Oil, Gas, and Mining

Page 102

Box 4.5 Local Benefit: The Kazakhstani Experience As Kazakhstan moves toward the status of a major oil and gas producer, it has developed a policy on sourcing hydrocarbons-related work to Kazakhstani firms. Legal mechanisms have been put in place to require oil and gas companies (or “subsoil users”) to use local goods, works, and services in their operations and to increase the proportion of Kazakhstani employees in their staff and in the staff of their contractors. The policy was first introduced into hydrocarbons legislation in 2004 with the terms Kazakh manufacturer and Kazakh origin applicable to goods, works, and services. It had little practical impact. The Kazakh Content Law of 2009 took a more robust approach to implementation and has proved effective. Virtually all of these provisions migrated into a new Law on the Subsoil and Subsoil Use (2010). Why was this change necessary? When goods, works, and services were purchased from a foreign supplier, the funds benefited non-Kazakhstani economies, often the same country of origin as the subsoil user. All such expenses were treated as contributions to the annual minimum level of investments that were required under contracts between subsoil users and the state. Failure to meet this target could lead to unilateral termination by the state. Finally, once production was started, the subsoil users had the opportunity

Natural gas

Agreements for the exploration and production of petroleum typically cover both oil and gas. They usually contain clauses dealing with the peculiarities of the gas industry: longer lead times to identify viable markets if gas is found and to reach agreement with buyers for long-term sales contracts. Longer times are also needed for securing the high levels of investment for field development, processing, and transportation. (See pages 70–71 and 107–08 in this chapter.)47 The fiscal terms applicable to gas production have to be more attractive to investors than those for oil, because the selling price is lower than its oil equivalent (and hence offers lower profitability), transportation costs are higher, and the production profile is longer and flatter. The duration of the project and the long payback period mean that investors will tend to pay extra attention to the guarantees provided by stabilization clauses. To anticipate the complexities of contracting, a government may provide a special legal instrument for the interim

82

OIL, GAS, AND MINING

to avoid paying higher taxes for the investments, giving them an incentive to overstate their costs at the exploration stage. In response, Kazakhstani content on goods is defined as a percentage share of the cost of Kazakhorigin materials and the producer’s expenses for goods processed in Kazakhstan. For services, Kazakhstani content is defined as an aggregate cumulative share based on the cost of goods used for the performance of works, as well as the agreement value and/or payments to Kazakhstani employees. It also takes into account the salary fund of the entity performing works or providing services. Among the key elements in the Kazakhstani regime is an online registry of goods, services, and work in subsoil operations that allows the authorities to monitor the operation of the procurement rules, according to the 2010 law. Quarterly reports by subsoil users ensure that this mechanism allows the authorities to monitor fulfillment of obligations on content. Calculation of the local benefit percentage is done by means of a uniform method. Certification of local benefit is also used. There is also a long-term plan with targets for local benefit set in percentage terms. Violations of procurement rules are treated as a breach of the subsoil contract and the penalties may include termination of that contract.

negotiating period. For example, Vietnam’s amended Petroleum Law (2000) states the following: If discovering gas with commercial value, while lacking the consumption market as well as conditions on pipelines and suitable treatment facilities, contractors may retain the areas where gas is found. The duration of retention of such an area shall not exceed five (5) years and may, in special cases, be extended for two (2) more years. Pending the consumption market and the conditions on pipelines and suitable treatment facilities, the contractors shall have to proceed with the work already committed in the petroleum contracts (Le Leuch 2011, at 8.6.2). The concept of a specific retention lease was first developed in Australia. Its objective is to encourage the exploration of gas and the identification of commercial gas markets by granting the contractor enough time to assess the


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10.1 Environmental and Social Institutional Arrangements

3min
page 316

10.6 Response 3: Accountability—Stakeholder Consultation and Participation

3min
page 315

10.5 Response 2: Effective Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement

3min
page 314

10.4 Response 1: Appropriate and Adequate Rules

3min
page 313

Notes

6min
pages 303-304

9.11 Goal Setting and Community Participation

11min
pages 298-300

9.7 Summary and Recommendations

7min
pages 301-302

9.10 Social Impacts: Special Issues

3min
page 297

9.9 Essentials of a Good Environmental Protection Regime

19min
pages 292-296

9.8 Challenges Associated with Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM

3min
page 291

9.6 The Responses

7min
pages 289-290

9.7 Decommissioning and Environmental Protection Plans

3min
page 288

9.5 Tools: Legal and Regulatory

30min
pages 280-287

9.6 Potential Opportunities Generated by ASM

3min
page 279

9.5 Reframing the ASM Debate: Integrating It into the EI Value Chain

3min
page 278

9.3 The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

11min
pages 273-275

Areas and Critical Ecosystems (PACE

7min
pages 276-277

9.4 Challenge 2: Environmental and Social Impacts

4min
page 272

9.2 Objectives of the Parties to an Infrastructure Project

2min
page 271

9.1 Liberia: Open Access Regime in Mineral Development Agreements

11min
pages 268-270

Investments Create Positive and Sustainable Impacts

23min
pages 262-267

9.2 Two Key Challenges

3min
page 261

8.4 Civil Society–Led Initiatives

3min
page 252

8.5 Private Sector–Led Initiatives

3min
page 253

8.6 Emerging Global Norms and Standards

3min
page 251

8.3 The Seven Requirements of the EITI Standard

5min
pages 249-250

8.5 Transparency Initiatives

3min
page 248

8.2 EIs and Social Accountability

2min
page 247

8.4 Challenges and Special Issues

3min
page 244

8.1 Balancing Transparency Interests: Opposing Dodd-Frank

7min
pages 245-246

Other Resources

1min
pages 238-240

8.2 Definition and Scope

3min
page 242

8.3 The Benefits of Transparency

3min
page 243

Notes

8min
pages 232-233

7.4 Examples of Revenue-Sharing Formulas

17min
pages 226-230

7.9 Revenue Allocation and Subnational Issues

3min
page 225

7.8 Spending Choices and Use of Government Revenues

16min
pages 221-224

7.7 Alternative Means of Addressing Volatility

4min
page 220

7.6 Addressing Volatility: Stabilization Funds

3min
page 218

7.3 Stabilization Funds: The Experience of Chile

3min
page 219

7.5 Alternative Means of Addressing Fiscal Sustainability

7min
pages 216-217

7.2 Savings Funds: Four Examples

6min
pages 214-215

7.3 Consume or Save?

10min
pages 205-207

6.5 What a Well-Designed Fiscal Regime Must Do

3min
page 197

7.1 Botswana and Chile: Experiences with Fiscal Rules

3min
page 208

7.2 Why Revenue Management is Difficult

3min
page 204

6.4 Routine Tax Administration: Challenges

7min
pages 194-195

6.7 Summary and Recommendations

3min
page 196

6.6 EI Fiscal Administration

3min
page 193

6.5 Special EI Fiscal Topics and Provisions

27min
pages 186-192

6.3 Elements for Action on Taxation of Transfer of EI Interest

3min
page 185

6.4 Main Fiscal Instruments under a Fiscal Regime

20min
pages 175-179

6.1 Forms of State Participation

13min
pages 180-183

6.2 Key Fiscal Objectives

13min
pages 170-173

6.3 The Main Types of EI Fiscal Systems

3min
page 174

5.4 Summary and Recommendations

3min
page 164

5.8 Unitization in Maritime Waters

32min
pages 156-163

5.6 Petroleum Sector Reform in Brazil

3min
page 150

5.5 Petroleum Reform in Colombia

3min
page 149

5.1 Institutional Structure: The Ministry and the Regulatory Agency

22min
pages 138-143

5.2 Mining Participation

3min
page 144

5.2 Organization in the Public Interest

5min
pages 136-137

5.3 NRC Success Stories

11min
pages 145-147

5.4 Petroleum Technical Assistance to South Sudan

3min
page 148

Notes

12min
pages 128-130

4.13 Taking Action: Recommendations and Tools

4min
page 127

4.12 Summary

4min
page 126

4.11 Disputes: Anticipating and Managing Them

8min
pages 122-123

4.11 Claims under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs

7min
pages 124-125

4.10 Contract Negotiations

3min
page 121

4.10 The Four Main Forms of Stabilization Clause

3min
page 120

4.9 Investment Guarantees: Stabilization

4min
page 119

4.8 Why Regulations Are Necessary

7min
pages 117-118

4.9 Geodata

23min
pages 111-116

4.7 The Award of Contracts and Licenses

3min
page 110

4.6 Contractual Provisions for Natural Gas

16min
pages 104-107

4.7 Model Mining and Development Agreement

3min
page 108

4.5 Local Benefit: The Kazakhstani Experience

7min
pages 102-103

4.4 Local Benefit

3min
page 101

4.8 Practices to Avoid

3min
page 109

4.6 Contracts and Licenses

31min
pages 93-100

4.5 Hydrocarbons and Mining Laws

27min
pages 86-92

4.3 Deep-Sea Mining

3min
page 85

4.2 Licensing across Shifting International Borders

3min
page 84

4.4 Policy Priorities

11min
pages 81-83

4.3 Eight Key Challenges

3min
page 80

4.1 Sovereignty over Natural Resources

3min
page 79

4.2 Getting Started: Facts of EI Life

3min
page 78

Other Resources

4min
pages 73-76

3.4 Convergence of Mining and Hydrocarbons?

16min
pages 67-70

3.3 Key Differences of the Industries

7min
pages 62-63

3.2 Features Specific to the Oil and Gas Sectors

2min
page 65

3.1 Key Differences between the Petroleum and Mining Sectors

3min
page 64

3.2 Common Features of the Industries

7min
pages 60-61

References

13min
pages 53-56

Other Resources

1min
pages 57-58

Notes

8min
pages 51-52

2.6 Conclusions

4min
page 50

1.2 The EI Value Chain

11min
pages 31-33

1.5 Our Approach

3min
page 34

1.4 Bridging the Knowledge Gap

3min
page 30

2.2 The Opportunities Arising from Resource Abundance

8min
pages 40-41

2.1 Changing Perspectives: Reframing the ASM Debate

3min
page 42

1.2 The Demand for Knowledge

4min
page 24

2.4 Understanding the Challenges: Changing Perspectives

8min
pages 47-48

2.5 Applying New Insights

4min
page 49
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