Public-Private Partnerships in Urban Bus Systems

Page 163

Appendix A | 145

(42 kilometers in total), 1 central station, 4 intermediate stations, 52 regular stops, and a 420-vehicle fleet. The project had the following goals: • • • • • •

Reduce costs and travel times for users Foster competitiveness, urban entrepreneurship, and productivity in the city Encourage technological advancements and savings in fuel Improve accessibility to main roads Improve safety and reduce pollution Carry 400,000 passengers per day.

The government (national and local) funded the infrastructure (roads, s­ tations, stops, and bus parking and maintenance depots), part of the rolling stock, and fare collection systems. Total investment in the project was US$320 million. Multilateral development banks provided around 5 percent of the total public financing. Four bundled operators raised more than US$138 million to finance and procure the rolling stock. Two other private partners operated ­ticketing and fare collection systems. A second phase of the project includes availability payments to pay for the infrastructure, and a third phase includes the use of local sources of income to pay for the infrastructure. Phase I of TransMilenio achieved positive results. More than 1,200 old buses were decommissioned and replaced by articulated buses on dedicated routes. Government subsidies were not required to cover operation costs. However, the government faced construction delays due to difficulties in obtaining

TABLE A.3  Lessons

learned from the TransMilenio bus rapid transit project in Bogotá, Colombia

BEST PRACTICES

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

• A fuel tax was established to finance the feasibility studies, designs, and construction. This tax paid for most of the infrastructure required for TransMilenio. [financing risk] • The project demonstrated how a national and local government can collaborate to develop impactful projects through clear delegation of responsibilities, setting of deadlines, and provision of resources to the project. [political and social risk] • The project has good financial management through the fideicomiso and electronic payment systems. [financing risk] • The competitive procurement process gave more certainty to the bidders and led to an unbiased choice of operator. [operation risk] • Tariffs reflect the costs of operation. [operation risk] [political and social risk] [financing risk] • The payment mechanism includes performance-based incentives. [operation risk] • TransMilenio’s control center monitors service effectively and communicates information to users. This helps to plan, validate, and dispatch system operations. [operation risk] • Creation of a special-purpose vehicle allowed for the integration of existing operators, preventing social conflicts and maintaining local experience. [operation risk] [political and social risk] • The project included a system to decommission old buses to maintain service quality and reduce congestion. [operation risk] • Continued political support and championing of the project are important ingredients of success. [political and social risk] [planning risk]

• A better project structure would have improved outcomes— many of the issues experienced during the operations phase originated on the public side of the partnership. Infrastructure was outpaced by demand or the quality was inadequate. The city would have benefited more by assigning more functions to the private sector. [planning risk] [design risk] • To avoid construction delays, the planning authority could have obtained permits and acquired land before executing the construction contract. [planning risk] • The government could have established deadlines to start operations and conduct technical supervision of construction contractors, which could have been promoted with penaltyand-reward mechanisms in the contract. [construction risk] • Insufficient planning and integration of phases may overconcentrate demand in some areas and affect the quality of service. [construction risk] • The government should follow good corporate governance practices to avoid brain drain and learning costs. [operation risk] • The public authority should regularly review the operations report and respond as needed to changes in demand and system pressures. [operation risk] [design risk] • Demand forecasts must be robust and should be updated periodically. [design risk] [operations risk] • Increasing coverage of payment points and introducing incentives for concessionaires to maintain better control of payment evasion may have improved financial performance. [financing risk] [operation risk]

Source: World Bank.


Turn static files into dynamic content formats.

Create a flipbook

Articles inside

A.16 Lessons learned from the business collaboration agreements in Singapore

10min
pages 179-186

partnership

5min
pages 188-190

A.13 Lessons learned for urban mobility in Port-au-Prince, Haiti A.14 Lessons learned from the TransOeste bus rapid transit project in

2min
page 175

C.4 Essential elements of an operation concession contract

2min
pages 192-195

A.15 Lessons learned from the business collaboration agreements in Medellín, Colombia

2min
page 178

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

5min
pages 176-177

A.11 Lessons learned from the Metrobús-Q System in Quito, Ecuador A.12 Lessons learned from the Avanza Zaragoza concession in Zaragoza,

2min
page 173

Spain

3min
page 174

A.8 Lessons learned from the SYTRAL integrated public transportation system in Lyon, France

2min
page 170

A.9 Lessons learned from the DART Phase I bus rapid transit project in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

3min
page 171

Cali, Colombia

2min
page 169

Acapulco, Mexico A.7 Lessons learned from the Metrocali bus rapid transit project in

3min
page 168

Monterrey, Mexico A.6 Lessons learned from the Acabús bus rapid transit project in

5min
pages 166-167

Mexico City, Mexico A.5 Lessons learned from the Ecovía bus rapid transit project in

3min
page 165

Bogotá, Colombia A.4 Lessons learned from the Metrobús bus rapid transit project in

5min
pages 163-164

A.2 Lessons learned from the Transantiago bus rapid transit project in Santiago, Chile A.3 Lessons learned from the TransMilenio bus rapid transit project in

3min
page 162

in Lima, Peru

5min
pages 160-161

11.2 Situations affecting economic equilibrium A.1 Lessons learned from the Metropolitano bus rapid transit project

2min
page 156

Economic and financial elements

2min
page 155

Institutional and regulatory elements

7min
pages 152-154

11.1 Remuneration arrangements and incentives

4min
pages 150-151

Technical elements

1min
page 149

Setting up subsidies

4min
pages 145-146

Funding sources

9min
pages 141-144

Private financing instruments

12min
pages 135-139

10.1 Summary of the World Bank Group’s instruments

2min
page 140

Structuring a project’s capital

4min
pages 131-132

Model 4: Private finance and operation of electric buses

2min
page 125

Model 1: Bundled private finance and operation of buses

1min
page 115

bundled or unbundled

2min
page 122

Topical bibliography

5min
pages 108-114

Macroeconomic risks

1min
page 101

Topical bibliography

4min
pages 96-100

7.13 International lessons for achieving quality and level of service

2min
page 89

7.8 International lessons for managing fare evasion and cash risk

2min
page 85

7.7 International lesson for managing affordability risk

2min
page 84

7.1 International lessons for acquiring land

2min
page 80

Planning

1min
page 79

6.5 International lessons for defining technology components

2min
page 77

6.2 International lesson for dealing with incumbent operators

2min
page 71

5.1 Categories and types of direct risk, organized by project stage

2min
page 63

5.2 Definition of direct project risks

2min
page 64

Dealing with incumbent operators

1min
page 69

Identifying project risks

2min
page 62

Overview and guiding principles

1min
page 61

Institutional and regulatory elements

2min
page 56

Fiscal capacity

2min
page 55

Implement punctual infrastructure-related interventions

2min
page 47

Technical elements

2min
page 54

Support private sector initiatives to promote user-friendly technologies

2min
page 46

References

4min
pages 50-53

References

3min
pages 43-45

and Tendering

2min
page 41

2.2 Examples of the objectives and restrictions of key stakeholders

2min
page 42

References

2min
pages 39-40

public or private

2min
page 31

1.2 A public-private partnership: Three reasons why

2min
page 36

Notes

2min
page 38

What is a public-private partnership in urban bus systems?

4min
pages 29-30

Notes

2min
page 24

References

0
pages 25-26

Further discussion

2min
page 37

Key Messages

5min
pages 22-23
Issuu converts static files into: digital portfolios, online yearbooks, online catalogs, digital photo albums and more. Sign up and create your flipbook.