in Belo Horizonte and Betim,Brazil

34 Brian Wampler

budgeting in both municipalities (Nylen 2003b).However,this evidence tells us little about the larger numbers ofordinary participants who do not assume leadership roles.Evidence from Belo Horizonte,Ipatinga,Porto Alegre, Recife,and São Paulo suggests that most participatory budgeting delegates were supportive ofleftist political parties (Wampler 2007a).

A second explanation is that participatory budgeting provides new opportunities for the already politically active (Nylen 2002).About halfof participants in Belo Horizonte and Betim are single-time participants (table 1.6).Ifthese data are representative ofother participatory budgeting programs, the empowerment capacity ofthe process may be dampened.

Nearly 75 percent ofrespondents participated only one or two times. This finding is troublesome,because little public learning is likely to occur where few participants remain involved in the process.Wampler’s survey of eight participatory budgeting programs indicates that first-time participation rates are higher in more recently established programs (Wampler 2007b).In municipalities in which participatory budgeting has been used since the 1990s,such as Ipatinga or Porto Alegre,participation is high,but a core group ofactivists participates every year.In places where participatory budgeting has been in place for many years,restrictions are placed on participation by activists,who are allowed to run for office only every second or third year,in order to allow a broader number ofpeople to hold elected office. However,it may be that a small group ofactivists rotates the positions among themselves.

TABLE 1.6 Frequency ofParticipation in Participatory Budgeting in Belo Horizonte and Betim, Brazil

Belo Horizonte Betim

Number oftimes respondent Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of participated respondents respondents respondents respondents

Once 526 54.5 92 49.5 Twice 168 17.4 32 17.2 Three times 78 8.1 19 10.2 Four times 70 7.2 13 7.0 More than four times 64 6.6 14 7.5 No response 60 6.2 16 8.6 Total 966 100.0 186 100.0

Source: Nylen 2002.

A Guide to Participatory Budgeting 35

Demonstration effects,based on deliberation,negotiation,and implementation,may also account for the rise in participation (Wampler and Avritzer 2004).Ifindividual citizens have positive experiences (because their demands are heard or their proposals selected for implementation),they will have incentives to participate again.These incentives are short term,immediate (policy changes),and long term (deliberation and accountability),but they depend,in large part,on the ability ofthe government to implement projects selected by participants.

Very few eligible citizens participate in participatory budgeting processes. Getting citizens to attend meetings remains difficult,for reasons that plague participation in any public setting.These include the time and financial cost ofattending meetings,general apathy,the lack ofawareness ofparticipatory budgeting,and the perception ofpartisanship within the participatory budgeting process.Participatory budgeting has been successful at encouraging participation when municipalities have been able to produce outputs that reflect the decisions made through the process.Citizens are willing to give their time to this process ifthey believe that the outcomes will benefit them.

Most participatory budgeting programs allow citizens to have a say only on new capital investment expenditures.(Many participatory budgeting programs claim that participants make decisions on the entire budget,but there is little evidence that participants make meaningful decisions outside ofdiscretionary funding.) When analyzing participatory budgeting,it is important to distinguish between proposed spending and actual spending.

Porto Alegre had the lowest annual budget but allocated the largest amount to participatory budgeting—$201 per capita in 1996–98.This figure far exceeded per capita spending in Belo Horizonte ($42) or Recife ($11). Differences in spending are attributable to the financial health ofthe municipalities,especially debt commitments and personnel expenditures.Porto Alegre cleaned up its finances,allowing more resources to be dedicated to investment spending.Belo Horizonte and Recife spent more on debt and personnel and on investment projects selected outside the participatory budgeting framework.

Spending outcomes are important indicators ofthe success or failure of a program,because they link the demands ofparticipants to the municipal government’s commitment to implementation.Governments that are able to follow through on spending decisions send clear signals to participatory budgeting participants and the larger community that they value the choices made within the participatory budgeting process.Porto Alegre’s government was able to meet nearly 100 percent ofits commitments (projects are often backlogged,but they are generally completed).In contrast,Recife completed