Oil, Gas, and Mining

Page 218

the budgets of other countries are set on the basis of a single macroeconomic projection. Then the budget is subjected to stress tests (lower resource prices than the price in the budget, or other shocks) to assess the budget’s vulnerability to potentially adverse developments and what would be done if such circumstances arose. Finally, price and production assumptions should be codified and not made subject to year-on-year or monthon-month manipulation in order to generate more fiscal space. However, revenue forecasting has limits: a government can have good revenue forecasting and still run a reckless fiscal policy.

7.6 ADDRESSING VOLATILITY: STABILIZATION FUNDS Volatility

The volatility of resource revenues in the EI sector can have major impacts on fiscal policy, public consumption, and investment spending. High revenues encourage many governments to step up spending based on a mistaken belief that the revenue windfall will be permanent or a politically driven disregard of virtually certain future declines in revenue. This gives rise to unsustainable spending levels with painful adjustments when revenues fall (Ossowski et al. 2008, 8). Revenue volatility is particularly worrisome in its potential effects on domestic consumption via changes in wage income and employment. The poor are especially vulnerable, having limited ability to alter household consumption, and often face severe difficulties in either insuring themselves or borrowing against fluctuating income. Current government expenditures are difficult to cut in low-income states where they are likely to be focused on basic services and poverty reduction. This is not to argue against allocation of resource revenues to consumption but to suggest the importance of protecting some (recurrent) expenditures against the volatility of revenues. Fluctuations in domestic investment may be more manageable and less costly than those in consumption. In a mechanical sense, it may seem easier to cut capital expenditures as a large piece and in one action. In practice, existing contracts with suppliers have to be adjusted or renegotiated, sometimes at great cost if there are contractual clauses that protect suppliers from such government interventions. Some investments depend on other investments: a new school may need a new country road for example. Investment expenditures have to be

198

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reprogrammed. Spending ministries usually oppose such cuts, which creates political problems for the ministry of finance. It may be thought that the fluctuating investment can be partially offset by the relatively smooth output it typically produces. However, even if less costly than fluctuating consumption expenditures, “stop-go” investment behavior carries a considerable cost in terms of efficiency losses, a build-up on project contract arrears, and aggregate economic instability (Alba 2009, 14). Effective utilization of volatile resource revenues requires that the resulting expenditure in both consumption and investment be smoothed. Key features of the funds

A stabilization fund differs from a savings fund (see section 7.4) in that it is designed to guard against volatility in the international resource markets. Such funds are a form of self-insurance against short-term volatility (Shabsigh and Ilahi 2007), and so are designed to address precautionary objectives and, indirectly, to assist in expenditure smoothing, although the latter will depend on many other things besides a fund. In many stabilization funds, when revenues or prices are high relative to some norm, payments are made into the fund. When revenues are low relative to the norm, payments are moved out of the fund to the budget. The optimal size of a stabilization fund depends on the magnitude of expected resource revenues, their relative importance in the budget, and the volatility of the revenues. The larger the possible variation in revenues relative to the total state budget expenditure, other things being equal, the larger the amount of precautionary assets in the fund should be. Given the objective of stabilization funds, they should hold short-term, highly liquid, and low-risk assets. The fund’s assets should be held abroad to avoid putting pressure on the domestic economy; otherwise, the fund far from contributing to domestic stabilization, would actually exacerbate procyclicality and transmit resource price volatility into the economy. As is the case with savings funds, a major challenge facing a stabilization fund is setting a reference price or revenue and ensuring that, if the resource price exceeds the reference price, any revenue collected over and above the reference is deposited in the fund and not channeled through the budget. If the aim is to help to stabilize current government revenues, the calculation of future revenues


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10.1 Environmental and Social Institutional Arrangements

3min
page 316

10.6 Response 3: Accountability—Stakeholder Consultation and Participation

3min
page 315

10.5 Response 2: Effective Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement

3min
page 314

10.4 Response 1: Appropriate and Adequate Rules

3min
page 313

Notes

6min
pages 303-304

9.11 Goal Setting and Community Participation

11min
pages 298-300

9.7 Summary and Recommendations

7min
pages 301-302

9.10 Social Impacts: Special Issues

3min
page 297

9.9 Essentials of a Good Environmental Protection Regime

19min
pages 292-296

9.8 Challenges Associated with Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM

3min
page 291

9.6 The Responses

7min
pages 289-290

9.7 Decommissioning and Environmental Protection Plans

3min
page 288

9.5 Tools: Legal and Regulatory

30min
pages 280-287

9.6 Potential Opportunities Generated by ASM

3min
page 279

9.5 Reframing the ASM Debate: Integrating It into the EI Value Chain

3min
page 278

9.3 The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

11min
pages 273-275

Areas and Critical Ecosystems (PACE

7min
pages 276-277

9.4 Challenge 2: Environmental and Social Impacts

4min
page 272

9.2 Objectives of the Parties to an Infrastructure Project

2min
page 271

9.1 Liberia: Open Access Regime in Mineral Development Agreements

11min
pages 268-270

Investments Create Positive and Sustainable Impacts

23min
pages 262-267

9.2 Two Key Challenges

3min
page 261

8.4 Civil Society–Led Initiatives

3min
page 252

8.5 Private Sector–Led Initiatives

3min
page 253

8.6 Emerging Global Norms and Standards

3min
page 251

8.3 The Seven Requirements of the EITI Standard

5min
pages 249-250

8.5 Transparency Initiatives

3min
page 248

8.2 EIs and Social Accountability

2min
page 247

8.4 Challenges and Special Issues

3min
page 244

8.1 Balancing Transparency Interests: Opposing Dodd-Frank

7min
pages 245-246

Other Resources

1min
pages 238-240

8.2 Definition and Scope

3min
page 242

8.3 The Benefits of Transparency

3min
page 243

Notes

8min
pages 232-233

7.4 Examples of Revenue-Sharing Formulas

17min
pages 226-230

7.9 Revenue Allocation and Subnational Issues

3min
page 225

7.8 Spending Choices and Use of Government Revenues

16min
pages 221-224

7.7 Alternative Means of Addressing Volatility

4min
page 220

7.6 Addressing Volatility: Stabilization Funds

3min
page 218

7.3 Stabilization Funds: The Experience of Chile

3min
page 219

7.5 Alternative Means of Addressing Fiscal Sustainability

7min
pages 216-217

7.2 Savings Funds: Four Examples

6min
pages 214-215

7.3 Consume or Save?

10min
pages 205-207

6.5 What a Well-Designed Fiscal Regime Must Do

3min
page 197

7.1 Botswana and Chile: Experiences with Fiscal Rules

3min
page 208

7.2 Why Revenue Management is Difficult

3min
page 204

6.4 Routine Tax Administration: Challenges

7min
pages 194-195

6.7 Summary and Recommendations

3min
page 196

6.6 EI Fiscal Administration

3min
page 193

6.5 Special EI Fiscal Topics and Provisions

27min
pages 186-192

6.3 Elements for Action on Taxation of Transfer of EI Interest

3min
page 185

6.4 Main Fiscal Instruments under a Fiscal Regime

20min
pages 175-179

6.1 Forms of State Participation

13min
pages 180-183

6.2 Key Fiscal Objectives

13min
pages 170-173

6.3 The Main Types of EI Fiscal Systems

3min
page 174

5.4 Summary and Recommendations

3min
page 164

5.8 Unitization in Maritime Waters

32min
pages 156-163

5.6 Petroleum Sector Reform in Brazil

3min
page 150

5.5 Petroleum Reform in Colombia

3min
page 149

5.1 Institutional Structure: The Ministry and the Regulatory Agency

22min
pages 138-143

5.2 Mining Participation

3min
page 144

5.2 Organization in the Public Interest

5min
pages 136-137

5.3 NRC Success Stories

11min
pages 145-147

5.4 Petroleum Technical Assistance to South Sudan

3min
page 148

Notes

12min
pages 128-130

4.13 Taking Action: Recommendations and Tools

4min
page 127

4.12 Summary

4min
page 126

4.11 Disputes: Anticipating and Managing Them

8min
pages 122-123

4.11 Claims under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs

7min
pages 124-125

4.10 Contract Negotiations

3min
page 121

4.10 The Four Main Forms of Stabilization Clause

3min
page 120

4.9 Investment Guarantees: Stabilization

4min
page 119

4.8 Why Regulations Are Necessary

7min
pages 117-118

4.9 Geodata

23min
pages 111-116

4.7 The Award of Contracts and Licenses

3min
page 110

4.6 Contractual Provisions for Natural Gas

16min
pages 104-107

4.7 Model Mining and Development Agreement

3min
page 108

4.5 Local Benefit: The Kazakhstani Experience

7min
pages 102-103

4.4 Local Benefit

3min
page 101

4.8 Practices to Avoid

3min
page 109

4.6 Contracts and Licenses

31min
pages 93-100

4.5 Hydrocarbons and Mining Laws

27min
pages 86-92

4.3 Deep-Sea Mining

3min
page 85

4.2 Licensing across Shifting International Borders

3min
page 84

4.4 Policy Priorities

11min
pages 81-83

4.3 Eight Key Challenges

3min
page 80

4.1 Sovereignty over Natural Resources

3min
page 79

4.2 Getting Started: Facts of EI Life

3min
page 78

Other Resources

4min
pages 73-76

3.4 Convergence of Mining and Hydrocarbons?

16min
pages 67-70

3.3 Key Differences of the Industries

7min
pages 62-63

3.2 Features Specific to the Oil and Gas Sectors

2min
page 65

3.1 Key Differences between the Petroleum and Mining Sectors

3min
page 64

3.2 Common Features of the Industries

7min
pages 60-61

References

13min
pages 53-56

Other Resources

1min
pages 57-58

Notes

8min
pages 51-52

2.6 Conclusions

4min
page 50

1.2 The EI Value Chain

11min
pages 31-33

1.5 Our Approach

3min
page 34

1.4 Bridging the Knowledge Gap

3min
page 30

2.2 The Opportunities Arising from Resource Abundance

8min
pages 40-41

2.1 Changing Perspectives: Reframing the ASM Debate

3min
page 42

1.2 The Demand for Knowledge

4min
page 24

2.4 Understanding the Challenges: Changing Perspectives

8min
pages 47-48

2.5 Applying New Insights

4min
page 49
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