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Bogotá, Colombia A.4 Lessons learned from the Metrobús bus rapid transit project in
(42 kilometers in total), 1 central station, 4 intermediate stations, 52 regular stops, and a 420-vehicle fleet. The project had the following goals:
• Reduce costs and travel times for users • Foster competitiveness, urban entrepreneurship, and productivity in the city • Encourage technological advancements and savings in fuel • Improve accessibility to main roads • Improve safety and reduce pollution • Carry 400,000 passengers per day.
The government (national and local) funded the infrastructure (roads, stations, stops, and bus parking and maintenance depots), part of the rolling stock, and fare collection systems. Total investment in the project was US$320 million. Multilateral development banks provided around 5 percent of the total public financing. Four bundled operators raised more than US$138 million to finance and procure the rolling stock. Two other private partners operated ticketing and fare collection systems. A second phase of the project includes availability payments to pay for the infrastructure, and a third phase includes the use of local sources of income to pay for the infrastructure.
Phase I of TransMilenio achieved positive results. More than 1,200 old buses were decommissioned and replaced by articulated buses on dedicated routes. Government subsidies were not required to cover operation costs. However, the government faced construction delays due to difficulties in obtaining
TABLE A.3 Lessons learned from the TransMilenio bus rapid transit project in Bogotá, Colombia
BEST PRACTICES
• A fuel tax was established to finance the feasibility studies, designs, and construction. This tax paid for most of the infrastructure required for TransMilenio. [financing risk] • The project demonstrated how a national and local government can collaborate to develop impactful projects through clear delegation of responsibilities, setting of deadlines, and provision of resources to the project. [political and social risk] • The project has good financial management through the fideicomiso and electronic payment systems. [financing risk] • The competitive procurement process gave more certainty to the bidders and led to an unbiased choice of operator. [operation risk] • Tariffs reflect the costs of operation. [operation risk] [political and social risk] [financing risk] • The payment mechanism includes performance-based incentives. [operation risk] • TransMilenio’s control center monitors service effectively and communicates information to users. This helps to plan, validate, and dispatch system operations. [operation risk] • Creation of a special-purpose vehicle allowed for the integration of existing operators, preventing social conflicts and maintaining local experience. [operation risk] [political and social risk] • The project included a system to decommission old buses to maintain service quality and reduce congestion. [operation risk] • Continued political support and championing of the project are important ingredients of success. [political and social risk] [planning risk] • A better project structure would have improved outcomes— many of the issues experienced during the operations phase originated on the public side of the partnership. Infrastructure was outpaced by demand or the quality was inadequate. The city would have benefited more by assigning more functions to the private sector. [planning risk] [design risk] • To avoid construction delays, the planning authority could have obtained permits and acquired land before executing the construction contract. [planning risk] • The government could have established deadlines to start operations and conduct technical supervision of construction contractors, which could have been promoted with penaltyand-reward mechanisms in the contract. [construction risk] • Insufficient planning and integration of phases may overconcentrate demand in some areas and affect the quality of service. [construction risk] • The government should follow good corporate governance practices to avoid brain drain and learning costs. [operation risk] • The public authority should regularly review the operations report and respond as needed to changes in demand and system pressures. [operation risk] [design risk] • Demand forecasts must be robust and should be updated periodically. [design risk] [operations risk] • Increasing coverage of payment points and introducing incentives for concessionaires to maintain better control of payment evasion may have improved financial performance. [financing risk] [operation risk]
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
environmental and city permits; despite the early success of TransMilenio, protests about service quality have led to injuries, arrests, and damage to more than five bus stations (Centre for Public Impact 2016). Table A.3 shows the main lessons learned from the project.
Metrobús formalized public transportation in Av. Los Insurgentes in Mexico City. This case presents the development of a BRT system with exclusive lanes using the “bundled private finance and operation of buses” PPP structure. Metrobús has achieved positive results, but unforeseen growth in demand has reduced the efficiency of its operations.
Before Metrobús, Mexico City had a largely nonregulated and inefficient public transportation system. Buses had aged beyond their useful life and had low capacity; the overall system was oversupplied—particularly during nonpeak times—exacerbating congestion. The Mexico City government led the Metrobús project to provide safer and faster service by reorganizing and better regulating existing operators. The project involved broad negotiation, instead of large capital expenditures. The goal was to improve the efficiency of one of the city’s busiest corridors. The project was structured in two phases. This led to the development of 30 kilometers of lanes, 44 intermediate stations, 3 terminals, and an initial bus fleet of 80 vehicles that grew rapidly to satisfy an ever-growing demand. To date, the Metrobús fleet amounts to 225 buses. The Metrobús project had six basic goals:
• Improve access to fast and safe public transportation • Service an increasingly dense corridor • enhance road network efficiency • Improve infrastructure to reorganize public transportation • Replace obsolete rolling stock • Carry 500,000 passengers a day.
The government financed and built US$33.8 million in project infrastructure: roads, stations, terminals, and fare collection systems.3 It also supported a newly created special-purpose vehicle (SPv) rolling stock purchase with US$9 million, half given through a scrapping program to compensate operators for retiring their obsolete buses (stakeholders’ engagement).4 Three bundled operators financed and procured the rolling stock—using commercial practices—and operated the buses on a 10-year concession contract. Operators also financed and built maintenance and parking depots on land provided by the government. A fourth private partner operates the ticketing and fare collection systems. The total private finance raised for the project was US$16.5 million, equivalent to 27 percent of the total investment for the project.
Metrobús initially achieved efficient operations. Its early financial sustainability relied largely on government subsidies that were provided either through direct cash transfers to the SPv operators or through the public SPv operators, which were allowed to operate more kilometers not fully paid by the transportation authority. Recently issues have begun to arise because of excess demand. Although the bus fleet increased from 80 vehicles in 2005 to 225 in 2017, overcrowding in stations, low operating speeds, and long waiting times are still common. Furthermore, Metrobús operated without a central control system between
