoral ramifications. While there are certainly other factors that presumably impact the domestic politics of business lobbying for the normalization of relations such as the relevance of economic reforms in the adversary country for business decisions, the length constraints of this paper prevented further in-depth analysis of potential influences on business lobbying activity which could be addressed in a future research project. Finally, the many activities of business interests in lobbying Congress and presidential administrations are not subject to view within the public domain. These activities occur “behind closed doors” as a means of preventing policymakers from being subjected to public scrutiny. Because of the “shadow” surrounding business conduct in lobbying activities, my research was constrained by my inability to directly interview business organizations about their activities in my selected cases. As a result, my description of business lobbying activities is limited to extent of available published materials describing lobbying efforts. To achieve its own goals, the business community needs the support of the U.S. government, whose potential impact on public policy change is naturally profound (Wiarda 99). For decades, businesses and the government have had a close working relationship as a means of benefiting the interests of both parties. These relationships became especially pronounced since the early 1990s, when business began to flex its policy-making muscle more aggressively. Many corporate executives are quite familiar with their government counterparts because they have the same goals of “political stability, moderation, and economic growth” (Wiarda 103). The internationalization of the economy has compelled business to become more interested in trade agreements, investment climates, and “level playing fields for U.S. investors” (Wiarda 99). Given that exports as a share of U.S. GDP grew from 5.55% in 1970 to 12.51% in 2010, multinational corporations headquartered in the U.S. have lobbied the government to preserve the integrity of their operations (The World Bank). The U.S. government is sensitive to the demands of

businesses because the health of the overall economy depends on their success--they employ millions of workers who happen to be congressional constituents and voters in presidential elections (Wiarda 98). In an age of globalized trade where businesses depend on international business activities, the U.S. government has generally needed to give businesses more flexibility to conduct foreign operations, as reflected in the normalization of relations with China and Vietnam in the 1990s and 2000s. In the course of lobbying for foreign policy change, businesses utilize two primary methods of influence: advocacy and provision of information to policymakers. From an advocacy perspective, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers are the primary channels through which businesses communicate their policy aims, complemented by thousands of trade associations from each sector of the economy (Wiarda 101). Likewise, given the size of many American multinational companies, individual businesses have a sizable Washington presence to safeguard the interests of their firms (Wiarda 101). Through these organizations, businesses are able to channel campaign funds to federal politicians who support their agenda. Campaign funding is critical to political success in contemporary American elections, and approximately 90% of funding stems from businesses and their related associations (Wiarda 102). In conjunction with direct advocacy, businesses play a crucial role in providing information to policymakers while also receiving information in return that could impact their lobbying strategies. Due to the many constraints on policymakers, lobbyists are able to keep up with legislative progress and can provide both Congress and the executive branch with critical information on pending legislation (Wiarda 103). To an even greater extent, many economically-oriented government agencies including the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and National Economic Council work at the direction of and in service to individual businesses (Wiarda 99). Accordingly, â&#x20AC;&#x153;business influence over foreign policy extends far beyond traditional lobbying efforts [particularly in the area of economic development]. It now includes business largely running or controlling large areas of U.S. foreign economic policyâ&#x20AC;Śâ&#x20AC;? (Wiarda 99). For example, during the Reagan administration, David Rockefeller and Chase Manhattan Bank organized the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which was purported to be a program implemented and run by the USTR (Wiarda 103). Thus, within this context, business interests have

had a large toolkit to promote the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with former adversaries over the past two decades. When considering whether or not to influence foreign policy, business interests must first determine whether their engagement would result in a favorable outcome. Based on the chosen cases of China, Vietnam, and Cuba, the factors of commercial opportunities available, absence of a clear national security threat, and the presidential administration’s relations with the chosen country seem to be decisive in motivating businesses to lobby to alter the status of political and economic relations. Before choosing to lobby for policy change, businesses must be sure that there are clear economic advantages to opening up relations. Businesses are best able to make the determination about the viability of market opportunities because they have the “hands-on” knowledge of conditions at the sector- or individual corporation-level which can then be expressed to policymakers (Cohen et al. 123). With the possibility of new export markets or investment potential, commercial opportunities present major opportunity costs of inaction that are hard to ignore. In addition, commercial opportunities provide businesses with the opportunity to secure a competitive advantage with foreign competitors or at least gain competitive parity. Previously, national security interests have prevented commercial liberalization, but now that adversary status has gradually diminished and there is little need to attempt to control interactions with the formerly hostile nation. This absence of threat is key to business involvement. Furthermore, for any major investment in lobbying, business looks to the White House for signals of possible changes to the existing diplomatic or trade relations. A presidency generally engaged with trade issues is crucial to mobilizing business, because there is likely limited opportunity for changes in policy without the support of the executive. For a greater chance of business involvement, both the president and the USTR need to prioritize the expansion of trade while publicly garnering support for that expansion (“Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy” 101). In the absence of these conditions, business will likely not have the motivation to get involved in lobbying efforts that result in substantive change to restore relations, as depicted in the table below. Beyond the factors required to (I) motivate business interests to get involved in crafting foreign policy, (II) success in catalyzing policy change is shaped by a separate set of factors outlined in the table below, including the strength of opposing interest groups such as (1) human rights campaigners or

ethnic groups, (2) the level of bipartisanship surrounding the normalization or maintenance of existing normal relations, (3) lobbying of congressional actors, and (4) the political ramifications of changing U.S. foreign policy towards former international adversaries for politicians. When businesses seek to lobby for a particular policy agenda, the strength of opponents arguing for a different agenda is a key differentiator of success. To that end, making a case to the policymakers centered around liberalizing political and economic relations is a crucial component to any successful lobbying strategy that defeats the opposition (“Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy” 101). The prevalence of the arguments supporting free trade, in particular, have been a boon to business lobbying because these arguments support a discussion of why policies should be changed (“Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy” 101). Even with a weak lobbying opponent, however, a bipartisan environment is instrumental in promoting business interests, because it is difficult to build a congressional majority based on the members of solely one party. Mainly, this is due to the strong labor interests of Democrats (“Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy” 101).Businesses and their interest groups must lobby Congress in order to build congressional majorities supportive of their agenda. Channels of advocacy, information provision, and campaign finance help businesses build a coalition in Congress that can pass substantive normalization able to endure for business continuity (“Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy” 101). Overshadowing the entire business lobbying process are the political and electoral ramifications for any change in policy. These incredibly important ramifications can destroy an entire coalition if politicians are too negatively impacted in future elections. The failed push by business to lift the Cuban embargo in 2016 demonstrated the impact of these electoral consequences . Accordingly, limiting these consequences can improve the chances of achieving lasting foreign policy changes. A favorable alignment of the factors discussed results in business success, while the example of Cuba demonstrates the devastating impact of powerful opponents, strong partisanship, entrenched congressional support, and deep possible political ramifications.

II. China â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Renewal of MFN Status (1993-1994) For most of the 20th century, American business interests were hesitant to attempt to enact foreign policy change through a coordinated campaign of lobbying and intervention. Thus, their intervention in Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s MFN status renewal was their first real foray into lobbying on behalf of their policy goals, which included protecting MFN status for China. To that end, they were remarkably successful in overcoming a skeptical executive, apprehensive Congress, and an unfavorable political climate horrified by the actions of the Chinese leadership in Tiananmen Square in 1989. This unfavorable political climate partially manifested itself in a backlash of human rights concerns. Faced with the delicate issue of renewing MFN status annually as required by the Jackson-Vanik amendment, businesses encountered

opposing interests comprised of human rights NGOs in both 1993 and 1994. By understanding the benefits of strong commercial opportunities, engaging with the administration, and persistently lobbying Congress, business interests were initially able to see the benefits of political intervention and then achieve a victory that would later help define their actions in Vietnam and Cuba. Unlike the Vietnamese and Cuban cases, where business chose to intervene in an attempt to restore relations, the U.S. had dialed down its adversarial behavior towards China starting in 1972. Meanwhile, China had become a major trading partner where business discovered an incredibly large export market and investment center. Paired with economic reforms that grew the Chinese economy from within under Deng Xiaoping, American economic ties with China grew rapidly in the 1980s and early 1990s (Auger 2). MFN status, granted in 1979 by the Carter administration for political reasons during the Cold War, was a major incentive for businesses to trade with China because it removed protectionist barriers that had would have otherwise stifled American action in China. China emerged as a remarkable business opportunity as the fastest growing economy in the world, and the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s markets were included in almost all corporate strategic plans of multinational companies (American Trade Politics 212). In fact, by 1992, American exports to China reached a total of approximately $7.5 billion annually and 150,000 jobs depended on trade with China, so businesses had clearly taken advantage of MFN status and were deeply invested in the success of U.S.-China relations (Auger 3). As American businesses entered the early 1990s, they faced a greater level of competition from both Western European and Japanese firms, so any disruption to trade relations would severely hamper competitiveness and result in lost opportunities if China turned its attention away from the U.S. (Cain 16). Recognizing the commercial opportunities in China, businesses realized that intervention would be necessary. Because the U.S. had been engaging constructively with China since the 1970s and MFN status renewal did not require a new normalization of relations, national security issues did not play a major role in dissuading policymakers preserving MFN status. Rather, national security concerns over Chinese economic relations had been primarily addressed in the Jackson-Vanik amendment of the Trade Act of 1974, which happened to be specifically aimed at the Soviet Union (Cain 1). While the attacks on

demonstrators of 1989 obviously provoked international outrage because of their brutality, the internal Chinese actions of cracking down on reformers did not fundamentally alter the security dynamics between the U.S. and China. Furthermore, businesses were better able to justify their involvement in the MFN debate because they were able to make the case that market freedom and economic development were the key to international engagement and pathway to future human rights reforms in China. The market freedom would also provide a better security relationship than any disruption to the existing economic partnership (American Trade Politics 213). This viewpoint aligned well with George H.W. Bush’s reasoning that a collapse of ties with China could increase security threats. Accordingly, the lack of national security threat paved the way for business mobilization to protect economic ties with China. It was the deep involvement of the Clinton administration in the renewal of MFN status for China in 1993 and 1994 that most significantly motivated the formation of the business coalition that ultimately saved protected status for China. However, the Clinton administration’s involvement on issues surrounding China’s MFN status was not unique. Rather, the executive branch perpetuated the inherently political act of granting China MFN status in 1979. h. For example, the Carter administration saw an opportunity to undercut the Soviet Union’s stature in the international system in exchange for granting China MFN status, which was denied to the Soviet Union, and for recognizing Beijing’s government as the “rightful” China over Taiwan (Foot 229). Consequently, by the early 1990s, presidential administrations, including that of George H.W. Bush, supported renewing MFN status for China every year, even following the human rights violations of 1989, because limiting economic ties would hurt relations with China dramatically. By contrast, President Clinton provided a relatively sharply opposing view to this consensus in the campaign of 1992 (Auger 2). When Clinton entered the White House in January 1993, he had a track record on the campaign trail of attacking continued approval of MFN status, citing the flagrant human rights violations by the Chinese (Auger 1). In response to Clinton’s expressed concerns and clear interest in the issue, the business community decided that it would be imperative to mobilize and steer an engaged White House in the “proper” direction. To that end, the National Association of Manufacturers released a statement during the campaign of 1992 stressing the importance of

continued MFN status (American Trade Politics 211). Moreover, following Clinton’s election, business interests decided to create a formal united front of opposition known as the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade, which then released a letter of support signed by 298 companies and 37 trade associations opposing any changes to China’s MFN status (American Trade Politics 211). Prior to the 1993 MFN status renewal, businesses were able to work with the active Clinton administration, as Clinton expressed desire to be a positive force for the economy and even ran on the slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid!”. These interactions resulted in an MFN renewal that placed limited conditions on the Chinese for human rights compliance. Approaching renewal in 1994, businesses had formed deep working relationships with and relied on the support of the Treasury and Commerce Departments, USTR, and the National Economic Council (American Trade Politics 212-213). With the support these crucial agencies and the frank openness of these agencies and of administration officials including Secretary of State Warren Christopher regarding their agendas, businesses were able to make the case to Clinton that further limitations on MFN status would be fruitless and that it would be nearly impossible to revoke MFN status (Auger 8). As a result, the Clinton administration acknowledged that tying human rights conditions to trade was not effective after seeing the limited progress on the 1993 goals. Its work with the administration emboldened the business community’s objectives and gave it a crucial source of support in overcoming opposition. With a firm coalition motivated to preserve MFN status, the business community turned its attention to defeating its chief opponent in the debate over renewal: human rights NGOs. Given the clear abuses of the Chinese regime, NGOs believed that they would have the upper hand in the debate. The public was outraged over what occurred and many members of Congress indicated that some form of limitation must be imposed on the Chinese to actually initiate long-term reform. Moreover, the first Democratic administration in over a decade took power, and it contained sympathetic listeners that would supplement existing supporters in Congress (Cain 24). Nevertheless, compared to the unity of business groups who were armed with significant resources and the predominance of pro-trade elements in the administration, these NGOs did not have the same level of resources, could not build the same level of coalition as the business groups did, and thereby ultimately failed.to overcome the swell of business influence in the lobbying

process. Hence, in this case, the weakness of the opposing interest group helped business effectively make their case publicly with little interference. Considering the impact of a concerned public, business interests felt it was imperative to make a significant impact in lobbying Congress to not impede the executive-level’s decision to renew MFN status.. In this case, lobbying was crucial: many moderates in Congress who did not wish to see MFN status fully revoked wanted some restrictions because of the public pressure for restrictions on China after Tiananmen Square (Cain 26). The Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade worked tirelessly with supportive legislators to counteract any impact of human right advocates for linkage of human rights and trade (American Trade Politics 212). They were able to garner the support of 106 legislators, who sent a letter to President Clinton describing their opposition to linking human rights and trade (Auger 8). After this event, a large majority in Congress began to support delinkage efforts by the Coalition (Auger 8). Moreover, the U.S.-China Business Council and Emergency Committee for American Trade publicly appealed to Congress to “not impose any conditions on MFN renewal” (Auger 5). Companies who had received large contracts from the Chinese government as a means of influencing the American political system were particularly aggressive in their efforts (Auger 5). These companies included large multinational corporations such Boeing, AT&T, General Motors, and Coca-Cola (Cain 26). Businesses made their case to lawmakers, arguing that any loss of trade in China would threaten the jobs of constituents in districts across the U.S. Specifically, businesses applied pressure tactics on liberals like Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA), whose district was home to “thousands of Boeing Co. workers whose jobs would be jeopardized in a U.S.-China trade war” (Behr). As a result, reluctant supporters of MFN were politically forced to support renewal or face the consequences in the next election. In the aggregate, business was effective in its congressional lobbying efforts, swaying key legislators at the center of the political spectrum. A combination of bipartisanship and limited political ramifications ensured that Clinton renewed MFN status in 1993 and 1994. Although there was an initial bipartisan coalition supporting restrictions on MFN status led by liberal congressional Democrats Representatives Nancy Pelosi (D-CA),Jim McDermott (D-WA), and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME), support for the cause began to fade due to business lobbying

activities (American Trade Politics 213 and Auger 1). Moreover, businesses’ engagement with the administration led President Clinton to command the political center on the issue by 1994, uniting both moderate Republicans and Democrats aware of the political pressure surrounding jobs dependent on strong economic ties with China (American Trade Politics 213). Given the salience of potential job losses in the U.S., the lack of a natural electoral constituency for human rights NGOs weakened the impact of any influence by opposing interest groups. It was also easier for business groups to supersede the influence of NGOs because no new policy was being introduced; existing policy was simply being renewed. The maintenance of the status quo limited the potential political backlash and lowered the political “bar” for approval. Consequently, the eventual shift to bipartisanship on renewal of MFN status and the lack of serious political consequences were integral in securing policy continuity for business interest groups. III. Vietnam – Normalization of Diplomatic Relations (1995) and Passage of PNTR Status (2006) U.S. involvement in Vietnam extends back to the departure of the French colonial authorities in the mid-1950s through the final departure of Americans in the wake of the fall of Saigon in April 1975.Given this painful history, it was never an easy proposition for the U.S. government to restore ties with communist Vietnam. Bitter memories of a brutal war and a large population of veterans at home seemed to be impossible obstacles to renewing relations with Vietnam. Nonetheless, fresh off of a victory in preserving MFN status for China, business groups intervened to gain access to a highly promising market undergoing economic reforms. The business efforts saw support from the U.S. presidency for change, diminishing threats from veterans’ interest groups, and a bipartisan Congress. As the twelfth most populous country in the world, Vietnam had an incredibly large untapped market for American businesses, whose economic activity in Vietnam was restricted by a trade embargo imposed in the aftermath of the Vietnam War (Nguyen 26). More specifically, the Vietnamese market was so appealing for businesses because more than half of its population was under age 25, indicating the presence of a major consumer sector likely interested in purchasing American exports (Nguyen 26). According to the World Bank, the normalization of economic relations with Vietnam “would generate direct welfare of $56 million per year for the United States” (Nguyen

26). From the Vietnamese perspective, the presence of American businesses in Vietnam would benefit and encourage other allies to invest and trade, which is beneficial for all parties involved (Sutter 7). Following the end of the embargo and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, American businesses increased pressure on government officials because it was in the economic interest of firms to establish normal trade relations after an initially limited presence (Stromseth 14). This need for a permanent resolution to the economic divisions culminated in permanent normal trade relations status in 2006 under President Bush. Hence, commercial opportunities for businesses helped transition American-Vietnamese relations from antagonism to cooperation. Like both the Chinese and Cuban cases, the strategic timing of American business involvement in the normalization of relations with Vietnam occurred after the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its extensive network of relations with other communist countries granted the U.S. power advantages in Southeast Asia (Brown 319). Vietnam, without the backing of the Soviet Union and with its complicated history with China, saw that it essentially had no choice but to cooperate with the American-led international system on several key issues, including the political situation in Cambodia and residual POW/MIA issues that had initially hardened continued American opposition to Vietnam throughout the 1980s (Brown 319). Moreover, Vietnam no longer posed a direct security threat to the U.S., especially considering its distance from the mainland of the U.S., meaning that business likely would not face skepticism regarding interaction with a former opponent. As a result, the end of the Cold War rapidly accelerated business lobbying in Washington for normalization with Vietnam. The commitment of Clinton and both Bushes to normalizing relations with Vietnam marked a welcome departure for the businesses community from the Reagan administration’s steadfast opposition to any type of diplomatic or economic engagement (Brown 320-321). In fact, these presidential administrations showed such initiative in beginning a new era of engagement with Vietnam that George H.W. Bush and Clinton commenced a “road map” to positive relations, which became a very important signal to business that it was a good time to involve itself in foreign policy making with regard to Vietnam (Brown 321). Moreover, Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury under Clinton, directly expressed interest in “co-prosperity” in economic relations between the U.S. and Vietnam (Nguyen 27). This level of

executive engagement continued after the end of the Clinton administration; George W. Bush’s administration was very receptive to business lobbying efforts for the granting of PNTR status and supported congressional action on that front (Nguyen 27). Consequently, the engagement of the post-Cold War administrations was further motivated business to alter foreign policy for its own benefit. The weakening of opposing interest groups provided a crucial opportunity for business interest groups to enter and undercut their support with the public and political actors. In the Vietnamese case, the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia was business groups’ most significant opponent in normalizing diplomatic and trade relations, while Vietnamese Americans did not play a major role in the debate. The League had held a major presence in Washington since the conclusion of the Vietnam War and fiercely lobbied Congress and the Departments of State and Commerce on POW/MIA issues (Brown 321) Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the lobby took action through inflammatory public statements, regarding the possible sighting of Caucasians in Vietnam since 1973 as proof that American POWs were still alive, and aligned itself with powerful allies such as presidential candidate Ross Perot and Senator Bob Smith (R-NH) (Jones and Barber). To that end, the POW/MIA issue was the primary blockage of further progress on improving relations in the mid-1990s (Brown 320). As an indication of their deep distrust of the Vietnamese, the League publicly denounced the Clinton administration’s normalization of relations in 1995 (Brown 321). Yet, the primary argument driving the opposition of the League was being undercut by the fact that the U.S. and Vietnam had made significant progress with remains and accounting for the missing in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, despite the opposition of the League, it was no longer a major political force by 2006 when PNTR status passed through Congress, and any remaining concerns present in the American government involved human rights concerns related to freedom of religion (Brown 324). As a result, like in the Chinese case, it appears that the business community pressed for normalization by taking advantage of an opponent’s weaker lobbying leverage . The major increase in business presence complemented the decline of the POW/MIA movement. Meanwhile, Vietnamese Americans did not present a concern because they were not a politically active group overall, though a small, politically insignificant minority of older citizens organized demonstrations

and action against diplomatic delegations (Brown 332). In response to the dearth of strong opposition, business groups were able to mount a fierce and successful lobbying campaign. Similar to the Chinese case, large American multinational corporations were the most significant forces in the lobbying effort. They made the case that the Congressional constituents would benefit from strong ties with Vietnam and Southeast Asia despite a legacy of violence and hostility. Boeing, General Electric, Caterpillar, and Microsoft among others were in charge of making the case to Congress at an individual corporation level to counterbalance the remaining power of the League (Brown 321). To sufficiently pressure Congress to take action on normalizing diplomatic relations, business leaders from groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council expressed their frustration publicly that businesses were losing access to a market that resembled Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s in potential opportunities for significant growth (Masland). This expression of public frustration by business leaders towards Congress was paired with the mobilization of large companies, which was key because it showed Congress the extent of their influence on the American economy and on their individual districts and states, with many constituents likely employed by at least one of the lobbying corporations. Accordingly, the Vietnamese case shows a replication of business public pressure tactics from the Chinese case. Compared to the Chinese case, business interests remained effective at communicating to congressional actors their comparatively higher value over opposing interest groups. Although the legacy of tension and war ran high in re-establishing relations with Vietnam, there was a high degree of bipartisanship surrounding renormalization, most likely because of the limited political consequences for supporting improved relations with Vietnam. Unlike what is seen in the Cuban case, prominent politicians from both parties actively supported normalization of relations with Vietnam. For example, both Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and John McCain (R-AZ), both veterans of the Vietnam War, spoke in favor of normalization and lobbied their colleagues to support foreign policy change as well (Nguyen 50). In addition to bipartisan support for the normalization of relations with Vietnam, business groups lobbying for change benefited from the lack of a concentrated domestic political constituency in opposition to normalization. Given the support of both Senator Kerry and Senator McCain

as veterans, it was difficult for the POW/MIA opponents to make the case to policymakers that there would be national consequences for the senatorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; support of change. Therefore, even though was a slowdown on final PNTR passage in 2006, any political fallout focused primarily on temporary religious freedom issues stemming from the ongoing suppression of religious activity in Vietnam and was not significant (Nguyen 65). Moreover, Vietnamese Americans live primarily in Texas, California, and Virginia, states that were not electorally competitive in the late 1990s and early 2000s, so it would be difficult for such a small group of citizens, numbering around 1.7 million, in total to cause serious problems for either party in an upcoming campaign (Brown 332). For that reason, business groups were able to make the case for reform while assuring policymakers there were few political consequences. IV. Cuba â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Normalization of Diplomatic Relations (2014) and Proposed End to the Embargo (2016) Contrary to the positive results surrounding business intervention in the cases of China and Vietnam, Cuban-American relations remain in a state of disrepair and enmity. This poor state of relations is strongly influenced by the fact that, while diplomatic relations were restored by the Obama administration in 2014, the extensive trade embargo has remained in place since the climax of the Cold War. In the Cuban case, businesses were still motivated to get involved in the policy making process because of the immense commercial opportunities in such close proximity to the U.S., the decline of Cuba as a security threat, and the extensive positive engagement of the Obama administration in restoring relations with Cuba. Nevertheless, the opposing force of the Cuban American National Foundation, a high level of partisanship, and serious electoral consequences of lifting the embargo offset the positive impact of the intense lobbying campaign launched by business groups throughout 2015 and 2016. In light of the factors explaining both lobbying success and business motivation for involvement, Cuba provides an example where business was involved but failed in their lobbying action. With Cuba located the closest to the U.S. of all its former adversaries, the commercial opportunities for American businesses are robust and plentiful, an encouragement for businesses considering advocating for policy change. A normalization of economic relations with Cuba would strongly benefit the U.S. economy because businesses would acquire an untapped market that is very close for the purpose of exporting merchandise goods (Ritter 155).

To illustrate the depth of this potential market, American exports to Cuba totaled $247 million in 2016 while exports from the European Union totaled €2.04 billion in 2016 (“Cuba”; “EU-Cuba Relations Factsheet”). Moreover, because Cuba is currently trying to grow its economy and avoid continued stagnation, it desperately needs an injection of capital goods that could be provided by businesses in the U.S. (Ritter 155-156). Furthermore, the U.S. is a major exporter of professional and financial services, meaning that specialized American businesses would gain from the opportunity to provide their services with limited competition in the new Cuban market (Ritter 162). Demonstrating the potential of the Cuban market for American businesses were the “hundreds of airlines, hotel chains, telecommunications firms and other firms” already hoping to launch business ventures in Cuba following a very preliminary rollback of commercial restrictions by the Obama administration (Linthicum). Likewise, when the U.S. Chamber of Commerce established the U.S.-Cuba Business Council, a large group of businesses was highly interested in joining (Wilson and Needham). The only impediment blocking further business expansion in Cuba was the embargo, and businesses were highly motivated to remove this remaining restriction. Cuba has long been considered a serious national security threat to the U.S. because of its geographic proximity and prior sworn allegiance to supporting the cause of the Soviet Union. These threats persuaded policymakers to pursue an agenda of enmity both diplomatically and economically. Yet, by the end of the Cold War, the possible national security threat posed by Cuba had diminished considerably, with the number of troops on active duty in Cuba dropping by 80% in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union (“Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations” 475-476). Moreover, further reducing the threat, Fidel Castro announced that Cuba would no longer provide “material support” to communist revolutionary movements around the world (“Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations” 476). In 2014, President Obama clearly stated that Cuba no longer posed a national security threat to the U.S. or its allies (“Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations” 476). Because of this diminished national security threat, businesses felt emboldened to argue that Cuba would be worth more economically to the U.S. as a friend than as a foe. More than any past administration, the Obama administration made a significant effort to reform American relations with Cuba. During his tenure, Obama engaged extensively with business stakeholders. In December

2014, President Obama proclaimed that diplomatic relations with Cuba would be restored in full while simultaneously publicly calling for an “honest and serious debate on the lifting of the embargo on Cuba” (Baker). Choosing to make this announcement, the Obama administration saw business interests as necessary and integral partners who could further expand relations with Cuba (Piccone). To that end, during his state visit to Cuba, Obama planned to put pressure on the Cuban government to open up possibilities for American business expansion (Piccone). In exchange for his support, business groups, industry groups, and individual companies formed Engage Cuba, which decided to launch a multimillion dollar advocacy campaign in 2015 and 2016 to gather support for Obama administration proposals (Wilson and Needham). The formation of Engage Cuba complemented the activities of the U.S.-Cuba Business Council, which was established in the wake of the December 2014 announcement by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as a means of rallying business support for the extension of Obama’s policy changes (Wilson and Needham). Remaining undeterred, Obama again publicly called for lifting the embargo on Cuba in his State of the Union address in January 2016, with the full support of business groups. However, these statements were to no avail of action in Congress (Carney). The engagement of the administration in soliciting the perspective of business groups and in taking action on its own in the Cuban case exemplifies the broader relevance of signaling from the executive branch as a time for policy change. Distinct from both the Vietnamese and Chinese cases, the strength of lobbying by Cuban Americans was a major factor in ensuring that business groups were not successful in persuading lawmakers to lift the trade embargo against Cuba. The Cuban American lobby is powerful and is primarily represented by the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), which was founded in the 1980s by wealthy Cuban exiles living in South Florida (“Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations” 476). CANF has been so powerful over the past three decades that it essentially held veto power over any changes in American policy towards Cuba from 1981 to 2008 (“Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations” 476). In recent years, CANF’s extreme positions on the isolation of Cuba have lost some support among Cuban Americans, especially those in the younger generation, and there is a close divide on support for the embargo (“Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations” 477). Nevertheless, CANF’s positions do not reflect this divide, and it remains highly influential among

policymakers in Washington. Thus, the core of the embargo remains. Congress has been very active in establishing and overseeing Cuba policy since the end of the Cold War, meaning it is essential for business groups to successfully lobby Congress in order to remove the embargo. As recently as 1996 with the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, Congress has attempted to prevent presidents from making progress on the normalization of relations with Cuba (“A Policy Long Past Its Expiration Date” 947). Specifically, Helms-Burton was passed to disallow any president from lifting the embargo with Cuba unilaterally; the goal was to prevent a repetition of what was seen as executive overreach with Clinton and Vietnam, where the end of the trade embargo coincided with the normalization of diplomatic relations (Haney and Vanderbush 162). The passage of Helms-Burton firmly entrenched the opposition of the business community to the continued imposition of the embargo on Cuba.Business lobbyists sprang into action after Obama’s 2014 announcement, rising to 97 firms lobbying on Cuba in 2015 from 31 firms in 2014 (Wilson and Needham). Groups included the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Electronic Transactions Association while individual firms included Verizon, Major League Baseball, Carnival Cruise Lines, Marriott, American Airlines, and Chevron (Wilson and Needham). To counter CANF’s base of congressional supporters supplied with campaign contributions, Engage Cuba, among other groups, established the New Cuba PAC, supplying funds to supporters of progress on Cuban issues. However, Engage Cuba’s work work was initially small in scope compared to CANF’s activities. In addition, business lobbying success has been limited because of the influence of several high-profile Cuban American members of Congress opposed to the end of the embargo, including Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL), Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Ted Cruz (R-TX), and Representative Ileana RosLehtinen (R-FL) (Wilson and Needham). The power of these individuals was increased because of seniority and Republican control of Congress, thereby limiting the effectiveness of business lobbying. The level of partisanship involved in the normalization of relations with Cuba is stark and complements the significant political implications taking action for both political parties. The presence of large numbers of Cuban Americans in the electorally competitive states of Florida and New Jersey and relevance of campaign donations from CANF heavily dissuaded lawmakers from supporting normalization. With Republicans in charge of

both the Senate and House of Representatives in the 2014-2016 legislative session, Majority Leader McConnell’s (R-KY) vow not to pass any legislative solution to lifting the trade embargo had serious weight (“Normalizing U.S.Cuba Relations” 486). Furthermore, the upcoming presidential election in 2016 inspired Republican candidates to paint Obama’s foreign policy as a failure, and any additional progress on Cuban relations would destroy that narrative. Thus, the partisan distance between the parties increased on this issue. In this context, there is a strange juxtaposition between business interests who generally support Republican candidates and Republican opposition to a business foreign policy proposal, which highlights the importance of bipartisanship for business to pass its agenda through Congress. This situation indicates the broader principle that lobbying succeeds best when interest groups are able to frame their interests as an issue that rises above the squabbles of partisanship and is “All-American” in nature. Large donations from CANF and control of the electorally-competitive states of Florida and New Jersey at both the presidential and congressional level amplified partisanship surrounding normalized relations with Cuba. . CANF’s Free Cuba PAC has contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to supportive presidential and congressional candidates each election cycle since its founding in the late 1980s (“Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations” 476). Business groups were just beginning to raise money in support of the liberalization of relations, while the New Cuba PAC in 2015 had already conducted impressive fundraising, so politicians were less likely to stray away from an established money source in pursuit of what is still potentially an unknown (Whitefield). In addition, candidates did not wish to alienate firm opponents of the Castro regime in Florida and New Jersey given how closely divided Cuban Americans are on the issue of the embargo. Both Florida and New Jersey have a substantial number of competitive districts at the congressional level and are competitive at the presidential level, so any loss of votes matters (“Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations” 477). Therefore, business groups were not able to overcome the partisanship surrounding the normalization of relations with Cuba or provide incentives that surmount of the threat of political consequences. V. Conclusion Faced with the prospect of a decline in competitive advantage with their Western European and East Asian counterparts in entering the world’s new liberalizing markets, American businesses took the unprecedented step

of intervening in domestic politics to enact foreign policy change that would accelerate their international growth and enhance their market development opportunities. National security threats that existed in countries formerly acknowledged to be adversaries of the U.S. because of their association with the Soviet Union or communist economic systems deteriorated or became nonexistent. Therefore, the 1990s and 2000s represented a new era for business involvement in the political process with regard to foreign policy. Beginning with Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s MFN status renewal in 1993 and 1994, business interests found that they had a powerful voice in American government because of their influence on the economy and their vast network of resources. This power was especially apparent when businesses competed against other interest groups who did not have the same leverage in Congress or when business encountered a bipartisan Congress relatively receptive to their demands for policy change. As the 1990s progressed, businesses believed the incredible potential market available in Vietnam was too great to ignore and took action to normalize diplomatic relations in 1995 with the support of the Clinton administration. They eventually achieved PNTR status for Vietnam in 2006. Nevertheless, the failed lifting of the trade embargo against Cuba shows the limits of the power of business interests in lobbying for policy changes. Entrenched interest group opponents with a solid base of congressional support and a highly partisan atmosphere prove serious electoral ramifications for incumbents supporting lifting of the trade embargo despite the Obama administrationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strong advocacy for normalization. Altogether, the influences of American business interests in domestic politics have a profound impact on diplomatic and economic relations with former adversaries. Furthermore, the actual results of my selected cases matched my expectations with regard to when businesses choose to get involved and when they are successful in achieving foreign policy change. These results are summarized in the tables below. Taking into account evidence from the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban cases, as well as themes in the literature, it is clear that businesses are motivated to act when they sense a high degree of commercial opportunities and the ability to engage the current administration in substantive progress without the ominous threat of national security concerns. Furthermore, businesses are successful when interest group opponents are weak, businesses can launch a strong lobbying campaign in Congress, bipartisan consensus forms between the parties, and electoral consequences for politicians supporting the preferred policy of

business interests are limited. Accordingly, these factors are essential for any business to consider while seeking to alter foreign policy in the pursuit of normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with former adversaries.

Bibliography Auger, Vincent A. Human Rights and Trade: The Clinton Administration and China. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1995. Baker, Peter. “U.S. to Restore Full Relations with Cuba, Erasing a Last Trace of Cold War Hostility.” The New York Times, 17 Dec. 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/americas/us-cuba-relations. html?_r=0. Behr, Peter. “U.S. Businesses Waged Year-Long Lobbying Effort on China Trade.” The Washington Post, 27 May 1994, www.washingtonpost. com/archive/politics/1994/05/27/us-businesses-waged-year-long lobbying-effort-on-china-trade/79238413-fa4d-44d2-b51f 32273f99e7f8/?utm_term=.76474075987c. Cain, Patricia Lynn. “Sino-American Relations During the Clinton' Administration: The 1993 and 1994 Battles Over Most Favored Nation Trade Status for China.” University of Virginia, 1998. Carney, Jordain. “Obama Calls for Lifting Cuba Embargo: 'The Cold War Is Over'.” The Hill, 12 Jan. 2016, thehill.com/policy/national security/265691-obama-realize-cold-war-is-over-lift-cuba-embargo. Cohen, Stephen D., et al. Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Trade Policy: Economics, Politics, Laws, and Issues. Westview Press, 2003. “Cuba.” United States Trade Representative, ustr.gov/countries-regions/ americas/cuba. Destler, I. M. American Trade Politics. Viva Books, 2006. Destler, I.M. “Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy.” Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policies, The University of Michigan Press, 1998, pp. 93–108. “EU-Cuba Relations Factsheet.” European Union External Action Service, 31 Oct. 2017, eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters homepage_en/16558/EU-Cuba%20relations,%20factsheet. Foot, Rosemary. The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949. Clarendon Press, 1995. Brown, Frederick Z. “Rapprochement Between Vietnam and the United States.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs, vol. 32, no. 3, Dec. 2010, pp. 317–342. Haney, Patrick Jude, and Walt Vanderbush. The Cuban Embargo: the

Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. Jones, Clayton, and Ben Barber. “Hanoi Copes With POW Fallout.” The Christian Science Monitor, 23 Apr. 1993, www.csmonitor. com/1993/0423/23031.html. LeoGrande, William M. “A Policy Long Past Its Expiration Date: US Economic Sanctions Against Cuba.” Social Research, vol. 82, no. 4, 2015, pp. 939–966. LeoGrande, William M. “Normalizing US-Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past.” International Affairs, vol. 91, no. 3, 2015, pp. 473–488. Linthicum, Kate. “U.S. Companies Line Up to Do Business in Cuba.” The Los Angeles Times, 25 Mar. 2016, www.latimes.com/world/ mexico-americas/la-fg-cuba-gold-rush-20160325-story.html. Masland, Tom. “Clinton's New Vietnam War.” Newsweek, 25 Apr. 1993, www.newsweek.com/clintons-new-vietnam-war-191932. Nguyen, Viet Tuan. “US-Vietnam Relations 1995-2006: A Theoretical Approach.” University of Virginia, 2008. Piccone, Ted. “Obama to Cuba: A Gamble to End the Embargo.” The Brookings Institution, 26 Feb. 2016, www.brookings.edu/blog/ order-from-chaos/2016/02/18/obama-to-cuba-a-gamble-to-end the-embargo/. Ritter, Archibald R.M. “United States-Cuba Relations: The Potential Economic Implications of Normalization.” Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations: How Should We Now Play Ball?, Taylor & Francis, 2017, pp.153–175. Stromseth, Jonathan. “Dialogue on U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Domestic Dimensions.” The Asia Foundation, Dialogue on U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Domestic Dimensions, 2003. Sutter, Robert G. Vietnam-U.S. Relations: The Debate over Normalization. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1995. Whitefield, Mimi. “PACs for and against Cuba Embargo Bring in Big Money.” Miami Herald, 29 Jan. 2016, www.miamiherald.com/ news/nationworld/world/americas/cuba/article57000133.html. Wiarda, Howard J. “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy.” American

Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes, HarperCollins College Publishers, 1997, pp. 95–115. Wilson, Megan R., and Vicki Needham. “Business Believes US Embargo on Cuba to Crumble.” The Hill, 10 Mar. 2016, thehill.com/business a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/272465-lobbyists-bullish-that cuban-trade-embargo-will-soon. The World Bank. Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP). data. worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=US.

The Effects of Religion and Religiosity on Individual Attitudes towards Domestic Violence: An Analysis of World Values Survey Data 2010-2014 By Thomas Ale

About the Author

Thomas Ale is a 4th year from Vienna, VA, double majoring in

Economics and Foreign Affairs, along with a minor in Astronomy. His policy

areas of interest include US-Russia relations, religion and conflict, and the future

of the Middle East. Outside of school, he is an avid lover of hiking and DC sports teams. He hopes to move into business analytics or policy research after graduation.

Foreward

Thomas Ale wrote the first draft of his article as a term paper in my

PLIR 4320 Religion and War course. Although the focus of that course is on

international rather than on intimate partner violence (IPV), I was immediately impressed with Thomas's proposal when he informed me that most of the

quantitative literature on religion and IPV was based on small-scale US-only studies.

Although I am not a scholar of IPV myself, the conclusion of those small

scale US studies comports with my liberal college professor intuitions: namely, religion in general seems irrelevant to IPV attitudes, but Evangelical Christianity

in particular may promote them. By contrast, Thomas's global analysis of World Values Survey data turns both aspects of that conventional wisdom on its head:

specifically, Thomas finds that religiosity in general may promote IPV, whereas Evangelical Christianity in particular may work against it.

As Thomas himself notes in the article, these are big and controversial

issues, and, needless to say, there is only so much that a single preliminary analysis can accomplish. Even so, Thomas's analysis at a minimum suggests that

anyone interested in religion and IPV should completely rethink the conventional scholarly wisdom on the subject, and that constitutes a rare contribution for any academic paper in any journal. Peter Furia

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of religion, specifically religious

denomination, religiosity, education, and income on violence against women.

Specifically, by using World Values Survey data from Wave 6 (2010-2014), several similar regressions were performed in order to quantify the relationship between those variables and attitudes towards gender-based violence. Response to the

question “Is it ever justifiable for a man to beat his wife?” was used as the dependent

variable, and responses were coded on a scale of 1 to 10 in increasing justifiability. Independent variables included: religiosity, quantified by membership in religious

organizations, and belief that the respondent’s religion was the only acceptable one; religious denomination; education level attained; and income level within the respondent’s country. The results indicated that as religiosity increases, acceptance

of gender-based violence does as well. Acceptance of gender based violence was also found to be increasing in income, while it was found to be decreasing in

education. Finally, Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism were found to be the religious denominations most in favor of justifying violence against women. Ultimately, it

is likely that other cultural factors that are either difficult or impossible to quantify also affect these opinions towards gender-based violence. Introduction

Domestic violence remains one of the most prevalent and pressing forms

of injustice present in society today. According to the CDC, 38.9% of American

women and 28.2% of American men have experienced physical violence from an intimate partner over the course of their lifetime (CDC). Globally, it is estimated that around one third of all women have experienced intimate partner violence,

and nearly 38% of all murders of women are committed by male intimate partners (WHO). If the problem of femicide and gender-based violence, in particular violence against women, is to be solved or at least mitigated, an analysis of the

underlying causes and attitudes surrounding it is necessary. Is there a specific cause of gender-based violence? Can that cause be quantified? In particular,

whether or not religion or religiosity contributes to levels of gender-based violence is an important topic in the literature and in modern discourse that could have a distinct effect on rates of violence against women.

In this study, I use Wave 6 World Values Survey data, collected from

approximately 2010 to 2014, to perform an analysis of individual-level attitudes regarding violence against women. Specifically, I am interested in determining

whether or not there is a relationship between individuals’ attitudes towards

violence against women and (1) their religion and (2) their level of religiosity. . Using this data, I will perform a linear regression of factors including education, income, religiosity, and religious denomination on individual attitudes toward the justifiability of gender-based violence in hopes of finding a significant relationship.

Ultimately, this is an extremely difficult and controversial subject to analyze,

as opinions regarding religion tend to be extremely polarized, with extremely prevalent confirmation bias in regards to acceptance of evidence. However, by

performing this study in a more quantitative manner, and by focusing more on attitudinal data rather than specific statistics regarding levels of violence, I am hoping to mitigate potential bias or misinterpretation from my findings. Religion and Violence against Women

Much of the debate surrounding the effects of religion and religiosity

on violence against women is related to scripture. Critics often point to examples within scripture that imply or explicitly describe the subordination of women,

which could thus provide religious justification for the promotion of a patriarchal

familial or societal structure. In the West, the vast majority of this scriptural critique is done in relation to the Bible, both New and Old Testaments, and the

Quran. In particular, each of these holy works contains passages that would, as these critics argue, promote male domination and female subordination. In the Bible, for example, critics often point to Ephesians 5:22-25, which states “Wives, submit to your own husbands, as to the Lord . . . husbands, love your wives, as

Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her.” They argue that such verses

not only command female submission, but also clearly establish husbands and wives as diametrically opposed in terms of the relationship, with the nature of

love being different for each side. In addition, critics of the Quran point to specific verses, such as Surah 2:282, which outlines the inequality of testimony between a man and a woman, with a woman’s word being worth half of that of a man.

Critics of religion in general also argue that the “images of God in

Scripture and liturgical prayer are overwhelmingly male: Lord, King, Father”

which therefore leads to the oppression of women in many predominantly

Christian societies (Rakoczy 2004). One critic argues that “the presumed 'maleness' of God and the male identity of Jesus are used to justify women's subordination” (Rakoczy). This scriptural justification for female subordination

promotes a “patriarchy that exerts its violent power through social control

of women,” whether or not this control actually results in physical violence

(Rakoczy). In Islamic societies where religious law is nationalized, “women’s rights are subject to dominant interpretations of religious principles,” where often

the “supremacy of the male and the subordination of the female is assumed to be part of the culture, and even have the sanction of religion” (Hajjar 2004). While

the advancement of women’s rights can often be seen as “threatening to the social order” in any society, in Muslim societies governed by Sharia law, conflicting with the established order can be seen as anti-religious (Hajjar).

Nonetheless, it is also argued that interpretations of scripture as

inherently patriarchal are unfounded or misinformed. For example, in Islamic

thought, the collection of speeches, actions, and habits of the Prophet known as

the Hadith “contains evidence of women’s full participation in communal and other matters, but later generations of pious scholars changed these patterns”

towards “restrictions” and subordination (Sharif 1985). This argument contends

that from a strict, scripturally deterministic perspective, the Hadith itself contained evidence for gender equality, even though later scholars and religious leaders altered the meanings of these texts. In addition, it is argued that the

veiling of Muslim women in Islamic texts was intended not as a “restriction of

liberty,” but rather undertaken in order to “protect them,” perhaps from enemies of Muhammad in the time before his religious and military successes (Sharif).

However, as a caveat, the verses that call for the veiling of Muslim women at the

same time “were legitimized by exegetes who interpreted the vague and general Qur’anic provisions to sanction” seclusion and subordination.

As for evidence from specific statistical studies, research has found that

“general religiosity, measured as belief in God, strength of religious faith, church

attendance, and frequency of prayer, was not associated with violence approval, psychological aggression, or intimate partner violence” (Koch and Ramirez

2010). However, the same study also found that “Christian fundamentalism was positively associated with both violence approval and acts of intimate partner

violence” (Koch and Ramirez). These findings indicate that broadly it may be the case that religiosity may not contribute to violence, particularly against women,

but that specific religions may do so. In particular, “patriarchal leadership and

authority approval of corporal punishment may also legitimize the use of force

and violence by males in fundamentalist Christian families” (Koch and Ramirez).

Research has also found that “ideologies that sanction male dominance, as well

as relative power differentials between partners (as reflected by disparities in levels of education and earnings), have also been linked with domestic violence,”

perhaps legitimized by inequalities explained in religious texts (Ellison et al., 2007). However, the same study also found that “religious involvement is correlated with reduced levels of domestic violence” but that these effects vary

by race and ethnicity, implying that factors outside of religiosity are also at play.

Ellison et al. (2007) also found that religious elements such as rituals, sermons, and informal social interactions can help religious congregations “emphasize the

significance of committed relationships and family life for personal and spiritual

growth,” thereby helping to reduce levels of domestic violence, as well as gender and partner subordination. Data and Methods

As previously mentioned, the data for this study comes from the World

Values Survey database, specifically their “Wave 6” data collected from 2010 to 2014. Using this data, I performed several regressions using Stata to approximate

a relationship between responses to several survey questions and their effects on

responses to a particular survey question regarding the justifiability of gender-based

violence. To streamline the analysis as much as possible, I dropped questions from the survey which I found to be unrelated to my analysis. Amongst the remaining

questions, I dropped any observations from the data that coded either to “no response” or “question not asked,” as these were coded in a manner that would have

skewed my findings. In addition, because there seemed to be an inconsistency in

the way the World Values Survey asked for religious denomination across various countries, I dropped all respondents whose reported religion did not conform

to a set of major religions. Mostly this involved dropping respondents who

belonged to various local Christian sects, as the survey was inconsistent in that it allowed for broader religious denomination responses in some countries than in others. I chose to retain those who self-identified as Roman Catholic, Protestant,

Orthodox, Evangelical, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, or No Religion in the

dataset for my analysis, out of the desire to compare the major religions. Despite

my cleaning of the data, my final sample size consisted of 60,534 observations and was satisfactory for my analysis.

The remaining survey questions used in my analysis corresponded to

V208, V25, V154, V248, V239, and V144, according to the variable coding index created by the World Values Survey. Variable V208 is the dependent variable

in my regression, and corresponds to the question: “Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife.” It is coded by the WVS such that an answer of 1 corresponds to “never justifiable” and 10 to “always justifiable,” and justifiability increasing in the response number. I chose this variable because it shows the attitudes of

each respondent towards a very specific and understandable phenomenon that is clearly an example of domestic abuse. Thus, I believe it is a valid proxy for both general attitudes towards domestic violence and the subordination of women.

Variables V25 and V154 correspond to my representations of religiosity, and thus

are my key independent variables. Variable V25 asks whether the respondent

has “active or inactive membership in a Church or religious organization,” with an answer of no membership coded as 0, inactive membership as 1, and active membership as 2. For variable V154, respondents were asked “Agree/Disagree:

The only acceptable religion is my religion,” where “strongly agree” is coded as 1, “agree” as 2, “disagree” as 3, and “strongly disagree” as 4. Variable V248 is my

education control, which corresponds to a question regarding “highest education level achieved,” with no formal education coded as 1, incomplete primary school

as 2, completed primary school as 3, incomplete vocational secondary school as 4, complete vocational secondary school as 5, incomplete university prep secondary

school as 6, complete university prep secondary school as 7, some university level education as 8, and completed university level degree as 9. Variable V239 is my

income control, which corresponds to a question regarding the respondent’s income percentile within their own country with the poorest group coded as 1 and moving on upward to the richest group coded as 10. Finally, variable V144

is the respondent’s religious denomination, which are coded by various numbers for each religion, and includes the denominations I mentioned previously. This variable acts as a dummy variable within the regression.

With these variables I created several regressions with the same basic

setup, differentiating the models by which religious denomination was the base variable from which the other denominations were compared in terms of their

effects on acceptance of domestic violence.. With these regressions, I tested these key hypotheses:

(1) as religiosity increases, violence towards women would be seen as more acceptable;

(2) different religions would have different effects on peoples acceptance of

violence towards women, and Hinduism, Islam, and Catholicism would be most accepting;

(3) increased education and income should decrease acceptance of violence against women

To test the above hypotheses, I developed the following linear regression

model, using the variables described above:

V208 = B0 + B1 V25 + B2 V154 + B3 V248 + B4 V239+ B5V144

Or in plain English:

JustifiableBeatWife = B0 + B1 ReligiousParticipation + B2 OneTrueReligion +

B3 Education + B4 Income+ B5 ReligiousDenominationDummy

Because of the way the variables were coded by the World Values Survey,

and by the nature of the regression, the beta coefficients on each variable were hypothesized in a manner dependent upon these factors: B1, hypothesized to be positive, ceteris paribus

B2, hypothesized to be negative, ceteris paribus B3, hypothesized to be negative, ceteris paribus

B4, hypothesized to be negative, ceteris paribus

B5, coefficients for each denomination dependent upon the base

comparison group

In regards to prediction (e), performing the regression several times

with different base categories would allow for a ranking of sorts for the different

religious denominations in terms of acceptance of violence against women. In this ranking, I hypothesized that Islam, Hinduism, and Roman Catholicism would

be the most accepting of violence against women, as the vast majority of Muslim

and Hindu societies surveyed are in the Arab world and India are notoriously patriarchal. According to a US News and World Report survey conducted in 2016,

8 of the “10 countries perceived to be the worst in terms of gender equality” are “Muslim-majority nations,” and another is India (US News). In addition, many of

the Roman Catholic survey respondents live in Latin American countries, such as

Mexico and Columbia, where femicide rates are extremely high. In fact, 14 of the 25 countries with the highest rates of femicide are located in Latin America (UN Women).

Results

Table 1, found on the final page of this report, gives the complete

numerical results of the regression. Variables were found to be statistically significant if their coefficients had p-values of (p < .05) and are indicated as

such by an asterisk (*). The number of observations was N = 60,534 and the R-squared value was extremely low at (R^2 = .0307). The same basic setup of

the regression was performed several times, with the base category on Religious

Denomination changing each time in order to establish a hierarchy in terms of

how acceptable violence towards women is for the set of religions. In regards to the other indicators, the two variables representing religiosity, V25, the

respondent’s active/inactive membership in a religious organization, and V154, the respondent’s agreement/disagreement that the only acceptable religion is

their own, each produced the predicted negative coefficient based on the coding

of the variables, and each coefficient was statistically significant. This result suggests that increased religiosity increases levels of acceptance of violence

against women, holding all else constant. The variable V248, or the respondent’s

education level, also produced the expected negative coefficient result based on the coding of the variable, and was statistically significant. This result suggests a negative relationship between education level and acceptance of violence against women, holding all else constant. However, variable V239, or the respondent’s

income level within their home country, produced a positive coefficient, implying

that from this data, that increased income levels increase acceptance of violence against women, holding all else constant.

In regards to specific religious denominations, by using the set of

results obtained from regressing multiple times using a different base category (Table 1), I created a rough list of which religions seem to accept violence against

women more than others. Although the results are not exactly clear cut in terms of which religions are explicitly shown in the data to be more condoning

of violence towards women, I was able to develop a tier system of sorts to rank them. Thus, the religions that showed the most acceptance of violence against

women were Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam. These three religions were grouped together, as there were no clear statistical differences between them in the data.

These are followed by, in order of decreasing acceptance of gender-based violence, No Religion, then by the group encompassing Protestantism, Catholicism, and Buddhism. These three religions were grouped together as the data did not show a

clear statistical difference between them. Further, these are followed by Orthodox

Christianity, and lastly by the religion least accepting of violence against women: Evangelical Christianity.

Discussion and Implications

In regards to the study itself, the regression analysis obtained an

extremely low R-squared value. While this could normally be cause for concern,

the purpose of my study was not to establish a true predictive model of opinion or society in terms of violence towards women. My purpose instead was to determine

if there existed a causal connection between different variables on religion and opinions toward women. The extremely low p-values that I observed (less than 0.001 for the religiosity, income, and education variables) show that it is extremely

likely that there is a relationship, even though this relationship only explains approximately 3% of the variation in the justifiability of beating a wife. Thus,

in terms of predictive power, the model is not very useful, but I believe that my analysis has shown at least some evidence of a causal connection.

Nonetheless, the results showed that there is likely a positive relationship

between religiosity and acceptance of gender-based violence. This relationship is likely influenced by patriarchal structures both embedded within the religion

itself and from within the culture. Cultural factors are more difficult to quantify,

but likely play a significant role both in the aforementioned reinforcement of

religion and in the determination of gender roles and gender domination and subordination. For example, measures on patrilocality could be useful, but including a country level indicator such as that would not be suitable for this

individual level opinion study, as patrilocality does depend on region and

whether the region is urban or rural. Religion and culture, ultimately, combine and reinforce each other, creating societies that often promote gender-based

violence or domination/subordination. Placing a personal emphasis on religion can reinforce this feeling in the individual.

Variables other than religious denomination and religiosity were also

statistically significant, even though they too explained little of the variation of the data. The results for educationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s effect on acceptance of violence against

women were negative, as predicted, however, the effect of income level was not negative, as predicted. Instead, the data showed that increased income

was associated with an increase in acceptance of violence against women. It is possible that the nature of employment and womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s participation in the labor

force in many countries is influencing this finding. For those at the lower end of the income ladder, it is likely that women in families work, out of necessity,

in order to provide more income and thus more financial security for the family

unit. Thus, it is possible that women in these situations likely have a more equal

footing with their male counterparts, and thus incidences of intimate partner violence would be diminished. Whereas in higher income households, women

likely are not required to work, and are confined to home life. This would lead to inequality in terms of income, which could be reinforced by other factors and lead

to an imbalance of power within the household and more incidences of violence. On the other hand, increases in education are shown to decrease acceptance of violence towards women. It is possible that increasing education leads to more democratic and egalitarian thinking in terms of gender, and thus a decrease in support of gender subordination, particularly through violence.

My results regarding the different religious denominations and their

effects on peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s acceptance of violence against women produced some expecting

and surprising results. As I had predicted, likely due to the patriarchal nature of

the majority of Muslim societies and of Hindu/Indian societies as shown by the US News survey, Islam and Hinduism produced the highest level of acceptance of violence against women among the religions. Unexpectedly, Judaism also showed

a high level of acceptance, although it showed no clear statistical difference from

Hinduism and Islam. This is somewhat surprising, but this could be a result of certain scriptural prescriptions within Jewish texts, or due to the specific culture

of the respondentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; homelands. However, I believe this result is most likely to have been due to the relative sample sizes for each religious denomination in

the dataset. Each of the other religious denominations ranged from sample sizes of approximately 1000-16000, but Jews only counted for 162 of the 60,000

respondents in the sample. This could have created some sampling bias in my

results. Nonetheless, regarding the other denominations, having no religion at

all seems to occupy the second tier of acceptance of violence against women. This could be due to certain elements not restricted to religion, like spirituality and morality, which could decrease levels of acceptance of violence.

Within the remaining religions, the least accepting of violence towards

women were the Evangelicals, followed by Orthodox practitioners. In regards to each of these, culture may be playing as much, if not more, of a role in shaping

opinion as does religion. Orthodox traditions are largely present in Eastern European and Slavic cultures, with a history of matriarchy and a stress on the

importance of women, particularly older women. As for Evangelicals, recent

studies have highlighted frequent domestic abuse and a systematic cover-up

undertaken by the church, contradicting my regression results (ABC News).

However, my result again could tie back to culture and the different cultural

norms of many of the respondents of the survey, as Evangelical respondents in

my dataset were not from the United States, whereas the evidence of cover-up and frequent abuse came from the US in this instance.

Overall, this study has shown that many factors combine to affect

individualsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; opinions regarding the justifiability of domestic violence, specifically the justifiability of beating a wife. Religiosity, religious denomination, education, and income all appear to have some effect on levels of acceptance of violence against women. While ultimately it is difficult to quantify which of these causes is the most direct or influential factor in determining opinions regarding domestic

violence, as well as general violence, it is important to examine how these factors

can affect peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lives and opinions regarding this difficult subject. Factors such as religiosity can influence peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s perceptions of the world and of others, such that their worldview is shaped by religious experience, and thus in combination

with other factors, lead them to believe certain things about gender, relationships, and the nature of equality before God.

Bibliography Ali, Yusuf. The Holy Quran - English Translation. King Fahd Holy Quran Printing Complex, 1987. Baird, Julia, and Gleeson, Harry. “'Submit to your husbands': Women told to endure domestic violence in the name of God.” ABC News, 10 Aug. 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-18/domestic-vio lence-church-submit-to-husbands/8652028. Ellison, Christopher G., et al. “Race/Ethnicity, Religious Involvement, and Domestic Violence.” Violence Against Women, vol. 13, no. 11, 2007, pp. 1094–1112., doi:10.1177/1077801207308259. English Standard Version. www.biblegateway.com/quicksearch/?quick search=Epheians&qs_version=ESV. Hajjar, Lisa. “Religion, State Power, and Domestic Violence in Muslim Soci eties: A Framework for Comparative Analysis.” Law and Social Inquiry, vol. 29, no.1, 2004, pp. 1–38., doi:10.1086/423688. Koch, Jerome R., and Ignacio Luis Ramirez. “RELIGIOSITY, CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISM, AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIO LENCE AMONG U.S. COLLEGE STUDENTS.”Review of Religious Research, vol. 51, no. 4, 2004, www.jstor.org/stable/ pdf/20778531.pdf. McPhillips, Deirdre. “The 10 Worst Countries for Gender Equality, Ranked by Perception.” US News & World Report, 10 Mar. 2016, www. usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-03-10/the-10-worst countries-for-gender-equality-ranked-by-perception. National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey 2010. Center for Dis ease Control, www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_re port2010-a.pdf. Rakoczy, Susan. “Religion and Violence: The Suffering of Women.”Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity, vol. 61, 2004, www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4066596.pdf.Sharif, Rashda. “Women in Islam.” European Judaism: A Journalfor the New Europe, vol. 21, no. 1, 1987, www.jstor.org/stablepdf/41442936.pdf. “Take five: Fighting femicide in Latin America.” UN Women, www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/2/take-five-adriana-qui nones-femicide-in-latin-america. “Violence against women.” World Health Organization, World Health

Organization, www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/. “World Values Survey.” WVS Database, www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ WVSOnline.jsp.

The Fall From Grace:

A Neuro-Political Investigation into the Context and Consequences of the American Abuses at Abu Ghraib

By Sabrina Kim About the Author Sabrina Kim is a 3rd year at UVA majoring in biology and Global Security & Justice. On grounds, she is an intern at the Miller Center for Public Affairs working on the Millennial Caucus Project. She is also a member of College Republicans, Triathlon Club, Kappa Delta sorority, and was a teaching assistant for Professor Condronâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s neurobiology course. In the future, Sabrina hopes to go to law school. Foreward We live in politically divided times. Since the last presidential election, divisions have deepened along the lines of partisanship, racial and gender identities, as well as economic inequality. Most important, the cracks of this split are now also running directly through the very fundament of any liberal democracy: reasoned debate and discourse. In the current campus climate where the battles around free speech, right-wing extremism, identity politics and sexual harassment have turned violent at times, we need reasoned debate and discourse more than ever. This paper, its author and the undergraduate course in which this paper was written are a testimony to the fact that bipartisan, reasoned debate is still possible, and much needed. Sabrina Kim, an undergraduate student double-majoring in biology and Global studies & justice, was one of the brightest, engaged and truly interdisciplinary students in my class. An Echols scholar and repeatedly on the Deanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s list of distinguished students, Sabrina has impressively researched and written on topics ranging from neurobiology, nuclear waste, obesity to race. Her paper brilliantly merges the social neuroscience and political

science readings from my course on “The Political Brain: An Introduction to Neuropolitical Explanations of Prejudice, Exclusion and Diversity”, producing a sophisticated and original paper that examines torture and abuse by U.S. military officers at Abu Ghraib prison through a neuropolitical lens. Sabrina uses the latest social neuroscience studies on out-group exclusion and dehumanization, linking it elegantly to political arguments about military conduct, International law and conflict resolution. One of the highlights of her paper lies in combining a critique of modern state power (reminiscent of theories of Max Weber, Theodor Adorno and Hannah Arendt) with the dangers of excluding others from our sense of humanity at the brain level. In addition, Sabrina is also a UVa College Republican and was the ‘Students for Trump’ ambassador during the presidential election. These are not minor facts: the condemnation of torture, dehumanization and the post-9/11 breakdown of the rule of law in her paper, as well as her argument that in-group favoritism and an overblown national sense of identity against ‘barbarian’ Arabs led to the neurobiological desensitization of U.S. military officers against prisoners, are significant in light of her political affiliations and activism on campus. The intellectual brilliance that Sabrina exhibits in her paper, as well as her engaged discussions in class show that liberal academics cannot simply stereotype conservatives and Trump supporters as disgruntled, undereducated and stupid White men. Sabrina’s paper and its success is therefore both a challenge and hope for the possibility of reasoned debate within our liberal democracy. It poses a challenge because liberal professors and educators need to re-examine how to address Millennials and the inner complexities (and yes, also confusions!) of their nascent political affiliations and beliefs. By taking our universally shared human brain as a starting point, my “Political Brain” class tried to bring together students from disparate political and intellectual fields: talking about racism, prejudice and exclusion in a non-shaming, non-moralizing way, yet not shying away from defining what kind of exclusions – such as torture, dehumanization and discrimination – are unacceptable from the viewpoint of what we owe to each other at a neuropolitical level. The hope lies within students such as Sabrina, who are willing and able to define the political standards of our liberal democracy anew, casting aside the noise of partisan quibbles and overcoming the cynicism felt by many

Millennials towards an older generation of liberal intellectuals who actively contributed to the breakdown of the rule of law post-9/11 and helped usher in the Iraq War. With the recent nomination of Gina Haspel, the ‘cheerleader of torture’, as the director of the CIA, innovative and interdisciplinary papers such as Sabrina’s on the disastrous consequences of torture for both the victim and the perpetrator are crucial in preventing both conservatives and liberals not to make the same mistakes twice. Liya Yu

Abstract Unbeknownst to most Americans at the time, autumn of 2003 harbored some of the gravest abuses ever committed by members of the United States Armed Forces. In the midst of the anarchic Iraq War, U.S. Army Reserve soldiers of the 372nd Military Police Company (372nd MP CO) were responsible for overseeing detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex outside of Baghdad. Instead, as an internal report eventually detailed, at least eleven soldiers executed a long list of morally and legally questionable acts. This list included the use of military dogs to intimidate detainees, the sexual assault and rape of both female and male detainees, and the implementation of numerous physical exploits that, in extreme cases, resulted in death (Fay, 2004; Strasser, 2004). In the immediate blowback following the scandal, President George W. Bush and the Department of Defense attempted to explain these atrocities using the “bad apples” hypothesis, blaming the members of the 372nd MP CO for acting in bad faith and failing to adhere to official United States policy (Mastroianni, 2013). Many scholars have since disputed this claim, citing memos released during the Bush administration that officially sanctioned “enhanced interrogation techniques” --a convenient euphemism for torture. In this paper, I reject both of these assertions, opting instead for a neuro-political approach to illuminate the systematic mechanisms behind the Abu Ghraib scandal. I begin with an exploration of nationalism in the post-9/11 era and the rise of the fundamental distinction between “Americans” and “non-Americans,” the latter of which was often reserved specifically for Arabs and Muslims. This division was further solidified by the nature of basic military training and the use of repetitive doctrines to reinforce the idea of an “American-only” in-group.

This dichotomy invited intergroup empathy bias at a fundamental level, allowing soldiers to reserve empathy for members of their in-group and withhold it from the Iraqi prisoners. The 372nd MP CO’s relative position of power in the Abu Ghraib prison and the soldiers’ desensitization to killing and violence further augmented these biases, allowing the neurological satisfaction of observing an out-group’s failure to reach dangerously elevated levels. Nevertheless, these phenomena alone were not enough to facilitate torture. Dehumanization of the Iraqi prisoners, both at a systematic level via the policies of the Bush administration and at the individual level of the soldiers themselves, allowed the members of the 372nd MP CO to remove the prisoners from the essential human “in-group” and engage in the torturous behaviors displayed in the now infamous and incriminatory photos. In the following pages, I explain these arguments in greater detail, combining the relevant neuro-political literature with official military reports, anecdotal testimonies, and comprehensive scholarly writing to examine the context in which the Abu Ghraib abuses occurred. I will also conclude with a collection of policy suggestions to systematically combat such corrupt behavior, as well as with some brief remarks on the limitations of political neuroscience and the necessity of individual culpability. Nationalism on the Rise: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are often viewed as a direct assault on the American psyche, but the days and weeks after the fall of the Twin Towers would usher in a new wave of fervent national pride. Many of the soldiers who would eventually abuse the Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib capitalized on these sentiments and joined the Army Reserves during this time, a period when military recruitment reportedly “hit the ceiling” (Miles, 2005). This aura of intense nationalism, which reverberated throughout American society, functioned as a coping mechanism for the wounded and disheartened population, However, it also created the framework for an austere and dichotomous in-group/out-group dynamic. The official rhetoric in the wake of 9/11 was essentialist at best and often included dogmatic assertions about the core essence of “being American.” President Bush thanked those who responded to the carnage “with the best of America,” and reminded the distraught country that “in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment” (Murphy, 2003); however, this type

of language also had the unintended consequence of reinforcing intragroup homogeneity and necessitating a clear distinction between “American” and “non-American” (Li & Brewer, 2004). Despite President Bush’s later appeal that “the enemy of America is not our many Muslim or Arab friends,” the work of Ferguson, Carter, & Hassin (2009) showed that participants viewed non-White ethnic minorities as “less American” than Whites, even if they reported otherwise (Bush, 2001). These observations are bolstered by the work of Salaita (2005), who argues that President Bush’s reminder that “[Arab-Americans] are American, just like you” functioned as a symbolic platitude in lieu of an effective roadblock to bigotry. Xenophobia against Muslims and Arabs had always existed in various corners of American society, but the 9/11 attacks created a “fifth-column” mentality that provided a justification for these beliefs. The aforementioned trends were consistent across various demographics in several geographic regions. While the entire nation listened as prominent newscasters and politicians tried to fortify the vestiges of national spirit, the American people were perhaps unaware of the subtle and implicit distinctions that were reinforced with every speech. The members of the 372nd MP CO were no less susceptible; the unifying but dichotomous rhetoric which they heard from the President would be compounded even further by their experiences in basic military training camp. As detailed in the next section, the “American” in-group became so fundamentally ingrained in their psyche that their ability to dispense empathy and control power urges was markedly, and in some cases dangerously, altered. Empathy: A Finite Resource Empathy is defined as “an affective reaction caused by, and congruent with, another person’s inferred or forecasted emotions” (Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991). This confers positive feelings on an individual when witnessing another succeed, as well as negative feelings upon viewing failure or suffering. However, this phenomenon is not universally applicable--people exhibit more empathy for those in their in-group than those in their outgroup (Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). Known as intergroup empathy bias, this trend is particularly illuminating in the context of Abu Ghraib and helps illuminate the motives and mechanisms behind such unabashed perversion. The basic military training required of all members of the United States Army has an explicit goal of “learning the basics of Army life…

including the Seven Core Army Values.” Importantly, one of these values is “loyalty,” referring specifically to the act of “bearing true faith and allegiance to…the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other Soldiers” (“The Army Values,” n.d.). While the necessity of military units to display obstinate unity, especially during conflict, is undisputed, this camaraderie inherently enforced the in-group/out-group distinction that was already subconsciously defined. Additionally, basic training desensitized recruits to various types of aggression and violence, including killing. According to William F. Briscoe, Director of the Directorate for Training Plans and Capabilities Review, the Army strategy embodied a new mentality where “everybody [was] going to be a warrior first.” The program included a round-the-clock emphasis on killing the enemy with “incredible precision,” offering early exposure to violence that opened the door for behavior so explicit that it once seemed impossible (Lankford, 2009). This desensitization was particularly foreboding when considering the idea that intergroup empathy bias is primarily driven by severe antipathy for the out-group, rather than immense empathy for the in-group. This has large implications for the notion of Schadenfreude, the satisfaction experienced from the failures of an out-group. While “failure” is a loosely-defined term, the ability of soldiers to overcome the traditional human aversion to violence, combined with a strong bias against the perceived out-group, help explain how torturous actions against Iraqi prisoners could be neurologically tolerated by the members of the 372nd MP CO. Discussions surrounding military endeavors often included direct or implied causal statements regarding the intentions behind the 9/11 attacks. This likely resulted in Glückschmerz, or feelings of distress from the perceived success of out-group members. These effects are hypothesized to be motivated by a desire to mitigate threat from the out-group--in fact, feelings of inferiority, such as those experienced by the soldiers after 9/11, predict Schadenfreude (Smith, Powell, Combs, & Schurtz, 2009). Notably, this bias is not readily dismissed, even after members of an in-group learn that they have a competitive advantage over the out-group. Contrary to the work of many scholars, the phenomenon of intergroup empathy bias is not as easily reversible as once suggested (Cikara, Bruneau, Bavel, & Saxe, 2014). In the context of Abu Ghraib, any reports of American

battle successes or dwindling Al-Qaeda activity that the soldiers may have received would not have mitigated any of the preconceived notions they had developed in the months following 9/11. In fact, as detailed in the following section, any feelings of superiority after a series of victories would likely amplify the division between the soldiers and their out-group. Power & Empathy: A Lethal Combination Various scholars have identified a negative relationship between perceived power and the ability to empathize. Those in positions of power often operate within narrow social constructs, such as stereotypes and biases, and have a reduced ability to absorb and process peripheral information (Guinote, 2007). This tunnel vision depresses the ability to take another’s perspective--a necessary precursor to both the detection of emotion and the attribution of empathy. These two components often combine in a vicious cycle that allows powerful individuals to maintain their status by utilizing their reduced empathetic capacity to perpetually stereotype out-groups and remain in control of the social dynamic. By refusing to take others’ opinions and concerns into account, those in powerful positions are able to “plunge headfirst into action and pursue goals without restraint” (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). Members of the United States Armed Forces were in perpetual positions of power during the occupation of Iraq, where many were tasked with restoring order after the overthrow of Sadaam Hussein. The 320th Military Police Battalion, of which the 372th MP CO was a substituent, was generally responsible for “detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex” that included “accountability, care, and well-being of…detainees, as well as Iraqi criminal prisoners” (Fay, 2004). On a subtler note, the rhetoric of the Bush administration and its subsequent directives portrayed America as the bastion of civilization amidst the barbarism of the Middle East. In the National Security Strategy Statement of 2002, the Bush doctrine stated that “we will actively work to bring the hope of democracy…to every corner of the world” (Bush, 2002). This doctrine is alarming because it fundamentally ignored the notion that citizens of other nations might resist Western hegemony. Even more problematic is the cultural superiority complex that it invited amongst the American diplomats, military officers, and soldiers responsible for supervising the Middle Eastern theater. As seen so far, the elements that permitted the grave abuses at

Abu Ghraib were multifaceted and required significant time to manifest themselves; however, the simple notions of an in-group and an out-group are not sufficient preludes to mass atrocity. In the next three sections, I explore these brain activities further, detailing how the soldiers at Abu Ghraib crossed the ultimate neurological hurdle into the world of torture, perversion, and extreme violence. Empathetic Distress: The Final Roadblock Empathetic distress, defined as a “strong aversive and self-oriented response to the suffering of others,” normally prevents an individual from executing violent acts against another human (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Certain brain regions, including the anterior insula and a section of the anterior cingulate cortex, are activated when an individual senses pain or discomfort. These regions are also active when a participant sees another human in distress; however, this phenomenon is severely diminished if the “other” is not a member of the perceived in-group. While the Iraqi prisoners clearly represented an out-group in the context of war, the fundamental distinction of “human” is still a conceptual in-group that typically prevents violence on an everyday level. Feelings of empathetic distress induce a strong desire to withdraw from a negative situation as a means of self-protection--therefore, humans attempting to commit brutal acts, such as those undertaken at Abu Ghraib, must find a neurological antidote to empathetic distress. The next section serves to explain this method, introducing the concept of dehumanization as the final component necessary to facilitate the soldiers’ violent treatment of Iraqi prisoners. Dehumanization: The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back Dehumanization is often viewed as an extreme manifestation of the aforementioned in-group/out-group distinction. By denying groups or individuals “typically human attributes and a uniquely human nature,” the human brain is able to bypass restraints that would normally hinder violence or torture (Fiske, 2015). Dehumanized groups fail to activate the medial prefrontal cortex, the brain region normally responsible for inferring another’s intentions or predispositions, in would-be perpetrators. Further research suggests that dehumanized groups are perceived in a way that does not afford them the capability of experiencing exclusively social emotion--a trait typically attributed to all individuals by virtue of being human (Harris

& Fiske, 2007). Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill (2015) expand this argument by focusing specifically on blatant dehumanization, an “overt and aggressive” action that “involves openly held beliefs about the inherent inferiority of other groups relative to the in-group.” The “Ascent of Man” scale was developed to quantify blatant dehumanization, where survey participants were asked to rank other groups (Arabs, Japanese, etc.) on a sliding scale between the fourlegged ancestor of humans and modern-day Homo sapiens. Among American participants, Arabs and Muslims were rated 10.6 to 14.10 points, respectively, lower than Americans, and were also ranked lower than all of the other target groups. Additionally, Americans were also more likely to dehumanize Arabs and Muslims after the Boston Marathon bombings, a pattern that likely occurred after the 9/11 attacks as well. Furthermore, blatant dehumanization against Arabs and Muslims was a strong predictor of severely negative retributive outcomes. High levels of dehumanization forecasted a decreased support for Arab immigration, increased support for drone strikes, decreased sympathy towards Arabs and Muslims and, most importantly for the purposes of this paper, an increased support for militaristic counter-terrorism and other violent acts of vengeance. Additionally, the more that survey participants perceived the attacks specifically as a result of Islamic terrorism, the more likely they were to increase their magnitude of blatant dehumanization. Another study reinforced this notion by demonstrating that the degree to which participants dehumanized Muslims correlated to their self-reported likelihood of torturing Muslim prisoners themselves (Vasiljevic & Viki, 2013). These trends were more pronounced for individuals who endorsed group-based hierarchy--the notion that some groups are inherently superior to others. Unsurprisingly, the military is both hierarchy-enforcing and encouraging of anti-egalitarian attitudes, two characteristics correlated with highly biased perceptions of the in-group and increased dehumanization of the out-group (Haley & Sidanius, 2005). Thus, it is plausible to imagine various degrees of dehumanization in the context of Abu Ghraib. In the months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration released a series of memos and directives that harbored many examples of blatantly dehumanizing language. The dangerous amalgam of augmented nationalism, rigidly defined in-groups and out-

groups, an undisputed superiority complex, and the explicitly dehumanizing orders from the highest level of the United States government spawned one of the most explosive displays of unabashed perversion in modern history. The Paper Trail: The Bush administration attempted to preemptively thwart another attack by ordering suspected terrorists to be tried in military commissions not subject to “the principles of law and the rules of evidence…generally recognized…in the United States district courts.” Furthermore, federal district courts were denied habeas jurisdiction over any detainees, which prevented prisoners from challenging their detention before a judge or a court (Philbin, 2001). The memos invalidating the Geneva Conventions for members of AlQaeda or the Taliban are by far the most conspicuous examples of emphatic dehumanization. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions details the expectations for the behavior of signatories, including the United States, in conflicts against parties regardless of whether those parties are signatories or not (Geneva, 1949). Relevant regulations include: (1) Persons taking no active part in hostilities…shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth, or wealth…The following acts are and shall remain prohibited… a. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b. Taking of hostages; c. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; d. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court… The Bush administration’s legal advisers argued that Al-Qaeda was 1) a non-State actor and thus ineligible to claim privileges under the War Crimes Act, 2) not covered by the protections of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and 3) not eligible for treatment as POWs under the Geneva Convention III. The memo extended these arguments to members of the Taliban on the basis that Afghanistan was a “failed state,” invalidating the signature of the Afghan government to all four of the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, the memo argued that “customary international law has no

binding legal effect on either the President or the military,” a notion that President Bush had accepted by February of 2002 (Yoo, 2002; Bush, 2002a). To add insult to injury, the February 26, 2002 memo concluded that statements obtained by military interrogations were admissible in court even without proper Miranda warnings. Despite mentioning in the text of the memo itself that Miranda was a rule “designed to guide the conduct of officials in law enforcement agencies,” Jay S. Bybee of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel argued that it had “no application whatsoever in the context of interrogations of battlefield detainees” (Bybee, 2002a). By late summer, top U.S. officials had acknowledged the illegality of “torture” but had underscored the notion that “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishments” were exempted from judicial scrutiny (emphasis added). This memo also explained that a perpetrator must possess specific intent, a point notoriously difficult to prove, in order to be convicted of torture. Bybee alluded to this in the memo by encouraging military officials to act with “a good faith belief that [your] conduct would not produce the result that the law prohibits…[and] a good faith belief need not be a reasonable one” (Bybee, 2002b). Despite the Justice Department’s feeble attempt to veil torture with euphemisms, the practical implications of their memos were both morally and legally ambiguous. In January of 2003, the Defense Department created a working group to “assess the legal, policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogations of detainees…” (Haynes, 2003). By early April, the Working Group Report argued that it was potentially necessary to “interrogate detainees in a manner beyond that which may be applied to a prisoner of war who is subject to the Geneva Conventions.” Further sections are even more damning, utilizing legal technicalities to ensure plausible deniability as well as to nullify potential allegations of torture. A chart detailing various interrogation methods, including the use of sleep deprivation, forced standing, and removal of clothing, was included as a final note (Walker, 2003). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved the use of these tactics just weeks later, with a stipulation that additional interrogation techniques were available upon direct request to Rumsfeld himself (Rumsfeld, 2003). Each of the aforementioned conditions combined to construct an environment that was dangerously suited to gross violations of ethical conduct. In some ways, the Bush administration was prescient in their attempts to

extricate themselves from guilt. The United States was sure to face criticism abroad for denouncing rules that had governed nearly every armed conflict since World War II, and the Justice Department was correct in assuming that many would not find the threat of terrorism cause enough to undermine the fundamentals of wartime decency. Unfortunately for Yoo, Bybee, Rumsfeld, and many others, these memos relied heavily on dubious legal precedents. The resulting power vacuum may have allowed for the “enhanced interrogations” and coercive treatments considered gospel by the Washington elites, but as the Bush administration would soon discover, far more than semantics was at stake. The Beginning of the End In March of 2004, Major General Antonio Taguba of the Iraqi task force released a report detailing the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. He found that “between October and December 2003…numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees.” He went on to describe cruelties including “keeping [detainees] naked for several days at a time…threatening male detainees with rape… sodomizing a detainee with chemical light…and pouring phosphoric liquid on detainees” (Taguba Report, 2004). By the time the investigation had come to fruition, twenty-seven military and intelligence officials were implicated in the scandal. Eleven soldiers from the 372nd MP CO were either sentenced to prison or courtmartialed, and those further up the chain of command were given a variety of non-criminal punishments (Bejesky, 2013). Even Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld attempted to resign in the wake of the public outrage, but his letter was rejected by President Bush in a move that Rumsfeld later designated “his biggest regret” (Klein, 2011). While the exposure of these grave abuses and the scandal that followed were certainly germane to proper notions of justice, the selfreinforcing nature of dehumanization partially negates the benefits of public accountability. The tendency of an in-group to dehumanize an out-group is intensified by a feeling of collective responsibility for atrocities. The United States Armed Forces and the Bush administration as a whole jointly bore the consequences for the abhorrent events at Abu Ghraib; however, by denying the Iraqi prisoners the same “human essence” afforded to in-group members, feelings of moral distress and/or guilt were reduced or avoided entirely

(Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Simply put, the larger problem of excessive stigmatization and inappropriate dehumanization of Arabs and Muslims remains to be solved. With that being said, the existence of in-groups and out-groups should not be stigmatized or criminalized--the creation of groups is a neurological process that is both fundamental and imperative to assessing immediate and contextual surroundings. However, this distinction becomes problematic when it is improperly grounded in race, ethnicity, religion, or another arbitrary category that invites discrimination, bigotry, or dehumanization. Longstanding beliefs about a particular group can be difficult to change, especially in a military setting, but the following proposals outline potential efforts that could be enacted at both an institutional and individual level. Policy Recommendations: Decreasing Out-Group Entitativity A high level of entitativity, or the perceived unity of an out-group by an in-group, is correlated with an increased intergroup bias and thus high incidences of violence and non-cooperative behavior (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998). Especially in the context of the War on Terror, there is a tendency among Americans, and more broadly Westerners, to view Arabs and Muslims (two descriptors that are erroneously used synonymously) as a distinct outgroup. The work of Salaita (2005) emphasizes the reality that Arab Americans are by no means homogenous--Islam and Christianity are both prevalent religious practices, and many non-Arab Middle Easterners are haphazardly stereotyped into this constructed and largely arbitrary category. The post-9/11 insistence that Arab origins or Muslim beliefs are prerequisites for terrorism facilitates the view that Americans are literally and figuratively at war with an entire faction of the world. Therefore, mandatory coursework or seminars should emphasize the distinction between ethnicity and religion, showcase the various identities within the Middle East (or relevant theater of action), and edit the language surrounding the War on Terror. Research by Cikara, Bruneau, Bavel, & Saxe (2014) demonstrates that cues signaling low group entitativity reduce intergroup hostilities--creating another barrier to prevent the atrocities of Abu Ghraib. Compassion Training As mentioned previously, the human brain is ill-equipped to process the suffering, especially if it is intentionally imposed, of other humans. Known

as empathetic distress, this results in a strong desire to remove oneself from a stressful situation in lieu of helping or providing aid. Importantly, this does not come from a place of selfishness or narcissism; rather, it is a protection mechanism to prevent the onset of “excessive negative feelings” as a result of witnessing particularly traumatizing events (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Compassion also has to do with an individual’s reaction to the pain of others but differs from empathy because it is characterized by a feeling of concern and a desire to improve the suffering person’s situation. Importantly, compassion does not cause anguish in the perceiver, and those who feel compassion (in lieu of empathetic distress) are more likely to aid those in need. The work of Singer & Klimecki (2014) has shown that short-term compassion training modifies neural networks in a way that aims to “cultivate feelings of benevolence towards all human beings” and to increase positive emotions, even in stressful situations. This is not recommended for combat soldiers who must be prepared to kill an enemy--compassion training would likely result in conflicting neural processes that would jeopardize the soldiers’ own prospects of survival. However, for those responsible for guarding prisoners or conducting interrogations, compassion training could provide another neurological hurdle that would allow for forceful behavior but could prevent potential perpetrators from crossing the line into torture. Support for Whistleblowers Arguably, the hierarchal structure of the U.S. military is necessarily rigid in order to maintain composure in war-time conditions. Humans have a strong aversion to exclusion by members of their in-group, and the basic training described in an earlier section helps to create a framework where soldiers are hesitant to deviate from command (Krill & Platek, 2009). However, this rigidity effectively prevented other soldiers at Abu Ghraib from reporting ethics violations and facilitated a coercive environment where soldiers felt that they had no choice but to obey all orders (even those that they deemed morally questionable). For those who did speak up, the initial response was disheartening and critical. Major General Antonio M. Taguba, whose report first detailed the internal abuses of power at Abu Ghraib, faced criticism for actions that are now widely viewed as heroic and necessary (Lankford, 2009). Sargent Joseph Darby, responsible for turning photographic evidence over to the proper authorities, was called a “traitor” and accused of “[letting] his fellow

soldiers and the U.S. military down” (Cooper, 2006). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld set the tone for treatment of whistleblowers by marginalizing both Major General Taguba and Sgt. Darby. On the eve of Rumsfeld’s testimony before the Senate and the House Armed Services Committee, Taguba was summoned to the Pentagon and greeted with mocking statements such as “Here…comes…that famous General Taguba—of the Taguba Report!” (Hersh, 2007). Rumsfeld is himself responsible for the publication of Sgt. Darby’s name, when he “thanked” him for the release of the photos in an open Congressional hearing (Hylton, 2006). Such treatment from the upper echelon of the military discourages reports of legitimately concerning or illegal behavior--a pattern that must be broken in order to prevent additional human rights violations and protect the international reputation of the United States. Conclusion The Abu Ghraib Prison Facility was one of the world’s most infamous penitentiaries during the era of Sadaam Hussein. It was known for its decrepit living conditions and weekly executions; yet the United States, a nation supposedly saving the Iraqis from the villainous wrath of authoritarianism, transformed Abu Ghraib into a U.S. military prison housing atrocities no less heinous or vitriolic than before. In this paper, I have rejected most of the current literature on the Abu Ghraib scandal, refuting the attribution of sole responsibility to either the individual soldiers or to those in the upper ranks of the Bush administration. Instead, I’ve explained the events at Abu Ghraib from a neuro-political perspective, integrating nationalist fervor, rigidly defined in-groups, the U.S. military superiority complex, and the blatantly dehumanizing language of the “torture memos” to explain how the soldiers of the 372nd MP CO were able to debase the very fundamentals of human dignity. The War on Terror is far from over, and a conflict as vaguely defined as this one will surely be fraught with future controversies and much debate over the utility of such a term. However, there are many opportunities for improvement in order to prevent another scandal as detrimental as Abu Ghraib. The implementation of policies that dismantle pervasive stereotypes, extend the appreciation of human essence, and provide institutional support for whistleblowers will aid the United States government in its quest to redeem its reputation and re-define global conflict.

As a concluding note, the ramifications of the political neuroscience detailed in this paper must be fully addressed. There is a tendency in the scientific world to heavily extrapolate these findings, often attempting to explain â&#x20AC;&#x153;the nature of human natureâ&#x20AC;? in a metaphysical and largely speculative manner. However, the neurological phenomena explored in this paper do not excuse the members of the 372nd MP CO from individual liability. There were many other personnel, both in Iraq and around the world, who operated under similar conditions but did not abuse prisoners in such sadistic and inappropriate ways. This paper is an exploration of context, not a voucher for clemency--viewing it as such would be the gravest abuse of all.

Bibliography The Army Values. (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://www.army.mil/values/ Bejesky, R. (2013). The Abu Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage of Justice. Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal, 32(2), p. 103-176. Benjamin, M., & Scherer, M. (2006, March). The Abu Ghraib Files. Salon. Retrieved from http://www.salon.com/topic/the_abu_ghraib_files/ Bush, G.W. (2001). George W. Bush Addresses Muslims in the Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks. Retrieved from https://berkleycentergeorgetown. edu/quotes/george-w-bush-addresses-muslims-in-the-aftermath-of the-9-11-attacks Bush, G.W. (2002a). Human Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees [Memorandum], in The Torture Papers, p. 134-135. Bush, G.W. (2002b). â&#x20AC;&#x153;The National Security Strategy Statement of 2002,â&#x20AC;? The US State Department. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/63562.pdf Bybee, J.S. (2002a). Potential Legal Constraints Applicable to Interrogations of Persons Captured by U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan [Memorandum], in The Torture Papers, p. 144-171. Bybee, J.S. (2002b). Standards of Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A [Memorandum], in The Torture Papers, p. 172 217. Carter, T.J., Ferguson, M.J., Hassin, R.R. (2011). Implicit Nationalism as System Justification: The Case of the United States of America. Social Cognition, 29(3), 341-359. Castano, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2006). Not Quite Human: Infrahumanization in Response to Collective Responsibility for Intergroup Killing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(5), 804-818. Cikara, M., Bruneau, E.G., Saxe, R. (2011). Us and them: Intergroup failures of empathy. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 149-153. Cikara, M., Bruneau, E., Van Bavel, J.J., Saxe, R. (2014). Their pain gives us pleasure: How intergroup dynamics shape empathetic failures and counter-empathetic responses. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 55, 110-125.

Cooper, A. (2006, December 7). Exposing the Truth of Abu Ghraib. Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/exposing-the truth-of-abu-ghraib/3/ Eisenberg, N., Shea, C.L., Carlo, G., & Knight, G.P. (1991). Empathy related responding and cognition: A chicken and the egg dilemma. In W.M. Kurtines (Ed.), Handbook of moral behavior and development: Vol 2: Research (63-88). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Executive Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 13 November 2001, in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 25-28. Fay, G.R. (2004). AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib detention facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. Retrieved 4/28/2017 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/ reports/2004/intell-abu-ghraib_ar15-6.pdf Ferguson, M.J., Carter, T.J., Hassin, R.R. (2009). On the Automaticity of Nationalist Ideology: The Case of the USA. In J.T. Jost, A.C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification (53-85). New York City, NY: Oxford University Press. Fiske, S.T. (2015). Dehumanization. Brain Mapping: An Encyclopedic Reference (201-203). London: Academic Press. Gaertner, L., & Schopler, J. (1998). Perceived in-group entitativity and intergroup bias: An interconnection of self and others. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 963-980. Galinsky, A.D., Magee, J.C., Inesi, M.E., & Gruenfeld, D.H. (2006). Power and Perspectives Not Taken. Association for Psychological Science, 17(12), 1068-1074. Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, Retrieved from http://www.un-documents.net/ gc-3.htm Guinote, A. (2007). Power affects basic cognition: Increased attentional inhibition and flexibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 685-697. Haley, H., Sidanius, J. (2005). Person-Organization Congruence and the Maintenance of Group-Based Social Hierarchy: A Social

Dominance Perspective. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 8(2): 187-203. Harris, L.T., & Fiske, S.T. (2007). Social groups that elicit disgust are differentially processed in mPFC. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2, 45-51. Haynes, W.J. (2003). Working Group to Assess Legal, Policy, and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism [Draft Memorandum], in The Torture Papers, p. 240. Hersh, S.M. (2007, June 25). The General’s Report. Retrieved from http:/ /www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/06/25/the-generals-report Hylton, W.S. (2006, July 31). Prisoner of Conscience. Retrieved from http://www.gq.com/story/joe-darby-abu-ghraib Klein, R. (2011). Donald Rumsfeld to Diane Sawyer: ‘Would’ve Been Better Off If I Had’ Resigned Post-Abu Ghraib. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/rumsfeld-sawyer-abc-exclusive wouldve-off-resigned-post/story?id=12862090 Krill, A., Platelek, S.M. (2009). In-group and out-group membership mediates anterior cingulate activation to social exclusion. Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience, 1, 1-7. Kteily, N., Bruneau, E., Waytz, A., Cotterill, S. (2015). The Ascent of Man: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for Blatant Dehumanization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109(5), 901-931. Kteily, N., Hodson, G., Bruneau, E. (2016). They See Us as Less Than Human: Metadehumanization Predicts Intergroup Conflict via Reciprocal Dehumanization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110(3), 343-370. Lankford, A. (2009). Promoting aggression and violence at Abu Ghraib: The U.S. military’s transformation of ordinary people into torturers. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 14, 388-395. Leidner, B., Castano, E., & Ginges, J. (2013). Dehumanization, retributive and restorative justice, and aggressive versus diplomatic intergroup conflict resolution strategies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39: 181-192.

Li, Q., & Brewer, M.B. (2004). What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism, Nationalism, and American Identity after 9/11. Political Psychology, 25(5), 727-739. Mastroianni, G.R. (2013). Looking Back: Understanding Abu Ghraib. Parameters, 43(2), 153-166. Miles, D. (2006). Five Years after 9/11, Recruiting, Retention Remain Solid. Retrieved 4/30/2017 from http://archive.defense.gov/news/ newsarticle.aspx?id=823. Murphy, J. (2003). â&#x20AC;&#x153;Our Mission and Our Momentâ&#x20AC;?: George W. Bush and September 11th. Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 6(4), 607-632. Philbin, P.F. (2001). Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [Memorandum], in The Torture Papers, p. 29-37. Rumsfeld, D. (2003). Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism [Memorandum], in The Torture Papers, p. 360-365. Salaita, S.G. (2005). Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism: Arab Americans Before and After 9/11. Project Muse, 146-168. Singer, T., & Klimecki, O.M. (2014). Empathy and compassion. Current Biology, 24(18), R875-R878. Smith, R.H., Powell, C.A.J., Combs, D.J.Y., & Schurtz, R.D. (2009). Exploring the when and why of Schadenfreude. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3, 530-546. Strasser, S. (2004). The Abu Ghraib Investigations. New York, NY: Perseus Books Group. Taguba, A.M. (2004). The Taguba Report: Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, in The Torture Papers, p. 406 465. Vasiljevic, M. & Viki, G.T. (2013). Dehumanization, moral disengagement, and public attitudes to crime and punishment. In: Bain, Paul G., Vaes, J. and Leyens, J-Ph. (Ed.), Humanness and dehumanization. Psychology Press, Hove. Walker, M. (2003). Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assesment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations [Draft Memorandum], in The Torture Papers, p. 286-359.

Yoo, J. (2002). Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees [Draft Memorandum], in The Torture Papers, p. 38-79.

A "Twin Study" on Development: The Post-Independence Cases of Rwanda and Burundi By Ilana Shapiro About the Author Ilana Shapiro is a 4th year student from Arlington, Virginia, studying Foreign Affairs and Economics with a French minor. She is particularly interested in development policy and is planning to serve in the Peace Corps, working with youth in Morocco, after graduation. Foreward Ilana Shapiro was in my class Politics of Developing Areas (PLCP 3012) in the fall 2017. The course is a survey of government and politics in the “Global South.” It concentrates on the rule of political elites and their sources of power. In addition, it examines processes of democratization and national integration, as well as patterns of economic development, foreign financial penetration, and social inequalities in the context of “globalization.” The course studies also how race, gender, and class structure the domestic and world order. Finally, a few case studies are presented to illustrate and explain successes and failures in national development. The lectures tend to offer a broad perspective on these varied themes. However, I encourage students to test the utility of these broad perspectives by writing papers on a topic of their own choosing. The idea is to give students the opportunity to choose a subject that excites their intellectual curiosity and interests. They can choose a broad question such as the relationship between colonialism and development, or

a more specific problem faced by a single or several countries. The ultimate goal is to give students the analytical tools to begin to understand problems of “development,” poverty, and inequalities affecting our world. Ilana decided to compare the developmental path of Rwanda and Burundi, two countries that are very similar and whose complicated histories are difficult to separate. Ilana used the “twin studies” methodology to understand how and why in spite of this similar history, Rwanda and Burundi have diverged politically and economically over the past 30 years. While Rwanda has been called by some a “success story,” Burundi has stagnated and remained extremely poor. To explain this divergence, Ilana compared and contrasted the leadership styles of Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, and Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza. While both rulers tend to be authoritarian, they created different political systems to deal with their countries’ endemic ethnic conflicts and imposed contrasting sets of economic policies to extricate their societies from underdevelopment. The paper is elegantly and succinctly argued; it offers cogent if not definitive answers to the diverging trajectories of Rwanda and Burundi. Robert Fatton Abstract Today, 55 years after their independence from Belgium, “twins” Rwanda and Burundi have experienced diverging developmental paths despite sharing many similarities. Evaluated using a “twin study” approach by holding colonial history, geography, and ethnic composition constant, four factors account for Rwanda’s greater developmental progress: societal structure, current leadership, legacy of civil war, and foreign assistance. The post-civil war societal structure of Rwanda emphasizes national over ethnic identity and deliberately avoids racial quotas in government, while in Burundi, a consociational approach emphasizes ethnic differences and keeps the legacy of ethnic violence relevant. The leaders of each country take differing approaches to development, with Rwanda’s Kagame emphasizing growth in development indicators and investment in urban areas and Burundi’s Nkurniziza enabling a corrupt civil society. Civil war ended in Rwanda in 1994 but continued to destabilize Burundi until 2003. Rwanda has attracted international investment that further propels economic growth and keeps it accountable to progress, while the aid Burundi receives supports its national

budget but is not focused on long-term development. The “twin” nature of Rwanda and Burundi means that they cannot be approached separately: lessons learned from the success of one are transferrable to the other, and conflict in one state inevitably spills into its neighbor. Although the World Bank predicts that only Rwanda will become a middle-income country by 2020, Burundi still has the opportunity to catch up to its “twin” if it can focus on ending corruption and militia violence while attracting progress-oriented development assistance. Introduction Rwanda and Burundi are both East African states located in the Great Lakes region of Africa (Van Leeuwen 2008, 394). On a map, Rwanda and Burundi appear similar in size and topography (see Index 1); indeed, both share a similar climate, population size, and traditional pattern of societal organization in farming villages (Paxton 2012). These two states also share colonial history: first under German control after the Berlin Conference of 1885, then governed jointly as the kingdom of Ruanda-Urundi when the Belgians took control of the region in 1923. Both nations earned their independence in 1962 (East Africa Living Encyclopedia n.d.), and both are ethnically 15% Tutsi and 85% Hutu (Gaffey 2016). Rwanda and Burundi are so similar that many scholars believe that they “cannot be understood independently” (Lemarchand 1994, 585). Twin studies are a type of methodological design that allow researchers to evaluate developmental outcomes by holding genetic factors constant, so any differences can be attributed to the impacts of external factors (Monslisha and Prasuna 2016). While twin studies are traditionally used by psychologists and behavioral geneticists, the unique structure of this experimental design can be generalized to approach research in other disciplines. Due to their shared colonial experience, similar geography, and ethnic makeup, this paper can evaluate Rwanda and Burundi using a twin study approach. Today, 55 years after their independence from Belgium, Rwanda and Burundi have witnessed diverging developmental paths despite the fact that they continue to share many similarities. This paper will define developmental outcome on the basis of several economic indicators: UN Human Development Index Rank (2015), GDP per capita (in US dollars), and percentage of the population below the poverty line. In all of these indicators, Rwanda appears

to be more developed than Burundi. This paper will evaluate the independent variables contributing to this outcome, arguing that several factors contribute to Rwanda’s developmental success over Burundi, its “twin.” Table 1. Developmental Outcomes by Country

What factors account for higher progress in developmental economic outcomes today in Rwanda than in Burundi? The results of a “twin study” approach holding colonial history, geography, and ethnic composition constant make it clear that four factors account for Rwanda’s greater developmental progress: societal structure, current leadership, legacy of civil war, and foreign assistance. There are three dependent variables that serve to measure development: the UN Human Development Index Rank (2015), GDP per capita (in US dollars), and the percentage of the population below the poverty line that all indicate greater progress in Rwanda than in Burundi. Factors held constant are colonial history, geography, and ethnic composition. This paper will examine each of the four independent variables--societal structure, current leadership, legacy of civil war, and foreign assistance--and assess how each contributes to the dependent variables of higher development in Rwanda than Burundi, and then proceed to draw conclusions from this analysis. The “twin study” approach to Rwanda and Burundi is not unique to this paper; it has been used in prior research on comparisons between the two. However, this paper takes an original approach to the scale of analysis and variables included when using this methodology. Social Structure Rwanda’s emphasis on national, rather than ethnic, identity since the end of their civil war has been a driver of economic progress in the nation, while Burundi’s explicit recognition of its different ethnic groups keeps tensions present and suppresses growth. The populations of both Rwanda and Burundi are comprised of two ethnic groups, the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. During the period

of Belgian colonial rule, the two states were governed jointly, with the Tutsis explicitly favored by the colonizers. As a result of this colonial structure, both countries experienced ethnic violence after independence. One of the most well-known episodes of genocide in the twentieth century occurred in Rwanda, and similar periods of genocide and massacre occurred during the same time period in Burundi (Paxton 2012). While the common experience of ethnic violence is shared between the two countries, they took different approaches to establishing peace and avoiding further ethnic clashes. Rwanda’s approach to its ethnic makeup and legacy of violence is to stress national identity and ignore ethnic differences. Paxton, who calls this approach to social structure “assimilationist,” characterizes the degree to which the topic of ethnic differences is avoided as “self-censoring.” There is no explicit recognition of different ethnic groups in the country’s constitution, and no rules for the proportions of Hutu and Tutsi representation in government (Paxton 2012). By contrast, Burundi takes the opposite approach to its legacy of ethnic clashes: its 2003 ceasefire agreement after a bloody civil war explicitly recognized ethnic differences and mandated that the National Assembly be 40% Tutsi and 60% Hutu. Furthering the divide, even police and military have ethnic quotas meant to ensure a voice for the Tutsi minority. The social situation is one of separate coexistence (Paxton 2012). Burundi’s shared-power approach reflects a consociational structure, where political representation is shared to ensure representation for all parties. Its state structure is based on “explicit recognition of ethnic differences” (Lemarchand 2007, 4). However, Rwanda has seen more economic success and social stability with an assimilationist approach. While Burundi’s society is structured to remind citizens of their ethnic differences, Rwanda emphasizes shared identity factors. This approach shifts focus away from historical disputes and ethnic animosity, thus allowing the country to put ethnic differences aside while working toward economic growth and progress. Meanwhile, Burundi’s social structure ensures that ethic differences remain relevant, which prevents them from reaching common development goals. When ethnic tensions are kept present, incentives to work with those of another ethnic group are suppressed, and constant reminders of ethnic violence reduce economic activity in public areas.

Leadership Rwanda’s Paul Kagame is development-oriented, while Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza is focused on short-term projects and allows corruption to persist. These differences in leadership style help to explain Rwanda’s economic progress over Burundi. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has been in office for seventeen years. He is a popular leader in Rwanda and has earned international praise in the past “for the stability and economic development he has brought Rwanda since the 1994 genocide” (Burke 2017). Under Kagame’s leadership, infant mortality and poverty levels have fallen dramatically, while literacy rates have improved. Recently, however, Kagame has drawn criticism for his decision to run for a third term in office after proposing a constitutional amendment to end the two-term limit on holding presidential office. He won the 2017 election with 99% of the vote, and a female opponent was disqualified from running against him, which drew skepticism of the legitimacy of the election. Kagame continues to be a popular leader among Rwandan citizens despite these critiques (Burke 2017). Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza is not a development-oriented or popular leader like Kagame. He came to power after the end of the civil war, and was initially liked by constituents for bringing peace to Burundi as a former rebel leader (Williams 2015). He is known as the “avocado president” for his interest in planting avocado trees all over the country (Paxton 2012). He spends most of his time in rural areas, lending to his unpopularity in the capital city region. Further, Nkurunziza has faced criticism from international human rights groups for many years because of his dictatorial tendencies and refusal to cede power. In 2014, he attempted to amend the constitution to expand the power of his own Hutu party by eliminating the designated seat requirement for Tutsi representatives. In 2015, he announced his bid for a third re-election, which ignited protests and caused 100,000 Burundians to flee to neighboring countries, including Rwanda. This was followed by an attempted coup, which was put down and caused increasing government repression. Over forty opposition parties stand against Mr. Nkurunziza (Williams 2015). Corruption under Nkurunziza is also a major issue in Burundi (Hamman 2012, 59), which placed 159 out of 176 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index in 2016. This index ranks all the

countries in the world by how corrupt their citizens perceive the government to be, where first is the least corrupt by perception; Rwanda placed 54th (Transparency International 2017). Impunity is a consequence of widespread corruption, resulting in the majority of ethnically-motivated crimes committed in Burundi from 2002 to 2012 going unpunished by the state law enforcement system (Hamman 2012, 58). Corruption and lack of rule of law stifle economic progress, as there are fewer incentives to make money just to pay taxes that end up in the pockets of corrupt officials. Without freedom from fear of ethnic violence due to lack of rule of law, citizens are fearful of public spaces that would otherwise be centers for economic development and exchange. Thus, while both leaders continue to share some characteristics-notably that they both won a third term in office despite widespread opposition--Rwanda’s Paul Kagame is more development-oriented, pushing for economic growth and reforms that have helped propel Rwanda to progress in many development indicators. Growth in the literacy rate and political stability has made room for economic growth and progress around the country. Burundi’s Nkurunziza has not emphasized urban development and chooses to pursue policies that bring short-term popular approval. His choice to run again in 2015 and the ensuing coup have destabilized the country for the first time since the end of its civil war in 2003, and corruption and lack of law enforcement contribute to instability and suppress innovation. Consequently, under the leadership of Kagame, Rwanda has seen developmental progress and GDP growth, while under Nkurunziza, Burundi has stagnated and seen a decline in GDP growth due to instability and lack of rule of law. This partly explains Rwanda’s higher rank on the Human Development Index. Civil War While Rwanda’s civil war ended in 1994, Burundi’s continued until 2003, giving Rwanda a ten-year head start to begin development while Burundi continues to deal with violence. A civil war began in Rwanda in 1990 when rebel Tutsi invaded from Uganda; a cease-fire was signed a year later, creating a new constitution. At the 1993 Arusha Accords, the civil war officially ended, and the parties established a transitional government designed to share power among the groups represented in Rwanda (East Africa Living Encyclopedia n.d.). Ethnic violence broke out again in 1994 when the presidents of Rwanda and

Burundi were killed by a surface-to-air missile; this began the Rwandan genocide that left over 800,000 dead, mostly Tutsis killed by Hutu extremists (Gaffey 2016). With UN intervention, the genocide was put to an end in 1995 (East Africa Living Encyclopedia n.d.). Since the end of the genocide, Rwanda has been relatively politically stable, with no further episodes of ethnic violence (Paxton 2012). The Burundian president was alongside his Rwandan counterpart in the 1994 plane shooting, and his death sparked ethnic violence in Burundi as well. A 1995 massacre of Hutu refugees from Rwanda led to renewed violence in the capital city. Some parties proposed a cease-fire in 2000, but two main Hutu groups refused to sign. The fighting intensified until 2003, when a major rebel assault launched on the capital city led to an agreement between the transitional President Ndayizeye and rebel group leader Nkurunziza to end the war. In 2004, the UN peacekeeping mission stepped in to ensure the end of the civil war (BBC News 2017). Overall, around 300,000 people died in the conflict (Paxton 2012). In Burundi today, militia groups, including the youth group Imbonerakure, remain active from the civil war era and regularly carry out executions, tortures, and other atrocities on the orders of Nkurunziza (Williams 2015). In 2015, renewed violence during Nkurunziza’s third re-election bid caused 260,000 refugees to flee to neighboring states (Graham-Harrison 2016). Civil wars such as these severely stunt development progress. Conflicts destroy physical and human capital, create refugees and displaced people that cannot contribute to the economy, limit supply flows, and pull government resources away from development objectives (Murdoch and Sandler 2002. Though both Rwanda and Burundi experienced devastating civil wars in the twentieth century, Rwanda’s conflict ended almost a decade before that of Burundi. While Rwanda has seen peace and stability since the end of violence in 1994, Burundi continues to see lasting violence from the civil war period, with militia groups continuing to perpetrate ethnic violence. This manifested most directly in the renewed unrest in 2015 surrounding the presidential election. The ten-year advantage that Rwanda has over Burundi to focus on investment in development and infrastructure contributes to its developmental progress over Burundi, evidenced by the poverty reduction metrics--over half of Burundi’s population (64.6% in 2014) lives below the poverty line, in comparison to Rwanda’s 39.1% in 2015 (Central Intelligence

Agency 2018). Burundi’s ongoing turmoil has been a “handbrake” on its development when compared with Rwanda (Paxton 2012). Foreign Aid Stability and strong leadership has attracted foreign aid to Rwanda, while high risk and low returns makes Burundi an unfavorable aid recipient. In Rwanda, Kagame’s leadership and resulting political stability has brought foreign aid money to the country, promoting economic development. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which view Rwanda’s political stability and 64% female representation in its parliament favorably, have supported its development over the past decade. Rwanda’s development goals are outlined in a World Bank plan called “Vision 2020,” which seeks to turn it into a service economy with middle-income status by 2020 with the help of international aid institutions. The World Bank commends Rwanda’s “remarkable development successes,” recent drops in the poverty rate and Gini coefficient, and its focus on meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Other international institutions, such as the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, have invested in projects in Rwanda in support of the World Bank’s development plan (World Bank 2017, “The World Bank in Rwanda”). Burundi does not receive the same accolades from the World Bank, though it is still the recipient of aid money from international institutions and is reliant on foreign aid money for half of its yearly budget (Santora 2015). The World Bank outlines several alarming measures in Burundi’s development, including ranking last on the 2013 Global Hunger Index and being one of the five poorest countries in the world (World Bank 2017, “The World Bank in Burundi”). World Bank’s strategy in Burundi focuses on agricultural development, infrastructure, energy, and governance, while contending with renewed violence and the “transition from a post-conflict to a developing economy” (International Development Association and International Finance Corporation 2012). Long-term development projects and goal-oriented development are not part of the World Bank’s involvement in Burundi. While the World Bank praises Rwanda’s development and created a comprehensive plan to support its transition to a middle-income country by 2020, its strategy in Burundi is that of the maintenance of basic human needs

rather than investment in developmental and economic progress. The social structure, leadership, and civil war outcome variables have caused these two countries, which started at the same point in 1962, to diverge, leading to sole investment in Rwanda’s development by international financial institutions. This will serve to widen the developmental differences between the two countries and the gap between their rankings on the Human Development Index, as projects and investment will continue flow to Rwanda over Burundi. However, this has also meant that Rwanda’s external debt in 2016 was $2.442 billion, compared to Burundi’s $705.2 million--37.6% and 15.2% of GDP, respectively (Trading Economics 2018). The accumulation of higher debt reflects the increased investment in Rwanda, but historical studies of high debt in third world countries--a situation that led to a crisis in the 1980s--provide cause for concern (Hurt 2015). If debt levels grow but economic activity begins to stagnate, Rwanda may find itself in a situation where it is unable to pay back its investors and must default or restructure its debt. With lower levels of debt, Burundi is safer from this outcome. Conclusions and Limitations The “twin study” approach to evaluating the causal factors for economic differences that exist today in the development of Rwanda and Burundi provides several explanatory variables for Rwanda’s higher levels of economic development, as indicated by its higher Human Development Index Ranking, higher GDP per capita, and lower population proportion living in poverty, relative to Burundi (see Index 2). First, the countries approach the issue of ethnic coexistence differently. The post-civil war societal structure of Rwanda emphasizes national over ethnic identity and deliberately avoids racial quotas in government, while in Burundi, a consociational approach that is meant to ensure representation for both Hutu and Tutsis in government emphasizes ethnic differences and keeps the legacy of ethnic violence relevant today. Second, the leaders of each country take differing approaches to development, with Rwanda’s Kagame emphasizing growth in development indicators and investment in urban areas and Burundi’s Nkurniziza overseeing a corrupt civil society with a lack of rule of law. Third, civil war ended in Rwanda in 1994 but continued in Burundi until 2003, with militia groups continuing to terrorize civilians and contributing to a renewed outbreak of conflict in 2015. Finally, stability

in Rwanda has attracted international investment that further propels economic growth and keeps Rwanda accountable to progress, while the aid Burundi receives supports its national budget but is not focused on longterm development. The World Bank predicts that Rwanda will become a middle-income country by 2020, but projects no such future for Burundi. The “twin” nature of Rwanda and Burundi also means that they cannot be approached separately. For one, lessons learned from the success of one are transferrable to the other, given their similar historical and geographic context. Similarly, conflict in one state inevitably spills into the other, with refugee flows, regional trade disruption, and intervention by one in the other’s political affairs. Lastly, comparisons between Burundi and Rwanda and lessons learned from their divergent development are similar to situations in countries that share core history, geographic factors, and demography: Kosovo and Albania or Tunisia and Algeria, for example. While the “twin study” approach provides several insights into factors leading to differences in outcomes between Rwanda and Burundi, it is important to note that this approach has many limitations. This approach rests on the assumption that the two states began in 1962 at exactly the same place; in reality, there are historical differences between the two states that began before the period of colonialism, which are beyond the scope of analysis in this paper. Other variables than those identified may also be responsible for developmental differences between the two states, especially external factors. Furthermore, many indicators still remain the same between the “twins.” Both have leaders that have sought a third term in office despite opposition; both have extremely high population density and growing populations; and both have begun to escalate animosity towards the other in recent years. In addition, this paper assumes that three economic indicators indicate higher development today in Rwanda, which merely act as proxy measures and may not capture the entire situation and comparison between the development of the two countries. Thus, this approach has many limitations and cannot explain or account for all of the current differences in development between Rwanda and Burundi. Based on current trends, these two countries that began as “twins” after 1962 will continue to diverge on their development paths. Investment in Rwanda will propel it ahead of Burundi, which is likely to continue to stagnate under current leadership and unstable social conditions. This wasn’t

always the case: ten years ago, Burundi was the model of hope between the two based on its shared-power structure (Lemarchand 2007, 4). Yet, in the past ten years, Rwanda has moved far ahead of Burundi in terms of economic development, indicating the importance of leadership, stability, and resulting investment. Large changes in the relatively short term may mean that Burundi still has the opportunity to catch up to its â&#x20AC;&#x153;twin,â&#x20AC;? if it can focus on ending corruption and militia violence and attract progressoriented development assistance.

Index 1 Map of Rwanda and Burundi

Source: Google Maps (made with qGIS software) Index 2 Rwanda and Burundi Economic Development Indicators

Source: CIA Factbook, United Nations Development Programme

Bibliography BBC News. 2017. “Burundi Profile - Timeline.” August 7, 2017. www.bbc. com/news/world-africa-13087604. Burke, Jason. 2017. “Paul Kagame Re-Elected President with 99% of Vote in Rwanda Election.” The Guardian, August 5, 2017. Central Intelligence Agency. 2018. “CIA World Factbook.” Last modified February 22, 2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the world-factbook/. Daily Monitor. 2012. “Rwanda and Burundi: Neighbours Worlds Apart.” July 22, 2012. http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/ Rwanda-and-Burundi--Neighbours-world-apart/689844-1459934 s4s8uoz/index.html. East Africa Living Encyclopedia. n.d. “Rwanda - History.” Last accessed March 3, 2018. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/rwhistory.htm. Gaffey, Conor. 2016. “How Burundi and Rwanda Became East Africa's Bad Neighbors.” Newsweek, June 13, 2016. Graham-Harrison, Emma. 2016. “The World Looks Away as Blood Flows in Burundi.” The Observer, April 10, 2016. Hamann, H. 2012. "Can Decentralisation Contribute to Promoting Rule-Of-Law Structures? The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi as Examples." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 15, no. 2 (June): 32-68. EBSCOhost. Hurt, Stephen R. 2015. “Third World debt.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Last modified on November 29, 2016. International Development Association and International Finance Corporation. 2012. “Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Burundi for the Period FY13-16.” September 18, 2012.http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/490171468238758418/ pdf/723340CAS0P1280Official0Use0Only090.pdf. Lemarchand, René. 1994. “Managing Transition Anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi, and South Africa in Comparative Perspective.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 32, no. 4: 581 – 604. JSTOR. Lemarchand, René. 2007. “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the

Congo.” African Affairs 106, no. 422 (January): 1 – 20. Murdoch, James C., and Todd Sandler. 2002. “Civil Wars and Economic Growth: A Regional Comparison.” Defence and Peace Economics 13, no. 6 (December): 451 – 464. Paxton, Will. 2012. “Rwanda's ‘Evil Twin.’” Prospect Magazine, March 19, 2012. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/rwanda burundi-genocide-peace. Sahu, Monalisha, and Josyula G Prasuna. 2016. “Twin Studies: A Unique Epidemiological Tool.” Indian Journal of Community Medicine 41, no. 3: 177 – 182. PMC. Santora, Marc. 2015. “Fragile Burundi Casts a Wary Eye on Rwanda.” The New York Times, August 3, 2015. Trading Economics. 2018. “Burundi Government Debt to GDP.” Last accessed on March 13, 2018. Transparency International. 2017. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.” January 25, 2017. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/ corruption_perceptions_index_2016. United Nations Development Programme. 2016. “Human Development Reports." Last accessed on November 29, 2017. Van Leeuwen, Mathijs. 2008. “Imagining the Great Lakes Region: Discourses and Practices of Civil Society Regional Approaches for Peacebuilding in Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 46, no. 3: 393 – 426. JSTOR. Williams, Hugo. 2015. “Burundi's President Pierre Nkurunziza in Profile.” BBC News, October 14, 2015. World Bank. 2017. “The World Bank in Burundi: Overview.” Last modified October 31, 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burundi/ overview. World Bank. 2017. “The World Bank in Rwanda: Overview.” Last modified November 6, 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/ overview.

The Legacy of Getúlio Vargas' Nation Building Policies and the Resulting Role of the White Man in Brazil's Indigenous Development By mariana brazao About the Author Mariana Brazao is a third year in the College of Arts and Sciences pursuing a double major in Foreign Affairs and Latin American Studies, as well as a minor in Portuguese. She is an immigrant from Portugal and is particularly interested in the question of minority population inclusion into Brazil’s political institutional structures. On grounds, Mariana has conducted research for the Portuguese Department, is an Honor Support Officer, and Marketing Chair for Third Year Council. Foreward Mariana Brazao was in my class Politics of Developing Areas (PLCP 3012) in the fall 2017. The course is a survey of government and politics in the “Global South.” It concentrates on the rule of political elites and their sources of power. In addition, it examines processes of democratization and national integration, as well as patterns of economic development, foreign financial penetration, and social inequalities in the context of “globalization.” The course studies also how race, gender, and class structure the domestic and world order. Finally, a few case studies are presented to illustrate and explain successes and failures in national development. The lectures tend to offer a broad perspective on these varied themes. However, I encourage students to

test the utility of these broad perspectives by writing papers on a topic of their own choosing. The idea is to give students the opportunity to choose a subject that excites their intellectual curiosity and interests. They can choose a broad question such as the relationship between colonialism and development, or a more specific problem faced by a single or several countries. The ultimate goal is to give students the analytical tools to begin to understand problems of “development,” poverty, and inequalities affecting our world. Mariana’s paper is an interesting study of how Getúlio Vargas’ authoritarian “New State” sought to further the national integration of Brazil in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Vargas’ project was to conquer and civilize the “interior” of the country by bringing to the indigenous people and the territory they occupied “development” and “modernity.” The project, however, contributed to the marginalization of the indigenous populations because they were never consulted about Vargas’ “civilizing” policies. Based on a rather paternalistic and racist foundation, these policies of national integration tended to undermine the political rights and culture of the indigenous populations. Mariana points out that while in the post-Vargas era, successive governments have improved the conditions of these populations, their quest for full and equal citizenship in a multicultural Brazil has yet to materialize. Robert Fatton

Abstract Dating back to the times of Portuguese colonization, the indigenous population of Brazil has served as a prop to a larger state developmental policy goal. Policies regarding the indigenous population have continuously discriminated against their political rights, barring them from full inclusion into Brazil’s society. With the rise of the Getúlio Vargas’ authoritarian “New State” regime in 1937 came a solidified nationalist policy aimed at developing the interior of Brazil. The rhetoric and policies instituted during this period had profound impacts on the indigenous population, locking them into a system where their only political savior became the white man who decided to take up enough interest in their cause. Under current President Michael Temer the political rights of this population have come under fire. Long court cases battling the rights to land claims and titles have further propelled the issue. This paper thus seeks to examine critically the policies instituted under Vargas’ regime to help explain the fragmentation of indigenous political rights

Brazil, as an idea, exemplifies the legacies of a European colonial past, the introduction of the African population through slavery, and the edenic qualities stemming from the Amazonian region and its indigenous population. With these three very separate and distinct identities and cultures, the concept of Brazil as a nation is still heavily contested and in constant formation. For most of Brazil’s history, no direct government attempt was made to try to crystallize its identity, that is, until Getulio Vargas’ regime. Vargas’ desire to explore the “interior” of Brazil for developmental purposes brought one specific population to the limelight, the indigenous. In an attempt to rebrand Brazil’s social imaginary to favor one of nation building, the indigenous population would serve as a prop to a larger goal, locking them into a misfortunate faith that still precedes them today. Following this line of thought, my argument to be presented in this paper is such, that the Vargas regime’s famously tag-lined “New State” (Novo Estado) instituted the first policies for nation-building that prioritized Brazil’s development at the expense of indigenous rights. The ideological practices set forth during this period (1937-1945) would have a rippling and lasting effect, classifying the indigenous population as subordinate peoples and leaving their only hope for political representation to the white man who decides to take enough interest in their cause. In analyzing three of the most pertinent policies for indigenous population’s rights in Brazil – the creation of FUNAI (National Indian Foundation), the establishment of the Xingu National Park, and the 1988 Constitution’s “Temporal Mark Clause” (Clausa Marco Temporal) – I will exemplify this causal link between the impact of a state’s development policy on a subordinate population’s political rights and the limitations of having an “outsider” as your political savior. In a brief historical overview, the tension between indigenous population’s political rights dates back to Portuguese colonial territorial expansion and can be followed to the founding of the Vargas regime. A historical narrative “of a westward moving frontier constantly pushing further into areas which had been occupied for thousands of years by indigenous tribal populations” depicts the environment of Portuguese colonization (Junqueira 7). Historical literature surrounding this time includes examples of “just wars, slavery, epidemics of contagious diseases and the loss of territories, all of which exterminated the natives who already occupied the coast” (Neto 176). Following the years of Brazil’s independence, the desire to consolidate Brazil

as a whole led consequently to “the intensification of the number and rigor of repressive laws against the indigenous populations” (Neto 177). As Brazil started to industrialize in the early 20th century, profound structural changes were being made. Industrial development was pushing for the opening up of “virgin territories to occupation by pioneering sectors to meet a rapidly growing population” (Junqueira 8). The clash between the rural sector and agrarian reforms, the economic exploitation of indigenous land for the construction of highways, and the state’s desire to populate these virgin territories, led to the height of the ongoing clash between the indigenous populations and the state (Junqueira 8-9). Out of this turbulent political and economic situation rose Getúlio Vargas, the defender of a corporatist economic reform and national development policies. The breakdown of the “coffee with milk politics” (politica café com leite) and the 1929 financial crash in New York marked a new era in Brazil’s politics and the ending of the Old Republic. On November 10th, 1937, Vargas would preside over a coup d’état that set aside the constitutional government and marked the start of his new populist authoritarian “Estado Novo” or “New State” (Getúlio). This “New State” would have profound impacts on indigenous policy, as it is where the Brazilian indigenous “problem,” the changing economic landscape, and the rise of a new dictatorial power all came to head. Following Seth Garfield, a narrative strand that I will adopt briefly in this paper is one that “explores how the Brazilian state since the Estado Novo dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas (1937-1945) crafted a political project and cultural discourse to exercise dominion over indigenous groups and their territories” (Garfield 8). My intention, however, is to expand upon this thought to come upon a conclusion on the repercussions that such a policy had on indigenous political rights and representation today. Consolidating a nation as large as Brazil had always been a challenge for the state. The growing separation between Brazil’s populous coastlines and the far-flung regions of Mato Grosso and the Amazon represented a “divided nation,” one that wasn’t cohesive in the social imaginary of those who inhabited it. Forced to deal with the repercussions of an industrializing state and a break with a form of politics that dominated Brazil for so long, Vargas’ New State was marked by “political centralization, pronounced intervention in civil society, inward-oriented economic growth, and nationalist bent – signifying

an important watershed in relations between the state and indigenous peoples and between the political center and periphery” (Garfield 8). The height of this ongoing policy shift was marked by Vargas’ proclamation of his “March to the West” (Marcha Para o Oeste), which placed the development of Central Brazil as the key piece to a cohesive formation of national identity in Brazil due to the region’s “historical legacy” (Galvao 15). This March embodied, in Vargas’ own terms, “the true sense of Brazilianness,” an attempt to encompass Brazil’s different regional sectors to produce a “remedy for skewed demographic distribution and uneven economic development” (Garfield 28). The march would set off a series of expeditions to march inland and establish “posts” or “nucleus’ of civilization” that would further be developed and populated through direct state intervention. Vargas still had one obstacle to overcome, however. The only thing impeding this vanguard nationalist policy were the indigenous populations who inhabited these sought out Central-Western Brazil areas. To muster popular support, Vargas inscribed the indigenous population to a policy that sought to “westernize” them and integrate them as a whole into Brazilian society. Indians, here, would “embrace present-day western expansion; indigenous communitarians would buttress the political economy of the frontier; Indian prowess would strengthen the nation; and racial mixture would eliminate social conflict” (Garfield 13). The participation, or for better words coercion, of the indigenous populations into this policy would benefit this sought out narrative of an idealistic building of a nation, leaving the westernization of Indians as the key piece for formulation. An entire population was characterized without their own input setting a dangerous precedent. In the end, the “Indian stood as a valuable symbol for a state whose political legitimacy rested on its nationalist development project” (Garfield 18).

Figure 1 – Map of Central-Western Brazil and Indigenous Populations (Garfield 24)

The rhetoric and policies employed by Vargas during this era exemplify that of a state completely out of touch with the reality of a locality, imposing coercive measures for the “improvement” of the nation, which resulted in catastrophic consequences for the indigenous population. Following James Scott, this policy represented the hegemonic powers of a state bent on improving the “nation” against a population that had no means of opposition: “In sum, the legibility of a society provides the capacity for large-scale social engineering, high modernist ideology provides the desire, the authoritarian state provides the determination to act on that desire, and an incapacitated civil society provides the leveled social terrain on which to build” (Scott 21). This would have serious repercussions to come as the deliberate decisions by the Vargas regime solidified a hierarchy between the white man and the indigenous population, furthering the Indian’s historical role as “an obstacle to progress and civilization” (Junqueira 9). The only hope for future progress would come through the white men who decides to take cause in the Indian’s fight, which as I will argue, has serious limitations. Rising out of the March to the West and the renewed political debate over indigenous rights, FUNAI (National Indian Foundation) was founded in 1937. It took the place of SPI (Indian Protection Service) after failing to fulfill its duties as a bureaucratic body. Branched under the Ministry of Interior, its mandate fulfills an extremely complicated and contradictory role: When establishing the guidelines of its action FUNAI must take into account, on the one hand, the needs of national integration, the

interests of the Brazilian community which wants to expand and is expanding, by eliminating any obstacles on the path of development and, on the other hand, it must consider the needs of the Indian who can change abruptly and whose traditions, customs, beliefs and way of life must be preserved so long as he needs them for his survival (Supysáua). The irony found in this mandate can be traced back to one of the original founders of such an institution, Candido Mariano da Silva Rondon. A Brazilian army officer who worked on implementing telegraphs lines in the Mato Grosso region, his policies were originally praised for his work with indigenous populations. Referred to as a positivist, his main mandate was in “proclaiming the country’s duty to protect the last native populations from the destructive effects of national expansion” (Junqueira 12). More recently, however, his policies and actions have been criticized for being more “about expanding state power than about assisting indigenes” (Diacon 23). FUNAI now insists on upholding Rondon’s concepts, demonstrating the limitations of a state body whose policies revolve around a “martyr” whose interests do not reflect the population to which it is representing. The contradictory nature of an institution representing both the state and the marginalized indigenous population has led to several defeats of indigenous rights in the past couple years, maximizing the height of the problem of this representative agency. FUNAI is being called out for its total irresponsibility in dealing with the “demarcations of new areas, the processes of defending the expansion of indigenous reserves,” and upholding the various land claims in a battle in court over the rights to these debated lands (Petragalia). Furthermore, since FUNAI acts under a ministry it provides a direct line to the government, meaning who’s in office will seriously dictate the progress or destruction of its capabilities. Current president Michel Temer’s government has exemplified such destruction. In 2016, 11% of FUNAI’s budget was cut leaving several of FUNAI’s organizational agencies to be dissolved (Madeiro). FUNAI currently finds itself in a position to inadequately represent the indigenous population, respecting instead the wishes of the state. Established as a result to Varga’s New State, the decision to mandate FUNAI’s main mission to the values prescribed by Rondon, a white man with contradictory ideals, and creating it as a direct link to the state, this agency was never set to represent indigenous political rights. Instead, it serves as a

Established as a result to Varga’s New State, the decision to mandate FUNAI’s main mission to the values prescribed by Rondon, a white man with contradictory ideals, and creating it as a direct link to the state, this agency was never set to represent indigenous political rights. Instead, it serves as a farce idealizing Vargas’ original development policies. One of the most famous expedition’s resulted from Vargas’ March to the West campaign was the Roncador-Xingu Expedition commenced in 1943. The Roncador-Xingu Expedition was entrusted with “various tasks: opening up lines of communication to the Amazon through central Brazil, building airstrips and roads, and establishing settlements along the headwaters of the Xingu River” (Garfield 45). This would then serve as a mainline to the state for further development.

Figure 2 - Expedition route of Roncador-Xingu (Garfield 47)

Out of this expedition arose three central figures, the Villas Boas Brothers: Claudio Villas Boas, Orlando Villas Boas, and Leonardo Villas Boas. Born in the state of Sao Paulo, the brothers presented themselves as illiterate and from the north of Brazil to those organizing the March as they knew the organizers were refusing “people from the city” and only contracting people “who had resistance” (Galvao 21). To them, this march represented an opportunity like no another that they wanted to embark on. During the trip, however, their real identities were revealed and they were promoted to be the main leaders of the March. Following some of Rondon’s principles, the Villas Boas brothers adopted great affinity for the indigenous populations, learning their languages and penetrating the Xingu occupied region peacefully. As

the state continued to push for the development of the Xingu area for the establishment of air force bases and highways, the Villas Boas “realized that the Indians had no protection against the society that would advance along the tracks opened up by the expedition, and devoted themselves to creating an area where the indigenous nations of the Xingu area would be safe” (Rochas). The Xingu National Park was established by an Executive Decree in 1961 and encompassed an “area of 26,000 square km where 15 different previous warring tribes learned to live together” (Rochas). The purpose of the Xingu National Park is “to ensure the survival of the native groups which live in it or might come to live in it and to preserve the wildlife resources with constitute a reserve for scientific research” (Junqueira 14). The main activities of the park revolve around two “postos” that are tasked with caring for the Indian’s physical health and also making the Indian familiar with some modern techniques and resources of society. At the “posto,” Indian tribes can choose to live there for some time and learn daily routines of modern life, such as cooking and machine operation, as well as become more fluent in Portuguese (Junqueira 14-15). A truly first of its kind, the Xingu National Park can be celebrated for it’s pioneering of an experimental policy favoring the protection of indigenous populations. However, we must realize the repercussions of such a protectionist and paternalistic policy. Founded by the Villas Boas brothers as their martyrs, it’s hard to ensure that the government will continue to recognize the legitimacy of the park. In 1971, a road linking Brasilia with Manaus crossed the reservation with the approval of FUNAI and the entire government. Several hundred Kayapo Indians inhabited the part cut off and as a consolation prize they were awarded an extension of a distant southern part of the park (Junqueira 4). This example points to a larger phenomenon. We can truly commend the Villas Boas Brothers for their work, but until these policies are initiated directly by the state, the political rights of indigenous populations and their lands will continue to be manipulated by the state for their own purposes, putting national development as their main task. Even a park, which was founded with a mandate to protect the lands and culture of indigenous people, has proven vulnerable to the state’s agenda, which will only continue over the coming years. With the end of Brazil’s military dictatorship in 1985, a new constitution was set in place on October 5th, 1988. The Federal Constitution

of 1988 opened up a “new chapter in the history of indigenous peoples, as it recognized their cultural and territorial rights as an essential element of a multicultural society that adopts democracy and citizenship values” (Volpato 2). A huge win for the indigenous populations, this constitution sought to recognize their land claims that have been so heavily contested for years. The central focus of this constitutional article are the main issues surrounding indigenous territorial rights in Brazil between these populations and the government: “the process of demarcation of indigenous lands, the mining interests that fall on these lands, and the utilization of water resources in or around these areas” (Volpato 2). This celebratory accomplishment would be short-lived, however, with the introduction of the Temporal Mark Clause (clauso marco temporal), signed into power under President Michel Temer. The Temporal Mark Clause represents a 1988 cut-off date and states that the article put forth in the constitution is only deemed valuable if populations of indigenous people occupied that specific land at the time of the implementation of the Constitution. What it fails to consider are the external factors that have affected these lands, such as forced migration of indigenous populations from this land and the centuries of historical background that surpass the 1988 cut off date. An intentioned political move done by President Temer to reign in his weakening political support, his bargaining chip to remain in power has been the selling of these land claims (Griffin). While the Supreme Court has upheld these heavily contested land rights of indigenous peoples in specific cases, this article once again represents a marginalized population at the hands of the state – serving as a prop for their own political purposes. The Supreme Court may serve as a martyr for now until their political interests start to conflict with their decisions. As these lands continue to be sought after for their precious natural resources and mining capabilities, the indigenous have no solidified claim to these rights leaving it instead up to interpretation by the court. What I have been trying to argue thus far is a causal link between the Vargas regimes’ nation-building policies to the fragmentation of indigenous political rights in Brazil. While the struggle between indigenous rights and the development of the state can be traced all the way back to the times of Portuguese colonial occupation and so forth, Vargas rose to power to institute a deliberate state policy that sealed the fate of these populations. A precedent

100

was set where the Indian was used a symbol or prop to the larger goal of the state in creating a unified “nation” without the input of those affected. While some accomplishments were achieved in the following decades through FUNAI, the founding of the Xingu National Park, and the 1988 Federal Constitution, their true success’ have been undermined both by the fact that they were created through the scope of a white man and through the government’s continuous entitlement to using these channels for their own political benefit. In order for Brazil to institute a true developmental policy that includes the rightful interests of the indigenous populations, there must be mechanisms for direct participation of these people. As long as their interests are being represented through state channels and on behalf of the white martyr, this pattern will continue on for decades to come.

101

Bibliography Diacon, Todd. “Candido Mariano Da Silva Rondon and the Politics of Indian Protection in Brazil.” Oxford University Press on Behalf of The Past and Present Society, 2002. Galvao, Maria. “A Expedição Roncador-Xingu e a Tarefa De Ocupar, Civilizar, e Urbanizar of Brasil Central [The Roncador-Xingu Expedition and the Task of Occupying, Civilizing, and Urbanizing Central Brazil],” February 9, 2014. Garfield, Seth. Indigenous Struggle at the Heart of Brazil: State Policy, Frontier Expansion, and the Xavante Indians, 1937-1988. Duke Univeristy Press Durham & London 2001, n.d. “Getulio Vargas | President of Brazil.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed November 21, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Getulio-Vargas. Griffin, Jo. “Brazilian Supreme Court Upholds Land Rights of Indigenous People.” The Guardian, August 17, 2017, sec. Global development. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/aug/17/brazilian-supreme-court-upholds-land-rights-indigenous-people-mato-grosso-do-sul. Junqueira, Carmen. The Brazilian Indigenous Problem and Policy: The Example of the Xingu National Park. International Work Group for Indigneous Affairs, 1973. Madeiro, Carlos. “Índios Sofrem Com Cortes Na Funai e Sem Decreto de Terras Há Um Ano [Indians Suffer Budget Cuts to Funai and without Any Land Decrees for a Year].” Cotidiano, 2017. https://noticias.uol. com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2017/04/19/indios-sofrem-comcortes-na-funai-e-sem-decreto-de-terras-ha-um-ano.htm Moreira Neto, C. A. Constante Histórica Do “Indigenato” No Brazil [A Stagnant History of the “Indigenous” in Brazil]. Vol. 2. Atas Do Simpósio Sôbre a Biota Amazônica, 1967. Petragalia, Laura. “Funai é Desumana e Irresponsável, Critica Nilson Leitão Sobre Suiá-Missú [Funai Is Inhuman and Irresponsible, Criticizes Nilson Leitão about Suiá-Missú].” Olhar Direto, 2012. http://www. olhardireto.com.br/noticias/exibir.asp?id=292252&noticia=funai-e-de-

102

sumana-e-irresponsavel-critica-nilson-leitao-sobre-suia-missu. Rochas, Jan. “Obituary: Orlando Villas Boas | World News | The Guardian.” Accessed November 16, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/ news/2002/dec/14/guardianobituaries.brazil. Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State - How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. Yale University Press, 1988. Supysáua: A Documentary Report on the Conditions of Indian Peoples in Brazil. Indigena, American Friends of Brazil, 1974. Volpato Curi, Melissa. “Moving Forward or Backwards? Indigenous Peoples, Development and Democracy in Brazil.” Journal of the Society for the Anthropoly of Lowland South America 12, no. 2 (2014).

103

104

Wilson Journal The Wilson Journal of International Affairs Spring 2018 University of Virginia Printed by Charlottesville Press Charlottesville, Virginia Sponsored by the International Relations Organization, a contracted independent organization 105