Global Productivity

Page 239

GLOBAL PRODUCTIVITY

CHAPTER 4

213

Pace of conditional convergence. Consistent rates of convergence have also been found when controlling for country characteristics. The “rule of 2 percent” was coined after a common rate of annual income convergence across U.S. states, and separately countries, was identified when controls for factors such as educational levels and political stability were included (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). Most studies have found results within a range of 1 to 3 percent per annum (Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple 2005). An annual convergence rate of 2 percent implies that half of any initial difference in productivity levels will disappear after 35 years. Evolution of conditional convergence rate. The results of a conditional convergence regression, containing typical country characteristics used in the literature, show that lower initial incomes were associated with higher productivity growth in each decade since the 1980s.11 The convergence rate is estimated to have increased over time, peaking at 1.5 percent per year over the past decade, which if sustained would halve the productivity gap in just under 50 years (figure 4.3, panel D). Previous studies, including recent tests for club convergence, have documented similar rates of conditional convergence but have yet to document the acceleration in pace in recent decades (Johnson and Papageorgiou 2020). The panel specification, covering all decades, shows an annual convergence rate of 1.3 percent, within the range of 1-3 percent found in surveys of the literature of growth regressions on income per capita (annex 4C).12 Conditional or unconditional convergence rates? Unconditional convergence rates have recently turned positive but remain very low, requiring over 100 years to close just half of the average productivity gap. Estimates conditional on other characteristics, such as the level of education and investment, suggest that convergence rates have been much faster and rising in recent decades. However, the conditional convergence concept is less useful as a generalized measure of convergence progress among EMDEs, because it suggests that economies may be on many different productivity paths dependent on their characteristics. A deeper examination of which economies are experiencing fast rates of convergence because of their characteristics can be explored through club convergence analysis.

Convergence clubs Club convergence definition. In general, the β-convergence framework underlying the unconditional and conditional convergence results faces limitations in distinguishing between multiple attraction points that may exist for productivity levels in different economies. Even in cases where the coefficient is negative, economies may not be 11 See annex 4C for further details. Regression includes controls for average levels of education, trade openness, the Economic Complexity Index of Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), commodity exporter status, the level of investment as a share of output, and a measure of political stability. 12 Most of these studies have performed these exercises on PPP-adjusted measures of income per capita. This alternative measure results in estimates of a convergence rate of 1.7 percent using the same specification. However, PPP adjustment may be inappropriate for measuring growth in output per worker. Many economies have substantially faster productivity growth rates measured using time-varying PPP adjustments compared to national accounts measures (annex 4F).


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Annex 7B Marginal productivity gap

4min
pages 452-453

References

14min
pages 456-463

Annex 7A Data and methodology

6min
pages 448-451

References

13min
pages 421-428

Sectoral productivity gaps

2min
page 432

Annex 7C Firm TFP data, estimates, and methodology

5min
pages 454-455

Annex 6C Commodity-driven productivity developments: Methodology

2min
page 420

Conclusion and policy implications

2min
page 412

Drivers of productivity: Technology vs. demand shocks

2min
page 391

Annex 6A SVAR identification of technology drivers of productivity

8min
pages 413-416

PART III Technological Change and Sectoral Shifts

0
pages 383-386

Effects of demand shocks

2min
page 397

Figure 6.1 Global labor productivity surges and declines

7min
pages 388-390

Sub-Saharan Africa

2min
page 350

Figure 5.22 Factors supporting productivity growth in MNA

7min
pages 333-335

Figure 5.19 Drivers of productivity growth in LAC

9min
pages 325-328

South Asia

4min
pages 337-338

Conclusion

2min
page 363

Figure 5.13 Drivers of productivity growth in ECA

10min
pages 314-317

Middle East and North Africa

2min
page 329

Latin America and the Caribbean

2min
page 318

Figure 5.12 Drivers of productivity growth in ECA in regional comparison

5min
pages 312-313

Europe and Central Asia

2min
page 305

Figure 5.7 Drivers of productivity growth in EAP

3min
page 301

PART II Regional Dimensions of Productivity

0
pages 281-284

Sources of, and bottlenecks to, regional productivity growth

4min
pages 290-291

Figure 5.1 Evolution of regional productivity in EMDE regions

4min
pages 288-289

East Asia and Pacific

2min
page 295

References

12min
pages 274-280

Evolution of productivity across regions

2min
page 287

Annex 4F Productivity measurement: PPP vs. market exchange rates

4min
pages 268-269

Annex 4C Beta-convergence testing

2min
page 257

Figure 4.4 Convergence club memberships

2min
page 242

Annex 4D Estimating convergence clubs: Commonalities in productivity levels

7min
pages 258-260

Testing for convergence and its pace

4min
pages 236-237

Conclusion and policy implications

7min
pages 253-255

Convergence clubs

7min
pages 239-241

Annex 3B Robustness

2min
page 213

Conclusion

2min
page 204

Figure 3.8 Episodes across different types of events

4min
pages 193-194

Annex 3A Data, sources, and definitions

2min
page 206

How has productivity convergence evolved?

2min
page 231

Figure 3.4 Episodes of war

2min
page 187

What policies can mitigate the effects of adverse events?

2min
page 203

Figure 3.5 Correlations between war frequency and productivity growth

7min
pages 188-190

Figure B3.1.1 Severity of pandemics, epidemics, and climate disasters

6min
pages 179-181

Figure B3.1.3 Impact of epidemics

6min
pages 184-186

Annex 2A Partial correlations

2min
page 146

Figure 3.2 Episodes of natural disaster

4min
pages 175-176

Box 3.1 How do epidemics affect productivity?

1min
page 178

Adverse events: Literature and stylized facts

2min
page 171

Conclusion

2min
page 145

Figure 2.13 Developments in financial and government technology

2min
page 143

Figure 2.12 EMDE infrastructure and education gaps

2min
page 142

Policy priorities

4min
pages 140-141

Figure 2.11 Post-GFC slowdown of the drivers of productivity growth

10min
pages 136-139

References

12min
pages 101-108

Analyzing the effects of drivers

1min
page 128

Developments in drivers of productivity

2min
page 134

Figure 2.1 Innovation

5min
pages 114-115

Box 2.1 Review of recent firm-level total factor productivity literature

8min
pages 130-133

Summary of stylized facts

2min
page 126

Long-run drivers

4min
pages 112-113

Box 1.1 Productivity: Conceptual considerations and measurement challenges

9min
pages 85-88

Conclusion

2min
page 96

Annex 1A Cyclical and technology-driven labor productivity developments

1min
page 100

Figure B1.1.1 Labor productivity decomposition and natural capital in EMDEs

7min
pages 89-91

References

13min
pages 65-70

Key findings and policy messages

4min
pages 32-33

Future research directions

2min
page 64

Synopsis

2min
page 39

PART I Productivity: Trends and Explanations

0
pages 71-74

Evolution of productivity

2min
page 78

Sources of the slowdown in labor productivity growth after the GFC

2min
page 83

Implications of COVID-19 for productivity

11min
pages 34-38
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