Global Productivity

Page 397

GLOBAL PRODUCTIVITY

CHAPTER 6

371

Technology-induced employment losses were also more severe in countries with smaller foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and, in the short term, in higher-productivity countries and those less open to global trade.

Effects of demand shocks Although demand shocks are, by construction, short-lived, their effects can be longlived. Over a 10-year horizon, demand shocks accounted for about one-quarter to onethird of labor productivity variation between 1980 and 2018. Demand shocks can be caused by changes in expectations about the returns to investment, changes in government spending or taxes, changes in monetary conditions, externally driven changes in commodity prices and terms of trade, or changes in “animal spirits” affecting investment behavior (Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti 2010; Keynes 1936).18 Although the methodology used here does not explicitly distinguish demand shocks from other factors that can drive business cycle fluctuations, the resulting characteristics are consistent with those associated with a typical demand shock.19 Below we consider changes in animal spirits as a determinant of investment behavior and show that their productivity effects can be highly persistent through the capital-deepening channel. Annex 6B examines as a second example the effects of commodity price fluctuations, a key demand-driven determinant of productivity developments in EMDE commodity exporters. Response of labor productivity to demand shocks. In advanced economies, a positive demand shock raises labor productivity only for a couple of years, after which the effect fades. In contrast, in EMDEs, positive demand shocks are associated with sustained productivity gains (figure 6.6): a decade after a one-standard-deviation positive demand shock, labor productivity remains about 1 percent higher. Long-term responses to demand shocks. In advanced economies, the rapid reversal of labor productivity gains arising from positive demand shocks largely reflects a contraction of TFP and fading investment after an initial boost. Initial employment gains fade, in less than a decade, as do gains in consumption and the initial surge in inflation. In EMDEs, however, the effects of demand shocks are more persistent. TFP and employment gains fade, but investment remains 4 percent higher and consumption about 1 percent higher a decade after a positive demand shock that generates a 1 percent increase in labor productivity (figure 6.6). 18 Changing expectations (“news”) about future technological innovations have also been cited as a key driver of the business cycle, resulting in large swings in investment growth (Beaudry and Portier 2014). Demand-side factors have been found to dominate the short-run volatility of output in the G7 economies (den Haan and Sumner 2004). 19 Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2018a) identify a common driver of unemployment, investment, consumption, and output at business cycle frequencies in the United States using the same technique. They find similar characteristics to those identified in the panel VAR framework here across advanced economies and EMDEs. They attribute the resulting responses to “confidence” shocks, which cause comovement of investment and consumption at the targeted frequencies (Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas 2018b).


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Annex 7B Marginal productivity gap

4min
pages 452-453

References

14min
pages 456-463

Annex 7A Data and methodology

6min
pages 448-451

References

13min
pages 421-428

Sectoral productivity gaps

2min
page 432

Annex 7C Firm TFP data, estimates, and methodology

5min
pages 454-455

Annex 6C Commodity-driven productivity developments: Methodology

2min
page 420

Conclusion and policy implications

2min
page 412

Drivers of productivity: Technology vs. demand shocks

2min
page 391

Annex 6A SVAR identification of technology drivers of productivity

8min
pages 413-416

PART III Technological Change and Sectoral Shifts

0
pages 383-386

Effects of demand shocks

2min
page 397

Figure 6.1 Global labor productivity surges and declines

7min
pages 388-390

Sub-Saharan Africa

2min
page 350

Figure 5.22 Factors supporting productivity growth in MNA

7min
pages 333-335

Figure 5.19 Drivers of productivity growth in LAC

9min
pages 325-328

South Asia

4min
pages 337-338

Conclusion

2min
page 363

Figure 5.13 Drivers of productivity growth in ECA

10min
pages 314-317

Middle East and North Africa

2min
page 329

Latin America and the Caribbean

2min
page 318

Figure 5.12 Drivers of productivity growth in ECA in regional comparison

5min
pages 312-313

Europe and Central Asia

2min
page 305

Figure 5.7 Drivers of productivity growth in EAP

3min
page 301

PART II Regional Dimensions of Productivity

0
pages 281-284

Sources of, and bottlenecks to, regional productivity growth

4min
pages 290-291

Figure 5.1 Evolution of regional productivity in EMDE regions

4min
pages 288-289

East Asia and Pacific

2min
page 295

References

12min
pages 274-280

Evolution of productivity across regions

2min
page 287

Annex 4F Productivity measurement: PPP vs. market exchange rates

4min
pages 268-269

Annex 4C Beta-convergence testing

2min
page 257

Figure 4.4 Convergence club memberships

2min
page 242

Annex 4D Estimating convergence clubs: Commonalities in productivity levels

7min
pages 258-260

Testing for convergence and its pace

4min
pages 236-237

Conclusion and policy implications

7min
pages 253-255

Convergence clubs

7min
pages 239-241

Annex 3B Robustness

2min
page 213

Conclusion

2min
page 204

Figure 3.8 Episodes across different types of events

4min
pages 193-194

Annex 3A Data, sources, and definitions

2min
page 206

How has productivity convergence evolved?

2min
page 231

Figure 3.4 Episodes of war

2min
page 187

What policies can mitigate the effects of adverse events?

2min
page 203

Figure 3.5 Correlations between war frequency and productivity growth

7min
pages 188-190

Figure B3.1.1 Severity of pandemics, epidemics, and climate disasters

6min
pages 179-181

Figure B3.1.3 Impact of epidemics

6min
pages 184-186

Annex 2A Partial correlations

2min
page 146

Figure 3.2 Episodes of natural disaster

4min
pages 175-176

Box 3.1 How do epidemics affect productivity?

1min
page 178

Adverse events: Literature and stylized facts

2min
page 171

Conclusion

2min
page 145

Figure 2.13 Developments in financial and government technology

2min
page 143

Figure 2.12 EMDE infrastructure and education gaps

2min
page 142

Policy priorities

4min
pages 140-141

Figure 2.11 Post-GFC slowdown of the drivers of productivity growth

10min
pages 136-139

References

12min
pages 101-108

Analyzing the effects of drivers

1min
page 128

Developments in drivers of productivity

2min
page 134

Figure 2.1 Innovation

5min
pages 114-115

Box 2.1 Review of recent firm-level total factor productivity literature

8min
pages 130-133

Summary of stylized facts

2min
page 126

Long-run drivers

4min
pages 112-113

Box 1.1 Productivity: Conceptual considerations and measurement challenges

9min
pages 85-88

Conclusion

2min
page 96

Annex 1A Cyclical and technology-driven labor productivity developments

1min
page 100

Figure B1.1.1 Labor productivity decomposition and natural capital in EMDEs

7min
pages 89-91

References

13min
pages 65-70

Key findings and policy messages

4min
pages 32-33

Future research directions

2min
page 64

Synopsis

2min
page 39

PART I Productivity: Trends and Explanations

0
pages 71-74

Evolution of productivity

2min
page 78

Sources of the slowdown in labor productivity growth after the GFC

2min
page 83

Implications of COVID-19 for productivity

11min
pages 34-38
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