50 years of shipbuilding on the banks of the Seine by Worms & Cie

ACSM AND ITS GARDEN CITY (1917–1972)

50 YEARS OF SHIPBUILDING ON THE BANKS OF THE SEINE

www.wormsetcie.com

50 YEARS OF SHIPBUILDING ON THE BANKS OF THE SEINE

www.wormsetcie.com

50 YEARS OF SHIPBUILDING ON THE BANKS OF THE SEINE ACSM AND ITS GARDEN CITY (1917–1972)

Christian Lebailly and Mathieu Bidaux, Based on the archives of Worms & Cie and its shipyard named Ateliers & Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime – ACSM This publication is downloadable at www.wormsetcie.com. ©www.wormsetcie.com ISBN 978-2-9199525-8-8 (April 2022) Any complete or partial performance or reproduction made by any process whatsoever, without the consent of the authors, or the publisher or of their successors in title or assigns, shall be unlawful and constitute an infringement under the Law of 18 April 2001 and subsequent legal provisions on the copyright and intellectual property in Luxembourg. The same shall apply to translation, adaptation or transformation, arrangement or reproduction by any technique or process whatsoever.

The text in this book contains numerous references to French organisations, institutions, administrative services, etc. In order to make reading easier, we have provided an English translation of most of these terms. Some translations are available on the Internet; others are our own. If you would like to do further research on these French organisations, please refer to the list of their names in English and French in the table at the end of the book.

Introduction by Mathieu Bidaux

I. “Industrial activity sprung up in an abandoned corner” by Mathieu Bidaux

II. 1914–1917 “Present and future needs” by Christian Lebailly

III. 1917–1939 “Transformation from a rural community to an industrial centre” by Mathieu Bidaux and Christian Lebailly

IV. 1939-1944 Under the yoke of the German occupiers and the Allied air raids by Christian Lebailly

178

V. 1945–1959 Rebirth, modernisation and climax by Mathieu Bidaux

252

VI. 1960–1972 From bad to worse – the final chapter for ACSM by Christian Lebailly

320

Ships and other equipment built in Le Trait between 1920 and 1971Ð

391

List of the names of organisations, institutions, administrative services, etc., in English and FrenchÐÐ

403

Table of contents

409

Nestled between two meanders of the Seine, Le Trait had forever been tucked away between river and forest, earning its living from fishing, forestry and agriculture. A nondescript Normandy village, its lethargy came to abrupt end in 1917. Whereas elsewhere, the war brought death, havoc and desolation, for Le Trait it was a source of unexpected growth and rebirth. Within just four years, a radical change occurred. Fields and green pastures gave way to vast construction shops, while the riverbanks became home to eight large slipways. Its status transformed from a small village to a bustling town at the forefront of technological, social and cultural progress. The entire Seine valley, on the road to Paris, entered the Industrial Age. Nowadays, for anyone familiar with the rural landscape of Normandy, with its fields, cows, apple trees and names like Yvetot, Yerville and the Plateau de Caux, just as for anyone familiar with maritime Normandy and its cities of Honfleur, Dieppe, Le Havre or Cherbourg, the sight of Le Trait will come as a surprise. The town is unparalleled in appearance and ambiance, bisected by a straight arterial road extending for several kilometres, while here and there you will see houses, buildings and shops. Secondary roads run parallel. It doesn’t really have a town centre, normally characterised by a town hall, church and nearby market square. Sharp eyes are needed to find anywhere that could be described as historic: possibly the area surrounding Saint-Nicolas church, now on the outskirts following the town’s transformation. It must be remembered – or, at least, 7

not forgotten – that for almost half a century (1917– 1966/1972), the lifeblood of Le Trait was its shipyard, otherwise known as the “Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime,” or “ACSM” for short. In 1917, Le Trait had a population of just 350. The figure for 2012 was 5,329. Accelerating until the 1930s and peaking at more than 6,400 in the 1960s, this growth was rooted in the decision of Worms & Cie to establish an industrial complex in the town, thus creating a new community and fostering its culture. How did a previously rural, wooded and even swampy village develop into a garden city, one of the most advanced of its day in terms of social and practical organisation, an exemplary town in the eyes of visiting officials and journalists, as witnessed by their many enthusiastic articles? Such an outcome could not have been achieved without overcoming numerous challenges: piecing together a vast domain from parcels of land in the hands of various property owners; importing materials despite the war; building infrastructures; attracting a labour force and training it if needed; providing housing with suitable conditions of hygiene and comfort; feeding, caring for and entertaining workers and their families; in a nutshell, recruiting and retaining a labour force in this neck of the woods. Having accomplished that, the village developed into a town with streets, neighbourhoods, houses, shops, a health centre, a community centre, a cinema, etc. A town with a unique physiognomy: a garden city, to which the residents’ attachment throughout the decades was testimony to its success. Yet a town now without shipbuilding. ACSM belongs to the past. A glorious industrial past, for sure, but a bygone past. The company was unable to come to

terms with competition from its French and foreign rivals at a time when order books were hard to fill: its inland location on the banks of the Seine was unsuitable for launching ships with ever-increasingly gigantic tonnage. At the end of the 1950s, the government decided to concentrate naval shipbuilding, which led to the merger of ACSM with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat forcing ACSM to close its doors in 1972. Losing its main employer, the deeply wounded town had to “reinvent” itself. Starting in 1974, Le Trait got a second wind by welcoming Flexi-France, a major player in the flexible pipe industry, a colossus, it seemed, when looking at the huge coils stored in its warehouses on the Rue Jean-Huré. Sanofi Aventis, another flagship of the French economy, brought further relief. Like the ships built by ACSM, the reputation of these companies and their products has travelled across oceans. What initially attracted them to Le Trait? The founding action – if not the fruitful power – of Maison Worms. The importance of the industrial saga in Le Trait and the value of its urbanisation surpass the local or regional context. Preserving and disseminating this two-pronged story fell first to Béatrice Maheut in 1982, under the direction of Marcel Boivin; and then to Paul Bonmartel, the Le Trait chronicler and author of numerous publications: Le Trait, cité nouvelle (1995); Histoire du chantier naval du Trait (1997); Histoire du patrimoine industriel de DuclairYainville-Le Trait (1998); Les pionniers traitons (2006). Likewise, the research conducted by Jacques Derouard and the three-volume work by Gilbert Fromager entitled Le Canton de Duclair have enabled younger generations to relive 20th century life in Le Trait. This books falls in line with those publications.

“Industrial activity sprung up in an abandoned corner” Ch. Pinchon, Havre-Éclair, 30 November 1921

1 - Le Trait on the road to Rouen 2 - Map of the Le Trait zone, B. Maheut, Histoire des chantiers du Trait, p. 12

To grasp the magnitude of the upheaval that struck the village of Le Trait in 1917, we need to know its precise location and trace its history as far back as memory allows.1 The village is located exactly 60 km from Le Havre and 30 km west (downstream) of Rouen, on the right bank of the Seine, in the Seine-Maritime department (known as Seine-Inférieure until 1955) in Upper Normandy. At Le Trait, the meanders of the river narrow as it heads towards Rouen, the regional capital.

the Hautes-Alpes department provides another indication: like Lettret, Le Trait may mean “narrow place.” The oldest written documents on the ford refer to that of Yainville to designate a single parish: Saint-André, Saint-Martin and Saint-Nicolas; for many years, Le Trait and Yainville together formed one and the same subdivision. A river crossing, but also a land crossing: apparently, a Roman road traversed Le Trait, serving as a shortcut, a path through the forest to reach the hamlet of Vaurouy. The population of Vieux-Trait must have lived around the castle, the outline of which can still be discerned between the Calvary and the Seine; the “Vieux-Château footpath” keeps the memory of this initial settlement alive. In his Simples notes sur l’histoire du Trait, Jacques Derouard recalls discovering “pucks made from polished stone pierced with a hole,” which were used to keep fishing nets under water when fishing for sturgeon, salmon, sole or eels. Noted in documents dating back to the 11th century, a church in Clos Saint-Martin, the foundations of which were found during construction of the shipyard, leads us to believe that the first inhabitants of Le Trait settled near here.

Le Trait: a river crossing or “narrow place”? The site had been inhabited, so it seems, since Antiquity. Small bronze axes were discovered there, possibly dating back to 1500 BC. By then, metals were already coming from England. The Seine, wider than it is today, was a trade route connecting Le Trait to Northern Europe. The village was surrounded by thick forests which most likely grew down to the riverbanks and provided wood in large quantities. For centuries, harvesting wood was the main source of income for many of the inhabitants of the nearby town of Canteleu. Trajectum is the Latin name for Le Trait. Its meaning is similar to that of Maastricht: Trajectum ad Mosam or Mosae trajectum, meaning a river crossing on the Meuse. Le Trait had a ford allowing travellers to cross over to the left bank of the Seine. It was also a transit point to Rouen or Le Havre. To document its etymological relationship with Maastricht, we cite Treiectensis in 634, Triecto, Triectu in the 7th century, Triiect from 768–781, Traiecto in 945; so many patronymics for the Dutch city strongly resemble that of Le Trait. The village of Lettret in

Border territory between Jumièges and Saint-Wandrille Several characteristics result from the history of Le Trait during the Middle Ages. Certain local lords and abbots agreed to exploit the resources of the territory, the borders of which seemed fairly fluid. Where exactly did the village begin and end? Documents from the Abbey of Jumièges confirm that the monks operated a ferry there before the Norman invasions, prior to the 8th century. A charter by Guillaume Longue-Épée dated 930 cited the “Le Trait d’Avilette manor” as belonging to Jumièges. According to Jacques Derouard, the oldest reference to Le Trait as an organised community – a village, so to speak – dates back to 1027, in a charter issued by Richard II, Duke of Normandy. This charter confirms the possessions of the Abbey of Jumièges in the Seine valley, extending from Belinguetuyt (Bliquetuit) to

1 J. Derouard, Simples notes sur l’histoire du Trait, Groupe Archéologique du Val de Seine, 1979.

Josephsartum (Joseph-Essart) and on up to Vuitvillam (Yville), passing through Euuenvillam (Yainville) and Tractus (Le Trait) on the right bank of the river. Conversely, nearby Gothville (Gauville) belonged to the Abbey of Saint-Wandrille. The document by Richard II mentions the existence of farms in these villages. In 1027 (or 1024), the Count of Évreux apparently forced the Abbey of Jumièges to sell him “the ground and woods of Le Trait, from the Yainville valley all the way to the Croix du Comte.” Legal proceedings involving the monks of Saint-Wandrille similarly provide evidence that they were allowed to exploit the woods, especially for heating. Wood: a coveted source of wealth The village actually described itself as a border territory, a Middle Ages buffer between the abbeys of Jumièges and Saint-Wandrille.2 At stake: the forest. But the forest ultimately fell to the Counts of Évreux (Richard and his heirs) who served as arbiters between the rival abbeys. Between 1055 and 1066, a charter issued by William the Conqueror (or William the Bastard), Duke of Normandy, granted Richard, Count of Évreux, the tithe on all his revenues north of the Seine, notably the Le Trait forests and the Mesnil-sous-Jumièges mills. The wood was used to build manors and houses, agricultural equipment and warships. Before 1066 and the conquest of England, William of Évreux, son of Richard, reportedly had eighty ships built from logs originating in Le Trait and Maulévrier. Trunks and firewood were transported down the Seine to the naval shipyards in Villequier and Caudebec. There were apparently two chapels in Le Trait. A few archaeological details of the current Saint-Nicolas Church – such as the position of its buttresses – lead us to believe that the church was constructed on the site of a 12th-century chapel. Establishing a single village centre based around a single religious monument probably proved difficult. Conducted under the aegis of Jumièges and SaintWandrille, forest clearance extended cultivable land. At the beginning of the 13th century, some woods were cleared for Richard, Lord of Yvetot and Touffreville, isolating the Le Trait forest in the north from the rest of the

The Seine, as seen from the Le Trait forest

forest. Cleared at that time, the hamlet of La Bucaille (meaning “little woods”) serves as a testament to deforestation in the 13th century. The Seine, source of nourishment In the 14th century, the Duke of Normandy asked the Viscount of Caudebec to pay Gautier Bourgeois, a ferryman, and his fellow sailors the sum of 24 gold deniers, as payment for transporting him by boat from Jumièges to Harfleur. As with the other towns and villages along the Seine, daily life in Le Trait was dictated by the river. A fort was built, the significance of which prompted a visit by the “bailli” of Rouen in March 1369. Throughout the Hundred Years’ War, the fort was in the hands of the lords of Tancarville, who took over from the County of Évreux which had entered the royal domain due to its dependency on King John of England. The important Counts of Harcourt and Melun served in succession among the lords of Le Trait. The last of the Melun line was killed at the famous battle of Agincourt in 1415. The fortifications fell into Burgundian hands in 1418, only to be captured one year later by the English. These fortifications were mentioned in the capitulation deed of 1449. In 1485, mention was made of a ferry on the Seine plying “from the mudflats of Le Traict all the way to Mesleraye.” A pier was apparently located at “Buquet de Lisle.” On the right bank, the ferry departed from

2 The presence of a fortified castle reinforced the idea of a border territory separating two powers.

among the pastures within the area named Traict de Goville, among the marshes at La Hazaie. The area seems to have been generally marshy. At the end of the 15th century, the monks of Jumièges complained that the land to which they had rights was entirely fallow. In the 16th century, the residence of the feudal lord was transferred to the castle of Le Taillis near Duclair. During that same century, a post house was established in the village.3 From the 16th century to the Revolution, the Lords of Vaurouy and the “Sires” of Carouge owned the village. An edict of 1566, renewed in 1569 and 1571 and discovered by Jacques Derouard, put up “wastelands, fields, marshes, grounds planted with bushes and woods” for sale.

However, sixty years later, a third map drawn by a surveyor named Lefebvre and dated 17 March 1735 showed that the forested area had shrunk by over three hundred arpents (total area: 2,844 arpents), probably due to forest clearance: for example, in 1699, Abraham Carrier purchased some lands for ploughing which were said to have been formerly wooded. Likewise, tree feller huts were constructed near the edge of the forest in Hauteville. According to a document dated 17 March 1628, a captain and an archer aboard a “flambart” (a small sailing boat) apparently had a longstanding mission to stop ships on the river to check whether their cargo contained salt, as its transport was subject to the payment of a royal tax. Plan de la forest du Traict by Jean Fleury

Forest clearance On a “map of the Le Traict forest”4 drawn up in Paris by Jean Fleury in August 1674 the domain, with a surface area of 3,160 arpents (1,080.32 hectares), was divided into three “gardes.”5 Fleury drew a sort of triangle, two sides of which bordered the Seine. Along it were marked the villages or hamlets of Caudebec, Gauville, Neuville (which faced an island), Le Trait and its marshes, Claquenel, Yainville, La Chapelle de SaintJulien, Saint-Paul, and Duclair. In a first map drawn up ten years earlier by Pierre Delavigne in 1665 on the orders of Jean-Baptiste Voysin de La Noiraye, a second island6 was shown alongside La Mailleraye, whose castle or manor was presented within a vast enclosure. A port was depicted around a site known as “La Plage” (the Beach).7 The total surface area, similarly split up into three parts, covered an identical 3,160 arpents.

Map of Le Trait by Pierre Delavigne

3 https://anciennephotodutrait.jimdo.com. 4 Maps of the forest of Le Trait by J. Fleury entitled Figure et arpentage de la forest du Traict […] / faict à Paris de l’ordonnance de Monsr Le Feron, conseiller du roi […] par moy Jean Fleury, arpenteur, 1674, and by P. Delavigne, entitled Plan de la forest du Traict, en la maistrise de Caudebec, divisée en trois gardes ansy qu’il appert par la table suivante, contenant le nombre de 3160 arpens, faict l’an 1665 (see illustration). 5 Dictionary Littré: “Extent of the jurisdiction of an official in charge of preserving the woods.” 6 The island was known as “Candie,” or “Platon du Trait.” 7 J. Derouard, op. cit.

Floods and tidal bores occurred as frequently as shipwrecks, such as the one in Villequier that swept away Victor Hugo’s daughter, Léopoldine, and his son-inlaw. The ex-voto ships adorning the church of Le Trait bear witness to the villagers’ concern for guarding against these perils. Drowned victims were frequently found in the marshes. Their remains were buried on the spot, in a seated position. In the mid-1950s, in an area previously covered by the Seine, a grave containing three seated corpses was exhumed in open ground along the Rue Denis Papin. When the deceased were Christian, they were taken to the cemetery via a route known as the Valley of the Drowned (“Val des Noyés” now spelled “Val des Noyers” – Valley of the Walnut Trees).8

A Normandy village still half-asleep (19th century)

Le Trait, the Route du Passage (across the Seine)

Le Trait and its inhabitants 1835 marked the election of the first Mayor of the community; his name was Jean-Baptiste Doucet, and he held this position until 1869. When Worms & Cie started operations in Le Trait, the municipal council was headed by Paul Aubert, its sixth mayor. His term ended in 1919.

The ferry In the 18th century, the ferry was located in VieuxTrait. The road leading to the ferry, the “chemin de La Quesnaye,” was so steep it was difficult to use. The ferrymen had come from the Abbey of Jumièges since the 14th century, with the job being passed down from one generation to the next. They lived in the ferryman’s cottage and were able to maintain a small farm. Some had more than one job. For example, ferryman Michel Rollin was also a merchant. The ferrymen lived off the ferry proceeds, only having to pay the abbey the cost of the lease. They were required to carry out all repairs to the boat and received no money for transporting the monks. According to a public notice in July 1779, for each peddler or passenger, they could collect one “sou Tournois”; for each riding horse, two “sous”; for each horned animal, one “sou six deniers”; for each pig, nine “deniers.” Bushels of wheat, bales of hay and cider “pots” were the ordinary fare transported for the peasants. Navigation along the Seine was risky, if not downright dangerous, because there were no dikes along the river, and many sandbars formed vast bare islands which shifted at the whim of the currents. In 1827, someone named Jaustin mentioned the plains of Le Trait being snatched by the river after it washed away sections of a wall. In 1870, a syndicate was formed for the purpose of protecting riverside properties.

List of Mayors of Le Trait from 1835 to 1974 Period

Name

1835 1870 1873 1878 1900 1908 1919

1869 1873 1878 1900 1908 1919 1933

Jean-Baptiste Doucet Antoine Gustave Sécard Amédée Léon Delametterie Adrien Boquet Alphonse Leroy Paul Aubert Octave Pestel

1933

1941

Achille Dupuich

1941 1945

1945 1974

Eugène Hardy Raymond Bretéché

Source: Wikipedia (French version)

8 Ibid.

Party

Occupation

Teacher Director of the Société Immobilière du Trait SFIO

ACSM employee

The official records of births, marriages and deaths of 185811 listed twenty names, highlighting the common patronymics within the canton: Déhayes, Lefebvre, Levillain, Lebourgeois, Leboucher, Blondel, Caron, Leroy, Binard, Duhamel, Moret, etc. The listed occupations proved not so different from other Normandy villages: for example, Sire Lebourgeois was a farmer native to Le Trait, whose parents – themselves residents in the village – were both landowners and farmers. His wife, “née” Tanquerel, was also a farmer and from Le Trait. Eugène Anquetil, the witness at their wedding, was originally from Berville-surSeine, a nearby village located “on the other side of the water.” The civil-status record was filed with Mr Bicheray, a notary with offices in Jumièges. The community teacher, Alphonse Rivette, was one of the men in the public eye; he witnessed deaths and other deeds associated with the inhabitants’ daily lives. Accordingly, he was declared a “friend” of the inhabitants of Le Trait, at least among those mentioned in the civil registry. The majority of the population were farmers, with husband and wife working shoulder to shoulder. The rest included day labourers, several wood carriers, as well as a seaman, a weaver, a laundress, a seamstress, several people “without an occupation,” a carter and a servant. In 1900, the list included six customs officials, one carpenter, twenty-three farmers, five railway employees, two cartwrights, thirty-one day labourers, one road mender, one blacksmith, two fishermen, one crossing keeper, one cobbler, one boatman, nineteen servants, two seamstresses and two seafarers.12 The five railway employees were the one anomaly in the register, as their presence revealed that the industrial world had arrived in the heart of the Normandy countryside. The baker came from Caudebec-en-Caux, organising his rounds to supply the households. In 1906, the village consisted of one hundred and thirty-seven houses.13

Demographic change Between 1793 and 1851, the Le Trait population increased by barely one hundred from 476 to 570, though the trend started to reverse in 1856, going down to just 366 in 1911. As the statistics clearly show, the region’s population had been in decline since the end of the 19th century.9 Normally, a base of rural Pestel, Mayor of Le Trait workers formed a labour Octave from 1919 to 1933 reserve, providing a large portion of the skilled personnel for major enterprises. The population decline in Normandy posed an additional challenge for Worms & Cie during the construction phase of the naval shipyard and during the crises of the 20th century, such as in the reconstruction phase after the Second World War. On the other hand, this rural isolation encouraged the labour force to put down roots. Faraway from the major agglomerations (Rouen or Le Havre), the inhabitants of Le Trait organised their lives around services provided by the company. Evolution of the population10 1793 476 1856 543 1901 427 1962 6 407

1800 458 1861 536 1906 392 1968 6 408

1806 448 1866 522 1911 366 1975 6 321

1821 501 1872 465 1921 1 570 1982 5 917

1831 464 1876 504 1926 1 767 1990 5 485

1836 517 1881 445 1931 2 932 1999 5 397

1841 530 1886 466 1936 3 200 2006 5 217

1846 532 1891 498 1946 3 593 2007 5 186

1851 570 1896 460 1954 4 569 2012 5 239

11 Departmental Archives of Seine-Maritime: civil registry of Le Trait for the year 1858. We have chosen this year and this particular registry because of the completeness and legibility of the information. The inventory counted 543 inhabitants in Le Trait in 1856. It included the population in all hamlets associated with Le Trait. 12 G. Fromager, Le Canton de Duclair (1900-1925), Fontaine-le-Bourg: Le Pucheux, 2014 (1st ed., 1986), pp. 138–149. 13 Ibid.

9 On this subject, see the diagram on demographic change in Normandy, in Y. Marec, J. Quellien, J. Laspougeas, B. Garnier, and J.-P. Daviet, La Normandie au XIXe siècle. Entre tradition et modernité, Éditions Ouest-France, 2016. 10 See fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/LeTrait#Démographie until 1999, then INSEE (National Institute of Statistics) starting in 2006.

The village’s surface area totalled 1,752 hectares, dotted with woods and hamlets. The community owned a rowboat, a smaller version of the ferries typically found in the valley. That same year, in 1906, Saint-Martin-deBoscherville, just 17 km upstream and soon also to be a contender for the Worms naval shipyard, counted thirty or so craftspeople – laundresses, bakers, saddlers, a butcher, a pork butcher, cartwrights, innkeepers, café owners, a grocer, fruit merchants, a doctor, a carpenter, masons, a painter, a forest warden – and had its own ferry. In 1911, a gas lamp was installed to light the square in front of Saint-George’s Abbey.

opportunities and the promise of better salaries, people nevertheless generally continued to cultivate their own patch of land, provided they owned one. Everyday village life was dominated by the farming timetable: hay required a large labour force in June; straw at the end of July/beginning of August; the harvest in September; fruits in summer and autumn (cherries in July; greengage plums (la “Verte Bonne”) in August and the beginning of September; apples in October and November); cider-making at the very end of the season.16 Companies needed to prove their attractiveness in order to lure the labour force away from the fields.17 In the late 19th century and early 20th century, factories sprang up on the banks of the Seine, providing employment for hundreds of Normans. But it was the First World War that dramatically and very rapidly changed the face of the valley. The Latham airplane factory was built in 1916 in Caudebec-en-Caux. Forced to leave the combat zone, the Société des HautsFourneaux et Fonderies from Pont-à-Mousson opened a coal tar factory in Yainville in 1917. Standard Oil filed for authorisation to set up a refinery in Le Trait in 1917. Large-scale construction work on a new power plant took place in Yainville that same year. New wharves were built there for the purpose of unloading coal shipped in from Cardiff. The ships included colliers belonging to Maison Worms, which had set up shop in the large Welsh port in 1851. In 1921, a nut and bolt

Arrival of the railway Railway development began in the 1830s. In 1843, under the reign of Louis-Philippe, the Paris–Orléans and Paris–Rouen lines were launched; four years later, in 1847, the Paris-Rouen line reached Le Havre, thus making the sea accessible from the capital in six hours. Positioned at the heart of the rail network, Paris was connected to all the major regions of the country, including Normandy. On 20 June 1881, the Barentin-Duclair line was inaugurated14 and, in 1882, extended all the way to Caudebec. Le Trait got its own railway station.15 However, the station that really influenced the choice of sites for the Worms shipyard was La Mailleraye-Guerbaville, on the right bank, on the line to Caudebec-en-Caux. Better suited for transporting freight, the station would ultimately be connected to the industrial complex by a dedicated branch line. The station at Le Trait (or Vieux-Trait), a simple halt alongside the Seine, would be used by shipyard workers coming from the surrounding areas, who then had to walk another two kilometres to reach their place of work.

16 According to the memoirs of Henri Nitot (private archives), the ACSM management referred to the inhabitants of the area as “apple gatherers.” 17 The problem of farm leases (over which a crisis erupted in the 1920s and 1930s) prompted several peasants to take on factory work, as incomes from farming were low due to lease payments. See D. Bellamy, Geoffroy de Montalembert (1898-1995). Un aristocrate en République, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006, p. 110; and C. Bouillon and M. Bidaux, André Marie (1897-1974). Sur les traces d’un homme d’État, Paris: Autrement, 2014, pp. 136–137. André Marie was continuously asked to plead for revisions to farm leases before the Chamber of Deputies. This brings to mind the agricultural crises mentioned by Noiriel, crises that contributed to cutting off peasant-workers from their rural environment. See G. Noiriel, Les ouvriers dans la société française XIXeXXe, Paris: Le Seuil, 2002 (1st ed., 1986), p. 90 and p. 143, on the isolation of factories within rural environments, which fostered the workers’ local roots.

The industrialisation of the Seine valley: from farmer-soldier to farmer-worker Upon returning home from war, the men from the Seine valley – peasants for the most part – resumed their farming. Though factory work offered far more

14 F. Aubert, P. Sorel, G. Devaux, Duclair, un regard sur le passé, Fontaine-le-Bourg: Le Pucheux, 2011, p. 195. 15 J. Derouard, op. cit. See also M. Decarpentry and J.-P. Ferrer, Précis chronologique d’histoire. Les chemins de fer en terre de Caux, coll. “Les cahiers de terres de Caux,” 2015.

Traditional Normandy thatched-roof cottage

factory started operations in Duclair. In the 1930s, a soap factory and an oil mill opened in Yainville.18 As often reported in the regional press,19 this industrialisation raised standards of living, and parents could now hope to see their children moving up the income and social ladder.

The arrival of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime added to the overall enthusiasm. But it remains no less true that Le Trait, at the time Worms & Cie was interested in the location, had absolutely no industrial infrastructure (with the exception of its railway station). Any advantages to the site were to be sought elsewhere. To understand its attraction, we need to study the personality of Maison Worms and the problems it had been facing since the outbreak of the war.

18 P. Bonmartel, Histoire du patrimoine industriel de Duclair-Yainville-Le Trait (1891-1992), Luneray: Bertout, 1998; and E. Real, Le paysage industriel de la basse Seine, coll. “Images du patrimoine,” Connaissance du patrimoine de Haute-Normandie, Région Haute Normandie, 2008. 19 Normandie : Revue régionale illustrée mensuelle de toutes les questions intéressant la Normandie : économiques, commerciales, industrielles, agricoles, artistiques et littéraires, Nos 9 and 10, Alençon: Imprimerie Herpin, 1918. In P. Bonmartel, Les pionniers traitons. La citéjardin 1916-1936, auto-edition, 2006, terms such as “far west” were used to depict the brutal transition from rural area to large industry. Similar terms were also used to describe the steel industry in Lorraine. See G. Noiriel, op. cit., p. 124.

1914–1917 “Present and future needs” Georges Majoux, Le Trait, 15 October 192220

20 Speech given by Georges Majoux on the occasion of a visit to Le Trait by Paul Strauss, Minister for Hygiene, and a delegation from the Social Hygiene Alliance on 15 October 1922 – quoted in the journal, Alliance de l’hygiène sociale, congrès de Rouen, 13 au 16 octobre 1922, pp. 227–231. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr, and www.wormsetcie.com – archives 1922.

The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, circa 1921

Unless otherwise specified, all documents produced or received by the Le Trait shipyard or Worms & Cie, and quoted in this chapter, may be found on the website www.wormsetcie.com; the documents are listed according to the date on which they were issued (yyyy/mm/dd).

“The powerful Maison Worms” “An uncontested authority in the world of the Merchant Navy”

Henri Nitot, who headed ACSM from 1921 to 1960, mentioned in his memoirs21 “the powerful Maison Worms,” when as a youth, he walked by the company’s headquarters at 45, Boulevard Haussmann in Paris, and dreamed of pursuing a career there. From dream to reality!

Worms & Cie, 16 January 191422

Reviewing its history in early 1914, Maison Worms described itself23 in terms that warrant repeating: the company “was founded in 1848 by Hypolite Worms,24 […] and was one of the first, if not the first, to export English coal to France” and abroad. It remained a simple trading house until 1874, when Hypolite Worms, in partnership with Henri Josse,25 registered his company as a general partnership “Hte Worms & Cie.” This change enabled the company to outlive its founder, who died on 8 July 1877. In 1881, the company became a limited partnership under the new name of “Worms Josse & Cie.” Following the death of Henri Josse on 23 July 1893, Henri Goudchaux headed the company, which was renamed “Worms & Cie” on 1 January 1896 “and has remained

22 Historical note on Maison Worms dated 16 January 1914. 23 Ibid. 24 Maison Worms was actually established in 1841–1842 at 46, Rue Laffitte in Paris. Up until 1848, Hypolite Worms, a merchant banker, was a jack of all trades, dabbling in mercantile transactions (cotton, cast iron, grain and oats, indigo fabric, tin, coffee, etc.) for his personal account or for third parties to whom he granted cash advances; purchases of shares in railways; equity holdings in for example the Compagnie des Charbonnages de Sauwarten in January 1843, an investment that led him to trade in Belgian coal between 1844 and 1846; the sale in France of gypsum from the Buttes-Chaumont quarry in Paris from 1846 to 1865 (at least), etc. Consequently, 1848 marked a commitment to his longest-lasting business activity: international trade in English coal. 25 A Frenchman exiled in Great Britain in 1851, Henri Josse (1828–1893) was recommended to Hypolite Worms by the Committee for the Relief of Deportees of the Coup d’État of 2 December 1851 (opponents of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte) led by Michel Goudchaux, himself the uncle of Séphora Goudchaux, the founder’s wife. Henri Josse created the subsidiary Worms Great-Grimsby in 1856. A naturalised British citizen, toward the end of his life (1892) he became a Liberal member of the English Parliament, a duty from which he resigned shortly afterward, once his partners convinced him that the relationships with public administrations and the Minister for the Navy in France risked being affected by the presence of a member of the English Parliament in Maison Worms.

Hypolite Worms (1801–1877), founder of Maison Worms

21 Henri Nitot, memoirs, non dated printed text, private archives.

so ever since.” “In the fuel merchanting, the Maison is considered as one of the world’s leading companies; […] it enjoys a place and authority truly unrivalled by any other.” Maison Worms set up shop in the main British coal ports: Cardiff, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Grimsby, Goole and Hull, as well as Swansea, Sunderland, Liverpool, London and Glasgow.26 The company sold its coal through its branches in Le Havre, Dieppe, Rochefort, Tonnay-Charente, Angoulême, Bordeaux, Bayonne, Marseilles and Algiers, as well as Port Said and Suez in Egypt. Its clients, whether for exports of English coal or for supplying coal bunkers where ships from all over the world came to refuel, included: “the French Navy, several foreign navies, the Suez Canal Company, the Messageries Maritimes, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (French Line), the Chargeurs Réunis, the main French shipping companies” and many of the largest shipping companies in England (including Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company – P&O), Belgium, Holland and occasionally Germany. When the Suez Canal opened in 1869, Maison Worms established a presence in Port Said, supplying the coal needed for the steam dredgers owned by Borel Lavalley & Cie, the contractor responsible for completing construction of the canal after the abolition in 1864 of the forced labor imposed on the fellah workforce; “since

1869, Worms & Cie has maintained its leading position as a provider of shipping services” in Egypt. “Despite the large number of coaling stations established there, the company was responsible for 32% of the 1,555,000 tons of coal” traded in Port Said in 1913. The company regularly won, there as in Algiers, “almost without exception, contracts from the French Navy”; “besides, the company was well known to the Ministry of the Navy, a regular customer since the Crimean War [1854–1856], and whose opinion was often consulted for purchase and charter transactions,” even though “the company no longer handled those transactions, following modifications” made in 1912 to the terms of naval supplies.27 “Maison Worms also supplied railway companies and gasworks in France and abroad, and its various branches and agencies engaged in operations for the industrial needs of the regions they served.” As an extension of its British coal trade, Maison Worms entered the shipping industry in 1856. The owner and operator of its ships registered in Bordeaux, the company was initially the co-owner28 of the largest share of steamers belonging to the Le Havre company Hantier Mallet & Cie (later to became F. Mallet & Cie), a company created in 1851 at the instigation and with the financial support of Hypolite Worms by one of his representatives, Frédéric Mallet.29 In 1881, Maison

Floating Worms coal warehouse in Port Said (Egypt) in 1872

27 See, for example, the provisions relating to Cardiff coals destined for military ports and naval forces, which, because of their “great extension,” were transported by coal freighters chartered by the Navy (most often on time charter), while their purchase was made in Cardiff by the French consul or a special delegation of the Central Markets Committee, see Bulletin officiel de la Marine (t. 129, vol. 2, No. 14) on www. gallica.bnf.fr. 28 The French word designating the co-owner of a ship is a “quirataire”; “quirat” being the ownership share of a ship. 29 Frédéric Mallet was Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of Le Havre from 1875 to 1890.

26 The company held such a prominent place in Great Britain that it was mistaken with an English company by the public at large. For example, in 1892, when Worms Algiers won a three-year contract to supply coal to the French Navy in Algiers, Bone (now Annaba), and Philippeville (now Skikda), the Algerian newspaper, La Bataille, published an article on 24 February entitled: “Amirauté d’Alger – les fournitures de charbon pour la flotte française confiées aux Anglais.”

services. Its fleet included eighteen steam-powered vessels, complemented by four further freighters ordered in June 1913 from the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire in Nantes. Merchandise transported under the Worms flag “totalled 534,602 tons in 1912, and 578,151 tons in 1913. Despite its status as a shipping company engaged solely in cabotage,” the company was “an uncontested authority in the world of the Merchant Navy.” In 1903, the company was instrumental in founding the Central Committee of French Shipowners, with Henri Goudchaux serving as its treasurer from the very start.

Hypolite Worms and Georges Majoux: a taste for entrepreneurialism When the First World War broke out in the summer 1914, the General Partners of Worms & Cie were Henri Goudchaux and his son, Michel, as well as Paul Rouyer and Hypolite Worms. Rising up to become head of the Port Said branch in 1887, Paul Rouyer entered the management board in 1896. After retiring in 1916, he was replaced by Georges Majoux, head of Shipping Services since 1907. The grandson of the company’s founder, Hypolite Worms started at Maison Worms in 1908 at the age of 19.32 For three years, he followed a training programme that led him from the branch in Cardiff, “where he worked at the most mundane tasks in exchange for ten pounds per month,”33 to Port Said, then to Le Havre, close to Georges Majoux. Appointed a General Partner in December 1910, he proved to be so adept that Henri Goudchaux put him in charge in September 1914 when he himself joined the government in Bordeaux. When Henri Goudchaux succumbed to a serious illness on 25 April 1916, it was his wish that his closest colleague, Hypolite Worms, succeed him. He was not yet 27!34 Twenty-two years his senior,

Henri Goudchaux (1846–1916), Worms & Cie General Partner from 1881 to 1916, engraving by Walter

Worms took over the company, directly operating its lines.30 The company made a similar move in 1905, taking over the service between Dieppe and Grimsby “which in the past had been in the hands of Maison A. Grandchamp of Rouen,” with whom Hypolite Worms had teamed up in 1851. Specialised “in reserved cabotage31 and international cabotage, Worms lines served the majority of French ports between Bayonne and Dunkirk, with operations extending from Pasajes (Spain) to Great Grimsby (England), Antwerp (Belgium), Bremen and Hamburg (Germany).” In addition to its Fuel Merchanting branches and its branches in Bordeaux, Le Havre, Dieppe and Rouen (which combined trade in fuel and shipping services), Worms & Cie operated branches in Dunkirk, Boulogne, Brest and Nantes, as well as in Belgian, Dutch and German ports, to service its needs as a shipping company as well as those of the companies to which it provided

32 Hypolite Worms was born on 26 May 1889. 33 Interview with Hypolite Worms on 24 July 1948. 34 Appointing young people to positions of responsibility had been a constant feature of Maison Worms’ management ever since its establishment: F. Mallet (1825–1899) was 24 years old when he took charge of the commercial office in Le Havre in 1849; J.R. Smith was 26 years old when, in 1851, he founded the Cardiff branch; Georges Schacher (1835–1883) was 22 years old when he opened the Bordeaux branch in 1857.

30 See the Bordeaux–Le Havre–Hamburg line inaugurated in February 1859, and the Bordeaux–Antwerp line opened in 1869–1870. 31 Unlike free cabotage, reserved cabotage (under a national flag) means transporting goods and people from one point to another within the territory of a State which limits the trading rights to its own subjects.

Georges Majoux35 had “great experience in matters of shipping.”36 Between 1903 and 1906, he headed the Denain and Anzin branch in Dunkirk.37 At the time, “the Société des Hauts Fourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de Denain et Anzin had its own fleet of cargo ships, transporting iron ore from Spain (and Bone in Algeria) to Dunkirk, as needed for its operations.”38 The company placed an order with ACSM for the ship “Ostrevent” which was launched in September 1925. Previously, in November 1899, Georges Majoux had founded the maritime trading company Georges Majoux & Cie in Calais, Dunkirk and Paris. In 1901, he helped create the General Committee for the Defence of the Interests of the Port of Dunkirk.39 That same year, he was listed in the Annuaire de la société des ingénieurs civils de France.40 A savvy industrialist, Georges Majoux also made his mark with various scholarly societies: in August 1905, he served as secretary to the 26th National Congress of French Geographical Societies, while in 1927 he became a member of the Normandy History Society. His appointment as head of the Worms Maritime Services in 1907 coincided with the opening of a Worms branch in Dunkirk, which was probably set up specially for the purpose of recruiting this valuable man. His new duties led him to settle in Le Havre, where the management of Worms Shipping Services had been based since 1881. In the 20 July 1911 issue of Navigazette, Georges Majoux

Hypolite Worms (1889–1962), Worms & Cie General Partner from 1910 to 1962, portrait dated 1913

was listed among the members of the Association of Labour Employers in the Ports of France. Managing a fleet in normal times, and pursuing a career as a shipping agent, required many fields of expertise: - Technical (knowledge about each ship’s characteristics and transport potential, based on the shipping routes and ports served); - Commercial (type of merchandise exchanged between regions and countries; prices and prospecting for goods in France and abroad); - Legal and fiscal (maritime law; port legislation; customs systems, taxes, etc.); - Personnel management (seafaring personnel, shore personnel; traders, agents, dockers, etc.). Day-to-day problems had little in common with the chaos brought on by a state of war. As obvious as it seems, this finding surely weighed upon the decision made by Maison Worms in 1916 to launch its shipbuilding business. One of the questions needing to be answered was the following: How should it rejuvenate its fleet and repair its cargo ships given that nearly all French and foreign shipyards were no longer able to accept orders? The question was even more pressing, as major contracts had been concluded with the Ministry of the Navy.

35 G. Majoux was born on 7 February 1867 in Villeron (Vaucluse department). 36 Worms & Cie administrative circular of 1 January 1907, announcing the appointment of Georges Majoux as head of Shipping Services. 37 Georges Majoux married Antoinette Brabant in Dunkirk on 28 June 1902. 38 Notice regarding the ship “Capitaine Arsène Guillevic,” formerly the “Ostrevent,” on the website of the Union Industrielle et Maritime. 39 Cf. “Revue des questions ouvrières et de prévoyance,” in Revue politique et parlementaire, April 1905, p. 161, regarding the organisation created in Dunkirk on 14 January 1901, by Mr de Wulf and Mr Majoux, known as the General Committee for the Defence of the Interests of the Port of Dunkirk. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. 40 Cf. Annuaire 1901 de la Société des ingénieurs civils de France: “Majoux, Georges-Édouard, Consul of Bolivia; Maison Georges Majoux et Cie, a maritime trading company; Deputy Head of the maritime division for the Société de Denain et d’Anzin, Rue de Metz, in Calais and Quai de la Visite, 12, in Dunkirk.” Source: https://archive.org.

“What [Maison Worms] could not procure from others, it resolved to build on its own: by creating a shipyard, its very own shipyard” Jules Avril, Journal du Havre, 29 November 1921

The “initial project”

Georges Majoux, 4 August 1921 The official version Maurice Quemin introduced his book, Le Trait berceau de 200 navires […], with a foreword by Charles Duguet, the last ACSM Secretary General: “Upon its establishment in 1848,” he wrote, “Maison Worms had the opportunity to serve the government, in particular by ensuring the transport of supplies during the Crimean War.41 During the First World War, the company again responded affirmatively to the request of the public authorities which sought investors for shipbuilding yards, both to counter the significant losses of ships torpedoed by German submarines and to ensure that the Merchant Navy would flourish once peace was restored. These were the reasons behind the construction of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime between 1917 and 1921.” These words took their inspiration from the speech delivered by Georges Majoux on 15 October 1922 to the members of the Social Hygiene Alliance:42 “The government,” he said, “is urgently calling for private initiatives and capital to construct, without delay, major shipyards in France, capable of providing all the vessels that the country needs. The public authorities sought out our company in particular, as it had no doubt caught their attention through continuing, despite all difficulties, to ensure regular shipping services, and perhaps as well, to make up for the heavy losses that the torpedoes inflicted upon its fleet.”

Georges Majoux (1867–1941), General Partner of Worms & Cie from 1916 to 1925

Unquestionably, during the months in which Worms & Cie resolved to build a shipyard, the issue of rebuilding the French merchant fleet was raised, with the government asking for help from the private sector to meet demand. Nonetheless, several indications lead us to believe that Maison Worms reached its decision prior to the government’s appeal. In a long article on ACSM published in the Journal du Havre of 29 November 1921, Jules Avril wrote: “Worms & Cie, like all shipping companies, suffered from losses of its vessels and a lack of repairs. It contacted the existing shipyards, but either their orderbooks were full or they were focused on military production. To many, the

41 In 1991, Gabrielle Cadier-Rey, history professor at ParisSorbonne University, analysed the Maison Worms archives for 1854 and 1855, and established that in each of these two years, Hypolite Worms provided the Baltic squadron with 100,000 to 120,000 tons of coal, a sizeable quantity which made him the main supplier to the French Navy. 42 Alliance de l’hygiène sociale, congrès de Rouen, 13 au 16 octobre 1922, op. cit.

approximations): “After the Armistice [sic], the naval shipyard of Le Trait […] which had previously operated under the name ‘Société Auxilliaire de Constructions Navales’ and under the direction of Mr Majoux, had been established as a special ‘division’ within Maison Worms, assuming the name ‘Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime – Worms & Cie.’” There is no trace of this original name in the archives. A company called Société Auxiliaire de Constructions Navales did exist, but it had nothing to do with Worms and ACSM.

problem seemed insolvable, but not to Maison Worms. What it was unable to procure from others, it resolved to build on its own, by creating a shipyard, its very own shipyard.” The Journal de la marine marchande of 8 December 1921 corroborated these words: “In 1916, Worms & Cie, faced with the losses that submarine warfare had inflicted upon its fleet, thought about creating a new branch of industrial activity, for the purpose of reconstituting its fleet, in the face of overburdened shipyards.” Georges Majoux himself made a similar statement to the members of the French Association for the Advancement of Science on the occasion of their visit to Le Trait on 4 August 1921:43 “Worms & Cie,” he told them, “decided to create the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime for the purpose of constructing ships needed to replace those destroyed by the enemy. […] Moreover, the initial project has been completely reworked and enlarged to meet the government’s urgent entreaties to reconstruct the national fleet.” Thus, between his speeches in August 1921 and October 1922, Georges Majoux removed any reference to the more modest original design, undoubtedly for the purpose of highlighting the intentions of the public authorities and the higher purpose for which the work was being accomplished. This highlighting of the government’s role was most likely not devoid of ulterior motives: his words served to tell Maison Worms representatives that they were to remind the administration, in their negotiations with it for new vessels, of its responsibility to provide work to ACSM at a time when it was cruelly lacking (we will look at this aspect later on in this text). Pushed to its extreme, this version allowed some to affirm: “In November 1917, the government selected Le Trait,”44 without any reference to Worms & Cie and its activity. The only person referring to “this initial project” would seem to be the essayist, Roger Mennevée, in the 1940s, who went so far as to give it a name. In one of the articles devoted somewhat obsessively to Banque Worms in his newsletter, Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales,45 he asserted (with some chronological

Two Worms ships destroyed in 31 months of war (August 1914 to March 1917) One of the reasons generally given by newspaper articles and company brochures to explain why Maison Worms established ACSM was that “like all shipping companies, [it] had suffered [heavy] losses”46 that “[German] torpedoes had inflicted on its fleet.”47 The oldest document preserved in the Worms archives regarding Le Trait is dated 9 November 1916; it is a letter addressed to the Le Havre branch by James Little & Co., a company located in Glasgow: “We have observed with pleasurable interest,” the letter reads, “a report that you have purchased a large piece of ground on the river Seine for the erection of shipbuilding yards, to be known as the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime.” Research undertaken by the historian, Paul Bonmartel,48 established that Georges Majoux visited Le Trait in September 1916 to study the site there. The first (known) land purchase contracts date back to December 1916. These witness accounts infer that Maison Worms launched its shipbuilding project in early autumn 1916 (at the latest). Establishing this point of reference raises the question about the extent of losses suffered by the Worms fleet during this period. Just how many vessels had the company lost? On 1 August 1914, eighteen cargo ships flew the Worms flag: “Hypolite-Worms,” “Suzanne-et-Marie,” “Séphora-Worms,” “Emma” (the third bearing this name), “Thérèse-et-Marie,” “Michel,” “Sauternes,” “Haut-Brion,” “Bidassoa,” “Barsac,” “Cantenac,”

43 Compte-rendu de la 45e session de l’Association française pour l’avancement des sciences, Rouen, 1921, published in 1922, pp. 197–199. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. 44 See Serge Laloyer, “Le Trait et son chantier naval, 7 années de lutte,” published in No. 6 of the journal Le fil rouge, 1999. 45 February 1949 issue.

46 Jules Avril, Journal du Havre, 29 November 1921. 47 Speech by Georges Majoux, Le Trait, 15 October 1922, see Alliance de l’hygiène sociale, congrès de Rouen, 13 au 16 octobre 1922, op. cit. 48 Paul Bonmartel, Les pionniers traitons. La cité-jardin 1916-1936, auto-edition, 2006, p. 29.

“Fronsac,” “Listrac,” “Pessac,” “Léoville,” “PontetCanet,” “Pomerol” and “Margaux.” Four vessels came into service at a later date: “Château-Palmer” in October 1914; “Château-Yquem” in November 1914; “Château-Lafite” in April 1915; and “Château-Latour” in March 1916. “Saint-Émilion” was purchased in 1917, and “Ar-Stereden” in 1918. The company thus operated a total of twenty-four vessels during the four years of war. Maison Worms suffered eleven losses. The first was the cargo ship “Emma,” torpedoed on 31 March 1915.49 This was followed by the sinking of “Léoville” which hit a mine on 19 January 1916. After an interlude of more than one year without losses, German submarines – U-boats – and floating mines carpets wreaked havoc on the fleet: “Michel” was the third ship to sink, hitting a mine on 19 March 1917. The fourth was “ChâteauYquem” which also hit a mine on 30 June 1917. One month later, on 27 July 1917, a fifth cargo ship, the recently purchased “Saint-Émilion,” was torpedoed. Six other vessels suffered the same tragic fate: two went down in August 1917: “Sauternes” on the 5th and “Thérèse-et-Marie” on the 19th; two others sank just hours apart in January 1918: “Barsac” on the 11th and “Château-Lafite” on the 12th; “Pontet-Canet” disappeared on 25 August 1918, and “Ar-Stereden” on 21 October 1918. This last ship had such a brief career that it is generally not included in the inventory of Worms vessels. While this list shows that Maison Worms was “seriously hit by the losses inflicted upon its fleet by submarine warfare,”50 most losses occurred after the company had purchased the first parcels in Le Trait. Therefore, its decision to create ACSM could not have stemmed from

the decimation (that had yet to occur) of its fleet,51 a fact confirmed by the evolution in tonnage. Considering the launch of the “Château-Palmer,” “Château-Yquem,” “Château-Lafite” and “Château-Latour,” and despite the loss of “Emma” and “Léoville,” the company still had twenty ships in March 1916, two more than on 1 August 1914. Similarly, its total deadweight had increased: 33,755 tons in September 1916 versus 27,830 tons when France entered the war. It fell to 24,430 tons on 1 November 1917 and to 19,380 tons on 1 February 1918. The shrinking and redeployment of Shipping Services While tonnage had not yet gone down in 1916, shipping operations were certainly in a state of considerable upheaval. Since its creation, the Worms cabotage network had been focused on Northern Europe: the flagship Bordeaux-Le Havre-Hamburg line, as well as that between Bordeaux and Bremen, “held a monopoly in shipping between France and northern Germany.”52 Opened in 1869–1870, the line between Bordeaux and Antwerp was also very popular. Other services, albeit less regular, connected French ports along the Atlantic Coast with Baltic ports: Malmö, Gdynia, Danzig, Kronstadt (St. Petersburg), and depending on opportunities, with Arkhangelsk, in the White Sea. Germany’s declaration of war on France and the invasion of Belgium, in application of the Schlieffen Plan (3 August 1914), put a stop to these Shipping Services, as illustrated by the case of “Listrac.”53 On 31 July 1914, the Hamburg port authorities forced the cargo ship, about to leave for Le Havre, to remain anchored. On 6 August, Worms Le Havre, still without news of the vessel, was convinced that it would not hear “anything more before the end of the war.” On 8 August, the eventuality that the ship would be seized – “a true attack

51 Worms management could certainly not wait to witness its ships to sink one after the other before reacting. However, since 1856, the year during which the company commissioned its first two steamships, “Séphora” and “Emma” (the first vessel with this name), Maison Worms had to contend with several shipwrecks. In 1897, it lost “Blanche” on 3 March and “Marie” on 25 December. Yet these losses did not cause the company to consider becoming a shipbuilder. 52 Historical note on Worms & Cie dated 16 January 1914. 53 See the correspondence between the Le Havre and Bordeaux branches on www.wormsetcie.com – archives 1914.

49 Marc Saibène, in La Marine marchande française, 19141918, l’approvisionnement de la métropole et des armées en guerre (Marines-Éditions, 2011), devoted an article to the sinking of the “Emma” (p. 63), highlighting that the loss of life (there were only two survivors) could have been reduced had life vests been more readily available. The Under-Secretary of State for the Navy therefore demanded that life vests be stored on the bridge of the ships and close to rescue boats. 50 Journal de la marine marchande, 8 December 1921.

Moss, Hutchison, Chevillotte Frères and Vapeurs du Nord had all been stopped, whereas those belonging to Chargeurs Réunis were awaiting their requisition orders, and ships owned by “La Transat” (French Line) would soon be used to transport troops. Ten cargo ships from Worms & Cie were immobilised in French ports, while others were rerouted: instead of being sent to Germany, “Michel” was sent from Le Havre to Bordeaux; “Haut-Brion” from Dunkirk was sent to Rouen instead of Hamburg. Only three vessels based in Bordeaux had a sailing plan: “Bidassoa” destined for Bayonne, “Fronsac” en route to Nantes, and “Margaux” to Le Havre via La Pallice. Convinced that maintaining seagoing routes between the coastal ports, Rouen and Paris offered a transport alternative “at a time when the railways were fully occupied with the mobilisation,”54 Maison Worms viewed “with regret that public authorities had lost interest in this marvellous tool” and feared “that once they want us to deal with it, it will be too late, because people and equipment will be scattered or not in any useful condition.” From the outset, the company affirmed its intention “to maintain regular services between Dunkirk and Bayonne, ensuring supplies for the points served.”55 With this in mind, the company called upon the government, since “it was from Paris, where everything was centralised, that the instructions [had] to come […] to order all ports to organise themselves, using all their available resources, so as to immediately establish regular services. Departures to a set schedule will ensure that the various centres receive supplies, and by using the Seine, it will be possible to bring the variety of goods found along its banks all the way to Paris.”56 That was the idea! However, putting it into practice meant the French Navy would have to stop removing “part of the crews belonging to the latest mobilisation categories and assigning them into the Army.”57 In addition to reinforcing its national cabotage lines, Worms committed its fleet to developing shipping lines with Great Britain for the dual purpose of bringing in France supplies and merchandise to the population and the

Sandy Hook poster in the 1920s – portrait of the cargo ship, “Château-Yquem”

on people’s rights” – seemed more and more likely. The publication of a decree giving German steamships moored in France “a period of seven days starting from the date of the decree (4 August) to leave the ports where they were docked” still left room for hope, although they were somewhat dashed by the declarations of the harbourmaster in Bordeaux who “in no way intended to honour the decree and would continue to hold two seized German steamships and one Austrian steamship.” Such was the fate of “Listrac,” which remained impounded in Hamburg throughout the conflict. The interruption of the lines also stemmed from the mobilisation of the crews. For example, in Bordeaux at the beginning of August 1914, ships belonging to

54 Letter from Georges Majoux dated 7 August 1914. 55 Letter sent on 6 August 1914 by Georges Majoux to General Capiomont, Governor of Le Havre. 56 Letter from Georges Majoux dated 7 August 1914. 57 Letter from Georges Majoux dated 6 August 1914, op. cit.

army, and of ensuring that the French Navy and public services were supplied with fuel and raw materials. In July 1915, a weekly Le Havre–Bristol–Swansea service58 was launched, complementing the existing line between Dieppe and Grimsby, in operation since 1856. The midOctober 1914 occupation of two-thirds of the Nord Pasde-Calais coalfield and the cessation of imports from Belgium and Germany swelled demand for English coal. Thanks to Maison Worms having a presence in Great Britain where its branches were specialised in the purchase and transport of fuel, the company was able to increase imports of coal, indispensable to the functioning of the French economy and to civil and military logistics.59 Demand as well as the volume imported shot up. Orders for Welsh coal from Cardiff, the quality of which was in high demand for propelling battleships, exploded. In mid-December 1914, the Ministry of War turned to Worms to supply this variety of coal. The plan was to supplement the four ships already designated to transport merchandise for the troops between Bordeaux and Dunkirk with two further cargo ships to transport coal from Cardiff to Bordeaux. The government placed its orders with the branches in Dunkirk, Brest, Le Havre and Bordeaux. By early 1915, the shipping network had been organised, and all ships were deployed. In mid-January 1916, the Navy planned to maintain a monthly stock of 8,000 tons of coal in Port Said, to be supplied by the Worms branch.60

What was required by State contracts In the same vein, a contract was signed on 26 September 191661 with the Ministry of War for the monthly delivery to Brest of 8,000 tons of coal from Wales. This amount was reduced to 6,000 tons on 25 October 1917.62 On 30 January 1917, an agreement was reached with the government63 under which Maison Worms promised to assign thirteen of its ships for services between Bordeaux and Dunkirk and between other French ports; the administration took responsibility for the war risks, based on the individual values set for each ship. The first of these contracts was signed in September 1916, i.e. at a time when Worms was in the process of seeking a location for a shipyard, an aspect which could not be coincidental. Given Maison Worms contractual commitments vis-à-vis the public authorities, the company had an imperative need to ensure regular deliveries, and consequently, to maintain its transport capability. Under such conditions, being unable to replace a lost ship or, in the event of an accident, having to wait indefinitely for repairs, posed a serious risk. Consequently, ACSM was intended first and foremost to safeguard against the potential catastrophe resulting from the destruction of the ships under State contract (irrespective of the amount of damages set forth in the charter) rather than against losses of its vessels that had already occurred. “Lack of repair” Jules Avril, Journal du Havre, 29 November 1921

Both the operation of a ship and the renewal of its classification by the Bureau Veritas64 depend on the reliability of its equipment and its structures. If the equipment wears out, structures can deteriorate (during a collision, in particular). As a result, the ship has to undergo regular maintenance and inspections to ensure its seaworthiness. For larger work (the servicing of boilers, for

58 See letter of 23 November 1915 which details the freight loaded on board the “Haut-Brion” for the French Navy, the British Marine Engineering Corps, the Belgian Army and industry. It is specified that “the Under-Secretariat of Artillery and Munitions, which closely monitored the functioning [of] the three lines [...] (Grimsby–Dieppe, Bristol– Swansea–Le Havre and Newport–Le Havre) had to make representations to the Minister for the Navy to ensure that, as far as possible, no disturbance was caused to their operation by requisitioning the steamers assigned to them.” 59 Correspondence exchanged on 15 and 24 January 1916 among Worms Port Said, the consul of France, and Worms Paris. 60 A Decree of 3 July 1917 linked the Services of coal import, production, and distribution to the Ministry of Armaments and War Production, proving (if necessary) the strategic importance of this raw material.

61 Cf. letter sent on 19 February 1918 by Worms Le Havre to the Central Department for Maritime Stewardship. 62 For the date, see the collection of information from January to December 1917 on www.wormsetcie.com. 63 Information taken from a memorandum filed in May 1918. 64 “The mission of the company was to provide insurers with all information needed regarding the condition of the ships and their equipment, and to keep them apprised of the premiums and specific terms in practice in large commercial areas,” cf. www.bureauveritas.fr.

Damage to the prow of the cargo ship, “Suzanne-et-Marie” (1891–1933)

example), Maison Worms called upon specialised companies, such as Établissements Caillard in Le Havre. Moreover, since 1901, Maison Worms had operated its own repair yard on the Quai de Saone in Le Havre.65 This facility, suitable for repairing peacetime damage, was, unfortunately, not designed for repairing wartime damage or that incurred in the congested basins or locks, particularly in Le Havre where an English military base had been established in August 1914.66 Up to 1919, no less than 1,900,000 British soldiers entered France via Le Havre.67 Various quayside sheds and out-

side storage areas were made available to this expeditionary corps to stock provisions and materials, which a fleet of barges transported daily up the Seine to a second base in Rouen. Supplementing this already dense traffic were the ships supplying merchandise and raw materials to people and factories between the coast and Paris. Congestion was further fuelled by the thousands of people belonging to the Belgian Governmentin-exile based in Sainte-Adresse (a municipality adjacent to Le Havre). So great was the congestion that it was extremely difficult for shipping companies to operate there: ships were forced to anchor for unusually long periods outside the harbour, prey to German U-boats,68 before weaving their way to the wharf to unload their cargo. Any delay led to the payment of heavy demurrage. To avoid incurring any such charges, captains and crews took risks that resulted in a much higher than usual number of collisions, broken equipment and injuries.

65 See historical note of 11 June 1948. The repair shop was an old three-masted ship, the “Hélène-et-Georgina,” which had been refitted. 66 Three of the nine British bases in France were located in Seine-Maritime: in Le Havre, Rouen and Dieppe. See “Les bases anglaises de Seine-Inférieure dans la Grande-Guerre” on https://rouen1914-1918.fr/armee-britannique. 67 Cf. the presentation of Yves Buffetaut’s book, Rouen-Le Havre 1914-1918, dans la Grande Guerre, on http://www. ysec.fr: “The Seine-Inférieure operates to English time, and the two British bases receive men from throughout the Empire: the local Normandy population thus crosses paths with Englishmen, Scots, Australians, Canadians, South Africans, New Zealanders, Indians and Chinese, not to mention German prisoners of war. Entire towns have sprung up to lodge tens of thousands of men.”

68 In 1915, a floating barrier was set up at the entrance to the port, then a 25 km anti-submarine wire mesh was installed across the Bay of the Seine, see the digital exhibition Les Havrais dans la Grande Guerre on htps://archives. lehavre.fr.

least during the years 1914–1915) from this belief in the superiority of its land forces, which caused shipyards to turn into land military weapons factories.72 “Let us not forget,” said Louis de Chappedelaine, Minister for the Merchant Navy, before the French Shipbuilding Consortium on 21 March 1936,73 “that the operations of our shipyards during the great ordeal from 1914 to 1918 contributed to saving our country’s independence. Must I remind you that […] these shipyards turned out more than three million shells, repaired hundreds of locomotives, built carriages for all calibres of cannons, tirelessly forged on behalf of the war effort, and manufactured tanks.” Thus, arms manufacture replaced the replenishment of ship stocks. Having entered the conflict with 2,192 ships (representing 2,498,000 gross registred tons), all the French Merchant Navy could do was to count its losses. Maison Worms decided to take action.

“Shipyards […] were overladen with orders or had oriented their operations towards war production” Jules Avril, Journal du Havre, 29 November 1921

In 1916, four generations of cargo ships sailed under the Worms flag. The oldest, the steamship “Hypolite Worms” had entered into service in October 1882. The most recent, “Château-Latour,” had been delivered in March 1916. Between these two dates, twenty-four units joined the fleet, while fifteen were sold or scrapped. This process, which alternated between orders placed with shipyards or purchases from other shipping companies, and sales or scrappings, stemmed from the need to align the fleet with changes in traffic and technological progress. The competitiveness of the shipping companies was at stake. The war put a stop to this mechanism. One reason was the conviction, largely shared by military strategists and politicians (at the beginning of the conflict, at any event), that victory would be achieved on the ground. This certitude meant that most of the 31,000 shipyard workers in 191469 were sent to the front line. Deprived of a large slice of their workforces, businesses were forced to cancel or suspend unfilled orders for new ships, and to complete the ships already on the slipways with the remaining personnel as best they could and with long delays. As a result, “Château-Palmer” and “Château-Yquem” were delivered respectively two and three months late, “Château-Lafite” seven months late and “ChâteauLatour” nineteen months late. Even production for the French Navy – a domain in which France, with its 793,729 tons70 of old and mismatched battleships, had fallen behind its Allies and belligerents71 – suffered (at

First steps Choosing the site In September 1916 (at the latest), a small group set out to find the best location for the new Worms division.74 Heading up the group was Georges Majoux, assisted by Colonel Le Magnen.75 Two people in Maison Worms bore the name Le Magnen: Edmond and Paul. Edmond had run the Dieppe branch76 from its inception in 1905 until 1913, when he (unofficially) became a management advisor. An engineer, Paul Le Magnen was taken on as head of the Technical and Shipping Personnel Department on 1 January 1902. His training as a naval architect leads us to believe that it was him who worked in association with George Majoux.

69 Figure provided in the report by the French Shipbuilding Consortium of July 1934, p. 11. 70 This tonnage is indicated by the Naval Encyclopedia. André Tardieu, in L’Homme libre dated 14 February 1930, estimated the French naval forces in 1914 at 964,000 British tons (1,016 kg) in service and under construction, plus 174,000 tons to come. The maximum weight a ship can carry is expressed in deadweight tonnes (dwt) and its total volume (including all closed superstructures) in gross registered tons (grt). 71 Under the impetus of international tensions and the impact of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, published in 1887 by Alfred Thayer Mahan, which presented naval supremacy as key to the modern world, England, Germany, Norway, Japan, and the United States […] launched a race to produce warships. Within ten years, the German Navy was ranked second in Europe, behind the Royal Navy, and ahead of France.

72 Cf. Marc Saibène, op. cit. p. 15. 73 See the article in Le Matin, which in its 22 March 1936 issue reproduced the conclusions from the speech by Louis de Chappedelaine before this Consortium. Source: www. gallica.bnf.fr. 74 See Paul Bonmartel, op. cit., p. 29. 75 Le Magnen was known in Le Trait for embellishing the first municipal garden with a bandstand, where “La Lyre,” the ACSM musical group, performed. 76 The Dieppe branch opened following the resumption by Worms, in 1905, of the Grimsby line created in 1856 by A. Grandchamp with Hypolite Worms; Edmond Le Magnen managed this line for many years before he entered Worms & Cie in 1905.

Worms Le Havre, Coal and Patent Fuel Services

The team also included Commander Louis Mongin and Louis Achard. The former chaired the Société Immobilière du Trait from January 1919. The latter was – as we shall soon see – the man who led the building and start-up of ACSM. Like Georges Majoux, Louis Achard, a marine engineer, pursued his career in Dunkirk, where he worked for Bureau Veritas, before joining Worms. Four experts were also poached from the Dunkirk or Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët) sites: the engineer Scheerens, the workshop manager Rialland, the industrial designer Boldron and the carpenter Loiseau.77 Thus, no fewer than eight people, including one General Partner, combed the countryside. Criteria guiding their choice reflected both the needs of the shipping industry and those inherent to running Maison Worms. Their

search zone: Normandy. This region, long known for its shipbuilding sites78 – similar to all regions bordering the French coast – was also the company’s traditional stamping ground. Hypolite Worms (the company’s founder) had begun his career there: between 1829 and 1837, in Rouen, operating under the name Worms Heuzé & Cie, he ran a wholesale business in draperies, local cotton fabric and “toiles peintes,” amongst others.

78 Jules Avril, op. cit., wrote: “La Mailleraye, located on the left bank, slightly downstream [from Le Trait], had been an important shipbuilding centre.... Remember that the first ship fitted out by Le Havre shipowners for fishing expeditions in Newfoundland was a sailing ship constructed in La Mailleraye. […] It must be said as well that La Mailleraye held such a place in the shipping world that any ship passing by this community tilted its flag and fired three cannon shots, to which the castle responded. A mandatory gesture up until the Revolution, the custom continued until 1830, although as a courtesy.” Other shipyards worth mentioning were the Honfleur shipyards established in the 16th century; those in Cherbourg, or the Établissements Augustin Normand, which relocated to Le Havre in 1816.

77 P. Bonmartel, Le Trait, cité nouvelle (1917-1944), and Histoire du chantier naval du Trait 1917-1972, Luneray: Bertout, 1995 for the former, 1997 for the latter. Albert Rialland, Alphonse Boldron and André Loiseau were included on the list of employees “having more than thirty years of presence” established at the end of the book Un centenaire - 1848-1948 - Worms & Cie. They were inscribed with the mention “1916. Le Trait,” which suggests that the ACSM staff department was formed in that year.

Although his business activities subsequently summoned him to Paris, Hypolite Worms continued to maintain relationships with Normandy merchants and industrialists until his return, occasioned first by his trade in plaster, then coal. His first two shiploads of coal imported from England were delivered to Le Havre in November 1848 and sold to two clients in Rouen. Without doubt, his thorough knowledge of the Normandy economy gave his coal trade the impetus guaranteeing its success.

this port. If damaged, ships would not have to travel far for repairs, and ships could be commissioned as soon as they were launched! Furthermore, and most importantly, Le Havre was located relatively close to the English coast: a hundred or so miles from Portsmouth, and approximately 90 from Brighton or Newhaven. At a time when the occupation of Nord Pas-de-Calais deprived France of its steelmaking operations, the close proximity to England – where Maison Worms had been established for decades, where the company had bank accounts, where its name was known – guaranteed a steady supply of materials and equipment not found in France, yet essential for the construction of shipyard. The plan was simple: buy the necessary equipment in England, ship it to Le Havre, and then send it on by train or barge to Le Trait. Having been used by Maison A. Grandchamp, of which Worms had been a limited partner since 1851, the Seine proved to be a vital supply route during the war, making Rouen a leading French port.

“Roughly halfway between Rouen and Le Havre” As noted in the preceding chapter, most of the press articles and internal memos devoted to ACSM in the years 1920–1930 start by stating the location of Le Trait as “roughly halfway between Rouen and Le Havre.”79 Several journalists were more precise: on 24 September 1921, J. Blondin highlighted in the Revue générale de l’électricité80 that the “small municipality is located slightly less than 30 km from Rouen.” La Vigie de Dieppe, in its 2 December 1921 issue, stated that this village was located “between Duclair and Caudebec, on the right bank of the Seine.” This topographic data resonated with Worms & Cie in a particular way. Le Havre served as its fleet’s base, the centre of its Shipping Services.81 It was the home port of all its ships. Since the company was going to build a shipyard, it might as well be located in the vicinity of

Saint-Martin-de-Boscherville or Le Trait?82 In his book, Les pionniers traitons. La cité-jardin 19161936, Paul Bonmartel quotes from the private journal of Abbot Quilan, priest of Le Trait, in which he paid a posthumous homage to Louis Achard, who died in October 1921. “Arrived in September 1916,” wrote the priest, “already parcels of lands on the banks of the Seine were being studied in many places. Le Trait was his preferred site. […] In his mind, he was already constructing everything that we see today.”83 Among these “many places,” two retained the attention of Maison Worms: Le Trait, obviously, and Saint-Martinde-Boscherville. These rural communities, located 17.5 km from each other by road and 37 km via the Seine, shared many characteristics. Neither was close to the front. Neither was densely populated84 – meaning there would only be a small number of property owners with whom to negotiate the purchase of the land. Neither was heavily industrialised. And because they were

79 For example, see the account of the visit to Le Trait by the Association Normande on 28 July 1927, in Annuaire des cinq départements de la Normandie, or the article by Georges Benoît-Lévy published on 25 April 1931 in the journal, L’Hygiène sociale. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. 80 Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. 81 Reminder: The opening of the Worms branch in Le Havre in April 1849: management was entrusted in January 1850 to the young Frédéric Mallet, who, on 1 April 1851, founded, together with one of his principal competitors, the company Hantier, Mallet & Cie, of which Hypolite Worms was the limited partner. This subsidiary was absorbed in 1881 by Maison Worms and replaced by a branch office in which the general management of the Shipping Services was established. The evolution of the Worms facility in Rouen followed the same pattern: at the beginning of 1849, Hypolite Worms entrusted his business to a local representative; in 1851, he participated with one of his competitors, Achille Grandchamp, in the establishment of the company A. Grandchamp & Fils, of which he was the limited partner – and in April 1905, the company was bought out under the name Leblanc, Guian & Cie, by Worms & Cie (Dieppe–Grimsby line + three ships).

82 See the websites: https://anciennephotodutrait.jimdo. com and http://www.boscherville.fr/fr/information/70678/ notre-histoire. 83 Paul Bonmartel, op. cit., p. 29. 84 Gilbert Fromager, Le Canton de Duclair - 1900-1925, Fontaine-le-Bourg: Le Pucheux, 2014 (1st ed., 1985), p. 111. There were 644 inhabitants in Saint-Martin-de-Boscherville in 1900, and 629 according to the 1911 census.

Parcels listed by purchase dates Lot numbers Location

surrounded by forests, both guaranteed a steady supply of wood for the shipyard (part of ACSM would be constructed on wooden piles). In both locations, the Seine was wide enough and deep enough to launch ships measuring 170 metres in length and with a tonnage of up to 18,000 tons.85 At first glance, neither seemed to offer an advantage over the other. At first glance! Saint-Martin-de-Boscherville was situated approximately 90 km by road from Le Havre and 13 km west of Rouen. Le Trait was 60 km from Le Havre and 30 km from Rouen. Le Trait, with its closer proximity to the Channel port – and thus to England – had the added advantage that the Seine ran in a relatively straight line up to the mouth of the river, whereas between Le Havre and Saint-Martin-de-Boscherville, the river included two meanders, explaining why the distance by river between the two neighbouring villages was twice as long. One additional advantage was that Le Trait had a sand quarry:86 sand was an essential ingredient for producing the mortar and concrete needed to construct the shipyard and housing. Last but not least, this village had been connected to the main Paris-Le Havre railway line since 1882 via the branch line between Caudebecen-Caux and Barentin. Assembling the land parcels for ACSM — Once Le Trait had been selected as the location, land purchases started in late 1916 and were completed with great speed. In the (previously quoted) letter of 9 November 1916, James Little & Co. affirmed: “You have purchased a large piece of ground on the river Seine for the erection of shipbuilding yards,” leading us to believe that purchases had begun even earlier. Nonetheless, there are no witness accounts to support this probability. The oldest land purchase agreements preserved in the Worms archives are dated 13 December 1916, and were included on a list drawn up in 197787 in the context of researching a book published by Worms & Cie the following year: Cent ans boulevard Haussmann. Here is the list:

85 See Normandie illustrée, No. 10, January 1918. 86 See the article by Jules Avril, op. cit. 87 Letter of 14 November 1977 from Mr Jean Chalain to Francis Ley, Banque Worms.

B 43 44 45 and 55

La Barrière des Prés

13 December 1916

Mrs Piceni

B 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

La Barrière des Clos

13 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Léopold Baillif

76 77 83 83ter Le Renel 84 85 86p 87p 88

13 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Léopold Baillif

296 311 313

Le Clos des Voies

13 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Léopold Baillif

A 554p 556p

Le Clos des Voies

15 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Gobin

B 22-23, 24-25, 26-27 59 60 61

La Barrière des Prés

15 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Gobin

B 115p 115b 116 Les Palfondenos 116b

15 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Gobin

B 117 b

Les Palfondenos

26 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Fournier

B 115 p

Les Palfondenos

26 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Aubert

B 309 310 312

Le Clos des Voies

26 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Gabriel Baillif

B 113p 114 p

Le Renel

26 December 1916

Mrs Boquet and Mr and Mrs Charles Boquet

B 288p 289p

Le Bout des Voies

26 December 1916

Mrs Boquet and Mr and Mrs Charles Boquet

B 302 B 303

Le Clos des Voies

26 December 1916

Mrs Boquet and Mr and Mrs Charles Boquet

B 93p 96 97p 100p 101p 104p

Le Renel

28 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Auguste Leroy

294

Le Clos des Voies

28 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Auguste Leroy

B 314

Le Clos des Voies

30 December 1916

Mr and Mrs Montier

A 553

Le Clos des Voies

9 January 1917

Mr and Mrs Derivery

B 292 293

Le Bout des Voies

9 January 1917

Mr and Mrs Derivery

B 298 299 300

Le Clos des Voies

9 January 1917

Mr and Mrs Derivery

B 49 50 51 52 53 54

La Barrière des Prés

30 January 1917

Mr and Mrs Quillet

B 46 47 48

Barre des Prés

30 January 1917

Mrs Bien

A 554 554p 555 556p

Le Clos des Voies

30 January 1917

Mr and Mrs Alphonse Leroy

30 January 1917

Mr and Mrs Alphonse Leroy

B 40 41 42 56 57 La Barrière des Prés

Purchase date Sellers

B 290 291p

Le Bout des Voies

3 February 1917

Mrs Crevel

B 112p-291p

Le Renel et le Clos des Voies

15 February 1917

Mr and Mrs Michel and Mr Pierre Baudouin

B 295-295 bis

Le Clos des Voies

15 February 1917

Mrs (widow) Crevel and Mr and Mrs Treboutte

B567

La Barrière des Prés

20 February 1917

Mr and Mrs Adophe Dehais

B 315p vicinal Le Marais road No. 2, No. 9, No. 10

19 March 1917

City of Le Trait

B 73 74 75

Le Renel

5 April 1917

Mrs Sausay Mr and Mrs Hebert, Ms Vandu

B 109 p

Le Renel

2 May 1917

Mr, Mrs, Ms Landrin

B 117 p

Les Palfondenos

2 May 1917

Mrs Lamant

B 29p 30 31p 32p 35p 36 37

La Barrière des Prés

1 June 1917

Cauvin partners

B234

La Barrière des Prés

24 November 1917

Mr Pierre Baudouin

B 58 71 72

Le Renel

24 November 1917

Mr Pierre Baudouin

78 79 80 81

Le Renel

24 November 1917

Mr Pierre Baudouin

83 83b 86p 91

Le Renel

24 November 1917

Mr Pierre Baudouin

92 94 95 98 99p 102

Le Renel

24 November 1917

Mr Pierre Baudouin

B 304 305 306 307 308

Le Clos des Voies

24 November 1917

Mr Pierre Baudouin

B 283p 287p

Le Bout des Voies

24 November 1917

Mr Pierre Baudouin

38p 105p 106

La Barrière des Prés

24 November 1917

Mr and Mrs Michel

107p 108 110

Le Renel

24 November 1917

Mr and Mrs Michel

63p 64 65 66p 69p 70

La Barrière des Prés

24 November 1917

Mr and Mrs Michel

A 542 546

Le Clos des Voies

24 November 1917

Société Isidore Bernard

A 547

Le Clos des Voies

6 February 1918

Mr and Mrs Baillif

B 90

Le Renel

13 February 1918

Mr and Mrs Duquesne

B 301 - 301b

Le Clos des Voies

13 February 1918

Mr and Mrs Duquesne

B 315p

Le Marais

13 April 1918

City of Le Trait

B 89p 112p

Le Renel

18 June 1918

Mr Pierre Cauvin

These parcels of land were listed in Article 2 of a lease agreement concluded on 16 October 194588 between ACSM and Maison Worms, in reference to the “land on which the various workshops and shipbuilding facilities operating under the name ‘Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime’ are located.” This land was distinct from that on which the workers’ housing estate was built, which was covered by a separate agreement.89 Today, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact location of the parcels in “Barrière des Prés,” “Barrière des Clos,” “Palfondenos,” “Renel,” “Clos des Voies,” and “Bout des Voies.” With the exception of “Le Marais,” these names have all disappeared from the land registry. They are now grouped together under the name “Les Chantiers.” Research using the land registry map of 1827 nevertheless allows us to locate them in the area between the banks of the Seine and the N182 road (see map, page 11). The total surface area covered by both the shipyard and the workers’ housing estate varied according to sources: in the presentation given on 4 August 1921 to the members of the French Association for the Advancement of Science,90 Georges Majoux estimated it to be 300 hectares; the area was reported as 275 hectares in the minutes of the excursion to Le Trait on 28 July 1927 by the Association Normande,91 and as just 175 hectares in the article devoted to ACSM by Georges Benoît-Lévy in the 25 April 1931 issue of L’Hygiène sociale.92 However, most testimonies in the interwar period agree that 25 hectares were dedicated to the shipyard.93 According to the list of documents drawn up in 1977, the initial purchase transaction involved (if not in total, at least its largest slice) the participation of about fifty

88 To finance the rebuilding of the Le Trait shipyard after the Second World War, that Worms & Cie decided in 1945 to incorporate as a public limited company. 89 This contract is also dated 16 October 1945. 90 Cf. Compte-rendu de la 45e session de l’Association française pour l’avancement des sciences, op. cit., p. 197. 91 Cf. Annuaire des cinq départements de la Normandie, op. cit., p. 143. 92 Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. 93 In the agreement of 30 November 1959, in which Worms & Cie assigned various assets to ACSM, the surface area of the shipyard was estimated at 12 hectares 48 ares 6 centiares. In the merger document for ACSM-La Ciotat of 5 April 1966, the surface area was “23 hectares 15 ares 33 centiares, connected to SNCF and listed in the updated land registry for Le Trait under Section AC, No. 9, known as ‘Les Chantiers.’”

landowners and required the signature of fifty or so documents. Most of these were signed in the presence of Mr Rousée, a notary in Jumièges, either directly or standing in for Mr Garrigue, a notary in Duclair – and also in the presence of Mr Dubost, a notary in Savignysur-Orge, who stood in for Mr Leclair, a notary in Caudebec-en-Caux; in the presence of Mr Clé, a notary in Longjumeau, or in the presence of Mr Weber-Modar, also a notary in Jumièges. Two-thirds of the land purchase deeds (33) were signed between 13 December 1916 and 1 June 1917 (twenty-eight had been signed before the end of February 1917). After a six-month pause, forty lots were sold on 24 November 1917,94 including twenty-seven by Pierre Baudouin, the largest landowner. Another two-month hiatus ensued until February 1918. These pauses may have stemmed from the fact that some residents of Le Trait took longer than others to decide to sell. But they may also have

been due to the expansion of the project scope: to create a shipyard to meet not solely the needs of Maison Worms, but to assist in the effort to reconstruct the French Merchant Navy. It is interesting to note that, in February 1918, Mr and Mrs Baillif sold a parcel located in “Clos des Voies,” the same location as the two lots they had sold fourteen months earlier, in December 1917. Proof of ACSM’s need to enlarge, or a consequence of procrastination? Given the lack of land references for the time period in question, it is impossible to know why Maison Worms bought a particular parcel before another. The final deed (to which reference is made in 1977) was signed on 18 June 1918. It took eighteen months to finalise negotiations. In a society traditionally attached to the land,95 it is surprising that all landowners agreed to sell. It seems that no expropriation proceedings were undertaken,96 most likely because Worms & Cie offered a fair price.

94 The sales granted by Mr and Mrs Michel were announced in the Journal de Rouen, on 24 August 1918: “Law office of Mr Lebreton, a solicitor in Rouen, rue Jeanne-d’Arc, No. 31. Legal redemption [of mortgage]. In accordance with recorded contract received by Mr Rousée, notary, in Jumièges on 24 November 1917, Worms & Cie, whose headquarters is in Paris, boulevard Haussmann, purchased from Mr JosephVictor Michel and Mrs Gabrielle-Eugénie Baudouin, his spouse, who reside together in Notre-Dame-de-Bondeville, rue du Chemin-de-Fer, No. 14. 1o: One piece of meadowland known as ‘Barrière des Prés,’ crossed by ‘Chemin des Voies,’ comprising approximately 3000 square metres, according to the titles, and listed in the land registry under numbers 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38p, of Section B, for a total area of 3579 square metres and according to a recent measurement, containing 3338 square metres. 2o: A meadow in what is known as ‘Renel,’ a plot traversed by the ‘Chemin des Voies,’ listed in the land registry under Nos. 105p, 106, 107, 108, and 110 of Section B, for a total surface area of 3964 square metres, and according to a recent survey, comprising 4266 square metres. 3o: A piece of meadowland known as ‘Barrière des Prés,’ crossed by the ‘Chemin des Voies’ at the ‘Chemin du Malacquis,’ listed in the land registry under numbers 63, 64, 65, 66p, 69, and 70 of Section B, for a total surface area of 4624 square metres, and according to the recent survey, comprising 4513 square metres. A collated copy of the aforementioned sales contract was filed with the court clerk of the Civil Tribunal of Rouen on 7 June 1918, as certified in a filing certificate drawn up on the same day, by the head court clerk of said Tribunal. Notification of said filing was given to the public prosecutor for the Civil Tribunal of Rouen, in accordance with the writ from Mr Terrier, court usher in Duclair, dated 25 July 1918, recorded along with a declaration made by said magistrate. […] Signed: Lebreton.” Source: http://recherche.archivesdepartementales76.net.

— and for the garden city As with the shipyard, the information available makes it impossible to reconstruct how the land needed for the workers’ housing estate was purchased. One source provides an inventory of the parcels involved: the lease agreement of 1945.97 The plots were listed by number according to their corresponding locations. Some place names are still in use: “Candeux,” “VieuxChâteau,” “Hazaie,” “Neuville” (and its extensions: “Plaine Neuville” and the “Village de La Neuville”); others, such as “Haut Camp,” “Clos Mouton,” “Plaine Saint-Martin,” have disappeared from the land registry. Several documents have been preserved by the Norman Seine River Meanders Regional Nature Park (PNR). Among them, two contracts stipulated that on 25 and 26 December 1916 a piece of land was sold “as fine sandy land for ploughing, in what is known as the Plaine Saint-Martin, traversed by the major road from Rouen to Saint-Martin de Colbosc [sic] [with a surface area of ] 3680 square metres, but according to land surveys, consisting of 2570 square metres.” Parcels were

95 R. Schor, Histoire de la société française au XXe siècle, Paris, Belin, 2005, and F. Démier, La France du XIXe siècle (1814-1914), Paris: Le Seuil, 2000. 96 Given the lack of land registry records, it is not possible to know whether the zone devoted to the future shipyard was connected to the public services or not. 97 Contract of 16 October 1945.

added for a total surface area of 16471 square metres, and were sold altogether for 10,212 francs (F), paid by “Mr Achard, on behalf of the assenting company […] in cash with legal tender and bills.”98 Another contract was signed by Mr and Mrs Aubert on 29 March 1917, involving “a piece of pasture land, in what is known as the ‘Plaine de La Neuville,’ listed in the land registry under numbers 496 and 497, 498P and 499P Section B, with a size of 3805 square metres, but which, according to a recent survey, corresponded to 4532 square metres.” This document also authorised the sale of a “piece of land for ploughing, in what is known as the ‘Haut Camp,’ listed in the land registry under number 425 Section B, with a size of 1560 square metres.” The transaction was concluded in exchange for 3,170 F. One final example: the sale granted on 18 June 1918 by Mr and Mrs Delafosse of a “piece of land for ploughing located in the location known as ‘La Carrière’ consisting of 10352 square metres” for a price of 1,800 F. According to the Napoleonic land registry, the lot numbers corresponded to parcels spread over the village territory, located on either side of the road traversing Le Trait, as well as on both sides of the swamp between the hamlets adjacent to the Seine, and the land at the end of the forest.99 The possible draining of this swamp100 offered the possibility for future extension. This sizeable land purchase transaction had the impact of uniting the city and incorporating the hamlets scattered over its territory.

work is dated 13 March 1917; concluded with Veuve Hottat et Fils, the contract was referenced in a memo sent on 27 November 1920 from Maison Worms to A. Lebreton, a solicitor in Rouen. A new agreement signed with Veuve Hottat et Fils on 12 June 1917 also referred to the original contract: “Worms & Cie,” stipulates the second agreement, “seeking to construct a dry dock at the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime […] has drawn up, under the direction of Mr Achard, Engineer and Director, through his architect, Mr Majou, who lives at 41, Rue Laffitte in Paris, the specifications and specific terms and conditions governing the performance of this work. The general specifications and specific terms of the contract of 13 March 1917 will apply to this project.” Thus, exactly three months after the first land had been purchased (in the period 13 December 1916 to 13 March 1917), Maison Worms enlisted the services of a construction company to undertake the construction of the shipyard, placing said company under the dual authority of Louis Achard and Gustave Majou, the architect. Trained at the French National School of Fine Arts (1881–1886), Gustave Auguste Majou (1862–1941) was known for the development, together with his colleague, Henri Provensal, of a group of 321 lodgings and 31 workshops in 1909, located at 8, Rue de Prague in Paris (12th arrondissement), in the context of a competition launched by the Rothschild Foundation to “improve the conditions of workers’ material existence.”102 His recruitment by Maison Worms (unfortunately, at an unknown date) – underscores the priority accorded to social affairs by Maison Worms, albeit perhaps not an immediate priority. A document drawn up on 2 September 1918 by Charles-Arthur Terrier, court usher with the Civil Tribunal of Rouen, at the request of Veuve Hottat et Fils, introduced Gustave Majou as the successor to Louis Lanave at ACSM.103 This replacement might have been related to the previously mentioned change in the scope of the “original project.” Louis Lanave may have been recruited at a time when Maison Worms was seeking to build a shipyard solely

The builders: Louis Achard, the Director; Joseph Lanave, the Chief Engineer; Gustave Majou, the “architect of public housing” In a speech delivered on 4 August 1921 to members of the French Association for the Advancement of Science,101 Georges Majoux stated that “the work [building the shipyard] began in April [1917] and continued until after the Armistice.” The oldest contract in the Worms archives relating to the structural

98 Norman Seine River Meanders Regional Nature Park Archives: 6J/D113. Sales documents. 99 Departmental Archives of Seine-Maritime. Land registry maps. Section B, Sheet 1 – March 1826. Entry 3P3_3413 Le Trait. 100 Wooden piles were used to make this swamp suitable for construction. 101 Compte-rendu de la 45e session de l’Association française pour l’avancement des sciences, op. cit.

102 Cf. notices on https://agorha.inha.fr and https://structurae.net/fr. 103 In correspondence of 2 September 1918, Charles-Arthur Terrier wrote: “I […] tendered my resignation to Mr Gustave Majou, the successor to Mr Louis Lanave, who resides in Le Trait, in his capacity as Director and Representative of Worms & Cie.”

for its own needs, and that it changed its architect on committing to a larger-scale industrial programme, including a garden city to house its workers. In a letter dated 29 December 1918, a subcontractor by the name of Marcel Duchereau “hastened to point out that, prior to undertaking minor fitting work, [he had] provided Mr Lanave, at the time serving as Project Director, with the design drawings which he [had] approved, and [had] agreed with him on all points.” Moreover, Lanave and Majou had completely different profiles. Born in 1856, Joseph Louis Lanave was a State Public Works Engineer (he retired on 1 January 1926).104 Among his credits was the construction of the FrancoEthiopian rail line between Djibouti and Addis-Ababa (1897–1917), for which he served as Interim Director. He was the author of Agenda-aide-mémoire des travaux publics, published in 1902; and of Procédés généraux de construction, terrassements, routes, navigation fluviale and maritime, chemins de fer et tramways, constructions civiles. As for Gustave Majou105 he was described as “a proponent of public housing architecture” in early 20thcentury Paris,106 a topic to be discussed later in this book. When exactly did Majou replace Lanave? A summons filed on 30 November 1918 by Mr Émile Asselin, attorney and court usher with the Civil Tribunal of the Seine, at the request of Marcel Duchereau, emphasised that Mr Duchereau “during a visit he made to Le Trait in March 1918 to the sites where the proposed construction was to be undertaken,” stated to Mr Lanave, Project Director, and Mr Achard of Worms & Cie that he would agree to undertake said construction only if a secondary workforce […] were provided to him.” Clearly, Lanave was working on the site in March 1918. On the other hand, in a document filed on 2 September 1918 by the Court Usher Charles-Arthur Terrier, Majou was said to have replaced Lanave: “Through a writ from Mr Dessaix, court usher in Paris, dated 26 August, Worms & Cie, acting at the request and in the best

interests of Mr Lanave.” The two men have worked together for some period of time; Lanave may originally have been represented the Project Owner, a position which was later added to the duties of Majou, thereby making the latter responsible for the entire project. Just as chronological details are missing, so too are the terms of the mission assigned to Gustave Majou. Activities attributed to him are deduced from the contracts, memos and correspondence in which he is cited. The contract of 12 June 1917 indicates that Majou acted under the direction of Louis Achard. This subordinate link is also mentioned in a contract concluded with Guyon Frères on 6 November 1917. In addition to drawing up the plans, it was incumbent upon Majou to “draw up […] the specifications and specific terms and conditions related to the execution of the work.” On several occasions, he was presented as “Director and Representative of Worms & Cie” – a peculiar title inferring that he was linked to the company not through an architect’s contract but through an employment contract, i.e. he counted as a Worms employee, thus receiving a salary, not fees. In fact, some of his correspondence was signed on letterhead stating “head of construction at the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime,” work for which he had both technical and administrative control. The bulk of his correspondence refers to him grappling with subcontractors. He was responsible for gaining information on “both [their] morality and [their] financial resources as well as [their] technical capabilities”107 and their references. He selected them (alone or together with Achard) on the basis of their ability to perform a task for which he had designed the plans and defined the specifications; and he followed the project step by step. In the (numerous) cases in which legal proceedings were initiated by or against service providers, Gustave Majou, as a representative of Worms & Cie, dealt with the attorneys and court ushers when defending the interests of his employer-client. For instance, on 3 June 1919, he described conversations he had just had with various parties in the dispute with Marcel Duchereau, along with possible solutions. According to a letter dated 1 March 1920, Gustave Majou performed functions similar to those described

104 See National Archives, entry F/14/19561. 105 He was a member of the Society of Friends of Parisian Monuments and of the Central Society of French Architects. He was listed as the architect for the Cité Saint-Éloi in Le Trait. See the note that Marie-Jeanne Dumont dedicated to him in Le logement social à Paris, 1850-1930 : les habitations à bon marché, Éditions Mardaga, 1991. 106 See the website of the Committee for Historical and Scientific Works, http://cths.fr.

107 Letter of 5 June 1919.

above for the Société Immobilière du Trait, a subsidiary created by Worms & Cie in 1919 for the purpose of building, managing and maintaining the garden city, as will be discussed later. Between autumn 1916 and the first quarter of 1917, Maison Worms project took on form. It found the site on which to build, purchased the land needed for the construction of its shipyard and the future housing for its employees, assembled the team responsible for supervising the contractors selected, and began the work. Its commitment to shipbuilding responded to internal concerns raised by the execution of State contracts and the ensuing commitments. Since the conditions that had determined its new orientation […] continued to deteriorate, the company would go beyond the scope of its initial project and embrace national interests. Conditions worsened primarily as a result of the havoc wreaked on merchant fleets by German submarines

from 31 January 1917 onwards108 and on French Navy vessels. Subjected in November 1914 to a blockade by the Royal Navy in the North Sea and by France in the Adriatic, Germany sought to loosen their grip by attacking the merchant vessels of its adversaries and neutral countries without warning, a previously unknown circumstance. In an article of 20 July 1917, Le Figaro109 illustrated the substantial number of vessels sunk or severely damaged by the U-boats: “In the past week, there were fifty-two submarine attacks against ships belonging to the three Merchant Navies [England, Italy, France], and sixty-nine the week before. Twenty-three steamships sank last week, twenty-four this week.”

108 The destruction of three American civilian vessels in March 1917 prompted the USA to declare war on Germany (6 April 1917). See R. Girault and R. Frank, Turbulente Europe et nouveaux mondes (1914-1941), Paris: Payot, 1998, pp. 78–91. 109 Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr.

The interior of an U-boat – Larousse collection

“The government’s urgent entreaties” Georges Majoux, 4 August 1921

Anatole de Monzie The man “for whom the position of Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy has been created” Le Figaro, 22 March 1913

The MP for Cahors since 1909, former Cabinet Chief for Joseph Chaumié, Minister for the Public Instruction in 1902, then Minister for Justice in 1905, Anatole de Monzie112 at 37 years of age, entered the government formed by Louis Barthou (22 March 1913 to 2 December 1913) on 22 March 1913, under the presidency of Raymond Poincaré (18 February 1913 to 18 February 1920). Le Figaro113 spread word of his appointment in an article on the new government team, which ended with the following words: “Last but not least, winding up the list of those called to serve, one name that had never been uttered appeared on the horizon, that of Mr de Monzie, for whom the position of Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy has been created. Mr de Monzie […] is a talented speaker, having given several striking speeches in the Chamber.” The purpose of the portfolio assigned to him was to centralise civilian shipping services, up to now scattered among various ministries: the status of seafarers, shipping safety, the policing of fishing, and the administration of maritime affairs all depended on the Navy; shipping premiums came under the Ministry of Commerce; health and safety under the Interior Ministry; subsidies were granted by the postal services to shipping companies engaged in postal operations; the construction, maintenance and policing of ports, lighthouses and buoys were the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works; while the tax regime governing maritime trade came under the aegis of the Ministry of Finance. Shipbuilding was controlled by the Navy. “This

Anatole de Monzie in 1925

As mentioned earlier, Georges Majoux, in his speech on 15 October 1922,110 underscored how “the government’s urgent entreaties” in 1917 shaped the future of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime. Stemming from Anatole de Monzie, Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy at the time, these entreaties were heard by Georges Majoux111 and Hypolite Worms, when Majoux, assisted by the latter, sat on the Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee; this committee, known as the “Comité des Cinq” because it was composed of five directors of the most important French shipping companies, was established on 12 July 1917, that is to say about ten months after the creation of ACSM was initiated.

112 Anatole de Monzie (22 November 1876 to 11 January 1947) performed the duties of Minister for Finance (3 to 17 April 1925 and 19 to 23 July 1926); Minister for Public Instruction and Fine Arts (17 April to 11 October 1925); Minister for Justice (11 to 29 October 1925); Minister for National Education (3 June 1932 to 30 January 1934) and for Public Works (23 August 1938 to 5 June 1940). 113 Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr.

110 Alliance de l’hygiène sociale, congrès de Rouen, 13 au 16 octobre 1922, op. cit. 111 On the functions of Maison Worms in various public bodies, see the Decree of 18 April 1914, in which Georges Majoux was named a member of the Commission tasked with studying the modifications that needed to be made to the Law of 11 April 1906 on towing.

dispersal was a major handicap, in the opinion of many observers, hindering the development of a large fleet capable of serving the colonial empire and rivalling the English fleet.”114 Through a ministerial order and two decrees signed on 29 March 1913, several services were transferred to the new department, where they were divided into four divisions (Decree of 13 August 1913): 1) shipping and crews, responsible primarily for budget forecasts and provisions regarding seafarers; 2) the merchant fleet, responsible for general legislation, i.e. drafting and implementing laws governing premiums and agreements with shipping companies, as well as measures regarding pilotage and shipwrecks, etc.; 3) sea fisheries, responsible for the regulation and oversight of sea fisheries from a national and international perspective, as well as questions relating to the maritime public domain and concessions in this domain; and for the promotion of sea fishing and maritime credit services; 4) the administration of the Institute for Disabled Navy Personnel, responsible for drafting and overseeing the respective budgets of the Disabled Navy Personnel Fund and Provident Fund, plus the issues of maritime seizures, damages, shipwrecks and sinkings.115 The plan integrated various bodies able to support the Under-Secretary: Higher Council for Maritime Navigation; Board of Directors of the National Provident Fund for French Seamen; Higher Council for Sea Fisheries; Superior Commission for the Institute for Disabled Navy Personnel; Superior Commission for Control and Supervision of Shipping Credit Agencies; Commission for the Distribution of Subsidies to Maritime Companies and Academies; Higher Commission for the Safety of Maritime Navigation.

“I have had the pleasure of knowing you for twenty-six years” Hypolite Worms to Anatole de Monzie, 5 November 1938

This restructuring was welcomed by professionals within the shipping sector, who saw in Anatole de Monzie the much-anticipated helmsman, as witnessed by the words of André Lebon, Chairman of Messageries Maritimes, thanking Anatole de Monzie for a speech he had just given: “[Your] actions in the four months [you have been] at Rue Royale,116 and [your] assurances given today provide the most acerbic yet fair criticism of what had been done so egregiously for twenty years. Over these past twenty years, so much has been done to weaken all French shipping companies, without exception. The companies requested government assistance, and their representatives were happy to find in [you] the statesman ready to lend them his support and to study jointly the reforms in the plan that you have outlined, a plan they approve.”117 The leaders of Worms & Cie were among the supporters of this statesman who wished to give the merchant fleet a single and autonomous decision-making body. In the praise he extolled upon Anatole de Monzie on 5 November 1938,118 Hypolite Worms referred back to the beginning of their friendship. “I have had the pleasure of knowing you for twenty-six years. At the time, still quite young, I joined one of the longstanding shipping companies, whose numbers are declining little by little. At that very same time, you were making your debut in government councils, since, if my memory serves me correctly, it was in 1913 that you were given the title – the first to hold the title – of Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy. I remember, as if it were yesterday, the visits I paid to you while you were in that

114 Cf. inventory for the F/46 sub-series: the Merchant Navy, on www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr. 115 Cf. the article entitled “L’organisation et le rôle économique du sous-secrétariat de la Marine marchande,” in the Revue de la marine marchande et des pêches maritimes, No. 1, October 1915. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr.

116 The offices of the Merchant Navy were located at 2, rue Royale, Paris, 8th arrondissement. 117 Based on an article in Le Figaro on 18 July 1913, p. 4. 118 Document listed on the website www.wormsetcie.com.

old building on the Boulevard Montparnasse,119 where the freshness of your youthful intellect, imbued with progress, swept the dust away from a […] somewhat misbegotten department.”

by these protests, the government finally decided to set up a department headed by an Under-Secretary for the Merchant Navy, set to be the first step towards centralising the many different departments responsible for the Merchant Navy. Unfortunately, we never got beyond this first step. This initial artificial centralisation left all the special responsibilities in the hands of several ministers, letting them maintain power over the Merchant Navy. While the post of Under-Secretary of said Navy did have a certain amount of leverage, its role was largely incomplete, given that it should have been the key player. As it was, had the Under-Secretary not been subject to all the enervating ups and downs of politics, he would have been able to form that focal point, so wholeheartedly implored by Maurice Sarraut121 as a solution ‘to the problem of the Merchant Navy.’ But it could be said that no sooner was the fire kindled that certain factions wanted to stamp it out.” Anatole de Monzie left his post on 9 December 1913, after little more than nine months in office. “Though this new Under-Secretary of State did not last long,” agreed Hypolite Worms in his homage on 5 November 1938, “your obstinacy that created this position was to recreate it in July 1917, as a result of the dire warning uttered by you in the Chamber during one of those typically eloquent speeches of yours: ‘We have no chance of winning the war without a fully operational merchant fleet headed by one leader, just one leader!’ Because of the pressure you exerted, this command post was established, with you yourself as that one leader.”

The department of the Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy: “somewhat misbegotten” Hypolite Worms to Anatole de Monzie, 5 November 1938

“Misbegotten” was exactly the right term for the department. Coming back to this period in order to emphasise how the inability to resolve past problems continued to weigh on the present, Henry Laurier, chief commissioner of the Navy, highlighted in L’OuestÉclair120 of 14 August 1919 the inconsistencies of government action. “So long as there is no continuity of perspectives or spirit of consistency and stability in its management, no structuring or restructuring of councils, committees or offices will have any impact whatsoever on the pitiful situation of our merchant fleet. For years and years, specialists on the issues concerning the fate and development of this fleet have deplored in vain the dispersal of responsibilities and efforts paralysing its growth. The Chambers, in turn, protested against this dispersal and the resulting complications. Pushed

119 At the time the department of the Under-Secretary of State was setting up shop at 120, Boulevard Montparnasse, L’Ouest-Éclair published an article on 11 September 1913 entitled “Mr Lebureau attacks a Ministry – depriving it of furniture”: “Our young Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy, Mr de Monzie, has claimed that bureaucracy serves the public, and not the pen-pushers. Moreover, with the laudable scruple of not burdening the budget, Mr de Monzie is set on restructuring the services responsible for the Merchant Navy without this costing taxpayers a cent. But he was awaited on this point by Mr Lebureau, who has been kept from sleeping peacefully among his dusty boxes by all the brouhaha. Mr de Monzie, if you don’t like Mr Lebureau, you won’t get a desk or even chairs! The Ministry of Commerce has had to hand over its old office furniture to the Under-Secretary of State. The matter was settled, but now Mr Lebureau, reversing his decision, refuses to provide even a stool. He even took the precaution of removing the rugs that he suspected Mr de Monzie would undoubtedly want to smuggle to Boulevard Montparnasse. Fortunately, the Under-Secretary for the Merchant Navy is a regular tenant of the building at 120 bis, Boulevard Montparnasse, as otherwise we would undoubtedly have seen an Under-Secretary camped under the bridges, which, with winter approaching, would have been somewhat lacking in comfort, even for Navy administrators.” 120 In an article entitled “Ce que réclame la Marine.”

1917: “One leader, just one leader!” Anatole de Monzie, July 1917

The position assumed by Anatole de Monzie in the Government of Alexandre Ribot (20 March to 12 September 1917) and again in that of Paul Painlevé (12 September to 13 November 1917) had not technically been re-established: it had been filled in the interim by Louis Nail (29 October 1915 to 4 July 1917). Anything novel about the post stemmed from the increased scope of responsibilities it now encompassed. The full title was “Under-Secretary of State for Maritime

121 Senator representing the Aude department since 1913, Mr Sarraut (22 September 1869 to 2 December 1943) resigned from this post in 1932 to become the owner of La Dépêche. He was assassinated by the French Militia on 2 December 1943.

Transport and the Merchant Navy within the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.”122 Among the legal texts referenced in the decree that reorganised this position (4 July 1917123) were the clauses of 14 January and 8 May 1917 regarding the charter and purchase of foreign ships.124 Article 1 stated that the responsibilities for shipping previously assigned to the Ministry of General Supplies and Maritime Transport had already been transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, as had the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance regarding shipping insurance. Article 2 stated that the Under-Secretary of State, in addition to the services assigned to him by the decree of 17 January

1917,125 was responsible for the maintenance, growth and operation of the merchant fleet used by all public services or individuals. For this purpose, he oversaw: 1) the use and operation of all of merchant ships, whether by individuals or public, civil, or military services; 2) purchases and new construction, either on behalf of the State or individuals; 3) public service charters and permits required for private charters; 4) negotiations with Allied governments for allocating or increasing tonnage; 5) measures required to facilitate the maintenance of and repairs to all ships belonging to the merchant fleet; 6) maritime insurance. He worked together with the Under-Secretary of State for Transport to select ports of embarkation and disembarkation, whereby the organisation of loading/unloading ships remained the exclusive responsibility of the Under-Secretary of State for Transport. Hypolite Worms and the “Comité des Cinq” By decree of 12 July 1917,126 a Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee was created, “tasked with assisting the Under-Secretary of State in managing the fleet, chartering ships, taking measures to ensure an increase in the tonnage used to supply the country, and in general, handling all questions directly or indirectly related to maritime transport. It had five members: Mr Dal Piaz, Director of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique; Mr Philippar, Interim Director of the Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes; Mr Breton, Director of the Compagnie des Chargeurs Réunis and of the Compagnie Sud-Atlantique; Mr Stère, Managing Director of Les Affréteurs Réunis; and Mr Majoux,

122 Minister for Public Works and Transport: G. Desplas (20 March to 12 September 1917); Minister for the Navy: Admiral L. Lacaze (29 October 1915 to 2 August 1917). From 18 February 1913, the Republic was presided over by Raymond Poincaré, and would remain so until February 1920. In the Painlevé Government, the Under-Secretary of State for Maritime Transport fell under the aegis of Minister for Public Works, then that of the Ministry of Commerce in the Clemenceau governement. See Louis André, L’Industrie dans la Grande-Guerre, conference of 15–16 November 2016. 123 Cf. Journal officiel of 5 July 1917. 124 “14 January 1917 – Decree on chartering. Art. 1. Any public service or individual wishing to charter per time or per trip a ship other than a French or English ship with a tonnage greater than 1,000 deadweight tons shall, after the promulgation date of this Decree, obtain prior authorisation from the Under-Secretary of State for Transport. 2. Any individual currently using ships other than French or English ships, chartered per time or per successive trips, shall declare such to the Under-Secretary of State for Transport before 25 January 1917. 3. Any purchase of merchandise abroad weighing more than 1,000 tons at a price that includes both the cost of the merchandise and the freight, may take place only with the prior authorisation of the UnderSecretary of State for Transport. 4. The cargo of any ship, other than a French or English ship, chartered under different terms than those set forth in Articles 1 and 2 hereinabove, and merchandise purchased abroad in violation of clauses of Art. 3 shall be requisitioned on being unloaded in a French port.” According to the Decree of 8 May 1917, “no public service, company, or individual may, in France or in its colonies, directly or indirectly, enter into negotiations to purchase or charter a foreign ship, constructed or to be constructed, without the written authorisation of the Minister for General Supplies and Maritime Transport.” Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr.

125 “17 January 1917 – Decree governing the organisation of the departments of the Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy. Art 1. The Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy includes, independent of the office of the Under-Secretary of State, four Departments: shipping and crews; the merchant fleet; sea fisheries; administration of the Institute for disabled navy personnel. 2. The office of the Under-Secretary of State has been assigned the following tasks: general correspondence, legislative measures, personnel management and management of central administration equipment, budget preparation and accounting, publications and archives, honours and awards.” The responsibilities of the four departments follow. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. 126 Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr.

Director [sic] of Worms & Cie.”127 It was agreed that “the committee would meet permanently, under the chairmanship of the Under-Secretary of State or his Delegate, to propose any measure or formulate any useful suggestion” and that “its members might be tasked with special missions in France or abroad.” They were also allowed to “take on new experts from the French shipping industry, either permanently or temporarily, whose consultation might be deemed necessary.” Hypolite Worms was one such expert. “Every one of us who lived through this period,” he told Anatole de Monzie on 5 November 1938, “every night checking the considerable transportation flows of that day, knows what role you played in the results. This was the occasion for me to re-establish contact with you, and the cordiality of our relationship grew in line with the frequency of our meetings. During my time spent working with the ‘Committee of Five,’ I watched you work with a completely independent mind – one of the pleasant traits of your character. The ease with which you sought […] and found the simplest solutions to the most complicated problems, taking all aspects into account with intellectual and moral elegance. The way you asserted your responsibilities and often those of others. Permit me to say that all this engendered feelings of affection which have successfully survived the test of time.” On 8 October 1917, Hypolite Worms became a member of another committee, the Merchant Navy Committee,128 created for the purpose of monitoring the merchant fleet. Further members were Mr Lazard, head of the Transport Priorities and Programmes Service; Mr Berengier, head of the Maritime Transport Service; Mr Blazeix, Director of Technical Services for the Ministry of Commerce; Mr Dal Piaz, Director of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique; and Mr Breton, Director of the Chargeurs Réunis. In the diary (21 August 1938 to October 1940) which he published as Ci-Devant,129 Anatole de Monzie introduced Hypolite

Worms130 in an entry dated 1 November 1939, as “one of three or four experienced shipowners still in the top echelon of our merchant fleet. I have known Hypolite Worms for twenty-two years,” he underscored, “and he proved his worth in 1917, when I served as UnderSecretary of State for the Merchant Navy.” These merits were undoubtedly shared by all those who hunkered down to remedy a situation made considerably worse by years of procrastination and inadequacy. This deterioration was so tragic that Jules Charles-Roux was to write in April 1917:131 “Up until now it seems that [France] has been somewhat indifferent to the slow and methodical destruction of its merchant fleet.”

130 Hypolite Worms also became a member of the Maritime Transport Executive Committee, created on 30 April 1918 by F. Bouisson, commissioner for Maritime Transport and the Merchant Navy (attached to the Ministry of Commerce). “Art. 1. A ‘Maritime Transport Executive Committee’ has been established within the ‘Maritime Transport and Merchant Navy Commission.’ This committee will examine periodic programmes prepared by the ‘Executive Committee for Imports,’ along with the decisions taken at each committee meeting. Its goal is to assign ships to the various shipping lines serving France, and to check the composition of freight so as to maximise the use of deadweight and cubic capacity of these ships. These assignments and composition of freight will be undertaken in conformity with the programme and decisions of the ‘Executive Committee for Imports.’ Art. 2. The ‘Maritime Transport Executive Committee’ is chaired by the ‘Commissioner for Maritime Transport and the Merchant Navy’ or by its delegate. It is comprised of Mr Breton, Director of the Chargeurs Réunis; Mr Dal Piaz, Director of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique; Mr Fraissinet, Director of the Compagnie Marseillaise de Navigation à Vapeur; Mr Houet, Director of the Société Navale de l’Ouest; Mr Hubert-Giraud, Administrator and Director of the Société des Transports Maritimes; Mr Philippar, Director of the Messageries Maritimes; and Mr Worms, of Worms & Cie. Art. 3. The Traffic Bureau of the Maritime Transport Department shall make available to the committee all documents needed to accomplish its tasks. […] Art. 4. The committee is also tasked with providing its technical opinion on various questions regarding maritime transport, which may be submitted by the ‘Commissioner for Maritime Transport and the Merchant Navy.’ Art. 5. Each committee meeting shall be recorded in minutes, which will be sent to the ‘Maritime Transport Department.’ […] Each committee member, after providing all useful information, shall abstain from taking part in deliberations regarding the assignment of vessels belonging to his fleet.” Source: www. gallica.bnf.fr. 131 Revue des deux mondes, vol. 38, March–April 1917, “Le péril de notre marine marchande,” Jules Charles-Roux, 1 April 1917, pp. 481–506.

127 On 29 February 1916, the Maritime Transport Committee was created for the purpose of improving the yield of commercial ships and to assist with the issuance of shipping permits; the committee was disbanded by the Decree of 27 December 1916. See Revue de la marine marchande, March 1916, January 1917. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. 128 The creation of this Committee was announced in Le Sémaphore algérien of 3 November 1917. 129 Ci-devant, Flammarion, 1941, pp. 178–179.

“The thorny issue of tonnage”

currently in the region of billions of francs.134 Moreover, losses incurred between 1 August 1914 and 1 June 1917 have reduced our fleet by 550,000 tons; submarine warfare alone was responsible for the loss of nearly 460,000 tons.” In relation to the 2,500,000 gross registred tons that the Merchant Navy had accounted for when France entered the war, 22% of the 2,192 ships in service at the time had been destroyed. Account also needed to be taken of the number of vessels requisitioned (selected from among the fastest and best equipped: they represented 66% of the total number in July 1916 and 40% on average in 1917) as well as the number (presently incalculable) of ships which, due to their intense use during the conflict, were in such poor condition that they would no longer be useable once peace was restored.135 Labelled “exorbitant” by Le Bail-Maignan, “extravagant” by Étienne Clémentel,136 Minister for Commerce and Industry, the increase in freight resulted in a 1,500% to 2,000% jump in pre-war tariffs. This dizzying rise resulted from a shortage of ships in a context of exploding demand for maritime transport, stemming from the destruction of the road infrastructure in combat zones, the predominant use of railways for military purposes and the cessation of production in the coalmines and industrial centres in Northern France, all of which made France dependent on its Allies for supplies of raw materials. In August

Étienne Clémentel, 1931

The price paid for the decline in the French Merchant Navy “Whereas in the middle of the last century,” noted MP Georges Le Bail-Maignan in October 1916,132 “we occupied second place among the Merchant Navies of Europe, and third throughout the world, by 1914, we had dropped to sixth place. […] In 1850, we were in third place behind England and the United States, we were overtaken by Germany and Norway around 1880, and by Japan in 1910. Our merchant fleet is indisputably inadequate. […] Whereas cargo ships in England and Norway represent more than two-thirds of all ships, ours do not even reach 50% of steam tonnage. Our inadequate tonnage and lack of cargo ships have consequences which were annoying in the pre-war period, which are now very serious, and which are set to be disastrous in the future. […] Prior to the war […] French shippers, unable to guarantee the shipment and arrival of merchandise under our flag, were forced to resort to competing Merchant Navies […] meaning that the share of our ships in seagoing transport continued to decline, falling from 32% in 1890 to 26.6% in 1900 and 23.6% in 1910.” A study published in July 1917 in the Revue de la marine marchande et des pêches maritimes133 backed this data. Whereas “in 1913, ships under national flag contributed to port activity at the rate of 59% for England, 53% for Norway, 50% for Sweden and Germany, French ships transported just 23% of freight to or from French ports.” In fact, continued the study, “our import needs made us reliant to an overly large extent on foreign Merchant Navies [especially British and Scandinavian] to which, given the increase in freight, we are having to pay considerable sums,

134 Jules Charles-Roux, in “Le péril de notre marine marchande,” wrote (p. 484): “One author calculated that France paid allied or neutral nations a monthly ransom of 160 million. ‘Given that we import three million tons and that the average rate per ton of freight is 60 francs, we were paying 200 million in freight per month, in round numbers. 74% of this sum goes to foreign shippers.’” The figure of 2,192 ships in service in 1914 is given by this author. 135 In the course of the conflict, 267 French merchant ships were listed as destroyed. On 29 October 1918, total losses were 1,050,044 tons, “933,100 of which were due to acts of war,” while “a large number of ships [were] effectively out of use due to a lack of maintenance,” cf. P. David, S. David, C. Le Baron, Y. Marchaland, Un port dans la plaine. De Caen à Ouistreham, Éditions du Bout du monde, 2011, p. 93. 136 Minister for Commerce, Industry, Posts and Telegraphs (29 October 1915 to 20 January 1920), Étienne Clémentel led the discussions between England and France, in August 1917, on achieving “full cooperation, and the proportional and equitable distribution of the war burdens, by assuring that the people of both countries have an equivalent standard of living.” Ref. Étienne Clémentel, La France et la politique économique interalliée, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris; Yale University Press, New Haven, USA, 1931.

132 Cf. report by Georges Le Bail-Maignan (MP for Finistère department, 1914–1918) to the Chamber of Deputies on 26 October 1916, and quoted in the draft Law of 13 April 1917 intended to augment the French merchant fleet, Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, règlements et avis du Conseil d’État, vol. 17, 1917. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. 133 Revue de la marine marchande et des pêches maritimes, July 1917, No. 22: “L’Œuvre du sous-secrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande (1er juillet 1917),” pp. 337–379.

1914–1918: Workers preparing to punch a large steel plate at the Northumberland shipbuilding company, Howdon, Newcastle – photo by Horace Nicholls (Imperial War Museum Photograph Archive Collection)

1917, the amount that had to be imported by sea for the upcoming twelve months was estimated at 37,450,000 tons.137 And even then, the French Government reached this estimate only by drastically rationing sugar, coal, bread, meat as well as gas and electricity consumption, etc.;138 otherwise, imports would have climbed to 100 million tons. Transporting the 37 million tons needed strictly for the war effort and the survival of the population required total tonnage of 6 million tons. France had available just 4,023,000 tons, of which 1,756,000 tons were under its flag and 1,166,000 tons under British flag, while 1,101,000 tons were provided by allied and neutral merchant fleets.

The country faced a two-million-ton deficit.139 “One consequence of our inadequate merchant fleet,” railed Le Bail-Maignan in October 1916, “is that we are defenceless against foreign shipowners able to raise their prices freely, to depreciate our currency, and to place us in the impossible situation of curbing an increase in basic necessities; in a nutshell, to make us feel the full weight of economic servitude, from which we must be freed.” It was this challenge that Anatole de Monzie tackled as soon as he assumed his position, implementing a whole range of measures, not the least of which was taking control of the Merchant Navy.

139 Ibid. During the debate session in the Chamber of Deputies on 22 June 1917, Louis Nail presented the status of the merchant fleet in very different terms, showing that France had “a surplus of 180,000 tons” versus 1 August 1914. This surplus was the result of adding the “recovered” tonnage, i.e.: – purchases abroad reflagged as French vessels: 90,815 tons // – purchases abroad, not yet reflagged: 242,546 tons // – purchases by the Navy: 41,930 tons // – purchases by General Supplies: 7,600 tons // seized or embargoed ships: 149,848 tons, for a total of 664,915 tons. As advantageous as it was, this positive balance was not enough to calm the “apprehensions of the men most skilled in maritime affairs, such as Mr Charles-Roux, Mr Perreau, Mr de Monzie,” or André Hesse, who objected early on that the 242,546 tons remaining under foreign flag could not be considered as acquired. Undoubtedly, this surplus was an inadequate substitute as regards the governmental project that sought to augment the French merchant fleet, on which Louis Nail himself was working. Cf. Revue de la marine marchande et des pêches maritimes - July 1917, pp. 420–425.

137 Ibid. Étienne Clémentel distributed the tonnage as follows: “Minister for General Supply: 6,940,000 tons – of which, wheat and grain: 4,300,000 tons – oil: 800,000 tons / Ministry of Armaments: 6,570,000 tons – of which, metals: 3,500,000 tons – ores and unfinished products: 2,270,000 tons / Ministry of War: 1,710,000 tons – of which, for aeronautics alone: 950,000 tons / Coal: 20,000,000 tons / Commerce: 1,475,000 tons – of which, textiles: 560,000 tons – seed oils: 700,000 tons / Agriculture: 755,000 tons, of which, phosphates: 540,000 tons. In 1913, É. Clémentel specified that total imports in France had risen to 48,620,000 tons, of which, by land: 18,430,000 tons; by sea: 30,190,000. However, as a result of the war, imports by land had been reduced by 15 million tons. Likewise, following the German occupation, coal production had fallen by 20 million tons; production of foodstuffs by 13 million tons. Finally, the manufacture of armaments and the transport of troops to Thessaloniki required 10 million tons.” 138 Ibid.

sition of its cargo by determining the quantities and categories of merchandise intended for public services and “if necessary” for trade. As rational as this planning system was, it still bumped up against a sizeable obstacle: the largest share of traffic with France – foreign tonnage – escaped its reach. To be truly effective required extending control over all allied or neutral vessels entering the ports of France, its colonies and its protectorates, a step taken on 29 September 1917: as of 1 November 1917, any ship that put in to a French port – irrespective of its flag – could not operate without a license. As a way of controlling freight charges and “fighting the increase in prices of essential raw materials, while safeguarding the ability to reconstruct the French merchant fleet,” the Under-Secretary of State was additionally equipped “with true power of taxation,” applicable to merchandise deemed essential for the country’s survival. “In the event of any breach,” he could also “take any measures he deemed appropriate, including requisitioning ships flying the French flag.” While these measures made it possible to better manage shortages, they were far from adequate. It was essential that the merchant fleet be augmented. Victory, the survival of the population and the rebalancing of trade depended on it, as did the country’s future. It was a simple equation: the greater the number of French vessels, the sooner the operation of shipping lines that had been suspended or reduced since 1914 could be restarted, and even extended worldwide. This was seen as the only possible way for France to control its supplies and develop its international trade, in particular with its far-flung colonies, thus avoiding the looming economic crisis. Ships had to be purchased and constructed.

Licensing or the need to “turn partial control into total control”140 In addition to the lack of ships, the lack of rationality in managing the available vessels worsened the shipping crisis. Admittedly, the Decrees of 18 July 1916 and 13 April 1917 established a licensing system designed primarily to oversee and control trade between England and France, particularly the import from the British Isles of merchandise prohibited in theory because it could be used for military purposes, such as raw materials and manufactured goods (steel, machine tools, etc.). This led to a French office being established in London and its English counterpart in Paris. But the extremely long delays in issuing shipping permits and all sorts of administrative complications paralysed a number of cargo ships, considerably hampering supplies to France. Accordingly, André Hesse, MP for the CharenteMaritime department, in a debate in the Chamber on 22 June 1917,141 stated that “on 25 April [1917], in the port of Marseilles alone, there were forty-five immobilised ships; on 23 May, there were fifty-two.” Vessel loading and sailing plans left much to be desired, as did the priority given to deliveries for certain clients at a time when public interest demanded that others be supplied. To fight this dysfunction, Anatole de Monzie placed the whole merchant fleet under government control: on 17 July 1917, he asked the Council of Ministers to approve a decree under which, as of 1 August 1917, any French seafaring ship of more than one hundred gross tonnage had to operate with a license, without which it would no longer be allowed to enter or leave the ports. By centralising the day-to-day data on transport supply and demand throughout France territory, the UnderSecretary of State was able to manage the available tonnage based on the “hierarchical needs of national defence and supplying the civilian population.”142 He dictated each ship’s itinerary and decided the compo-

Agreements with England In autumn 1915, France had considered buying 200,000 tons of ships from its British Ally. But after the British Admiralty imposed a ban on out-flagging for the duration of the war, it became impossible to reflag these ships as French vessels, thus causing negotiations to fail. One alternative was found with the Hudson Bay Co., an English company which agreed to charter thirty-nine ships to France on a permanent basis. This arrangement served to defer the problem, though it returned with a vengeance in mid-1916. Since the invasion of its Northern coalfields, France had depended heavily on

140 Report supporting the Decree of 29 September 1917. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. 141 Cf. Revue de la Marine marchande et des pêches maritimes - July 1917: “Principaux débats : L’organisation du sous-secrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande,” pp. 420— 425. 142 This, and all subsequent quotations through to the end of the paragraph were taken from the report given to the President of the Council by the various ministers, meant to provide background information for the Decree of 29 September 1917.

England for its coal supplies,143 paying dearly for its subservience: by March 1916, the price of coal freight from Cardiff to Le Havre had increased dramatically compared to October 1914, resonating in public opinion.144 It became urgent to contain this increase, while assuring regular deliveries. On 25 May 1916, an agreement was concluded for this purpose. The monthly amount of English coal to be exported to France was increased to two million tons, and the Board of Trade undertook to limit purchasing and transport costs. As a result, eight hundred coal ships (half of which sailed under a neutral flag) were assigned each month to this traffic. But that same autumn, England found itself obligated to allocate a portion of this tonnage to supplying wheat to France, seriously affecting coal deliveries: in December, (only!) 1.4 million tons of English coal arrived in French ports. In the opinion of Étienne Clémentel,145 the only possible way to avoid a repeat of the supply crisis was “to combine the economic power of the two countries.” In this spirit, an agreement was signed on 3 December 1916 for the purpose of “regulating the coordinated use of vessels available to both France and England, and deciding on the relationship between [the two governments] as regards the use by France of English vessels made available to it.” As a result, the issues of tonnage and its management, the issuance of import licenses, pricing, cases of force majeure, or even the decongestion of French ports by making available tens of thousands of English freight cars, etc. were (momentarily) resolved. The British Government authorised the chartering of English and neutral boats via “time charters,”146 while an Inter-Allied Office in London was made responsible

for coordinating time charters. Also permitted was “the transfer under French flag of steamships ordered by the French companies and constructed on their behalf in England. […] Priority was granted for these construction orders […] on the condition that said ships were used to serve the French Government.”147 Finally, it was agreed that ships returning to English ports could be used to transport grain, minerals, pyrite or mining timber. To be effective, the system required that “the two countries communicate monthly regarding the usage status of their merchant fleets, as well as the status of their maritime ports.” The French Government was required “to make maximum use of its available tonnage.” It was in response to these commitments that the French Government, via the Decrees of 17 July 1917 and 29 September 1917, placed under its control all ships using its ports, a condition that allowed Anatole de Monzie to set up on France’s behalf the “programme for its essential needs in tonnage and for its available resources.” In August 1917, further negotiations between Étienne Clémentel and his British counterparts took place for the purpose of “securing England’s post-war economic assistance.” Various issues were debated and regulated, including “obtaining immediate for 310,000 tons of supplies in September, and the permanent support of fifty ships, i.e. 250,000 tons.” Soaring prices The shortages dictated prices. “At this moment in time,” declared Anatole de Monzie before parliamentarians on 22 June 1917,148 “a ship has the same value in wartime as a piece of heavy artillery, perhaps even higher.” In April, “the price for a ton of cargo, between 200 and 250 francs in normal times, has risen to between 1,000 and 1,200 francs.”149 In July 1917, forecasts expected prices to rise tenfold. Nonetheless, under the principle that it was better to be a shipowner than a charterer, and having observed that the increase in chartering costs was twice as high as that of the cost of ships (1,500% to 2,000% versus 700% to 800%), public

143 Stephen D. Carls, in Louis Loucheur, 1872-1931 : ingénieur, homme d’État, modernisateur de la France, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2000, points out that “in 1916, consumption (of coal in France) was approximately 44 million tons, at a time when domestic production was less than 22 million tons.” 144 In La marine marchande française - 1914-1918, Marc Saibène highlights (p. 70) the fact that coal freight from Cardiff to Le Havre rose from 8 F in October 1914 to 42 F in March 1916, while the rate in Marseilles increased from 14 F to 125 F. 145 All of the quotations in this paragraph were taken from the book by Étienne Clémentel, La France et la politique économique interalliée, op. cit., p. 152, and Appendix 1, p. 327. 146 A time charter is the hiring of a vessel for a specific period of time as defined in the charter party.

147 The Agreement of 3 December 1916 was included in the Appendix to the book by Étienne Clémentel, op. cit., pp. 327– 330. 148 “Principaux débats : L’organisation du sous-secrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande,” op. cit., p. 425. 149 Jules Charles-Roux, op. cit., p. 502.

authorities felt that “it was still preferable to spend in one go an amount equal to one year’s charter costs, thereby gaining a valuable asset for future national prosperity, a taxable asset for the Treasury, while keeping freight currently carried in neutral ships in French hands.”150 Above all, “for many years after the war, the more freight capacity a country has at its disposal, the richer it will be.”151 At that time, shipowners did not embrace this projection into an uncertain future. The amortisation over a reasonable timeframe of an investment requiring such an excessive amount of capital was conditional on freight costs remaining at stratospheric levels. As soon as markets stabilised – which seemed inevitable once conditions returned to normal – the acquisition value would no longer be in line with market prices, thus making the ship unsaleable – or only saleable at a great loss – while its amortisation would extend over a period greatly exceeding its operating life (normally calculated as twenty years). In other words, “after the war, with the merchant fleets of enemy countries entering into service, along with seized or blockaded allied ships, and the innumerable vessels currently retained for the needs of the armed forces becoming free, freight and charter rates could be expected to drop sharply; in the same vein, the value of ships would decline to a level closer to normal peacetime values. Henceforth, if the shipowner has not amortised the difference between the cost and the real value of his ships, his capital will be compromised.”152 A further disincentive for potential purchasers was the opacity characteristic of various fiscal and administrative measures. For example, since 30 June 1916, war profits had become subject to a special tax payment. However, the taxpayers still had no idea of “the portion of the amounts that could be deducted as exceptional amortisation.”153 Even then, the issue of paying for requisitioned ships had yet to be settled.154 Another concern: the Law of 19 April 1917 on mandatory war risk insurance for ships, based on the principle of full replacement value; this required shipowners to replace, through purchase or an order

for a replacement, ships that had been lost. “Insurance claims will only be paid in full once vessels of a tonnage equivalent to that of the lost ships have been incorporated into the French fleet.”155 Easier said than done! But where to get the ships? What would be their book value? Faced with these uncertainties, shipowners hesitated to invest, despite the government’s incentives which, in light of the sizeable sums it was forced to pay for the purchases of wheat and steel required for the needs of the country, just could not afford the ships. 13 April 1917: an advance of 160 million francs to purchase or construct ships After numerous debates and revisions (particularly on the duration and amount of the aid),156 a “law intended to increase the size of the French merchant fleet” was passed on 13 April 1917. It was decided that, once the law was implemented, and during the “eighteen months following the signing of peace, the government may […] up to an amount up to 160 million francs, procure, by way of an advance payment to shipowners based in metropolitan France and its colonies and approved by the Minister for Public Works and Transport and subject to a favourable opinion from the Minister for

155 See the Chamber debates on 13 March 1917 concerning compulsory marine insurance. 156 On 25 November 1916, Le Sémaphore algérien published an article entitled “Avances aux armateurs pour l’achat de navires”: “Mr Le Bail-Maignan has just distributed a supplementary report on the draft law defining the terms under which construction advances may be granted to shipowners for the purpose of making it easier for them to purchase and construct cargo ships. […] Once the peace treaty has been signed, a period of eighteen months has replaced the twelve-month period originally established for the allocation of advances: total advances may not exceed 160 million versus 200 million previously written in the draft law, with total credits allocated up to 100 million for construction advances, and up to 60 million for advances intended for ship purchases; as regards the reimbursement of said advances, a maximum period of five years has replaced the ten-year period set forth in the original text. This time period will be established by the Minister for the Navy.” Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr. On 13 January 1916, Louis Nail had filed a draft law seeking to “dedicate 100 million francs for advances to shipowners for the purchase of ships.” Cf. “L’Œuvre du soussecrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande (1er juillet 1917),” op. cit., p. 345.

150 “L’Œuvre du sous-secrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande (1er juillet 1917),” op. cit., p. 356. 151 Ibid., p. 347. 152 Jules Charles-Roux, op. cit., p. 502. 153 “L’Œuvre du sous-secrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande (1er juillet 1917),” op. cit., p. 345. 154 See the Chamber debates on 9 June 1920.

Schneider shipyard in Le Havre during the 1914–1918 war (Historical Museums of Le Havre collection)

tonnage of less than 20,000 tons, and for new companies: 70% of the price. The advances granted are to be repaid in annual instalments – not to exceed five, as determined by the Minister for Public Works and Transport.”157

Finance, [as] a portion of the funds needed to purchase or build mechanically propelled cargo ships. All shipbuilding is to be undertaken in French shipyards. […] Of this amount, 60 million francs are allocated as advance payments for purchasing ships, and the other 100 million as advance payments for building new ones. (The latter) will be the subject of an agreement between the Minister for Public Works and Transport, the shipowner and the shipbuilder. Payment is to be made in instalments to the shipbuilder on behalf of the shipowner. These advances, calculated at an interest rate of 6%, will be granted only to French companies. […] The maximum proportion is fixed as follows: for shipping companies owning a fleet with gross tonnage of 20,000 tons or more: 50% of the purchase or building price; for shipping companies owning a fleet with gross

“Victory for the Entente,” Admiral Jellicoe said the day before yesterday, “is in the hands of the shipyards” Le Figaro, 20 July 1917

Sales of ships prohibited almost everywhere For someone to buy something, someone else must have that thing to sell. Yet, there were hardly any ships on offer. Except for the United States (until it entered the war), Japan, Canada and Greece, where a few

157 Law of 13 April 1917 (Journal officiel of 12 May 1917). Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr.

purchases were made,158 and with the exception of certain Latin American countries, where purchases were still possible, sales everywhere else were prohibited. “It is no longer possible to acquire tonnage abroad,” lamented Jules Charles-Roux in April 1917,159 “the majority of nations having not only banned reflagging but even sales of ships.” Moreover, even when an opportunity presented itself, the French were simply not in a position to seize it. The Decree of 8 May 1917 obliged any potential buyer to obtain the prior approval of the Minister for General Supplies and Maritime Transport. Obtaining this permit, which international agreements had rendered necessary, would have been a pure formality if, in reality, the timeframe had been so long that “in most cases the ship was sold to a foreigner before the requested permit was granted.”160 Even if, by chance, a French shipowner managed to purchase a vessel, he still needed to be patient and allow time for the reflagging procedure to be completed before commissioning the ship. Yet the worst was still to come. Henri Mazel, Head of the Department of Economic Studies at the Commissariat for Maritime Transport and Merchant Navy161 wrote: “The government requires that the shipowner, to whom it has made an advance payment, on top of a mortgage payment on the ship purchased or built, pay a deposit which, naturally, is not free of charge, thereby doubling the interest that the borrower must

pay; the very legitimate concern for guaranteeing the funds advanced by the government has caused legislators to go off course; a serious borrower – and nearly all shipping companies fall under this category – should not be required to provide a deposit, as the mortgage on the ship combined with hull insurance on the vessel should be sufficient guarantee for the Treasury.” The Law of 13 April 1917 produced no results. Paradoxically, it ended up worsening what it was trying to avoid by causing “a considerable increase in freight rates for all types of merchandise.”162 If totally unable to procure ships abroad, was France at least able to build them? Build ships – but with what means? In mid-1917, the situation of French shipbuilding was catastrophic: with 127,000 tons built since the outbreak of war, the industry had hardly produced more than in 1913 alone.163 Admittedly, funds were available to renew the fleet; in 1915, “William Bertrand, MP of the Radical Party in the Charente-Inférieure department (1914– 1919) and a member of the Merchant Navy Commission, [had submitted] a draft law in the Chamber to distribute subsidies for ship construction.”164 But how could ships be built without a labour force or raw materials? How could the 137,000 tons be completed which for

162 Marc Saibène, op. cit., p. 70. 163 According to “L’Œuvre du sous-secrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande (1er juillet 1917),” op. cit., p. 350: “The tonnage of merchant ships leaving French shipyards between 1910 and 1913 was as follows: 1910 1911 1912 1913 Steamships 50,850 79,200 156,100 122,610 Sailing ships 13,350 14,430 14,690 15,440 Total 64,200 93,630 170,790 138,050 i.e. an average of 116,650 tons per year.” These figures are slightly less than the numbers that René La Bruyère provided in 1921 in his article, “Notre industrie des constructions navales,” published in La France nouvelle, which estimated French production at 220,000 gross tons for merchant ships, and 100,000 gross tons for military vessels. E. Lorenz, in an article entitled “L’offre de travail et la stratégie d’emploi dans les chantiers navals en France et en Grande-Bretagne - 1890-1970,” published in issue 138 of the journal, Le Mouvement social, Éditions Ouvrières, January– March 1987, pp. 21–44, wrote that “on average, production in terms of tonnage represented just 5% of that of Great Britain.” 164 Pierre-Alexis Hirard, Master’s thesis, “Produire pour la guerre, l’arsenal de Rochefort 1914-1918,” 2013–2014, Sciences Po Rennes, p. 18.

158 In La marine marchande française - 1914-1918, Marc Saibène notes (pp. 101–102) that in 1917, “several missions will be mandated in the United States and Japan, but with disappointing results. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the year, the Transport Commissioner successfully places orders with the United States […] and is able to start construction on 26 cargo ships for a total tonnage of 188,600 tons. But when the United States enter the war, its merchant fleet is short of vessels, prompting the government in Washington to place an embargo on all construction and forcing the Ministry to fall back on orders for wooden ships for which the American authorities had no pre-emptive right. […] Around that same time, 50 wooden steamships are ordered from Canada. […] Three cargo ships from Japan are ultimately purchased through the intermediary of the Governor General of Indochina. […] And even a few others, in early 1918. […] In addition, at the beginning of the year, the Department of the Merchant Navy purchase several Greek ships.” 159 Jules Charles-Roux, op. cit., p. 502. 160 “Principaux débats : L’organisation du sous-secrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande,” op. cit., p. 422. 161 Henri Mazel, “Le problème des transports,” Revue de la marine marchande, No. 34, July 1918, p. 213.

months had been stagnating on slipways, while more and more munitions had to be produced? While some thought that “the labour problem could be easily resolved through an understanding with the Department of War,”165 others objected that the resumption and development of shipbuilding depended, first and foremost, on bringing skilled workers back to their shipyards: engineers, designers, scale modellers, cabinet makers, fitters, carpenters, boilermakers, metalworkers specialised in drilling, forming, riveting and caulking, electricians, painters, etc. Yet, it was just these skilled craftsmen whose services were, for the most part, required to manufacture munitions and weapons, locomotives, and railway rolling stock, etc. A commission comprised of representatives from the Navy, the shipping industry and the administration of the Merchant Navy was tasked with restoring the workforce, but with inconclusive results. The issue also raised concerns about restoring the seafaring labour force: once released from military duties, would there be sufficient seafarers to man the new and old vessels? Even more preoccupying was the problem of supplies. In March 1917, writing in the Revue des deux mondes,166 Jules Charles-Roux summarised the situation as follows: “The occupation of the Briey basin, of our coalfields and the main regions […] of our blast furnaces has made it momentarily impossible for France to meet the needs of its shipyards.” Within France, efforts are being centred on increasing production in former coalfields (in Anjou, in the Saint-Étienne basin) and on searching for new extraction zones (primarily in Normandy). “It is all too true that, once again, our eyes must turn toward England, our generous Ally.” As a reminder, 135,000 tons of steel had been needed in 1913 to produce 138,000 tons of ships.

the work of the Under-Secretary of State in July 1917.167 “Currently,” the article stated, “the situation is as follows. We have 137,000 tons of vessels nearing completion, which have been divided into two categories: primary and secondary urgency, based on the degree of progress. The primary urgency category involving five ships requires 3,700 tons of sheet metal which England has promised. The secondary category involving eight ships with a far-off completion date requires 12,000 to 13,000 tons of sheet metal. Our high commissioner has obtained a promise from the American Government to supply it.” “An understanding has been reached with the other ministerial departments that import sheet metal, whereby the Merchant Navy will take priority over the other departments with regard to sheet metal deliveries. Several batches of specifications have already been sent to Mr Tardieu,168 with others to follow. It is hoped that deliveries will take place in September or October. Meanwhile, the United States has promised to supply France at a monthly rate of about 10,000 tons. 40% or 4,000 tons of this are earmarked for warships, while the remainder will be distributed among the other services on a pro rata basis, in accordance with their needs.169 The Merchant Navy will thus receive its share, and there is reason to hope that the construction of new cargo ships can proceed soon. But France faces two serious problems. The first is the increase in the cost of sheet metal, which continues to climb due to the worldwide shortage thereof, making it nearly impossible to buy, should the Americans sell it to us at commercial rates. France needs to obtain more favourable terms from its Allies. Why can they not agree to supply the Merchant Navy at the rates previously contracted with the Ministry of Armaments? The latter has steel available at its US suppliers. Washington’s intervention could be persuasive, should these suppliers hesitate. They have signed contracts with France: they must deliver to France, even if the department that signed [the contract] is different from the department to which

“The very scarcity of sheet metal is becoming a real problem” Revue de la Marine marchande et des pêches maritimes, July 1917

The issue of sheet metal laid bare the difficulties encountered in the shipbuilding industry. The problem was addressed in an article published in the Revue de la Marine marchande et des pêches maritimes devoted to

167 “L’Œuvre du sous-secrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande […],” op. cit., p. 351. 168 André Tardieu (1876–1945), MP for Seine-et-Oise department, in charge of Franco-American War Cooperation. 169 For more details, see the debate between Louis Nail and André Hesse in the Chamber on 22 June 1917, in “Principaux débats : L’organisation du sous-secrétariat d’État de la Marine marchande,” op. cit., pp. 420–422.

165 Jules Charles-Roux, op. cit., p. 503. 166 Ibid., p. 503.

we are asking them to make the delivery. For example, a 20% increase could be considered solely for when the steel is additionally laminated. On the other hand, the very scarcity of sheet metal is becoming a real problem. While the United States cannot supply us indefinitely, France cannot count on steelmakers Denain and Anzin, whose steelworks are located in occupied territory: iron ore from the Caen region is not immediately available and will take time to extract: we are left with Le Creusot, la Basse-Loire and Montluçon where production is extremely limited and almost entirely taken up by Ministry of War and Ministry of the Navy. Transport problems further complicate the situation: we lack ships, and on board those that are available there is often a lack of space for such heavy freight. No matter which aspect of our sheet metal concerns we consider, the problem always seems very difficult, and its solution is subject to all kinds of conditions.”

the 1860s, driven by a spirit of free trade, the public authorities had eliminated the surcharges levied on foreign flags (Anglo-French Treaty of 1860, Law of 19 May 1866). The ensuing competition led to several French shipping companies having to cease or reduce operations, in turn causing a sharp decline in orders for new vessels. Fifteen years later, when the Administration became aware of the harm this policy was causing and sought to correct its impact, the introduction of a system of shipbuilding and shipping subsidies (Law of 29 January 1881) re-energised the transport sector, and thus, the shipbuilding industry. This in turn led first to an expansion phase, with new shipyards established in a period of prosperity, and then a phase of concentration in times of crisis with the weakest companies disappearing or being bought up by more robust companies. Shaped by the alternation of these two cycles, the French shipbuilding industry at the outset of war was dominated by a dozen companies,173 to a large extent reliant on such leading shipping companies as Messageries Maritimes, Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, Chargeurs Réunis or Fraissinet and on powerful steelmaking and financial groups (Schneider, Wendel, Aciéries du Nord et de l’Est, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, Banque de l’Union Parisienne, among others). The main shipbuilding companies were: - Ateliers et Chantiers de France, established in Dunkirk in 1899; - Ateliers et Chantiers de la Manche, established in Dieppe in 1896, and known as the Établissements Amblard until 1912; - Chantiers et Ateliers Augustin Normand, founded in Honfleur in 1728 and transferred to Le Havre in 1816; - Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët), whose origins went back to the Chantiers John Scott & Cie, opened in Saint-Nazaire in 1861 with the help of the Pereire brothers, then filed for bankruptcy in 1866, and rescued by the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique in 1881. While the financial holding company named Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët) was

State intervention and private initiative: “A semi-mixed economy” Hubert Bonin, 2003170

Because of the massive amount of capital it mobilised, the profile of its shareholders, the size of its labour force and the size of its shipyards,171 shipbuilding was an “eminently private”172 industry. However, because of the great commercial and strategic role of maritime transport and because shipyards, through producing for the benefit of national defence, worked in the interest of France, the State had intervened in the operations of this sector since the middle of the 19th century – for better or worse. For example, in

170 The expression “semi-mixed economy” is taken from a study written by Hubert Bonin in “Les avatars financiers des Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde dans les années 1920,” and published in Guerre et économie dans l’espace atlantique du XVIe au XXe siècle : Actes du colloque de Bordeaux 3-4 octobre 2003, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2006. 171 See Albert Charles, “L’industrie de la construction navale à Bordeaux sous le Second Empire,” in Annales du Midi: revue archéologique, historique et philologique de la France méridionale, 1954, vol. 66, No. 25, pp. 47–60. 172 Silvia Marzagalli, David Hancock and Bruno Marnot use this expression in Guerre et économie dans l’espace atlantique du XVIe au XXe Siècle : Actes du colloque de Bordeaux 3-4 octobre 2003 (p. 16), in reference to the study by Christian Borde, “Les armateurs français au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale (1917–1921), innovation, nationalisation ou américanisation ?”

173 On his website, Jean-Pierre Guiol states that “there were 11 large naval shipyards in 1914,” but does not provide a list (neither did many other authors). See https://sites.google. com/site/guioljeanpierre. In his study, “Les avatars financiers des Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde dans les années 1920,” Hubert Bonin notes: “The overall history of French shipyards […] has yet to be written,” which remains true to this day.

created in 1900, the industrial facilities of Saint-Nazaire took the name of Chantiers et Ateliers de l’Atlantique. With the acquisition in 1901 of the Nouvelle Société Anonyme des Chantiers de Normandie, successor to the Ateliers et Chantiers Laporte et Cie (1893–1897), the company was completed by the Grand-Quevilly shipyard, downstream from Rouen; - Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire, incorporated in 1881 in Nantes (following the acquisition of the Chantiers Jollet & Babin) and established in Saint-Nazaire in 1882, as well as in the Paris suburb of Saint-Denis where it operated boat engine and boilermaking facilities. Counting among its clients the Chargeurs Réunis and the French Navy, the company purchased the Société de Construction Navale of Le Havre in 1884, and two years later, the Rouen company, Claparède et Cie, the facilities of which were then transferred to Saint-Nazaire. In 1889, it had to be bailed out by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the Banque de l’Union Parisienne, and Denain & Anzin. In 1907, the company established the Usines Métallurgiques de la Basse-Loire, taking over the facilities of the Forges et Aciéries174 in Trignac (Loire-Atlantique); - Chantiers Dubigeon (named after its founder), active in Nantes since 1760; - Ateliers et Chantiers de Bretagne, emerged in 1909 from E. de La Brosse & Fouché, established in Nantes in 1895, with a mechanical construction site and two shipyards; to strengthen its shareholder structure, the company opened its capital “in the direction of financial companies close to the Aciéries du Nord et de l’Est”;175 - Compagnie Générale du Matériel Naval, located in La Rochelle; - Chantiers et Ateliers de la Gironde, the former Usine de Construction Navale Chaigneau et Bichon, built in Bordeaux in 1836 and purchased in 1882176 by Schneider & Cie. The shipyard was located on the Quai de Brazza, on the right bank of the Garonne; - Usine de Construction Navale, known as the Chantiers

Desbats, opened around 1875 opposite the Chantiers et Ateliers de la Gironde; - Société Anonyme de Travaux Dyle et Bacalan, the result of the 1879 merger of the Société des Chantiers de Bacalan (established in Bordeaux in 1869) and the Ateliers de la Dyle (founded in Louvain in 1866); its factories were located in the Bacalan and Queyries districts of Bordeaux; - Chantier des Messageries Maritimes (the future Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat), between Toulon and Marseilles, whose development dated back to the 1830s, and which was taken over by the Messageries in 1851; the company operated ship repair yards in Marseilles; - Société Nouvelle des Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, the name adopted in 1856 by the Société des Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée founded in 1853, which operated a shipyard in La Seyne-sur-Mer (on the outskirts of Toulon) and a mechanical forge in Marseilles, as well as facilities in Le Havre following the 1871 acquisition of the Ateliers Mazeline (a manufacturer of engines and propellers). The latter had emerged from the dissolution of the Société des Ateliers et Chantiers de l’Océan, (itself the outcome of the merger in 1863 of the Ateliers Mazeline in Le Havre and the Chantiers Armand in Bordeaux) and the establishment of the Chantiers de Graville in 1872. - Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence, formed in 1899 in Port-de-Bouc, west of Marseilles, under the umbrella of the Compagnie Fraissinet; the shipyard also owned an engine and boiler construction and repair shop in Marseilles. Through the havoc it wreaked, the First World War led to both consolidation and the emergence of new companies: some companies closed their doors, others regrouped into larger entities under the aegis of parent companies, while new ones appeared. For instance, in 1916, the Chantiers Dubigeon was sold to the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire, which took control of the two sites in Nantes, one in Prairie-au-Duc, the other in Chantenay under the name Anciens Chantiers Dubigeon. The facilities were complemented by a ship repair yard in Brest. That same year, the Messageries Maritimes brought its shipyard in La Ciotat to the Établissements Schneider, leading to the formation of the Société Provençale de Constructions Navales, which remained the arsenal of the Messageries Maritimes. In Bordeaux, the Ateliers et Chantiers Maritimes du Sud-Ouest was formed; its industrial complex was located in the Bacalan

174 See “Le paradoxe de la construction navale dans la marine marchande en France de 1815 à 1914,” by Bruno Marnot, in Revue d’histoire maritime, No. 7, 2007, Pups, pp. 183–211. 175 Ibid., p. 208. 176 Hubert Bonin, op. cit.: “In the wake of the famous 1881 Law promoting naval construction, which began to build a semi-mixed economy in a branch deemed necessary for national interests.”

district, on the left bank of the Garonne, on the site of the Chantiers Desbats, which had just been acquired by the subsidiary of the Armateurs Réunis. In 1918, in Le Havre, the Chantiers Augustin Normand absorbed Lemarchand shipyard; the Établissements Ch. Baudouin & Cie, incorporated in 1917, became, one year later, Chantiers Maritimes du Midi. Other new shipyards also appeared: the Compagnie Générale des Constructions Navales, founded in Couëron, near Nantes, and a subsidiary of the Société de Construction des Batignolles; the Chantiers Navals de l’Ouest, created from the merger of two large shipyards in Saint-Malo and owner of factories in Saint-Servan and Cancale, etc. These transactions attest to the correlation between absorption and expansion, reflecting the imperative to combine State intervention with private initiative as a means of leaving the chaos behind and to come up with a shipbuilding programme of unprecedented proportions. “Shipbuilding,” noted Henri Mazel in July 1918,177 “now benefits from favourable public opinion and investors, who were previously barely interested in this type of work, are now approaching [these] undertakings.” Savers’ infatuation for shares in companies undergoing formation or recapitalisation was spurred on by the rise in power of certain players, such as the Banque de l’Union Parisienne, alongside traditional investors such as Schneider & Cie. Concurrent with this financial boost, the sector experienced an increase in the role of the government, which helped (or attempted to help) companies by extending credit (Law of 13 April 1917), oversaw production (cf. the Inter-ministerial Commission for the Supervision of Shipyards, set up in February 1918) and actively promoted the projects of certain entrepreneurs – such as, in the course of 1917: - Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime (ACSM), which, as discussed above, Worms & Cie had decided to establish prior to the entreaty of Anatole de Monzie; - Chantiers Navals Français, located in Blainville-surOrne near Caen (“i.e. in the centre of the mills producing steel from ore mined in Normandy”178), at the instigation of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas; - and Société Normande de Constructions Navales,

formed by Schneider & Cie,179 the Tréfileries et Laminoirs du Havre, the Banque de l’Union Parisienne, the banks Bénard & Jarislowsky and Thalmann & Cie. The company operated two shipyards, one in Harfleur near Le Havre, and the other in Cherbourg, on the site of the Société des Chantiers et Ateliers du Temple (created in 1916), which it had absorbed. These new structures brought the number of flagship shipbuilding companies operating at the end of the war up to fourteen.180 “We must hope,” noted René La Bruyère in 1921 in his article, “Notre industrie des constructions navales,”181 “that orders will not be lacking. […] It is of vital interest to France, given that France needs five million tons of French-flagged ships to meet its transport demands. In our view, the public authorities are willing and able to take the necessary measures to allow our shipowners to find the tonnage they need within our borders and at a better price than abroad.” And a few pages ealier, the author wrote: “In July, when the President of the Republic, on board the ‘Amiral-Senès,’ sailed past Le Trait at the head of his imposing entourage, all of the shipyard sirens blared simultaneously, drawing the head of State’s attention to the magnificent project accomplished in this corner of the Seine-Inférieure at the height of war. This chorus of sirens would remind the government, particularly the Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy, of the promises made to all of these new shipyards, which, like ACSM, were established to repair the damage caused by the submarine campaign. […] It is clear that the government has contracted a duty towards them; it must do everything in its power to give them work.”

Headquarters of Worms & Cie, located at 45, Boulevard Haussmann, Paris, in November 1918

179 For an analysis of the ties between the Schneider group and the Banque de l’Union Parisienne, particularly the industrial and financial synergies created by these two partners, see the study by Hubert Bonin, op. cit. 180 Some authors count sixteen shipyards, four of which dominated the sector during the 1920s: the Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire, the Chantiers et Ateliers de la Gironde, the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée. 181 René La Bruyère, op. cit.

177 Henri Mazel, Revue de la marine marchande, No. 34, July 1918, “Le problème des transports,” p. 213. 178 René La Bruyère, “Notre industrie des constructions navales,” La France nouvelle, 1921, pp. 329–335.

1917–1939

“Transformation from a rural community to an industrial centre” Georges Majoux, Le Trait, 15 October 1922182

182 Speech given by Georges Majoux on the occasion of a visit to Le Trait by Paul Strauss, Minister for Hygiene, and a delegation from the Social Hygiene Alliance on 15 October 1922 – quoted in the journal, Alliance de l’hygiène sociale, congrès de Rouen, 13 au 16 octobre 1922, pp. 227–231. Source: www.gallica.bnf.fr, and www.wormsetcie.com – archives 1922.

Unlesss otherwise specified, all documents produced or received by the Le Trait shipyard or Worms & Cie, and quoted in this chapter, may be found on the website www.wormsetcie.com; the documents are listed according to the date on which they were issued (yyyy/mm/dd).

So many challenges to be overcome The miraculous birth of a shipyard? An article authored by R. Marcireau and published in La Journée industrielle on 30 November 1921 described the creation of ACSM and its overall appearance upon completion: “Worms & Cie, a Le Havre company [sic] dedicated exclusively to Shipping and Fuel Merchanting Services until 1918 […] has created an industrial complex in the small community of Le Trait, near Rouen. Its construction was relentlessly pursued until completion, with the whole complex, along with its outbuildings, covering a surface area of 24 hectares. The author added that the new Le Trait shipyard included: 1o: a workshop for hulls and forges, served by two fiveton bridge cranes; 2o: a large-scale boilermaker and a machine centre for the construction of boilers and machinery, each served by one 50-ton bridge crane, one 30-ton one and two 5-ton ones; 3o: a sawmill and a vast workshop for all woodworking activity; 4o: an office dedicated to design work, photographic services, tracing and making templates, thus completing a complex whose equipment reflected the latest advances in modern industrial technology; 5o: eight slipways, equipped with Titan cranes and divided into three groups: two 170-metre slips for ships with a displacement of 17,000 tons; four 135metre slips capable of launching 9,000-ton ships; and two 135-metre slips to accommodate 2,800-ton ships.”183 Articles and books on the history of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, such as that of Jacqueline Goubé,184 give us the impression that the shipyard and its garden city sprung up quickly, as if overnight. The construction work performed by Worms & Cie and the companies hired to build the shipyard was nothing short of miraculous. “The companies

The offices of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, circa 1921

working on the project included Veuve Hottat et Fils, the Compagnie Générale de Travaux Publics et Privés (CGTPP), Solié et Groc, manufacturers of roofing and pipes, as well as Sainrapt et Brice. At the start of the construction work, management, design offices and the accounts department were housed in sheds; but it did not take long for the shipyard facilities to take shape,” to quote Jacqueline Goubé. However, many difficulties had to be overcome to achieve the full-fledged indus-

183 www.wormsetcie.com. R. Marcireau, La Journée industrielle, 30 November 1921. 184 J. Goubé, “Le Trait, village en 1916, ville en 1926,” Actes du Congrès national des sociétés savantes, vol. 100, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1976.

trial complex. The preceding quote shows that historiography erased the chronology of events, masking the complexity of the problems encountered. These were subsequently glossed over to benefit the image of Le Trait and ACSM. When the shipyard opened its doors in 1921, the press was impressed with the results. In reality, at the same time that contracts were being concluded with the various construction companies, the land for the proposed industrial site and for the workers’ housing had still to be purchased – land held by numerous landowners. Twenty-four hectares were acquired for ACSM, while a further 58 hectares185 were set aside for the workers’ housing area whose “development cost was equal to the construction cost of the shipyard.”186 The lack of supplies of raw materials (cement, petrol, steel from the United States,187 etc.), the cruel absence of manpower (fighting at the front or injured in combat), the attempts of rival companies to poach employees, the shortcomings of the French railway system, new legislation on labour and strikes (the eight-hour day legislation) and poor weather conditions were all problems pervading the construction of the shipyard and garden city. Against the backdrop of the World War, the country found itself in a dire situation facing all sorts of shortages. There were many more companies working on the site than those mentioned in the quote, with a myriad of different-sized companies used. In addition to Veuve Hottat et Fils, Sainrapt et Brice, CGTPP, and Solié et Groc, these included: Péqueur, hired to construct the wharf; Cohier, builder of workers’ housing and rainwater cisterns; Duchereau for various workshops; the Société de Construction et d’Installations Industrielles for Artesian wells; Gilardi, Ringot for workers’ housing and cisterns, and lastly,

Blondel, Posth et Cie. Cohier subcontracted some tasks to Bertrand, Canat, Chapellieret et Bance, Pelfrène, Boullenger, Curta, the Société des Ciments Français, the Société des Lièges de Lasserens, Dellafond.188 All the companies involved in the project did not work together at the same time between 1916 and 1921. One company replaced another when forced to transfer a contract. Some companies contracted directly with Worms & Cie, while others were subcontractors engaged to perform a specific task.

The first companies on site (March 1917 to December 1918) Veuve Hottat et Fils for the slipways and workshops, J. Cohier for 32 houses and Péqueur for the wharf Worms & Cie signed the first contract with Veuve Hottat et Fils on 13 March 1917.189 The work required the installation of heavy equipment and a quantity of materials: three locomotives, sheds, barrels of machine oil, a crusher, a boiler, an iron bending machine, a steampowered cable winch, water tanks, hoists, iron carts, planks, poles, etc.190 The agreement mentioned that Veuve Hottat et Fils, headquartered in Paris, “after reviewing the [building plans], set about gathering all useful information both on the site of the proposed project and from the Director [Achard] and the architect [Majou]; and after having made all the necessary calculations,” proposed that it assume responsibility for developing the shipyard slips, levelling the ground for the factory foundations and the new community road, building the rail link between the factory and the national railway network, constructing the boilermaking shop, the facility for hull construction, the warehouse, the tracing and modelling room, the sawmill, the smithy, the electricity power station and the office building, for a total contract price of 4,460,000 F. Construction of the slipways, including

185 Normandie illustrée, No. 10, January 1918. 186 As stated by Georges Majoux in his speech to the Société Industrielle de Rouen in March 1919. See Public utilities committee, session of 12 March 1919 and extraordinary session of 14 March 1919, Bulletin de la Société industrielle de Rouen, Rouen, 1919, pp. 115–126. 187 ACSM initially turned to the United States to supply steel, since France itself was no longer in a position to produce steel in any great quantities. However, in the 1920s and 1930s, ACSM sourced it from a variety of French companies so as not to depend on a single supplier. As a result, ACSM partnered with the Aciéries de Longwy, the Société Anonyme des Hauts Fourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de Pompey, the Aciéries de Paris & d’Outreau, the Comptoir des Tôles.

188 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 5 August 1919 from Cohier. 189 www.wormsetcie.com. Cf. the letter sent on 27 November 1920, by Worms & Cie to Mr Lebreton, the solicitor, for a retranscription of the contract with Veuve Hottat et Fils. 190 “Vente publique,” Le Petit Havre, 22 April 1919.

dredging and riprapping,191 proved to be the costliest. The dry dock was to be made of reinforced concrete and measured 120 metres in length by 17 metres in width at the point of entry.192 A period of three months was scheduled for the construction of the first phase of the project (upper part of slips 4 and 5, constructed over a length of one hundred metres, and for preparing the adjoining land for its ultimate use). Next, a seven-month period was earmarked for the construction of one-half of the area intended for the hull-building workshop and the total area for the boilermaking shop. Phase three foresaw eleven months for the completion of all buildings and finishing work. During the first phase of construction, a 2,000 F penalty was imposed for each day of delay; a contrario, the contractor would receive a 1,000 F bonus for each day completed ahead of schedule. These amounts changed during the second phase of the agreement. The penalty increased to 3,000 F for each day of delay, while the bonus went up to 2,000 F for each day completed ahead of schedule. In the third phase, the penalties and bonuses were the same as in the first phase, but were applied on a pro rata basis of the total value of the buildings or facilities under construction in relation to the total project cost. Construction of the workshops could not begin until piles, constituting “one-fifth of the Brotonne Forest found on the opposite bank” were driven into the soft Le Trait soil.193 The new shipyard was thus going to rest in part on solid beech, oak, or elm pilotis 10 to 15 metres in height, with the largest of the workshops, measuring 200 metres in length by 40 metres in width built on the reinforced area.194 First to be constructed were a canteen and barracks for housing the building workers. Hangars were built to shelter the materials.

In the minds of Worms & Cie management, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime had to be constructed in less than one year. The shipyard was scheduled to start operating sometime in 1918. The system of penalties and bonuses was seen as a way of safeguarding the schedules. A few rare photographs depict the working conditions of the workers prior to 1920. They show men alongside the Seine, performing their trades by hand (navvies, masons, etc.), equipped with simple shovels and wheelbarrows, assisted by horses transporting materials, with wooden crates open here and there (see below).195 On 16 August 1917, 32 workers’ houses were ordered from J. Cohier, a building contractor based in Dourdan. Various works, materials and equipment, such as excavations and concreting, carpentry, joinery, locksmith work, roofing, painting, tiling, chimneys, the supply of cement, corks, sinks, cisterns, were subcontracted by Cohier.196 Dissensions over supplies surfaced very quickly between Worms & Cie and Veuve Hottat et Fils. The vital wharf,197 located close to the planned warehouses, had to be linked to the railway to allow supplies to reach the latter during the construction phase of the industrial complex. Though Maison Worms was bound by a contract with Péqueur to build the wharf since early 1917, according to Hottat, work was not progressing quickly enough, with penalty costs threatening the Paris-based company.

195 Iconographic collection of the association, Le Trait Naval d’Hier. See the illustration below. 196 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 5 August 1919 from Cohier, in which he retraces the history of his relationship with Maison Worms. The general contractor agreement was concluded with the Cohier company, established in Dourdan, in the Seine-et-Oise department, on the Île-deFrance. A second contract was concluded on 10 November 1917, to supply individual rainwater cisterns, for a total cost of 920,700 F. This contract was intended to equip 78 workers houses with watertight cement cisterns. 197 The workers called the wharf, “the little wharf.” It was seldom used for fitting ships, since ships were practically completed when they left their slipways and sailed directly to Le Havre to undergo trials at sea. The wharf was used more for the construction of submarines. The larger fixed cranes ensured shipyard supplies. Interview with Serge Lepême, Chairman of the association, Le Trait Naval d’Hier.

191 Riprap is a protective cover of rocks placed at the base of a bridge, to protect against water erosion. See Dictionnaire de la langue française, by É. Littré. 192 See the contract of 13 March 1917. A contract of 7 June 1917 gave Hottat twelve months to construct the dry dock. 193 J. Goubé, “Le Trait, village en 1916, ville en 1926,” op. cit. 194 Ibid. These may be the tracing and hull buildings, but the author does not specify.

22 October 1919: construction of the shipyard, photography E. Douillet (Leblond collection – Le Trait Naval d’Hier)

sion. Hottat subsequently decided to completely halt part of the work. Supplies of construction materials were interrupted, as was the unloading of raw materials transported by rail. The contractor insisted that responsibility for the situation lay with Worms, which issued a frank response on 14 November 1917: “When you write: ‘When you assumed responsibility for concentrating the requests for supplies of the fuel vital for your needs and ours, it was at your initiative and not ours,’ you are distorting the truth. In reality, in this circumstance as in many others, we have, out of pure kindness, always lent you our support to help you obtain supplies – which we were in no way obliged to do; to be convinced, you need only reread the specifications and contract. We have not assumed a responsibility, but rather obligingly lent our assistance, which is not at all the same thing. You will find that in our response we have limited ourselves ‘in general terms’ to declining any responsibility in this matter. If you reread our letter of 8 [November], you will see that we wrote in the first paragraph: ‘We do not accept any of your reservations and vehemently

Petrol is lacking, Hottat goes on strike, and relations with Maison Worms become strained Moreover, on 7 November 1917, Hottat informed Worms & Cie of the lack of petrol “to fuel the vehicles serving the construction site.”198 The company blamed its partner for withholding 30% of the fuel delivered to the site. The Hottat recriminations referred to a stock of fuel allocated to Worms on an exceptional basis by “the competent authority”: indeed, since 1917, the government had been rationing numerous supplies, materials and products, including petrol.199 Ration cards for coal were introduced that same year. According to Hottat, the public authorities had granted the fuel solely for the vehicles used by the company constructing the project, and not for Worms, which, in turn, refuted Hottat’s ver-

198 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter from Hottat to Worms, 7 November 1917. 199 R. Schor, La France dans la Première Guerre mondiale, Paris: Armand Colin, 2005 (1st ed., 1997). In addition, there was a head of the Supplies Division.

contest its content’ and in fine: ‘We refuse all responsibility’; what more do you need?” Worms & Cie was indeed supplied with petrol to ensure “the service of [its] automobiles used primarily to transport [its] personnel from Duclair to Le Trait, and vice versa.” The experts in charge of supervising the project were housed in Duclair and came by car each morning.200 Also included in Worms’ petrol needs were its “ferry that brings over [its] wood and [its] river barges” as well as its lorries. Management retorted that it was highly audacious of Hottat “to claim, under these circumstances, to rule on the quantity [that it can] withdraw from the goods issued for [its] benefit.”201 From that point on, the authorities were informed that Worms’ requests for petrol applied to its needs alone. Hottat had to make its own requests.202 On 15 November, management again wrote to Hottat: “With regard to our projects, we hereby inform you that you are strictly forbidden to erect any buildings, apart from on the actual shipyard construction site – i.e. the part for which you are authorised to perform work as covered in the contract dated last 13 March – of any type or size on the land of which we are the owners, without our written consent.”203 Firm words were again exchanged on 16 November, with Hottat directly accusing its client of wanting to delay construction of the wharf for its own interests, insinuating the penalties set forth in the contract of March 1917. The management of Worms & Cie defended itself, as delivering the wharf depended on Péqueur and was not guaranteed by a specific date. “For the third time, you write, you are renewing your proposal to complete the project under the gracious conditions you previously outlined, on two separate occasions, whereby you would resume the work in its current state and finish it completely at your own expense, using the wood and metal provided by us. These are the very terms of your offer, are they not? So, for the third time, we repeat that we cannot accept such a proposal, and for the third time, we are providing you with the reasons.

22 October 1919: earthworks: driving piles – in the background, the hull workshop – photograph by E. Douillet (Leblond collection – Le Trait Naval d’Hier)

1o – We are bound by a contract with Mr Péqueur to construct the wharf. It is a bilateral contract: we intend to pursue its execution, and it would not be permissible for us to terminate it without the consent of the other party. 2o – We cannot, and do not want to, provide the wood and metal hinges needed to construct the wharf, just as we did not agree in our contracts with you to become involved in the delivery of the materials intended for your company. From your letter, it seems that you have met with Mr Péqueur, and that he is amenable to coming to an arrangement with you. If this is indeed the case, the arrangement can be very simple. Suggest to Mr Péqueur

200 J. Goubé, op. cit. 201 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 14 November 1917, from Maison Worms to Hottat. 202 Ibid. 203 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 15 November 1917, from Maison Worms to Hottat.

England.205 Cohier concluded a new contract to supply individual rainwater cisterns for 78 workers’ houses. Further land was still being purchased during this period, with three deeds of sale covering the properties known as “Barrière des Prés,” “Le Renel,” “Clos des Voies” and “Bout des Voies.” These plots were located alongside the Seine and were intended for the shipyard. The beginning of 1918 also marked Maison Worms’ efforts to acquire its industrial site. Among

205 www.wormsetcie.com. A table of 26 November 1917 lists the orders placed in England between 29 September and 9 November, but not regularised: hydraulic and pneumatic pipes, electric cables, 2 grinding wheels (import not granted), 158 cast iron plates, 1 mortising machine, lights and crane tools, forge fans and anvils. Another table lists the remaining machines to be ordered for each workshop, as of 26 November 1917. The hull workshop was expecting delivery of 1 radial drill press with electric motor; 1 horizontal drill press with electric motor; 1 sensitive drill press with electric motor; 3 grinders; 1 emery grinder; 1 two-HP motor; and 6 wall-mounted cranes. For the boilermaking works, 1 weighing machine suspended from the overhead crane; 1 crane for portable riveters; and furnaces, bucking tools, fans were ordered. The moulding forges needed furnaces, bucking tools, fans. The smithies required 1 pre-forging furnace, 2 bucking tools, 1 hot saw, 1 machine for upset forging, 2 rivet-making machines with kiln, 2 grinders and 1 electric motor. For small tool work: transmissions. For woodwork: 1 grinder, 1 eight-HP motor for grinding and 1 vacuum cleaner. Wires and lamps were also needed for the interior of the workshops, conveyor belts, circuits, crossbeams, and weighing apparatus. In addition to this heavy machinery, a sizeable list of tools had to be ordered: various hammers and sledgehammers; bucking tools; punches; metal-work tools; pincers; hardy tools, drill bits and cutters, a reamer, chisels, mortise chisels, caulking irons, pawls and ratchets, tube expanders, vices, taps and dies, screwdrivers, compasses, files, screw presses, various jacks and hoists, pulleys, various wrenches, rivet forges, blowtorches, hacksaws, manual punching machines, portable scales, pressure test pump, various pliers, etc. Management at the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime was interested in floating cranes, plans for which can be found in the archives. At the beginning of 1919, the Gusto shipyards (Firma AF Smulders) based in Schiedam in the Netherlands offered their services. Other shipyards purchased from Gusto, whose worldwide reputation made it a market leader. Their floating crane with electric turret was constructed to lift loads up to a maximum of 200 tons. The jib could be swung into various positions and could make a complete turn. The steel superstructure of the crane turned on a cone-shaped turret, installed on a pontoon. The jib had two side-by-side hoists, each with power to lift 100 tons. When both operated at the same time, the two hoists could lift 200 tons. The power station was placed in a special machinery room at the edge of the pontoon.

that you will be his subcontractor for the completion of the remaining work. We would have no objection. But it must be fully understood that Mr Péqueur remains bound to us for the performance of his contract, and we will pay him any sums due by virtue of said contract. Once the wharf is completed and delivered to us, we will allow you to use it along with us, as we have obligingly offered, but naturally, you will be responsible for any damage that you may cause.”204 That same month [November 1917], the management of the future shipyard ordered tools and machinery in

204 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 16 November 1917, from Maison Worms to Hottat.

the company’s initial goals was to build a rail link to the Barentin-Caudebec line on the national network. In February 1918, Mr Achard, the Director, had been advised that a large number of crates had arrived in Le Havre, which had to be transferred as quickly as possible “to avoid their placement in costly warehouses.”206 At the same time, all the parcel known as “Le Marais” was purchased from the municipality of Le Trait.207

sent to the Worms & Cie management vouched that earthworks on the connecting line had resumed “on the portion between the starting point and the byroad of the main road No. 5”; in other words, the portion over which Worms had assumed control, following the incident when Hottat had temporarily abandoned the worksite. But doubts remained: was the company still able to fulfil its part of the contract? Time was of the essence: “Two window frames have been installed and primed, but are still without glass; one frame is being assembled, and a fourth is being made in the small woodworking workshop set up on the construction site by Maison Veuve Hottat et Fils.”209 Several oak rafters had just arrived in Le Trait. Steel was piling up at La Mailleraye railway station, as were the previously ordered bricks. Having no means to shift them, the site manager felt that the connecting line up to the byroad, where a storage site was available, was the only possible quick solution.210

Marcel Duchereau, the building engineer, agrees to build three additional workshops and 16 houses In March 1918, a contract was concluded with Duchereau for the construction of one assembly workshop, one small-fittings workshop, one carpentry workshop and a group of 16 houses, which ultimately rose to 240 lodgings. The Worms & Cie management decided to take charge of constructing several buildings, under the supervision of an associate of Gustave Majou. For its part, Cohier announced the completion of 12 workers’ houses, but it was behind schedule and complained that its employees were the victims of poaching attempts. It was thus obliged to increase its hourly wage by 0.30 F, as Worms & Cie was offering higher wages than other companies. At the same time, Hottat seems to have worked at a very slow pace between November 1917 and July 1918. Nonetheless, in a letter of 1 August, the Parisian developer reaffirmed its intention to continue the construction work. Work resumed on the embankment for the rail link. However, the work on the embankment, “modified until level” to raise it or fill in some holes, was performed by a “hired hand” employed by Worms & Cie, in an effort to mitigate Hottat’s lapses and delays. The track thus had two profiles, the first in accordance with Hottat’s plans and the second in accordance with the instructions given to the “hired hand,” none other than a quarry operator. The latter worked with a twoman team from Hottat, assisted “by a foreman from the firm of Mr Duchereau and several navvies hired at their request, and not poached, as Veuve Hottat et Fils wanted some to believe.”208 On 17 August 1918, a letter

The Hottat affair grows acrimonious The situation clearly became mired in large part because of the difficulties encountered by Hottat, which was no longer able to meet its obligations. Worms appointed an independent expert, as the eleven months allotted had been greatly exceeded. On 26 August 1918, the agreements of 13 March 1917, 12 June 1917 and 4 March 1918 were terminated, even though the developer insisted on laying blame for the delays on the project manager.211 On 7 September 1918, Mr Lebreton, an attorney in Rouen, paid an official visit to Le Trait. “It is clear from the words of Mr Hottat himself,” confirmed the attorney, “that he will leave your worksite only if forced to do so by a court ruling. […] It is very possible that Maison Hottat, in order to prolong its occupation, will solicit an independent expert,” he warned management.212 So another major problem loomed: how to proceed if the Hottat workers refused to leave the worksite? On 12 September 1918, a member of ACSM management reported that “things here remain unchanged. Maison Hottat is not leaving, and we have no way to

206 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 19 February 1918. 207 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter from Jean Chalain, 14 November 1977. 208 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 17 August 1918, from the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime to the management of Maison Worms.

209 Ibid. 210 Ibid. 211 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 2 September 1918 from Charles-Arthur Terrier. 212 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 7 September 1918 from Mr Lebreton, the attorney, to Worms & Cie.

20 December 1919: the hull workshop in the background – photograph by E. Douillet (Leblond collection – Le Trait Naval d’Hier)

19 October 1919: the dry dock and the electric station – photograph by E. Douillet (Leblond collection – Le Trait Naval d’Hier) µ 20 October 1919: the sawmill in the background – photograph by E. Douillet (Leblond collection – Le Trait Naval d’Hier)

eject them. […] If the worksite were enclosed by walls, it would be very simple; we would close the gate and only let in those persons carrying a card. But as you have seen, the site can be accessed from all sides of the twenty hectares we occupy. Our guards are not sworn in and they can only eject non-card-bearing employees by force, which is clearly not a solution.” The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime again requested an expert opinion to verify the shortcomings in the buildings intended for building the hulls and making boiler. Management feared getting bogged down in interminable legal proceedings.213 And then a dramatic turn of events. Veuve Hottat et Fils declared bankruptcy at the end of 1918.214 It had to auction off all its equipment in order to cover its debts.215 Various companies assumed the tasks that had been assigned on 13 March 1917. The project transitioned from a period of conflict in which one party was responsible for the bulk of the work and upon which depended the progress of the shipyard, and thus, the fate of ACSM, to a plan in which work was shared among several parties, who ultimately divided up the tasks and shared the risks.

The lack of labour: the requisitioning of prisoners, many of them Russian One of the leading obstacles and causes for delay was the lack of labour, at a time when demand for labour was very high. Given this scenario, workers were priceless; the war had cost 1,400,000 lives, most of them young men. 300,000 men were reported missing, and more than 4,000,000 were injured. There was a dearth of skilled workers. This carnage – amputating 10.5% of the active labour force217 – posed problems both for finding labour to build the shipyard and housing, and for starting up shipbuilding operations. Soldiers were mobilised for front-line duty until 1919, as seen among Cohier employees. In February 1918, the company received a reprieve for just one man, then for a second in May 1918, but its senior clerk remained enlisted until February 1919. Because of the labour shortage, employee poaching – or at least, suspicions of employee poaching – was as frequent as feared. Following a conference held by the Chamber of Shipbuilders (created in 1899), the Chantiers Navals Français (CNF) from Caen responded on 9 December 1918 to the fears of ACSM. It went through its personnel, listing seven workers who had come from other shipyards but none from ACSM.218 Since the war, one solution had been to turn to prisoners of war,219 mainly German POWs, who, under the surveillance of Belgian soldiers, were tasked with felling trees which were then transported by oxcart from Jumièges to Yainville. The timber was preserved using a sulphate treatment. The railway picked up from there, with the wood arriving in Le Trait aboard freight cars.220 Even more surprising, Russian prisoners were also requisitioned; it appears that the companies were able to ask the authorities to supply them with this foreign manpower. Having been employed by the

The strategy changes following the bankruptcy of Veuve Hottat et Fils: several parties divide up the tasks and share the risks (December 1918 to May 1920) Veuve Hottat et Fils was replaced by the Compagnie Générale de Travaux Publics et Privés, Duchereau as a company specialised in the construction of bridges, reservoirs, flooring and factories; the Société de Construction et d’Installations Industrielles for the construction of an Artesian well (1919), and, as of December 1918, Sainrapt et Brice. Consequently, the framework for the small-fittings building was completed by the end of January 1919.216

217 J.-C. Asselain, Histoire économique de la France du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours, vol. 2, Paris: Le Seuil, 2011, (1st ed., 1984), p. 13. 218 Worms & Cie Archives. Letters of 9 December 1918 and 2 March 1922. In 1922, a riveter foreman from the Chantiers Navals Français (in Blainville-sur-Orne) tried to poach workers from Le Trait, and ACSM lodged a complaint. CNF management retorted that it was a mistake, that only two men had been poached, and that measures would be taken to ensure it did not happen again. 219 Departmental Archives of Seine-Maritime. 1 M/220 and 10 M/325. 220 “Le Yainville des années 1920,” http://melao.free.fr.

213 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 12 September 1918 from ACSM to the Lawyer, Mr Bonpaix. 214 Worms & Cie Archives. Letter sent to Worms & Cie on 6 June 1931. Maison Worms pursued the Hottat affair through the 1930s. 215 “Vente publique,” Le Petit Havre, 22 April 1919. 216 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 29 December 1918, from Duchereau.

The wharf – circa 1926 (Mr Panier collection)

Germans, Russian POWs from the Eastern front were perhaps handed over to the Allies, then used as cheap labour.221 Another theory: Allied armies had intervened in support of the Russian counterrevolution in spring 1918; were these Russian revolutionaries captured by Western forces? Duchereau obtained twenty-five of these nationals in July 1918. There was even talk of one hundred more coming in November of that year, as well as a further five hundred to be housed in a camp set up by ACSM. Duchereau addressed its requests to a court

usher.222 In principle, since 1916, the labour inspectorate was replaced by another entity under the authority of the Ministry of Armaments tasked with “knowing

222 www.wormsetcie.com. Summons of 30 November 1918, from Mr Asselin, the court usher. This summons raised the possibility of having one hundred labourers come to work for Duchereau. Achard had apparently promised the company that one hundred Russian nationals would be made available for up to 9 F 10 per day, and that one wooden shed would be allocated for their housing. This summons from the court usher also revealed that ACSM installed a camp to receive five hundred war prisoners who, they proposed, would be “put to work on projects assigned to its developers or performed” by the company itself. Two groups of billeting were planned, including one shed for a guardhouse and non-commissioned officers, with two kitchens for prisoners and French soldiers, and one shed for the sick, with a covered hangar for washrooms, and two small groups of sanitary “closets.” These sheds and annexes were timber-framed with removable panels. They were to be delivered on wagon cars to a Paris railway station, with Worms & Cie responsible for their subsequent transport.

221 See O. Abbal, “Les prisonniers de la Grande guerre,” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, No. 147, 1987, pp. 5–30. “Russian prisoners in the hands of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians were not affected by the terms of the Armistice.” Some had to fend for themselves and fled back to Russia. What happened to the others? The situation in revolutionary Russia complicated the return of Russian prisoners. “Approximately 2,000 Russians refused to return to their fatherland.”

everything about working conditions and employment problems in the industries and departments contributing to the production of armaments, in the broadest terms.”223

Prices of supplies skyrocket Cohier provided figures that spoke for themselves: “cement prices have gone up from 60 to 120 francs (F), then to 140 F and in February 1918 to 185 F, an increase of 200%. Plaster has gone up from 35.50 F to 65 F, a 90% increase; labour from 0.90 F to 1.20 F, then to 1.50 F, 2 F, and ultimately, to 2.50 F. Iron prices have shot up from 48 F to 145 F; and last but not least, wood, which in 1917 cost 200 F per cubic metre, costs 450 F since 1918 [sic].”225 The contractor warned Worms & Cie: “I am informing you that my subcontractors […] have asked me for a 60% increase for the work in hand, an increase motivated by the increased prices of all products, general expenses, labour transport, etc., and they tell me that unless they receive a satisfactory response, they will not be able to continue the projects and will withdraw their workers.” The dual business failures of Veuve Hottat and Duchereau, plus rising costs, were the visible and palpable consequences of the disorganised state of the country since the war. Conditions were too unstable for companies to be able to complete their missions. The war also placed companies in great difficulty, with the weakest companies going out of business in the Seine-Maritime department, ridden with strikes.226

Duchereau throws in the towel But developments took a new twist in July 1919. The next company to throw in the towel was Duchereau (undoubtedly due to the lack of labour as well as problems with housing its workers and obtaining supplies): the company “purely and simply” sold its “equipment and property” to the Compagnie Générale de Travaux Publics et Privés in exchange for “600 CGTPP shares at 500 F and 50,000 F in cash.”224 “Mr Duchereau’s status vis-à-vis CGTPP,” stated a letter of 15 July 1919, “is therefore that of a simple shareholder. We hereby confirm that there is no possible way for Mr Duchereau to interfere in the management of CGTPP, nor can he contribute in any way to the management or execution of company projects, particularly of projects currently being negotiated.” Gustave Majou further announced that certain work would be taken over by Blondel, Posth et Cie, which agreed to complete the work on the assembly workshop, the small-fittings workshop, the carpentry workshop and the group of 16 workers’ houses. On 1 July 1919, Blondel, Posth et Cie took charge of the projects, undertaking to take over the plans, estimates and contracts negotiated with Duchereau. Nonetheless, as a result of the continuing increase in the cost of raw materials and labour, the terms in July 1919 were no longer the same as those negotiated on 30 March 1918. This forced Worms & Cie and its subcontractor to review the details regarding the execution of the contract and the associated rates.

Strikes and problems with applying the Law of 23 April 1919 Working time legislation was clearly challenged. In the period just prior to the outbreak of war, workers had seen their working hours decrease little by little. In February 1913, workers in the construction, earthworks or metalworking sectors were accustomed to work some 60 hours a week, or 10 hours a day. In 1905, miners had won an eight-hour day, with its generalisation promised throughout the labour world.227 When the Great War broke out, the labour force was very

225 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 5 August 1919, from Cohier. 226 J. Barzman, “La gravité du fléchissement qui s’était produit au Havre […]. Grèves et opposition à la guerre en 1917-1918,” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, No. 179, 1995, p. 116. Seine-Inférieure was ranked second behind the Seine department for strikes in 1915–1918. Even if the statistics contain errors, they display a worrisome situation within the department. 227 G. Noiriel, Les ouvriers dans la société française XIXe-XXe siècle, Paris: Le Seuil, 2002 (1st ed., 1986).

223 A.-C. Decoufle and N. Svendsen, “Contribution à une histoire des durées du travail dans l’industrie française du milieu du XIXe siècle à la seconde guerre mondiale,” Travail et emploi, No. 20, 06/1984, pp. 57–70. 224 www.wormsetcie.com. Letters of 15 July 1919, from Blondel Posth & Cie; 12 August 1919, from Duchereau; and 3 June 1919, from Gustave Majou regarding the “full termination of the Duchereau contracts.”

quickly mobilised. A circular of 5 August 1914 from the Ministry of Labour declared that work inspectors had “to maintain national business activity with the greatest intensity possible by replacing mobilised men with adolescents, women and older men.” Working hours increased, driven by the need to increase production. The pace accelerated. From that point onwards, inspectors had the power to authorise companies to exceed statutory working hours.228 But after the Armistice, the working class found itself in a position of strength. As with gold or wheat, labour was rare, pushing up its price. Moreover, there were increasing fears of a revolution, like the one that had given birth to the USSR. To avoid the working class being tempted to come out onto the streets, the French Parliament adopted the Law of 23 April 1919 establishing eight hours as the statutory daily working time for everyone. For ACSM, this reform seemed difficult to put into practice; it was hard to reconcile with the demands inherent to the construction of an industrial complex. Wildcat strikes broke out.229 In the words of Cohier, the Law of 23 April 1919 brought the problems the company encountered to a climax.230 On 8 April 1920, the management of ACSM sent a letter to Sainrapt & Brice: “As a result of the strike that has just broken out, we have decided to completely shut down our factories. Consequently, the contract which we entered into on 26 December 1918 is terminated as of noon this day.” It called on the contractor to dismiss its workers. The announcement of the shutdown was also sent to Gilardi, Sollier & Groc. The response from Sainrapt & Brice on 15 April 1920 indicated the probable reason for the strike: wages. “As a result of the discussions that we held with union delegates and workers, particularly on the 10th, 12th, 13th, and 14th

[of this month], the workers […] have agreed to resume work immediately on the former terms, but with an understanding that they will be paid at a later time in accordance with the Rouen rates.”231 Rail transport problems The Compagnie Générale de Travaux Publics et Privés highlighted another problem slowing down the work: “Delays are due to the problems of supplying raw materials to building sites, problems due almost solely to the acute crisis in the country’s transportation system.” “Even though it is our responsibility […] to ensure supplies reach our sites, our hands are tied in the face of the near-absolute lack of rail transport.” The rail companies were at fault, unable to transport materials, wood and cement, complained the building company.232 In May 1920, the railways were hit by a strike so severe that it remained etched in memories. Finally, it is possible that the workers’ morale was hit by “the bad weather and floods” aggravating the problems: “Construction of the woodworking shop, […] had begun (all the iron footings were in place) [but] has had to be abandoned after flooding. Currently, the land on which the woodworking and fitting workshops are built is still under water,” stated a letter of 4 March 1920 from the Compagnie Générale de Travaux Publics et Privés.

228 A.-C. Decoufle and N. Svendsen, “Contribution à une histoire des durées du travail dans l’industrie française du milieu du XIXe siècle à la seconde guerre mondiale,” op. cit. 229 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 31 May 1920 from the Compagnie Générale de Travaux Publics et Privés. 230 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 5 August 1919, from Cohier. See also G. Noiriel, op. cit., p. 156. 1919 was known for being a year of social unrest in the building, textile, and even shipbuilding industries.

1 - The sawmill 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - The construction workshops 7 - The boilers workshop 8 - The marine machinery workshop 9 - The hull construction workshop

231 The Rouen rates were the prices in effect in the Normandy capital. 232 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 4 March 1920 from the Compagnie Générale de Travaux Publics et Privés.

How can decent housing be provided for 3,000 future Le Trait residents? “A worker must earn enough to pay his rent”

Henri Lafosse, conference of the Industrial Society of Rouen, 12–14 March 1919

Georges Majoux at the centre of discussions on public housing At the time the first plots of land were being purchased for the workers’ housing (between 1916 and 1918), no solution to the issue of how workers were to be housed and how their loyalty could be promoted had yet been found. Georges Majoux, a General Partner of Hypolite Worms, was personally involved in solving this twofold problem. He made his thoughts known in a speech to the Société Industrielle de Rouen in March 1919. This scholarly association, founded in 1872 and modelled on the Société industrielle de Mulhouse, provided interesting backing to Majoux. Part of a vast network of similar associations, the Société Industrielle de Rouen sought to promote “progress and confraternity” among its members, the majority of whom came from the local business elite (within the textile industry in particular). During the Third Republic, its role in fostering welfare capitalism was highlighted by the academic, P. Lecouteux.233 Members of the Society included leading figures from the Rouen industrial world, who, like Worms & Cie, were looking into ways of dealing with this housing problem. A number of workers were living in camps while waiting to move into new housing. Georges Majoux felt that the Le Trait shipyard needed to provide accommodations for “3,000 labourers’ families.”234 He demonstrated his knowledge of the topic. Whereas in the past, industrialists chose to make housing available to their employees at prices that were less than the interest on the construction capital, Majoux thought otherwise: he

felt that the worker should henceforth pay rent, but in order to do so, wages had to rise. The increase had to be in the form of a bonus granted to any worker who displayed a rent receipt issued by a housing company that conformed to hygiene requirements.235 “From a wage perspective,” said Majoux, “we know what the system for our workers will be: in our company, they will earn neither more nor less than at similar companies in the region.” There were several reasons why Georges Majoux was in favour of having occupants pay rent. First, benefits

233 See P. Lecouteux, La Société industrielle de Rouen (18721939), une sociabilité spécifique ?, a thesis supervised by Serge Chassagne, University of Lyon II, Lyon, 1996. The architect, Pierre Chirol, was a member of the Société Industrielle de Rouen. He was also a member of the low-cost housing company, the Société d’Habitations à Bon Marché de la SeineMaritime, of which Hypolite Worms was a founding member. 234 This number appears exaggerated. Majoux probably meant 3,000 individuals, or the population of Le Trait between that time and several years after 1919.

235 Public utilities committee, session of 12 March 1919 and extraordinary session of 14 March 1919, Bulletin de la Société industrielle de Rouen, op. cit., pp. 115–126. Approximately one hundred people were present for Majoux’s speech. Henri Lafosse, President of the session, confirmed that the issue sparked the interest of employers.

in kind, such as free or subsidised housing or heating, had become taxable under the Law of 31 July 1917, which came on the heels of the Law of 15 July 1914 on general income tax. Second, low-rent housing, as made available by the 19th century industrialists, came across as an act of charity, thus upholding the claim made by revolutionary movements that employers were enslaving the labour force.236 “Wages,” Majoux stated, “are compensation for work. This compensation must be calculated so as to allow a worker to live and prosper, i.e. to feed, clothe, and house himself and his loved ones. Today, wages are paid in cash, not in kind.” This exposed the problem: how high should the rent be? It should be set at a level not discouraging employees, but rather encouraging them to stay put. It was vital to find the right conditions for the workers’ homes to be built. In Le Trait, homes cost between 14,000 F and 17,000 F in 1919, though neither the purchase price of the land,237 developments costs nor utilities (drinking water, sewers, gas, electricity) were included in this price. Taking 2% as a base for maintenance, amortisation and taxes, a sum considered by Majoux to be too low, annual rent for the house would have to be 800 F to 960 F to make the investment worthwhile. This amount was too high, given a worker’s wage. At the time, the average daily wage in the Rouen region was 10 F, i.e. providing an income of 3,000 F for 300 days of work. “If the worker subtracted 800 F or 900 F for rent from his 3,000 F, could he and his family be able to live on the rest?” asked Majoux. “Prior to the war, the worker paid an average rent of 260 F; let us suppose that today he might pay 300 F, or 1/10th of his average income. Where will we find the extra 600 F needed for workers to live in the hygienic and moral conditions to which he is entitled?” he asked. Majoux then proposed that the 600 F shortfall be taken up by the employer. Instead of earning 10 F a day, the worker would receive 12 F, for example: “This is a nec-

essary expense, [the employer] will factor it into his cost price just as he does for wages.” Majoux pointed out one last problem: the laws governing low-cost housing (Habitations à Bon Marché – HBM) were no longer in line with the post-war situation.238 He thus called for the laws on HBM to be reformed to release industrialists from their obligation to build workers’ housing: “With the capital [an employer] is required to set aside for affordable housing if he wants his employees to be decently housed, he could expand his factories, upgrade their facilities, and, via his voluntary contributions, would fully pay his workers what he owes them, thus completely fulfilling his duties as an employer.”239 After complimenting Majoux on the quality of his speech, the Chairman of the Société Industrielle de Rouen, Henri Lafosse, summarised the speaker’s main points: “A worker must earn enough to pay his rent: Mr Majoux states that he cannot do so directly, and proposes a system, which, as a result of an employer’s financial sacrifice, places the worker in a position to be housed in a healthy manner; under this system, it is not the employer who is obliged to construct the housing: a building company is placed between the employer and the worker, which is much better from all perspectives,” because such intermediation helps avoid conflicts with the workers. Creation of the Société Immobilière du Trait In this vein, the Société Immobilière du Trait was set up in 1919 as a public limited company with a capital of 2,500,000 F.240 It was a subsidiary of Worms & Cie, responsible for constructing and allocating housing, setting rents, developing and overseeing the garden city, supervising its upkeep, and ensuring that its “internal rules” were respected.241 The subsidiary also dealt with

238 Laws of 12 April 1906; 10 April 1908; and 23 December 1912. 239 Public utilities committee, session of 12 March 1919 and extraordinary session of 14 March 1919, Bulletin de la société industrielle de Rouen, op. cit., pp. 115–126. 240 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins. Étude sur le mouvement des cités-jardins. Monographie de la cité-jardin de Trait (SeineInférieure), Paris: PUF, 1924, pp. 121–128. 241 Two guards under oath were even taken on in the 1920s. Marcel Lecret oversaw the teams that opened up the roads and cleared the overgrown land. See Le Calfat du Trait, No. 56, April 1959.

236 The workers movement at the end of the 19th century equated patronal policy with charity, as Ernest Vaughan pointed out in 1881. He did not consider “the gift from the richest to the poorest as a worthy, appropriate, or sufficient solution.” See M. Bidaux, Ernest Vaughan, le patron rouge, Rouen: L’Écho des vagues, 2013, p. 225; and E. Vaughan, “Bals de charité,” L’Intransigeant, 28 January 1881. 237 1.50 F per metre (each house occupied 230/300 square metres).

requests from ACSM staff and served as an intermediary between Worms & Cie and its workers. Mr Mongin served as its Director, “in whose hands,” wrote Gustave Majou in a letter of 1 March 1920, he “placed administrative control […] over everything related to the works depending on the said Société Immobilière du Trait,” whereas he himself “would limit his activities exclusively to the technical control of the projects performed under [his] supervision, both within the shipyard and on behalf of the Société Immobilière.” Henceforth, ACSM and the Société Immobilière du Trait together exerted such strict control over the harmonisation of the workers’ housing estate overall that people sometimes seemed to confuse the two firms. Even at the beginning of the 21st century, people were still speaking of the “shipyard housing” without realising that the Société Immobilière was a separate entity. There was a thin line between the two companies. From the perspective of the residents of Le Trait, the Société Immobilière du Trait and ACSM were one and the same, i.e. Maison Worms. Workers, for example, could be transferred from the shipyard to the Société Immobilière.242 Another example of the role played by this Worms & Cie subsidiary: finding jobs for workers, guiding them in their search for work or redeployment. Men came regularly to find work.243 The workers’ housing estate project and construction of the houses by the Société Immobilière du Trait sparked articles in the press, which was struck by the work underway. An article on 24 September 1921 in the Revue générale de l’électricité stated the following: “As regards the materials needed to construct the houses, it should be pointed out that sand is extracted on site

and that the Société Immobilière itself is manufacturing the breeze blocks made of cement, sand, and slag with six presses, each able to produce about 350 per day.”244 The use of sand from Le Trait, highlighted here, seemed to be in response to the shortage of raw materials and their continually increasing costs. Between conflicts and cooperation with elected officials and the administration: supplying the town and shipyard with water, gas and electricity In order for the shipyard and the workers’ houses to be functional, water, gas and electricity facilities were planned. Worms & Cie brought the latest innovations in comfort to Le Trait, at a time when it was still standard for a traditional rural home to have a woodburning stove in the centre of a large room on the ground floor and bedrooms under a hay-filled attic.245 While some projects were executed by independent companies on behalf of ACSM, Maison Worms itself set up a number of companies in order to gain the leverage needed to make rapid progress, as it was unable to call upon its usual know-how. The Société Normande de Distribution d’Eau, de Gaz et d’Électricité for instance was established in 1921, with its subscribers being the Société Immobilière du Trait (970 shares) and the Maison Worms General Partners: Michel Goudchaux (10 shares), Georges Majoux (10 shares) and Secretary General Joseph Denis (10 shares).246 “We started by planning to collect rainwater for domestic use by providing each house with a cistern and pump. […] For drinking water, we deliberately rejected the use of surface wells, the system used in the area prior to the creation of the shipyard. […] Instead, very deep wells were drilled, providing peace of mind from the perspective of hygiene and with enough water to

242 Archives from the Norman Seine River Meanders Regional Nature Park (PNR): 6J/L120. Memo of 4 December 1945. For example, “Mr Caban – category 3 – is transferred definitively to the Société Immobilière du Trait, starting on Monday, 5 December 1945 (request by Mr Kérautret upon approval by Mr Roy).” 243 PNR Archives 6J/L120. Reception of delegates on 19 February 1945. In the case selected by us, a man wished to become a mason and try his hand at the Société Immobilière du Trait. The company responded that it was better to have “a unity of perspectives” and directed him to the shipyard. For another man, “following your request for employment of 15 October, we hereby confirm that you have been hired as a category 2 labourer, at an hourly rate of 19.45 F on the Société Immobilière team,” responded the administrative office of Worms & Cie on 18 October 1945.

244 www.wormsetcie.com. Article by J. Blondin, Revue générale de l’électricité, 24 September 1921. 245 Such houses were still to be found, for example, in Jumièges in the 1940s and 1950s. An employee at the Société Lyonnaise des Eaux et de l’Éclairage came on a scouting mission to look at the water supply. During his tour between Le Trait and Rouen, he was struck by the “empty” region, he wrote, but a “region, which, fortunately, seems destined to be populated.” 246 Worms & Cie Archives. Letter of 20 February 1921. Documentation specified that one-half of the capital (500,000 francs) had to be obtained through subscriptions, with the Société Lyonnaise des Eaux et de l’Éclairage subscribing to the other half.

posal, and even roadways, all with the meagre means we had available. Electricity also had to be installed, both for private clients and public lighting. I remember that we lived for years under the light of an oil lamp,” pointed out Henri Nitot, a member of ACSM management whose role will be examined later in the text.249 The Société Normande de Distribution d’Eau, de Gaz et d’Électricité encountered problems in implementing its proposed services, most notably the supply of electricity:250 “Innumerable problems arose, […] delaying the solution from year to year, despite our proposed specifications which were highly advantageous to the municipality. We had to put up with the paradox that, though we would have needed just eight days’ work to provide light to the residents, [our] garden city […] remained plunged in darkness due to the overly narrow interpretation of some official documents.”251 Georges Majoux’s project was to light the departmental road all the way to the La Mailleraye railway station,252 as well as the city. In vain. The plans for the road network largely envisioned the town’s future development, with ACSM management expecting a population of 10,000 to 12,000 inhabitants once the labour force for the “shipyard was at its maximum.”253 There were great ambitions for the young workers’ housing estate, but it still had to be brought to life and given a soul.

Le Trait, the town hall square

accommodate any future change in needs. As for water distribution, the area was divided into three sectors. The first sector covered ‘Le Vieux Trait’ district; the second the ‘Cité Saint-Eloi,’ while the third sector included the ‘Place du Marché’ and the ‘Cité de la Neuville.’ For each sector, the principle was to pump well water into reservoirs elevated toward the watersheds.”247 The various projects executed by Worms & Cie and outside the municipality’s purview obviously led to tensions between the large company and the small municipal administration and other administrations, because the municipality was unprepared to handle such a large upheaval, or to cope with the massive influx of children into its school, or to deal with road problems or the sharp increase in its costs. These rose from 8,000 F prior to the creation of the shipyard to over 30,000 F in 1916, then to 53,000 F in 1920. Conversely, revenues did not rise accordingly248 and both sides sought to impose their perspectives. “At the time, the municipality did not have sufficient financial resources to provide the public services necessary for our new town. As a result, we had to step in and provide basic services, such as water, waste dis-

249 Ibid. 250 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 20 June 1924. In the course of 1924, management even proposed to dissolve the company: “Our measures with the administration remain pointless. […] This situation may go on indefinitely, and our City remains without lighting, while for several weeks, the Société Havraise [d’Énergie Électrique] has been distributing light in Vieux-Trait.” 251 H. Nitot, op. cit., p. 102. 252 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 1 February 1922. The document mentioned “problems along the lines of the one created by the municipal council” of Le Trait. 253 www.wormsetcie.com. Article by J. Blondin, Revue générale de l’électricité, op. cit.

247 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, op. cit., p. 101. 248 Ibid., pp. 129–131.

Le Trait, Rue des Chantiers

“The shipyard created the town” Mariette Lefebvre, assistant to Charles Duguet, the last ACSM Secretary General, account given in 1990

“When we arrived, there was nothing, absolutely nothing”

residents,254 particularly those who wished to distance themselves from the front line in 1917 and find safety in Le Trait. Management was drawn to large families because they offered the advantage of ensuring that a plentiful supply of labour would be available immediately and in the future. Job offers were soon listed in the Journal du Trait. ACSM sought fitters, lathe operators, carpenters and model makers, while the Société Immobilière du Trait sought to hire a locksmith, a plumber, a roofer, a stable lad for the carting business, unskilled labourers, vehicle washers, a gardener and a horse groomer.

Conference of 16 September 1989 at the Seine Marine Museum in Caudebec-en-Caux At a conference in 1989 organised by the Seine Marine Museum in Caudebec, Maurice Quemin and Jean Lootvoët quoted two testimonies from new 20thcentury residents of Le Trait. The first recalled the experience of a family with four children aged between seven and eighteen. The oldest son, still with a sharp memory, recalled the year 1919. The family’s father worked as executive at the Chantiers de France in Dunkerque – a shipyard in operation for less than twenty years – and he was (most likely) solicited by the head of the Le Trait shipyard, the Engineer Alexandre Vince, to whom we will come back later. The Director, Louis Achard, also played an important role in recruiting Dunkerque

254 Henri Nitot, memoirs, non dated printed text, private archives. “Mr Achard, the agent for Bureau Veritas in Dunkerque, cleverly knew how to benefit from the threats and dangers posed to the city by the proximity of the German lines in 1917; the Chantiers de France provided ample recruits of managers and workers preferring to settle in a more tranquil region.”

Mailboxes in Le Trait were soon peppered with surnames originally from northern France – Vanstaevel, Dobbelaere, Dekeister, Verkoucke, Lootvoët, Brouwers, Demeester, Vanloo, and Denaeyers – and the LoireAtlantique region (Brière or Nantes): Vince, Quilan, Aoustin, Quintrec, Rialland, among others. Vince convinced the head of household employed at Chantiers de France, who accepted and then notified his future ex-employer of his plans to leave. The reaction was quite telling: Chantiers de France fired the employee’s son, brother and the two grandfathers. This dreadful punishment served as a warning to other Chantiers de France managers and employees tempted to leave. The father left for Le Trait alone, as in 1919 there was still little accommodation; work on the garden city was ongoing, with no place to house a large family. The man found a room in a café near La Mailleraye railway station, where he stayed for several months until his house on Rue Jean Bart was ready. It then took two days for his family to travel from Dunkerque to Le Trait: after spending one night in Amiens, the travellers arrived on the left bank of the Seine in Rouen, then made their way to Barentin, before changing trains to finally reach their destination. Once housing became available, workers came with their families. In 1989, one witness told Maurice Quemin: “We grabbed our suitcases and made our way to Rue Jean Bart, where our parents stayed with friends while waiting for their furniture to arrive; the children were put up by their uncle on Rue Denis Papin. Everyone was tired and spirits were low. It took another two weeks for the furniture to arrive, which did not help. Our mother criticised our father for having led them on such an adventure and talked about leaving.” There was nothing much to do and no school large enough to accommodate the new pupils. In 1920, construction on 240 houses came to a halt after Duchereau withdrew. Only one street had been completed, and some 40 homes were unfinished. To quote a young girl, twelve years old in 1918 and a member of a family with five children aged between one and fifteen: “When we arrived, there was nothing, absolutely nothing.”255 The prevailing mood at the time was that we had settled in “isolated territory.” People originally from northern France were used to

Le Trait, route from Duclair to Caudebec in 1919

living in a less “rustic,” more urban and industrialised environment. They were very much aware that they had been uprooted. The temptation to leave posed a real threat to the Worms & Cie shipyard. At the same time, this lack of roots promoted solidarity. The influx of men, initially alone, dismembered families for a while, until they came together again in an unknown environment (the founding of the Saint-Eloi Chapel, named after the patron saint of metalworkers, seems to have been a sort of community gathering place). Workers from northern France mingled with workers from the Nantes region, while peasant workers (from Jumièges, Yainville, etc.) rubbed shoulders with foreigners (Poles and Yugoslavs as of 1929 – see below). All these men constituted the ACSM workforce.256 Relative isolation made it easier to become attached to Le Trait.

256 See pp. 131–138, the speech by Hypolite Worms, given at the launch of the “Charles Schiaffino” on 16 March 1930, which among other topics, covered the lack of manual labour nationwide.

255 Conference of 16 September 1989 at the Seine Marine Museum in Caudebec-en-Caux.

The response of Worms & Cie: build a garden city to help employees put down roots

insurance company, “Caisse Mutuelle Normande de Capitalisation”; and Director of the “Caisse Autonome de Retraites [autonomous pension fund] de la SeineInférieure.” Accordingly, he had the benefit of a large network within the institutions specialised in workers’ housing.

“It is highly likely that the amenities provided within the garden city, such as piped water and sewers, a picturesque environment, and all its conveniences will retain the workers living there almost indefinitely.”

Half-timbered Normandy houses versus North French miners’ homes What choices did Maison Worms face as it set about creating a workers’ housing estate? 19th century experiences revealed the shortcomings of this type of urban planning: uniform brick homes, constructed of the same brick used for the factories; party walls that ruled out privacy; a lack of green spaces; the development of certain diseases, alcoholism and boredom. Worms & Cie drew its inspiration from the latest experiences in the design of garden cities, a concept coming from England. Several projects had already been executed in the Paris region.258 The basic scheme – a small house and a garden – seemed to work: workers, understandably, became attached to their homes, since they were new and offered many comforts, at least under the standards of the 1920s or 1930s. Worms & Cie selected the same architect for the housing project as for the industrial complex. Gustave Majou already had suitable experience in designing garden cities. Before being selected, he had already worked with the Rothschild Foundation from 1905 to 1914, after winning the Rothschild competition in 1905. He was one of the leading proponents of public housing in the 20th century. In 1921, his work was

Henri Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, 1924

Employees supported the system set up by Henri Nitot,257 who, following the death of Louis Achard in 1921, was next in line for Secretary General. Mr Nitot had written a law thesis on the French garden cities, which he defended in 1924 at the University of Paris. As part of his research, he met with Georges Benoît-Lévy, Chairman of the French Garden Cities Association, a key figure behind the development of this type of urban planning, and Raoul Dautry, a teacher at the engineering institute, “École Spéciale des Travaux Publics, du Bâtiment et de l’Industrie” and involved in creating in 1938 the SNCF, the French national railway (he later served as Minister for Reconstruction and Urban Planning under Charles de Gaulle, and designed garden cities for the railway company, Chemins de Fer du Nord). Nitot, who started working for Worms & Cie in April 1920 as an Executive Attaché in the Shipping Services, did not assume control of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime until 1928. Other positions included Secretary of the Union of Industrialists of Seine-Maritime; Vice Chairman of the SeineInférieure Federation for the “Ligue du Coin de Terre et du Foyer” allotments; Director of the French Garden Cities Association, committee member for former students of the business school, “École des Hautes Études Commerciales – HEC”; a member of the Technical Committee for the Chamber of Shipbuilders; Vice Chairman of the “Fédération des Jardins Ouvriers [allotments] de la Seine-Inférieure”; Treasurer of the Société d’Habitations à Bon Marché de la Seine-Inférieure – SHBM (low-cost housing company); Director of the life

258 At the end of the 19th century in Noisiel, the chocolate-maker Menier family constructed a company town that already displayed some characteristics of a gardencity. A further example was the Blumenthal garden city in Épinay-sur-Seine, Argenteuil, in which some houses were surprisingly built in the “Le Trait” style. In Normandy, a lowcost housing company built the Les Brandons garden city in 1922 in Blainville-sur-Orne, on behalf of the Chantiers Navals Français, using the same formula as in Le Trait (Les Brandons was demolished in 2009; see P. Diversy and J.-L. Schoellkopf, Nous les Brandons, printed text, 2009 and Departmental Archives of Calvados). There were three types of houses – Brandon, Demarteau and Gilles – constructed in the 1920s; the population grew, but less quickly than in Le Trait, proof of the attractiveness of ACSM. In GrandQuevilly, the Planchon workers’ housing estate has also been demolished.

257 This attachment was also underlined by the French historian Michelle Perrot. See Mr Lévy-Leboyer (Dir.), Le Patronat de la seconde industrialisation, coll. Cahiers du “Mouvement social,”ˮ No. 4, Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1979, pp. 293–306.

Le Trait – village in bloom in the 1930s (Stadsarchief Rotterdam collection)

again recognised, with Majou being awarded the Grand Medal for private architecture from the Central Society of French Architects.259 Barons from the Rothschild family created the Rothschild Foundation, an institution headed by businessman Jules Siegfried, Mayor of Le Havre, MP for the Seine-Inférieure department, Minister for Commerce, Industry and the Colonies, and father of the geographer and sociologist, André Siegfried.260 The goal of the “Siegfried Law” of 30 November 1894, which Siegfried defended in the Chamber, was to promote public housing and create low-cost housing. The Foundation was also led by Georges Picot, co-founder of the low-cost housing companies, and author of an essay entitled Socialisme et devoir social; and by Émile Cheysson, an

engineer, social reformer, member of the Institute, and above all former Director of Le Creusot, a factory town founded by the Schneider industrialists. With the Foundation a true public housing laboratory, it had a strong influence on the work of the Parisian architect, Gustave Majou, and contributed to the development of the ACSM garden city. As proof of the link between the public housing model in Le Trait and that of the Rothschild Foundation, Émile Cheysson wrote the following instructions in the competition programme: “The housing can only be pleasant and well maintained when the homes are spacious and ensure the abundant circulation of light and air, clean piped water, drains, waste disposal, laundry facilities, lighting and heating; in other words, amenities promoting tidiness and order: many conditions, each one of which exerts a decisive influence over the proper upkeep of the house and the well-being of its occupants.”261

259 M.-J. Dumont, Le logement social à Paris 1850-1930 : Les habitations à bon marché, Liège: Mardaga, 1991, 192 p. See also E. Lapierre, Guide d’architecture de Paris (1900-2008), Paris: Éditions du Pavillon de l’Arsenal, 2008, 178 p. 260 The foundation was created in 1904, as a ‘lab’ to experiment with the creation of a public housing model. Endowed with 10 million francs, the foundation sought to “improve the material living conditions of workers.” See M.-J. Dumont, op. cit., p. 131 ff.

261 E. Cheysson, Le confort du logement populaire, Paris: Chaix, 1905, 18 p.

The programme of the Rothschild Foundation competition also revealed a desire to distance itself from the 19th century workers’ housing estate model. The Le Trait housing project was a clear break from such housing projects as the textile factories in the Austreberthe Valley. The designers of the Le Trait garden city were aware of the negative influence that a rectilinear city had on the well-being of the workers, and kept in mind the counter-example of the terraced houses in Northern France. Gustave Majou made great efforts to take into account the layout of the road, which “very closely followed the undulations of the ground.” “As a result of this process, the costs of earthworks were kept to a minimum. Not only were all the roads easily accessible, the houses did not in any way obstruct one another’s views, which obviously presented an advantage that each resident highly appreciated,” explained Henri Nitot.263 While supervising this development, Gustave Majou was also building a new village as a garden city in the Loire-Inférieure department around the La Brutz iron deposits, on behalf of the Établissements Carnaud de Wendel, another large company from the previous century. There is every indication – from the background of the designers to the construction dates, the geographic origins of certain contractors (such as Cohier)264 and the style of the houses – that the houses built in Le Trait were constructed according to the taste and principles defined by the French school of public urban planning which prevailed from 1920s to 1930s. This type of dwelling, featuring decorative timbers, was found in Trouville with its seaside allure, and even now in the Paris region (for example, in Pontoise or Argenteuil), or in the Vietnamese city of Dalat during the French colonial era in Indochina.265 Undoubtedly, therein lies the explanation as to why the homes in Le Trait looked different to their closest neighbours. Vieux-Trait looked

Henri Nitot – Le Calfat du Trait – January 1959

Henri Nitot’s thesis These lines written in 1905 echo the theories Henri Nitot put forward in his doctoral thesis. “It is especially important that dwellings are spacious and have sufficient ventilation. It is highly recommended that at least four rooms be made available to a working-class family.” He went on to specify the following: “These requirements have been scrupulously met in the Le Trait houses, all of which include, at a minimum, one living room, one bedroom for the parents, one bedroom for boys and one bedroom for girls; should the size of the family require more space, it is understood that the family will be provided with as many additional rooms as appropriate, free of charge.” He went on to state: “All rooms have large windows, making them pleasant and welcoming. The architect shall ensure that in every house, window exposure in the living room is as favourable as possible.” A top goal was to fight the spread of disease.262

263 Ibid., p. 97. 264 In the 1930s, developers in the Seine Valley took to constructing villas, as indicated in the PNR archives, but the style had been spearheaded beforehand. Architectural drawings 6J D3 to 6J D42 listed developers from La Mailleraye, NotreDame-de-Bliquetuit, Caudebec, Duclair, Pavilly, Sahurs, etc., but the plans had been drawn up earlier on. 265 O. Tessier and P. Bourdeaux, Da Lat - Et la carte créa la ville…, École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 2013; for example, see pages 75, 165, and 182.

262 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, op. cit., pp. 109–110. Did the houses in the Worms garden city also influence the longevity of Le Trait residents? Actually, nonagenarians and centenarians were no rarity.

more like Jumièges or Villequier than the new garden city, which resembled residential neighbourhoods in the Paris suburbs at the beginning of the previous century (see for example the commune of Stains). Even if a neo-regionalist Normandy style could clearly be detected,266 it resembled the houses constructed throughout France in the 1920s and 1930s with their false half-timberings. In one of its 1918 issues, the magazine Normandie highlighted that “this city will be built in the Normandy style, according to plans drawn up by architect Mr Gustave Majou and will feature the most modern facilities.”267 But was it not a certain form of Normandy dreamed up by the garden-city designers that was favoured in Le Trait? Modern taste well and truly dictated this style.

trees. This aspect was visible as well in the choice of descriptive terms: executive employees’ homes were described as “villas.”269 This type of organisation was often the work of Christian employers. In this respect, Nitot270 was a Director concerned with maintaining proper practices both inside and outside of the factory. “Proper values” were transmitted in a school of home economics for girls where they learned how to sew, embroider and run a household, (including from an economic perspective).271 Thus, the family was raised with fundamental reference points. The intended goal was clear: to train good homemakers and mothers. Henri Nitot’s intentions resembled those of other designers of workers’ housing estates. Schools helped maintain order in households, and also to curb requests for wage increases that some workers’ wives were likely to claim on behalf of their husbands, based on patent disparities between one factory and another.272 Within this same line of thinking, religion seemed a means for maintaining order, with the Saint-Éloi Chapel built under Nitot’s benevolent eye. All of these measures produced a highly-structured society, in which workers lived closest to the factory, supervisors on the opposite side of the street, and management in villas in wooded areas on the shores of the Seine. Thus, “it is highly likely that the amenities provided within the garden city, such as sanitary facilities, a picturesque environment and all its conveniences will retain the workers living there almost indefinitely. The social works promote the development of family life, while the educational facilities make it easier for young people to gain access to skilled work. And everyone benefits from the combination, from the wage earners living under conditions more comfortable than else-

An ideal city, or a certain concept thereof “And everyone benefits from the combination” Henri Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, 1924

The garden city had to be an ideal city from all perspectives: a progressive, socially mixed city (in theory)268 where a modern work organisation could thrive, an aesthetically groomed city, an aspect promoted on postcards from Le Trait which depicted the garden city somewhat idyllically in the midst of flowering cherry

266 Term used in the Drac (Regional Directorate of Cultural Affairs) de Haute-Normandie, Patrimoine du XXe siècle : espaces urbains, habitations & jardins, édifices religieux, June 2001, 55 p. Or in CAUE 76, Identifier, préserver, reconvertir les éléments de paysage naturels et bâtis non protégés en Seine-Maritime, 2013, 138 p. If you compare with the architecture of the former workers’ housing estate of Planchon in Grand Quevilly, in the suburbs of Rouen, you find the same type of housing as in Le Trait: large houses with false timbers. See also M. Croguennec, Les Chantiers de Normandie, 1893-1987 : Un siècle de construction et de réparation navale en Seine-Maritime, Rouen: Gecko/Petit à petit, 2008, pp. 232–233. 267 Normandie : Revue régionale illustrée mensuelle de toutes les questions intéressant la Normandie : économiques, commerciales, industrielles, agricoles, artistiques et littéraires, No. 10, Alençon: Imprimerie Herpin, 1918, 16 p. 268 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, op. cit., p. 106: “We noticed right away that, albeit slightly farther away on the hill overlooking the Seine, the houses for the department heads were included in the same overall area as the workers’ homes, creating a community spirit which could only be of great benefit to social relations. By further intermingling in this way the lives of managers with those of their subordinates, it truly seems that the garden city model can generate moral progress of sizeable importance.”

269 The vocabulary here is nearly verbatim that of a seaside city. The feeling gets stronger when this perspective is backed by witness accounts of the many Sunday strolls along the streets of Le Trait, a far rarer occurrence today. 270 Some of the terms used in his memoirs lead us to believe that Nitot was most likely a practicing Christian. 271 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 42, October 1954. After the Second World War, the school of home economics was co-managed by the National Fund for Family Allowances and ACSM, in the form of an association regulated by the Law of 1 July 1901. Each year, between 9 and 14 students took the household arts certificate of vocational aptitude and between 7 to 11 were successful. In the 1950s, families each year sent between 85 and 90 students to take the courses. 272 G. Noiriel, op. cit.

where, all the way up to the manager, for whom the problem of recruiting labour is made considerably easier, and as a result, is better equipped to fight competition,” thought Henri Nitot.273

Quemin and Jean Lootvoët in 1989,274 “that shortly after arriving, people talked about leaving. The first problem was to keep them there. This meant providing them what they lacked. A cooperative, nicknamed ‘La Coopé,’ was set up in a wooden shed similar to all the buildings of that time, except for housing. It was a company led by a committee elected from among its members, in other words: everyone. Almost everything needed to eat and take care of the home could be found at ‘La Coopé,’ except bread and meat. […] The first manageress was from Dunkerque, assisted by her two daughters. Everyone went about their routine, the merchandise kept its label of origin, and everything went very smoothly. However, when the manageress returned to North France in 1923, she was replaced by a couple not originally from the border. It was a catastrophe. It proved difficult to understand each other, and what was more, orders had to be painstakingly noted in a counterfoil book. After the initial uncertainty, everyone ultimately got used to it, order was restored, and the Dunkerque dialect became a thing of the past. During this period, several shops opened on the outskirts of the garden city, also in wooden sheds, several of which existed until after the Second World War. There was a butcher’s shop, for which a permanent building was quickly constructed […], a haberdashery and a grocery known as ‘la Légumière’ – with its own café and newspaper stand. In addition, there were several enclaves on the outskirts. These featured for example a café that also sold cigarettes, groceries and various sundries (now ‘La Civette’) and, a bit further on, a bakery. At the same time, the shipyard had a shopping centre constructed which quickly became the home of ‘La Coopé’ (now ‘Les Coop’) and the post office, soon followed by a delicatessen, a hair salon and a shoe store. The shipyard soon made a small truck available to households, providing transport to the Duclair market every Tuesday. Around 1923, this vehicle was replaced by a bus – the ‘blue bus’ – which also made a weekly trip to Rouen. The bus, owned by the shipyard – like everything else – played a major role in opening up Le Trait until 1931, when services were provided by private companies. The bus was also used for transporting the UST (Union Sportive du Trait) sports teams and for excursions. As a result, the

Table of the constructions completed by ACSM between 1925 and 1929 Villas Houses Dwellings Barracks 1925

166

360

1927

174

460

1928

173

414

1929

176

445

4 barracks + Breton camp for 15 bachelors 4 barracks (57 lodgings) + engineering circle for 6 people + Breton camp for 15 people 4 barracks (57 lodgings) + naval barracks for 64 people + Breton camp for 15 people + engineering circle for 6 people 4 barracks (57 lodgings) + Hôtel du Clos fleuri for 40 lodgings + naval barracks for 64 people + Jean Bart pavilion for 35 people + engineering circle for 6 people + Breton camp for 11 people

Bringing city conveniences to the country: providing the garden city with business structures, education and social welfare “It is not enough to build a city: it must be brought to life and given a soul. Public services need to be developed, making daily life amenable to all its residents.” Henri Nitot, memoirs

It takes more to create a true community than merely building an industrial complex and constructing the housing and infrastructure for a workers’ housing estate. Well aware of this, Worms & Cie needed to infuse it with a soul, providing not simply modernity and comfort, but also cultural activities: in a nutshell, by bringing city conveniences to the country. “La Coopé,” the “blue bus,” the market A cooperative was set up to provide food supplies, as Le Trait had neither a baker nor a butcher (these came two or three times a week from either Caudebec or La Mailleraye). “It came as no surprise,” reported Maurice

274 Conference of 16 September 1989 at the Seine Marine Museum in Caudebec-en-Caux.

273 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, op. cit., p. 56.

The new Le Trait garden city – in the foreground, the barracks surrounded by houses and villas

bus was known throughout the region.” The Le Trait market was inaugurated on Thursday, 4 January 1923 at 9 a.m. Trains brought in a huge crowd, with railway station staff hardly able to cope. Buyers and sellers came from neighbouring cities. Le Trait attracted people all the way from Bolbec, Maromme, Rouen, Sotteville and even Paris.275 Proof of the success of Maison Worms in creating its garden city.

Henri Nitot noticed that the presence of the health centre, where certified midwives examined pregnant women, increased the birth-rate “sizeably.” Likewise, infant mortality rates dropped significantly. These improvements were the result of scheduling medical check-ups for infants and distributing brochures with doctors’ advice for mothers.276 In Pierrepont, Henri Nitot observed that, while rents were affordable for families, there were also numerous social activities: home economics classes, a youth club, a gym club including a youth section, two soccer teams, a food cooperative and a musical society. On launching its housing project, ACSM management drew inspiration from these previously cited examples and set up La Fraternelle, a mutual benefit society, founded in December 1919, a school of home economics and entertainment facilities. ACSM fostered artistic and cultural activities which the current town has largely inherited. Le Journal du Trait, the cinema,277 the “Lyre des Chantiers” (a brass band), the Symphonic Circle, the Association

Best practices for sanitary facilities, health, education, entertainment, etc. Having studied garden cities in France for his thesis, Henri Nitot was in a position to compare what he considered to be best practices. He reproduced organisational structures. He observed that the Pierrepont workers’ housing estate in Meurthe-et-Moselle, constructed in “wooded surroundings,” was home to some 160 families. Each of the sixty or so houses offered five to nine rooms for large families. Garden lots of 100 to 200 square metres were allotted, and prizes awarded to those who harvested fruits and vegetables. The town centre hosted a health centre, a bathhouse and public institutions such as schools.

276 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, op. cit., pp. 42–44. 277 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 14 January 1929: Gustave Majou asked the Morineau company to build a cinema as early as 1919–1920.

275 Journal du Trait, 11 January 1923.

School of home economics

Gustave Flaubert School, inaugurated on 22 June 1930

of Mandolinists (comprised of the musicians who played “Estudiantina”), the Lyrical Circle, the Artistic Circle, the “Bouchon” (a form of workers club where residents originally from Dunkerque often met; during the celebration of Saint-Éloi, a large, popular banquet was organised, which included the new residents of Le Trait), a sports club, a gym club, an association known as “Le blé qui lève” were but some of the clubs that emerged under the patronage of shipyard management. The system took care of staff before they entered the labour force, and subsequently, during and after a day’s work. Plans were drawn up to construct a gym, a library, a health centre, a medical examination centre, as well as chicken coops, garages, rabbit hutches adjacent to houses, and even a marketplace (on a piece of land donated by Hypolite Worms), an educational facility (Gustave Flaubert School) inaugurated on 22 June 1930, a “celibatorium” to house unmarried labourers or those far from home, a cooperative society (“L’Avenir du Trait”).278 This construction project paralleled the facilities constructed in other garden cities in France. Le Trait had its own tuberculosis screening centre near

the railway station, served by a doctor recruited from Dunkerque. Before, it was necessary to travel to Duclair or Caudebec for medication. The dentist came once a week. Further amenities included the post office set up on shipyard premises in 1921 and a girls’ school in the barracks commonly referred to as “Camp Breton” in 1925. The Société Immobilière du Trait managed every aspect of the garden city. Rent was paid at the company’s offices, as were dues payable to La Fraternelle, founded to help cover health expenses, well before the rise of social insurance companies.279 At his nomination in 1933 to the rank of Knight of the Legion of Honour, a distinction strongly supported of Hypolite Worms,280 Henri Nitot was cited as having founded and developed all the social programmes provided in Le Trait; namely, fifteen associations, such as Les Jardins Ouvriers (allotments) run by Marcel Lecret

279 Conference of 16 September 1989 at the Seine Marine Museum in Caudebec-en-Caux. 280 Worms & Cie archives. A letter written by Hypolite Worms on 1 June 1933 lists Henri Nitot’s qualities. In the words of H. Worms, Nitot was “one of his most valuable partners”; he is gifted with “intelligence that is broadly open to all areas”; with “tireless zeal and devotion” and endowed with “sound good sense,” and a “mind focused in particular on social issues.”

278 PNR Archives. See architectural drawings 6J D43 to 6J D60.

The brass band “La Lyre des Chantiers” created in 1917

A parade of floats in Le Trait on 8 August 1926: festivities celebrating the launch of the two tugs “Turgot” and “Colbert” (on eight that ACSM was instructed to extend by the Office National de la Navigation), and of “Adriatique” (one of the two cod fishing trawlers built for La Morue française & Sécheries de Fécamp)

which provided gardening advice to all workers, or the Société d’Habitations à Bon Marché; occupational training courses, health centres and even a school of home economics.281 To use the expression coined by Georges Picot and quoted by Nitot, a freestanding house was a “normal type of human habitat” and “a school for domestic virtues.”282

sought to avoid problems and increase productivity. The company assumed control over everyday life, introducing a management culture that had been lacking in Le Trait up till then: after having housed its workforce, ACSM saw to it that life outside the factory was supervised by the administrative authorities (mutual benefit, sports, leisure time, food, medical care). The employer assumed authority over apprentices, but also bestowed positive actions (gifts, bonuses). This paternalistic culture led to staff being proud of the company and members of a close-knit community.284 This policy should not be viewed pejoratively from an early 21st-century perspective, but rather placed within the context of the early 20th century: it was common policy in the majority of large companies.

The benefits of a family-run company Little by little, a paternalistic organisation took shape in Le Trait, imposed by outside forces283 like the formidable labour market with its “wild” poaching, and from within (by certain demands from workers distressed by the emptiness of the Normandy countryside). However, this paternalistic culture, with its utilitarian allure, went hand in hand with sincere generosity (regular gifts, bonuses on various occasions – possibly in an effort to buy social peace?). Following the social uprisings that occurred during the construction of the shipyard, ACSM undoubtedly

281 P. Bonmartel, Les pionniers traitons, op. cit., p. 79. See also C. Lebailly, La Maison Worms, un siècle et demi d’histoire. Paris: Le Messager, 1993, pp. 90–97. 282 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, op. cit., pp. 108–109. 283 We have borrowed the term from M. Lévy-Leboyer, “Le patronat français a-t-il été malthusien ?,” Le mouvement social, No. 88, July-September 1974, p. 10.

284 Staff was so close-knit that outsiders to the garden city, or even to ACSM, were often poorly integrated. Standard Oil employees in Le Trait were for example often victims of social exclusion.

A period of intense activity (1921–1927) “We set to work” Ch. Pinchon, Havre-Éclair, 30 November 1921

Worms & Cie and the French National Coal Board fill the order book

Industrial Reconstruction.287 These vessels were delivered to private companies, and documentation leads us to believe that the State supplied them to the companies as war reparations. The six ships were: - “Capitaine Bonelli” (construction No. 14), the keel of which was laid down in slip 3 on 6 May 1920, for Les Armateurs Français; this was the first vessel built at ACSM. - “Chef Mécanicien Armand Blanc” (construction No. 15), the keel of which was laid down in slip 4 on 1 July 1920, for the Société Commerciale du Nord; - “Capitaine Le Diabat” (construction No. 16), the keel of which was laid down in slip 2 on 31 March 1921, also for the Société Commerciale du Nord; - “Capitaine Prieur” (construction No. 17), the keel of which was laid down in slip 1 on 29 April 1921, for Jules Cavroy & Cie; - “Capitaine Edmond Laborie” (construction No. 18), the keel of which was laid down in slip 3 on 8 December 1921, again for the Société Commerciale du Nord; - and lastly, “Dionée” (construction No. 19), the keel of which was laid down in slip No. 4 on 31 March 1922, for the Compagnie Africaine d’Armement. Of these first twelve ships, “Capitaine Bonelli” was the first to be launched.

ACSM had to demonstrate its expertise very quickly. With the most interesting shipbuilding contracts being awarded to established shipyard with solid reputations, all was dependent on the quality of its work. Worms & Cie, through its branch in Le Havre, placed an order on 31 December 1919 for six 3,195-dwt285 “superchâteau” and six 1,120-dwt “super-Listrac” vessels. Out of this initial contract, six vessels were eventually cancelled and six others were built: four maximum 1,235-dwt and two 3,358-dwt steam cargo ships. The first four vessels were named “Léoville” (construction No. 1), the keel of which was laid down in slip 5 on 20 October 1920; “Sauternes” (construction No. 2), its keel was laid down in slip 6 on 12 October 1921; “Barsac” (construction No. 3) in slip 2 on 24 May 1922; and “Cérons”286 (construction No. 4) in slip 5 on 28 September 1922. The other two were “ChâteauLafite” (construction No. 7) in slip 2 as of 25 January 1923 and “Château-Yquem” (construction No. 8) in slip 3 starting 30 March 1923. That these construction projects were spaced over a period of almost two and one-half years (20 October 1920 to 30 March 1923) was in all likelihood linked to the staggered completion dates of the slipways. Interspersed with this first series of six ships was a second group of six 4,700-dwt colliers; the order makes reference to a contract concluded on 19 July 1919 with the French National Coal Board within the Ministry of Aerial view of the eight slipways, five of which were occupied – 1920s

285 The deadweight tonnage (dwt) mentioned in the text corresponds to the tonnage indicated by the shipowner (Worms, NCHP, SFTP, etc.). This figure varies from a few dozen to several hundred tons of the “theoretical” load specified in the order. 286 These four freighters were modelled on “Listrac,” “Pessac,” and “Léoville” (the first vessel bearing this name), ships built at the Chantiers de Graville and used on the Dieppe–Grimsby line. See memo from DGSM on 31 January 1949.

287 The initial contract was for eight ships – but a break in the construction numbers (Nos. 9–13) attests to the fact that several orders were cancelled.

29 November 1921: launch of the “Capitaine Bonelli” and inauguration of the shipyard

collier, the “Capitaine Bonelli,” to glide gracefully into the river. The ship was named after the courageous officer who saved his entire crew before he went down with his ship during the war.288 Despite all these preparations, one unforeseen event occurred, severely testing the organisers’ nerves. “A slight mechanical accident,” in the words of the journalist for Havre-Éclair, caused the special train to arrive forty-five minutes late; on board were Alphonse Rio and numerous guests. Nonetheless, “the ceremony [was able to] take place according to schedule, at least for the most part.” Ninety-five metres long, 14 metres wide, seven metres in depth and a speed of 10 knots, “the ‘Capitaine Bonelli’ [was] launched fully fitted, all boilers lit, its three masts elegantly decorated with flags and multicoloured banners,” reported R. Marcireau in La Journée industrielle of 30 November 1921. “Today, the vessel reached Le Havre under its own power, where it will undergo sea trials in the very near future.” The reception was an occasion “for a grand banquet for more than 200 people, served in one of the Le Trait shipyard’s refectory rooms,”289 during which Hypolite Worms, Mr Lallemand, Prefect of the Seine-Inférieure department, Senators Brindeau and Noulens, Mr Fabiani on behalf of the Trade Federation of Coastal Captains, and Alphonse Rio, Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy each spoke in turn, before a learned assembly comprised of “a great number of people from the industrial world.” The ceremony was covered by many members of the local and national press.290

“Where not long ago just a marshy plain existed, the slipways and vast workshops vital to such a decisive industry now stand” Ch. Pinchon, Havre-Éclair, 30 November 1921

Plans for the event kicked off under the best of circumstances. The invitation cards, requesting the presence of the shipowner, Les Armateurs Français, on the scheduled launch date, could be sent with assuredness. The two shipyards created under the same conditions as ACSM were also launching their first ships. The Schneider shipyard in Harfleur for example invited ACSM management to the launch of its “MécanicienPrincipal-Carvin” on 3 November 1921. Three weeks later, the 29 November 1921 was the big day for ACSM. The launch had to be celebrated, even if, as Hypolite Worms lamented in his speech, “Maison Worms is saddened not to have among us, on this day, Louis Achard, the project’s pioneer. Just a few months ago, he was at the helm of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime. Unfortunately, he was taken [from us] before having the satisfaction of seeing the first ship launched.” “A complete success” R. Marcireau, La Journée industrielle, 30 November 1921

The staff were on their toes. Numerous letters were sent to officials, lists of names grew longer and longer. Seating plans were drawn up and schedules arranged: departure of a special train from Paris Saint-Lazare station at 7.45 a.m., arriving in Le Trait at 11.30 a.m. Invitations specified: “Persons from Rouen, Le Havre, and Dieppe, may board the special train at Rouen (right bank) at 10 a.m.” A tour of the shipyard was planned. The launch was set for 12.15 p.m. and would last a half hour. Lunch was scheduled for 12.45 p.m. The return train was to leave at 3.15 p.m. arriving back at Paris Saint-Lazare at 7.20 p.m. Preparations were skilfully orchestrated. The event was promotional in nature, offering the opportunity to form or strengthen contacts, extend networks and potentially engage in discussions for future orders. As a result, everything had to go as planned. The shipyard’s reputation was at stake. The slipway had to be greased in order for the 4,700-dwt

288 Housing in Le Trait was also named “Capitaine Bonelli.” 289 R. Marcireau, La Journée industrielle, 30 November 1921. 290 www.wormsetcie.com. In addition to the articles by R. Marcireau and Ch. Pinchon, see Jules Avril, op. cit.; Le Petit Havre, La Dépêche de Rouen, of 30 November 1921; La Vigie de Dieppe of 2 December 1921; L’Impartial de Dieppe and the Journal des charbonnages of 3 December; the Journal de la marine marchande of 8 December; and La Journée industrielle of 17 December 1921.

29 November 1921: launch of the collier “Capitaine Bonelli” “A tribute to the glory of the French Navy and French shipbuilding” “Le Trait, a tiny dot on the department map, was one among many small villages saved from oblivion thanks only to its proximity to the ruins of Jumièges Abbey. About four years ago, Worms & Cie, having decided to set up a shipyard, chose this site on the banks of the Seine. By building a major industrial complex there, the company gave life to a small village which now has the look of a seaside town, with small houses built on a charming site on the shores of the Seine. More

than three hundred working-class families live there, benefiting from comfortable and thoroughly modern homes in the most pleasant of environments. The population of the commune has risen from 400 to 3,000. The shipyard Within just a few months, where hitherto there was just a somewhat marshy plain, workers set to work on constructing slipways and the vast workshops essential to such a large industry. The first account

of all this work in a shipyard established so quickly in this abandoned corner was provided to us yesterday at noon, when the first steamer constructed there was launched. The ‘Capitaine Bonelli’ The steam collier, ‘Capitaine Bonelli,’ was part of a large order placed with the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime by the French Merchant Navy. Except for its engine, the ship was constructed entirely at the Le Trait shipyard. At its launch yesterday morning, the

ship was fully fitted out and ready to set sail. Prior to the scheduled tricky and interesting launch, we had the opportunity to take a full tour of the interior. To start, a list of its features: length: 95 metres; width: 14 metres; depth: 7 metres; deadweight tonnage: 4,700 tons; draught: 6.1 metres; speed: ten knots. The flatkeeled collier has two bilge keels. The walls of its holds, one at the bow and the other at the stern, are exactly perpendicular. The engine room takes up the centre of the ship. The crew stations, storeroom, lamp room chain well are in the bow, while the steering gear is on the foredeck. The bridge is in the central part over the captain’s apartment with living room and bedroom, and that of the first mate. At the rear of superstructure are the kitchen, the pantry, the officers’ quarters, the bathroom, etc.; on the rear bridge the servo motor and galley. It should be noted that this ship is equipped with the latest devices for ensuring safe navigation. Near the helm, above the captain’s liv-

ing room, a special device attached to the bell signals if the navigation lights happen to go out. The electrically-lit compass has dual oil lighting, and a wireless telegraph [TSF] is installed on board. There are two specially rigged lifeboats, plus a ship’s boat and dinghy. The overall lines of the ship, just like its shape, are very harmonious. The launch As could be expected, this premiere at the Le Trait shipyard was a truly solemn affair. Worms & Cie sought to make it a tribute to the glory of the French Navy and French shipbuilding. Mr Rio, Under-Secretary of State, upon request, gladly accepted to preside over the launch. A large number of members of Parliament along with VIPs from the shipping, commercial and industrial sectors insisted on attending. Upon descending from the train, Mr Rio was greeted by Mr Worms, Mr Goudchaux, Mr Majoux, the company’s Senior Management and other VIPs. The Under-Secretary of State immediately mounted the platform, with the VIPs at his side. 89

Meanwhile, the chocks holding the new ship in position were removed, leaving only the ring, into which a single rope tied the ship to the dock, thus maintaining its balance. With a single chop of a silver hatchet, Mr Rio cut this remaining rope that held the ‘Capitaine Bonelli’ in its ‘cradle.’ The ring fell, the ship shuddered, but Mr Vince, the distinguished Chief Engineer in charge of the launch, wanted its departure to be memorable. For two minutes, which seemed to last an eternity, the ship glided imperceptibly, millimetre by millimetre. Then, the last chocks, intentionally left near the centre of the keel, gave way, accelerating the speed; majestically, the ‘Capitaine Bonelli,’ with its large flag billowing in the wind, slid toward the Seine to the sound of ‘hurrahs’ and excited applause. The stay ropes unfurled, pulling the carefully weighted casings, the ship turned on its own with the bow facing downstream, and the strident cry of the siren greeted its first contact with the waters. The ‘Capitaine Bonelli’ entered the channel and,

29 November 1921: launch of the “Capitaine Bonelli”

under its own steam, set course for Le Havre, where it was scheduled to arrive that evening, had the fog not forced it to drop anchor in the Seine. Once the ship had been launched, Mr Rio and the accompanying guests entered the vast refectory built for the workers, which had been sumptuously and beautifully decorated for the occasion. Large tables were exquisitely decorated with baskets of flowers and garlands of delicate greenery. Mr Rio sat at the head of the table, to his right Mr H. Worms, and to his left, Mr Lallemand, Prefect of the Seine-Inférieure department. In addition to Mr Goudchaux and Mr Majoux, further VIPs included Senators Louis Brindeau, Quesnel, Lemery and Noullens, and Deputies Anquetil, Lavoinne, Maillard, Nibelle, Thoumyre, Guernier and Ajam.

Vice Admiral Didelot; Captain (N) Durand-Viel, head of the Military Cabinet for the Minister for the Navy; Mr Patard, Director General of the Propellants and Explosives Department; Mr Haarbleicher, Chief Marine Engineer; Mr Le Roux, Deputy Director of the Chemins de Fer de l’État; Commander Bonelli. The Chairmen of the Chambers of Commerce: Mr Du Pasquier, Le Havre; Mr Delmont, Rouen; Mr Hutter, Dunkerque; Mr Vasse, Fécamp; Mr Kircheer, Ponts et Chaussées Engineer (Public Works); Mr Bassot, industrialist; Mr Leparmentier, Director of the Ship Registration; Mr Kopp, Chairman of the Société Industrielle de Rouen. The Director of the Établissements Schneider of Le Havre; Mr Dupont, Director of Docks-Entrepôts; Léon Pamard, Administrator of the Compagnie Péninsulaire; 90

Max Robert, Secretary General of Maritimes Transports; Mr Gustine, Secretary General of the French Major Ports Association; Mr Savigny, principal agent of Chargeurs Réunis; Mr Siegel, builder; Mr Haas, Chief Engineer at the Chantiers de la Loire; Mr Drome, Director of the Chantiers Navals Français; Mr Fenaux, Chief Engineer at the Chantiers A. Normand; Mr de Berthe, Chief Engineer at Bureau Veritas; Mr Félix, Chief Engineer at the Société Provençale de Constructions Navales; Mr Ardidi, Chairman of the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Paris; Mr Ward, Inspector for Lloyd Register; Mr Chachuat, Secretary of the Trade Federation of Navigators; Mr Vallet, Deputy Head of the Seine Pilotage Department; Mr Damaye, from the Compagnie des Abeilles; Mr Andrade, Director of Compagnie Auxiliaire de Navigation;

Mr Arnaud-Tizon, Chairman of the Le Havre Borough Council; Mr Corbeaux, Chief Engineer for the port of Le Havre; Mr Direz, Principal Engineer, head of Railway Operations; Mr Le Bourhis, Ponts et Chaussées Engineer; Mr Polack, Principal Engineer for the railways; Mr Augustin-Normand, shipbuilder; Mr Raverat, industrialist; Mr Fabiani, Chairman of the Trade Federation of Coastal Captains. Mr Nitot, Secretary General; Mr Serret, Director of Worms & Cie in Le Havre; chief engineers, engineers, and department heads of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime, etc. The speeches Mr H. Worms, on behalf of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime, started by welcoming Mr Rio, Under-Secretary of State, who had gladly accepted the invitation extended to him to preside over the ceremony. [See speech, which follows.] Mr Lallemand Following the moving launch ceremony for the ‘Capitaine Bonelli,’ Mr Lallemand said his thoughts went beyond the river’s shores towards the ‘Paris,’ as it returned home from the United States with the head of government on board, where he had been speaking on behalf of France. Mr Lallemand believed that he was speaking in everyone’s interest when extending a hearty ‘Godspeed’ to the ‘Paris’ and its illustrious passenger. His thoughts also reached back to that sunny day last July when the President of the French Republic, sailing down the Seine, had been saluted and acclaimed by all riverside residents. At a time when the French truly needed to uphold

fraternity, a moment such as this seemed appropriate to unite their hearts in a toast to the President of the French Republic. The Prefect lifted his glass to Mr Millerand, and warm applause rang out. Mr Louis Brindeau In the name of his colleagues in Parliament, the Senator from the Seine-Inférieure department thanked Worms & Cie, congratulating the company for, once again, having shown so much initiative and activity. Mr Brindeau recalled the past prosperity of the port of La Mailleraye, where just across the river, fine and elegant long-haul ships had also been built. Today, this interesting industry was regaining life with even greater intensity. Normandy was proud that this site had been selected for a new shipyard. Mr Brindeau assured Worms & Cie that the company would always have the unwaiving support of the department’s Parliamentarians when they set their sights on developing the Merchant Navy and shipbuilding. You will always have our support, he said, either through direct encour-

agement or customs measures, and whenever the occasion arose, they would be available to push the Minister for the Merchant Navy to engage in discussions possibly leading to appreciable results. Mr Noulens Mr Noulens paid tribute to the splendid achievement that the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime had just accomplished. Once the work had been organised, the next step had allowed Worms & Cie to own a fleet flying the French flag on all seas and competing advantageously with foreign companies. In addition, Worms & Cie had built housing for its workers, with gardens, a hospital and a cinema, thus making not just useful institutions available to the workers but also pleasant ways of passing their time – an example he hoped others would follow. Mr Fabiani On behalf of the Trade Federation of Coastal Captains, Mr Fabiani thanked Worms & Cie management for their invitation and Mr Rio for his interest in seafarers. He thanked Worms & Cie and Mr Rio for

naming the new ship ‘Capitaine Bonelli,’ thereby honouring the memory of their comrade. Mr Fabiani addressed a moving speech in memory of Captain Bonelli to his widow and orphans, paying tribute to Commander Bonelli, who, through his admirable conduct, had worked for the glory of the French Navy. The Under-Secretary of State Under-Secretary of State, Mr Rio, wound up the speeches, saying that he had immediately and with great pleasure accepted the invitation extended by Worms & Cie. The Worms Shipping Company engaged in a very difficult but also very interesting traffic, operating small vessels on numerous shipping lines, with numerous ports of call. […] It came as no surprise that the company was testing the waters in another field! Major problems had arisen in the shipbuilding field. The future had to be safeguarded. It was essential that French shipbuilders were able to compete with foreign ones. It was essential that they be assured of receiving orders, and he

This aerial view was taken during the launch of the steam cargo ship “Cérons” on 3 June 1923. It shows the ratio between the size of the ship and the width of the Seine

thanked Mr Brindeau for the offer he had made to help overcome these problems. But if the French State fleet was being liquidated, the shipyards could only receive orders from private shipowners. Losses had been high during the war; the State was virtually powerless, and it was now up to the private shipowners, with State backing, to come up with the solution, specifically by constructing the ships lacking in France, thus saving the mechanical engineering sector from imminent crisis. Mr Rio went on to speak about the housing, childcare facilities and other institutions created by the company, congratulating management for their democratic work. A speaker asked him to say a few words about Captain Bonelli. For me to say a few words about Bonelli, he said, I need only to speak of seafarers in general. We wanted to name the vessels after captains, engineers, sailors and ship’s boys, covering them all in our thoughts. Bonelli died during the war, keeping watch as in peacetime. Bonelli was

a symbol, the proudest of all, since he drew the attention of his leaders. He did not fail in his duty, since he raised the morale of those with lessresilient souls. Bonelli remained the symbol of high maritime virtue. These words were greeted with applause. Mr Rio finished by raising his glass to the prosperity of the company and drank to the French Navy. Tour of the shipyard Once Mr Rio’s speech and the applause were over, the audience left the banquet room and, led by the shipyard’s top management, toured the various workshops and outbuildings. The visit was conducted in great haste, given the late hour. […] The tour ended at 3.15 p.m. Mr Rio and his entourage than boarded the special train that had brought them to Le Trait; it left a few minutes later, heading back towards Rouen and Paris where it was scheduled to arrive at about 8 p.m.” Ch. Pinchon, Havre-Éclair, 30 November 1921

Launch of the “Capitaine Bonelli” – 29 November 1921

Speech by Mr Hypolite Worms “For the greater good of the country” I would also like to thank the members of Parliament who have agreed to take one day’s leave of absence from the important work currently incumbent upon the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, solely to show us how much they consider the future of our impoverished France and its recovery to be dependent on the effort invested in its Merchant Navy. I would also like to thank Mr Lallemand, Prefect of the Seine-Inférieure department, for his unfailing attentiveness towards all those working so hard to make his magnificent and hardworking department prosper. Finally, I would like to extend a big thank you to all our friends who came without hesitation, some from very far, in response to our invitation. Trust me, we hold all these expressions of friendship and encouragement in greatest esteem. Before taking our seats, I would like to express to all the staff of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime our satisfaction and recognition for their efforts and for the results achieved through their zeal and devotion. Their task is nowhere near finished, and tomorrow more than ever, all of our efforts must remain relentlessly and unfailingly focused on creating a stronger and more prosperous Merchant Navy for the greater good of the country. In this spirit, Gentlemen, I lift my glass to the French Merchant Navy and to the health of he who assumes the heavy burden of leading it through such a difficult era with such distinction and authority.

Mr Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, Fully convinced that we all share the same feelings, I shall commence my speech by taking the liberty to evoke the ever-glorious memory of the seaman whose name is inscribed on the bow of the vessel just launched. A more eloquent and authoritative voice than mine, that of Mr Rio, Minister for the Merchant Navy, will shortly be telling you all about Captain Bonelli; how this valiant seaman perceived his duty; and how, through his courage, “sang-froid” and excellent tactical skills, he was able to save two ships successively entrusted to his command; and how he met his death in a grand gesture of selflessness. It was our fervent wish to have his widow and his two sons honour this gathering with their presence; unfortunately, they were unable to undertake the long trip from Bastia to Le Trait. While we very much regret their absence, we are happy to have the hero’s brother, Frigate Captain Bonelli, among us today. I am sure that I am speaking for you all when I express our sincere thanks to him. Allow me, Gentlemen, to also express the sadness felt by Worms & Cie about not having Mr Louis Achard among us today; with us from the very start of construction, he headed the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime up until a few months ago, when he was taken from us before having the satisfaction of seeing this first ship leave the shipyard. Having expressed these words of regret, I would now like to thank our Minister for the Merchant Navy who, while not wishing to leave behind the worries of his heavy burden – alas! worries are our permanent companion – agreed to leave his desk for one whole day to come and preside over this ceremony, demonstrating once again the great interest he attaches to private initiatives within the shipping industry.

The shipyard entrance in 1925

Six years of guaranteed work

The reasons for such a full order book can be traced back to the French economic boom of the 1920s, with the country heading the list of all industrialised nations.292 Whole fleets had to be rebuilt. From 1922 to 1926, tonnage nearly regained its pre-war level. Privatesector clients abounded. During the period from 1919 to 1927, eighteen clients enlisted the services of ACSM. The share of private shipowners (excluding Worms & Cie) represented slightly more than 60% of purchases, whereas between 1920 and 1972, the year the shipyard closed for good, this ratio was around 50%. Hypolite Worms’ experience and network within the shipping sector are possible explanations for why ACSM attracted more clients than the other shipyards established around the same time.

A period of sustained activity reigned between 1921 and 1927, with 1924 and 1926 the two best years in terms of production in the whole history of ACSM. Curiously, this growth phase occurred at a time when national production was in decline. For example, the Schneider shipyard in Le Havre was forced to close during this same period. Average production of French shipyards for the Merchant Navy between 1910 and 1933291 From 1910 to 1914

120,000 tons per year

From 1922 to 1926

107,000 tons per year

From 1928 to 1933

75,000 tons per year

292 J.-C. Asselain, Histoire économique de la France du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 24–29.

291 See memo of July 1934 on www.wormsetcie.com.

for the Ponts et Chaussées [Public Works] of the SeineInférieure department. Considering that these operations lasted less than two hours, it must be agreed that the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime accomplished a great performance.”

60 million in sales contracted in 1919 Total contracts signed in 1919 generated 60 million francs in sales. Construction of the steam cargo ships “Léoville,” “Barsac,” “Cérons” and “Sauternes” was based on orders valued at 3,359,350 F per vessel. “Château-Yquem” and “Château-Lafite” were estimated at 6,424,000 F each. To ensure that the ships were constructed flawlessly, ACSM was assisted by the technical department of the general management of Worms & Cie’s Shipping Services. Total contracts signed in 1919 were enough to keep slipways 1 to 6 and the workforce busy until 1924, freeing the shipyard from the need to look for new contracts until 1922, without threatening the growth of the company and city. The workforce grew from ca. 400 workers in 1921 to nearly 1,000 in 1925 and 1926. This headcount evolution allowed ACSM to be ranked among the largest French companies with 1,000 employees prior to the Second World War. Workers could expect to spend their entire career there and their sons as well, as was often the case in industrial organisations of this size.293 Launch dates of the Worms freighters: “Léoville” – 3 September 1922; “Sauternes” – 9 November 1922; “Barsac” – 18 January 1923; “Cérons” – 3 June 1923; “Château-Lafite” – 22 June 1924; “Château-Yquem” – 8 February 1925. Launch dates of the cargo ships (other than the “Capitaine Bonelli”) ordered by the French National Coal Board: “Chef Mécanicien Armand Blanc” – 25 February 1922; “Capitaine Le Diabat” – 10 May 1922; “Capitaine Prieur” – 3 July 1922; “Capitaine Edmond Laborie” – 22 March 1923; “Dionée” – 27 November 1923. “The launch of ‘Château-Lafite,’ reported Le Journal du Trait of 26 June 1924, was preceded by the launching of two pontoons intended for the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique and two split hopper barges

The State, a much-coveted client Among those placing orders, the State seemed to be an economic partner destined to assume evergreater importance, because it often placed multiple orders. The Ponts et Chaussées of the Seine-Inférieure department (Rouen) had six split hopper barges constructed (“P.C. 51” to “P.C. 56,” delivered between 17 April and 6 August 1924), while the 600-horsepower steam tugboat “Balidar” built for the Dieppe Chamber of Commerce was launched on 3 September 1924; the 725-dwt freighter “Rennes” was launched on 23 August 1925, built for the Chemins de Fer de l’État; while that same year, the French Navy ordered an oil tanker. The keel of this vessel, baptised “Le Loing” (construction No. 38) was laid in slip 2 on 21 August 1925. The Société des Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire supplied the engines. The vessel was launched on 4 April 1927. Presiding over the ceremony, Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Salaün, the guest of honour of Hypolite Worms, was to declare: “I cannot believe that our country wishes to see a decline in its shipyards, or that Parliament would not approve the idea of entering discussions to reinstate subsidies if, as I and many others believe, subsidies are truly essential to restoring shipbuilding.”

Launch of the freighter “Sauternes” on 9 November 1922

293 A. Aglan, O. Feiertag, and Y. Marec (Dir.), Les Français et l’argent. Entre fantasmes et réalités, Rennes: PUR, 2011, p. 74. See the article by J. Ruhlmann, “Argent et identité sociale. L’a(r)gent double. La défense, l’identité sociale des classes moyennes et l’argent dans la première moitié du XXe siècle.” In his analysis, the author counted “406 companies employing over 1,000 employees” around 1936.

4 April 1927: “Le Loing,” the first oil tanker delivered to the French Navy and the first motor ship built at Le Trait Specifications Length

123 metres overall 117 metres between perpendiculars

Width

15.40 metres

Draught

9.25 metres

Gross tonnage

3,481 tons

Deadweight tonnage

6,476 tons

Fully loaded

9,915 tons

Propulsion

2 diesel engines Burmeister & Wain engines

Speed

13.5 knots

Crew

76 (officers and crew members)

Plan taken from the article by Pierre Abbat published by the Association Technique Maritime et Aéronautique in June 1928

Launch of the oil tanker “Le Loing” – 4 April 1927

Speech given by Hypolite Worms “The watchful and benevolent assistance of public authorities” May we not forget that this shipyard was conceived while the Battle of Verdun was raging: an act of faith – in no way merely symbolic – first in the success of our forces, then in the enduring economic vitality of our country! Events have demonstrated, in 1926, as in 1918, that this trust, imposed by duty alone, was perfectly justified: therein lies a precious lesson for the future, whether the perpetual “naysayers” like it or not. In 1921, we launched the first vessel built here: the “Capitaine Bonelli,” a collier ordered by the Merchant Navy. On that occasion, our nascent shipyard was “inaugurated,” if I may say so, by the Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy at the time, the Honourable Mr Rio. Well now! Gentlemen, today is the occasion for a “consecration,” as “Le Loing” is the first ship built by the Le Trait shipyard for the French Navy: Admiral Salaün, Chief of the Naval General Staff, has graciously agreed to preside over this launch as the representative of the Minister for the Navy. I am eternally grateful, Admiral, for your kind gesture: once again, as on so many other occasions, you are demonstrating your utmost concern, beset as you are with military problems, for all the issues upon which the prosperity and greatness of our country depend – at the forefront of which is the shipbuilding industry. I cannot imagine that you have abandoned your difficult job for an entire day, just to feel good over the launch of “Le Loing” or for the pleasure of listening to a speech. In my Maison Worms, where you are so well known – were not several of my colleagues originally colleagues of yours? – we are well aware of the breadth of your vision, of the genius illuminating your patriotism! A leader of your stature knows how to offer encouragement.

Simply put, this “consecration” I have just evoked refers solely to the new business division at Maison Worms, because our relationship with the French Navy is so longstanding that it would be more appropriate to speak of a jubilee. Our company was founded in 1848. Combing through our archives – particularly during the crises which sometimes moderate our operations – we were able to find the first contract concluded between your military department and Maison Worms. On 1 March 1850, the Minister for the Navy purchased, for its facilities in Cherbourg, 2,050 tons of coal (at the time, it was expressed as 2,050,000 kilos). Eighteen ships were needed to transport this “impressive” amount. Our relationship grew closer during the Crimean War: in 1854, the French Eastern Mediterranean fleet was supplied by the Maison led by my grandfather, Hypolite Worms, in Milos, Piraeus, Gallipoli, Constantinople, and Beykoz – names that I am sure, Admiral, are familiar to you! At that time, in combination with the British Admiralty and its recently appointed Mr L.G. Gillespy, the French Navy awarded Hypolite Worms an exclusive contract to charter the vessels needed to supply both countries and to curb the increase in freight charges prompted by the war: a mission they successfully accomplished. The trust that the Navy bestowed upon Maison Worms from the start, Gentlemen, is an honour for which our company believes it has the right to feel most proud. At the same time, moreover, our nascent fleet was used to transport Navy supplies, primarily to the Baltic Sea, one of the main area of operations for our vessels.

This relationship has continued for 78 years, during which time the heads of Maison Worms have been pleased and proud to collaborate with the Navy every time it honoured our company with a request; tradition, atavism, if I might say so, are at the base of the intense joy I feel today, now that a third branch of our business, shipbuilding, can be made available to the Navy. I apologise, Admiral, for this somewhat lengthy digression, but it serves to help you better understand the gratitude I feel toward Mr Leygues, Minister for the Navy, who deemed it worthy to be represented here today. Please pass on to him my expressions of gratitude, thanking him in particular for having chosen your excellent presence for this task. I extend my respectful and grateful greetings to the Honourable Prefect, whose presence here is evidence of his concern for our industry, as if proof were needed after everything he has done in all regions where his successful administrative career has led him these past thirty enriching years. I say thank you to the senators and deputies who so kindly responded to our invitation; to you, Gentlemen, representatives of the Navy; and to you, friends from Paris and Rouen who have taken time off to be here today, as proof of the interest you have in an industry so vital to our country. I would be remiss if I failed to mention Mr René Fould, who was detained at the last minute, Chairman of the Société des Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire, our partners in the construction of “Le Loing”: indeed, they supplied the Burmeister & Wain engines, and were the first to build such engines in France. The interest accorded to us today, Gentlemen, allows me to avail myself of your presence in Le Trait to describe in a few short words what an “average shipbuilder” thinks of his industry’s difficult situation and the proposed solutions, over which, unfortunately, there is no lack of polemical debate! One point now seems to be well established: shipbuilding cannot survive in France without the watchful and benevolent assistance of public authorities. But divergences arise when it comes to determining the form and amount of said assistance. May I say to our friend, Senator Brindeau, that even with the conclusions drawn last February 4, after laborious and methodical studies, by the Extra-Parliamentarian Commission of the Merchant Navy, over which he presided with such authority, these divergences continue to exist, albeit in

an attenuated form. While the pledge introduced by MP Morinaud and adopted unanimously clearly favoured the re-establishment of construction subsidies, he nonetheless acknowledged, in the face of these difficult times, the possibility of certain temporary measures: tax exemption, exemption from customs duties, and the scheduling of shipping credits. However, Gentlemen, may I be frank when I say that, given the critical condition of our industry, it may not be able to wait as long as the government seemingly desires for permanent measures to replace temporary measures. Everyone knows the heavy sacrifices that the shipyards have had to make these past few years in order to guarantee a minimum of work, something we cannot continue much longer. Thus, Gentlemen, we insistently call on you to bring the issue of protecting our industry promptly before the public authorities, before Parliament and before the country – not packed in cotton wool, with its customary reservations and precautions, but in all its direness. Despite the enormous cost, I do not believe that our country wishes to see its shipyards collapse, or that Parliament cannot approve the idea of discussing the re-establishment of subsidies, if, as I and many others believe, such an action is truly essential for the recovery of shipbuilding. If public opinion needs to be guided and reformed in this respect, we should not waste one single minute, Gentlemen, to start the necessary campaign. Other countries are showing us the way. While England does not hesitate to grant long-term credits to shipowners, and uses the power of its considerable credit resources in a number of countries to support its own industries, and more specifically, its shipbuilding industry, Germany directly subsidises its shipyards. On all international markets, we find the Italian shipbuilders ahead of us, wholeheartedly supported by their government. To fight against this active competition, we, too, need substantial support from the public authorities. Once there is universal acceptance of the need, and shipbuilders themselves are convinced that, within a reasonable period of time, they can count on not just half-measures, but on truly effective measures, headway will have been made towards attenuating the frictions and divergences previously alluded to in my speech,

which have arisen and still arise (remember the recent discussions on temporary admission?) among people who are equally well-intentioned, equally sincere, and equally concerned about the interests of the Merchant Navy and the shipyards. We draw the government’s attention particularly to the fact that, in a sound assessment of our true situation, we should not be deluded by the benefits from orders we received from abroad in the past, a source that seems to have dried up for a long period of time, at least for merchant vessels. Perhaps out of a desire to gain markets that seemed open to us, we were too optimistic with regard to international production costs. As a matter of fact, I do not believe that the shipyards that built for international markets, like those that worked for the domestic market, came away without losses, especially since our foreign clients invariably extracted the maximum from us, while we were spontaneously determined to give our export ships, despite the extra cost, the brand and cachet of our country. Therefore, it would be painful for us to see protective measures for shipbuilding postponed, on the pretext of the apparent prosperity of shipyards working for the export market. I also call on the public authorities to consider, when looking at our production costs, the merciless competition among shipbuilders prompted by their terrible struggle for survival these past years. It is high time we change how we view the concept of fair profit. No one wins in a race to the bottom where we are unable to maintain and renew our facilities or benefit from modern technology; we must also avoid capital being permanently diverted away from an industry likely to play a key role in national defence. Thus, our demand to work with a reasonable profit margin seems completely justified. “The good Lord helps those who help themselves.” Gentlemen, for many years, shipbuilders have struggled on their own and, although they have been gnawing on a very meagre bone, they have never ceased to do everything possible to hone their methods for working together.

Yet we still need outside assistance. Outside means first from some sister industries which may not yet have completely understood everything they could do for us, without paying a huge sacrifice. I am alluding in particular to steelmaking which should be able to provide us with sheet metal and metal profiles, not at global export prices, but below them. The share we need is not so large that it cannot be easily balanced out over the entire steelmaking output. A highly interesting initiative was taken several years ago; we call on our steelmaking colleagues to resume this initiative as quickly as possible, taking into account that, since our industry is one of the most advanced processing industries, the very fact that we are prosperous leads to the prosperity of a multitude of other manufacturers and allows a sizeable labour force to be employed. Besides, this initial assistance, coming from the industrial world itself, could only prompt public authorities to hasten the adoption of other protective measures. Gentlemen, I did not want to make a polemical speech here, but rather to put across my thoughts frankly; I trust that, no matter in what capacity you have heard me, you will do everything to help us, thereby allowing shipbuilding, an industry so unstable today and so threatened from all sides, to finally regain the security and stability needed for its survival.

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Foreign companies turn to Le Trait – In 1924, less than four years after the start of its shipbuilding operations, ACSM received its first orders from a foreign client, the Norwegian company, Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab, which entrusted it with the construction of three cargo ships: “Leo” (construction No. 30); “Lynx” (31); and “Nova” (32), whose keels were laid in slips Nos. 1, 4, and 2 respectively, one month apart on 23 April, 23 May and 28 June 1924. They were launched on 14 December 1924, 22 March and 26 July 1925. The Bergenske was listed in the commercial register in the name of Worms & Cie: proof that the mother company had the ability to provide clients to the shipyard on the basis of its network and branches. Other foreign companies placing orders with ACSM included the Canadian company, Anticosti Shipping Co., Ltd, for the liner “Fleurus” in 1925, and the Norwegian company, Det Norsk Russiske D/S – Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S, for two steam cargo ships, the “Soroka” and “Keret,”294 and Westfal Larsen & Co. A/S for the motor oil tanker “Orkanger” in 1926. – as do French shipowners ACSM built the steam cargo ship “Vaccares” for the SA de Navigation à Vapeur Daher in 1922–1924; two mooring pontoons for the Compagnie Générale transatlantique in 1924; the steam cargo ship “Lucie Delmas” for the Compagnie Delmas Frères & Vieljeux in 1924–1925; the cargo ship “Ostrevent” for the Société des HautsFourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de Denain & Anzin (Société Anonyme d’Armement L. Ravasse & Cie) in 1924–1925; two cod fishing trawlers, the “Adriatique” and “Caucasique,” for La Morue Française & Sécheries de Fécamp in 1926–1927; and the self-propelled tank barges “Marne,” “Meuse,” “Moselle” and “Seine” for the Union Normande in 1926–1927. The momentum soon petered out Within ten or so years, ACSM built more than fifty ships and other structures (crane pontoons; mooring pontoons), accounting for one quarter of total production until 1971, the year the last hull was constructed. They worked on various kinds of freighters, bulk carriers

294 For information on these three ships (construction number, slipway, typology, placement and launch dates of the keel), see pp. 391–400 the table entitled “Ships and other equipment built in Le Trait between 1920 and 1971.”

(colliers for the most part), oil tankers, fishing trawlers, tug boats, as well as military vessels (torpedo boats, submarines). For the time being, ACSM production was little different to that of its competitors. However, the construction of the motor oil tanker “Orkanger” or the torpedo boat “Basque” opened the door to specialisation. Orders in 1928 and 1929 reached 50 million francs. “Megara” and “Mirza,” two motor oil tankers for a Dutch client, Petroleum Maatschappij La Corona were launched in those two years. On 8 October 1929, the steam cargo ship “Mérignac” left slip No. 4 to enlarge the Worms & Cie fleet. Nonetheless, as Hypolite Worms emphasised in a speech to the French Major Ports Association, during

The liner built for the Canadian company, Anticosti Shipping Co.

a study trip to Le Trait on 12 June 1929, the high cost of raw materials, labour costs, and increased overheads threatened the competitiveness of the French shipbuilding industry, whose survival depended on the support of the State (see his speech below). The efforts to reconstruct the Merchant Navy after the First World War had been mainly in the hands of the private sector. But, by the end of the 1920s, the sector had run out of steam and was unable to provide the investment required to renew the fleets. This situation led the French Parliament to adopt a law on shipping credits to shipowners on 1 August 1928. This allowed them to borrow from the mortgage credit

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Insertion of the first rivet, on 25 April 1924, for the mixed cargo ship “Nova,” launched on 26 July 1925, for the Norwegian company, Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S

institution (Crédit Foncier), while benefitting from advantageous borrowing costs, provided that the ships were built in France.295 This clause was combined with measures seeking to protect traffic, and thus, the market shares of French shipping companies (the Law of 9 August 1921 granting preference to French-flagged ships in all cases in which the transport terms of freight intended for the administration equalled those of foreign shipowners;296 the Law of 30 March 1928 requiring oil importers to transport at least two thirds of their imports to France in French-

295 www.wormsetcie.com. The Worms Shipping Services and ACSM helped set up the shipping credit facility, the subject of numerous studies and internal memos between 1928 and 1936. 296 This preference became an obligation through the Decree-Law of 30 October 1935. B. Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995), vol. 1, IGPDE – Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2002, pp. 15–35.

flagged ships, etc.).297 Yet this support and protection were insufficient to protect the profession (shipping and shipbuilding combined) from the threats that soon loomed on the horizon. As Bernard Cassagnou notes, while “shipowners were no match for foreign competition,” it was clear that “public authorities had not provided [the means for] an overall shipping policy, instead just implementing a series of stopgap measures”298 – measures which were to prove ineffective when, two years after the crash of the New York stock market in October 1929, the shock wave spread to the world economy. From 1928 to 1933, national tonnage delivered to the Merchant Navy fell to 75,000 tons per year while 40,000 tons were ordered abroad.

297 Ibid. This arsenal was complemented by the Law of 6 August 1933, granting the French-flagged ships a monopoly on imports of bananas to France, and especially by the Law of 18 August 1936, which required that at least 40% of coal imports be shipped by French vessels. 298 Ibid.

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Amount of the contracts per year in current francs (1919–1931) – data collected from the Worms archives

The cargo ship “Lynx,” launched on 22 March 1925 for the Norwegian company, Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S µ The cargo ship “Leo,” launched on 14 December 1924 for Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S

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20 May 1928: the “Orkanger,” the largest oil tanker built to date by ACSM Specifications Length

144,37 metres overall

Width

18.13 metres

Moulded depth

10.59 metres

Gross tonnage

8,029 tons

Deadweight tonnage

10,540 tons

Fully loaded

15,680 tons

Propulsion

8-cylinder Sulzer diesel engine 3,800-HP

Speed

11 knots

This vessel was launched from slipway 1, where its keel had been laid on 14 April 1926. Launch of the oil tanker “Orkanger”

through the glorious splendour of the truest Romanticism. Yet, for the last 10 or so years, Le Trait has become the owner of other equally renowned credentials.

“After holding its general meeting the previous evening in the vast library of the Journal de Rouen, the Association of Professional Journalists of Normandy set off to Le Trait on Sunday morning, where the Worms shipyard had kindly agreed to host its annual excursion. It is widely known that Le Trait, nestled in a bend of the Seine between lush hillsides, is one of the loveliest sites in the Seine Valley. Going up the valley from Jumièges to Villequier, one can take a leisurely stroll among the memories of bygone days, from the Merovingian era and the Benedictine annals up 104

There, Mr Worms has created the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime, a true industrial town where, on an enormous expanse of land, hundreds of workers’ houses are home to a population of more than 3,000 people benefiting from good working conditions, healthy living conditions and even entertainment: features – unfortunately! – seldom encountered elsewhere. It is truly a model workers’ housing estate, both from an economic and a social standpoint. Scheduled to leave the vast shipyard that day was a ship sold to Norway, the oil tanker ‘Orkanger,’ a splendid vessel weighing sixteen thousand tons and measuring one hundred and forty metres in length, eighteen metres in width, and nearly eleven metres in height. The launch took

place at noon, in the presence of Mr Worms, General Charpy, two parliamentarians, and many other VIPs, among whom we recognised several from Dieppe. The ship was christened by Mrs Zacharlasen, wife of the Norwegian Consul, who smashed the traditional bottle of champagne against the bow; shortly afterwards, the impressive ship slid slowly down to the river to the applause of the numerous spectators. A banquet for three hundred people, perfectly executed and served, was the setting for a gathering of Mr Worms’ guests. During dessert, Mr Worms gave a very interesting speech in which he, after respectfully thanking the VIPs surrounding him, provided invaluable information on the Le Trait shipyard and on merchant shipping in general. His speech was followed by ones from Mr Roux, head of the Prefecture Council, representing Mr Ceccaldi; the consul of Norway; Mr Morlère, Chairman of the Association of Professional Journalists of

Plan taken from the article by Pierre Abbat published by the Association Technique Maritime et Aéronautique in June 1928

Normandy; and Mr Rimbert, whose frank and strong words were very sincerely applauded. Speaking about the law on shipping credit, while acknowledging (something we have always said) that no laws are perfect and can always be amended, he praised its usefulness and opportuneness. He ended with an homage to the Merchant Navy, adding that France needed to once again become a great shipping nation, because, surrounded by water to the north, west and south, it could legitimately consider its naval development as a condition for its prosperity as well as for its independence. Five performing arts clubs then presented a perfectly executed musical and rhythmic programme demonstrating not only the artists’ talent, but also the patient, devoted and methodical work of those who have dedicated themselves to such admirable popular education projects. There is much to learn at Le Trait. 105

We advise our compatriots to make the trip, and we are so pleased that we ourselves were able to go. May Mr Worms, owner of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, where such fine and good work is being done for the honour of the country and the happiness of the people, find in these words an expression of our gratitude as well as a sincere token of our admiration.” L.-M. P. La Vigie de Dieppe, 25 May 1928299

299 Quoted on the website, http://jumieges.free.fr/Le_Trait_Orkanger.html.

25 May 1929: the “Basque,” the first torpedo boat delivered to the French Navy Built on slip No. 3 where its keel was laid on 20 August 1926, the “Basque” (construction No. 50) was part of an order for 26 vessels of the same type, known as the “1,500-ton series,” or “three pipes or funnels,” which the French Navy ordered from naval dockyards and private shipyards. Based on a design inspired by the former German destroyers handed over to France as war reparations, the “Basque” was called to active service on 7 March 1931 and assigned to the 5th Division of the 1st Squadron.

Specifications Length

107.20 metres

Width

9.80 metres

Draught

4.24 metres at full load

Displacement tonnage Fully loaded

1,380 tons 2,000 tons

Propulsion

2 34,000-HP Rateau turbines

Speed

33 knots

Armament

4 130-mm guns 2 37-mm AA guns 6 550-mm torpedoes 2 200-kg grenade ramps

Ship’s crew

134 men, including 7 officers and 12 quartermasters

Placing the compressor on board the torpedo boat “Basque,” on 16 April 1928

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Hypolite Worms’ plea to the French Major Ports Association (Le Trait, 12 June 1929) “Help us!” Permit me to say a few words to you on the situation of the French shipbuilding industry; your study trip would be incomplete without devoting a few minutes to reflecting upon this – maritime – branch of our national economy! Undoubtedly, Gentlemen, none of you needs to be enlightened on this issue; however, having the – not always very enviable – privilege of being both a shipowner and a shipbuilder and thus being on both sides of a fence maliciously created in the past by certain controversies, I feel the need to emphasise to this learned assembly the common interests uniting the two industries. Shall I begin with their goals? Are not the goals of a French shipowner to prevent the country from having to pay a heavy toll to foreign operators to transport the merchandise it needs as well as the merchandise it has to export to maintain its balance of payments; also to create a source of profits for the Nation by gaining a high share of worldwide shipping? And the goals of the French shipbuilding industry? To provide shipowners with the resources they need, and in doing so, to keep him from ordering abroad and also to gain markets for itself abroad? To emerge victorious, a shipowner needs a wellconstructed and well-priced ship! I am absolutely convinced that French technology is second to none! Similarly, the day will come when our industry, without having to agree to ruinous sacrifices, will be able to “supply” the world market at acceptable prices, when the problem with its vitality will be resolved, and when both goals will be achieved. Everything boils down to the question of the cost price. By entrusting its orders to the French shipbuilding industry, shipping companies can help reduce shipbuilders’ overheads – since these expenses are then distributed over increased sales –, with this reduction helping the industry to conquer new markets, leading

to a further improvement in the situation and perhaps further cost cuts. If there are any sceptics still in need of convincing, I would ask them to examine the consequences of the opposite theory: by turning abroad, a shipowner improves the situations of foreign competitors, enabling them to build at a lower cost: believe me, Gentlemen, it is not our compatriots who would benefit from this, but rather those within the beneficiary industry, since export prices would certainly have to remain at a maximum level to allow further success. There is no point insisting on the consequences of this action; French shipowners will have very simply “put themselves at risk for the benefit of others,” i.e. their competitors. Thus, I was right when I said earlier that the interests of both industries are interconnected; when our shipyards prosper, French shipowners will pay far less, while shipbuilders will benefit from the publicity provided by their clients, perhaps not so much through the resulting positive gains as through the disappearance of the immense downturn caused by their abstention. Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine that the efforts – as generous as they are – of French shipping companies will be sufficient to revive French shipbuilding, the only industry in France which – as I have said many times in the past, but something that is worth repeating – since the war, has not been able to shake off a crisis whose persistence is by far its most worrisome feature. Something else must be done! Eminent personalities have had the chance to speak of their relative optimism; their voices are, undoubtedly, more authoritative than mine: but why did they not convince me? I seek only to be convinced. Our production costs, as always, are determined by just three elements: raw materials, labour and overheads. - Raw materials! The “factory gate” prices we pay for sheet metal are at nearly the world price, almost at

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the level of the English, and slightly higher than the Germans and Dutch. Unfortunately, the map of our country shows that this factory gate is far away from the coast, with the resulting transport costs one of the main aspects playing against us in our struggle with our neighbours. Can this be remedied? I think so, but only with the good will of all involved: - of our suppliers: first and foremost the steelmakers must make a sacrifice – a small sacrifice compared to those that the shipyards must make to become the exclusive suppliers of the French shipping industry; a small sacrifice as well if we compare the sheet metal needs of shipbuilding with the possibilities offered by post-war France, a sacrifice that will ultimately pay off: once our shipyards are able to build at lower cost, the national tonnage will certainly grow, thus increasing the export capacities essential to steelmakers. While we obviously know that steelmakers cannot accept losses indefinitely, is it not possible for the

public authorities to devise, in one form or another, a way of partially compensating for this sacrifice, reasonably offsetting the necessary investment? On the other hand, would this not be an occasion for the railways to make a request – particularly wellfounded – because every ship should basically be considered an export item – to approve set prices for the transport of sheet metal and metal profiles? In fact, the large amounts of revenue generated by the railways is very much linked to the strength of our Merchant Navy, even if they happen to be competitors. Among all the many proposals submitted by the rail networks over the past year to the detriment of the Merchant Navy, there should be at least one in its favour. Would this not be a partial, but fortunate compensation? Winding up this topic, I would like to express the wish that we standardise as quickly as possible the metal profiles as well as all other shipbuilding components we need in order to be able to build ships without having to turn to abroad; together with

Hypolite Worms (centre) and Henri Nitot (right) during the launch of the oil tanker “Megara” on 29 December 1928

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the wish that our French clients remember that there are also French builders of engines and other auxiliary equipment. - Labour: my first concern must be to acknowledge that current English and German hourly wages are appreciably higher than ours; unfortunately, the differences between our productivity and that of our neighbours cancels out this advantage – making it change signs, I would be tempted to say. The reason is to be found in our need, given a lack of specialists, to call upon labourers for whom good will is certainly not in short supply, and whose work, thanks to the skills of our engineers and our foremen, honours French adaptability, but whose productivity is little more than that of those “unaccustomed to the work.” All this results in longer lead times, which cost dearly on account of both increased overheads and the heavy penalties incurred by the delays, and, far more serious, the higher success rates of foreign shipyards able to build at a faster pace. Countless efforts are being made to improve at all costs: boosting apprenticeships, the only source of truly interesting output, but something that takes time; the hiring of foreign workers, but with what caution and regret?; the fight against the loss of interest in shipbuilding since the end of the war – just as the demise of forging caused the blacksmith to disappear. So many costly sacrifices, so many acts of faith, so many acts of good will in order to give the country a vital industry, without which, under slightly different circumstances than those we experienced, the country could collapse in the worst of catastrophes. May I share the optimism I alluded to earlier on, when, climbing the hill, I noticed an even steeper path higher up? In our latest quotations, we have already had to partially take further expenses into account which, as of next year, are set to weigh down on us; I am talking about the expenses resulting from applying the law on social security. They will make already big problems even bigger. But can they be avoided? Certainly not, and we should immediately look elsewhere for a solution to the problem at hand.

As for overheads, despite what has been said, I do not have the impression that they are higher in France than abroad. Our problem is just that we are forced to spread them over an insufficient number of orders. For a long time, public opinion, based more on appearances than on a thorough examination, has been used to criticise the shipyards for their so-called inability to organise; this argument has been used as a pretext to postpone the necessary protective measures. “First, sort yourselves out,” we were told, “then we shall see.” Well, Gentlemen, let me tell you this is in no way fair: I am familiar with nearly all the English shipyards; I have never failed to make comparisons and, whether from the perspective of organisation or of facilities, I have nothing to be ashamed of. For the past two years in particular, French shipbuilders have provided ample proof of their desire for greater cooperation; several have joined forces in their search for foreign shipping programmes; some have – to a reasonable extent – concentrated their design and purchasing departments; and if I use the term “reasonable,” it is because, despite what we sometimes hear, there is a point beyond which concentration becomes dangerous – a danger to the shipping industry and its interest in advances in naval technology driven by healthy rivalry. Gentlemen, do you think diesel engines would have become what they are, in just a few short years, had competitors not fought to be at the front? And would the French Navy continue to find, within every one of our technical departments, our valuable assistance, which until now has been used in the design of submarines and engines in particular – or to conduct experiments on combustion and superheating – if emulation did not continue to prevail among us? Financial cooperation ultimately arose and jumpstarted the desired “union,” subsequently putting our industry on the right path. Yet, if I had to provide proof to you that the height of our overheads is not the root cause of our lack of success on the world market, all I would need to do to convince you would be to highlight that we have experienced failure many times, even though our production costs were calculated without including – or only partially including – “overheads.”

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Be that as it may, in the case of freighters – ordinarily the “bread and butter of our industry” – no one is unaware of the size of the current gap between French and English production costs. As for ocean liners – where the situation is even more dire because French workmanship finds greater development opportunity here –, the gap, as yet minimal, is set to widen as expenses increase. The same will hold true for oil tankers, as well as for warships, although they are the subject of major building programmes for a great number of leading maritime nations, whether poorly equipped or not equipped at all. Has not recent experience given us proof, if not evidence, that our fears were not whims of the imagination? Accordingly, Gentlemen, expensive raw materials, costly labour, the prospect of increased costs pushing up our already high overheads weighing down on an insufficient base: for all these reasons, we are unable to look to the future with calm. Instead, we are forced to turn to Parliament and the government, calling out loud: “Help us!” Before attempting to see how, it may prove useful to highlight the reasons why our Nation cannot remain indifferent to the risk of our industry’s decline. There are some who think that customs barriers and other protectionist measures serve only to paralyse the free play of the law of supply and demand, stifling economic activity by offering a security, often false and always enfeebling. The idea has support, and even I am far from a priori considering it unreasonable. It is one interpretation, among many, of the story. Be that as it may, I am addressing the disciples of Richard Cobden, telling them that the shipbuilding industry is not like so many others; it is of particular importance for the prestige of a great nation. It is one of those industries whose existence is a vital necessity for the country! - Essential for the prestige of France: Can you imagine that, within the colonial empire that France has created, metropolitan France would settle for a use of ocean liners built abroad? What conclusions would visitors and the local population alike draw, population who, given our unique aptitude for colonisation, can see for themselves what is happening? Would not the entire French industry suffer morally and, consequently, materially from the shortcomings of the shipbuilding industry, its flagship par excellence?

How humiliating for a country that paid so dearly for victory: a country that, prior to 1914, built numerous warships for secondary maritime powers, only to have one of its most visible branches of industrial activity declare bankruptcy? And when might this bankruptcy happen? Very simply, at a time when it would be most noticed; at a time when new and powerful governments are knocking on France’s door to establish or renew their merchant fleets, their navies, or both, because they owe everything to France’s victory, as seen in Czechoslovakia, the resurrection in Poland, the fortunate transformation of Romania or Yugoslavia; at a time when a new civilisation, having deeply modified the state of mind of a great Eastern nation, this people – and consequently its neighbours – are all seeking to procure the shipping facilities needed to maintain – if not to grow – their influence; at a time when the Baltic States, the outcome of the tragic events of 1917, are having to appeal to the West’s industry for the freighters, refrigerated vessels, ice breakers, submarines, and torpedo boats they need; at a time when the South American market has never had so many needs or possibilities! Oh, to be powerless at such a time! Tantalus never knew a more tortured agony! Never has the prestige of French industry – or put very simply, the prestige of France – suffered such a wound. - Vital necessity for the security of the Nation. Must I recall the situation we experienced during the last war, given our failure to plan ahead? Must we risk recreating the experience we’ve just gone through? It is often said that there are too many shipyards in France! No one thought that in the direct aftermath of those tragic times. If opinions are now different, it is because no one thinks any more about the multitude of small ships needed to defend our coastline: torpedo boats, submarines, dredgers, destroyers, whose construction and repair – at equal total tonnage – require a certain number of slipways and workers, much higher than for large vessels. We are losing sight of the tonnage needed to meet the needs of the country – liners, oil tankers, freighters. And lastly, it is because we have forgotten the formidable consumption of ships that was ours to witness. For this reason, Gentlemen, I say that our industry cannot – and must not – disappear: our industry is essential for our security.

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Launch of the motor oil tanker “Megara” on 29 December 1929 for the Dutch company, Petroleum Maatschappij La Corona

Therefore, the discussion can no longer be about economic theories, of knowing whether the best theory is the one that relies on the principle of free trade or the principle of protection; we must preserve a sufficient number of well-performing shipyards which, together with the State’s naval dockyards, constitute a resource that is never at risk of being too strong. Shipyards are as vital to our country as are chemical companies, foundries and others. It is useless to insist otherwise. But shipyards have to operate under normal times if they are to be ready on any given day; they must enjoy a minimum of prosperity, a minimum of possibilities and security, allowing them to fight competitors abroad on an equal footing, allowing them to constantly improve their technology and their productivity. However, does the portrait I have attempted to paint, above all with the aim of being accurate, not show in superabundance that, left to its own devices, the French shipbuilding industry cannot expect to “hold on”? It would thus seem that State intervention is unavoidable: to a low extent if early; but to a much greater extent if delayed.

To be true, certain measures have been taken: the shipping credit law, customs terms and tax reductions. I am fully aware of the benefits, and our industry must be grateful to the prudent ministers, national representatives and officials, who drafted, voted and implemented these various measures, with evermore praiseworthy tenacity, since, unfortunately, even the war failed to focus French public opinion on maritime issues. I must highlight here the remarkable effort put in to reviving the French Navy: in doing so, this government department can help French shipyards by a planned distribution of orders, resulting in reduced overheads and achieving a better position for our industry vis-à-vis foreign clients. But although I take great pleasure in highlighting these positive aspects, they are insufficient. In the current situation, these paths are circuitous and therefore take too long. It is high time we reach our goal. For years I have been cogitating about this issue. The only solution I can see is government assistance to re-establish the – No! Gentlemen, fear not! I shall not utter that fateful word, a word which has gained an unexpected mind-disturbing, a word equivalent to saying “Close,

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Sesame!” So, I will say only that we must re-establish measures similar to those instituted by the Law of 2 January 1881, and subsequently, the Law of 19 April 1906. If, as is my impression, the word does harm to the cause, I agree not to utter it. I shall remove it from my vocabulary, willingly handing over to whomever wants the task of replacing this noun – old, outdated, from whence stems the evil, if, in return, the effective, necessary and substantial assistance to which the word professes to allude is once again provided to an industry that is depressed – Excuse me, Gentlemen, languishing, even though it should be standing up and fighting for the nation, if not for itself. Call this assistance whatever you like: for example, the “State’s compensatory contribution” which, for lack of a better term, is absolutely essential to “compensate” for the reasons for our inability to fight on an equal footing with our neighbours. When all is said and done, what does this compensation boil down to? Very simply, to replace, through a measure designed to achieve the same goal, the customs barrier that benefits certain industries – sometimes not as vital as our own – a barrier impossible to establish for shipbuilding without immediately unleashing dangerous retaliatory measures. Acknowledging that it had to protect its automotive industry, the country slapped a 45% ad valorem import duty on cars! Production of certain chemical products had to be maintained in France at all costs; having agreed to the principle, the barrier was erected! It seems there is great interest in defending winegrowing! Duties have been imposed on foreign wines, and sometimes even “quotas.” Such is the nature of the oil industry that the government had a particular interest in its oversight: a premium (such a horrible word!) has been awarded to ships importing oil; and the companies which store, process and distribute the oil are being enabled to “hold on” through various protective measures limiting their workforce. Criticism, Gentlemen, is far from my thoughts. And I am not calling for that much! All that I am saying is that, if our industry is really one of those vital to the security of a great nation, it must, analogically, logically and in all fairness, be protected. Especially as it has been acknowledged that, as things currently stand, it cannot survive on its own!

A few years ago, the extra-parliamentary Commission, after a long and in-depth study, recognised that “the State’s compensatory contribution” was the only effective remedy against a state of affairs for which the industry involved was in no way responsible. I believe that the time has come to revisit these conclusions. Admittedly, the Commission established by the Law of 28 July 1873 needed slightly over seven years before it was finally heard! Moreover, by moving in this direction, we would only be following the lead of policies in place nearly everywhere abroad, as there are few countries not supporting their shipyards in one form or another. I know full well that, in the eyes of those who bear the heavy burden of our finances, the customs barrier and the “State contribution” are diametrically opposed: the former helps fill treasury coffers while the latter serves to empty them. Yet the difference is not as real as it may seem. When our shipyards are able to offer their international clients the same prices as their competitors, their activity will soon pick up again, not only due to the quality of their products, but also because France’s prestige and the feelings it evokes for the majority of small powers are such that the “sentimental” factor will have a decisive influence. Add up the taxes that our industry, operating at full capacity, would pay to the treasury, and you will quickly realise how quickly the “State contribution” would be repaid: the surplus would constitute profit! I apologise, Gentlemen, for talking at such length, but it seemed to me that minds such as yours, which place the prosperity of our shipping industry at the forefront of their concerns, should be aware of the opinion, not of shipbuilders in general, because I am neither qualified nor do I have a mandate to speak on their behalf, but of a shipbuilder who is somewhat apprehensive about the future, who believes he has to portray his apprehensions frankly, discuss their causes, and express the only remedy he sees for the ill he fears! Likewise, who better to hear these words than the French Major Ports Association, an association providing daily evidence of its awareness of the true interests of our port facilities and our merchant fleet; evidence as well of the energy with which the Association, under the energetic boost of its benevolent Chairman, knows how to come to their defence!

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20 October 1929: The public hurrying to the launch of the oil tanker “Mirza,” ordered by the Dutch shipping company, Petroleum Maatschappij La Corona

Exiting the shipyard – January 1930

Day-to-day life in Le Trait (how residents go about their working and social lives) The Société Immobilière du Trait: guidance, supervision, motivation “We do not have the slightest doubt about the future aesthetics of the garden city of Le Trait” Henri Nitot, les Cités-Jardins, 1924

One piece of information included in Henri Nitot’s thesis confirms what is alluded to in certain archives for the Norman Seine River Meanders Regional Nature Park (PNR) – that management of both ACSM and the Société Immobilière du Trait watched over the overall coherence of the garden city of Le Trait. The awarding of prizes also served to control how gardens were used. The garden city had to remain attractive. In 1923, various competitions or measures were organised to embellish the city. There was a competition for market gardening and fruit trees; a flower competition; a home decoration competition, both inside and out; a competition for farm animals. The winners received prizes in the form of cash, ornaments or everyday

items. The goal was to encourage the workers to cultivate a vegetable plot to supplement their incomes. Nitot felt that “the gardens made it possible for the workers, during their off-hours from the factory, to find a source of entertainment that was as pleasant as it was healthy.”300 The awards sought to encourage gardening and help workers relax. Another example: supervising the husbandry of animals intended to feed the workers. “We recognised that we needed to encourage the construction of a special type of chicken coop and rabbit hutch looking neat and tidy; otherwise, the land around the workers’ homes would become full of all kinds of sheds. In some garden cities, the construction of outbuildings was strictly prohibited, or at the very least, a certain style imposed. A good precaution is to prohibit chicken coops or hutches from directly abutting house walls,”301 wrote Nitot. One better understands the applications filed by workers with the Société Immobilière to decorate the interior of their homes. These requests were at times annotated

300 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, op. cit., p. 118, where the amounts of the awards are listed. See also Journal du Trait, 8 February 1923. 301 H. Nitot, op. cit., pp. 118–119.

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by Henri Nitot, even though he was the head of ACSM and not of the company managing the housing. As tenants, the workers did not have the right to do what they liked with their homes. The involvement of ACSM was striking, even responding to housing questions raised by its personnel.302 ACSM management was aware that the garden city was a project whose coherence had to be respected. Henceforth, Henri Nitot underlined, “we have not the slightest doubt about the future aesthetics of the garden city of Le Trait. In order to guide and advise the farming and gardening activities, the Société Immobilière has engaged the services of an experienced master gardener, available to everyone free of charge, especially for instructing them on the proper way to prune trees. And, with a view to providing all households with inexpensive floral plants, two large greenhouses have been built, the products of which are sold strictly at cost price. It is hoped, as a result, that not

302 PNR Archives: 6J/L120. Memo of 1 August 1934. On the other hand, there was another memo sent from the Société Immobilière to someone by the name of Kérautret. A worker requested to take off “Friday, 3 August and Saturday, 4 August to tend to his garden.” Management from both companies – the Société Immobilière du Trait and ACSM – was involved in the daily lives of the residents of Le Trait.

only the gardens but also all the windows will be decorated with flowers, serving to make the whole garden city look pleasant and welcoming.”303 A few years later, the Loucheur Law of 13 July 1928 helped the Société Immobilière grow throughout the 1930s. Some of the villas at Le Trait owed their construction to the Law, thus confirming that the Law covered not just workers’ homes, but also housing for the middle classes.304 Agreements were subsequently signed between the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime and home builders. For example, when a villa cost 44,700 F, the benefit society La Fraternelle paid 38,700 F, with ACSM taking over the remaining 6,000 F305 (see below).

303 Marcel Lecret was the gardener. H. Nitot, op. cit., wrote (pp. 118–119): “Not one house was constructed, not one road was built, not one tree was planted without our attentive involvement.” 304 As A. Fourcaut notes in “Le logement social, une histoire européenne,” Histoire et sociétés, 2006, pp. 6–13; see also Y. Roignant, Le Trait, la cité-jardin, report, Notre-Dame-deBliquetuit, Norman Seine River Meanders Regional Nature Park (PNR), June 2014, 53 p. Villas that were constructed as a result of the Loucheur Law were classified with numbers preceded by the letter “L.” 305 PNR Archives. Agreement of 2 November 1932 between ACSM and Rupert, the developer.

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The Loucheur Law was designed as a solution to the country’s housing crisis. State subsidies covering up to 90% of the construction cost were available under a five-year programme to build 260,000 dwellings to the latest hygiene standards.306 The government extended the prerogatives of the public financial institution, the Caisse des Dépôts which, since 1905, had been tasked with financing public housing.307 The Law required the construction of healthy dwellings. The decision by ACSM to build spacious houses was in line with the political will of the time: to boost French demographics, so severely hit by the Great War.308 Worms & Cie, a key economic player in the Seine Valley The influence of Worms & Cie within the Seine Valley region extended beyond shipbuilding and the construction of the garden city. Hypolite Worms was involved in the local low-cost housing company, the SHBM de la Seine-Maritime,309 of which he was a founding member and Director.310 The Board of Directors of the company, headquartered in Le Trait, was comprised of Georges Majoux, a property owner in Caudebec-en-Caux and Chairman of the Société Immobilière du Trait; René

306 M. Perrot, “Le corps et la maison. Hygiène, propreté, commodité, confort,” Ethnologie française, vol. 11, No. 1, January-March 1981, pp. 8–13. 307 A. Fourcaut, “La Caisse des dépôts et consignations et le logement social. De la loi Loucheur à la guerre : un constat d’échec ?” in A. Aglan, M. Margairaz, P. Verheyde (Dir.), La Caisse des dépôts et consignations, la Seconde Guerre Mondiale et le XXe siècle, Paris: Albin Michel, 2003, pp. 185–196. 308 G. Jaouen, La Société anonyme elbeuvienne d’habitations hygiéniques à bon marché de 1917 à 1940 : paternalisme ou philanthropie ?, Société Anonyme HLM d’Elbeuf, 2005, 96 p. 309 There was a Société d’Habitations à Bon Marché (SHBM) de la Seine-Inférieure, but the date on which it was established is unknown. Probably around 1922, like the one in Yvetot (created on 17 October 1922). 310 An involvement inherent to the extension of the garden city. See J. Soulas, “Villes-marchés et villes d’industrie de Haute-Normandie,” Annales de géographie, vol. 45, No. 256, 1936, pp. 399–413: “In a period of complete hostility, Maison Worms built its ‘Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime,’ bringing along a strong contingent of skilled shipbuilding workers. Immediately, the problem of housing arose. To solve the issue, a company tasked with providing low-cost housing was created. The rapidly rising population reflected the rising headcount of the Worms factories, as well as the creation of the oil refineries in La Mailleraye with its small workers’ housing estate. The population exploded: 1,750 inhabitants in 1921; 1,970 in 1926; and 2,930 in 1931.”

Stackler, the future mayor of Rouen, and Henri Nitot, Treasurer. The architects for the SHBM de la SeineMaritime were Pierre Chirol311 and Georges Peulevey, designers of numerous projects shaping the SeineMaritime area.312 Other garden cities sprung up in Normandy in the 1930s, such as Petite-Campagne, developed in PortJérôme (Notre-Dame de Gravenchon) in 1930 to house the workers at the Franco-American Standard Oil Company refinery. Inaugurated in 1934, the project was designed by the architects, Peulevey and Chirol, and constructed by a low-cost housing company. Apart from ACSM, the SHBM de la SeineMaritime shareholders included the Établissements Caron Delion, the Établissements Lecœur in Yvetot, the Société Havraise d’Énergie Électrique in Yainville, the Société Immobilière du Trait, the Société Agricole de Bolbec-Nointot, as well as the Rouen industrialist, Henri Denise (Duclair) and other industrialists from Lillebonne. Company correspondence from 1929 to 1932 mentioned a programme of 42 dwellings to be built in Le Trait, Duclair, Yvetot, Nointot, and Caudebec. The housing intended for Le Trait was to be built on the city outskirts in the direction of Caudebec; the Duclair project included four dwellings (on the road to Yvetot), but construction was delayed, because in February 1932, the municipality demanded the construction of water supply and drainage facilities as well as fire prevention measures. Worms & Cie was a key economic player in the Seine Valley. Hypolite Worms and his company exercised a form of leadership and became a true pillar of the

311 V. Maroteaux (Dir.), Pierre Chirol. Architecte et érudit normand (1881-1953), Rouen: Éditions Point de vue, 2009, 180 p. 312 As for the architects, Peulevey was the architect for the construction of the garden city in Maromme in 1952. See L. Vadelorge, Architecture du 20e siècle dans l’agglomération rouennaise, Rouen: Petit à Petit, 2002. The Société d’Habitations à Bon Marché de la Seine-Maritime was a corporation with capital of 2,200,000 F. Article 2 of its statutes defines its areas of operation: Allouville, Ambourville, Anneville, Auberville-sur-Seine, Auzebosc, Bardouville, Berville, Bolbec, Caudebec, Duclair, Gruchet-le-Valasse, Heurteauville, Jumièges, La Fresnaye, La Mailleraye, Lanquetot, Le Trait, Lillebonne, Mesnil-sous-Jumièges, Nointot, Notre-Dame-de-Bliquetuit, Norville, Petitville, Saint-Nicolas-de-Bliquetuit, Saint-Maurice-d’Etelan, SaintWandrille, Touffreville, Triquerville, Valliquerville, Vatteville, Villequier, Yainville, Yville, Yvetot.

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local economy: the construction of the garden city and public housing in Le Trait; the lending of vehicles; participation in the construction of monuments (such as the monument in Caudebec to honour the six aviators of the “Latham 47” killed while attempting to save Italian adventurers stranded on the North Pole);313 the construction of housing in the Seine-Maritime department; the participation in setting up companies (a soap factory and power plant in Yainville, the Société Immobilière du Trait). In some instances, Maison Worms partnered with various companies, as in the case of the SHBM de la Seine-Maritime. Alexandre Vince, Chief Engineer and developer of social works Chief Engineer at the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime since 1918, the year he joined Maison Worms, Alexandre Vince was born on 21 August 1871 in SaintJoachim, in the Loire-Inférieure department. At the age of twelve, he signed on as an apprentice at the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire in Saint-Nazaire. He became a team leader at the shipyard at the age of 18, then a foreman-

draughtsman three years later. Clearly, Alexandre Vince seemed to have a passion for shipbuilding trades. He was sent to Brest for one year to work on the delivery of the cruiser “Assas” and the battleship “Masséna,” built by the Chantiers de la Loire. In 1900, he left that shipyard to take up a job as site manager at the Ateliers et Chantiers de France in Dunkerque, at that time under construction. He was specially assigned, during his mobilisation, within this same shipyard, which never ceased operations, despite being close to the front and coming under enemy fire. In Le Trait, Vince not only told his workers what they had to do, he also participated in the social achievements of the garden city. He dedicated his activities to the mutual benefit societies, the cooperatives, the vocational classes, the working men’s clubs, and even workers’ gardens. He will probably be most remembered for having taught several generations of apprentices. In 1928, he was made a Knight of the Legion of Honour, then a Public Instruction Officer, before becoming Town Councillor and Deputy Mayor of Le Trait.314

The theatre of Le Trait in 1936 – its opening was planned as early as 1919–1920

313 ACSM contributed 500 francs during the campaign launched by the Mayor of Caudebec-en-Caux to construct a monument for the crew of the “Latham 47.”

314 www.wormsetcie.com. Memo of 2 May 1939 on Alexandre Vince.

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The shipyard: a “penitentiary,” a “prison”? In a letter kept in the Worms & Cie archives, Alexandre Vince refers to the discipline he imposed at Le Trait. In fact, discipline was one aspect of the shipbuilding company to which shipyard pensioners often made reference.315 If Pierre Abbat (the future Director of ACSM, discussed later in this text) caught a worker stopping work for just a few moments, the next day, he would dock a full day’s pay from the worker’s wages. Similar anecdotes are to be found in Olivier Boudot’s book: “Fire him!,” a manager might shout when catching an employee leaning against his workbench for a few moments.316 This harshness of management contrasts with a certain nostalgia on the part of certain shipyard workers, something also found among the former workers of the Chantiers de Normandie in Grand Quevilly. There, as in Le Trait, the pace of the workday reminded some of a “penitentiary.” Michel Croguennec, in his study of the Chantiers de Normandie, revealed that many compared working at the shipyard to slave labour, “even if few people wanted to quit.”317 This image was reinforced by the workers’ memories of the coldness and the penalties for arriving late; sometimes, they had to work nights, Saturdays and Sundays for over ten hours per day. Not everyone was able to bear these conditions, forcing some to leave the profession. Some young apprentices, deadened by the pace, even refused to take up work at the shipyard. Shipbuilding injuries The register of permanent disabilities and disability pensions kept by the PNR recorded the first of the workers’ injuries at the newly opened shipyard. It contains an inventory of work accidents and scheduled compensation payments. The document is very useful not only for understanding how the compensation helped the workers and their families, but also for ascertaining the shipyard workers’ places of residence. Recording the accidents which occurred between 1921

315 Recollections gathered from the elderly during a meeting of the association, Le Trait Naval d’Hier, held at the end of 2015. 316 O. Boudot, La grande traversée des ACH : deux siècles d’industrie navale et d’aventures havraises, Paris: Anabole, 2001, p. 10. 317 M. Croguennec, Les Chantiers de Normandie, op. cit., p. 225.

and 1932, the register provides an overview of the many trades needed for shipbuilding in the early 20th century. Clearly, eyes and hands suffered the most, being the parts of the body most often injured. The first entry referred to a man from Jumièges in 1921, “a thatcher” who received 108.80 F annually. Payments were made quarterly, but for one year only. Unfortunately, we do not know the nature of his injury. At the beginning of 1922, the second entry was a 40-year-old sheet metal worker from Paulu, whose his left eye had been “gouged out.” The disability percentage was estimated at 40%. His initial compensation was 970 F, though it seems to have been later adjusted to 630 F for one year. At the end of 1921, a third man, with a Belgian or Flemish last name, suffered a deep wound on the back side of his hand, reducing the use of his fingers. It seems to have affected his tendons. For this handicap, he received compensation of 1,452.50 F. His quarterly payment was changed to a lump-sum cash payment. The fourth man lived in Saint-Wandrille. His accident occurred in 1922, when he was 28 years old. The man lost an eye; disability percentage: 33%. Damages awarded: 13,039.45 F. He subsequently moved to Bray, within the township of Beaumont-le-Roger (Eure department) in 1925, which meant that he quit his job at the shipyard. Although the accident occurred in 1922, the payment was not ultimately made until 15 March 1926, when he received 2,975.65 F, “representing one quarter of the payment for damages.” Further entries refer to a fracture of the clavicle and muscle atrophy; a fracture of two bones in the left hand; a gash to the left index finger with stiffness in the last two phalanges. This latter individual, two years after his accident, lived at 9 Rue de Trignac in Penhoët, where the Chantiers de Saint-Nazaire were located. Undoubtedly, he had returned to his original place of work. Five permanent disabilities were recorded in 1922, whereas there had been only two in 1921. In 1923, the register lists an amputation of the left middle finger; the crushing of a phalanx in the left thumb; a hernia in the iris of the right eye; the loss of a phalanx in the left middle finger; the amputation of the first and second phalanges of the right thumb (a man with an Armenian name). Jean Bonelli lost his right hand and died in the Hôtel Dieu Hospital in Rouen on 3 September 1923; another man lost his right eye. It seems that the loss of an eye

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was considered a greater handicap than the loss of a hand, or at least, the amounts allocated were higher for eyes. Over time, the number of injuries increased. Did this increase reflect a greater level of work at Le Trait, a higher work pace, or the hiring of ever more workers?318 Judging by the change in the number of workers at the shipyard, the latter seems to be the case. An apprenticeship contract at ACSM in 1929 Thanks to the work of the association Le Trait Naval d’Hier, we have a digitised copy of an apprenticeship contract with ACSM. Signed in triplicate, the contract was between ACSM (Worms & Cie), “builders of ships, boilers, and marine machinery,” and the parents or guardian of the apprentice. The contract’s twelve articles covered practical aspects: the terms and conditions for starting work at ACSM, vocational classes, wages, “general incentives offered to the apprentice,” strikes, etc. ACSM agreed to accept the young man, keep him until he reached above the age of 18, and teach him a trade. In the copy we reviewed, the boy was to receive training as a draughtsman. The contract was tinged with paternalistic ideology. It is interesting to note that ACSM agreed to “treat him in the manner of a good father, to employ him only for the work and services associated with his trade, to comply generally on his behalf with all legal and regulatory clauses covering the work of apprentices.” The child became a member of a trade association and learned his trade “on the job,” where he was basically trained by the older shipyard workers. Starting his apprenticeship in 1939, he was supposed to start work at 6.45 a.m. and end at 6.45 p.m., Monday through Friday, followed by evening classes. The workers themselves might have had to work until Sunday. The parents of the young man also made commitments. The adolescent promised to be “loyal, to obey and respect the personnel in charge of running the shipyard as well as the personnel likely to oversee his work.” The supervisor had to make sure that the young man “complied” “with both present and future shipyard rules and compelled him to help his superiors to

318 PNR Archives. Register of permanent disabilities and disability payments. A table indicates the amount of payments made from the start of operations of the insurance department covering workplace accidents at ACSM and the Société Immobilière du Trait.

the best of his abilities.” The conditions for the apprenticeship were strict: “The apprentice may not leave the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime before he reaches the age of nineteen, except in the event of the father or guardian moving away.” If the move was within Le Trait or its surrounding areas, or in a neighbouring town, the apprentice was still bound to work at the shipyard. If the apprentice’s behaviour was not consistent with the rules, he could be dismissed: “In the event of misbehaviour or repeated absences on the part of the apprentice, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime will alert the parents by registered letter; in the case of repeat offences, ACSM will send a second warning in the same format along with an eight-day suspension. If the apprentice does not mend his ways, ACSM may dismiss him without notice, asking the justice of the peace to apply an indemnity, as set forth in the case of voluntary termination of the contract.” In the event of a permanent inability to perform the trade, the employer reserved the right to dismiss an apprentice without prior notice and without compensation. However, there was a two-month probationary period, during which both parties could terminate the contract without “advance notice.” In the event of the apprenticeship being terminated by the apprentice, the guardian had to reimburse the amount of wages received. Article 6 of the contract specified: “In the case of a voluntary termination of the apprenticeship contract by the apprentice, his parents or his guardian, compensation of 30 francs is to be paid […] to the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime.” Vocational classes were provided since 21 March 1921, date of their creation. Regular attendance was required, especially if the young man lived in Le Trait, but also in Yainville or Sainte-Marguerite-sur-Duclair. Responsibility for having the young man attend the classes fell upon the parents or the guardian. “The vocational education enables the apprentice to prepare for the Certificate of vocational aptitude and to reap the benefits offered to him as a result.” Wages might rise from 0.75 F per day for an apprentice aged 13 to 13.5, up to 2 F at the age of 18, with regular increases every six months. The incentives mentioned earlier related to the award of the Certificate of vocational aptitude. If the apprentice passed the exam, he

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received a bonus of 1,000 F. If he failed, he received only 500 F. Further incentives might relate to other moments of private life. Upon his departure for the regiment, i.e. on the day he started his military service, the apprentice might receive a bonus of 500 F. He “will receive […] upon marrying and starting a household a sum of 1,500 F.” Special incentives were offered to apprentice riveters, a difficult trade because of the heat. Responsible for heating rivets (a sort of large screw or nail) and then inserting them into the foreseen hole, rivet heaters could receive a premium of 2 F a day, in addition to their hourly wage. “When [they] move up to hold the bucking tools,319 they will receive a bonus of 100 F if results are satisfactory.” And when the holder of the bucking bar reached the status of riveter, he received 200 F (after confirming that the results were satisfactory). Any disputes that arose, as well as any requests for premiums had to be submitted to the authority of the justice of the peace of Duclair. Finally, it was set forth that “due to the family nature of this contract and the obligations that the law on apprenticeships imposes upon the employer, in the event of a strike or suspension of work due to force majeure, apprentices must remain at the disposal of their employer; whatever the case, wages are only due for actual time worked.” The contract was signed at the bottom by the ACSM Director – in this case, Henri Nitot in 1929 – the apprentice and the child’s parents or guardian.320 The garden city, a “political city”?321 The factory’s success as an instrument of production and of complete social organisation made it seem like the company was taking control of the city. The municipality acted as a brake on the development of the workers’ housing estate, as it found it difficult to keep pace with the upheavals caused by the arrival of such a large company. For example, a letter of 29 October 1920 showed that the estimated cost to construct a school was two million francs. The town’s contribution was

319 The worker who holds the rivet with a tool, known as a bucking tool. 320 Archives from the association, Le Trait Naval d’Hier. Contract of 8 October 1929. 321 A. Gueslin, “Le paternalisme revisité en Europe occidentale (seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, début du XXe siècle),” Genèses, 7, 1992, p. 202.

400,000 F,322 but this outlay was just too high for it, meaning that the Gustave Flaubert School was not built until the 1930s, on land donated by Hypolite Worms. In Nitot’s words, “projects of high interest for the entire population might flounder because of the hostility or indolence of a municipal council installed prior to the country’s growth and no longer representing the opinion of the majority of the voters.” Worms & Cie viewed the municipal council as unsuitable, noting that “it would be good if it were replaced.” Nitot expressed the same idea: “It would be a good idea to hold new elections with a view to aligning the number of municipal councillors with the new population figures, and to make it easier for new arrivals to participate in public affairs.”323 Pending this, the head of ACSM established a taskforce to run the companies and social institutions in Le Trait. It was made up of graduates from the business school, “École des Hautes Études Commerciales – HEC,” as well as from the Marine Engineering Academy, primarily civil engineers. Le Trait no longer corresponded to the village familiar to the older local officials. Henri Nitot himself was an HEC graduate, as were Achille Dupuich, Director of the Société Immobilière du Trait, René Bonnet from the management secretariat; Jean Faure from the supplies department and Jean Roy, head of administrative services. They were joined by a second contingent of HEC graduates: Chazelas, Beaussaut, Mercier, Bracquemont and Jean Lefebvre.324 Nonetheless, the former municipality did not surrender without a fight. Hypolite Worms was unquestionably the protective guardian of the garden city.325 Unquestionable, except in 1924, when the list headed by the Chairmans of the Le Trait companies, i.e. those close to Maison Worms, lost the municipal elections against the list comprised of Le Trait farmers and small business owners. Who was responsible for steering the destiny of Le Trait? The original population probably felt

322 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter of 29 October 1920. 323 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, op. cit., p. 131. 324 H. Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 325 One street in Le Trait, near the church, still bears the name of Hippolyte [sic] Worms. The street extends all the way to the Charcot middle school (named for the famous explorer who stopped in Le Trait, where some local residents, such as Mr Boutroue, met him briefly).

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somewhat dispossessed in their village.326 Le Journal du Trait regularly published a feature story on public life, which ended up worsening relations between ACSM and the municipality, indeed even with the town priest.327 The loss of this election, attributed to an overly close proximity to the employer side,328 was however only a setback: Achille Dupuich won the elections in 1933. A major turn of events, since it was to make cooperation between ACSM and Le Trait much easier. The situation improved only after he became mayor, following an emotional electoral battle. Little by little, the shipyard and the town merged.329 In addition to the municipality, workers themselves expressed concern about the organisation of the workers’ housing estate. Contrary to the idea of social diversity which, at least in theory, saw workers housed close to managers in order to foster “moral progress,”330 what ensued was a form of surveillance and continuation of work. As proof of the difficulty of achieving this unity, workers used to speak disapprovingly of the street of “silk stockings” in reference to the Rue Jean Bart, the neighbourhood where the upper echelons of Le Trait lived. Was it not there for all to see that the workers were housed in a well-defined neighbourhood, separate from the foremen on the other side of Rue Arago, while management lived on the other side of the main road across

326 H. Nitot, memoirs, op. cit.: “When I arrived in Le Trait, the municipal council was composed of people from the old village, a priori mistrustful of new arrivals, although at first, the Mayor, Mr Pestel, provided invaluable assistance to us.” 327 See Journal du Trait and H. Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 328 B. Maheut, Histoire des chantiers du Trait, master’s thesis under the direction of Marcel Boivin, 1982. 329 Worms was even involved with the village bell tower. It had been struck by lightning in 1921, leaving the church tower uncovered for two years. “Without Maison Worms,” the parish priest exclaimed, “our poor church would not have received these vitally important improvements.” See the works by Paul Bonmartel, notably Les pionniers traitons, op. cit., p. 79. 330 H. Nitot, Les Cités-jardins, op. cit., p. 106: “We noticed right away that, although at a slight distance on the slope of the hill overlooking the Seine, the houses of the department heads were grouped in the same complex as the workers, creating a community, from which social relationships could derive great benefit. Thus, by further mingling the lives of the department heads and those of their subordinates, the formula of the garden city seemed likely to achieve moral progress, the importance of which must not be underestimated.”

from the foremen, and that eleven villas for managers and engineers were nestled in wooded surroundings? In the region, the principle of the garden city also came under criticism, sometimes from industrialists themselves. For example, Robert Thoumyre, a MP for Dieppe, remarked that “the worker, as in Achille Dupuich (1872–1956) the past, is a serf tied to the land of the seigneur. This is not the progress and social justice we seek.”331 Nitot, nicknamed “the Emperor” by the residents, as if to highlight the grip of the all-powerful ACSM, responded to Thoumyre as follows: “First, we must have a better understanding of whether workers are more assured of their independence from their employer when they own their homes or when they are just tenants. We tend toward the latter option, for it allows them to move more easily from one place to another, perhaps because working conditions are better elsewhere, or because problems of any type have arisen.”332 The cost of living ACSM management closely watched over the living conditions of workers’ families. And for good reason. At stake was the retention of its labour force which might be attracted to a better situation elsewhere. A table drawn up by the ACSM management listed the prices of commodities and all the expenses that strained household budgets. It was surprisingly precise. Attention was drawn to the price of bread, meat (in particular beef, lamb and veal), fresh vegetables, dried beans, lentils, potatoes, rice, bananas, fresh fruit, butter, eggs, milk, camembert, wine, pastas, oil, sardines in oil, medium-sized peas, chocolate, sugar, coffee, salt and spices. The bulk of household expenses related to food, in line with hat was observed in France during the

331 Ibid., p. 66. 332 Ibid.

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1930s.333 Next were added the amounts needed to purchase Marseilles soap, cleaning products (bleach, soap powder, bars of soap, brooms, etc.), coal, clothing and shoes; lighting costs were estimated at 70 kW per family in 1927; rent at 600 F (from 1927 to 1931); taxes at 42 F in 1927, then 60 F334 in 1929 and 48 F in 1931; insurance and mutual aid; health expenses (pharmacist, doctor); toiletries (special soaps, cologne); travelling expenses; entertainment; tobacco; newspapers, school supplies and last but least, social security contributions not included among those previously mentioned. In sum, everything a four-person working-class family needed. These expenses were calculated at 12,923 F on 15 December 1927, rising to 14,027 F on 20 October 1928, 14,531 F on 28 November 1929, 15,041 F at the end of November 1930, and then falling to 13,623 F on 1 December 1931, according to the ACSM study.335

333 G. Noiriel, Les ouvriers dans la société française, op. cit. The author quotes the figure of 60% for expenditures on food. 334 Prices are indicated in current francs. Remember that in 1928, the franc was devalued, leading to price differentials as of 1929. 335 www.wormsetcie.com. Based on a table of 1 December 1931.

Comparing these costs to the average annual wages of the workers clearly shows that the most modest budgets were put to a severe test. The equation seemed difficult to solve without foregoing certain articles. In 1932, ordinary staff earned 11,726 F a year, while draughtsmen were paid 14,532 F, foremen 17,680 F and shift supervisors 18,754 F. However, these figures do not take overtime into account (from which shift supervisors were exempt).336 We know how much it cost to construct the housing designed for shift supervisors in the 1930s. New houses seemed to have been allocated based on the different income levels. One shift supervisor was able to stake a claim for a villa. As shown in several documents, Henri Nitot often approved the various types of work that had to be performed to a house. In the 1930s, in a construction contract for one of these dwellings, Worms & Cie contributed 6,000 F, while La Fraternelle paid 38,700 F, for a total cost of 44,700 F. The mortgage division of La Fraternelle was created in 1929 in order to help its members enjoy the benefits of the Law of 13 July 1928, aka the “Loucheur Law,” designed to

336 Nearly identical figures are found in Grand-Quevilly. Michel Croguennec quotes 16,536 F as the annual wage of a worker in 1930, versus 11,853 F in 1936. M. Croguennec, Les Chantiers de Normandie, op. cit., p. 71.

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fight the housing shortage. On top of these loans came subsidies dependent on the number of children in the household, starting with the third child, with a ceiling set at 15,000 F. Between 1930 and 1940, the company granted 50 loans, used to build houses – 48 in Le Trait and one in Saint-Paer – and to buy one house that had already been constructed.337 The dwellings were spacious, in line with the dominant theories of the time. Visible were the efforts to maintain an aesthetic appearance, there again for the purpose of encouraging workers to stay.338 Finally, if one considers the cost of living (approximately 13,000 F for a family of four) in relation to annual wages (approximately 14,000 F for a draughtsman), the ability to set aside savings was quite low.339 Under such circumstances, the participation of Worms & Cie was critical, especially if one of the parents was unemployed as a result of the economic crisis. Multi-ethnic Le Trait At the end of the 1920s, ACSM experienced a high influx of foreign workers (see the following table). To attract Yugoslav workers in particular, ACSM put in a request to the Ministry of Labour and the Société Générale d’Immigration,340 a company responsible for recruiting labour via its branches throughout the world. It is also possible that Commander Pradeau, in charge of international business development (see below) played a role in hiring, through the connections he was able to make with the appropriate authorities during his travels in various countries. European nationals reinforced a labour force comprised of workers from Normandy, Brière, Dunkerque and Saint-Nazaire. In communicating with each other, the “gruff” Flemish-tinged language of the workers from Dunkerque slowly gave way to French.

337 “Société de Secours Mutuels La Fraternelle: les opérations de crédit immobilier au Trait,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 10, January 1949. 338 PNR Archives, 6J D1 to 6J D41. 339 In addition, we know that the Managing Director of ACSM received 12,000 F per month in the 1940s, or approximately 10,000 F net. 340 The Société Générale d’Immigration received a commission paid by the French employers.

Manpower, including foreign personnel341 Years Total manpower Foreigners 1925 889 21 1926 970 28 1927 1 229 43 1928 1 098 39 1929 1 274 167

The eyewitness accounts of Jean Lootvoët and Maurice Quemin in 1989 shed light on how these new Le Trait residents were treated: “In 1929, workers from Central Europe arrived: Poles, Czechoslovakians, Yugoslavians speaking incomprehensibly and with customs so different from ours. Panic ensued once again. We did not dare go out at night. Though, I do not believe that there were many problems. These people participated in the life of the garden city by parading with the veterans on Bastille Day (July 14) and Armistice Day (11 November) in their national costumes; they wore their flag around their shoulders, which seemed odd to us. I think I can say that, within three years, they were almost completely integrated.”342 447 workers “coming from outside” were counted in November 1932, when ACSM took stock of its housing and residents: 518 dwellings were occupied by households, and 190 by bachelors, while just 17 women were employed in the shipyard and the Société Immobilière du Trait.343 Just what did management mean by “coming from outside”? Did 447 foreigners live in Le Trait? At the time, there were about 900 workers in the shipyard and close to 3,000 residents in Le Trait.344 An industry without unemployment before the economic crisis, but without specialised workers In an important speech (see below) made by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on the occasion of the 16 March 1930 launch of the steam cargo ship “Charles Schiaffino,” a vessel armed by the Société Algérienne de Navigation pour l’Afrique du Nord, Charles Schiaffino & Cie, the head of Maison Worms emphasised, among the many

341 www.wormsetcie.com. Table compiled based on data collected from the archives of ACSM management. 342 Conference of 16 September 1989 at the Seine Marine Museum in Caudebec-en-Caux. 343 www.wormsetcie.com. This data is taken from various tables, dated 1932, compiled by ACSM management. 344 Census data.

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points broached, “the disconcerting paradox stemming from the fact that the crisis hitting the shipbuilding industry and the shortage of specialised labour continually decried by the sector are able to co-exist.” He went on to ask: “Does not the observer – whom I assume to be impartial – have the right to say: ‘Why is this industry complaining while at the same time acknowledging that there is no unemployment? And if the shipyards lack labour, why are they clamouring for help and for State aid to fill their order books?’ The paradox would seem blatant. Although it can be admitted that unemployment does not currently exist in French shipyards, it is nevertheless true that on many occasions since the war the yards have experienced periods of inactivity, and the recurrence, as well as the duration of these crises, have resulted in a progressive disaffection of the specialised workforce which constitutes a real loss. All these riveters, fitters, copper boilermakers, ship’s electricians tired of an uncertain future due to the reduction in production, knew – through past experience – that they would have to wait for weeks, even months, for a new ship to be built. For this reason they had gradually lost confidence in their trade. They left for the factories in the big cities or to work on the docks. Disappearing in the crowd, they became untraceable and lost to their former trade. Statistics show the enormous loss of specialist labour within shipbuilding since the war. It would take a lot of effort to repair the harm and restore to the country the shipbuilding industry so necessary for its prestige and security. Irrespective of its scope, this effort would only be crowned with success when undertaken under totally secure production conditions. Our workers have a wonderful sense of dedication to the company’s prosperity: they understand perfectly well that there must be a relationship between the volume of business handled and the capacity utilisation of our production facilities; they like production to be regular. However, we are powerless to offer this to them, a fact which heightens the difficulties created by this issue of specialised labour. Nonetheless, shipbuilders have not hesitated to face these difficulties head-on; and here, at the very start when we did not even have the nucleus of specialists on which older shipyards were able to rely on without interruption, we have pursued, over the past twelve years, a clearly defined policy.” ACSM workers (jumieges.free.fr collection)

Between socio-economic difficulties and technical successes (1930–1938) “200 Le Trait workers have already been laid off since November 1932, and if ACSM does not get any new orders, it will have to order further dismissals: 150 workers in September 1933, 150 workers in October 1933, 200 workers in March 1934.” Worms & Cie, Memo, 29 july 1933 “Of all the ships proudly bearing the red and white flag, this ship [the oil tanker ‘Shéhérazade’], whose completion marks a new stage in the life of a fleet under continual improvement, is obviously the largest, fastest, best equipped, and most modern; in a nutshell, the ship best reflecting the power and personality of the company owning it.” Pierre abbat, Journal de la Marine Marchande, 30 January 1936

The industry overall was hit by a recession, and in particular by the significant lack of earnings brought on by ship orders – State or private – being placed in Germany in the context of war reparations. At the dawn of the 1930s, French shipbuilding companies were faced with intensifying international competition. This alarming situation was underscored by Hypolite Worms in the speech he gave on 16 March 1930, on the occasion of the launch of the steam cargo ship “Charles Schiaffino” (see below).

Crisis hits shipbuilding in the 1930s: market distortions and a lack of competitiveness Five out of the seven shipyards opened after the First World War disappeared during the 1930s.345 One of two companies established at the same time as ACSM, the Société Normande de Constructions Navales, ceased operations in 1927, after having been taken over in 1921 by the Société des Chantiers et Ateliers de la Gironde. The other “sister” company, the Société des Chantiers Navals Français in Blainville-sur-Orne, was liquidated in 1936 and forced to find a buyer. This hard blow was mirrored by the town’s demographics, with its population dropping from 1,206 in 1931 to 576 in 1936. Daily meals were served free of charge to the children of the unemployed.346

345 M. Croguennec, Les Chantiers de Normandie, op. cit., p. 72. The author did not indicate which shipyards, and we were unable to pinpoint them elsewhere. 346 Departmental Archives of Calvados. See 50J/2, “Historique des Chantiers navals de Caen,” 11 March 1963. The Société des Chantiers Navals Français closed for good in 1953.

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16 March 1930: launch of the steam cargo ship “Charles Schiaffino” built for the Société Algérienne de Navigation pour l’Afrique du Nord, Charles Schiaffino & Cie

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Blessing and christening of the the steam cargo ship “Charles Schiaffino” by Mrs Louis de ManiquetVauberet, the ship’s godmother

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Launch of the steam cargo ship “Charles Schiaffino” – 16 March 1930

Speech by Hypolite Worms The ills befalling shipbuilding The Honourable Minister, Though, for sentimental reasons, I have cause for deep rejoicing that the “Charles Schiaffino” has been built in this shipyard; though, for technical reasons, I am particularly proud of this vessel, I – along with its owner – must acknowledge without demur that this ship is not a member of that aristocratic class of luxury passenger liners; rather, this vessel is set to live out its life as a robust, seafaring workhorse ploughing its way through the blue and green seas between mainland France and its colonies, as long as possible, with its holds full of merchandise! The christening of a “prince of the sea” is hardly what brought you here. A powerful reason motivated your decision to enhance this celebration by honouring us, one and all, with your presence, despite the modest size of the ship. Ladies and Gentlemen, You are all very aware of the reason: was it not clearly demonstrated by the first gesture and action taken by Mr Louis Rollin, the very minute he assumed his high office? His first gesture: a moving salute to all those who, on land or at sea, work to ensure – alas! I dare not say – the prosperity, but at the very least, the existence of our merchant fleet! His first act – a gift on assuming office – was to deliver a fatal blow to a longstanding injustice by revamping our seamen’s pensions. We understood, Mr Minister, upon your arrival to power, that you clearly wished for all things maritime to lie in your purview, and the manifestation of your wish is the primary reason for which the honour of greeting you here today has been bestowed upon me. But there is also another one: Is not the “Charles Schiaffino,” at least to my knowledge, the first ship built in France for an Algerian shipping company (Algeria’s oldest and largest shipping company). And you yourself, the first Minister for the

Merchant Navy in our country’s history, have decided to grace this launch, a launch which happens to coincide with the centenary of the birth of our North African empire. Therefore, we value your presence here as a further testimony to the government’s solicitude toward the admirable national endeavours accomplished in Algeria to strengthen our seagoing connections, essential for uniting France ever more closely with its African empire; and as proof also of the developing and enlightened interest you bring to the concerns of the national Navies, over whose fate you preside. Ladies and Gentlemen, I refer to the concerns of the “national Navies” as it is vital for the country to understand that it needs to have two navies – both of which are national –, one of which is military, the other commercial. While the mission of the former is to watch over the blessed hives where others make honey, the latter, together with the female worker bee who, stocking her honeycombs, should be in a position to contribute more than any other to augmenting the national Treasury, is the messenger bee travelling back and forth from hive to hive – from African and colonial hives to the French hives – so that everyone’s honey tastes better and costs less. For the expression of your interest that you are conferring on us here today, Mr Minister, we would like to express our full gratitude. And we are so deeply touched that Mrs Rollin cared to share the considerable effort it took to make the journey here today and to demonstrate so graciously her desire to experience our concerns and our joys for a short period of time. We infinitely appreciate such an amiable gesture on her part. To Mrs Louis de Maniquet-Vauberet, godmother of the “Charles Schiaffino,” I address my respectful greetings together with my sincere compliments for the manner in which she is sending the ship […] off to sea! It is my ardent wish that her sponsorship be a long and happy 131

one. Our Honourable Prefect has demonstrated once more the generosity he brings to his active department. I am not in the least surprised by the presence here today of Senator Louis Brindeau, Chairman of the Study Commission, whose name is to be found in every line of the long list of efforts made by the Republic on behalf of its merchant fleet, over these past thirty years. Thanks also to the senators and deputies for the SeineInférieure department, whose constant encouragements are so priceless to us. I greet Senator Jacques Duroux, who vigilantly attends to the concerns of the shipping industry and, in particular, to the shipping links binding Algeria and France. I deeply regret the absence for health reasons of Mr Gaston Thomson, who so remarkably administered our Merchant Navy on assuming this historic mantle, but I owe my full gratitude to Mrs Thomson, who willingly came as a sign of her friendship. May she allow me to express my joy at seeing her among us, if only in memory of the tight bonds of friendship which have united our two families for so long. Earlier, I alluded to the sentimental reasons making me feel particularly satisfied that the “Charles Schiaffino” was constructed in this shipyard. For truly I am unable to forget the longstanding and cordial ties, which in this instance, bind the shipbuilder to the shipowner. In 1891 – thirty-nine years ago this October – Worms & Cie opened a branch in Algiers. The first person the company met, the first person with whom it had dealings, was Mr Charles Schiaffino, the father of my friend, Laurent Schiaffino, and the namesake of the ship just launched. The meeting was inevitable, since the man occupied an important place in his city. From this moment onwards, and despite the fluctuations inherent to commercial life, the relationship created back then remained cordial and trusting. It is only natural that I take pleasure in affirming that, as circumstances saw both companies getting to know each other better, the ties became even closer with each passing day. I also take pleasure in seeing the first vessel built in France for an Algerian shipping company depart from this shipyard, especially when this company bears the name Société Algérienne de Navigation pour l’Afrique du Nord. For the moment at least, the launch crowns the longstanding efforts of the Schiaffino family. I greet its supervisory board and its Chairman, Mr Henri de Peyerimhoff.

Gentlemen, the history of this family is intimately linked to that of Algeria. Enjoying a centuries-old relationship with this Turkish colony, the Schiaffino family, many members of which were valiant seamen, a “European” family several hundred years before the word was even invented, would not rest until this magnificent country, which it had chosen as its business centre, escaped from a stifling and debilitating political regime. And in 1830 [actually in 1827], when the representative of France, Consul Deval, was so rudely treated by the Bey in Algiers, he found a captain, the owner of a sailing vessel, who, despite the risks to his life, resolutely sailed to Genoa, straight through the Barbary flotillas, to bring to the King of France the letter informing him of the insult inflicted, known to history as the Fly Whisk Incident. Gentlemen, in the archives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, you will find an impressive account of this chivalrous escapade, just as you will find the name of the hero: the captain’s name was Jacques Schiaffino, the grandfather of Charles of whom I just spoke and the great-grandfather of Laurent who is here today. During the French conquest of Algeria, the Schiaffino family helped our troops in every possible manner. As seamen first and foremost, they organised transport services along the coastline, providing invaluable services to the Expeditionary Forces: small ships, sailing mainly between Algiers and Bône, offset the lack of ground communication, and thanks to this auspicious intervention, the lives of many French soldiers were able to be saved. In 1914, Charles Schiaffino, whose sentiments proved equal to those of his ancestors, presented himself to the Admiralty on the first day of mobilisation with these words: “Admiral, I am now too old to take up arms, but I have come with my whole arsenal of tugs, rescue equipment and seagoing vessels, making myself available to my country.” This was no mere gesture. Deeds were to follow his words: throughout the war, Charles Schiaffino scorned fatigue and danger to rescue Entente vessels torpedoed along the coast of Algeria and Tunisia, most of the time with a happy ending. Charles Schiaffino was awarded the Cross of the Legion of Honour, with the following citation: “Exceptional services, absolute selfless assistance to National Defence. Made his entire personnel and fleet available to the Navy during the initial days of mobilisation. Rescued

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32 allied vessels. Previously awarded the Navy Gold Medal for Rescue Operations.” The red ribbon for 32 rescued ships! I am convinced, Mr Minister, that, had you presided over the fates of the Merchant Navy at the time, the Maritime Order of Merit would have been created sooner, and the rank of Knight would not have been the only honour you would have bestowed upon this good man! My dear friend, I know the feelings laying hold of you today; what feelings of filial devotion, gratitude, and admiration filled your heart just now on seeing this ship sliding down the slipway and heading off on its first short, but important, journey to Algiers; a ship for which you reserved the name of your venerated father, as this was the first ship that the Société Algérienne de Navigation pour l’Afrique du Nord had built in France; this thought alone is proof enough that the virtues of the “Schiaffinos” are nowise on the verge of disappearing. In reality, those who know you need no such proof to judge your character. After the sorrowful stupor following the premature death of the unparalleled man who headed Maison Charles Schiaffino & Cie, your friends turned their eyes to you, perhaps with some concern in their eyes: you were so young to assume the mantle incumbent upon you. But from the start, you showed them that their fears were groundless, with the successful outcome of your early efforts constituting a guarantee for the success that the future holds in store for you! Allow me to say to all of you, Ladies and Gentlemen who have taken such great pains to come here today, allow me to tell you how comforting such testimonies of interest are at an especially harrowing time for our industry. Harrowing! Last June, in a speech to a delegation of the French Major Ports Association at this very venue, I believed I had the duty to ring out a warning cry; the picture I tried to portray of the French shipbuilding industry may have seemed a bit sombre to some, despite the efforts I made, perhaps too lengthily, to highlight the causes. In no way were our fears just whims of the imagination: if the situation has changed since then – alas! – it has not been in a positive direction. Should you have any lingering doubts, just look at the number of French orders placed abroad these past months, in spite of the advantageous laws introducing shipping loans and reducing tax burdens.

Even with said legislation, we were unable to gain the order for a second ship for the Société Algérienne de Navigation pour l’Afrique du Nord, so better were the foreign terms. Just recently, one French shipping company very close to my heart [he was speaking of Maison Worms itself ] placed an order for four freighters with English shipyards.347 I am not in the least embarrassed to tell you why this decision, as regrettable as it was, was unavoidable: as much as I would have qualms about discussing a similar gesture on the part of another shipping company, I have no such misgivings in this personal case. Needless to say, the shipping industry is essentially international in nature. A shipping company operating a fleet cannot wilfully place itself in a situation inferior to its foreign neighbours; it would be suicidal to exceed certain – quickly reached – limits. It is thus forced to only use vessels and equipment at prices nearing those of his competitors. Accordingly, if the French industry is unable to offer prices under desirable terms, a shipping company is forced to seek them elsewhere. I have had to resign myself to this situation: we have surveyed nearly all British, Dutch and German shipyards, and all the responses we received indicated production costs between 28% and 32% lower than ours. This difference greatly exceeds – alas! – these limits. I stand accused of pessimism. Lest there be a misunderstanding, may I point out that this percentage expresses the difference between our production costs and the price offered by foreign competition. Again, I would be remiss if I failed to add that a fairly sizeable number of these shipyards were in a position to grant all kinds of incentives designed to make their offers even more attractive. Gentlemen, this is where things stand! Must we stop operating our fleet under normal economic conditions, for the mere reason that we are unable to build ships at the prices offered by our foreign competitors? Just posing the question explains why French shipowners/ builders found themselves in the absurd situation of being forced to entrust their orders to foreign competitors, while their own shipyards are set to be idle in two years!

347 He was speaking of the freighters, “Médoc,” “Pomerol,” “Château-Larose,” and “Château-Pavie,” for which the orders were placed with the David & William Henderson & Co. shipyard in Glasgow.

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By no means does this mean that we are “throwing in the towel.” Any thoughts in this direction would mean that you don’t know us well: these difficult times will surely pass. It is not up to me to put forward demands at the moment: not only is the Minister for the Merchant Navy actively engaged in the issue and has summoned the National Economic Council, but the Study Commission is similarly working on the problem with an eye to finding a solution. However, Mr Minister, I would like to take advantage of your presence in Le Trait to look at the question of labour and the problems it poses: I know you are concerned about these issues and that you are investing a great amount of energy to resolve them. Likewise, I could not find a better occasion than before this audience, all of whom are fully won over to noble ideas and their bold implementation. Among this audience is a man with a lifelong vocation: Mr Georges Risler, always at hand to ensure the greatest material and moral well-being of workers and their families. First, allow me, Gentlemen, to highlight the disconcerting paradox stemming from the fact that the crisis hitting the shipbuilding industry and the shortage of specialised labour continually decried by the sector are able to co-exist. Does not the observer – whom I assume to be impartial – have the right to say: “Why is this industry complaining while at the same time acknowledging that there is no unemployment? And if the shipyards lack labour, why are they clamouring for help and for State aid to fill their order books?” The paradox would seem blatant. Although it can be admitted that unemployment does not currently exist in French shipyards, it is nevertheless true that on many occasions since the war the yards have experienced periods of inactivity, and the recurrence, as well as the duration of these crises, have resulted in a progressive disaffection of the specialised workforce which constitutes a real loss. All these riveters, fitters, copper boilermakers, ship’s electricians tired of an uncertain future due to the reduction in production, knew – through past experience – that they would have to wait for weeks, even months, for a new ship to be built. For this reason they had gradually lost confidence in their trade. They left for the factories in the big cities or to work on the docks. Disappearing in the crowd, they became untraceable and lost to their former trade. Statistics show the

enormous loss of specialist labour within shipbuilding since the war. It would take a lot of effort to repair the harm and restore to the country the shipbuilding industry so necessary for its prestige and security. Irrespective of its scope, this effort would only be crowned with success when undertaken under totally secure production conditions. Our workers have a wonderful sense of dedication to the company’s prosperity: they understand perfectly well that there must be a relationship between the volume of business handled and the capacity utilisation of our production facilities; they like production to be regular. However, we are powerless to offer this to them, a fact which heightens the difficulties created by this issue of specialised labour. Nonetheless, shipbuilders have not hesitated to face these difficulties head-on; and here, at the very start when we did not even have the nucleus of specialists on which older shipyards were able to rely on without interruption, we have pursued, over the past twelve years, a clearly defined policy. Our first concern – the basis for our action – was to stabilise personnel as much as possible, by providing housing close to the shipyard; hence our policy of a workers’ housing estate. Next, reckoning on work being there, not only today or tomorrow, but in the more distant future, we were concerned about making future recruitment easier, first by attracting large families, and quite naturally, assuming responsibility for the vocational training of their children once they reached working age. Finally, to cope with the national labour shortage, we had to turn to foreign labour. This forced us to solve the problem of immigration with all its consequences: adapting newcomers to our industry and assimilating them into the French population. Mr Minister, I would like to take a moment to discuss these various issues that we successively dealt with: housing our workers, protecting large families, offering apprenticeships, integrating foreign labour. The main particularity of our workers’ housing estate is that it is a strictly private initiative. I apologise to the members of Parliament who are listening for having to highlight that, for a long time, companies were systematically kept away from applying the laws on affordable housing, resulting in unfair consequences. Imagine, Gentlemen, that this shipyard, instead of having been built in the open countryside 135

of Le Trait, had been built close to a large city, perhaps Rouen, Le Havre or Bordeaux. It would have been fully legal for the workers to seek housing built by one of the many affordable housing associations that normally operate in these centres. There was no such association here, with the consequence that we alone had to bear the cost of creating our workers’ housing estate. I acknowledge that times have changed for the better. As a result of the latest Loucheur Law, our personnel are now able to take advantage of low-interest government loans to have homes built that they will own. Naturally, our mutual benefit society has set up a mortgage department to ensure that the law is applied; in addition, we ourselves are paying a portion of the annuities that borrowers must pay. This year alone, fourteen families have looked into benefitting from the terms of the Loucheur Law to settle in Le Trait, a testimony to their trust which, despite their full awareness of the economic crisis, we find deeply moving. The second characteristic of our housing policy is our wish for our town to be a garden city. Garden cities! The mere fact that we no longer find this word surprising is enough to underline how much progress we have made since the war, thanks, in large part, to the popularising talent of Mr Dautry, Director General of the Chemins de Fer de l’État and the greatest builder of garden cities in France, and whom we have the pleasure of welcoming in our midst today. Whereas in 1917, workers’ housing estates were normally ugly and gloomy places, we undertook to reconcile work and aesthetics, to provide workers and their families with a restful setting, much improved by the sight of pleasant and harmonious surroundings. To achieve our goal, we have done our best to show utmost respect for the – incomparable, it should be noted – Normandy landscape! Although we had no choice but to sully the solemn tranquillity of the river’s edge – disturbed only by a wonderful tidal bore, that lovely lunar whim – with the haggard arms of our modern facilities, we at least sought to create a village, on the edge of the forest, worthy of its location and worthy of the poetry emanating from this countryside where apple trees bloom in greater abundance than anywhere else. Six hundred homes are scattered over two hundred hectares. Every family has its own adequate vegetable plot. Trees have been planted everywhere – was this

not, Gentlemen, a further sign of our will to put down roots? Finally, we thought that, in a region where we were essentially the driving force, employer involvement should not be limited to the factory walls: thus, our programmes extended to the garden city which we had just built with the hope of working together to shape its soul and traditions. We have established an entire network of social programmes: an infirmary for the effective treatment of work accidents; an antituberculosis dispensary; schools for children of both genders; a farm to ensure supplies of milk; cooperatives for food and bulk purchases; two social benefit societies; musical and artistic groups; an association to encourage scholastic achievement, among others. To be sure, implementing such a programme does not happen without difficulties or tenacity, but the results are their own reward, as seen by the fact that, in the twelve years that the shipyard has been in existence, no serious problems have arisen between personnel and management. In the same vein, an average annual surplus of forty or so births over deaths is an affirmation of the noteworthy vitality of this country. An annual surplus of forty births: observing this beautiful gift offered each year by Le Trait to France leads me to highlight that in this area, large families, grouped together in a friendly association, hold a place of honour. Through the payment of a family bonus instituted at the same time as our shipyard, through the benefits granted by the statutes of our mutual benefit society on each birth – reimbursement of medical and medication expenses incurred at childbirth; daily compensation paid to the mother of the family throughout the period of unavailability; bonus for breastfeeding; and other incentives offered by various societies to large families – substantially alleviate the expenses they incur. What is more, I am convinced that the positive influence of our gardens remains one of the primary reasons for good health in Le Trait, since one outcome of the fortuitous layout of the houses is that infant mortality has been almost completely eliminated. There you have our policy on worker housing! We will now turn, Gentlemen, to our apprenticeship policy, of key importance for the restoration of our industry. As regards these children who constitute the valuable labour reservoir of our shipyard, we are well aware of our clear duties once they leave school: first, to help their parents maintain them in good moral health; next,

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to teach them a trade which, no matter what the future holds in store for them, will enable them to earn a respectable living; and finally, to watch over their physical growth. Out of concern for these duties, we have designed a wide-ranging vocational educational programme focusing mainly on topics of general education which teachers from the public schools in Le Trait come to teach. These studies end with a Certificate of vocational aptitude. An apprentice’s regular attendance in class is guaranteed by the parents’ commitment in a written contract, called an apprenticeship contract. In return for the specific obligations contained therein, the contracts also grant major financial benefits; first, in the shipyard: a diligence bonus on concluding the apprenticeship; a higher hourly wage once the Certificate of vocational aptitude has been obtained, etc.; next, outside the factory: a bonus paid during military service; a marriage bonus; a retention bonus upon conclusion of the apprenticeship for remaining with the company that paid for the vocational education. There again, our efforts have met with success, with 131 apprentices having signed a contract with us. Prospects for the future look extremely comforting! Unfortunately, these prospects are quite far off, because the programme I have just outlined to you cannot, especially in the Seine Maritime region with its many factories and quick-growing industrial prosperity, supply the necessary labour in the immediate future. In our search for a remedy, we have had to turn to foreign workers. Which triggered a whole new set of problems! First, choosing a source: where in Europe to find workers who, if not already specialised, were at least likely, fairly quickly, to provide a satisfactory return in such a particular trade. We had to find the means, as quickly as possible, to assimilate the newcomers and old hands, despite the diverse languages! We had to maintain the right proportion of labourers to specialists! Last but not least, we had to find a way to provide the necessary moral support to the foreigners. It was a delicate and arduous task; but as a result – and I cannot emphasise this enough – of the dedication of the managers at all echelons of the hierarchy, we succeeded in smoothly assimilating 183 foreign workers within just a few months! What we still needed to do – and this was the goal of our most recent effort – was to create an organisation

where young girls – and unfortunately, sometimes even women – obliged to work away from their homes could find employment preventing an undesirable separation between their families and themselves. Thanks to a close collaboration among neighbouring companies, we now have a workshop where women can work near their homes, performing an essentially feminine trade. In closing, and I apologise, Gentlemen, for having kept your attention for so long, but the occasion was simply too good and the temptation too great for me not to go into the complex and difficult problems needing to be resolved within our crisis-ridden shipbuilding industry; before this select scholarly gathering, so informed about the industrial and maritime issues that can be solved using the human brain, as well as the social issues that can be addressed only if the brain works hand in hand with the heart! You are now familiar with our workers’ housing estate, a purely private project, an adolescent at birth. You are now well aware of its social buttressing! By presenting first one and then the other to you, I wanted to show you, Mr Minister, that shipbuilders are not afraid of work or risk, nor do they fear either modern methods of industrial and social organisation, or the projects that are their logical consequence; and that shipbuilders have applied to the utmost the expression: “The good Lord helps those who help themselves!” While I am not privy to the designs of the good Lord, at least I know that your enlightened efforts, in the years to come, will seek to rid precariousness from the fruits of the labour accomplished by devoted colleagues with so much effort and intelligence, without counting the cost, without hesitation. It is this conviction that, in large part, nourishes my faith in the future.

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The battle for public procurement contracts Added to French shipyards’ lack of international competitiveness was an unequal distribution of public procurement orders, resulting in disparity and favouritism that exasperated the companies and pitted one against the other. State procurement represented the lifeline that all shipyards hoped would come to their rescue. Between 1927 and 1929, the French Navy awarded ACSM contracts for the construction of four “Diane II” class submarines, out of the sixteen in this series. These were Class II, double-hull, 630-dwt submarines. The first, christened “Antiope,” and the second, “Amazone,” were financed out of the 1927 quota year. According to two information sheets dated on 25 February 1932, the contracts were signed on 22 February 1928 for a unit price of 15,200,000 F. The construction period was 32 months from 6 March 1928. The keel of these ships was laid down respectively on 28 December 1928 and on 7 January 1929 – they were launched on 18 August and 28 December 1931. The third, “Oréade” (15,645,000 F), belonged to the 1928 quota year, and the fourth, “La Sibylle” (18,375,000 F), to the 1929 one. Work started on the former on 16 August 1929 and on the latter on 28 October 1930, and they were launched on 23 May 1932 and 28 January 1933. In that same period, the Ponts et Chaussées placed an order with ACSM for two boarding pontoons for the Hode-Berville ferry which were delivered in September and October 1931 (the ferry would be replaced by the Tancarville bridge in 1959), as well as for six 390-dwt split hopper barges (“P.C. 61” to “P.C. 66”): the keels of three of the barges were laid in May and June 1931, with launches in December 1931; the keels of the other three were laid in September 1931, with launches in March 1932. The public authorities had therefore not forgotten ACSM. Nonetheless, in the eyes of its management, the count was not right. Manna fell mainly upon the Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët) and the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire (see the table below).

List of orders awarded to French shipyards by the public authorities at the beginning of 1930348 Société des Chantiers & Ateliers de France

16,000,000 francs

Société des Chantiers & Ateliers Augustin-Normand

15,000,000 francs

Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée

5,000,000 francs

Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët) / Ateliers 40,000,000 francs et Chantiers de la Loire Société Anonyme des Anciens Chantiers Dubigeon

1,800,000 francs

Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde

8,000,000 francs

Chantiers Maritimes du Sud-Ouest

3,500,000 francs

Société Provençale de Constructions Navales et Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence

10,000,000 francs

Ateliers et Chantiers de Bretagne

17,000,000 francs

Chantiers Navals Français

1,200,000 francs

Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime

10,000,000 francs

Taken alone, the 10 million francs that the State awarded to ACSM was no trivial sum, especially when compared to its 10.415% share of total ships launched between 1930 and 1939 throughout the industry.349 But, given that Worms & Cie had enlarged its shipyard in response to the State’s entreaty in 1917, Maison Worms expected greater and more substantial support. For this reason, even if Le Trait was again asked to construct a submarine (the “Vénus” – 21,730,000 F – financed out of the 1930 quota; work on which started on 26 July 1932; launched on 6 April 1935), management could not accept “the unequal distribution of French Navy orders among the shipyards in the LoireInférieure department and those in the Seine-Inférieure department” (see the table below). For example, in 1933, the Chantier de Saint-Nazaire had received orders totalling 346 million francs for the naval programme (two cruisers and four escort vessels).

348 www.wormsetcie.com. 349 www.wormsetcie.com. Memo of 21 January 1942.

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Table highlighting the unequal distribution of French Navy orders between the Loire-Inférieure and Seine-Inférieure shipyards (ref. undated Worms document, filed in 1932) Loire-Inférieure

Seine-Inférieure

1929 funding tranche and 1929 quota year

Destroyers: “Cassard,” “Tartu,” and “Maillé-Brézé” Class I submarine: “Conquérant”

Submarines: “Psyché” and “La Sibylle”

1930 funding tranche and 1930 quota year

Class I submarines: “Sfax” and “Casablanca” Minelaying cruiser: “Émile-Bertin” Submarine: “Iris”

Submarines: “Junon” and “Vénus”

1931 funding tranche and 1931 quota year

Escort vessels: “Melpomène,” “Flore,” “Pomone,” and “Iphigénie” Four submarine chasers

None

1932 funding tranche and 1932 quota year

Cruisers: “Marseillaise,” and “Châteaurenault”

None

Total

900,000,000 francs

80,000,000 francs

Ω One of two pontoons for the Hode-Berville ferry, launched on 16 September and 24 October 1931

The split hopper barge, “P.C. 62,” launched on 23 December 1931

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Construction activity bears up in 1931–1932 Whereas in 1930 the only vessel launched was the “Charles Schiaffino,” 1931 was marked by the completion of four ships intended for shipping companies, in addition to the seven vessels for the French Navy and public services – bringing to eleven the total number of launches that year: - two 7,265-dwt steam mixed cargo ships, the “Ville de Tamatave” and “Ville de Majunga,” built on slips 1 and 3, were launched on 22 January and 19 July 1931 respectively, destined to join the fleet of the Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation à Vapeur (CHP);350 - two tugboats, the “Charles Nungesser” (the first vessel of this type without a funnel)351 and “Georges Madon,” were delivered to the company Transit et Transport Jules Roy, in Rouen, both leaving slip 4 on 28 October and on 27 November 1931. Other than the four vessels ordered by the public authorities (cf. the submarine “Oréade” and three split hopper barges, “P.C. 64,” “P.C. 65,” and “P.C. 66”), 1932 launches were complemented, on 30 November, by that of the 3,690-dwt steel freighter “Cap Blanc,” built for the Société Anonyme de Gérance et d’Armement (Saga), a shipping company to which a second vessel of the same type, christened “Cap Cantin,” was delivered on 12 March 1933. We should not be misled by the high number of launches, the result of contracts negotiated two, three, or even four years earlier. It was vital that vessels be built successively, i.e. to fill the slipways. In order to do so, the order book had to be filled far in advance. However, as of 1931, prospects were hit by an increasing scarceness of demand.

The “Ville de Majunga” launched on 19 July 1931 for the Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation à Vapeur

Inspection of the 750-HP tugboat, “Charles Nungesser,” before her launch on 28 October 1931

Launch of the steel freighter “Cap Cantin” on 12 March 1933

350 This dual order was the reason for the rescue of CHP by the Banking Services of Worms & Cie, and the incorporation of this long distance shipping company into the Worms Shipping Group. 351 See M. Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, Cany-Barville, Impr. Gabel, 1993, p. 135. The first edition of this book was published in 1987. They both indicate the same ISBN number but the information on several ships differs.

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Constructed at Le Trait: the submarines “Antiope,” “Amazone” (1928–1931), “Oréade,” “La Sibylle” (1929–1933), “Vénus” (1932–1935), and “Cérès”(1936–1938) 1

4 6 5

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1 - 2 - “Antiope” – launched on 18 August 1931 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - “Oréade” – launched on 23 May 1932

“Vénus” – launched on 6 April 1935

“La Sibylle” – launched on 28 January 1933

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“Our customers are vanishing into thin air” Hypolite Worms, Le Trait, 23 september 1933

Following the launch of the steel freighter “Cap Cantin,” six out of eight slipways were unoccupied: - No. 4, which had contained that vessel, remained empty until 12 December 1933; - No. 8 remained vacant from 16 March 1930 until 20 March 1936; - No. 5 suffered a similar fate from 18 August 1931 to 17 October 1934; - No. 3 was available from 19 March 1932 to 18 May 1936; - No. 1, vacant from 30 November 1932 to 1 September 1933; - and, finally, slip No. 7 which, following the launch of the submarine “La Sibylle” on 28 January 1933, remained empty until 29 September 1935. Therefore only slips 6 and 2 were in use: the former for the construction of the submarine “Vénus,” work on which started on 26 July 1932 and ended on 6 April 1935; and the latter for an order financed by the Merchant Navy for the “Président Théodore Tissier,” which was no less than the first French oceanographic research vessel (see below). After slip No. 2 was vacated on 23 September 1933, it would not be occupied again until July 1934. The first lay-offs The crisis unleashed galloping unemployment, as Hypolite Worms indicated in a memo to Anatole de Monzie in July 1933: “200 workers in Le Trait have already been laid off since November 1932, and if ACSM does not receive new orders, it will have the painful obligation to further dismiss: - 150 workers in September 1933; - 150 workers in October 1933; - 200 workers in March 1934. Considering that, unlike what happens in a large city, these workers will not be able to find another job here in Le Trait, these lay-offs will lead to the workers moving away from the garden city and all of its services. This situation is even more painful, given that a large number of employees and workers have built their homes under the regime of the Loucheur Law.”352

352 www.wormsetcie.com. Memo of 29 July 1933.

“Le Trait,” the “boat for the unemployed” Coming to the aid of its shipyard, Maison Worms placed an order for the construction of a 1,585-dwt freighter, christened “Le Trait.” The employees, aware that the goal of this order was to give them work and to keep them from getting disheartened, nicknamed the vessel the “boat for the unemployed.” Its keel was laid in slip No. 1 on 1 September 1933. Built using odd bits of sheet metal, it was launched on 29 July 1934. Three weeks after construction had started on this ship, ACSM launched the “Président Théodore Tissier” on 23 September 1933, about which L’Écho de Paris was to write: “The French Navy now has its own state-of-theart oceanographic research vessel.” Its diving bell, a type of telescope enabling the depths of the ocean to be explored, was capable of descending 800 metres, at a time when submarines only went down a hundred or so metres, clearly demonstrating the vessel’s performance.353 The launching ceremony took place as always to the sound of La Marseillaise, in the presence of the Minister for the Merchant Navy, Eugène Frot,354 President Tissier, and MP André Marie. It was an occasion for Hypolite Worms to make an important speech (see pp. 147–151) during which he did not mask from his audience “[his] deep concern for the current status of the French shipbuilding industry.” “These feelings,” he assured his audience, “will be yours to share shortly, as you walk past our slips which currently harbour nothing more than one 600-ton submarine [the ‘Vénus’] and one small freighter [‘Le Trait’], which we decided to build on our own account, not out of need but very simply to postpone for several weeks a fateful deadline for a large portion of our personnel. It would be dangerous to conceal the grave roots of this crisis: a reduction, for budgetary reasons, in French Navy programmes and their concentration on several large vessels, albeit too few in number to sustain every

353 The “Président Théodore Tissier” took part in the attempt to evacuate the Allied forces surrounded in SaintValéry-en-Caux from 11 to 13 June 1940, before being seized by the British Navy and used as a training ship for the Free French Naval Forces. 354 Minister for the Merchant Navy from 31 January to 24 October 1933 and from 26 November 1933 to 9 January 1934.

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shipbuilder; a slump in private shipping and fishing fleets; difficulties encountered by subsidised companies operating internationally; finally, cuts in all public works programmes and all colonial programmes. […] Our customers are vanishing into thin air. And whereas at other ceremonies, I was still in a position to ask your predecessors, Mr Minister, how to retain in France the orders that were readily being placed abroad, either through continued improvements to the functioning of shipping loans, or through the creation of compensatory allocations, a subject needing to be broached again one day, what we are now seeing is that neighbouring countries are not receiving any more orders than we are.”355

Under the left column: “Le Trait,” launched on 29 July 1934 for Worms & Cie and the “No. 7” ferry for the crossing of the Seine at Caudebec-en-Caux, launched on 5 April 1934 Below: “Le Trait” in dry dock in Le Havre in 1937

355 www.wormsetcie.com. Speech given by Hypolite Worms on 23 September 1933 at the launch of the “Président Théodore Tissier.”

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23 September 1933: launch of the oceanographic research vessel “Président Théodore Tissier,” for the Marine Fisheries Scientific Office

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Launch of the oceanographic research vessel “Président Théodore Tissier” – 23 September 1933

Speech given by Hypolite Worms “We are counting on you!” Mr Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, Clearly, current circumstances hardly warrant organising a gathering of this nature in this shipyard, hit so severely by the crisis. However, I felt that the leader of a company responsible for the immediate future of a large number of employees should never give in to premature pessimism. I felt it would be far better to celebrate the birth of a ship set, I hope, to bring great honour to the French flag. And finally I felt it an appropriate opportunity to appraise, in the company of exceptionally competent personalities, our remaining hopes and the means of making them come about. My friends have understood my reasoning, and I thank them very sincerely – but very simply – for having answered our call. I offer my apologies for not paying them individual tributes, so deserved either for their longstanding and distinguished public services or their permanent concern for our workers. Under current circumstances, you will find that all our thoughts converge towards the man at the top, towards the Minister with such an onerous task, yet in whom we have placed our hopes. I will make only one exception, out of pleasant duty, by honouring, as is so befitting, the sponsor of the vessel soon to be launched. Mr Minister, you are familiar with the concerns now besetting all those who, irrespective of their position, live off the Merchant Navy, and for this reason, you were well aware that today’s gathering could only be an occasion to study together the opportunities for improving future prospects, with no time to spare. You will not be surprised to hear me tell you how we have followed, with utmost interest, all of your moves since assuming control of this ministerial department, of such vital importance to our nation. However, I cannot disguise the fact that this interest quickly developed into warmth and trust, growing with each day. You

have displayed such a capacity for decision-making, such a sureness of judgment, such understanding and such interest in seafarers that you have won them over outright. In the same vein, the town of Le Trait is so proud to welcome you, and we very respectfully express our deep gratitude for your presence here today. Highly proficient individuals will explain to you, Gentlemen, what the technical design and efficient construction of this oceanographic research vessel represents from the perspective of national pride, as the vessel is already the envy of foreign countries. But it is my particularly pleasant duty to extend our tribute to the ship’s gracious sponsor, Mrs Frot, and to add – at this moment when the ship named after him is about to be launched – our feelings of respect and gratitude for Mr President Théodore Tissier, whose career, replete with hard work, integrity and devotion, was dedicated to the public good. Starting out as an auditor at the Council of State on 1 January 1891, you rose successively through the organisation’s ranks to ultimately become its Vice President, the highest rank in the entire public services organisation. All the while pursuing your brilliant career, you found the time to invaluably serve many ministries, most notably under Aristide Briand; in 1921–1922, you personally joined the government as Under-Secretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. But today, I would particularly like to highlight the distinguished services you rendered to fishing, to the Marine Fisheries Scientific Office. Upon its creation in 1919, you agreed to serve as Chairman of its Board of Directors; and from that date onwards, the board was the beneficiary of your esteemed and dynamic competence. Thanks to your impetus, and after somewhat hesitant first steps, all departments within the Office developed steadily; so that we can now safely say that researchers and technicians can work in peace, their tranquillity guaranteed

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by wise administration, the result of your effective protection. A further result of your influence is that our country is now represented in the major international councils overseeing matters related to fishing, the sea, and oceanography. In 1920, you served as Vice President of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, and from that time, you partnered effectively with its distinguished Chairman, Mr Henry Maurice, Secretary of Fisheries of Great Britain who has also agreed to honour this gathering with his presence. I know our voices are in perfect harmony, Mr President, as are yours, Gentlemen, when I convey our utmost joy in greeting Henry Maurice here today; not only in his capacity as Chairman of the International Council, but also – and especially – as the representative of the Great British Nation to which we are forever bound by memories, interests and friendship. In 1919, France gained a place on the Commission for the Mediterranean, and once again, it fell to Théodore Tissier to head the delegation: on taking his seat on the Commission, he immediately assumed a place of prominence. Finally, through your intervention, Mr President, our country is now a member of the International Council for North American Fisheries. A fertile liaison with the other side of the Atlantic which, from a practical standpoint, allows us to obtain and classify invaluable information about deep-sea fishing conditions off Newfoundland and Greenland. Foreign powers have come to understand our country’s interest in oceanographic research through it being represented on the major international commissions by the highest-ranking French Government Official. There, Gentlemen, summarily presented, are our reasons for rejoicing at the launch of the oceanographic research vessel, the “Président Théodore Tissier.” But alas! Every rose has its thorn, and I shall not mask my deep concern over the current status of the French shipbuilding industry. These feelings will be yours to share shortly, as you walk past our slips which currently harbour nothing more than one 600-ton submarine and one small freighter which we decided to build on our own account, not out of need but very simply to postpone for several weeks a fateful deadline for a large portion of our personnel.

It would be dangerous to conceal the grave roots of this crisis: - a reduction, for budgetary reasons, in French Navy programmes and their concentration on several large vessels, albeit too few in number to sustain every shipbuilder; - a slump in private shipping and fishing fleets; - difficulties encountered by subsidised companies operating internationally; - finally, cuts in all public works programmes and all colonial programmes. Therefore, with very few exceptions, our customers are vanishing into thin air. And whereas at other ceremonies, I was still in a position to ask your predecessors, Mr Minister, how to retain in France the orders that were readily being placed abroad, either through continued improvements to the functioning of shipping loans, or through the creation of compensatory allocations, a subject needing to be broached again one day, what we are now seeing is that neighbouring countries are not receiving any more orders than we are. Faced with a near-absolute lack of demand, we must draw the conclusion that, in order to save shipbuilding, we must first and foremost save the French shipping industry. The question immediately arises of direct State aid for private shipping companies. Permit me to linger on this topic for several moments: which is quite natural, since, though I am receiving you here today as a shipbuilder, I cannot forget that Maison Worms & Cie, the company I have the honour of heading, is also a shipping company which has been offering regular services between France and Northern Spain, the British Isles and the countries of northern Europe, up to and including Russia, for nearly 80 years. Maison Worms, along with several friends, also established the Société d’Exploitation de la Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation à Vapeur, as a means of saving the only regular French line linking Northern and Western France with Madagascar. Accordingly, I would like to underline that, due to a lack of reserves stemming from its inability to constitute them, private shipping will need credit lines, but even more importantly, it must not incur losses while operating its ships.

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However, though the origins of its current crisis were rooted in normal causes, i.e. the result of an overall decline in trade, this crisis has been singularly aggravated – as is its nature – by economic – or antieconomic – measures taken on all sides, and moreover in all countries, to protect national production and economic restructuring. Every new or increased customs duty, every new quota – a word as barbaric as what it designates – goes hand in hand with a further laying up of ships, causing further unemployment. Accordingly, our ports are no longer large enough to serve as cemeteries for our ships; we are forced to turn to port roadsteads – like the one in Brest – to lodge all of these “dead” vessels which ask nothing more than to sail again. Is it not the turn of the shipping industry, an industry greatly harmed by the remedies administered to others, to be the subject of care and concern? A place of honour has been reserved for the Chairman of the Merchant Navy Commission, the Honourable Mr Tasso, for understanding that we cannot wait any longer, that the time has come – first, on grounds of humanity for the unemployed seamen; and second, on grounds of fairness – to make a specific request to those benefitting from protective measures, that they come to the help of those who are suffering. Thus, we can only rejoice at the – expressed – will of the government, once Parliament returns to session, to update the draft law filed in the last session. I know that, at all levels, those who labour on behalf of the Merchant Navy can count on the vigilant and wise goodwill of their Minister. It would be ungracious of me to insist, and furthermore, I will leave it to the entire shipping industry to state its views and express its wishes in this important issue. On the other hand, I would be remiss if, foregoing the trust bestowed in me by the small shipping companies on appointing me Chairman of the Cabotage Section of the Central Committee of French Shipowners, I failed to warn the public authorities about the temptation to exclude them – these small shipping companies – from the benefits of the support law under preparation, Mr Minister, under the pretext that the industry already enjoys privileges inherent to sailing under the French flag.

Allow me, Gentlemen, to quickly outline the reasons why the coastal shipping companies deserve to be treated in the same way as the rest of the shipping industry. The reasons are both material and moral. Material: one is tempted to believe that one upshot of sailing under the French flag is to avoid competition. Actually, while foreign shipping is clearly not to blame, I ask Mr Théodore Tissier, who presides with such authority over the Railway Advisory Committee, to serve as witness that those engaged in coastal trading – small and large coasters – still have a powerful competitor, “the railways.” These have the advantage over ships of speed, frequency and safety. Accordingly, in order to co-exist, coastal shipping companies have to be content with fees 30% lower than rail fees. Whereas ocean-going vessels may reach an agreement with their foreign competitor(s), coastal traders cannot expect any type of agreement with rail networks, especially since railway policy is not for them but for the government to decide. And should the government, for higher reasons, or for reasons of general interest, lower its tariffs or fail to raise them to the level required by coastal shipping companies, the latter will be forced to follow suit, with the above-mentioned impact on their margins. But whereas the railway deficit is compensated by taxpayers, the only resource available to a coastal shipping company, itself a taxpayer, is to lay up its vessels […] or face ruin. What is more, even if, after a prodigious amount of effort, a client elects to send his goods by sea, he will most likely request a fixed price – with the request, incidentally, being firmer than the price. If all such requests had been met, the last of the coastal traders would have transported his last ton ages ago! Be that as it may, it would be a serious error to believe that the small shipping industry has no competition, since its field of operations is restricted. Furthermore, coastal shipping, whatever the size of the coaster, is intimately linked to international and oceangoing shipping; the fortunes of the former are largely dependent on those of the latter, and vice versa. Ask any oceangoing shipping company whether it would cheerily watch over the disappearance of the small vessels responsible inside the ports for collecting and distributing the merchandise transported by the large ships, by its oceangoing ships!

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Ask our maritime chambers of commerce and our autonomous ports – and do I not have the honour of seeing their chairmen here today? – the following question: would the revenues from mooring and landing charges still be high enough to maintain and renew facilities suitable to tempt foreign-flagged vessels, were coastal traders to disappear? As paradoxical as that may ‘a priori’ seem, these ‘ants of the sea’ are key port players, providing ports with life and revenues, and dockers with work. They are the ones making intense use of the handling facilities and metres and metres of wharves. Without them, a port would quickly decline, to the detriment of all, especially the oceangoing shipping companies and even the railways. Moral: would you not find it vexing to abandon to their fate this plethora of small sailing ships, steamships and motor vessels, whose owners are often the captains? - to allow this breeding ground of true mariners to disappear, the almost exclusive source of sailors and helmsmen for the French Navy; - to doom to unemployment all these particularly interesting seafarers, many of them married and fathers, who, as a group, are much more numerous than any other group within the shipping industry? I apologise for this lengthy digression, but I am convinced that I am performing an urgent duty in supporting the cause of every one of these small businesses, which in no way deserve to be treated differently than their larger counterparts. Be that as it may, State aid to the shipping industry logically remains the remedy for alleviating the misery of the shipyards. But even that is not enough, because shipping companies will still need the means to finance new vessels reflecting technical progress and customer demands and thus costing more, whether passenger liners, freighters, coastal or deep-sea fishing boats. Obviously, shipping credit is now available, and I cannot thank enough the high officials who drafted, and the parliamentarians who voted to renew this law. But I wonder – and in these few minutes I can offer only quick suggestions – whether the time has now come to move on from individual and fragmented shipping credit, and whether the ground is now ripe for applying shipping credit on a collective basis, closely linked to a policy of scrapping old vessels, as is starting to be done in many foreign countries.

Such a coordinated rejuvenation of all our fleets, eliminating the multiple and complicated formalities involved in applying for individual shipping credit – and the fishing companies so vexed by these formalities will not contradict me – should thus not be excluded from a comprehensive policy covering the whole French Merchant Navy. Perhaps we even have the chance, with State aid and support, to proceed quicker and better than other countries. Allow me to discuss one further remedy. Mr Minister, you recently rescued the leading French shipping company, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, enabling it to face the future. In addition to the ten to fifteen or so vessels this company will need in the years to come, there will be all those needed by all shipping companies supported by the State. Would it not be opportune, given the tragic events that we are experiencing, to prolong the period assigned to implementing the necessary programme, using today as the starting date? The work could be performed slowly, but if started right now, it would immediately provide the work so desperately needed by our workers – and us ourselves. On a separate note, could we not methodically canvass large markets, such as Russia and South America: we have considerable strengths there. Would it not be natural to ask the country that provides fuel to our naval squadrons, to barter part of this considerable tonnage of fuel for French ships? Would it not be more natural to require countries receiving loans from France to stop using our money to place orders for ships with other countries? Finally, I am going to make a wish. French shipyards receive orders from five different ministries: Air, Colonies, Merchant Navy, Military Navy and Public Works. Yet, there seems to be no linkage between these orders, and we often decry the unfair territorial distribution. If there were a central agency, the administration could take into infinitely better account, through just looking at the statistics, of how orders are allocated, enabling it to correct certain errors; in particular, it would find that, over these past few years, the Seine-Inférieure department has certainly not received its fair share. Through a more effective distribution of orders over time, possible by skilfully forecasting needs, the administration could also shelter us from ups and downs in

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our labour force which are all the more harmful since they affect many corporations of workers. After presenting my quick analysis of the possible remedies and without dwelling further on the subject, I wish only that the public authorities consider the problem with the haste it deserves. Without dwelling too long on the oft-discussed remedies, be they a decrease in the number of shipyards or their specialisation. There may be too many shipyards one day and not enough the next day, even from a national defence perspective. Nor can rationalisation be the panacea bringing down our construction costs to match those of our neighbours. And at a time when public opinion seems inclined to blame us wrongly for the increase in our production costs, why does it not see that the real reasons for the increase are the same reasons that determined the rise in custom duties that benefitted the majority of other industries, and which even justify a higher price for French wheat over foreign wheat. Mr Minister, these are a few of the ideas I wanted to present to you, certain in advance that your concern for the public interest will lead you towards new and lifesaving solutions. Concluding on a more personal note, I will finish with a heartfelt appeal on behalf of our dear workers at Le Trait. They are just pawns in this battle, with nothing but a remote influence on the clash of ideas and doctrines. They are the ones currently threatened with cruel unemployment, with worries weighing heavily on a number of families. Moving here from 1917 onwards, these are families which placed their trust in us. In

close union with them, we built a new city, embellished each day by their labours, their taste and their perseverance. In application of the Loucheur Law, many of them have even built their own homes, where they hope to see their families prosper, where they hope to grow old in honest labour. At all costs, we must stop these workers becoming greatly disillusioned as a result of unemployment and an exodus toward the unknown, the potentially fateful outcome of an overly steep drop in our labour force. Even now, our hearts are heavy when on some Saturdays we have to compile a list of layoffs, knowing that each pencilled name resulting from these exacting circumstances will cause a household to struggle with disappointment and discouragement. Our employees are not asking for alms, but for work; they seek work, ready to invest all their resources for the good of the country and the grandeur of the Merchant Navy. Need I summon as a witness the person who, as the representative of the French government in this department, works tirelessly to improve a situation understood through his savvy? Need I summon as a witness the Honourable Mr Marie, MP for our district, whose devotion to the workers and those suffering is all so well known to all of you that I feel no need to offer a tribute to it at this time? I am convinced that both of them join our people when, turning to their great natural protector, to their Minister – in whom they have confidence – they say to him today through my voice: We count on you!

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Diversifying and innovating To exit the crisis (or at least try to do so), ACSM drew on a range of classic business development strategies (sales drives in France and abroad, advertising, etc.), while at the same time focusing more intently than in the past on two areas: diversification of the offer and technical innovation, a field in which, quite paradoxically in that period of depression, it won with the “Shéhérazade,” an order as prestigious as that for the “Président Théodore Tissier.” In pursuit of orders - Representative Pradeau The Worms archives make reference to the role of an individual who remains an enigma given the little information about him. Bearing the name of Commander Pradeau, his signature is to be found on several letters exchanged with French shipyards. Sources outside of Maison Worms present him as a hero of the War of 1914/1918; he was a submarine captain and decorated with the Legion of Honour.356 After a career in the French Navy, Pradeau seems to have used his skills and knowledge to serve French industry, working for the Joint Engineering Office set up by ACSM, the Ateliers et Chantiers de Bretagne and the Société Générale de Constructions Mécaniques as a vehicle for sharing their information and analyses of the shipping sector in France and throughout the world. Pradeau lived a few years in Le Trait during the 1920s, even becoming Chairman of the local veterans’ association, the “Association Amicale des Anciens Militaires.”357 According to a letter of 30 July 1929, his annual remuneration at ACSM – salary and bonuses – totalled approximately 55,000 F, plus lodging.358

356 Commander Pradeau, Les marins : souvenirs maritimes, sociaux et politiques, d’un ancien officier de marine (excommandant de sous-marins pendant la Grande Guerre), Paris, 1941. See also Journal officiel, 25 April 1931, p. 4556. Born on 14 May 1882, Pradeau entered the Navy in 1900. Becoming a midshipman on 5 October 1903, then Reserve Corvette Captain, he served 25 years on active duty (11 years and 9 months at sea, and six war campaigns). To our knowledge, his activity as representative of the French naval shipyards does not appear in litterature on shipbuilding. 357 Journal du Trait, 18 January 1923. 358 Worms & Cie archives. Letter of 30 July 1929 from ACSM management to Dupont, Managing Director of the Ateliers et Chantiers de Bretagne.

Under an agreement between the management boards of ACSM and the Ateliers et Chantiers de Bretagne, Pradeau received enough remuneration to settle in Paris at the end of the 1920s: “Considering that we are providing you with free accommodation in Le Trait and that you will have to rent an apartment in Paris at your own expense,” stated a letter dated 30 July 1931, “your guaranteed minimum annual salary will be increased to 75,000 F – payable as follows: - monthly salary: 5,000 F – including 1,000 F for representation expenses which consequently will be deducted from your tax statement; - an annual bonus to be paid each year on 31 December: 15,000 F; - an additional bonus will be paid to you, dependent on the successful outcome of your business ventures conducted on behalf of our Joint Engineering Office.359 Your new contract will commence on 1 August, as of when you will make yourself available on a priority basis to our Joint Engineering Office, where you will follow the instructions provided by Mr Dupont [Delegated Administrator of the Ateliers et Chantiers de Bretagne]. In the time remaining available to you, and to the extent that your business trips abroad allow such, you will serve in Paris as the liaison to our shipyard, performing the various assignments that we may ask of you. It is however well understood that you may exercise this function only insofar as your services to the Joint Engineering Office allow.”360 Subsequently, he was to be found in many places in Europe, in search of large contracts. The missions entrusted to him included prospecting in Turkey around 1928; in Greece in 1930–1931; Yugoslavia in 1928; and in northern France and Belgium in the 1930s. He monitored the naval programmes of several Eastern countries361 – many young nations in the aftermath of the World War wished to build up their own Merchant and Military Navies. Commander Pradeau also took an interest in ACSM’s construction of oil storage tanks for Port-Jérôme, and tried to obtain contracts by canvassing clients or joint ventures with companies with experience in this

359 Hence, his nickname at Le Trait of “Mister 5%.” 360 Worms & Cie archives. Letter of 30 July 1931 from management to Pradeau. 361 See correspondence exchanged between Pradeau and Worms & Cie.

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field.362 On 7 May 1931, he informed his employers about the contacts he had established with high officials in the nations he covered. “In the course of the mission entrusted to me in Yugoslavia, and thanks to the good reputation of your companies, I have been able to develop personal contacts to the leaders of the counAndré Marie (1897–1974) try, enabling me to envision interesting material advantages in the future. […] At the same time, on a more personal level, thanks to the kindness of some ministers, and thanks as well to proven friendships, I recently obtained, without asking, options on mining operations, likely to bear interesting fruit.” He went on to propose documenting all business opportunities available to French companies and which, in his opinion, were worth studying. He promised his superiors a “positive and productive outcome.”363 On 21 May 1931, Pradeau decided to settle in Belgrade. A letter from his French managers details their future business relationship: “Your move to Belgrade, your registration in the city’s Trade and Companies Register, and more generally, all the measures that you will need to take in the exercise of your activity as representative, shall be done in your own name; and you shall abstain from mentioning the names of our companies or the Joint Engineering Office, not only in your letterheads, invoices, etc., but also in any form of advertisement, in your offices, in directories, etc. Under no circumstance may you represent any other companies of any nationality whose business activities are of a nature to compete with those of the Ateliers & Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, the Ateliers & Chantiers de Bretagne, and the Société Générale de Constructions Mécaniques. […] That said, you shall be the sole representative in Yugoslavia of ACSM, ACB and SGCM, and you shall keep us apprised, via the

362 Worms & Cie archives. Letter of 27 June 1930 from Pradeau to ACSM. 363 Worms & Cie archives. Letter of 7 May 1931 from Pradeau.

Joint Engineering Office, of everything that may be of interest to us.” His compensation was fixed as follows: “For any order under fifty million [francs], two percent of its total value; for the share of any order between fifty and one hundred million inclusive, one-and-a-half percent; for the share in any order exceeding one hundred million, one percent.” The agreement was concluded for three years, renewable annually. All trace of this representative was lost thereafter. Henri Nitot wrote the following in his memoirs: “Our marketing abroad was entrusted to Commander Pradeau, who, unfortunately, went off course.”364 - Role of elected officials, notably André Marie The launch of a ship was an occasion to thank the client for placing his trust in ACSM, but also to establish or strengthen political contacts and extend the sales network. For example, Joseph Noulens, Senator of Gers, a former Minister and friend of the Worms family, attended the launch of the “Capitaine Bonelli.”365 Relationships developed, like the one between André Marie, MP for the Seine-Inférieure department, and Henri Nitot who regularly exchanged correspondence,366 or Pierre Abbat.367 For André Marie, this was a way to keep abreast of what was going on at ACSM and to defend its interests in the National Assembly, particularly in times of crisis. No doubt his brother, Jean Marie, an Engineer and Director of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, also kept him abreast. André Marie regularly received memos from ACSM and statistical data on its activities. The MP also served as the intermediary between the company and the ministers in charge of shipbuilding. For example, he wrote to Henri Nitot in July 1935: “My dear Director, I would like to inform you, in all confidence, that I had the pleasure of dining seven or eight

364 H. Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 365 www.wormsetcie.com. See 1921 – Recueil des informations de janvier à décembre: an extract of the article on the inauguration of the ACSM published in La Dépêche de Rouen, 30 November 1921. 366 As evidenced by the list of parliamentarians invited to the launch of the “Charles Schiaffino”: Thoumyre, Marie, Anquetil, Coty, Bureau, Blondel, Lebret, Quesnel, Rimbert, Thureau-Dangin. These were the most important elected officials in Normandy during the 1930s. The Nitot family sometimes invited André Marie to dinner. 367 “Obsèques de Monsieur Abbat,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 33, October 1952.

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days ago in Paris with Mr and Mrs Pietri.368 During this luncheon, and no need for me to tell you that I did not overlook the question of the Le Trait shipyard, I obtained formal assurances that Le Trait would not be forgotten. I wanted to communicate this to you forthwith. For your part, of course, please keep me informed. Sincerely yours, André Marie.”369 During the crisis in the 1930s, the management of Maison Worms appealed to the governments in the speeches made by Hypolite Worms, as was the case at the launch of the “Président Théodore Tissier” on 23 September 1933. On 24 September 1935, André Marie obtained an appointment with Laurent Eynac, Minister for Public Works, in an attempt to resolve the problems suffered by ACSM.370 “His schedule is as follows: he will arrive in Paris at around 10 a.m. and make his way directly to Boulevard Haussmann371 for the necessary briefing; at noon, we will go to the Ministry of Public Works.” He also hoped to gain an appointment with the Minister for the Navy that same day, but was unsure whether he would manage to arrange it. In these meetings, ACSM management provided memos, for example this one of 11 July 1935 on the status of the hiring of workers. ACSM management also directly contacted the ministers. On 18 October 1933, Hypolite Worms appealed to Anatole de Monzie, then Minister for National Education. “You were kind enough to receive me on 4 August,” he recalled, “and to listen to my quick summary of the status of the Le Trait shipyard: 500 workers have been laid off so far, and a similar-sized number are set to follow if nothing changes. That means the annihilation of all our efforts. I added that the solution might be found in the distribution of the escort vessels for the French Navy, stating that it was vital for us to be allocated two vessels. As of now, six of the eight vessels have been allocated,

368 François Pietri, Minister for the Navy (9 February 1934 to 1 June 1935) during the governments of Doumergue and Flandin, as well as Bouisson, Laval and Sarrault (1 June 1935 to 4 June 1936). 369 Worms & Cie archives. Letter from André Marie to Henri Nitot, 2 September 1935. 370 Laurent Eynac, Minister for Public Works from 7 June 1935 to 24 January 1936. 371 Headquarters of Maison Worms.

but only one to Le Trait: two are still pending, for which the Minister for the Navy is on the verge of deciding. Consequently, your powerful and immediate advocacy at the Rue Royale Ministry would help us greatly to gain the order for one of the two remaining vessels. I took the opportunity to tell you that, for years, the shipyards in Seine-Inférieure have been given far fewer orders than their competitors. I am therefore fully convinced that my request in no way runs counter to holy justice – quite the contrary!”372 - Advertising The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime allocated an advertising budget in order to spread the word about its performances. In this respect, the role played by journalism needs to be highlighted, with the almost systematic coverage of the ship launchings in the press helping to promote the company. Specialist shipping magazines in France and abroad (England, the United States and Poland, for example) were advertising platforms coveted by shipbuilders. Management cultivated relationships with various magazines and publications, some official, some not: Le Journal de la marine marchande, Annuaire de la marine militaire, Encyclopédie coloniale et maritime, The New York Marine News Co. Inc., Shipbuilder & Marine Engine Builder, Revue coloniale maritime et aéronautique, L’Armée moderne, La Journée industrielle, Journal de la navigation fluviale et maritime, L’orientation économique et financière, the lastest issue of which, dated 19 October 1935, in particular, dealt with shipbuilding in France, and ACSM wished to be featured in the article.373 Relations were established with old boys’ associations such as those of Naval Academy and Marine Engineering. Everything was done to develop the network. Advertising came in various shapes and forms: the most classic were ads in various sizes (1/8th of a page; full page, etc.), but also included articles in periodicals focused on the seafaring world or other industrial sectors, such as the railways in France (Rails de France, Revue illustrée des chemins de fer de l’État), along

372 www.wormsetcie.com. Letter from Hypolite Worms sent to Anatole de Monzie on 18 October 1933, regarding the problems encountered by ACSM. 373 See also the 14-page article by Pierre Abbat on the “Shéhérazade,” in the Journal de la marine marchande of 30 January 1936.

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with reportages and dossiers. In the 1930s, ads were discussed as a means of promoting the know-how of ACSM. Management sought to get articles published in Le Port du Havre, Miroir du Monde, L’Espoir Français, World Petroleum (issues for the years 1933, 1934, and 1935), Le Monde colonial, Le Courrier des Pétroles, Nord Magazine, among others. The ACSM strategy in this field was identical to that of its competitors: to communicate at length about its dynamism, technical prowess, the quality of its facilities, etc., so as to win contracts. Diversifying the ACSM offering: construction of boilers, oil tanks and floating roofs Between 1924 and 1927, ancillary repair and conversion works were already enabling ACSM to “maintain its normal workload and full employment. […] Initial projects were to overhaul the deep-sea barge ‘Vivarais’ in 1924, to carry out repairs to the La Mailleraye ferry in February 1925, and to lengthen eight tugboats for the Office National de Navigation between 1925 and 1927.”374 Workers at the Chantiers de Normandie in Grand Quevilly also constructed port equipment and riverboats. In some cases, ACSM converted a ship for a function other than its original design. For example, the collier “Ostrevent,” launched on 30 September 1925 for the Société des Hauts-Fourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de Denain & Anzin, was converted into a wine tanker in the 1930s. Another recurring activity was the replacement of boilers, as done in 1938 on the “Château-Latour,” a vessel belonging to the Worms & Cie fleet. Carrying out repairs for private or public clients provided further work, such as that performed on the yacht “Le Condé” for a certain Mr Plugge, on “Le Pourquoi pas ?” owned by Commander Charcot, the famous explorer, on the barges belonging to the Ponts et Chaussées or on the mixed cargo ships owned by the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation: “Ville de Metz,” “Ville de Rouen,” “Ville de Tamatave,” “Ville de Majunga,” or on “L’Euphrate,” “Médéa,” “Désiré Delmotte.”375 The construction of boilers, oil stor-

374 M. Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, 1993, op. cit., p. 365. 375 Repairs uncovered upon reading the correspondence between ACSM and its clients.

age tanks and Wiggins floating roofs376 also served to stave off difficulties. Additional outlets were sought. Manufacturing sometimes took place away from Le Trait, for instance at sites where the floating roofs were to be installed: in France, the Middle East and North Africa.377 Such roofs limited evaporation losses in tanks containing crude oil or refined petrol. ACSM maintained correspondence with potential clients: Standard Oil; Kellog; Maison Derobert; The Whessoe Foundry & Engineering Co., Ltd.; Forster Wheeler (refinery distillation towers); Société des Distilleries de l’Indochine (storage tanks); Société de Raffinage des Huiles de Pétrole in Martigues, the Port-Jérôme refinery,378 among others, putting to good use the network developed by Worms & Cie. Before orders could be placed, ACSM needed authorisation to exploit patents. Agreements reached in 1933 led to the signing of a licensing contract to build Wiggins floating roofs (licensing agreement between the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company of Chicago, Illinois, USA, and Worms & Cie, Paris, France). A memo of 13 August 1931 highlighted management’s plan to diversify its production: “Business activity in Le Trait can expand […] to the construction of storage tanks and refinery equipment.”379 Le Calfat du Trait reported that ACSM built its first floating roofs in 1931 for the refineries of Standard Française des Pétroles and Vacuum Oil Company in Port-Jérôme. They were constructed under a licensing agreement with the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company of Chicago and New York. Construction was supervised by American engineers who oversaw ACSM personnel.380 120 floating roofs were built between 1931 and 1939. Tough competition in this sector,381 as in all branches of shipbuilding, did not prevent players from cooperating and even partnering in their search for solutions for their survival. Such was the mission

376 http://www.ineris.fr: “The floating roof is a movable disk that floats on top of the liquid, following it as it rises and falls. The free space between the roof and the side of the tank allows for this movement. The space is closed by a sealing system allowing the roof to slide freely inside the tank.” 377 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 56, April 1959. 378 These were their clients especially during the 1930s. 379 Worms & Cie archives. Memo of 13 August 1931. 380 “Toits flottants,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 13, May 1949. By the engineers, Day and Hudson. 381 Oil storage tanks were also manufactured in GrandQuevilly.

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of the French Shipbuilding Consortium, a national consortium made up of industrialists, including Ateliers et Chantiers de Saint-Nazaire, Ateliers et Chantiers de Bretagne, Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence, ACSM, and the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée. Set up as a company in 1930, the consortium held a capital of 200,000 F, and its primary purpose, according to Article 2 of its statutes, was to study all industrial, commercial, technical or financial measures deemed likely to promote the development of its members.382 As a means of continued existence, the consortium focused on innovation and the pooling of know-how.

On 3 March 1928, Pierre Abbat gave an account of a study tour which he had just completed to Berlin, Stettin (a German city until 1945, then integrated into Poland), Hamburg, Cuxhaven and Bremen to learn more about Lentz poppet valve engines. On 25 February 1928, he spent the morning at Salge & Co., Technische Gesellschaft in Berlin, where Willy Salge, the Director and engineer, explained the plans of the engines. In the afternoon, he visited Borsig, a company which held a licence to build the engines. His visit serves as a personal testimony by a Frenchman of German industry’s strength: “It is an old Berlin company,” he wrote, “and probably the largest machine

engineering company in Germany; Borsig also has a foundry in Upper Silesia. The Berlin facilities, reconstructed thirty or so years ago, make a rich and luxurious impression; management is housed in buildings resembling a feudal castle. In Berlin, Borsig employs 4,500 workers in its various mechanical workshops, foundry, iron works, assembly workshop and boilermaking workshop.” “I noted,” he continued, “how well-equipped the workshops are from a machinery perspective. […] These machines seem remarkably robust. I also noticed the considerable use of transport and handling equipment inside the workshop: electric cranes on rails, overhead cranes, etc. I also noticed the use of stationary grinders that mechanically suck in the dust. […] The forge is impressive: a 2,000-ton press, a 3,000-ton press, a rolling mill with reheating furnace. […] One thing that struck me was the speed at which all machine-tools operated thanks to the use of high-speed steels, a specialist area on which the head of Borsig had focused his studies. Borsig manufactures hydraulic and pneumatic riveting machines, as well as locomotives; indeed I saw one particular locomotive that had just been assembled. Weighing 130 tons, it must be one of the most powerful models in existence today in Europe.383 […] Currently employing 800 workers, the shipyard only builds hulls. It has four slipways, is extremely well-arranged with regard to moving materials, has an impressive draughting room above the hull workshop, nothing noteworthy about the shipyard tooling.” The process of building ships was already being optimised, something ACSM only started doing after the war. “Saw the ‘Aachen,’” he wrote in his report, “a 9,000-ton ship built in 1920 and equipped with a 3,600-HP triple-expansion engine, in which a 1,000-HP Bauer Wach exhaust turbine is just being installed. Highly interesting, the Bauer Wach exhaust steam turbine is very power-saving; unfortunately, its sales price is extremely high; I believe it is costing more than 200,000 marks to install the turbine on the ‘Aachen.’” He added, “noticed some impressive tooling, including one machine capable of cutting gearwheels up to 5 m in diameter which was purchased last year for 380,000 marks. On the slipway, saw a small ship intended for the Marseilles–Corsica route built as war reparations for the Freyssinet company.

382 Statutes of the French Shipbuilding Consortium, 1931.

383 www.wormsetcie.com. Memo of 3 March 1928 by Pierre Abbat regarding his trip to Germany.

Pierre Abbat in the forefront of technological advances During its short lifespan, the shipyard demonstrated its ability to rise to technical challenges by launching innovative ships. Pierre Abbat was undoubtedly the most emblematic naval engineering personality in Le Trait. Originally from Toulon, he continued his studies in Marseilles. A member of the learned society, Société Libre d’Émulation de la Seine-Maritime, and author of several technical studies, he directed construction projects at ACSM; in this capacity, he willingly travelled to England, the United States, or Germany to compare state-of-the-art techniques and draw inspiration from what others did best. Drawing inspiration from what others do best “The German industry was exceptionally wellequipped and capable of large-scale production” Pierre Abbat, 3 March 1928

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The Weser shipyard has built several vessels for the French merchant fleet as war reparations.” On Saturday, he went to Stettin where he visited Nüske & Co AG.384 In Hamburg, he met the head of the Worms & Cie branch, from whom he gathered information that “he might not have gotten, had Salge been present.” He then boarded the first ship equipped with the new “Les” ship engine: the steamship “Bilbao”385 belonging to the German company, CPDR. From Hamburg, he made the 6-hour sea trip to Cuxhaven. The following day, he went to the Weser AG shipyards in Bremen. “The little I have seen of German industry (because even in the facilities I visited, the most interesting things were most likely concealed from me),” he confirmed,

384 According to Wikipedia (German version), on the topic of Nüske & Co., “the Deschimag (abbreviation for Deutsche Schifs und Maschinenbau Aktiengesellschaft) was founded in 1926 when influential Bremen merchants and bankers decided to found a cooperation of great German shipbuilding companies under the leadership of the shipyard AG Weser. The intention was to coordinate and concentrate activities of German shipyards for higher efficiency but last not least mainly to support Bremen´s shipyard AG ‘Weser’ in the upcoming economic and financial crisis of 1930s. While the largest shipbuilding companies in Germany as Blohm & Voss and Bremer Vulkan AG because of their own strong market position at that time were not interested in this cooperation, eight other large German shipyards merged. These were: - Actien-Gesellschaft ‘Weser,’ Bremen (closed 1983) - Vulkan-Werke Hamburg A.G., Hamburg (1930 sold to Howaldtswerke Kiel) - Joh, C. Tecklenborg A.G., Wesermünde (closed 1928) - AG Vulcan Stettin, Stettin (closed 1928) - G. Seebeck A.G., Geestemünde (closed 2009) - Actien-Gesellschaft ‘Neptun,’ Rostock (bankruptcy 1935, since 1997 part of the shipbuilding company Meyer Werft GmbH, Papenburg) - Nüscke & Co. A.G., Stettin (bankrupt 1928) - Frerichswerft A.G., Einswarden (gave up shipbuilding in 1935.” 385 Pierre Abbat: “The ‘Bilbao’ is a ship with a gross tonnage of 2,450 tons; 278.5 x 40.5 x 23.7 (two 13 ko boilers, with 180 m2 heating surface and 4 m2 80 grate area; surface of each superheater, 78 m2; feedwater reheated to 110o by means of two series heaters); constructed in 1922, equipped with a ‘Les X’ engine that consumes 11.5 t [at 75 revolutions] per 24 hours, for a speed of approximately 10 knots; the ‘Bilbao’ mechanic told me that he limited superheating to 310–320o. This mechanic, on board for two years, was thrilled with his engine, which worked perfectly well and was very easy to manoeuvre […] ; I examined the cams, rollers and various bearing surfaces, which were in perfect condition and needed no repairs.”

“allow me to draw the conclusion [and his opinion as an engineer is particularly interesting on the eve of the stock market crash of 1929 and the rise of the Third Reich some ten years before the Second World War] that German industry is exceptionally well-equipped and capable of large-scale production. Its tooling is completely modern.” Its industry was in the forefront of advances in shipbuilding. “The Germans are constantly seeking to improve; they are not afraid of new ideas. I have the impression that they are ten or so years ahead of us. Their new ships are fitted with the latest developments. The majority of innovations […] would seem to be highly interesting, notably the Oertz rudder and the Maier form bow, which, when combined, achieve fuel savings equal to that of the Bauer Wach turbine, at an installation cost five to six times lower. Similarly, the Lentz poppet valve engine is certainly an upgrade to the alternative steam engine. I think it would be beneficial for a French shipyard to own the licences currently used in Germany; perhaps we could envisage one of the next ships to be built by Worms & Cie being equipped with

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Locomotive in the large-fitting workshop – 1930s

all the latest developments. This experiment would serve as advertising and, I am convinced, would offer great savings on operating costs.”386 During the 1930s, ACSM negotiated with German companies to obtain licences. On 16 February 1931, the Bremen company, Krafft & Weichardt, granted the Le Trait shipyard “representation of the exclusive licence for the Hein sealanding ramps for aircraft.” The French Navy was subsequently equipped with this system.387 During a trip to the United States in 1934, Pierre Abbat was interested in seeing the “Zephyr,” a train that the Budd Manufacturing Company had delivered that year to the Chicago Burlington Railroad Cy. The train was aerodynamically shaped and built entirely of stainlesssteel components welded together. “A 600-HP diesel engine drives a generator powering the electric propulsion engine.”388 Welding already seemed to be the future. “During its trial runs, this train reached speeds of 107 miles per hour. I myself,” underscored Pierre Abbat, “was able to make the roundtrip journey from Washington to Baltimore in this train in just 1 hour and 40 minutes. However, because the condition of the rails did not allow for such high speeds, the train did not exceed 75 miles per hour on this trip.” He also commented on the comfort, stability and solidity of the train. What struck him was the train’s overall weight, far lower than that of the steam engines it was to replace (186,000 pounds389 versus 1,600,000): “It should be noted that, during construction, they did everything to make the structure and its various components as light as possible, though they did not do likewise for the engines, propulsion components and accessory parts.” Finally, the cost to manufacture the “Zephyr” caught his attention: 200,000 dollars. The engineer highlighted the train’s specific features: the innovative use of stainless steel, the metal wheels, the number, location and type of the bogie390 suspension system, as

well as the gangway connections.391 All this information surely fired his imagination in his search for solutions to the problems that arose during ship construction, and in particular the oil tankers for which he excelled. “Shéhérazade,” the world’s largest oil tanker Backed by its feat of having constructed an oceanographic research vessel, ACSM started on the construction of the “Shéhérazade,” a 18,500-dwt oil tanker for which Le Trait held the world record for several weeks. “It makes me smile today,” recalled Henri Nitot in an interview in May 1977, “given the supertankers now being constructed throughout the world.”

391 Memo from Pierre Abbat regarding his trip to the United States in 1934. New crane for slips 1 and 2 – 1934

386 Worms & Cie archives. Memo from Pierre Abbat dated 3 March 1928, regarding his trip to Germany. 387 Note from Henri Nitot to ACSM, 29 October 1945. 388 Worms & Cie archives. Memo from Pierre Abbat regarding his trip to the United States in 1934. 389 Unit of mass of around 500 grams. 390 A bogie is a frame, located underneath a rail car, to which axles are attached. It moves in relation to the rail car chassis. See www.technoscience.net.

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The oil tanker, “Shéhérazade,” in the slipway in October 1935

12 October 1935: launch of the “Shéhérazade,” the supertanker built for the Compagnie Auxiliaire de Navigation (CAN) Articles in both the national and specialised presses resounded with praise over this achievement. Pierre Abbat himself burst with pride in a 14-page article in the Journal de la marine marchande, published on 30 January 1936: “This ship, the completion of which represents a milestone in the life of an ever-improving fleet, is the largest, fastest, best-equipped, and most modern of all those proudly sporting the white and red flag [of the CAN] – in a nutshell, the ship

best reflects the power and personality of the company which owns it. Moreover, it sets a record in its class – and a French record. Among our fleet of oil tankers, nothing can compare with the ‘Shéhérazade.’ I might add that, looking down the list of oil tankers in service throughout the world, I found very few – no more than a dozen or so – rivalling or surpassing the ‘Shéhérazade’ in tonnage; and among those that do, the majority fell short of its other qualities. 160

With its keel laid in the large slip in July 1934 – ACSM construction No. 81 – the ship took shape, sheet by sheet and rivet by rivet, to the point when its silhouette, initially inferred, then affirmed, dominated the Normandy plain. It soon became too large for its slipway, rising higher than all the buildings used in its initial construction. On 12 October 1935, the ‘Shéhérazade,’ with a lightness belying its weight – which, including its cradle, was close to 9,000 tons – slid down its

slipway into the Seine, producing a wave which was to bear the news of its launch along the banks of the river to the sea. […] Four powerful tugboats from Les Abeilles took hold of the vessel, taking it to Le Havre where for several weeks the great port would provide shelter for the final fitting stages. The envy of all, following a preliminary outing designed to measure its strength, ‘Shéhérazade’ left at last on 9 December for its official sea trials. […] The English Channel was blasted by a storm, and shelter had to be sought west of the Isle of Wight to allow the vessel to measure its speed. On 11 December, after slightly more than two days at sea, having satisfied all test condi-

tions, and especially after maintaining a speed of 14 knots for twelve hours despite the poor weather conditions, ‘Shéhérazade’ returned to port; on 15 December, the ship left Le Havre for its first commercial voyage, heading for the Syrian coast. It returned on 6 January, having covered approximately 6,400 miles, travelling on the outbound trip at an average speed of 13.5 knots, and 12.5 knots on the return trip, and despite very poor weather, breaking the roundtrip record for this journey (23 days between two consecutive departures from Le Havre).” Pierre Abbat outlined that the tanker’s name was particularly appropriate for “a ship that had specifically been designed and built for regular services between Tripoli

The “Shéhérazade”: construction phases from 4 September 1934 to 12 October 1935 1 - 2 - 4 September 1934 3 - 1 October 1934

2 3

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and Le Havre.” “Overall,” he continued, “[the vessel] offers a harmonious shape and elegant lines; the classic silhouette of large motor oil tankers, with its well-proportioned funnel accentuating the [stern] without crushing it.”

The following are the primary characteristics of the ship: Overall length 174.9 m Length between perpendiculars 166.2 m Width from out frame 21.8 m Moulded depth from upper bridge deck line 12.0 m Maximum draught from the summer freeboard to the centre of the disk 9.425 m Corresponding deadweight 18,800 t The Bureau Veritas certification company provided special oversight of the ship’s construction, and accordingly, issued its highest classification certificate. Each of the two propellers was driven by a four-stroke diesel engine built by

Schneider & Cie (under a B. & W. licence) in their Le Creusot factory. This three-compartment ship was divided into two continuous longitudinal bulkheads, in which transverse bulkheads delineated three tanks – one central tank, and two smaller lateral tanks, symmetrically placed – in each transverse section, based upon the Isherwood bracketless construction system [whose characteristics were described by Pierre Abbat]. The ship was fitted with 18 transverse watertight bulkheads. The engine room […] housed two B. & W. long-haul, four-stroke, single-acting diesel engines with mechanical fuel injection, constructed by Schneider & Cie, in Le Creusot. […] [The ship] was [also] fitted with two three-cylinder auxiliary diesel engines [also manufactured in the B. & W. (Burmeister & Wain) workshops]. Using plans and pho162

tographs, Pierre Abbat detailed the specific characteristics of the ship, including its crew and passenger accommodation, designed to be “comfortable, and even somewhat luxurious” and providing “decorative elements that would be appreciated on many passenger liners.” One image depicts “a corner of the lobby in the passengers’ roof, [whose] panelling and doors [are] made of ‘Océana’ art plywood, [and] the parquet floor in ‘Sylviso’ by the company Le Revêtement.”

“Shéhérazade” construction phases (continued)

5 7

4 - 31 October 1934 5 - 4 December 1934 6 - 7 - 3 January 1935

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“Shéhérazade” construction phases (continued)

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8 9

11 12

8 - 9 - 6 February 1935 10 - 4 March 1935 11 - 12 - 5 April 1935 13 - 6 May 1935

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“Shéhérazade” construction phases (continued)

14 15

17 16

14 - 15 - 3 July 1935 16 - 7 August 1935 17 - 6 September 1935 18 - 12 October 1935 19 - 10 December 1935

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The nadir of 1935 Although orders from the French Navy made it possible for construction to begin on the torpedo boats “Bouclier” on 17 October 1934 in slip 5 (launched on 10 August 1937) and “L’Incomprise,” on 2 November 1934 in slip 4 (launched on 14 April 1937), work dropped to a trickle in 1934, with just a third ship being started (the “Shéhérazade” in slip 2). Two launches occurred: a ferry built for the Ponts et Chaussées on 5 April 1934, and the freighter “Le Trait” on 29 July 1934. The recession reached its peak in 1935, when just one keel was laid: on 29 September for the “Danaé,” a 3,450dwt steam collier for the Société Navale Caennaise. There were just two launches that year: the submarine “Vénus” for the French Navy on 6 April, and the oil tanker “Shéhérazade” on 12 October. Activity picked up again in 1936, with construction beginning on 20 March on the 3,450-dwt steam collier “Dioné” for the Société Navale Caennaise; on 18 May on the 1,250-HP tugboat “Saint Louis,” ordered by the Entreprise d’Acconage et de Remorquage L. Schiaffino (Algiers); on 10 August on the submarine “Cérès” for the French Navy; and on 21 September on the 9,000dwt motor cargo ship “François L.D” for Louis Dreyfus & Cie. “Danaé” and “Dioné” were launched on 21 May and 27 November 1936, respectively.

On 14 April and 10 August 1937, the torpedo boats “L’Incomprise” (see above) and the “Bouclier” were launched, the first electrically welded hull ships

While this resurge of construction calmed concerns within the company, particularly as regards the safeguarding of jobs, 1936 was a year marked by an upheaval in relations between employers and the working class, brought about by the rise to power of the Front Populaire.

Social tensions from June 1936 to the beginning of 1937 After the victory of the Front Populaire, comprised of Communists, Socialists and Radicals, in the parliamentary elections of April and May 1936, spontaneous strikes spread to many factories. The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime was hit by this countrywide wave of protests. In hindsight, events in Le Trait seemed relatively mild, although management felt otherwise, as in its view traces of social struggle still existed. Troubles persisted through the end of 1936 and the beginning of 1937. On 6 June 1936, in agreement with the majority of CGT (labour union) workers, a list of claims was drawn up by the ACSM section of the Rouen Metalworkers’ Union. Its first item concerned wages, with the workers demanding that every skilled individual be paid a wage of 5.50 F an hour, and every labourer 4.50 F an hour.392 The Union demanded that young men as of 18 years of age be classified either as skilled workers or as labourers, and be paid the corresponding wage. The unionists claimed 1.50 F an hour for apprentices on starting work at the company (instead of 0.75 F), with progressive increases bringing wages up to the full wage at 18 years of age. There were to be no dismissals for strike activity. Another important point was recognition of Union rights: delegates elected by workers wanted to be informed of hiring and terminations of contracts, of health and safety measures, and of any provisions impacting their working conditions. Payment for strike

392 Using data from Paul Bonmartel, we can calculate that a labourer received 3 F an hour, without bonuses, prior to the 1936 agreements. See P. Bonmartel, Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, op. cit., p. 36. See also “Discussion du contract collectif, séance du 23 september 1936.” After negotiations with ACSM management, labourers received 3.80 F an hour, while the specialised workers received 5.50 F (Category 1 workers) or 5 F (Category 2 workers).

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Picket in 1936

days, authorisation to smoke freely in areas designated by management in agreement with the delegates from the corresponding workshop, permission to take a break in the morning were among the claims made by the workers, as well an increase in the overtime rate for time worked beyond the eight-hour day (50% up to 10 p.m., and 100% thereafter), and six days’ paid leave, taken at their discretion. Finally, they demanded that these requests be applied as quickly as possible. In the case of these demands being met favourably by management, the workers’ delegation agreed to resume work immediately. Otherwise, the delegation warned that it would call a full strike and occupy the workshops and shipyard until all its demands were completely satisfied. After making its intentions clear, the Union came up with further demands: the elimination of “marchandages”393 and, for workers coming by train, the right to enter the shipyard half an hour after the whistle. In sum, these claims were to be seen as a strict application of the eight-hour law and a loosening of the disciplinary constraints.

A letter dated 15 June 1936 discussing a circular (No. 432) provided by the Committee for Industry, Commerce and Shipping in Le Havre and the Seine Estuary looked at the various provisions within the Penal Code to remove workers in the event of them occupying the shipyard. A general strike was called on 4 June,394 and even the red flag was hoisted at the factory gate. Management decided to occupy the company offices. Several meetings were held outdoors, along with gatherings in the workshops. Management requested the assistance of André Marie. Very quickly – on 8 June – the workers resumed work, with the help of the MP.395 The Worms archives contain an initial report on the collective agreement negotiations conducted on 15 June 1936. Henri Nitot, supported by Pierre Abbat and Jean Roy, led the discussions and put forward proposals. The workers’ delegation was comprised of 55-year-old Robert Lemonnier, Le Trait’s first CGT leader and the man who initiated the strike, and Mr Adam and Mr Chapet.

393 The term “marchandage” is used in French Labour Law to refer to a contract in which one company places its employees at the disposal of another company without respecting the rights of these employees. The latter may in fact become employees of the client company without enjoying equivalent rights. Consequently, social legislation is not respected. See: http://www.journaldunet.com/management/ guide-du-management/.

394 P. Bonmartel, Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, op. cit., p. 37. 395 P. Bonmartel, Le Trait, cité nouvelle 1917-1944, op. cit., p. 114.

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Discussions were held on a regular basis thereafter. On 18 June 1936, for example, a further meeting was held at 10.10 a.m. in the library, presided over by Mr Dupuich, the Mayor of Le Trait, and Mr Hardy, specially appointed by the MP André Marie. Dupuich opened the meeting by “expressing the hope that the ensuing conversations would be pursued in an atmosphere of conciliation, vital to the establishment of the desired collective agreement.”396 He felt that, should disagreements arise over some issue, they “should be set aside and handled by an arbiter, as agreed upon, since it was in their interest to reach a quick settlement on all the other points of the collective agreement, where agreement was possible.” On this occasion, Lemonnier read out the list of delegates, workshop by workshop. It was agreed that the Minister for the Merchant Navy would be asked to arbitrate in the wage dispute. Again, André Marie – serving as a mediator between the two parties – was appointed to schedule a meeting. Relations seemed cordial: “Before concluding the session, Mr Nitot states that the library is available to the delegates for their meetings, though they have to inform Mr Dupuich so that he can have the room opened, and to make sure that it has not been reserved for another meeting. Mr Lemonnier thanks Mr Nitot for this.” Any improvement in working conditions, along with the wage increases, had not to Tugboat “Saint Louis” launched on 28 January 1937 for Entreprise d’Acconage et de Remorquage – L. Schiaffino (M. Lootvoët collection)

396 www.wormsetcie.com. Discussion of the collective agreement, session of 18 June 1936. See the documents on 25, 26, 28 November and 3 December 1936.

be to the financial detriment of ACSM compared to its competitors. Everyone was aware of this factor, with the men taking it into consideration when assessing their claims. The rental terms for housing in Le Trait seemed far better than elsewhere. For example, it should be remembered that, at the time of the discussions on the collective agreements, a four-room (Neuville type houses) dwelling rented by a low-cost housing company was 1,572 F per month; whereas in Le Trait, rents ranged from 486 to 594 F. Likewise, the rent for a five-room dwelling ranged from 1,886 to 2,188 F per month for the former, versus 756 francs in Le Trait. Services, such as street lighting, trash collection, road maintenance and water distribution were still the responsibility of the Société Immobilière du Trait at the time. This was a fundamental difference between Le Trait and its neighbouring towns which provided these services in return for a local tax levied on residents. This meant that the cost of living in Le Trait was lower than elsewhere. As part of its social benefits system, ACSM paid a seniority bonus: “200 F after five years of service, 800 F after 10 years.” For those who started working for the company before 1 January 1935, “a seniority bonus was paid after 15, 20 and 30 years of service.” Extra family allowances were also granted: “For one child: 0.40 F per day; for two children: 0.80 F per day; for three children: 1.20 F per day” up to nine children (8.80 F per day).397 During these times of social unrest, some foremen tried to step up productivity, thereby intensifying the workers’ determination. ACSM management noticed a change in attitude of its personnel, who became more combative and dissenting. In a report sent to the Prefect of the Seine-Inférieure department, management summarised further incidents occurring in early 1937. One event in question originated in an electrician’s refusal to pay his dues to the Metalworkers’ Union in Le Trait, and his expressed desire to quit the Union. On 19 January 1937, around 9.10 a.m., 250 to 300 workers gathered around the shipyard’s electrical power plant where the man in question worked. An engineer and the Union’s Secretary General had to intervene to get

397 www.wormsetcie.com. Discussion on collective agreement, session of 18 June 1936. Identical historical sources as note No. 396.

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the crowd to disperse. That same day, when the electrician did not leave for lunch, instead appearing to continue working, he was “grabbed by a number of his fellow workers and thrown out by a group swelling to a sizeable 500 workers or so.” The next day brought another work interruption: 500 to 600 persons, clearly with their minds set on making the electrician stay in the Union, circled on him. Pressured by the demonstrations and negotiations, the man was forced to comply. Only then could work resume.398 Beyond the anecdote, this event depicted the tense atmosphere reigning at the time, as well as the determination, group spirit and demonstration of force displayed by ACSM personnel. This can be seen as an awareness of the need for collective action as a means of obtaining rights in the aftermath of May 1936, and as a manifestation of group identity.399 Because of the disturbances, a number of employees moved to SaintNazaire in 1936. Management was concerned about these departures. The State itself was suspected of poaching workers from the private sector.400 ACSM management had to face up to the loss of four employees on 23 October 1936. Five others were also on the verge of leaving, while two decided to stop working and living in Le Trait, according to a memorandum.401 Parallel to these events of late 1936, negotiations continued on the collective agreements. Discussions focused on defining each of the positions (foremen, drafting office staff including copiers and different types of draughtsmen, etc.), and on classifying the various categories and the corresponding pay scales. They also covered the typology of work-related accidents and diseases, or expenses for travel outside the commune. But wage increases dominated the demands. Henry Nitot acknowledged that working conditions remained difficult: “Long working hours for six days a week, sometimes even extending to Sunday mornings; no annual leave offering respite and sunshine to the implacable course of workdays; the poor organisation of accident prevention; workshop leaders and lower management without any social training at all and often indis-

398 Worms & Cie archives. Letter of 21 January 1937 from ACSM management to the Prefect of the Seine-Inférieure department. 399 On this topic, see G. Noiriel, op. cit. 400 As implied in several letters exchanged between ACSM and its competitors. 401 Worms & Cie archives. Memo of October 1936.

Motor cargo ship “François L.D” launched on 3 May 1938 for Louis Dreyfus & Cie

criminately imposing outdated rules; and above all, when warranted by a dearth of orders, the possibility for the employer to dismiss workers without notice, without compensation and without any provisions to protect families from the disastrous consequences of unemployment.”402 Wages were ultimately increased. Comparing the first of the demands listed earlier in this chapter with the figures provided in the work by Paul Bonmartel, Le Trait, cité nouvelle, we note that nearly all the workers’ claims were met: “We obtained four categories [of remuneration]: the first, five francs fifty; the second, five francs;

402 H. Nitot, memoirs, op. cit.

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skilled worker, four francs twenty; ordinary worker, three francs eighty, plus an 8% bonus.”403 Workers received substantial back pay at the end of October 1936. At the end of the day, ACSM headcount remained stable between 1935 and 1936.404 “L’Incomprise,” “Cérès” and the others 1937 saw three launches: the tugboat “Saint Louis” on 28 January, the torpedo boat “L’Incomprise” on 14 April and the torpedo boat “Bouclier” on 10 August. Ordered by the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise et Péninsulaire de Navigation, the keel of an 8,960-dwt mixed cargo ship, the “Malgache,” was laid in slip 2 on 28 May 1937. Slips 1 and 6 were occupied; the former by the motor cargo ship “François L.D” which was launched on 3 May 1938, and the latter by the submarine “Cérès” which was launched on 9 December 1938. The “Malgache” was the last vessel to be launched before the outbreak of the Second World War. The launch of the “Malgache” on 19 July 1939: final moment of community Despite the social tensions and the threat of war, ship launches provided the cornerstone for a true moment of connection for the Le Trait community. The shipyard was the gathering place for the entire population. A journalist present at the launch of the “Malgache” on 19 July 1939 depicted the enthusiasm continuing to reign in Le Trait: “No matter how many ship launches one has attended, at each new ‘christening,’ at the very moment when the boat makes contact with its element, at the very moment when its metal frame first glides into the waters on which it will sail, at the very moment when, just seconds before, what had been a soulless mass becomes a true ship with its own personality, the spectator always experiences that same poignant emotion. The launch was scheduled for 2.45 p.m.; crowds started pouring in at 2 p.m. and half an hour later, when the VIPs began to fill the official rostrum built against the bulbous prow of the ‘Malgache,’ the slipways and neighbouring embankments were already full of people. Wielding massive sledgehammers, workers knocked away the final chocks. At exactly 2.48 p.m., the brace holding the ship to its berth was removed. For an

instant, the ‘Malgache’ remained immobile, then ever so slowly ‘set off.’ Representing Mr Chappedelaine, Minister for the Merchant Navy, Mr Léon George, Director General of the Ship Registration and Director of the commercial fleet, smashed the traditional bottle of champagne – in the name of ‘Marianne,’ the sole godmother of ships! – against the hull. One split second of anguish: would the ship depart? As a ray of sunlight shyly pierced through the clouds, the ‘Malgache’ glided little by little, imperceptibly at first, then markedly, down the slipway. The white and red mass, with its multicoloured signal code flags flapping in the strong wind, entered its element to the sound of the wind and water. Applause rang out, the ACSM brass band played ‘La Marseillaise,’ the freighter gathered speed, heaved into the Seine, dragging with it the retaining cables, those heavy masses of steel that slowed its course. The launch was a magnificent success, and the ‘Malgache’ itself joyously saluted its christening with loud siren blasts.”405 Starting in 1938, the looming war and France’s desire to build up its war fleet increased the activity of the shipyards. After military defeat, new problems were to arise: how to maintain operations under the German occupation? For whom should work be undertaken while taking into account social imperatives: providing employment for ACSM staff; economic necessities: survival – and patriotism: not betray their own?

403 P. Bonmartel, op. cit., p. 114. 404 Recap of personnel hired and settled.

405 Journal de Rouen, 20 July 1939.

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19 July 1939: launch of the “Malgache,” a mixed cargo ship for the NCHP

Speech given by Hypolite Worms May “the worldwide fleet remaining at the disposal of the Allies […] embrace the task that lies ahead” Gentlemen, The ship in front of you, the “Malgache,” which the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime will soon have the honour of launching, is a 9000-ton freighter. One of its characteristics is that it was ordered by the State and constructed on its behalf. The State – a shipowner! Is that good or bad? Suffice it to say that this undoubtedly reflects the inability of many shipowners to renew their fleets. In this case, it is a good thing, since the operation of this beautiful vessel has been assigned for the next twenty years to a private shipping company, the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de

Navigation (NCHP), enabling it to operate its shipping line in the Indian Ocean under the best of conditions. I would have very much liked this ceremony to have been presided over by the head of the Department to which the “Malgache” belongs, Mr Louis de Chappedelaine, Minister for the Merchant Navy; and I know that I speak on your behalf when I express our disappointment over his absence, and our regret that outside circumstances prevented him from granting our ardent wish. I would have enjoyed the opportunity to tell him how much we appreciate his prodigious endeavours to improve the fortunes of our Merchant Navy, and to thank him for the noteworthy decision he recently took, in conjunction with the Minister for Finance, to adopt measures encouraging the realisation of an initial construction plan of 100,000 tons. Mr de Chappedelaine is represented by Mr George, General Administrator of the Ship Registration, the new head of the commercial fleet who has already won over the hearts of all those in Paris previously unacquainted with him. His arrival was preceded by the reputation he garnered among those who had prior opportunity to appreciate his attributes, throughout his brilliant career, be it in Le Havre during the war where, under difficult conditions, he played a key role; or in Nantes, as Director of the Ship Registration, or more recently in Bordeaux and Le Havre. I wish you the best of luck, Mr George, in accomplishing the difficult task entrusted to you. Certainly, the chair you occupy is no place to put your feet up, but you will be assisted in your sometimes arduous and ungrateful task by the groundwork of your two predecessors, Mssrs André Haarbleicher and Jean Marie. I know these two great public servants well, and since I have occasion to mention them, allow me to express herewith, Gentlemen, my regret that circumstances have deprived us of the presence of Mr Haarbleicher among us today, but our memories of him are far from vanishing.

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May I also say how pleased I am to greet the Chairman, Jean Marie, here today. He has left his desk to take charge of Compagnie Générale Transatlantique – CGT. Never an easy task, but his past guarantees the future, and I have no doubt that the experience accumulated during his intelligent and robust career will enable him, with the assistance of my friend, Mr Cangardel, who has accomplished so much for the CGT to overcome all difficulties and reach his intended goal. My dear Chairman, my very best wishes to you! I would also like to welcome the Honourable Prefect, thanking him for agreeing to set aside his preoccupying tasks and demonstrate his interest in an industry of such vital importance to our country. We have been under his authority for nearly two years now, and with every passing day we have greater reason to be proud that King Louis IX under his oak tree did not render justice more righteously than Mr Verlomme, in the performance of his duties as the government representative in the Seine-Inférieure. I am highly obliged for the kind words he has just spoken, which I wish to interpret as a testimony to his kind friendship. Mr André Marie, former Under-Secretary of State and MP for our arrondissement, leaves a great void in this gathering. Circumstances prevented him from joining us as usual. I know that we are all of like mind when I express my regret that he is not among us today. I am very pleased to note the presence of Mr Veyssière, Senator of this department, and more specifically of this region. His role in the Upper House, especially on agricultural questions where he is an eminent and heeded expert, would lead us to believe that his actions are limited to that area, given the size of the task: yet his title of Vice Chairman of the Navy in the Senate, where he plays such an important role, and his presence here today, demonstrate that he is in no way indifferent to shipping issues. I thank him wholeheartedly for having wanted to join us today. My respectful greetings go out to Admiral Lacaze from the French Academy, a former Minister for the Navy whose presence honours the Board of Directors of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation, of which he is Vice Chairman. May he forgive me if I am unable to let this occasion pass without expressing all the sentiments he inspires through the services he has rendered and continues to render, unceasingly and tirelessly, to the country, in particular

to his devotion to a vast array of social projects. We expect to soon see Léonus Bénard, Senator from La Réunion. Despite his uncertain state of health, Mr Bénard has insisted on attending the launch of the “Malgache.” Accordingly, I will have the opportunity to tell him how much we appreciate his visit and how we regret that we were unable to receive him at this table. We appreciate that he is being represented by his son-in-law, Mr Declère, Delegated Administrator of [the sugar company] “Paris-Bourbon.” Madagascar has sent four of its delegates from the Supreme Council for French Overseas Territories: - Mr Boussenot: everyone knows how he has worked incessantly to defend the interests of the Madagascar and consequently to improve the shipping links uniting France with its colonies in the Indian Ocean; - Mr Poletti: a new delegate but one who has long been a conscientious and well-informed expert on issues he has made a personal commitment to study with a view to being able to better monitor and resolve them. He was also severely wounded in the Great War, and I am honoured to welcome him here; - Mr Gruet from the Comoro Islands: several of his interventions have demonstrated his common sense and the in-depth care with which he examines the issues raised at the Supreme Council for French Overseas Territories; - Last but not least, Mr Radalojane, who, as the newly appointed delegate from Madagascar, is here to strengthen ties with France. We have the good fortune of welcoming Mr Guinaudeau, member of the financial delegations, who has come in his capacity as Head of the Madagascar Delegation to the colonial empire festivals. A cordial welcome to Chairman Chaudun of the Banque de Madagascar, whose presence here came as no surprise to me since he is a long-standing friend. Believe me, Gentlemen, in no way have I forgotten the presence here of Mr Tasso. I have waited somewhat before wishing him welcome, intent on highlighting the fact that this day owes so much to him: was he not the author of the law that made the construction of the “Malgache” possible? Was he not the one who assigned its management to the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation? It is only fitting for me to seize the opportunity afforded me here to speak to you briefly about the colonial work done by the former Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy.

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The Tasso Law of 12 July 1934 is well known for the assistance it provided for private shipping. Designed to stave off the unemployment of mariners, it enabled French shipping companies to keep going, despite the “crisis” and despite their specific burdens. Lesser known is the other Tasso Law of 6 August 1933, the goal of which was to maintain colonial traffic within the purview of our national shipping. Recognising that a considerable effort had to be made for economic reasons in times of peace and out of vital necessity in times of conflict, he had this law adopted. It requires that colonial products, benefiting from an incentive – in other words, whose production enjoys protection – be transported by ships flying the national flag. Three years later, seizing the occasion of the law on equipment, Mr Tasso ordered construction of two banana boats and three freighters, capable of reaching speeds of 17 knots, to begin immediately, for the primary purpose of ensuring communications between France and its overseas territories. The Law of 23 July 1937 fine-tuned this work through allowing these ships to be operated by private shipping companies. The “Malgache” is one of these vessels and, by attending its launch, Mr Tasso gives proof that he does not intend to lose interest in his children. I congratulate and thank him. These measures, taken over the past five years, along with the endeavours of Mr de Chappedelaine, have no doubt led to more orders for ships being placed with the shipyards, but only within certain limits. Unfortunately, the shipyards have only partially benefited, as these limits were quickly reached: - on the one hand, as I will say shortly, shipping companies need access to affordable funding; - on the other, because shipyard capacities are being absorbed by the prompt implementation of the naval programs, dictated by these troubled times. Filled with war vessels, their building berths can handle very few merchant vessels. But this is only a short-lived scenario. The effort requested of the people cannot be prolonged indefinitely. Either there will be war, and I am unfortunately in a position to gauge the extent of the effort needed in order for that portion of the worldwide fleet remaining at the disposal of the Allies to embrace the task that lies ahead. Or, with friends and adversaries on their last legs, a period of calm will follow the fever, with shipyards able to proceed with rejuvenating the fleets. The measures taken by Mr Tasso

and Mr de Chappedelaine will therefore need a sequel. Thus, Gentlemen, a substantial task is arising for shipbuilding, but its accomplishment, while our shipyards are supposed to be in a situation similar to our foreign competition, is dependent on shipping companies having the means to place orders; in other words, given their lack of money, they need to be able to find ways to borrow at reasonable rates. And so, I have come to talk about the protective measures needing to be taken in these troubled times in support of French shipping companies, if we want them to maintain their operations, particularly their regular lines, if we want them to replace their outdated ships and equipment, if we want them to avoid near extinction due to a “fall in the birth rate” [of new ships], to use a barbaric neologism. Before addressing the kind ship charterers at the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation who were truly intent on attending this ceremony, may I first be permitted to thank them for coming. Shall I greet them one by one? The list is long and time is short, because the tide won’t wait. May they allow me, very simply but very warmly, to say how touched I am by the sacrifice they willingly made, for their time is precious, to attend the launch ceremony for the “Malgache.” The builders of this modern, fast boat express their wish that it help them prosper. Good fortune has made me head of the Board of Directors of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation; and, even though I invited you, I, too, along with the entire board, happen to be a guest, your colleague, among fellow charterers! Your colleague, but also your supplier of freight. For this reason, a short while ago I expressed my desire to talk to you about the issues confronting the Merchant Navy, the vitality of which you are more aware of than the average Frenchman. Among these issues, there is one I would like to broach, one that is incessantly topical: protection. A recent decree issued by the Minister for the Colonies has just made it even more topical. This creates exit duties applicable to products destined for France and set to be loaded on tramp ships, i.e. on vessels not belonging to a regular line. Whereas it was readily accepted by the vast majority of exporters of colonial products, it – this decree – has its detractors and critics who are harsher than justified. First of all, does our Merchant Navy need to be protected? So much 175

has already been said on this subject, and my friend, Mr Jacques Marchegay, Secretary General of the Central Committee of French Shipowners, whom I have great pleasure of seeing here today, has on numerous occasions highlighted this necessity, with his much-appreciated charming talent. Is there at present a single industry in France that could – I will desist from using the term ‘export,’ replacing it with ‘supply’ – its products to the domestic market, were it not protected by customs rights or quotas, or both? Is there any agricultural product not covered by protective laws in France? Yet the Merchant Navy, which works on an international scale and which, every time a further national activity becomes “protected,” registers a further decline in the volume of potential cargoes, is not seen as an industry in need of being defended. This need is all the more urgent when colonial sea traffic is involved: were the national shipping connections linking France to its overseas territories to disappear, what would happen in the event of a conflict, once the Allied merchant fleets become insufficient to supply their own countries, while the neutrals would try to shy away from the supply requests and then offer their services at prices which those of the last war only hinted at. The response to this question led to the Decree-Law of 30 June 1934, authorising the government, by simple decree, to take measures benefitting vessels flying the national flag, allowing them to exclusively transport any colonial product deemed necessary to keep in French hands. Protecting the “flag” is but one aspect of the problem. We must also defend our regular shipping lines. These lines are indeed subject to costly rules, especially in the case of Madagascar. The rules dictate costly regular services, requiring stops in all ports, in all harbours, regardless of the quantity of merchandise to be dropped off or taken on, regardless of whether there are facilities for handling operations, regardless of the value of the freight. And we would allow these companies to be ruined by tramp ships, nearly all of which are foreign and often subsidised by their governments, which reject the often onerous cost of an outbound trip undertaken with an insufficient load; which only stop off at convenient ports where loading and unloading are performed quickly; where cargoes of coffee beans and other rewarding or abundant products await them; by tramp ships focused solely on rewarding ports of call; which arrive and depart at their convenience, without

concern for the interest of the shipper who is nothing but a passing client; which have no reason to honour this policy of cross-subsidising freight rates adopted over time by the regular shipping lines, paying dearly for expensive and protected products, and cheaply for inexpensive merchandise, with prices descending perhaps not as low as the minimum level in times of crisis, but not rising to the maximum in periods of euphoria. Believe me, Gentlemen, it would be the end if foreign tramp ships were to take control in Madagascar. The regular lines would only be able to maintain their operations by imitating their competitors; and you, better than anyone, know that your interests would be in greater danger than theirs. Mr Mandel understood this. At a time when every gesture resounds with diplomatic “strategy” and not wanting to use the weapon provided to him by the Decree of 30 June 1934 authorising the Minister, if needed, to dictate that certain products be transported under the French flag, he created exit duties to be levied when products are not transported by the regular lines. Is there anything reproachable about such a measure? For making shipping companies overly brazen in the setting of their freight rates? Gentlemen, remember that, under the Agreement of 29 December 1920, the government has a right to oversee the rates of the contractual services of Messageries Maritimes. The other regular shipping lines are in nearly obligatory agreement with the Messageries and have undertaken to set their rates accordingly. For eliminating competition? No, because the measure taken by the Minister for the Colonies has no other effect than to bring the freight rates offered by these tramp ships up to levels considered reasonable by the public authorities. It is a measure similar to the one protecting the automotive industry and many others. With prices equal, what matters is the quality of service. For allowing shipping companies to earn too much money? Gentlemen, I sincerely hope to see this fear come true one day. But rest assured, we are not there yet! Indeed, we are even very far from it. What is more, I mentioned earlier that no French shipping company has been able to set aside – nowhere near, in fact – the sums needed to renew its fleet, which explain the government’s order for the “Malgache,” its two sister ships and two banana boats.

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I am going to provide some figures: if such-and-such company owned ten vessels – a modest number for a regular oceangoing line – purchased between 10 and 20 years ago at an average unit cost of five million – a normal price; in two decades, the company would need to save: 30,000,000 x 10 = 300,000,000, if the laws on shipping loans persist, and more than 40 million x 10 = 400 million, if not. Need I say more? Enough, Gentlemen, of this incursion into a field affecting all of us. The Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation will continue to do its utmost to satisfy its loyal customers. Its task will be made easier by the close ties – which I hope will become even closer – to the other shipping companies who share this traffic, especially with the contractual services offered by Messageries Maritimes. The task will be easy and pleasant: following a recent move we now have a man at the helm of this major shipping company who sets an example: throughout his career, he has earned the admiration of all those who have seen him at work, who have been able to appreciate his selfless devotion to public service, his prodigious activity, his intelligence, his appetite for work and his energy, whether during the war, where his heroic conduct earned him three citations and later, the rank of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour, and concurrently, the admiration of all, particularly of his men; or at the Ministry of Finance where in recent times he headed the department of finance and state holdings. I am referring to Chairman Bourgier, to whom I extend my heartfelt thanks for taking time away from his desk to honour this ceremony with his presence.

And now, Gentlemen, before gathering in Le Trait, I ask you to raise your glasses to the successful career of the “Malgache,” which I hope will be long and prosperous. - to its inventor, Mr Tasso, who made its construction possible; - to the engineers, foremen, shift supervisors and workers who contributed to creating this splendid vessel; - to our partners in this task, the engineers and personnel of Maison Sulzer, the company responsible for building the engine; I raise my glass to the Honourable Prefect, to the members of Parliament and to the officials who have honoured this assembly with their presence. - to our guests, particularly those who, engaging in trade with our colonies in the Indian Ocean, are the customers of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation. Thanking them for their faithful dedication and spirit of partnership demonstrated to this day, I drink to the prosperity of their business affairs, for the greatest good of all, and by extension, of the country; - to the shipowners, and I use the plural because there are two: - the first shipowner, the Minister for the Merchant Navy in the person of Mr de Chappedelaine and his distinguished representative, its Director, Mr George; - and the second, the shipowner-operator, namely the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation; - and to my board colleagues, to its seafaring and office employees, whose efforts have enabled and will enable this shipping company to regain the leading role played in the Indian Ocean for so long by this long-established Le Havre company.

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1939–1944 Under the yoke of the German occupiers and the Allied air raids

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Preamble The Second World War is the best-documented period in the history of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime (ACSM), as information was collected for the purpose of: - the investigation, entrusted by the occupation authorities to the Deutsche Treuhand und Revisionsgesellschaft and conducted from June 1941, for more than a year, of all Worms & Cie business activities; - the legal proceedings brought against Hypolite Worms, as the main General Partner of the company, and Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie,406 head of the Worms & Cie Banking Services, between 23 September 1944, the date on which they were indicted for collaborating with the enemy, and 25 October 1946, the date on which the Court of Justice dismissed the case. The investigation of this case produced a large amount of memos, historical background information, minutes, copies of letters, etc., submitted by Maison Worms and its branches to Gaston Bernard, the chartered accountant appointed by Judge Thirion and the author of a report counting more than 700 pages.407 These items have all been preserved in the Worms archives, as are the minutes to the interrogations, staff depositions and testimonies of individuals not belonging to the company. A portion of these documents can also be consulted in the French National Archives (Caran).408

On 25 September 1944, Hypolite Worms told two of his closest colleagues, Robert Labbé409 and Raymond Meynial,410 that “the operations at Le Trait seem to be the main grievance noted in the seized files.”411 The accusation “of having delivered military equipment to Germany in order to help the Reich pursue its hostilities”412 was also at the heart of an exchange between Hypolite Worms and the members of an American mission who came to question him on 5 October 1944, during his over four-month imprisonment in Fresnes.413 “It would seem,” said one of these “visitors,” “that you are accused of building submarines for the Germans, yet during their construction, you forewarned British authorities who then sank the vessels after they left the shipyard?” Hypolite Worms replied: “The truth is that my shipyard with its eight slipways delivered a total of two ships in four years414 to the Germans, ships belonging to the French Government and delivered in accordance with its formal orders; it took the shipyard three years to finish these two ships which should have been finished four to six months after the Armistice. […] I [am] probably the last Frenchman to be a threat and […] certainly the one who worked the least with the Germans.” In a memo sent to Robert Labbé on 11 December 1944, he recalled: “At our first meeting with Mr Thirion, we expressed our desire that he be fully apprised of all the activities of our group. From that point onwards, we gave him the constant impression that we ourselves,

406 Previously Director of the Banque de Paris et des PaysBas, posted to the Banque Franco-Polonaise in Katowice, Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie, in July 1929, joined the Worms & Cie Banking Services, created one year earlier (July 1928). Initially an authorised representative, he was appointed Director in June 1936. 407 The document may be consulted on the website: www. wormsetcie.com. 408 Cf. [references] Z/6/NL/74; F/12/9566; F/7/15343 and F/12/10273.

409 A grandson of Henri Goudchaux, Robert Labbé became an authorised representative of Worms & Cie in May 1938. 410 Coming from the Société Générale, where he had been an inspector, Raymond Meynial entered the Worms & Cie Banking Services in October 1932 as an authorised representative. 411 Memo may be consulted on the website: www.worms etcie.com. 412 Excerpt from a report entitled Note sur l’activité des chantiers du Trait depuis le 25 juin 1940, dated 29 October 1944 and addressed to Mr Lénard, lawyer for Hypolite Worms in the case referred to here. 413 Hypolite Worms was arrested on 7 September 1944 and imprisoned in Fresnes from 14 September 1944 until 21 January 1945. 414 In fact, three vessels were delivered, as we shall see later; but in this interview, Hypolite Worms referred solely to the two vessels ordered by the French Admiralty and launched on behalf of the Kriegsmarine (German War Navy); the third, a barge, was an order from the German Merchant Navy.

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September 1939: general mobilisation in France

with utmost loyalty, would keep him informed of all the documentation in the W file, thus forming the basis for the trust he showed in us.” This desire for transparency and the focus of the investigation on shipbuilding explain the abundance of testimonies stemming from ACSM or referring to it. The history of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime during the Second World War spanned three time periods: - the first phase extended from the outbreak of hostilities (3 September 1939) to the Armistice (22 June 1940), a stage during which shipbuilding operations and life within the workers’ housing estate carried on without any great difference to peacetime. This all changed however when the fighting reached Le Trait, forcing the population and workforce to take the road; - the second phase ran from the re-opening of the shipyard on 25 June 1940 to the Franco-German Agreement of 16 September 1941, a period characterised by frictions between the Occupier, which demanded that shipbuilders in the occupied zone take part in the fight against England, at the risk of contravening the clauses set forth in the Armistice Agreement, and the French

Government which, as a means of obtaining quid pro quos for the Reich’s confiscation of the country’s resources, put obstacles in the way of shipbuilding and engaged in a showdown (or a war of attrition) with the Germans, though with the shipbuilders bearing all the risks (intimidation, reprisals, etc.); - the third period extended from autumn 1941 to the liberation of the Le Trait shipyard (30 August 1944), a period during which ACSM, by dint of evasions and tergiversations, succeeded in delaying ship launches to the greatest possible extent, but also a period from which the shipyard emerged devastated by Allied air raids. Most of the documents produced or received by Worms & Cie or ACSM and quoted in this chapter may be consulted on the website, www.wormsetcie.com; they are classified according to their publication date (yyyy/ mm/dd).

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From the Phoney War to the Blitzkrieg (September 1939 to June 1940) “Nothing noteworthy happened for several months” Henri Nitot, memoirs

Maintaining “a somewhat satisfactory financial balance” Henri Nitot, memoirs

After the intense concerns of the years 1932–1936, the contracts concluded with the Navy – for six submarines, the “Antiope” (1931), “Amazone” (1931), “Oréade” (1932), “La Sibylle” (1933), “Vénus” (1935) and “Cérès” (1938), and two torpedo boats, “L’Incomprise” and “Bouclier” (1937) – enabled the shipyard to maintain a somewhat satisfactory financial balance. Apart from the warships, the tonnage launched from the ACSM slipways between 1930 and 1938 represented 10.415% of French shipping production. In 1938 alone, this figure reached 12.05%, or 5,700 tons, out of a total of 47,290 tons. Between 1936 and June 1940, the following vessels were launched: - motor cargo ship, “François L.D” 4,580 tons - mixed cargo ship, “Malgache” 6,000 tons - tugboat, “Saint Louis” 325 tons - torpedo boat, “L’Incomprise” 609 tons - submarine, “Cérès” 600 tons - torpedo boat, “Bouclier” 609 tons - collier, “Danaé” 2,000 tons - four submarine chasers, Nos. 13–16 456 tons - steam collier, “Égée” 2,000 tons - collier, “Dioné” 2,000 tons 415 for a total of 19,179 tons “French shipbuilding was basically in the hands of fifteen large private shipyards. This capacity was to a limited extent complemented by the French Navy’s dockyards (Brest and Lorient) and the small river shipyards. Over a period of twenty years, these shipyards

415 These figures were mentioned by G. Bernard in his report of 31 December 1945; they correspond more or less to the gross tonnage.

combined constructed nearly 800,000 tons of merchant vessels and 700,000 tons of warships. Using 72 slipways, the annual construction capacity of these fifteen shipyards was 250,000 tons […] produced by a workforce […] numbering nearly 35,000. By contrast, the Navy’s dockyards employed 40,000 workers, nearly one third of whom worked on maintenance work.”416 The last vessel launched at ACSM before war broke out was the “Malgache,” a 8,960-dwt mixed cargo ship. Constructed in slipway No. 2 under construction No. 87, it was fitted out by the French Government.417 Its launch on 19 July 1939 was celebrated by Hypolite Worms418 in his twin capacity as head of ACSM and Chairman On board the “Danaé” launched on 21 May 1936 (Joseph Kerdraon collection)

416 Claude Huan, with the assistance of François Bréchat, “La construction navale française 1940-1942,” Études d’histoire maritime, No. 1, 1990/1991. 417 The order for this vessel was part of a programme to renew the French merchant fleet, introduced in 1936 by the Under-Secretary for the Navy. Two other fast freighters of the same tonnage and with similar specifications were constructed, one by the Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde, the other by the Société Provençale de Constructions Navales. See Charles Limonier, Les 110 ans de la Havraise péninsulaire, Éditions P. Tacussel, 1992, pp. 193–199. 418 His speech is reproduced on pages 173–177. Hypolite Worms had been Chairman of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire since 1934.

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of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation, a shipping company rescued by Maison Worms between 1929 and 1934, and to whose management the “Malgache” had just been assigned. At that time, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime was the leading company in the SeineMaritime department by virtue of the number and skills of its workforce. Between 1,324 (31 December 1938) and 1,483 employees (31 December 1939) worked for the company, under the direction of Pierre Abbat who worked on-site and Henri Nitot who had been based in Paris since 1936, the year in which “the complexity [of the] tasks” made it “necessary to split the duties between a local management team in Le Trait and a general management team based […] with the Worms & Cie’s General Partners.”419 “Sheltered by the Siegfried and Maginot Lines” The Journal de la Compagnie navale Worms, 1982

On 1 September 1939, at the height of several months of international tensions, the Wehrmacht crossed the Polish border, violating Poland’s territory and sovereignty. The French Government, under its President of the Council, Édouard Daladier,420 decreed general mobilisation. Two days later, on 3 September 1939, Great Britain, through the voice of its Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain;421 and France declared war on Germany, thus fulfilling their commitment of mutual assistance towards Poland.422 “Sheltered by the Siegfried and Maginot Lines, it was a ‘Phoney War’ to start with, a period of suspense interrupted here and there by a few local border skirmishes.”423 Upon French mobilisation, all French merchant vessels over 500 tons were requisitioned. Of the twenty-four vessels making up the

419 Henri Nitot, memoirs, non dated printed text, private archives. 420 Édouard Daladier was appointed President of the Council following the resignation of Léon Blum (20 April 1938). 421 Sir Arthur Neville Chamberlain had been serving as Prime Minister of Great Britain since 28 May 1937. 422 Anglo-Polish Agreement of 25 August 1939. 423 Le Journal de la compagnie navale Worms, Éditions PEP, 1982, p. 52.

Worms fleet,424 fifteen were chartered by the Maritime Transport Department, while eight were integrated into the third squadron of coastal patrol-boats attached to the Northern Maritime Forces, under the command of the French Navy. Deprived of the direct command of its ships, Worms & Cie suspended operations of its international cabotage lines. In Le Trait, “out of 1,100 men who could be mobilised, 700 were specially assigned to continue work in the shipyard.”425 To avoid the disorganisation of industry, and shipbuilding in particular, which had paralysed the country in 1914–1918, the authorities made sure this time that, in the event of conflict, key sectors of the economy and defence would have sufficient labour to maintain operations. Even so, a large number of ACSM workers were still conscripted, with their departure upsetting – at least momentarily – work in the company and life in the workers’ housing estate. “The mobilisation,” noted Henri Nitot, “took place in an atmosphere of sombre acceptance, with the ‘Phoney War’ dragging On the Maginot Line – construction of a mortar launcher shelter (http://francois.munier2.free.fr collection)

424 With a total gross tonnage of 31,235 tons (of 2.83 m3), the Worms fleet, as of 1 September 1939, constituted 1.03% of the French fleet. With their total displacement of 41,400 tons, its twenty-four freighters were all registered in Le Havre. See Worms & Cie memos of 11–13 June 1941 and 21 January 1942. 425 Cf. Paul Bonmartel, Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, 1917-1972, Luneray, Bertout, 1997, p. 47.

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on for several months, a sad period sapping the morale of our armed forces.”426 The ACSM order book at the time was made up of fifteen vessels intended for the French Navy: eight Class 2 submarines (for coastal protection) belonging to the “Aurore” series,427 four of which were under construction: Financing

No.

Slipway Placed in slip* Keel laid**

“La Favorite” (Q 195)

1937 tranche

29.07.1938 07.11.1938

“L’Africaine” (Q 196)

1937 tranche

01.09.1938 09.11.1938

“L’Andromaque” (Q 203) 1938 tranche

10.07.1939 10.07.1939

“L’Armide” (Q 207)

01.11.1939 16.03.1940

1938 bis tranche

- three “L’Adour”-class oil tankers, for the rapid refuelling of warships at sea:429 Financing

No.

“La Charente” 1938 bis tranche 95

Contract/ Slipway Keel laid** Order* 27.02.1939 1 04.05.1939

“La Mayenne” 1938 bis tranche 97

27.02.1939 8

21.09.1939

“La Baïse”

25.08.1939 2

30.05.1940

1938 bis tranche 99

*http://www.postedeschoufs.com. **Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1987.

The steam collier “Égée” (construction No. 94) occupied slipway No. 7. Intended for the Société Navale Caennaise, it was the last in a series of four ships, two of which, “Danaé” and “Dioné,” were built by ACSM and launched in 1936.430 The keel of the “Égée” was laid on 2 November 1938.

*http://forum.netmarine.net: “La Saga des sous-marins de la classe ‘Aurore.’” **Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1987.

Boilermaking shop (Le Trait Naval d’Hier collection)

- four Class 5 submarine chasers:428 Financing*

No.

Slipway Keel laid**

1937

16.02.1939

N° 14 – “CH 14” Diélette 1937

16.02.1939

N° 15 – “CH 15” Paimpol 1937

27.02.1939

N° 16 – “CH 16” Nantes

27.02.1939

N° 13 – “CH 13” Calais

1937

*http://forummarine.forumactif.com: “Une marine française alternative”. **Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1987.

426 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 427 Specifications of the submarine, “Aurore”: displacement: 893 tons surfaced and 1,170 tons submerged; length: 73.50 m; width: 6.50 m; draught: 3.50 m; power: 3,000-HP/1,400-HP; 15 kn surfaced / 9 kn submerged; maximum submersion: 100 m; armament (original): 1 x 100-mm cannon; 2 x 13.2 mm; 9 torpedo tubes (4 bow, 3 external, 2 stern) – ref. http://forum.netmarine.net. 428 French warships: length: 37.10 m; width: 5.50 m; draught: 1.95 m; displacement (fully loaded): 137 t; powered by two Man 1,130-HP engines, they reached speeds of 15.5 knots. They were armed with 1 x 75-mm gun; 4 x 8 mm anti-aircraft machine guns; 2 x ASM mortars and 6 x submarine grenades. They were crewed by 23 men – ref. https://forumactif.com.

429 With a length of 132 m; a width of 16 m; empty tonnage of 4,500 t and fully loaded at 12,100 t; power of 5,200-HP; and speeds of 15 kn, “L’Adour” was launched on 9 October 1938, by the Société Provençale de Construction Navale, located in La Ciotat. It was the prototype for six refuelling vessels financed in the 1936–1938 tranches. Source: https:// clausuchronia.wordpress.com. 430 The fourth freighter, named “Phryné,” was built by the Ateliers & Chantiers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët).

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Ships under construction for the French Navy in early 1939

Submarines “La Favorite” and “L’Africaine”

Submarine chasers Ω “CH 13” à “CH 16”

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branches in England and Egypt, prior to assuming his duties as Managing Director in May 1928. Together with Hypolite Worms, Jacques Barnaud helped establish the Banking Services of Worms & Cie in July 1928. He became General Partner on 1 January 1930.

Jacques Barnaud (1893–1962)

General management on official missions Like the three other divisions of Maison Worms (Fuel Merchanting Services, Shipping Services and Banking Services), ACSM was managed by the Worms & Cie’s General Partners, established as a limited partnership and headquartered at 45, Boulevard Haussmann in Paris since 1878, and whose capital of 4,000,000 F was distributed among the heirs of the founder, Hypolite Worms (1801–1877) and his successor, Henri Goudchaux (1846–1916).431 Management was in the hands of Hypolite Worms, grandson and namesake of the former, Michel Goudchaux, son of the latter, and Jacques Barnaud. Born on 24 February 1893, graduated from the higher-education establishment, the École Polytechnique, and a former Finance Inspector, where he served as Deputy Director for General Movement of Funds, Jacques Barnaud made the rounds at Maison Worms for one year. This took him to the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, then to the Worms

431 The limited partners descending from Hypolite Worms were the descendants of his son, Lucien (1839–1914) and his daughter, Emma (1842–1926); descendants of Lucien included Hypolite Worms (born in 1889), Mrs Marcel Razsovich (born in 1886) and the heirs of the late Mrs Leroy; while the descendants of Emma included: Mrs FauchierMagnan (born in 1878); Mrs Fauchier-Delavigne (born in 1883), and Mrs Lebel (born in 1881). The limited partners descending from Henri Goudchaux were his two children, Michel Goudchaux (born in 1880) and Mrs Labbé (born in 1877). At the beginning of 1940, the capital was increased to 40 million francs by incorporation of reserves.

Jacques Barnaud at the Ministry of Armaments, then of Finance An officer mobilised to the front in the 1914–1918 war,432 Jacques Barnaud was placed on special assignment by the Ministry of National Defence for a period of three months from the day of mobilisation in order “to manage the Worms fleets [including NCHP and SFTP] and the maritime branches [...] that Maison Worms had established in all the major French ports and in a number of foreign ports.”433 In October 1939, Raoul Dautry,434 Minister for Armaments at the time, suggested that Jacques Barnaud lead the French Procurement Mission in the Scandinavian Countries, given his deep knowledge of the region gained through the business relations developed there by the Worms & Cie Banking Services. Two months later, in December 1939, Paul Reynaud and Yves Bouthillier435 appointed him to the Ministry of Finance, in charge of dealing with foreign payment issues, in particular, the availability of currency in France and the control of purchases abroad. “In fact,” stated Jacques Barnaud in 1950,436 “I resumed the duties I had had fifteen years earlier, when I served as Deputy Director for the General Movement of Funds. Each day, I spent two to three hours at the Ministry of Finance, and one hour at the Ministry of Armaments, before trying as best as I could to handle any problems that had arisen at Maison Worms.” His task was made even more difficult due to the fact that Hypolite Worms himself had been in London since the end of November 1939, working there for an undetermined period of time.

432 See memo on Jacques Barnaud, undated, available on the website: www.wormsetcie.com – archives 1945. 433 Excerpt from the hearing of Jacques Barnaud before Commission President Dhers, on 2 May 1950. 434 Raoul Dautry was Minister for Armaments from 20 September 1939 to 16 June 1940 (during the governments of Édouard Daladier and Paul Reynaud). 435 Yves Bouthillier served as Secretary General to Paul Reynaud, appointed head of the Ministry of Finance in 1938. 436 Excerpt from the hearing of Jacques Barnaud, op. cit.

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Hypolite Worms in London On 23 November 1939, Anatole de Monzie,437 Minister for Transport and Public Works, and Alphonse Rio,438 Minister for the Merchant Navy, appointed Hypolite Worms as head of the French Delegation to the AngloFrench Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping in London, a body set up following the agreement concluded, on 16 November 1939, by Édouard Daladier439 and Neville Chamberlain,440 seeking to pool the two countries’ resources required to wage war. Each major sector – armaments, supplies, aeronautics, blockading, oil, coal and shipping – was represented by a committee seated in London and comprised of an equal number of French and English delegates. Shipping was the most important one, having as its goal to coordinate tonnage needs, negotiate charter agreements with allied and neutral governments and share out between France and England the volumes available under time charters.441 Hypolite Worms was appointed to this post on account of his competences in shipping and financial affairs: he was a shipowner – transporting freight by cabotage (Worms) or by ocean-going vessels (Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire); Chairman of an oil tanker company (Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, created on 19 September 1938); Director of the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest; but also a shipping agent, shipbuilder and banker (Worms & Cie Banking Services). Since 1925, he had also served as Treasurer of the Central Committee of French Shipowners. His skills, already tested during the First World War, were recognised by Anatole de Monzie, with whom he had established a close relationship during that conflict. His reputation and his

437 Having served as Minister for Transport and Public Works from 29 October 1925 to 23 June 1926, Anatole de Monzie regained this portfolio on 23 August 1938. On 5 June 1940, Ludovic Oscar Frossard replaced him in this capacity. 438 Appointed Minister for the Merchant Navy on 13 September 1939, Alphonse Rio remained in this position until 16 June 1940. 439 Édouard Daladier handed over leadership of the French Government to his Minister for Finance, Paul Reynaud, on 20 March 1940. Under pressure from the Radicals, Reynaud appointed Daladier Minister for National Defence and War. 440 Sir Arthur Neville Chamberlain was replaced as Prime Minister by Winston Churchill on 10 May 1940. 441 A time charter is a time-bound agreement. The shipowner leases a vessel to a charterer for a fixed period of time, as opposed to a charter party for a specific voyage.

relations within the French and international business worlds were as solid as his attachment to England: his wife, Gladys Mary Lewis Morgan, a native of Cardiff (where her father served as Lord Mayor), and his only daughter, Marguerite Viviane, resided in London with her first spouse, Robert W. K. Clive, a British subject, and their children. Hypolite Worms arrived in the City of London on 29 November 1939, accompanied by his two “secretaries,” Raymond Meynial and Robert Labbé. His mission statement set forth that he “will be responsible for representing France in all inter-allied negotiations regarding the purchase and chartering of neutral ships.” With this goal in mind, he managed to gain the assurance from the Ministry of Shipping that, from them on, no contract would be signed without the French delegation having participated in the negotiations. In addition, all tonnage agreements were now to be jointly signed by the representatives of the two countries. Up to then, the British Government had signed just one contract.442 Concluded with Norwegian shippers, the agreement covered 250,000 tons of freighters and 150 oil tankers of 10,000 tons on average. Since France had not participated in the discussions, it was unable to receive direct allocations; its role was limited to making monthly requests for the tonnages needed for oil imports, requests which were always granted. According to the Journal de la marine marchande of 11 January 1940, Hypolite Worms also obtained twentyfive to thirty small Norwegian colliers capable of transporting 75,000 to 80,000 tons per month, principally to small French ports. Furthermore, the Ministry of Shipping had unsuccessfully conducted negotiations with Greek shipowners. Hypolite Worms resumed the dialogue and, leaning on his personal connections with certain shipowners, obtained full power to negotiate singlehandedly on behalf of the two Allies. The subsequent agreement, signed jointly by both governments, guaranteed 500,000 tons of long-haul vessels under extremely favourable conditions, for the duration of the war.

442 A memo sent on 3 November 1939 by the Delegate of the Ministry of the Merchant Navy to the Ministry, a copy of which was sent to Hypolite Worms by Commander Le Terrier, provides an account of a draft tonnage agreement between the Swedish and British Governments, and the terms of an Anglo-Yugoslav agreement to charter ten ships.

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Hypolite Worms’ diplomatic passport – 28 November 1939

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At the same time, negotiations with the United States were underway to acquire several vessels. To avoid competition between the two Allies and a risk of overbidding, Hypolite Worms called on the British Government to coordinate the purchases and to arrange an equitable distribution thereafter. Likewise, on his initiative, he requested that the principle of pooling production capacities be applied to shipbuilding.443 Following approval by the British Cabinet, the agreement was confirmed by Alphonse Rio during a trip he made to London at the end of January 1940: the cost billed to France was to be exactly the same as that billed by English shipyards to their government. According to estimates, France would thus increase its annual capacity between 100,000 and 150,000 new tons. The events of May and June444 prevented the treaty from being signed, although all the terms were settled. Another extremely delicate area of involvement for the Shipping Executive was the supply of British coal to France. Following protracted negotiations, Hypolite Worms succeeded in greatly increasing the number of British freighters available to transport coal to France. Accordingly, French imports of coal were rose from approximately 500,000 tons in November 1939 to 1.3 million tons in May. By July, coal imports were supposed to reach 2 to 2.5 million tons per month, the volume that the French Ministry of Public Works considered sufficient. Also for the purpose of ensuring the energy autonomy of mainland France, around ten Norwegian oil tankers (50,000 tons in all) were to be ceded to the country. To fulfil these goals, a thorough knowledge of daily needs was needed, and of what the Merchant Navy lacked. Like the “Committee of Five” (see page 42) twenty-two years earlier, the Anglo-French Shipping

443 A memo sent by Henri Nitot to Hypolite Worms, on 6 February 1940, stipulated: “Carrying out the Merchant Navy construction programme envisioned by the Minister for the Merchant Navy is going to face numerous difficulties, not only for the supply of metal materials (the order notebook for the Comptoir Sidérurgique de France has reached three or four times the production capacity at the time), but also for the supply of ancillary equipment. Therefore, there is immediate reason to seek whatever assistance we can find in Great Britain to construct this equipment.” 444 The period between the launch of Germany’s “Case Yellow” (Fall Gelb): the invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (9–10 May 1940), and the signing of the Franco-German Armistice (22 June 1940).

Executive became a vast data collection and assessment centre for monitoring the status of the Merchant Navy and import needs. In addition to the Anglo-Greek agreement, contracts were concluded with: - the Swedish shipowners who made available to the Allies all Swedish ships not needed to supply their country; - the Danish, who gave a guarantee to list on the London freight market all ships not needed for imports. This agreement enabled France and England, on the day the Wehrmacht invaded Denmark (9 April 1940),445 to seize the Danish ships docked in Allied ports;446 - the Norwegian shipowners, who, when Germany overran their country (9 April to 8 June 1940),447 handed over practically their entire fleet to the Allies, with the exception of the freighters serving regular shipping lines outside Europe; - the Dutch who, when their territory was invaded (10 May 1940),448 adopted the same measures as the Norwegians.

445 Despite having signed a non-aggression treaty with Germany, Denmark was invaded on 9 April 1940, during “Operation Weserübung.” 446 On 13 April 1940, the Cherbourg-Éclair published the following information: “New York – The Danish Consulate announced that orders had been given to the 705 ships comprising the Danish merchant fleet to sail immediately to neutral ports, or to stay there, if already moored. Despite the repeated exhortations on German radio to captains of Danish ships at sea to go to a German or neutral port, the commanders of these vessels nearly all went to Allied ports, in accordance with the instructions issued to them by the Danish Consular representatives to France and England via TSF [maritime wireless telegraphy].” 447 To protect the port of Narvik and the “Iron Route” from the Germans, who were threatening to invade Norway, the Allies planned a military expedition to Norway in January 1940, under the pretext of helping Finland, which the Soviet Union had just attacked. On 27 March 1940, Hitler decided on a counter-offensive, launched on 9 April. Within just two days, the Germans took over nearly all Norwegian ports. The Norwegian Government went into exile in London. Between 3 and 8 June, the Allies tried to resist, but then took to sea to concentrate on operations in France. The Germans were to remain in Norway until the end of the war, holding a key position in Scandinavia. See La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, chronologie commentée, André Kaspi, Nicole Piétri, Ralph Schor, Bibliothèque Numérique Perrin, 2012, pp. 76–78. 448 On 10 May 1940 (the day on which Winston Churchill was called to replace Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister of Great Britain), Germany invaded the Netherlands, thus violating its neutrality.

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Launch of the steam collier “Égée” on 28 January 1940

“The storm broke out” Henri Nitot, Memoirs

Production continued in Le Trait without any serious problems until spring 1940. Pierre Abbat maintained contact with the employees who had left for war and their families, while additional soldiers mobilised as special assignments swelled the ranks of the employees. In fact, in a speech he gave in 1946,449 Hypolite Worms observed that “the workforce, initially disorganised by the mobilisation, grew gradually until it reached numbers that were higher at the beginning of 1940 […] than before the war.” According to a memo written in June 1941,450 1,250 people (250 engineers and whitecollar workers, and 1,000 blue-collar workers) worked at ACSM in June 1940. The first four months of 1940 were marked by the launch of three vessels: - 3,400-dwt steam collier “Égée” on 28 January 1940; - submarine chaser No. 13, on 23 March 1940; - submarine chaser No. 14, on 21 April 1940. And “then came the sudden announcement of the German attack, its rapid advance through the Ardennes: the storm broke out,” wrote Henri Nitot in his memoirs. The “lightning war” and the ensuing debacle On 10 May 1940, at 4.45 a.m., German squadrons bombed Belgian and French aerodromes, marking the first phase of the Blitzkrieg which brutally put an end to the “phoney war.” This surprise attack allowed the Third Reich to gain control of the air. On land, the Wehrmacht bypassed the Maginot Line, launching an offensive against Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

The Battle of the Netherlands lasted just one week;451 panic gripped the population. The Dutch, as well as the Belgian and Luxembourg Governments, appealed to France and Great Britain to come to their rescue. By order of General Gamelin, Chief of Staff for National

449 Excerpt from the speech given by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262). 450 Excerpt from a memo on ACSM dated 11 June 1941. According to the account drawn up by G. Bernard in his summary report of 31 December 1945, the total workforce rose to 1,076 persons as of 31 December 1940, including 812 blue-collar workers, 202 white-collar workers and 62 managers (foremen and shift leaders). These figures do not take into account the management teams in Le Trait and Paris.

451 Cf. Journal de la France et des Français, Quarto Gallimard, 2001. On 13 May, a German airborne commando landed in The Hague to capture the Dutch royal family, but Queen Wilhelmina, Princess Juliana and Prince Bernhard had already boarded a British counter-torpedo boat heading to Great Britain; in London, they organised a government in exile. On 14 May, the Germans sent an ultimatum to the Dutch Government, demanding the surrender of Rotterdam; failure to comply would mean that the city would be bombed. Shortly after expiration of the ultimatum, the surrender was announced, but the bombers, already in flight, were not recalled, and the city was destroyed. On 16 May, General Winkelman, Commander of the Dutch Army, signed the capitulation. Battles continued until the bombing of Middelburg on 17 May. Cf. André Kaspi, La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, pp. 78–80.

The submarines “La Favorite” and “L’Africaine” in spring 1940

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Spring 1940: progress on the construction of submarine chasers

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Defence and guided by considerations dating back to the First World War (the Schlieffen Plan), the Army Group No. 1 launched an attack against the enemy forces, while the 7th Army was sent “to lend a hand to the Dutch”452 at the Belgian-French border. This manoeuvre, (known as the Dyle Plan) distanced the best French units from the zone not covered by the Maginot Line, the zone attacked by the Germans. The 1st Division and the British Expeditionary Force were sent to support the Belgian Army commanded by King Leopold III. Troops exposed to bombing and strafing began to flee. This was the start of the civilian population exodus. On 11 May, the German Panzers bypassed the Belgian positions and threatened the 7th Army. On 13–15 May, in the weakly defended Ardennes, the Germans crossed the Meuse near Dinant and surrounded Sedan. The 55th Infantry Division bowed down under the shock. The inappropriate initiatives of General Huntziger, the Commander of the Second French Army, facilitated the German advance. Panic-stricken by the intensity of enemy fire, some French units dispersed. The Wehrmacht turned to the north with the goal of surrounding the French, British, and Belgian forces. Brussels was occupied on 17 May, Antwerp on 18 May. As of 17 May, the Reich ordered that the French franc be tied to the German Reichsmark. On 18 May, Paul Reynaud reshuffled his cabinet; he took the Ministry of Defence from Édouard Daladier to which he entrusted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Marshal Pétain entered the government as Vice President of the Council of Ministers. General Maxime Weygand replaced Gamelin at the head of the armed forces. On 20 May, the Germans issued an order covering the occupied French territory whereby “all businesses engaging in trade and industry, food and agriculture, forestry and timber conservation must continue their operations, unless otherwise compelled by reasons of force majeure to take other decisions.” The Panzers opened a large breach towards the sea: Abbeville fell under German control on 20 May, Arras on 24, Boulogne on 25 and Calais on 26. The Worms branches in Boulogne and Dieppe were evacuated and communications with Dunkerque interrupted. Refugees from the latter were transported to Le Havre, Cherbourg, Saint-Malo and Brest. From Paris, Jacques Barnaud informed Hypolite

452 The expression was allegedly used by General Gamelin.

Worms in London, on 25 May, that he had “transferred most of the Banking Services to Nantes (75 people out of 115), the others having been placed on leave. At CHP [Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire] 18 of the 29 employees were transferred to Nantes, as well as 14 of the 20 employees of SFTP [Société Française de Transports Pétroliers].” “The general management of the Fuel Merchanting Services,” he added, “has sent a few employees to Bordeaux in an effort to reduce congestion in Nantes, while the DGSM [general management of the Shipping Services] has sent the accounts department (about 18 employees) to Nantes and the technical services and shipping to Bordeaux. However, all the directors and main department heads stayed put, either in Paris or in Le Havre.” These fallback positions had been prepared well in advance with the Ministry of the Merchant Navy.453 Initiatives taken by Abbat and Nitot compensate for the lack of military authority Work continued in Le Trait, despite the debacle and the approaching front: on 23 May 1940, submarine chaser No. 15 (the third in the series) was launched.454 In the ensuing days, faced with the probability of an evacuation, management worried about the fate of the Navy vessels under construction.455 It appealed to General Gaston Duffour, Commander of the 3rd Military Region (Rouen), for instructions and explosives to keep the vessels from falling into enemy hands. Its request fell on deaf ears; the general refused to provide either instructions or means of destruction.456 On 31 May, submarine chaser No. 14 left Le Trait for Cherbourg, where on 2 June 1940, after highly successful testing, it was declared fit for service.457 From Paris, Henri Nitot stepped up his contacts with Le Trait. In his memoirs, he narrated: “Abbat and were trying to plan what we could do in the event of the Seine-Maritime region becoming engaged in the fighting. On starting

453 Excerpt from the hearing of Jacques Barnaud before Commission President Dhers, on 2 May 1950. 454 Excerpt from a speech given by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262). 455 Cf. undated memo from Worms & Cie filed in 1944. 456 Ibid. 457 Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ? Cany-Barville, Impr. Gabel, 1987, p. 14.

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June 1940: exodus along the roads (https://prisons-cherche-midi-mauzac.com collection)

to hear the far-off echoes of heavy fire [6–7 June458] coming from the Bresle Valley, we realised that, to safeguard the productive capability of a large segment of our staff, whose technical skills were of key importance for the defence of France, we would be forced to retreat – but to where and how? Concerns grew with every new hour and I tried to obtain, if not specific orders, at least instructions from a completely panic-stricken Ministry of the Navy. Albeit in rather vague terms, Central Directorate of Naval Construction gave me a mission: to try and find an assembly point in Rochefort where we could attempt to resume construction at the former Navy dockyard, practically abandoned for quite some time. Upon returning to Le Trait,459 Abbat and I quickly realised that our shipyard and workers’ housing estate would have to be abandoned soon. We divided up the tasks: Abbat would handle the evacuation of staff to the south, where he would try to establish gathering points, knowing full well that in any event he could barely count on anything but limited means. I, on the other hand, left with our engineer, Jean Huré, picking up our former Head Engineer, Alexandre Vince, now retired in the Loire-Maritime, on the way. I was to try and pinpoint

458 In his memoirs, Henri Nitot referred to events, not to precise dates: the crossing of the Bresle Valley by the Wehrmacht, the storage tank fire at the Seine-Maritime refineries, the Germans entering Nantes, etc. 459 This elliptical phrase used by Henri Nitot to outline the stages of his account implies that he had left Paris.

bases for setting up shop in Rochefort. Mr Vince would try to determine the technical conditions needed to get the old Navy dockyard back into operation. However, events unfolded faster than we had foreseen, with the pace of the debacle accelerating quickly. Barely had I left, when the Bresle line,460 where General Weygand had tried in vain to halt the German advance, was overwhelmed for good [8 June].”

Evacuation of Le Trait (9–10 June 1940)461 On Saturday, 8 June, at 10 a.m., telephone lines to Le Trait were cut. In the afternoon, submarine chaser No. 16 was launched.462 On 9 June, Pierre Abbat warned Lieutenant (Navy) David, the commander of the vessels under construction and in particular submarine chaser No. 15 launched on 23 May, that the Germans had just surrounded Rouen: the news had been transmitted to him at 5 a.m. by Georges Métayer, MP and Mayor of the town. The Director of the Société Havraise d’Énergie Électrique in Yainville informed Henri Nitot of his decision to cease producing electricity. Deprived of its power supply, the shipyard found itself “forced to

460 Located, at its closest point, at about 80 km from Rouen. 461 The comparison of the testimonies from Henri Nitot and Pierre Abbat, the statements made by Hypolite Worms, etc., along with the important documentation preserved in the Worms archives, make it possible to recreate the unfurling of the events that caused, then punctuated the evacuation. 462 Excerpt from a speech given by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262).

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cease all work”463 – with the workers’ housing estate likewise deprived of electricity and water. Around 7 a.m., the La Mailleraye refinery owned by Standard Française des Pétroles and located near ACSM was set ablaze in accordance with plans; the subsequent explosions “ended up sowing confusion among the population,” causing “an exodus to the left bank of the Seine.” “After gathering together [his] fellow managers and part of [his] labour force, particularly those who had been ordered to work that day,” Henri Nitot had the most important of the company archives evacuated to La Mailleraye. During the morning, he “sent a motorcyclist to obtain orders, but his two attempts to get past Duclair proved unsuccessful.” The main bridges in the Seine-Maritime department had been destroyed.464 Lieutenant (N) David also sent “a seaman on a motorcycle mission. While he [was able to] reach Rouen, he did [not] bring back any orders, only confusing and dispiriting news.” Around 1 p.m., Henri Nitot “began to transfer members of [his] staff to the left bank, telling them to meet up in La Mailleraye.” Despite the “sky being tragically obscured by heavy smoke billowing out of the storage tanks at the Seine-Maritime refinery,”465 and the highly rudimentary means available to the population – “ferries were not allowed to be used as they were already highly insufficient ferries for the evacuees from the northern regions”466 – the evacuation from Le Trait and the crossing of the Seine took place in great calm. At 3 p.m., the tugboat “Attentif” arrived from Le Havre, bringing orders from the Navy: submarine chaser No. 15, of which only the starboard engine was operating, and chaser No. 16, launched the day before, had to be evacuated immediately. Twenty minutes later,

463 This and subsequent quotations are taken from a letter sent on 9 June 1940 by ACSM management to General Gaston Duffour, Commander of the 3rd Military Region. This letter is attributed to Henri Nitot and summarised in the report that Gaston Bernard sent to Judge Thirion on 31 December 1945. 464 See p. 262, the speech given by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on 7 December 1946. 465 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 466 Ibid. According to the historian Alain Huon, 15 canoes from Military Engineering, built by ACSM, were used to evacuate Le Trait. These boats were sunk in La Mailleraye on 10 June on the orders of Colonel Millard, Commander for the defense of the Basse-Seine area.

the “Attentif” left, towing the two vessels onto which Henri Nitot had loaded equipment belonging to the Navy.467 “I have no means of destroying any of the facilities or ships under construction” Henri Nitot, 9 June 1940

With neither instructions nor explosives, Lieutenant (N) David decided to not destroy the three oil tankers, “La Charente,” “La Mayenne,” and “La Baïse,” as well as of the three submarines, “La Favorite,” “L’Africaine,” and “L’Andromaque.” These six vessels were left intact on their respective slips. After “taking a walk round the town,”468 where “there [remained] only Mr Dupuich, Mayor of Le Trait, Mr Mahé, the postmaster, and Mr Boudrenguin, the engineer in charge of supervising the construction of the ships for the Marine,” Henri Nitot took “the decision to cross over to the left bank” at 3.30 p.m. From La Mailleraye-sur-Seine, he sent a letter to General Gaston Duffour, which concluded as follows: “Surrounded by the large majority of my staff, whom I am ordering to remain at my disposal, I have the honour of requesting orders and instruction from you, which I would be quite grateful to have the messenger return to me in writing: either an evacuation order, if you deem it necessary, permitting me, under these circumstances, to execute the provisions planned by the labour inspectorate to withdraw the labour force; or permission for me to continue operations, under the assumption that power will be supplied as normal and that a military force will be organised to protect the facilities, which, as I have brought to your attention in several previous letters, are totally devoid of protection (no anti-aircraft defence, machine guns, military guard or surveillance). I must add that, in the event that I am given an order to evacuate, I have no means of destroying any of the facilities or ships under construction, the main reasons being that I have received no instructions to do so and that, despite my requests – and as you yourself have confirmed – the military authorities have been unable to supply me with the neces-

467 Maurice Quemin, op. cit., p. 14. 468 This and subsequent quotations are taken from a letter sent by Henri Nitot on 9 June 1940 to General Gaston Duffour, Commander of the 3rd Military Region.

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10 June 1940: scuttling of the Duclair ferry

sary explosives.” This letter remained unanswered.469 At 10.15 p.m., the “Attentif” and the two submarine chasers anchored in the La Carosse, in front of the port of Le Havre. The next day, 10 June, at 4 a.m., the convoy headed towards Cherbourg, arriving at 5 p.m.470 With German troops advancing on Paris, General Weygand advised the public authorities to leave the capital, which was declared an “open city” on 11 June. The key ministerial departments left for Tours, where the Council of Ministers had decided that the government and Parliament would settle. Mussolini declared war on France that same day. Jacques Barnaud, whose missions at the Ministry of Armaments and the Ministry of Finance were both “virtually” terminated, left for Nantes, where “Maison Worms was organising its final withdrawal.”471 On 10 June at Le Trait, with the fires abating in Rouen but still raging in Caudebec, under an apocalyptic sky heavy with the thick smoke billowing

469 Historical account from ACSM – undated document, see www.wormsetcie.com – 1944 archives. 470 Maurice Quemin, op. cit. In a speech of 7 December 1946, Hypolite Worms indicated that chasers “15” and “16” arrived in Lorient on 16 June 1940, but that only chaser “15” was able to reach England; chaser “16,” which could not be towed across the Channel, was scuttled on 18 June 1940. 471 Excerpt from the hearing of Jacques Barnaud before Commission President Dhers, on 2 May 1950.

from the burning oil storage tanks, ACSM employees and their families took to the road to reach the retreat positions assigned by the Navy in the southwest of France. “With absolute confusion all around,” stated Henri Nitot in his memoirs, “it was out of the question for Abbat to arrange the orderly withdrawal of our staff; he had to be satisfied with providing likely gathering points: the Worms branches in Nantes and Bordeaux, as well as Rochefort, etc. And given how these families quickly dispersed over hundreds of kilometres, we were very lucky that we had no tragic incidents to grieve.” On 12 June, General Weygand and other leaders came out in favour of an armistice. Opposing them, Paul Reynaud and some ministers referred to the agreement of 28 March 1940, under which France and the United Kingdom agreed not to conclude separate armistices. On 14 June, with Paris occupied by German forces, the government, deeply divided over the question of whether or not to continue the war, left Tours for Bordeaux, where Jacques Barnaud went at the request of Yves Bouthillier. Unable to return to Nantes, Jacques Barnaud followed the government to Vichy. On 16 June, Paul Reynaud, who wished to pursue the war outside Paris, was forced to resign. He was replaced as President of the Council of Ministers by Philippe Pétain, who formed a new government in favour of an armistice.

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The scramble to Nantes (19 June to beginning of July 1940) On 19 June, “at the very moment the Germans were entering Nantes,” wrote Henri Nitot, “a madcap automobile adventure got under way. […] Without realising it, we had crossed the lines of the German Army advance guard several times, without incident. We first tried to regain contact with high naval officials, and with great difficulty, we were able to reach them as night fell on the grounds of a castle in Montbazon472 on the banks of the Indre River […, where] all these admirals and engineer generals were going around in circles, only able to confirm very vague assembly points: Rochefort still, or perhaps set up shop around small shipyards on the Gironde, either… or... We left for Nantes, where we established our headquarters for several days. Several of our engineers were there. […] The staff of the branch there helped us greatly in finding lodgings for our staff who were starting to arrive, still by their own means. The same was happening in Bordeaux. As for Rochefort, we quickly realised that the naval dockyard there was in a state of utter destitution and would require immense efforts to get it back into operation […] the news was becoming increasingly bad, and all of France seemed to be going around in circles on the roads. […] Finally, and very quickly, announcement of the armistice reached us.” The Armistice Agreement between the government of Philippe Pétain and the Third Reich was signed on 22 June 1940473 in Rethondes. The commander of the German forces (Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich) “was put in charge of transforming the French economy to meet the war needs of Germany.”474

472 Town south of Tour, approximately 200 km from Nantes and 230 km from Rochefort. 473 See François Berger, “L’armistice de 1940 : négociations et conséquences,” Revue de la société des amis du musée de l’Armée, No. 140, 2011, pp. 57–65. 474 Cf. Claude Huan, op. cit.

A demarcation line, punctuated with crossing-points, cut France in two: the occupied zone covered over three-fifths of the country, including Paris, where “the German Reich exercised all the rights of the occupying power”475 while the free zone, mostly to the south of the Loire, was left – along with the colonies – under the control of the French administration. “12 shipyards [including ACSM] out of 15 were in the occupied zone as were 3 of the 4 naval dockyards. In total, 85% of France’s shipbuilding capacity came under German control.”476 The same held true for the port facilities. The consequences of the Armistice: the French troops were disarmed; the French army was limited to one hundred thousand men in the free zone; the prisoners of war, i.e. more than 1.5 million soldiers, were to be kept in captivity until a peace agreement was signed; military vessels were ordered to return to their peacetime bases (Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, among others); the Navy, “with the exception of the portion that remained available to the French Government to safeguard the French interests of its colonial empire,”477 was demobilised and disarmed. Shipowners and their crews had not only to submit to the diktat of German and Italian forces (an Armistice Agreement was signed with the Italians on 24 June 1940), but also faced the English offensive, which, rather than seeing the French fleet pass under enemy control, began to seize the ships that had taken refuge in British Empire ports. In a letter sent on 16 December 1943 to Rear-Admiral Blehaut, Secretary of State for the Navy and Colonies, Maison Worms stated that “the Armistice alone prevented making available to the national defence authorities all ACSM workers, employees, managers [and] the new facilities planned for development at the time.” For the time being, the ceasefire rendered illusory any attempt to re-establish the shipbuilding site anywhere else than in Le Trait; and while Henri Nitot knew immediately that he had to return there, he preferred “to wait several days” in Nantes, “to take stock of the situation and […] assess events with greater clarity.”

475 Armistice Agreement of 22 June 1940 – Article 3. 476 Cf. Claude Huan, op. cit. 477 Armistice Agreement of 22 June 1940 – Article 8.

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From the Armistice of 22 June 1940 to the Franco-German Agreement of 16 September 1941 In application of Article 22 of the Armistice Agreement, a commission, acting under the orders of the German High Commander, was created to regulate and monitor the execution of the clauses agreed upon by France and the Reich. Headquartered in Wiesbaden, the commission “was also tasked with ensuring the necessary alignments with the Franco-Italian Armistice Agreement.”478 The French Government was required to form a delegation “responsible for representing French interests and for receiving the implementation orders issued by the German Armistice Commission.” General Charles Huntziger,479 one of the French signatories of the Armistice, headed the delegation. Whereas historians often think this delegation had just limited power, it in part decided the fate of the ships under construction in Le Trait.

“We decided to head back”

guards from the Kriegsmarine.482 Indeed, although Pierre Abbat was, according to Hypolite Worms, “one of the first industrial leaders not only to resume his post in Seine-Inférieure but also to renew vital contacts with the French authorities in both zones,”483 he first needed to obtain authorisation to re-enter the premises to restart work in accordance with the order given to all shipyards by the occupation authorities on 28 June 1940,484 an order conditional on the resumption of operations at the Yainville power station. For his part, Henri Nitot arrived back in the capital accompanied by Commander Denis, Secretary General of Worms & Cie. At the end of an uneventful journey, he found “Paris nearly deserted.” In the ensuing days, the teams trickled back to the Worms headquarters, whose doors re-opened on 2 July 1940, in the presence of the heads of the Banking Services and of the Fuel Merchanting Services,485 along with Jacques Barnaud.

Henri Nitot, Memoirs

On 25 June 1940, Pierre Abbat left Nantes and returned to Le Trait; on his way there, he tried to contact “the scattered members of his staff to instruct them to return to the fold by any means.”480 The workers’ housing estate and the shipyard seemed unharmed. Credit went to Mr Dupuich, Mayor of Le Trait, the “efficient guardian of the property” belonging to Maison Worms, who “had managed to obtain safeguards from the occupiers, thus preventing general pillaging.”481 Yet no one was able to enter the ACSM complex, as access was barred by a detachment of

478 The Franco-Italian Armistice Agreement of 24 June 1940 likewise initiated the creation of a commission headquartered in Turin. 479 Secretary of State for War, Charles Huntziger (1880–1941) headed the French delegation to the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden until September 1940, when he was replaced by General Paul-André Doyen. He was one of the signatories to the Law of 3 October 1940 on the status of Jews. 480 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 481 Ibid.

482 The German Navy under the Third Reich (1935–1945). The question of this military guard set up “for the security of the shipyard” was addressed in the temporary agreement signed between ACSM and the Occupier on 8 July 1940. 483 Letter of 16 December 1943 from Worms & Cie to Rear-Admiral Blehaut, Secretary of State for the Navy and Colonies. 484 Cf. Claude Huan, op. cit.: “Starting on 28 June 1940, the order is given successively to all shipyards to continue work in hand. Warships under construction are considered spoils of war, and the German authorities count on their completion for their own account. An initial plan is being drawn up, fixing the order for 134 auxiliary ships of various kinds, and demanding that work be continued on 20 warships (for the most part torpedo boats and submarines). Written orders are being sent to the shipyards.” 485 Cf. letter from Hypolite Worms sent on 10 August 1940 to an unspecified correspondent.

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June 1940: flight over ACSM by a German aircraft (Doucet collection, A. Huon)

Except for Hypolite Worms, who was still in London Isolated in London since 12 June 1940 following the interruption of communications with Paris, on 25 June Hypolite Worms decided, in agreement with the leaders of the other delegations,486 to head back to France and update Admiral Darlan,487 Commander in Chief of the French Maritime Forces, on his mission. “While still in England,” explained Hypolite Worms in September 1944,488 “I asked myself whether I should remain in England or return to France. The situation of Maison Worms in England and my family situation would have enabled me to favour the former option, especially as I never doubted the outcome of the war. However, I believed it my duty to return to France to safeguard the heritage of my ancestors and the interests of my staff, workers and employees who numbered several thousand people. I wanted at all costs to avoid having my companies fall into enemy hands.” Leaving England via Liverpool on 19 July 1940, he travelled through Portugal and Spain to finally reach Vichy where, on 1 August 1940, he delivered to the Secretariat of State of the Navy a report on his activities as head of the French Delegation to the Anglo-French Shipping Executive; and more specifically, on the decisions he had to “make, in the interests of the country, both for the execution of the agreements in effect, and to face up to the new situation created by the cessation of hostilities between France and Germany.”

486 Cf. interview with Raymond Meynial, given during preparations for the book on the history of Maison Worms, published in 1993. 487 Promoted to Admiral of the Fleet on 6 June 1939, François Darlan (1881–1942) became Minister for the Navy and Merchant Navy under the first Pétain Government (16 June to 10 July 1940), then under the governments of Laval (16 July to 13 December 1940) and Flandin (14 December 1940 to 9 February 1941). On 10 February 1941, he succeeded Flandin as Vice President of the Council of Ministers, and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Navy, then Minister for the National Defence. He was forced to relinquish his position to Pierre Laval in April 1942. He was assassinated on 24 December 1942. 488 Excerpt from the interrogation of Hypolite Worms by Judge Georges Thirion, dated 26 September 1944.

“Upon signing the Armistice,” he wrote, “most of the ships that had been assigned to France, or which we had to take under time charter, became unusable for the following reasons: 1. the Dutch and Norwegian Governments, which were continuing the war alongside England, found themselves forced to refuse to authorise their ships to sail to French ports; 2. the agreements with these countries, signed jointly by England and France, had been negotiated in consideration of the war continuing. Consequently, the British Government felt that the ships covered by these agreements should now be used exclusively for transporting goods to Great Britain, and thus could not be authorised to sail to French ports; 3. all of these vessels were insured or re-insured by the War Risks Insurance Office, and the British Government refused to cover voyages to French ports. The entire fleet of vessels assigned to France thus risked lacking insurance coverage from one day to the next; 4. finally, the British authorities were intercepting, throughout the world, all ships heading for French ports and re-directing them to British ports. As regards the neutral ships [chartered] under time charter by France in execution of the Franco-English agreements, England’s refusal to let them pass through their control bases and its cancellation of their insurance policies rendered their voyages absolutely impossible. What I sought to avoid was having our country incur considerable costs for ship rentals, insurance, crew bonuses, etc. – a sum amounting to fifteen to twenty million a day – if it were likely that the ships would remain blocked in ports, without war risk insurance. On the other hand, since these ships were no longer insured, the French Government ran a considerable capital risk, as the two million tons available to us represented a value of seven to eight million francs. The return of the ships to their owners raised a number of questions requiring comprehensive negotiations with the British authorities.”489

489 Excerpt from the report by Hypolite Worms to the Secretary of State for the Navy, dated 1 August 1940, in Vichy.

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Henri Nitot meets the occupation authorities: the “temporary” agreement of 8 July 1940 With an eye to “reconstituting a work programme […] by finding the necessary financial resources,” on 8 July 1940, Henri Nitot took the initiative to contact one of the highest-ranking representatives of the Kriegsmarine,

Kapitän zur See492 Heinz Degenhardt.493 In his memoirs, the Director General of ACSM listed the reasons leading him to request this interview. “We very much needed,” he wrote, “to approach the German authorities now working in the Ministry of the Navy. Paying them a visit, despite the fact that no one yet had a clear assessment of the situation, I was warmly received. I explained our difficulties so well that within just a few days, we were assigned a new shipbuilding programme […, a programme] sufficient to ensure immediate job security.” The provisions decided in this meeting were the subject of a compromise written in these terms: “The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime Worms & Cie, in Le Trait […] shall be tasked with: 1o- through the intermediary of the Prefect of Rouen, salvaging and refurbishing four ferries sunk in the Seine; 2o- for the needs of the German Navy high command: a) finishing the oil tankers ‘La Charente’ and ‘La Mayenne’; b) building four 700-dwt [tank] barges; these vessels are to be built without a propulsion system. For the purpose of pursuing these projects, authorisation to enter the shipyard is granted to its Director, Mr Pierre Abbat, as well as its staff. The military detachment initially sent to guard the shipyard will be withdrawn by the captain of the port of Rouen, as soon as work commences. The means of payment needed to pursue the work may be provisionally withdrawn from a bank. If needed, the assistance of the captain of the port of Rouen or Le Havre may be requested. A German Navy civil servant will soon be sent to Le Trait to conclude the final contract and to update the complementary agreements.” The occupation authorities considered this agreement – although defined as “temporary” – to be a firm and final commitment and never stopped referring to it as the basis for their demands (notably for the

490 Ibid. 491 Emmanuel Monick (1893–1983) was appointed, on 7 October 1944, Governor of the Banque de France.

492 Second-highest rank in the hierarchy of Kriegsmarine officers above flag officers and below Kommodore – English equivalent: Captain (Navy). 493 Also listed as Commander in the Worms archives, Heinz Degenhardt (born in 1893) was referred to as “special delegate of the OKM,” Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, by Arne Radtke-Delacor, in “Produire pour le Reich, les commandes allemandes à l’industrie française (1940-1944),” in Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, April–June 2001, p. 107.

The Worms Agreement of 4 July 1940 At the end of the negotiations with the Ministry of Shipping, Hypolite Worms took it upon himself to sign an agreement on 4 July 1940 setting forth that: 1. “all ships under time charter to France and docked in English ports are to be taken over by Great Britain at current rates, without giving rise to claims for damages from the shipowners; 2. the same shall apply to all ships allied to England in all ports and to neutral ships, with the exception of vessels operating French colonial traffic, [to be the subject] of a future discussion; 3. all cargo on board said vessels, after having been rerouted by British authorities, is to be purchased at current prices, fob [free on board] plus the freight paid, based on British compensation rates.”490 According to the statement, dated 8 April 1946, of Emmanuel Monick,491 Financial Attaché to the French Embassy in London, Hypolite Worms, “on his own initiative, negotiated the transfer, to the benefit of the British Government, of all charter contracts signed prior to the Armistice by the Merchant Navy Mission on behalf of the French Government.” As a result, two million tons of allied and neutral ships (Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, and Greek) were transferred to England. This agreement was signed the day after the British Navy attacked a squadron of the French Navy moored in Mers-El-Kebir, near Oran, (“Operation Catapult”) on 3 July 1940. As of October 1940, this agreement would be used by the collaborationist press as proof of the betrayal and Anglophilia of Maison Worms and its leader.

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submarines “La Favorite,” and “L’Africaine,” even though those vessels were not mentioned in that construction programme) and for putting pressure on ACSM, when Henri Nitot, undoubtedly better informed about the French administration’s reticence towards contracts that companies had negotiated directly with the Occupier, tried to reverse course. Jacques Barnaud ceases to manage the business affairs of Worms & Cie (early July 1940) Jacques Barnaud was assuredly one of the men best placed to advise Henri Nitot about how to deal with the German authorities. He became Deputy to Léon Noël, who had just been appointed to the post of Delegate General of the French Government within the Occupied Territories on 9 July 1940. His duties consisted of “resuming contact with civil servants, industrialists and merchants; handling the population returning to their homes; dealing with the supply problems caused by the destruction and the exodus; taking measures to deal with the unemployment brought on by the cessation of factory operations; reinstalling responsible authorities, the majority of whom had fled with the exodus; handling questions raised by the initial German requisitions.” “At that time,” testified Jacques Barnaud, “the German authorities, taking advantage of the absence of a large number of factory bosses and directors, demonstrated their intent to place a German administrator in all major companies. Above all, we wanted to avoid their complete stranglehold and to keep the French economy from operating exclusively for the benefit of Germany. We did everything to reinstate the heads of French businesses and to support them when faced with German demands. I pursued that policy for two years.”494 A variety of official missions were indeed entrusted to him until November 1942 (head of the Cabinet of René Belin, Minister for Industrial Production and Labour until February 1941; subsequently, Delegate General for Franco-German Economic Relations). As of July 1940, to avoid any conflict or suspicion of a conflict of interest, Jacques Barnaud chose not to continue working in his role as head of Worms & Cie.

494 See memo on Jacques Barnaud, op. cit.

While he “abstained until the beginning of 1943 – in the most absolute manner – not only from intervening in the management of Maison Worms, but even from having himself informed about what was happening there,”495 he retained his post as General Partner so as not to weaken the core partnership, of which he was the sole representative in Paris (Hypolite Worms was still in London and Michel Goudchaux had stayed in Bordeaux) and to prevent the Germans from replacing him. Law of 20 July 1940: termination and liquidation of contracts concluded with the State As a consequence of the demilitarisation of France imposed by the Armistice Agreement, the Pétain Government, on 20 July, adopted the law on the “termination and liquidation of contracts concluded with the State for the needs of national defence.” This law, mentioned numerous times in ACSM correspondence insofar as it determined the fate of the vessels ordered by the Navy prior to the outbreak of hostilities, was one of the key elements used by the French administration to resist the German authorities and to obtain quid pro quos for the occupation of the territory. “Art.1. – All contracts concluded by the State for the needs of national defence, which are in the process of being executed and have not yet been withdrawn, are terminated ipse jure, irrespective of the termination clauses set forth in the contract, with the exception of those contracts for which the competent administration shall decide to continue, or shall accept to be modified through an amendment, for the purpose of the economic reconstruction of the country. Insofar as the administration has not notified the holder of said contracts of such termination, it shall take effect, at the latest, fifteen days after publication of this decree. Art.2. – The liquidation and settlement of sums owed to the holder of a terminated contract, irrespective of the form of said termination, shall be covered by an additional agreement concluded by the competent administration, or by ministerial decision if no agreement is reached. Said decision may, if needed, derogate from the contract termination clauses, but there must

495 Excerpt from a memo from Jacques Baraduc to Hypolite Worms dated 5 March 1947, and from a memo from Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie dated 13 October 1944.

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be grounds for said action. Under no circumstances, as a result of the contract termination, may such compensation be higher than the expenses directly and necessarily resulting from the cessation of the contract and the additional depreciation specifically tied to the execution of said contract. Art.3. – The rules governing the liquidation and settlement of the terminated contracts will be set forth in subsequent decrees or instructions. In all cases, the State will have the right to take back, at cost price, the raw materials supplied for the purpose of executing the contract, the list of which shall be drawn up upon the advice of the Minister Secretary of State for Industrial Production and Labour. Any advance payments granted directly by the State with regard to the terminated contract may, in whole or in part, be rendered immediately repayable as of the date on which the contract was terminated, by special ministerial decision, and subject to the rights of voided debtors. To make it easier to mobilise the amounts owed by the State, the administration may, without waiting for the definitive termination of the contract and when presented with a claim, make advance payments to the contractor totalling up to three-quarters of the temporarily assessed costs. Art.4. – The rules applicable to the terminated contract shall also cover contracts which may be held by subcontractors regularly approved by the administration. The termination of a State contract in application of this decree shall constitute a case of force majeure, which the contractor may invoke as regards its suppliers for orders placed for the purpose of executing the terminated contract, but only for the terminated portion of said contract.” 25 July 1940: ACSM re-opens its doors On 6 August 1940, Henri Nitot informed Hypolite Worms (who was still in Vichy; he was to return to Paris “around 15 August”496 1940) that “the shipyard re-opened on Thursday, 25 July, with 195 workers.” In accordance with Kapitän Dengenhardt’s undertaking in return for the construction programme accepted by ACSM, the German military guard left the site and returned to Rouen.

“To cut back on general expenses,” stated Nitot, “we have gone ahead with retiring several foremen and draughtsmen and downgrading certain shift leaders. Wages have been temporarily reduced by 10–15%, in line with the measures taken in Rouen for all companies; it is deemed likely that we will soon cancel this purely local wage-cut, which contradicts the latest instructions issued by the government.” By mid-August, the workforce had risen to five hundred as a result of the return of “mobilised workers able to escape the Germans’ clutches.” Many more remained prisoners. In the following months, management did “its utmost to obtain their release, justifying this by the work […] ordered by the German Admiralty,” stated Henri Nitot in his memoirs, before going on to say: “Abbat put on our books – at our risk and peril – several young men from the Rouen region, thus enabling them to return to France. Moreover, I must say how much [the] help [of Pierre Abbat and his colleagues] for our staff spared them from great suffering. Even when it quickly became difficult to provide family with provisions, numerous measures were introduced, both to collect foodstuffs and to hasten the creation of numerous vegetable plots. Naturally, I continued to liaise with Le Trait on a highly regular basis, visiting at least once a week.” In his report, the expert Gaston Bernard noted that “the employee and manager headcount, low at the onset of the Occupation, soon re-achieved its 1938 and 1939 level. Most were technical staff associated to the establishment for a long time, whom management would not have found at the end of the war, had they been fired,” and towards whom it “unquestionably had moral obligations.”

496 Excerpt from the interrogation of Hypolite Worms by Judge Georges Thirion, dated 26 September 1944.

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3 August 1940: German officers inspecting the shipyard

206

(Doucet collection)

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On the other hand, the average headcount of bluecollar workers – which fluctuated between 970 and 1,130 in 1938–1939 – never achieved the same level during the Occupation. As of 30 September 1940, it numbered 672, and went up to 812 workers as of 31 December 1940, an increase stemming from “the return of many who had left in exodus and who had been unable to return to Le Trait as soon as the armistice was signed.” The list of orders in hand When the shipyard re-opened, work in the workshops which – other than the shipbuilding itself – was specialised in boilermaking, the manufacture of floating roofs, marine engines, and other related work, was guaranteed by the construction of four boilers ordered by the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée prior to June 1940 for the passenger liners “Londres” and “Vichy.”497 In addition, the Chantiers Navals Français in Caen had just commissioned ACSM to build two engines with an evaporator composed of four cylindrical boilers and two 1,500-HP triple expansion engines intended for two 3,500-ton colliers fitted out by the French Navy. We should immediately point out that these boilers were never delivered, even though the materials for them were supplied in 1941. As regards the engines, their construction was to be delayed so much that only 5% of the work had been completed by 1943. Indeed, the Germans never laid claim to them. In this same vein, we should add that the Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde in Bordeaux commissioned ACSM in November 1940 to manufacture four 1,000-HP triple expansion engines for four tugboats for the German Navy. In January 1941, the French Navy in turn placed an order for four complete cylindrical boilers with their encasements, intended for two 2,650-ton colliers under construction at the Chantiers de Normandie in Rouen.

497 Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1987, p. 15: “These two passenger liners had been ordered by the SNCF (Western network) and the British Southern Railways, and had temporarily been named ‘Dieppe’ and ‘Newhaven.’”

The slipways were occupied by:498 Slips

Vessels

Progress

Projected launch dates

Submarine: “La Favorite”

37%

October 1940

Submarine: “L’Africaine”

33%

February 1941

Submarine: “L’Andromaque”

17%

September 1941

6 1

Submarine: “L’Armide” Squadron supply ship: “La Charente” Squadron supply ship: “La Mayenne” Squadron supply ship: “La Baïse”

3% 46,84%

November 1941 End of November 1941

11%*

January 1942

9%*

July 1942

8 2

*Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1993, p. 19.

In addition, four submarines, No. Q 219 to 222, were on the order books, for which construction had yet to begin. Spoils of war in theory and in practice In application of The Hague Convention,499 all vessels intended for the Navy were declared spoils of war: from that moment onwards, it was up to the German authorities to decide whether to stop or pursue their construction – in theory at least. In practice, enforcing the Law of 20 July 1940 thwarted the automatic transfer of property to Germany: France apparently had to terminate the contracts before they could be taken over by the Reich. However, at ACSM (as perhaps everywhere else), the French Government took no steps in this direction. Such was the case for “La Charente” and “La Mayenne.” While Kapitän Degenhardt, at the meeting on 8 July, had ordered their completion on behalf of the Kriegsmarine, a similar request for these two vessels was made

498 Gaston Bernard, in his expert report, established that “La Favorite” totalled a launched tonnage of 800 t, of which 250 t remained to be constructed, as of 25 June 1940: 550 t / 800 t = 68.75%. For this same vessel, Maurice Quemin listed a completion level of 37%: the difference can be explained by a confusion between tonnage launched and deadweight. G. Bernard also established that “La Charente” totalled a launched tonnage of 4,910 t, of which 2,610 t remained to be constructed, as of 25 June 1940: 2,300 t / 4,910 t = 46.84%. For this same vessel, M. Quemin gave a completion level of 24%: here again, the difference can be explained by the fact that the latter calculated the level of the ship’s progress on the basis of its deadweight (9,420 t). 499 Cf. Art. 53 of the Hague Convention (IV), 18 October 1907.

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Le Trait – 3 August 1940

several days later by René Norguet, head of the Technical Service for Naval Constructions (STCN), this time on behalf of France. Faced with these identical instructions, ACSM management saw itself unable to determine who owned the vessels. It accordingly wrote to both the French Admiralty (letters of 24 and 27 September 1940) and the German Admiralty (letter of 21 September 1940) for confirmation of their directives. “We are trying to coordinate the instructions we have received as best we can,” Henri Nitot commented to Hypolite Worms on 6 August 1940. “The Germans have told us to pursue the construction of the oil tankers ‘La Charente’ and ‘La Mayenne’ and to proceed with the construction of four petrol barges. The French side has ordered us to pursue the construction of the three oil tankers ‘La Charente,’ ‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Baïse’; moreover we have confirmation to build two ‘Malgachetype’ vessels.” The disorganisation of the French public services only served to amplify the confusion surrounding the clash of orders.

Ending the confusion The debacle, the exodus of the government, followed by the Armistice and the subsequent division of the country into two zones, one of which, under German control, covered Paris “with everything the physical occupation of administration buildings implies.”500 This all blocked the wheels of bureaucracy. As Henri Nitot made abundantly clear in his memoirs, the greatest confusion reigned. “We had to wait weeks before a French Navy administration was organised, capable of negotiating with the German authorities. The fact that two levels were needed, one in Vichy and the other in Paris, did not help matters.”

500 François Berger, “L’armistice de 1940 : négociations et conséquences,” op. cit.

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The Technical Service for Naval Constructions – STCN and René Norguet, head of service Under these circumstances, René Norguet came to be the primary intermediary of ACSM, with Henri Nitot welcoming their “invaluable collaboration.” Appointed head of STCN in 1938, this Engineer General in Marine Engineering was “in Paris to handle shipbuilding questions on behalf of the French Government.”501 Among its tasks, the STCN “has to draw up the final and complete plans for the vessels in the fleet; to check the plans, calculations and estimates drawn up either by engineers working in ports or by private industry; to check the technical specifications drawn up by central or local entities within shipbuilding directorates or private shipyards regarding construction and major repair projects; and generally speaking, to study any question of principle related to shipbuilding. […] Although placed under the high authority of the Central Director for the Naval Construction, its head alone reported to the Minister regarding new constructions and overhauls, responsibility for projects and cost estimates: from this perspective, he enjoyed all the prerogatives of a director.”502 Other than the almost daily contacts he maintained with the companies within the industry, René Norguet503 was in constant contact with the Chamber of Shipbuilders – and particularly its Chairman, René Fould,504 whom he would succeed postwar – an organisation that played an important role as

501 Excerpt from the memo sent to Hypolite Worms by Henri Nitot, on 6 August 1940. 502 Excerpt from the Law of 22 April 1927 – in Collection complète des lois, décrets d’intérêt général, tome 27, année 1927. 503 René Norguet (1888–1968) was Secretary General for Industry and Domestic Trade in the Ministry of Commerce (17 August 1942–20 January 1943), then Secretary General for Industrial Production (20 January 1943–February 1944). 504 René Fould (1875–1961) was “Director of the Forges Committee from 1918 to 1940 and of the UIMM from 1931; he was appointed Secretary of the Chamber of Manufacturers and Constructors of Equipment for Railways and Tramways in 1927, and Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders. He was also a member of the Executive Committee of the CNPF (National Council of French Employers) and of the French Steelworkers’ Union” (Wikipedia French version). He was also Chairman (from 1923) of the Société des Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët), and a member of the Board of Directors (1936–1940), then Vice Chairman (1940– 1947) of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire. He was forced to resign because of his Jewish origins.

the intermediary between the administration and the industry until January 1941 when the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction, created at the end of December 1940, began to function. The resumption of ACSM activities is ensured by the construction or conversion of barges Degenhardt and Nitot again met on 31 July 1940. One can suppose that, over the course of their conversation, the question of the future of the two submarines “La Favorite” and “L’Africaine” was broached, though it is not mentioned in the minutes. On the other hand, the minutes highlight the efforts of the ACSM head to have the order for the four tank barges (accepted on 8 July) cancelled. After inquiring whether this order stemmed from an urgent need of the Kriegsmarine, or whether its purpose was (simply) to provide work for its workers, Nitot stated that “under the former scenario, ACSM would be happy to be freed from this construction, as [its] means of production were better suited to vessels with a higher tonnage.”505 His argument seemed weak. It makes us wonder whether Nitot had realised that he had rushed Maison Worms into a verbal commitment without first consulting the relevant departments within the French administration, for which “one of the major concerns,” historian Michel Margairaz mentioned, “was to avoid direct exchanges between the German purchaser and the French seller.”506 From Paris, Kapitän Degenhardt led an inquiry to assess “the possibility for all Channel shipyards to work on converting river barges,”507 also referred to in the correspondence as flatboats. As part of the debate,

505 Memo from Gaston Bernard of 13 October 1944. On 6 August 1940, Henri Nitot wrote to Hypolite Worms explaining that “the problem of supplying sheet metal and profiles [for tank-barges] seems to be coming up against considerable difficulties, which our entire industry must try its best to resolve. […] All in all, the volume of orders on our books should logically allow us to provide work for a normal workforce during the coming months, but we fear that we may be forced to trim operations at times due to a lack of certain supplies, for which we are currently encountering considerable problems.” 506 Michel Margairaz, L’État, les finances et l’économie. Histoire d’une conversion 1932-1952, vol. 1, doctoral thesis prefaced by François Bloch-Lainé and published by IGPDE – Comité pour l’Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 1991. 507 Expert report by Gaston Bernard of 31 December 1945.

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Pierre Abbat, whose initial reflex, once he had been able to re-enter the shipyard, had been to inventory stocks “to regulate production as best as possible,”508 was summoned to Rouen on 4 August 1940 by naval architect Freiberg, who gave him plans and drawings. The next day, Abbat returned with his rates and terms. On 9 and 11 August, German officers went to the shipyard to conduct “an on-site inspection of the situation.”509 Among them was frigate captain Iahl to whom a letter was sent on 11 August summarising the work to be performed and the potential delivery schedule: services included tracing, cutting, shaping, and installing (riveting and welding) sheet metal, as well as woodworking details, all capable of being completed in one week. The contract stated in particular that: “- ACSM will rebuild the barges according to the plans and within the timeframe set forth by an inspector from the Reich; - the work will be performed with all possible speed; staff must work on Sundays, if requested, and do overtime; - the Reich may be able to supply the raw and semifinished materials that the shipyard may not have in stock; - the Reich may cancel the contract at any time.” The other clauses covered invoicing and the settlement of advance payments. This was a typical contract that had also been offered to the Chantiers de Penhoët and the Chantiers Augustin Normand, which had similar orders to fulfil. Management approved the contract, subject to three provisos: the first two dealt with calculating shipyard expenses, while the third specified that, under all circumstances, the “[the company] would not be liable for any accidents that might occur to the barges.” The work began as soon as the first barges arrived in Le Trait on 13 and 14 August 1940. This order also included the construction of twenty-one platforms, for which ACSM estimated that they had enough sheet metal in stock. However, it lacked some iron supplies, which the Germans would have to provide. Six clear days were needed to build the first platform; subsequent platforms could be delivered at the rate of two a day. In total, twenty-seven barges were converted. And on

508 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 509 Gaston Bernard, op. cit. According to the captions of several photos (see pp. 206–207), the Le Trait shipyard would have been inspected by German officers on 3 August 1940.

24 September, at a meeting in Paris between Henri Nitot and the German Admiralty, the agreement on the total cost of the operation was signed. In the meantime, discussions on the tank barges continued, against Nitot’s expressed wish. On 24 August 1940, Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich (KAF)510 Rhein, who had just succeeded Degenhardt, addressed the following letter to ACSM: “Following our meeting with your Director, Mr Nitot, and following our prior agreement of 8 July, we hereby confirm our order for four 700-dwt tank barges to be built quickly and in accordance with the drawings and detailed estimates submitted to us in anticipation of an acceptable price. You are hereby requested to present your offer for final acceptance. You have planned a delivery deadline of three to four months. We kindly request you to provide us with a definitive deadline. […] The work will be overseen by my inspectors while it is being performed.” The final agreement was not ratified until the end of September: the first of the barges was to be delivered four months after the additional material was received, while the others would follow in six-week intervals. The Germans were to supply the missing materials, which would be billed to ACSM. Thus, in Le Trait, as in numerous companies, the Germans filled the order books. 24 August 1940: Formation of the German Order Service (SCA) “The pressure placed by the German authorities on French industrialists in the occupied zone,” confirmed General Huntziger on 19 August 1940, “is very high […]. It would be a good idea to check whether many of these industrialists have already bowed in to these demands, or are on the verge of accepting orders to which the government is hostile. […] The acceptance of orders for aggressive weaponry should […] be considered only if […] dealt with in negotiations resulting in explicit counterparties for the country. […] There may also be reasons to ask the Delegate General in Paris [General de La Laurencie, appointed that day, see infra] about which practical measures are to be envisaged, allowing the

510 The Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich (a rank that translates as Amiral Commandant en France) represented the high command of the Kriegsmarine in France. Karl-Georg Schuster was the first officer to occupy this post (27 May 1940 to 1 March 1941).

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organisation of the new department for Franco-German and Franco-Italian industrial trade to be brought to the attention of the industrialists; and what forms of pressure may be envisaged to prevent industrialists from entering in to contracts without the prior approval of this organisation.”511 The bureau in question was the German Order Service (SCA) established in Paris on 24 August 1940 by the Ministry of Industrial Production and Labour and which had just taken over from the Industrial Trade Department. It was “responsible for examining requests from the German administration to French industrialists, and for authorising or refusing them on a case by case basis, depending on whether they involved ‘defensive’ or ‘offensive’ products.”512 Its creation coincided with the decision reached at the end of July by Admiral Darlan to restore supervisory bodies at the shipyards in the occupied zone. Both a body for centralising German orders and an intermediary between the Occupier and French producers, the SCA, according to the wishes of General Huntziger, had the competence to compel the Reich to grant “counterparties” for its occupation of the country, and to force the Reich to conduct “comprehensive negotiations” on alleviating the constraints placed on France by the armistice. In practice, this tactic placed the shipyards in the centre of a field of opposing forces: - on the one hand, the SCA, headed by the Engineer General of Shipbuilding, Jean Herck,513 and the STCN, headed by René Norguet; - on the other hand, the KAF [Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich] Rhein, soon joined by Vice Admiral Kinzel and Professor Noe (see below). A Navy Supervisory Department was set up, under orders from Rhein in Rouen, with a detachment in Le Trait. Police Inspector Jean Jourde, head of the judicial police in Rouen, recalled in February 1945 that the Germans had sent technical specialists to the shipyard, whose role was generally to directly oversee the work, dictating their orders through

the channels of the directorate. Likewise, they installed a guard post tasked with watching over the shipyard and all working there.514

For Germany, pursuing the war against England was of paramount importance. By signing the Armistice, France had not concluded peace, but had undertaken to contribute as widely as possible to the Reich’s victory. On 26 August 1940, Göring issued a directive stating: “It is imperative for the Reich that the potential and raw materials available in the occupied territories be exploited methodically and on the broadest scale possible in support of Germany’s arms industry and to boost the country’s potential to wage war.”516 While the German delegation to the Armistice Commission affirmed that it had the right, based on its struggle against the enemy, to place orders with industrialists in the occupied zone via freely-negotiated agreements, on 10 September 1940, Vichy set up an agency tasked with distributing industrial products, the Central Bureau for the Distribution of Industrial Products. Reporting to the Secretariat of State for Distribution, itself a branch of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Bureau was headed by Jean Bichelonne, Secretary General of the latter. One gauge of its impact on shipbuilding were the 2,500 tons of steel that the bureau undertook to earmark on a monthly basis for the sector. On the German side, a Bureau for centralising orders was set up in Paris (Zentralauftragstelle = ZAST) on 15 September 1940. At nearly the same time, the Kriegsmarine was given two new departments: one for shipbuilding (Werftbeauftragter) and the other for repairs (Oberwerftstab), led by Vice Admiral Kinzel517 and assisted by Professor Noe, former Director of

511 Excerpt from a letter from General Huntziger, quoted by Annie Lacroix-Riz, in Industriels et banquiers français sous l’Occupation, 2013, p. 122. 512 Yves Beauvois, Léon Noël, de Laval à de Gaulle via Pétain (1888-1987), Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2001, p. 156. 513 Jean Herck (1885–1961) also signed as the head of the Department for War Material Licences; see in particular a memo of 3 January 1941 – National Archives AJ41 537.

514 See the statements of Jean Jourde before Judge Thirion, dated 10 February 1945. 515 August von Kageneck, La France occupée, Perrin, 2012. 516 Quoted by A. von Kageneck in La France occupée. 517 Walther Kinzel (1880–1964), placed at the disposal of the Kriegsmarine from January 1939, was made responsible for these services on 22 October 1940, after completing an inspection round in July. See http://www.1940lafrancecontinue. org.

“Since the conflict is continuing, France must contribute to the war effort, irrespective of whether such obligations are contained in the Armistice Agreement” August von Kageneck, la France occupée515

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Danziger Werft. At the same time, the Occupier progressively exerted greater control over the appointment of higher-ranking French officials: for example, when on 25 August 1940 Admiral Darlan, in search of a representative in the occupied zone capable of defending his interests, suggested the appointment of Captain (Navy) Léon Dupré518 to the Government Delegate General, his plans were dashed. The post, the goals of which were to have the shipyards receive support from the Secretary of State for the Navy, and to allow Admiral Darlan to hold sway – as far as possible – over shipping affairs in France, was given to the Commissioner of the Navy, Louis Fatou, on 22 November 1940, and subsequently, at the insistence of the German authorities, to Admiral de Rivoyre on 13 April 1941. Even more symptomatic was the choice of the Government Delegate General. This highly sensitive post, involving representing the French Government with the German administration and coordinating services in occupied territories, first went to Léon Noël (8 July 1940). However, his lack of docility provoked the hostility of the Germans, leading him to be replaced on 19 August 1940 by General de La Laurencie and later by Fernand de Brinon519 on 17 December 1940. In the face of the Reich’s increase in power, the keywords for orders from the administration to the private sector became: play for time, delay and stall. The risks of this policy, followed by ACSM, weighed down on the companies, with their “greatest passivity”520 exposing them to sanctions and retaliation from the Germans.

518 Claude Huan, op. cit. 519 In July 1940, Fernand de Brinon (1885–1947) was appointed by Pierre Laval, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and head of the government (12 July to 13 December 1940), to represent the French Government with the German High Command. On 5 November 1940 (or 18 December 1940?), he was appointed French Ambassador to Germany, then Delegate General of the French Government within the Occupied Territories. See Yves Beauvois, Léon Noël, de Laval à de Gaulle via Pétain (18881987), op. cit. 520 The expression was taken from a police report attached to the report by the expert, Gaston Bernard, according to which, “it is widely known throughout Le Trait that the Worms shipyard showed the greatest passivity during the Occupation, and that in fact, management has the gratitude of nearly all its staff.”

The shipyards caught up in politics While awaiting instructions from the government: what to do with the submarine “La Favorite”? Following several visits to inspect the submarine by German military missions, Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich Rhein in a letter to ACSM dated 2 September 1940 confirmed the demand made verbally to Henri Nitot on 8 July 1940 to resume construction of said spoil of war, “provided that the final price be ratified by the department for shipyard contracts. A draft proposal for a construction contract or a priced offer likely to be verified – along with all supporting construction costs – shall be studied as quickly as possible.” This demand gave rise to a number of problems, beginning with that of supplies of materials, as the shipyard, pursuant to the Law of 20 July 1940, had cancelled its subcontracts and no longer had a steady supply of (raw) materials. Moreover, payment terms had to be settled. As with the oil tankers “La Charente” and “La Mayenne,” the French Admiralty had not terminated the contract, thus raising the question as to who was responsible for payment; in other words, who was the vessel’s general contractor. The government held the answer, and ACSM solicited its response as to which position to adopt. Before acknowledging receipt of the order of 2 September, Maison Worms referred the issue to René Norguet, head of the STCN, in a letter dated 9 September 1940: “We would be much obliged if you would forward us precise instructions from the French Government in this matter. May we draw your attention to the urgency of the issue.” Rather than handle the requests on a case-by-case basis, the public authorities preferred to define an overall policy. For the time being, René Norguet referred the case to the German Order Service (SCA). The Secretary of State for the Navy encourages companies to play for time Engineer General Herck, head of the SCA, forwarded his response on 16 September 1940 through the Chamber of Shipbuilders, stipulating that, in the absence of instructions from the French Government, he could not sign off on any order. He recommended playing for time until Vichy reached a decision. The next day, 17 September, management issued a verbal refusal to resume work on the submarine under the pretext that the ship was still owned by the French Government,

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and that only it could issue the order to continue with its construction – or not. On 21 September, Herck confirmed to ACSM that the Secretary of State for the Navy had not yet settled the issue, signalling that, general speaking, “the industrialist may comply with orders or demands from the occupying authority, limiting itself to executing only what is strictly necessary to avoid serious trouble.”521 As vague and incomplete as they were, these instructions were repeated that same day in a letter sent by ACSM to KAF Rhein: “Thank you for your letter of 2 September 1940 to our shipyard in Le Trait on resuming construction of the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ […] As the Managing Director of our shipyard pointed out to you during your visit to Le Trait last Sunday, 15 September, we consider it necessary, given the nature of the work and the many technical and financial questions that need to be resolved with our Admiralty, that the latter be able to give us its instructions before we continue with this construction project. Moreover, we understood that your government planned to refer this affair to the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. In the meantime, our shipyard, as previously explained, is busy with reconstituting their design studies and with establishing the exact status of the subcontracts.” 27–29 September 1940: Henri Nitot in Vichy On 27 September 1940, Henri Nitot travelled personally to Vichy, carrying a letter for Admiral Darlan: “We are pleased to provide you with a copy and translation of the letter of 2 September from the German Admiralty which reached our shipyard in Le Trait on 6 September. This confirms its order to pursue construction on the submarine ‘La Favorite’ on its behalf. We immediately brought this communication to the attention of the Engineers General Norguet, Herck and Genon.522 Engineer General Norguet informed us that, during his scheduled trip to Vichy in the week of 9 to 15 September, he intended to speak to the government about the problem thus caused by the occupying authorities. Upon his return, and after contacting both him and Engineer General Herck, we responded to the German Navy, in

521 These same “instructions” were sent on the same day to the Secretary of the Chamber of Shipbuilders. 522 Quoted several times in the Worms archives, Engineer General Genon is presented as the head of the French Department for Monitoring Works and Manufacturing.

a letter dated 21 September, a copy of which you will find attached; this letter refers in particular to the verbal instructions that Commander of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) Rhein gave to the Managing Director of our shipyard on 15 September, whereby his government would contact the French Government, through the intermediary of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, regarding resuming construction work on the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ Having learned from a letter dated 21 September, sent by Engineer General Herck to the Chamber of Shipbuilders that no decision had yet been reached regarding the submarine ‘La Favorite,’ we consider it imperative to draw your very special attention to a serious matter, sharing with you our concerns, and requesting your instructions. I - The submarine ‘La Favorite’ is being built in execution of a contract with the French Navy dated 31 March 1938; on the basis on its terms (Article 15), the ownership of the vessel, its equipment, its machinery, along with anything fitted to the vessel in question in our shipyard or elsewhere, shall be transferred to the Navy, as construction and outfitting progresses, without exception or reserve, up to the amount of the advance payments from the Navy for this portion of the contract. Thus, it is up to your department alone to provide formal instructions regarding the definitive position that our shipyard must take regarding the request formulated by the occupying authority. II - Under the current state of affairs, Article 1 of the Law of 20 July 1940 would apply, unless your department issues instructions to the contrary concerning the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ Therefore, we feel that your instructions should determine the position that the Navy will ultimately take regarding the application of these legal clauses to ACSM. III - If, in accordance with your instructions, construction of the submarine ‘La Favorite’ is to be pursued on behalf of the German Government, we think that you will agree that the difficulties stemming from the current situation should not in any way engage our financial liability, nor should there be any interruption or delay in payment of the amounts owed to ACSM throughout the construction period; therefore, the measures to take in this regard would have to be addressed directly by both governments. IV - Since pursuing the construction of this vessel may clearly expose ACSM to serious risks of being bombed,

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we feel that the government must offset these risks, be it to the shipyard itself, its staff, its equipment or its supplies. V - Moreover, the completion on behalf of the German Admiralty of a submarine previously intended for the French Navy risks causing reactions among some members of our staff, which may escape our control, and on which we think it useless to insist. It is important that we are also not held liable in this respect. VI - On the other hand, we must point out that, in the event we do not comply with the orders given to us by the German Admiralty to complete the submarine ‘La Favorite’ on its behalf, we run the risk, through requisitioning, of having the occupying Admiralty take possession of our company and its facilities. VII - Finally, we must point out that the question regarding the submarine ‘La Favorite,’ posed by the written order we received, the various aspects and possible consequences of which we have examined in this document, may again arise in the near future for the submarine ‘L’Africaine.’ This opinion stems from recent verbal comments from the German Admiralty.” The French Admiralty seeks compensation for the “pillage” of the occupied zone In Vichy, Henri Nitot (among others) was received by Admiral Le Luc,523 in charge of military shipbuilding, and Rear-Admiral Auphan, Chief of Staff for the Merchant Navy, on 28 and 29 September 1940. In the minutes he took of these exchanges, he noted that: – the French Government was “willing in principle to approve continuing construction of the vessels ordered by the French Navy, provided that, at the Armistice

523 Admiral Maurice Le Luc (1885–1964) was one of the signatories of the Armistice of 22 June 1940, as a representative of the Navy, alongside General Charles Huntziger (Army) and General Jean Bergeret (Air Force). He commanded naval forces until September 1941, and subsequently from November 1942 to the beginning of April 1943. Rear-Admiral Gabriel Auphan (1894–1982) was head of the Darlan Cabinet, Secretary of State for the Navy. “He himself was a member of the Laval Government from April to November 1942. Alongside Admiral Darlan, or in the Laval Cabinet, Admiral Auphan bore his share of responsibility for the actions of the Vichy Government. But he never shared Darlan’s conviction that ‘France’s salvation was to be found in its collaboration with Germany,’” nor the desire of Pierre Laval of victory for the Third Reich. Source: Encyclopaedia Universalis.

Commission in Wiesbaden, the German Government agreed to certain trade-offs,”524 such as easier access to raw materials, which could be granted “to certain industries which would be designated by the government,” or even “the release of certain categories of prisoners”; – as for merchant vessels, the dividing-up of French shipyard activities between German and French orders should be discussed in Wiesbaden; – the general instruction was to wait and see, letting “winter pass by, after which things could be seen a bit more clearly.” Henri Nitot returned to Paris with a letter dated 29 September and signed by Admiral Le Luc, on behalf of Admiral Darlan, through which the Secretary of State for the Navy (Central Directorate of Naval Industries) established the legal framework within which the fate of all vessels intended for the Admiralty (the submarine “La Favorite” as well as the oil tankers “La Charente,” “La Mayenne” and “La Baïse”) was to be debated: “1 – The orders for weaponry placed with you by my department fall automatically under the Law of 20 July 1940 and should be the subject of a cancellation procedure. 2 – The question of resuming the construction of the vessels on behalf of the German authorities cannot be decided by the department of the Navy alone. It will be covered by further instructions to be sent to you by the Engineer General, the head of the German Order Service in Paris. 3 – Irrespective of the decision taken in this regard – either a definitive stop of construction and the cancellation of the contract or its continuation on behalf of the German authorities –, you will have to come to terms with the Engineer General, head of the Department for Monitoring Works and Manufacturing in Paris, regarding the execution of the instructions sent to you.” The Germans threaten the shipyards On 30 September, during a meeting in Paris, Mr Puech, Secretary General of the Chamber of Shipbuilders, was warned by two German naval advisers (Freiberg and Bergreen [sic]) and three representatives of the Reich Ministry of Communications that “the French shipyards

524 This quotation and subsequent excerpts were taken from the expert report by Gaston Bernard, dated 31 December 1945.

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must strictly execute the orders given to them by the German Navy. Failing this, the local directors will be held personally responsible.”525 A circular written in threatening terms was sent to the shipbuilders (Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire in Saint-Nazaire; Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire Penhoët; Chantiers et Ateliers de la Loire in Nantes; Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime) and to the Chamber of Shipbuilders, by KAF Rhein on 4 October 1940: “Some shipyards have shown hesitance as to whether continuing the construction of unfinished warships for the German Navy was compatible with the terms of the Armistice. On this subject, we hereby confirm that, fundamentally, the High Commands of the German Army and Navy are justified in using French industry in the occupied zone in any manner and to the extent required by the continuation of the war against England. This includes, among others, the completion of weaponry and ships still under construction in French factories or shipyards. I herewith demand that work be resumed immediately – in the event you have not already done so – and that you report back to me immediately once work has recommenced. If it turns out that shipyard managers have not done their utmost to ensure the continuation of construction, I shall regretfully be obliged to place the shipyards concerned under the management of a German commissioner.” The serving of this formal notice was confirmed by Vice Admiral Kinzel that same day, and by Engineer General Herck, head of the SCA, the following day, 5 October, in a letter sent to the Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders: “During our meeting on 5 October 1940, attended by Chief Engineers Norguet and Borde, you handed me the translation of a letter of 4 October 1940 from the Commanding Admiral in France in charge of shipyards, calling on your members […] to finish construction of the warships currently under construction in French shipyards. It warns them that, if it were found that not everything has been done at the shipyards to continue construction, he would regretfully be obliged to place the noncompliant shipyards under the protection of a German commissioner. Under these conditions, and in light of the written instructions he has sent you, I hereby confirm that the construction of the

525 Excerpt from a memo of 13 October 1944 by Gaston Bernard.

warships in question must be undertaken while awaiting the arrival of final instructions, as announced in the letter sent to the Worms shipyard on 29 September 1940, by the Admiral of the Fleet, Secretary of State for the Navy.” 8 October 1940: construction work resumes on “La Favorite” A memo dated 8 October 1940 announced the following to ACSM staff: “This authority [Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich Rhein] has requested that we resume work immediately on the submarine, ‘La Favorite,’ adding that ‘if not everything is done at the shipyards to ensure the continuation of the construction, the authority will, to its great regret, be obliged to place the noncompliant shipyards under the management of a German commissioner.’ This summary of the situation is intended to be understood by all.” After the Liberation, certain workers produced this document as proof of “management’s desire to accelerate production for the benefit of the Germans.”526 Maison Worms retaliated by arguing that it had no way of circumventing the German injunction, on account of the threats to which the company was exposed. These threats were to materialise several days later, involving the entire Maison Worms (see below). In a second memo dated that same day, Henri Nitot stated: “Construction work on the submarine ‘La Favorite’ No. 88 shall resume and progress in line with the availability of supplies, design studies and blueprints. The supply department will request providers to resume work on the subcontracts terminated ipse jure in accordance with the Law of 20 July 1940. We will need to notify them, requesting them to report the current state of supplies, the likely delivery date, as well as detailed information as foreseen in memo No. 5 of 9 August 1940. The Navy’s Study Bureau will do everything to ensure that the necessary construction plans are sent to the shipyard. The Chief Manufacturing Engineer will provide all instructions for the work in hand on 8 June to be restarted, to the extent that the circumstances ensuing from the two preceding paragraphs allow such. He is

526 Expert report by Gaston Bernard of 31 December 1945.

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to inform me in detail of the amount of labour needed, broken down by trades and is to submit to me, in agreement with the foremen involved, the proposals for rehiring men, without losing sight of the need to proceed in tandem or simultaneously with the redeployment of the temporary workers doing work unrelated to their trades. In addition, engineers and department heads are, following an examination of the situation, to send me proposals possibly justified in light of these instructions.” Also on 8 October, the Navy ordered ACSM to dismantle the submarines “L’Armide” and “L’Andromaque,” the order for which was officially cancelled on 9 October 1940. The same held true for four submarines, Q 219 to Q 222, the order for which was officially cancelled on 23 February 1943. Two days later (10 October 1940), the Secretary of State for the Navy reaffirmed that the shipyard was to continue construction work on the supply ships “La Mayenne,” “La Charente” and “La Baïse” via a telegram worded as follows: “Following the verbal instructions that my department gave to you on this subject, I have the honour to confirm that you are to proceed with the execution of your contract […] for the construction of the oil tankers ‘La Charente,’ ‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Baïse,’ ships which are to be exempted from application of the Law of 20 July 1940 on the termination of contracts concluded by the government for the needs of national defence.” However, the recipient of said vessels was not specified: was it to be the French Admiralty or the German Admiralty? And, if in alluding to the exemption from the Law of 20 July 1940, the French Admiralty seemed to give its implicit approval for the vessels to be delivered to the German Admiralty, a handwritten memo from the office of Rear-Admiral Auphan specified that the Occupier’s orders remained subject “to the discussions underway at the Armistice Commission.”527 Faced with such a lack of clarity, Hypolite Worms feared that, despite all these assurances and orders, his company would to a great extent be held responsible. Thus, during a meeting of the Technical Committee for Shipbuilding held on 11 October 1940, he attempted to find out whether the French Government intended to

527 Ibid.

discuss the basic issue with the German Government, i.e. whether the continued construction of warships conformed to the clauses of the Armistice. Four days later, he received his answer. 15 October 1940: the manufacture of war material is forbidden by law On 15 October 1940, Marshal Pétain decreed that “in consideration of the Armistice Agreement that entered into force on 22 June 1940 […] [you are] forbidden, on the territory of mainland France (including Corsica), Algeria, in the colonies, protectorates, and territories under mandate, to manufacture new war material and to continue any manufacturing thereof currently underway.” Included among the construction projects listed in Article 2 were “equipment carrying firearms or intended for use in combat: warships of any kind.” By obstructing the German policy, the goal of which – according to Bichelonne – was “to empty France of its substance,”528 this measure sought to push the Reich to open negotiations on all economic problems raised by the application of the Armistice Agreement, and in particular the use of the shipyards in the occupied zone: this happened the very next day, on 16 October 1940 in Wiesbaden. Discussions were to focus on the topics brought up with Henri Nitot in Vichy: - to obtain monthly deliveries from Germany of 5,000 tons of raw materials; - to earmark 30% of production capacity for France; - to rebuild the labour force (notably skilled labour) through the return of 5,000 prisoners; - to settle German purchases through the intermediary of clearing houses.529 Darlan’s ulterior motives “On 17 October 1940,” reported Claude Huan [unfortunately without citing his sources], “Admiral Darlan recalled that, through the Armistice Agreement, the German Government agreed not to use the [war?] fleet.

528 Words quoted by Claude Huan, op. cit.: “‘The German policy seeks to empty France of its substance,’ wrote Secretary General for Industrial Production, Bichelonne.” 529 Clearing house, or compensation chamber. Compensation refers to all operations tied to a transaction between its ordering and its settlement. A clearing house is a national or international entity that calculates the net sums to be paid and makes the payments. It aims to liquidate debts and claims between banks or between countries.

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He protested to Vice Admiral Kinzel about the formal notice sent to the shipyards, calling on him not to follow through on the threats and pointing out that the orders would be given by the government, which would subsequently convey them to the Reich within the framework of the negotiations. Darlan, in fact, wanted to negotiate. He was ready to accept that shipyards within the occupied zone lend their support to the German war effort with their facilities and personnel, but he felt that this support had to be debated. If the German authorities were against crosssector negotiations, they should at least accept sectoral negotiations. In this way, Admiral Darlan intended to maintain control over the private shipyards (20,000 workers) through the intermediary of the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction (COCN),530 over the naval arsenals (15,000 workers) and over his military personnel (3,000 officers and sailors with the status of prisoners) still subject to his authority, even in the occupied zone. As of that day,531 the German orders covered twenty warships, three freighters, six oil tankers, one hundred and thirty-seven assorted vessels, as well as the requisitioning of thirteen tugboats and four water tanks under construction. This programme represented 100,000 tons of raw materials.” Within this framework, starting at the end of August 1940, the German Admiralty informed the Chamber of Shipbuilders of its intention to order freighters of varying tonnages, a project that would be divided up among the shipyards in the occupied zone. ACSM is commissioned to build three 1,150-ton freighters for the German Navy On 22 October 1940, the Chamber of Shipbuilders formally commissioned ACSM to build three freighters, each weighing 1,150 tons.532

530 The reference to the COCN (Comité d’Organisation de la Construction Navale) is anachronistic, since the decree creating this committee was published three months later, on 17 January 1941. 531 17 October 1940? 532 According to memo No. 2, which Gaston Bernard included in his report of 31 December 1945, “in correspondence and various documents, the weight of these freighters was listed as 2,000 tons, 1,150 tons or 1,000 tons. There is an obvious reason for the difference: 2,000 tons referred to the total displacement; 1,150 tons to deadweight; and 1,000 tons to light displacement. Light displacement was used in the rest of the study and in calculations.”

KAF Rhein sent the following letter to ACSM: “On the basis of negotiations with the Chamber of Shipbuilders on 28/09; 30/09; 1/10; 4/10; 5/10; 18/10 and 19/10, the minutes of which are held by the latter, you are herewith commissioned to construct the ships listed below, within the following maximum deadlines for delivery, in your shipyard in Le Trait: - three 2,000-ton ships to transport various packages, in accordance with plans that you will draw up to match the German plans, to be delivered: - the first ship, 12 months after receipt of one-half of the materials - the second, 15 months after receipt of one-half of the materials - the third, 20 months after receipt of one-half of the materials. You will be provided with the German plans as soon as possible. […] Formal confirmation of the intentions, recently forwarded to you, covering the warships currently under construction in your shipyard will arrive shortly. You are requested to present a price estimate as soon as possible, based on the following: a)cost of materials, without additional expenses b)production labour force, including family benefits c) application of overheads for b) d) sum of a + b + c e) profit f) total of d + e g) tax at 11.10% h) proposed cost, the sum of f + g i) the height of the coefficient for overheads listed in c) is to be provisionally set at 120%. Final approval shall depend on the positive outcome of the price check carried out by the relevant department of the Oberkommando of the War Navy. Payment will be made as follows: - 20% upon receipt of the order - 20% after confirmation that all materials have arrived in the shipyard - 30% at launch - 20% on provisional acceptance - 10% after any remaining work has been completed. We kindly request you to send the specifications for the materials needed as quickly as possible, if you have not already done so, to the Chamber of Shipbuilders, which is collecting the specifications from all the shipyards. Please also indicate the monthly breakdown of the deliveries to made to your shipyard.”

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The submarine “L’Africaine” enters the scene At the same time, the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich issued the formal order to ACSM to complete construction of “L’Africaine” (letter of 24 October). Maison Worms referred the order to Admiral Darlan on 30 October, requesting him to provide specific instructions: “As you are well aware, we have received the official order to continue with the construction of this vessel, as previously been for the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ In addition, the German Admiralty seems to be affirming the principle that it will be taking over the contracts concluded by us with the French Navy, and is asking us to specify both the amount of money we have already received as advance payments and the costs incurred by us as of the date on which Le Trait was occupied by the German Army. All is to be communicated within one week. In our opinion, it is thus vital that we receive definitive instructions from the French Government on the points previously covered in our past correspondence before the deadline expires.” On that very day, Wilhelm Beines von Ziegesar, head of the Commerzbank AG branch in Cottbus, assumed his duties as CommissionerAdministrator of Worms & Cie.

25 October 1940: Maison Worms under the iron rule of the Occupier Von Ziegesar, Commissioner-Administrator of Worms & Cie On 25 October 1940, the head of the Militärverwaltung in Frankreich (der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres) informed Maison Worms that Wilhelm Beines von Ziegesar had been appointed Commissioner-Administrator of the Worms & Cie Banking Services, under the terms of the Government Order of 20 May 1940, and following the second Government Order of 18 October 1940 relating to measures against the Jews. The document was signed by Dr Michel. Olivier de Sèze was appointed his deputy. On 30 October, von Ziegesar sent the following message to Hypolite Worms, Jacques Barnaud and company staff during a meeting at Maison Worms headquarters: “While I have been appointed by the head of the military administration in France […] Mr Olivier de Sèze has been designated by the French Government. […] The Maison Worms to which you belong groups

together a variety of both industrial and commercial interests. We intend to untangle intertwined threads and to gain exact information on the size and profitability of each company.” The slander of the collaborationist press The reasons for this unprecedented appointment, which had not happened to any company other than the Banque de France, were to be found in a set of rumours unleashed several weeks earlier against the company and its leader. A “report” was in circulation: attributed to a certain Dr Henri Martin (a doctor, a former member of La Cagoule and founder of a private intelligence service), it focused on a “mysterious secret society,” the “Synarchy,” with the goal of “obstructing the ‘socialist’ tendencies of the national revolution and Petainism, protecting the economical interests of Jews, Anglo-Saxons and basically all foreigners, and blocking the efforts to shape continental Europe as an economic entity excluding Anglo-Saxons.”533 Without providing any evidence that this secret organisation existed, Worms & Cie was named as being at its core. Fiercely anti-Semitic and Anglophobic, the idea of a “synarchic plot” was encouraged by the Law on the Status of Jews, which Vichy had promulgated on 3 October 1940 without German pressure. On 7 October, Marshal Pétain received a defamatory letter against Worms & Cie and Ministers Baudouin and Bouthillier. In this contaminated climate, Michel Goudchaux resigned as General Partner one week later (14–16 October). Although a Catholic, he was actually considered to be an Israelite under the provisions of the Government Order of 27 September 1940, which was tightened on 18 October by the Government Order concerning Jewish companies. Following his resignation, the company statutes were modified. Jacques Barnaud, who had distanced himself from all his administrative positions, remained a partner, without receiving any compensation. On 21 October, a calumnious campaign began, orchestrated by the collaborationist newspaper, Paris-Soir, whose heinous attacks against Hypolite Worms for having surrendered the French fleet to the English (see the Worms Agreement of 4 July) and for being a British

533 Renaud de Rochebrune and Jean-Claude Hazera, Les Patrons sous l’Occupation. II, Odile Jacob, 1995, coll. Opus 1997.

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Appointment of Wilhelm Beines von Ziegesar as Commissioner-Administrator of the Worms & Cie Banking Services (known as Banque Worms) – 25 October 1940

sympathiser were relayed throughout the Occupation period in publications of similar ilk: Au Pilori, L’Œuvre, Franciste, L’Appel, France Europe, etc. The hostility of Laval Interrogated in October 1944 about the reasons for these attacks, the head of Maison Worms recalled the role of Pierre Laval: “In August and September 1940, I made several trips to Vichy to meet Admiral Auphan, Director of the Merchant Navy, regarding the mission that I had fulfilled in England. During one of these trips, having heard that Mr Laval had said hostile words against me personally and Maison Worms, I asked to meet with him. Though he received me, Mr Laval was violent and reproached me for being opposed to his politics. I assured him that I had never done anything against him, and that my rule was to abstain from all political activity. Mr Laval spoke to me about some people working for me, and more specifically about Mr Le Roy Ladurie [at that time head of the Worms & Cie Banking Services], whom he accused of being a monarchist. Mr Laval insisted that he ‘would break the back,’ to use

his own expression, of anyone who opposed him. After that, I never saw Mr Laval again, nor Admiral Darlan or any other minister. I never attended any political meeting, private or otherwise.” In this same deposition, Hypolite Worms mentioned that his meeting with Pierre Laval took place several days before the press campaign was unleashed against Maison Worms. “Although unable to confirm the situation,” he noted, “I wondered whether there might be a link between my visit and the subsequent campaign. I realised that the gist of the campaign was to accuse me of being hostile to the Franco-German collaboration.” The fact remained that Laval, “around 10 August 1943, explained to high-ranking members of the Legion of War Veterans that, had Hypolite Worms been arrested as he had intended one and a half months before 13 December 1940 [the date on which he was dismissed by Pétain], 13 December would never have happened.”534

534 Excerpt from a report of 19 August 1943.

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In the clutches of the Occupier The German authorities took an interest in Maison Worms as a result of its diversified business activities and its divisions: Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie testified as to the numerous attempts of high-ranking German officials to take up shares in the company’s capital and/or to enter its management. It is also likely that the shipyard’s great passivity in the face of the demands of the German Admiralty contributed to Maison Worms being placed under administration. For that matter, Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie was to highlight that ACSM had been placed under the control of the Kriegsmarine.

Waiting for Wiesbaden All construction work must be endorsed by the French Admiralty In anticipation of the instructions from Admiral Darlan, but without presaging who would receive the vessels, the ACSM management informed the Le Trait shipyard on 31 October that “construction on the submarine ‘L’Africaine,’ No. 89 will resume under the same conditions as those for ‘La Favorite,’ as defined in memo No. 37 of 8 October 1940, all provisions of which apply in this case.” The memo went on to state the following: “Construction work on the submarines ‘L’Andromaque’ No. 96 and ‘L’Armide’ No. 98 has been permanently interrupted. To free up the slipway, we shall proceed as quickly as possible with dismantling and demolishing the portions of the submarines already built. The materials from the dismantled vessels shall be stored out of the way in a to-be-determined corner of the shipyard, classified either as potentially re-usable or as scrap. The costs associated with each vessel are to be booked on a separate account. Prior to dismantling, the status of the work done on the submarines is to be documented. Similarly, all technical and accounting information is to be collected, thus enabling us to draw up the precise calculation bases for termination, as set forth in memo No. 5 of 9 August 1940. We could, where necessary, consider using the materials, equipment and any accessories originally intended for ‘L’Andromaque’ and ‘L’Armide’ in the construction of ‘La Favorite’ and ‘L’Africaine,’ though all necessary precautions will need to be taken to avoid booking errors.” Through the intermediary of Admiral Le Luc, Darlan issued his instructions on 2 November 1940.

These conformed with the instructions issued by Herck on 5 October: “I see no major problem in you submitting the information to the departments under ‘Admiral Frankreich,’ as requested in his letter of 24 October 1940. Nonetheless, I ask that you limit the communication of the contracts to their administrative content, not communicating the portion that deals with the specifications, unless formally demanded by the Germans. In addition, I hereby inform you that the negotiations covering shipbuilding in the occupied zone are part of the overall negotiations underway between the French and German Governments. The French Government has not lost sight of this issue, and a response will be sent forthwith to the German authorities by the French delegation in Wiesbaden. In the meantime, the French Government acknowledges, in application of the Law of 15 October covering the ban on manufacturing weaponry, that the only weaponry able to be manufactured is that for which orders have been were placed with industrialists by the German Order Service (SCA) in Paris. Any other orders from German authorities are to be turned down as long as the shipyard has not received authorisation from the French Government. You may, where necessary, forward what is stated above to the German authorities as being the instructions you have received from the Admiralty.” Around the same time (2 November), the Secretary of State for the Navy allowed construction work to proceed on the oil tankers “La Mayenne,” “La Charente” and “La Baïse,” but “with the exception of weaponry.” 28 November 1940: the SCA secretly authorises construction work to continue on “La Favorite” On 28 November 1940, a decisive step forward was taken: the Admiralty ordered Engineer General Herck (SCA), through the intermediary of the Chamber of Shipbuilders, to issue ACSM with a licence “to legalise orders for war material.” Departing from the Law of 15 October 1940, this authorisation was granted on a temporary basis: one single copy was provided to the Chamber of Shipbuilders and ACSM respectively, which were “forbidden from reproducing or circulating it.” The licence had to be kept secret from the Germans, “so as not to compromise the initiation of negotiations on the use of shipyards in the occupied zone, [which sought] to reserve a French share in future

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construction work.”535 This authorisation applied to “La Favorite” and to this submarine alone. It sought to discharge the company from any liability. It extended “to all subcontracts in the occupied zone,” and not “to subcontracts in the free zone [where French approval was mandatory], or to those involving shipyards in the Gironde, which were subject, through the intermediary [of Herck], to approval by the Secretary of State for the Navy.”536 In all likelihood, this was one of the first nine approvals temporarily granted by the SCA, to which Claude Huan referred. “The definitive licences,” he added, “[are to] be handed out upon conclusion of the negotiations” in Wiesbaden. Cessation of work on “L’Africaine” Sheltering behind the absence of an exemption similar to that granted for “La Favorite,” ACSM was not authorised to resume construction work on “L’Africaine.” The Worms management in Paris instructed the local management in Le Trait to cease work on it. However, on 22 December, ACSM was contacted by KAF Rhein: “In conjunction with the verbal negotiations, the provisional contract of 8 July and the letter from the shipyard chargé d’affaires of 2 September 1940, we now confirm the previously provisional order for: 1. the submarine ‘L’Africaine’; 2. the oil tankers ‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Charente,’ subject to definitive agreement on the final price between the ACSM chargé d’affaires and the Commanding Admiral in France.537 Completion of the oil tanker ‘La Baïse’ is also included in this order, subject to the same proviso regarding the price. We expect you to submit for checking as quickly as possible the original construction contract concluded with the French Navy, or the price estimate together with the whole construction file.” On 28 December, management turned to Engineer General Herck at the German Order Service for instructions regarding the response to this letter, and possibly, to obtain a licence to manufacture war material: “Please

535 Depositions of 20 October 1944 by Jean Dieudonné and Jean-Jacques Balland, marine engineers; the former was in charge of the Merchant Navy, and the latter, in charge of the Navy. 536 Licence granted by the German Order Service (SCA), 28 November 1940. 537 Translation of the title, Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich.

find attached a copy and translation of the letter of 22 December 1940, which we received from the German Admiralty. In accordance with the instructions that you gave to the Chamber of Shipbuilders, we attach an application (in eight copies) for a licence to manufacture war material intended to legalise the completion of the submarine ‘L’Africaine.’” On 30 December, the Engineer General in Marine Engineering, René Genon, head of the Supervisory Service for Works and Manufacturing at the French Secretariat of State of the Navy, was updated on the progress of the work on the oil tankers “La Charente” and “La Mayenne”: “We are currently working normally on these vessels under the instructions we received previously from the French Navy. Following our recent conversations, we reckon with soon receiving from you the cancellation of your dispatch of 24 December 1940 regarding ‘La Baïse.’” Will the oil tanker “La Baïse” have to be demolished? For several weeks, debates waged over the fate of this squadron supply ship. Whereas on 2 November, the Secretary of State for the Navy had authorised its continued construction, on 8 November, the Bauaufsicht der Kriegsmarine (Navy Supervisory Department) in Rouen had rang up, demanding that the oil tanker be destroyed. An official from this Department came and drew up a list of materials in storage so they could be reassigned to another vessel; on 19 November, Maison Worms sent a report of this visit to René Genon. The shipyard tried to use this and other letters to get the French Admiralty to oppose the vessel’s dismantling and the reassigning of its components by the Kriegsmarine. Simultaneously, it sought to obtain approval from the Kriegsmarine to continue construction work on “La Baïse” which it received: the chargé d’affaires to the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich ordered that construction work be resumed on the oil tanker, an order which the KAF ratified in the letter of 22 December quoted above. But on 3 December, the French Admiralty, wishing to send a positive signal to the occupation authorities, opted to cancel the contract for “La Baïse” and authorised its demolition, a choice it confirmed on 24 December. Faced with two contradictory orders, management hastened to have the French Admiralty reverse its decision. On 28 December, management sent Engineer General Herck (SCA) the letter of

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22 December from the KAF, and on 30 December made its case with René Genon, head of the Supervisory Service for Works and Manufacturing, regarding the work in hand, including “La Baïse” for which notice of the cancellation of the termination order had finally been served through a ministerial dispatch of 3 January 1941. Permission to continue construction work on the oil tanker was thus granted by both the German and French sides. Yet the question of for whom the ship was intended – France or the Reich? – had still not been resolved. It was not until the resolutions of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden in August– September 1941 the issue was finally resolved. Until then, the vessel would continue to be counted among the German orders. Thus, in a letter of 5 February 1941, ACSM advised the Rustungsinspektion of Saint-Germain that delivery of the three oil tankers would take place: - on 1 October 1941, for “La Charente,” - on 1 February 1942, for “La Mayenne,” - in September 1942, for “La Baïse.” In reality, though, the Kriegsmarine was uninterested in this last vessel, as the lack of materials was becoming increasingly severe. On 24 March 1941, or one and a half months after the preceding letter, the Rustungsinspektion was informed that deliveries would be postponed: - for “La Charente,” to 1 April 1942 (+ 6 months), - for “La Mayenne,” to 1 December 1942 (+ 10 months), - for “La Baïse,” to 1 May 1943 (+ 7 months). Obtaining supplies becomes increasingly difficult These delays, as much as the temptation of the German authorities to stop work on the least finished vessels, to dismantle them and reuse their materials in more completed vessels, stemmed from the growing shortage of all kinds of supplies. “We have no news concerning additional profiles and the entirety of the sheet metal,” wrote Le Trait to Paris on 9 November regarding an order for materials for the four tank barges, which had been scheduled since 8 July 1940, “and thus, we cannot provide a start date for construction.” The situation was aggravated by the complications caused by the many formalities to be fulfilled in order to ship supplies to the shipyard. Since 27 November, the government had subjected shipments from the free zone to the occupied zone to the issuance of a licence. Under these circumstances, the ACSM management,

in its note of 24 March 1941 to the Rustungsinspektion, stated that, in order to respect the delivery dates for the: - 1st barge, on 1 October 1941, - 2nd barge, on 15 November 1941, - 3rd barge, on 1 January 1942, - 4th barge, on 15 February 1942, it was imperative “that all materials needed for their construction be at the shipyard by 1 May 1941, and that the supplies be delivered on a regular basis thereafter.” An additional reason for delays cited by ACSM was the design of the plans, for example, for the 1,150dwt freighters, the order for which, signed by the Kriegsmarine on 22 October, was received by ACSM on 16 November. On 30 November, a memo was sent by Paris to Le Trait: “The German Navy has placed an order with us for three diesel-engine freighters each with deadweight tonnage of approximately 1,100 tons. The construction numbers allocated to these orders are: 111, 112, and 113, respectively. In principle, these ships, subject to updated specifications, will be built in accordance with the plans provided by the German authorities. The metal materials are to be supplied through their intermediary by German industry. The diesel engines remain to be determined. They will most likely be covered by a contract with a French manufacturer. The auxiliary equipment and other materials or various devices will, in principle, be provided by French industry, in accordance with the standard procedure.” The execution of this order gave rise to numerous observations and reservations on the part of ACSM regarding deadlines, prices, payments terms, etc. The problem caused by the plans was so thorny that an engineer from Le Trait, Mr Scheerens, had to be sent to the Kriegsmarine naval base in Wesermunde, Germany. But far from bringing about a quick solution, this option required numerous updates, meaning that work on the first two ships did not begin until December 1941, and not until January 1942 for the third ship, i.e. fourteen and fifteen months, respectively, after the order date. The growing lack of supplies notwithstanding, the German Minister for Transport (Julius Dorpmüller) announced, during a trip to Saint-Nazaire in mid-December 1940, his intention to launch a second wave of orders for freighters, bringing the total order up from three to sixteen vessels (160,000 tons of deadweight tonnage). Admiral Darlan approved, in principle, the construction of eight freighters (76,000 tons), encouraging René

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Fould, Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders, to in return obtain delivery of raw materials and the release of appropriate staff held prisoner. “At the end of 1940,” noted Claude Huan, “the situation was blocked. […] Settlement by a clearing [house] was the only approval granted (16 November 1940). […] The government sought to gain time by retrenching behind its proposal for comprehensive negotiations in Wiesbaden (and not at the Paris level). Pending this, if necessary, advance payments were granted to all the shipyards. […] Matters were heading towards a showdown or negotiations.”

cussions underway on this subject in Wiesbaden have been concluded.” A refusal he repeated in a letter of 5 February 1941, of which ACSM informed the KAF that same day. More than ever, the holding back of licences and the subsequent slow-down of shipyard activity were the “roundabout means [through which] […] the French Government [tried] to put pressure on the German Commission in Wiesbaden, for the goal of reaching a formal agreement and obtaining the quid pro quos discussed with Henri Nitot during his trip to Vichy in September 1940.”538

“A showdown or negotiations”

The Reich ups its demands In the eyes of the German Commission, “licences to manufacture war material were not subject to approval, but to the stamp of the French Government.”539 And the occupation authorities fully intended to complete their construction programme: in addition to the eight freighters approved by the French Admiralty in midDecember, the Germans announced on 16 January an order for eighteen warships in addition to the twenty initially scheduled, plus eighteen merchant vessels instead of the original sixteen. Moreover, they decreed that vessels located south of the Gironde would be considered spoils of war. These increased demands were to a certain extent tied to Petain’s dismissal of Laval from his duties as Vice President of the Council of Ministers on 13 December 1940, and his subsequent arrest: the Führer viewed the removal of this German partisan as proof that France was not prepared to participate in the German war effort. On “10 January,” noted Claude Huan, “Marshal Keitel, [head of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht,] insisted that from now on both the occupied zone and the free zone be called on to supply raw materials, munition and weaponry for the war against England, in accordance with the Preamble of the Armistice Agreement. The German authorities drew up a very broad plan to quickly make the French economy subservient to their needs. […] As for shipbuilding, the French had to complete the vessels at a lower cost and where necessary by force.”540

Claude Huan, “La Construction Navale Française 1940-1942” The French Admiralty blocks the licences Although more than one thousand people worked at ACSM, the Worms management recommended that work on the ships not be sped up, particularly on the warships (letter of 3 January 1941). Instructions provided on 14 January 1941, by the head of the Central Directorate for Naval Industries, the Engineer Balland, also took the same tack: “You have submitted a request for a licence to manufacture weaponry in order to finish the submarine ‘L’Africaine.’ In accordance with the orders that I have received from the Admiralty, I would like to inform you that the issuance of licences is subject to the conclusion of the negotiations underway in Wiesbaden. Accordingly, no licence may be issued at this time. Under the current circumstances, I encourage you: - not to make any change in your current position for orders whose licences are thus being delayed; - to respond to the questions you may be asked that the instructions of the French Government are not to undertake any new work to finish the warships until the discussions underway in Wiesbaden are concluded.” Having informed the German authorities of this position on 5 February 1941, the ACSM management adopted a wait-and-see attitude. The situation was repeated on 20 January 1941, after ACSM filed a request for an additional licence to validate the sub-orders placed in the free zone for the submarine “La Favorite.” In response to this, Engineer General Herck, head of the German Order Service, wrote: “No new licence to construct warships shall be issued until further notice, unless and until the dis-

538 Expert report by Gaston Bernard of 31 December 1945. 539 Claude Huan, op. cit. 540 Ibid.

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The submarine “L’Africaine” under construction

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27 December 1941: France responds by creating the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction (COCN)541 “Faced with the risk of being completely stripped by the German orders,”542 the government created the COCN, along the lines of the organisation committees set up in each industrial sector by the Law of 16 August 1940. This Committee, led by Georges Bourgès, succeeded the Chamber of Shipbuilders,543 whose Chairman, René Fould, was arrested by the Gestapo on 27 January 1941. The COCN oversaw the industrial and commercial activities of the shipyards (programmes, supplies, production, prices, distribution of materials, wages, etc.), serving as the liaison between companies within the sector, the government and the German authorities. In practice, its establishment and function were decried by the trade, which complained of the excess “procedural paperwork.”544 “In Paris,” Henri Nitot noted in his memoirs, “during all those years [of Occupation], I had to put up with the constraints imposed by our Organisation Committee for Naval Construction created through Vichy legislation, difficulties with obtaining supplies of materials, the tyranny of the ‘bons-matières’ [ration coupons for raw materials]. Fortunately, the official departments were represented by two great marine engineers, Balland for the Navy and Dieudonné for the Merchant Navy, both of whom performed their duties with great courage and supreme diplomacy, and thus did us many great favours.” The increasing complexity of the administrative tasks “regarding both social laws and regulations on the distribution of raw materials”545 led to an increase in office staff, the number of which exceeded in 1943–1944 (295 people) that of 1938–1939 (275 people). Advances and setbacks The line followed by Darlan seemed to be on the verge of bearing fruit: “On 14 February 1941, the German Armistice Commission indicated at last that it would

541 Some authors date the creation of the COCN to 17 January 1941, the day of the publication in the Journal officiel of the Decree of 27 December 1940. 542 Claude Huan, op. cit. 543 See L’Ouest-Éclair of 24 January 1941. 544 Cf. Les entreprises de biens de consommation sous l’Occupation, by Hervé Joly, Presses Universitaires François Rabelais, 2010. 545 Report by Gaston Bernard, op. cit.

agree to study the various problems raised by German and French shipbuilding programmes in the free and occupied zones (financing, construction and maintenance programme, compensation, raw materials).”546 Several days later (25 January 1941), “the German authorities [demanded] to be informed of the free zone’s construction capacities. […] Of the 3 billion francs […] representing the totality of vessels under construction, one-third had to be advanced by the French Government in the absence of a final agreement.” An initial financial agreement was initialled by René Sergent, Director of the Foreign Procurement and Sales Office (tasked with correcting the new exchange rate of the Reichsmark, deemed to be too low), and the future Deputy Director of Foreign Trade as of September 1942, along with Professor Noe, Kinzel’s Deputy. Admiral Darlan was still not granting the requested licences. A highly tense period ensued in Paris, with the German authorities expecting construction work to resume and threatening retaliations. In an attempt to appease them, Jacques Barnaud, acting in his capacity as Delegate General for Franco-German Economic Relations, met with Vice Admiral Kinzel and explained the affair to him, as conceived by Darlan – to no avail. The situation remained tense. In the shipyards, work progressed as slowly as the negotiations. Few orders were passed on to subcontractors. The German drain on French production was so strong that the shipbuilding industry had to make do with 750 tons of steel in February and 1,000 tons in March, instead of the monthly 2,500 tons initially scheduled. The Germans go on the offensive: the case of “L’Africaine” Management found itself in limbo since receiving the instructions from Balland and Herck in mid-January. This, in conjunction with the letter on the cessation of work on “La Favorite” and “L’Africaine” sent by Le Trait to the Rustungsinspektion on 5 February 1941, provoked the anger of the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich, leading to him serving formal notice on ACSM on 4 March 1941. “In the course of a conversation you recently had with Marinebaurat Isemer on the subject of the aforenamed ship [‘L’Africaine’], you mentioned that the posi-

546 Claude Huan, op. cit.

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tion of the French Government did not allow you to pursue its construction. That said, please note the following. A memo exchanged in January 1941 with the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden expressly states that German armament orders placed within occupied French territory are not subject to the approval of the French Government, and that the High Commander of the German Army has the right, on the basis of the Armistice Agreement, to make use of French industry within the occupied territory in any manner and to any extent needed for the pursuit of the war against England. Any different stance taken by the French Government and your shipyard contradicts this memo and the spirit of the Law of 15 October 1940 relating to the prohibition of the manufacture of war material. For this reason, you are ordered to continue work immediately on the above-named ship, without delay, and to so inform the chargé d’affaires reporting to the Commanding Admiral in France. Should you continue with your wait-and-see attitude, the chargé d’affaires will be obliged to take specific measures.” Maison Worms immediately informed the Central Directorate for Naval Industries and the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction of these threats, both of which intervened on 11 March, calling on Vice Admiral Kinzel not to exert any pressure on ACSM as long as the negotiations in Wiesbaden had not resolved the issues between the two governments. In the meantime, work ceased on “L’Africaine.” Engineer General Herck himself had to confront the exasperated Germans. “On 19 March, General Barckhausen, in charge of economic problems within the occupied zone, summoned [him] […] and ordered him to sign the licences. Admiral Darlan responded that it was not his responsibility if Germany decided to negotiate so late, but that he agreed to sign the licences once his demands had been met. There would be no construction under pressure,” he stated.547 The keel of barge No. 105 is laid in slipway No. 7 between two air raids (Summer 1941) For better or worse, work resumed on the ships during the second quarter of 1941, with the number of bluecollar workers peaking at 895 on 30 June (a figure that would never be surpassed during the Occupation).

547 Claude Huan, op. cit.

“However,” indicated Gaston Bernard, “it seems that no particular effort was made to find the pre-war workforce as, starting in [the second half of ] 1941, headcount collapsed rapidly”548 under the combined effects of a slowdown in construction and the flight of part of the workforce faced with the danger of Allied air raids. The first wave of air raids occurred on 6, 11, and 22 July 1941, with Le Trait and ACSM again targeted on 12 and 31 August. Destruction to the shipyard was listed as follows: - first air raid – 6 July 1941: 0.061% - second air raid – 11 July 1941: 0.008% - third air raid – 22 July 1941: 2.479% - fourth air raid – 12 August 1941: 0.298% - fifth air raid – 31 August 1941: 0.265% Though the impact of the air raids was still moderate, it was set to increase until the Battle of Normandy (6 June to 29 August 1944). “Production,” indicated Gaston Bernard, “slowed down each time, more or less in accordance with the amount of damage.”549 Despite the strafing, fires and bombs, the keel of barge No. 105550 was laid on 19 August 1941 in slipway No. 7. But in September 1941, ACSM received notification from the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich that it had cancelled the order of 24 August 1940. The Germans’ idea was to use the materials intended for the tank barges for repairs to other Navy vessels. But they had to face up to the facts: stocks were so depleted that the materials were used immediately they were delivered. “In consideration of the degree of progress made in the machining of material already in the shipyard,” the occupation authorities decided on 4 October 1941 to cancel their project and to go ahead with the construction of the ship. The keel of a new barge, construction No. 106,

548 Gaston Bernard, op. cit. Relative collapse, since in December 1941 the workforce, with 1,237 employees, reached a peak. 549 Ibid. 550 M. Quemin in Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires […], 1993, provided the following information on the barges: No. 105, initially called “Ingénieur Lacroix” then “Loir” – keel laid down: 19.08.1941 – slip No. 7 – launched on 31.12.1943 and delivered to the German Navy on 04.03.1944 // “Courlis” (No. 106) – keel laid down: 11.10.1941 for the German Navy – slip No. 7 – launched on 07.06.1948 for the Purfina group // “Lutetia” (No. 107) – keel laid down: 12.06.1946 – slip No. 7 – and “Djinn” (No. 108) – keel laid down: 04.11.1946 – slip No. 7 – respectively launched on 13 and 30.01.1948 for Soflumar (Société Fluviale & Maritime).

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was laid in slip No. 7 on 11 October 1941. The cancellation of orders with a view to re-using the equipment and supplies once again underscored the Occupier’s inability to ensure sufficient supplies to the shipyard. However, more than the supply problems, the activity of the shipyards was conditioned by the wait for the Wiesbaden decisions. 16 September 1941: the Franco-German Agreement on shipbuilding in the occupied zone is signed The negotiations in Wiesbaden ultimately led to an agreement officially recognised by the French Government on 16 September 1941. “In practice,” wrote Claude Huan, the French Government “succeeded in curtailing German claims for fifteen months and in earmarking 30% of the shipyards’ capacity for France. The agreement also specified that work would be paid through a clearing house, and not through occupation fees. In reality, we are led to believe that the occupying authorities, after believing that they could pressure the French shipyards, ended up accepting the negotiations, once they realised that they could not provide the supplies for their own orders. […] The following were the key points of the agreement: the French Government authorised the shipyards to construct for the Germans a specific number of warships (twenty-eight, for 44,000 tons), service vessels that the French Navy had already ordered, along with a German programme for merchant and service vessels (250,000 tons in total). It allowed subcontractors in the free zone to work for the shipyards. As for the German Government, […] it undertook to provide 2,500 additional tons of iron products (for three months!), and authorised the completion of the torpedo boat ‘Aventurier,’ three patrol frigates [avisos], two oil tankers (‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Baïse’) and several service vessels. […] Admiral Darlan felt that France had thus obtained satisfactory quid pro quos.”551

3–9 October 1941: The Germans take over as project managers for “La Favorite,” “L’Africaine” and “La Charente” Maison Worms was informed of the results of discussions in Wiesbaden on 3 October 1941 by Engineer General René Genon (Supervisory Service for Works and Manufacturing): “I have the honour to inform you that by virtue of a recent Franco-German Agreement, the German authorities, as of 26 June 1940, shall assume the project management of the further construction work on the following ships: Contract

Date

Number

Type

Name

Paris 5.771-B

31.03.1938

Submarines

Paris 6.881-A

21.04.1939

Oil tanker

“La Favorite” and “L’Africaine” “La Charente”

The French Navy has relinquished delivery of these ships. Nonetheless, the payment terms set forth in the contract, for which you had requested confirmation of the entitlements to payment prior to 26 June 1940 and which were paid by the French Navy, are rightfully yours to keep; those which might not yet have been paid shall be paid. Amounts not fulfilling this condition but which may nonetheless have been paid to you will be recalled. All financial guarantees currently existing for the payments received shall be released. You are to provide the list thereof to the relevant supervisory authority. Within the framework of the Franco-German compensation agreement, you are authorised to receive German payments based on the due dates set forth in the contract and acquired after 26 June 1940, as well as for other payment obligations that have arisen since that date. The necessary authorisations are hereby granted so that the supplies previously ordered by you in the free zone and intended for the aforementioned boats can arrive without further delay. ACSM is authorised to place new subcontracts in the free zone for the equipment intended for said ships. All these orders, as for those executed in the occupied zone, are subject to the provisions set forth in the general regulations in effect for the placing of German orders.

551 Claude Huan, op. cit.

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These provisions also apply to the materials which you may have to take from stocks other than those explicitly earmarked for the vessels in question. The French Navy is no longer under any obligation to oversee the construction work in question, nor the related subcontracts to supply the various equipment and materials which the Navy had agreed to make available to you to fit out the vessels. It is understood, however, that the supervisory authorities shall lend you any assistance you may need in settling various detailed questions arising from this change in project management. Last but not least, I call your attention to the need to release the Navy, as quickly as possible, from the interest payments on any advances that Crédit National may have granted. As regards the Navy, these advances must be repaid as and when cash inflows coming from German payments. For this reason, I request you and your main subcontractors, the Compagnie de FivesLille and the Matériel Électrique SW, to inform us of the date and amount of the advance granted to you and to keep the supervisory authority informed of any payments or reimbursements made by the occupying authorities, from which the advances received are to be deducted. PS. The issue of the engines for ‘La Favorite’ will be the subject of a later communication.” On 9 October 1941, Herck (German Order Service) wrote to ACSM: “I attach a copy of Licence No. 10 AF-bis regarding the completion of the submarine ‘L’Africaine’ in accordance with the Franco-German Agreement of 16 September 1941 on shipbuilding in the occupied zone. This copy was stamped on 4 October 1941 on behalf of the German Armistice Commission by the head of the Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsstabes Frankreich and also includes the decree which I signed on 9 October 1941, by delegation of the Secretariat of State of the Navy. Kindly confirm receipt of this document. Please note that, as of now, you will have to apply for an AT export licence as soon as the German Navy takes possession of the above-mentioned vessel: all information of use in making this application will be provided by my department within the desired timeframe.” A memo from ACSM dated 25 September 1944 stated that: “The order to continue construction work [on ‘L’Africaine’] was confirmed in a letter from the French Navy received during the month of October 1941 and sent, following intervention by the Government’s Commissioner, Engineer General Balland, by Mr Bourges, Chairman of

the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction, this latter entity having been the only one to intervene on behalf of shipyards as an intermediary between the German Admiralty, the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden and the French Navy.” In application of the measures taken in Wiesbaden, ACSM was also informed, on 8–9 October 1941, by the Secretariat of State of the Navy, that “ownership of the squadron supplyships ‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Baïse’ has been handed back to France. Everything is thus in order (or would appear so). The German Navy is reckoning on the three vessels, of which it had just been recognised as the owner (‘La Favorite,’ ‘L’Africaine’ and ‘La Charente’) being delivered without delay: in particular ‘La Favorite’ which the Kriegsmarine intends to use to train ASM forces552 – and which, with construction progress at 68.75% in June 1940, should have been launched one year before.” Five months after the Franco-German Agreement, on 12 February 1942, ACSM tried once again to shelter behind the fact that it had not received a formal order to continue work on “L’Africaine” as justification vis-à-vis the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich of why it had not resumed work on this vessel, but the argument no longer held. Confirmation was given to ACSM on 16 February 1942 by the Marine Bauaufsicht of Rouen: “Following the telegram from Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich Werftbeauftragter of 17 December 1941, work on the submarine ‘L’Africaine’ must also be stepped up. The preceding has already been transmitted to you verbally and is herewith confirmed in writing.” From now on, Maison Worms would have to come up with other excuses: technical problems, a lack of (raw) materials, air raid warnings and air raids, electricity blackouts, and soon staff requisitions, to justify the incessant delays in its launches to the occupation authorities.

552 ASM: anti-submarine warfare.

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Sign indicating the direction of a bomb shelter, placed in front of the Chantiers Worms

Avoidance and dithering (end of 1941 to August 1944) Throughout the period ending with the liberation of its shipyard, ACSM engaged in a balancing act between a form of passive resistance and the repercussions precipitated by its evasions and equivocation.

Between shortages, air raid warnings and air strikes Shortages of materials “By the end of 1941, the overall situation in the shipbuilding sector,” noted Claude Huan, “had clearly become worrying. […] Deliveries of raw materials continued to decline: 50% for metals, 30–40% for copper, zinc and aluminium. Worse still, the occupation authorities were considering going ahead with the requisitioning of stocks of materials and machine-tools. Instead of the 5,000 tons of steel needed monthly for the [new construction] programme, not even 1,000 tons could be guaranteed in 1942. […] It was quite clear that the major projects from the previous year could not be executed.”553 Whoever they were – Chantiers de la Loire, Schneider & Cie, Aciéries de Rombas, Matériel Électrique SW, etc. – the ACSM suppliers delayed their deliveries. These delays, resulting from real or organised shortfalls, coupled with frequent work interruptions caused by air raid warnings, played havoc with schedules. Work on “La Mayenne” stopped at the beginning of 1942, as did that on “La Baïse,” the stem of which was to be requisitioned in January 1944 for use on repairs. Construction on “L’Africaine” had slowed down to such a point that the submarine would ultimately not be delivered to the Germans. The problems with supplies led the occupation authorities to downgrade their construction programme and focus on repairing their warships, tasks for which Hypolite Worms was to make the following statement in September 1944:554 “Although we were asked to repair or transform ships, we did our best to turn

553 Claude Huan, op. cit. 554 Interrogation of 26 September 1944.

down the work under the most diverse, and most often spurious, pretexts.” Many orders were cancelled, including that for two of the four tugboats, for which Maison Worms had been ordered to build the 1,000HP triple expansion engines in November 1940. The Kriegsmarine cancelled two of these engines in June 1942, while the remaining two were not delivered; the work would resume in September 1944 on behalf of the French Navy. Likewise, the manufacture of the four cylindrical boilers intended for two 2,650-ton colliers for the French Navy was stopped at the end of March 1943, and not restarted until June 1945. By contrast, two of the four boilers ordered for the passenger liners “Londres” and “Vichy” prior to June 1940 were completed around the end of 1941. The French Government had in the meantime ceded one of the two ships to which the boilers were intended to the Germans, who demanded that the vessel be rush delivered to Le Havre. The ACSM management was opposed to this demand, arguing that the crane pontoon owned by the port of Rouen before 1939 and needed to put the boilers on board had been destroyed. The Kriegsmarine itself subsequently took care of finding the necessary equipment and went ahead with installing the boilers without the help of ACSM technicians. The other two boilers were never delivered. The pace of production, already slowed down by shortages and, according to several workers, deliberately braked by ACSM management, was deemed unacceptable by the Germans. To avoid sanctions, Worms & Cie wrote to Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich: “Our shipyard continues to put pressure on its suppliers; for our part, we plan to intervene with our suppliers in the Paris region, but we think it would be a good idea for you to do [likewise], in particular with regard to the Établissements Merlin & Cie in Grenoble and the Société de Construction Électromécanique in SaintÉtienne. Without your intervention, we will most likely have difficulty obtaining satisfactory delivery deadlines.” One of threats was that some ACSM staff would be imprisoned if the ships were not launched by the scheduled dates. This led management to request Vice

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April 1942: the submarine “La Favorite” is covered with a camouflage against air raids (National Navy Museum Paris collection)

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Admiral Kinzel to intervene so as to obtain the supplies promised by the Kriegsmarine on time and on schedule, thereby highlighting the latter’s responsibility for the delays. On 24 July 1942, ACSM wrote to KAF: “We hope that you will kindly pass on [the] specifications forthwith to the steelworks involved, allowing ACSM to take possession of the materials needed for the work within the shortest period of time.” On 1 August 1942, Worms Paris informed Le Trait of its intention to “pay another visit to the German Admiralty to ensure that the latter has undertaken everything necessary for the materials to be delivered to ACSM as quickly as possible.” On 14 December 1942, ACSM management urged the KAF to provide “as soon as possible one of the copies [of a] plan so that ACSM could quickly start executing it.” This insistence sought to give basic satisfaction to the Occupier, and “according to the details given by Hypolite Worms, was part of an overall plan to increase stocks. […] These materials, once on site, would be used in construction only after many tergiversations and delays. Basically speaking, the goal was to immobilise as much material as possible on site, only allowing a minimum to be used in production.” Raw materials and supplies increased in absolute value from 8,550,000 F in 1940 to 11,300,000 F in 1943. The oil tanker “La Charente” is rechristened “Ostfriesland” On 25 March 1942, Le Trait was the target of such intense air raids that nearly 7% of the shipyard was devastated. Following this new wave of destruction, the third after the air raids of July and August 1941, many workers holed up at home. The decrease in the workforce drew the attention of the Gestapo, whose threats of reprisals were the subject of circulars distributed by ACSM management as a means of getting the absentees to return to work. The investigation conducted by the expert Gaston Bernard revealed that management deliberately “closed it eyes when workers did not resume their work immediately after air raid warnings.”555 The reason for the delay in the construction work on “La Charente” however had nothing to do with the air raid warnings or the attacks. Initially scheduled for January 1942, delivery was pushed back to April, then postponed

555 Expert report by Gaston Bernard of 31 December 1945.

again because of an order to convert this oil tanker, which the Germans had rechristened “Ostfriesland.” In a letter of 27 May 1942, ACSM management notified the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction that a sizeable extension would be needed, with the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich being informed on 30 June that: “Insofar as we are currently able to assess the repercussions, execution of the scheduled modifications leads us to believe that the earliest possible delivery date for the ‘Ostfriesland’ is April 1943,” i.e. ten months later than planned. There is no information in the archives regarding the nature of the conversion work planned and executed. On the other hand, the archives point out that “the steering gear, ordered in Oran before June 1940, only reached the shipyard in March 1943, after numerous incidents.”556 12 September 1942: launch of “La Favorite”; ACSM is taken hostage Despite the lack of zeal shown by ACSM staff during its construction, the submarine “La Favorite” was launched from slipway No. 3 on 12 September 1942. In anticipation of the event, a management memo relates,557 “Admiral Kinzel, Commander of the German Navy, had his Chief of Staff ring up Henri Nitot to announce the following: ‘Admiral Kinzel intends to come to Le Trait to attend the launch of the submarine. He expects to find Mr Worms there and would like to know what type of launch ceremony has been planned for this ship.’ Mr Nitot passed the message on to Mr Worms, who responded to Kinzel several hours later, stating that, in light of the difficult circumstances that France was going through, the launch of a ship on behalf of Germany could not be considered a day of celebration, and accordingly, there would not be any kind of ceremony, nor would Mr Worms be attending the launch of the ship.” That day, remembered Henri Nitot in his memoirs, was “particularly dismal: A fair number of representatives from the German Navy had come to Le Trait for the occasion, which I, along with Abbat and our engineers,

556 Ibid. 557 This undated document without addressee is filed in 1944, see www.wormsetcie.com. According to some sources, the launch is dated 5 or 19 September 1942; other documents confuse the launch and the delivery they date 2 or 5 November 1942. We have chosen to follow the date given by the expert G. Bernard.

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Launch of the submarine “La Favorite” – commissioned by the Kriegsmarine under the name “UF2”

observed from afar, not mingling with them for one second. Both groups were thus present at the launch, each side in silence. Once the launch was over, we left without speaking to the Germans. The workforce, wherever they were in the shipyard, watched us, clearly moved and very tense. The atmosphere was leaden. The submarine was moored at our wharf, where fitting out and preliminary tests lasted another several months. Just as the final trials were set to start, the Gestapo arrested Jean Roy, our beloved Secretary General, and René Bonnet, head of the Secretariat.” In his report, Gaston Bernard detailed that: “On 10 September 1942, the German Shipbuilding Supervisory Committee, undoubtedly fearing sabotage, felt compelled to take Mr Roy, Mr Bonnet, Mr Émile and André Rougeolle [the latter two were workers] as hostages.” Henri Nitot continued: “Imprisoned in the cellars of the Rouen court building, each understood that they would remain hostages until the submarine was com-

missioned; and that any incident considered as a malicious act on the part of the shipyard might cost them their lives, or at least their deportation. Roy and Bonnet were among my closest friends. It was my duty to do everything possible to obtain their release. Along with Robert Labbé, we approached German Navy representatives in Paris several times. Unfortunately, we quickly realised that, instead of being received by our usual contacts, including Commander von Tirpitz, we were in the presence of officers who were representatives of the Gestapo in the Ministry of the Navy. Consequently, we received a glacial welcome, full of venomous and threatening innuendos. Quickly understanding that any intervention was doomed to failure, we left these meetings with shivers down our spines, very worried about the fates of our friends, and even fearing further preventive arrests. Fortunately, the trials went well, and several weeks later – a period which must have seemed far longer for those involved – they were finally freed, to our great joy.”

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Air raid on ACSM on 25 March 1942

Gaston Bernard mentioned that they were freed on 4 November 1942, a few hours after the Occupier took possession of “La Favorite.” It seemed that the taking of hostages was, in fact, caused by the discovery of an anomaly: when the vessel was launched, the safety plumbs underneath the keel dropped out and poked into the channel, passing through the dock of Rouen. Suspecting sabotage, the Germans imprisoned several members of ACSM management staff. “Roy and Bonnet,” praised Henri Nitot in his memoirs, “endured their ordeal with magnificent courage. Locked up in their cells with other Gestapo victims, I know that not once did they stop being paragons of camaraderie for their companions, always seeking to raise everyone’s morale, preaching hope, and helping maintain a general atmosphere full of dignity and Christian resignation under deplorable sanitary conditions with insufficient food. At the end of hostilities, I was assured that no commission of inquiry was able to trace the fate of the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ I leave it up to each and every one of you to find a suitable theory about the circumstances surrounding how the vessel vanished in the ocean.”

On 5 November 1942, the Kriegsmarine took acceptance of the submarine, putting it in service on 24 November 1942 under the name “UF 2.”558 Hypolite Worms noted that “this vessel, for technical reasons, (removal of its swivelling torpedo tubes as well as three of its four bow torpedo tubes) was devoid of any military value.” According to the report by Gaston Bernard, the hour/ ton coefficient559 corresponding to the manufacture of this vessel rose from 454 h/ton before June 1940, to 1,140 h/ton during the Occupation. The more than two-year delay of the launch, automatically led to large operational losses for Maison Worms, since the same staff worked on “La Favorite” for twenty-seven months instead of six.

558 Source: http://www.u-boote.fr/uf-2.htm. The vessel was used for training. Disarmed in Gotenhafen on 5 July 1944, it was scuttled in May 1945 and then turned into scrap. 559 Definition of return based on the number of hours needed to build one ton of a vessel.

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December 1942: 120 workers from Le Trait are sent to Gdansk While on 24 August 1942 the air raids of destroyed nearly 2% of the facilities, a new ordeal awaited the shipyard: the requisitioning and transfer of staff, dictated by Vichy, to German arms manufacturing factories. “At that time,” noted Claude Huan, “there were 8,800 German managers and workers working in France (in Brest, Lorient, Saint-Nazaire), but 23,000 French (shipyards and Navy dockyards) who for numerous reasons were working at a much lower productivity rate (lack of materials, air raids, blackouts, insufficient food, low wages, etc.). Since the summer of 1941, the occupying authorities had considered transferring workers from Cherbourg to Bordeaux where German facilities were being developed. Moreover, they had the opportunity to reduce deliveries of raw materials to create unemployment wherever they wanted. German authorities also complained about the output of French workers.”560 Following the failure of measures encouraging voluntary departures (the “relief system” construed by Laval561 in June 1942 sought to obtain the release of one prisoner of war by sending three Frenchmen to Germany), Fritz Sauckel, the “slave driver of Europe” who was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Labour Deployment on 21 March 1942, threatened to order the removal of contingents of male and female workers from the occupied territory in August 1942. Negotiations were launched with the COCN in early July 1942: the interest of the German Navy was spurred by the higher proportion of specialists in French shipyards than in German shipyards. To keep his hand on this requisitioning of labour, Laval had the Law of 4 September 1942 voted through. This established obligatory conscription in both zones for all men between the ages of 18 and 50, and for single women between the ages of 21 and 35. French shipyards were forced to send 5,000 members of their besttrained staff to the Reich’s Navy dockyards.562

560 Claude Huan, op. cit. 561 After being dismissed on 13 December 1940, Pierre Laval returned to the upper ranks of the government on 18 April 1942. His appointment to the new post of head of government confirmed the decline of Darlan, who fell into disgrace following the failed meeting between Pétain and Göring in Saint-Florentin (1 December 1941). 562 Claude Huan, op. cit.

A German delegation visited ACSM on 7 October 1942, laying claim to one hundred and twenty-nine people. The next day, “the first detailed list of staff to be requisitioned from each shipyard and Navy dockyard (4,396 in total)” was published.563 On 21 November 1942, a further delegation to Le Trait increased this number to one hundred and fifty men. Management intervened with the Germans, who allowed this figure to be reduced to one hundred and twenty. These workers, designated by name by the labour inspector of Rouen, departed on 5 and 12 December 1942, en route to Danziger Werft in Gdansk, a Polish port annexed to the Reich since 2 September 1939. Two of them, recognised as unfit for work, were soon repatriated. In his memoirs, Henri Nitot emphasised that for ACSM: “The position was made even more difficult by the major slowdown in construction activity due to the destruction caused by the air raids. We were quickly presented with demands to transfer large numbers of workers. There again, Pierre Abbat reacted in an extremely wise and energetic fashion. Courageously standing up to all of the Occupier’s interventions, fighting tooth and nail against its demands, he succeeded as best he could in limiting departures for Germany, sparing those on whom this exodus would have caused particularly serious hardship for their health or families. Nonetheless, one hundred or so of our workers had to leave for the shipyards in Danzig. [Mr] Abbat demanded that they remain together, and our Engineer Chabrol was able to accompany them in order to watch over the material aspects of their lives, which he did with great devotion and skill. Fortunately, providence protected our workers right up to the end of hostilities. They came through the bombardments and vicissitudes of the Russian advance unscathed, and for them at least, this dangerous adventure ended without anything serious to decry.” Since ACSM continued to be threatened with staff requisitioning (January 1943), Professor Noe informed it that the only way to avoid this danger was to have the German Admiralty recognise the shipyard as a “training centre for specialist labour.” Management alerted the COCN, to the danger, which responded on 22 January 1943: “It has been formally acknowledged by the German Navy that no more

563 Ibid.

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labour will be taken from your shipyard.” Nevertheless, in February and March 1943, further workers were listed by name. Each time, management worked hard to keep them in place, although it was unable to avoid the departure of small contingents of young men from the 1940–1941 and 1942 classes. Out of an average workforce of around eight hundred workers, one hundred and eighteen workers and two foremen were forced to leave for Germany under the French legislation in force at that time. “Management,” reported Gaston Bernard, “does not seem to have made any moves encouraging the departures. […] Quite the contrary, it is possible to say that ACSM tried as hard as it could, with the support of the COCN, to keep hold of its workforce in Le Trait.” The resultant drop in the workforce was to be compensated by requisitioned workers sent to the shipyard by the Germans, particularly during the first half of 1943. 19 June 1943: launch of the “Ostfriesland” To meet the scheduled delivery date of this squadron supply ship, for which the Kriegsmarine had been waiting for months, the ACSM management informed its staff in two memos of its decision to grant performance bonuses. “In the final days leading up to the launch,” explained Henri Nitot to Gaston Bernard,564 “the Germans frequently exploded in management offices, complaining of overall inertia. To avoid extreme solutions, and fearful of renewed arrests similar to those preceding the launch of ‘La Favorite,’ management had to take this measure to calm the German authorities. Mr Nitot added that this was the only time during the Occupation that a performance bonus was offered, and besides, there was no guarantee that it would be effective.” The first memo was dated 21 April 1943: “Taking into account the highly specific and exceptional circumstances surrounding the completion of ‘Ostfriesland,’ we have decided to grant a bonus to the staff working directly on the project, based on two work aspects: assiduity and the effort made to meet the delivery date.

Starting today and up until the completion of the work, all workers employed continuously on board the ‘Ostfriesland’ will receive a bonus fixed at the following maximum amount: - 600 F, if the ship is delivered before 5 June 1943 - 525 F, if the ship is delivered between 5 June and 10 June, inclusive - 450 F, if the ship is delivered between 10 June and 15 June, inclusive - 0 F, if the ship is delivered on any date thereafter. The amounts set forth above, which are payable as a lump sum upon delivery of the ship, will not be decreased in the event of an excused absence (with supporting documentation) for the following reasons only: marriage of the worker involved; death of a close relative (ascendants and descendants, relatives by blood or marriage), the birth of a child or an official summons. For all other absences, the bonus will be decreased: - by 35 F per day and 15 F per half-day, when the absence is authorised or supported by a medical certificate; - by 75 F per day and 40 F per half-day for all other absences. In addition, the bonuses may be reduced when the workers concerned demonstrate insufficient activity in the eyes of the engineers and foremen. The figures defined above have been scheduled for workers working continuously on the ‘Ostfriesland,’ between now and the delivery date. In the event of this employment being intermittent or reduced for a longer period due to departmental and work needs, the maximum bonus shall be calculated based on the time passed in relation to the number of weeks of continuous work. The measures described above will thus take account of the diligence of those deserving this bonus. However, everyone’s attention is drawn to the fact that those not demonstrating this attitude will not only be deprived of the bonus but will also not be immune from the sanctions which such an attitude (lacking diligence, lacking performance, lacking discipline) may give rise to. In this regard, it does not seem that everyone realises the severity of such sanctions, nor the reality of the current situation. Devoid of superfluous comments, we hope that this memo will be of assistance.” The second memo was dated 10 May 1943: “To avoid the problems that might arise on completion of the ‘Ostfriesland’ outside the shipyard, the German Navy has set 19 June as the date for the launch of the ship.

564 Expert report by Gaston Bernard of 31 December 1945.

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Photograph taken in haste by Maurice Quemin two days before the launch of the squadron supply ship “Ostfriesland”

This decision does not lead to any appreciable change in the timeframe established for the shipyard, and we draw everyone’s attention to the following two points: 1o) all work shall be terminated on 19 June; 2o) the greatest possible number of equipment tests shall be undertaken at the slip in order to reduce the duration of the shakedown cruises as much as possible; To take account of this change in schedule, only the bonus of 525 F set forth in memo No. 351 of 21 April will be paid, insofar as the work is fully completed by 19 June. All other instructions contained in memo No. 351 shall remain in effect.” Effectively launched on 19 June 1943, the vessel was delivered to the German authorities on 15 September 1943, i.e. more than two years late, having spent four years on the slip. The hour/ton coefficient of 166 h/ton achieved between laying the keel (4 May 1939) and June 1940 rose to 448 h/ton during the years of Occupation,

“showing a considerable decline in labour productivity,” confirmed Gaston Bernard in his expert report. “According to reliable sources,” stated an ACSM memo of 5 September 1944, [the “Ostfriesland”] “suffered serious damage while crossing the Channel”; it was taken to the Blohm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg and used as a supply ship for U-Boats. As completion of the “Ostfriesland” and “L’Africaine” was deemed a priority by the Kriegsmarine, work on the 1,150-ton freighters was stopped at the beginning of 1943. Work was to resume at the end of the year, but only on two of the vessels (No. 111 and No. 113); No. 112 was abandoned. None of these vessels was actually delivered to Germany. They were still in their slipways when the shipyard was liberated.

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Praise for Pierre Abbat On 16 December 1943, Worms & Cie wrote a letter, propably penned by Hypolite Worms,565 to RearAdmiral Henri Bléhaut, Secretary of State for the Navy

and Colonies:566 “Since the Armistice, many are the Frenchmen who have displayed their share of devotion and sacrifices during the ordeals endured by our Country. For nearly four years, colleagues from our Maison Worms, a company primarily focused on ships and shipping, have fulfilled their duty in the various ports where they reside. Nonetheless, I would like to draw your particular attention to Mr Pierre Abbat, head of our Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime in Le Trait, for whom the ordeals have been particularly burdensome, and whose attitude, both within our company and on a national scale, is in my mind worthy of special praise.” After recalling his action in June 1940 during the evacuation, then upon the return of the staff and the resumption of activity at the shipyard, “a period [which], as anguishing as it appeared at the time, must seem relatively easy in comparison with the tragic situations that have since ensued,” the author of the letter continued: “Indeed, between 6 July 1941 and 11 September 1943, our shipyard was the target of nine air raids, resulting in many people being injured and the deaths of twenty-eight of our workers; 215 bombs on the factory were counted, causing extensive destruction (the plan appended to this letter allows you to appreciate the extent thereof). After each raid, the material damage had to be repaired under the greatest of difficulties, while the morale of the working population, working under particularly stressful conditions, had to be boosted, a task accomplished with great diligence by our Director. The day before the air raid of 4 August 1943, despite near impossibilities with regard to supplies, and despite the atmosphere created by the requisitioning of an appreciable share of our workforce, our shipyard was operating at a satisfactory pace. This result was primarily the work of Pierre Abbat, who was able to create, at all levels of the workforce, the atmosphere essential for overcoming the challenges they had been faced with. On 4 August and 11 September, two massive air raids seriously interrupted shipyard operations. But once again, we started back to work. In light of these circumstances, and with utter frankness, I would like to ask you, Admiral, to consider

565 The copy of this document kept in the Worms archives is unsigned.

566 From 26 March 1943 until 10 September 1944.

August–September 1943: new attacks by Allied bombers On 4 August and 11 September 1943, Le Trait suffered two new attacks by Allied bombers, the eighth and ninth since the beginning of hostilities. Stepping up the bombing, they destroyed more than 20% of the industrial complex, causing “great depression” (to use the expression of Gaston Bernard) among the workforce. “Toward the end of 1942–1943,” reported Henri Nitot in his memoirs, “heavy air raids began, first by the English, and later by the Americans, which for months caused the workers and the entire population to be on near-permanent alert day and night. These raids were completely useless, as our shipyard contributed an infinitesimal amount to the German war effort; clearly, the English intelligence services worked poorly or received completely distorted information. […] The whole of Le Trait started living in perpetual apprehension, wearing away at everyone’s nerves. Then the inevitable happened: in two raids, the planes came in broad daylight, just when the workforce was hard at work, destroying our two rows of workshops and generating panic everywhere. Both times, the unfortunate outcome was thirty or so deaths and scores of injured, victims of the absolutely inexcusable and savage bombing. What can I say about the sorrow of the families, the horror of searching for victims, or the infinite pain felt by all after losing such or such a colleague, such and such a friend. The entire town, stricken, went into mourning; and each time, a single funeral service was held for all who had died at the same moment, moving funerals in their simplicity during which the entire appalled population gathered around the coffins of those who, just a few days ago, had still been courageously busy at their jobs. I was able to attend the first of these ceremonies, and my feelings ran deep in the church, where the coffins of all those unfortunate souls who had served under my orders stood in a line. For the most part I had recruited them and had asked them to come to Le Trait. They had always shown great friendship to me.”

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the possibility of promoting Pierre Abbat to the rank of Officer of the Legion of Honour. A marine engineer on the reserve list, Pierre Abbat, who entered Maison Worms in 1926 and has headed our shipyard since 1937, was made a Knight of the Legion of Honour in 1935. A promotion of this nature, the highest level of recognition of the civic courage and professional skills of one of our most highly esteemed and dearest employees, would also serve as a sign of the interest attached by your department to one of the hardest-hit companies in a branch of particular importance for the national economy, a company whose main concern, whether in the past or in the future, is to contribute to the prosperity of the French fleet.” Pierre Abbat was decorated five years later, in October 1948. The ceremony, described by Le Calfat du Trait of November 1948, afforded to Hypolite Worms the occasion to pay tribute to the “eminent merits” of the Director General of ACSM and to look back on the “tragic situations” that the company faced in the conflict. Further requisitioning of workers Although departures to Germany had ceased, the Occupier began further requisitioning in early 1944. The purpose this time was to boost workforces in other shipyards in France. By order of the Bauaufsicht in Rouen dated 25 January 1944, forty-four workers were thus summoned to leave Le Trait at the beginning of February 1944 and go to Rochefort. Their transfer was to be extended beyond the three months initially scheduled. Shortly after, another contingent was sent to Rouen to dismantle four barges in the port. Work continued until 11 August 1944. One month later, on 27 February 1944, the Bauaufsicht in Rouen sent sixty-one workers to Cherbourg to perform “special short-term work” for one month. During their absence, these employees no longer had an employment relationship with ACSM, receiving their pay from the companies employing them. Nonetheless, they continued to be part of the ACSM workforce. The final work Although one month earlier (8 February 1944), the shipyard and the town had been bombed, ACSM delivered to the Germans the 700-dwt non-self-propelled tank

barge No. 105, ordered in July 1940 and launched on 31 December 1943. The three others, Nos. 106, 107 and 108, would not be completed until 1948. Signed by Pierre Abbat on 4 March 1944, the delivery report stated: “Construction work on the non-selfpropelled barge No. 105 with deadweight tonnage of 700 tons started in August 1941. It was ordered from the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime – Worms & Cie via a letter of 24 August 1940 from the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich. The construction work has been performed in Le Trait in accordance with the specifications, under the local supervision of the Marine Bauaufsicht, on the one hand; and the expert from Bureau Veritas, whose verification certificate is attached hereto. The non-self-propelled barge No. 105 was delivered to the German Navy on 4 March 1944. The latter acknowledged receipt thereof that same day, taking charge of the vessel without any reservations.” Despite the Allied landings on the beaches of Normandy on 6 June 1944, and the ensuing violent battles, the Germans, in a spirit of fighting to the end, continued to place their orders. On 20 June 1944, the Bauaufsicht in Rouen placed an order for eight 15-ton ferries, in accordance with plans already communicated: - the first was to be delivered on 3 July 1944; - the second, on 5 July 1944; - the third, on 15 July 1944; - and the rest, every ten days. The occupation authorities demanded that work be pursued during air raid warnings. According to the list kept since January 1944, such warnings accounted for 217,000 hours, i.e. 20% of the total hours paid up until Liberation. Their impact cumulated with the decline in the workforce (658 workers as of 30 June 1944, versus 1,126 workers out of a total workforce of 1,483 people as of 31 December 1939). In return for their diligence, the employees were given an 80% wage increase. A bonus of 16,000 F and 10,000 F was also scheduled, in the event of an early delivery. The first two ferries were completed, with the Germans taking possession of them. On 22 July 1944, ACSM received the order to build three 24-ton ferries, in accordance with the instructions of 1 July and 3 July 1944. Construction started on an additional ferry on 4 August 1944, just a few days before the liberation of the shipyard.

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The British Army in the Normandy Campaign 1944 © IWM B9329 – www.dday-overlord.com

Landing of the Allies and liberation of the shipyard (6 June 1944 to 30 August 1944) 30 August 1944: Le Trait is liberated Hypolite Worms, in his first speech delivered in liberated Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262); and Henri Nitot, in his memoirs, offered precise and moving account of the events that took place between 6 June and 30 August 1944. Henri Nitot: “At the time the Allies landed, the situation in Le Trait was getting worse and worse. As each day passed, the Germans became harder and harder, demanding more and more. They threatened to requisition our stocks of materials and transport them back to Germany but, with the German Navy representatives

adopting a passive attitude, no shipments took place. More serious was the growing number of English and American air raids, obviously aimed at attacking the enemy’s channels of communication, but executed in a very clumsy manner. Our town was hit more and more, frequently resulting in innocent victims.” Hypolite Worms: “During the second half of August 1944, in the final phase of the Battle of Normandy, Le Trait came under fire day and night, the target of bombing, strafing and shellfire. This greatly exacerbated the damage already incurred though previous raids. The retreating enemy added to the shelling. Three times – on Sunday, 20 August; Tuesday, 22 August and Thursday, 24 August – the Germans systematically shelled more than thirty carefully selected points, bringing further destruction through explosives and fire. We watched

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this dreadful scene, unable to distinguish between the aerial bombs and the explosives on the ground, both occurring simultaneously.” Henri Nitot: “As the Allies advanced, the communication channels between Paris and Le Trait became increasingly difficult and perilous. Abbat got through a couple of times on the back seat of a motorbike. […] For several days, a wall of silence fell between us. With Seine-Maritime now the battle theatre, I apprehensively waited for the news trickling through from Rouen to Paris. In the capital as well, things were coming to a boiling point. In my office one morning, rumours started coming in faster and faster of an uprising in the capital. I decided to hurry over to my residence across the Tuileries, where armed Resistance units were beginning to gather. Just as I entered our building, the first gunshots rang out. If I’d gone just a few moments later, I think that I would have been in great danger. With Paris liberated [25 August 1944], I anxiously awaited the news from Le Trait. Soon Pierre Abbat arrived to announce that Le Trait, too, had been liberated after several days of trials and tribulations for the population stuck in the middle of the combat zone, just where the Allies were crossing the Seine.” Canadian troops were the first to enter the shipyard on 30 August 1944. Hypolite Worms: “On the evening of 30 August, among the still-smoking ruins of the shipyard destroyed beyond repair, among the general chaos, the piles of rubble and the dead horses, the Liberation forces found ships under construction in the slips, gutted, overturned, offering a sorrowful scene of desolation. According to our count, 217 bombs, most of them 500-kg ones, hit the shipyard during the nine air raids in 1941, 1942, and 1943. In the course of the fighting from 18 to 30 August 1944,567 at least a further 56 bombs still fell on the shipyard, causing not just considerable material damage, but also inconsolable griefs. All the buildings had been hit, with some, including the management offices and the general warehouse, completely destroyed. All roofs had been blown off, all the lifting equipment and cranes had been flattened, and many of the machines were affected. However, right

567 The list of destructions showed that these air raids wiped out 20.67% of the shipyard and caused 131,543,000 F of damage.

from the very start, a spontaneous act of faith seized everyone in the face of this frightening desolation.” Learning from Pierre Abbat that Engineer Jean Huré568 had been killed during an air raid, Henri Nitot spoke the following words of praise: “An individual of exemplary morality and rare intellect, an engineer through and through, I held him in high esteem and great affection. His very character fostered loyalty.” And as regards the courage of the Le Trait population, Henri Nitot said the following: “May I content myself with highlighting the exemplary civic conduct of both staff and the entire population over these past few years, with each bearing their ordeals with great heart. The liberation did not cause any problems in Le Trait.” “Nothing but ruins and desolation” Henri Nitot, Memoirs

“On making my first visit to Le Trait,” reported Henri Nitot, “I found nothing but ruins and desolation.” A report resulting from a Gestapo investigation in May 1944 confirmed (somewhat hastily): “As the result of some ten air raids [from 1941 onwards] the workshops were completely destroyed. The few employees still there are working on clearing the rubble. Production has come to a halt, and we can say that this branch is totally dormant.” As the contingent sent to Danzig now back in Le Trait, as the prisoners gradually returned, without “any bereavements to be deplored or serious illnesses to be recorded,”569 the situation was revealed with harshness: 55% of the industrial complex had been destroyed; the war damage exceeded 250 million francs; and losses were estimated at more than 30 million. Final assessment: “The tonnage built for the German did not even reach 8%” of the shipyard’s capacity Gaston Bernard, 31 December 1945

A detailed assessment of the Occupation years was drawn up by the expert, Gaston Bernard, who, we recall, was appointed by the investigating magistrate Thirion in a case that, upon Liberation, pitted Hypolite Worms and Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie against the public prosecutor. Among the various points that he was asked

568 Several days later, Jean Huré’s wife was killed when their villa was bombed, as were her mother and the wife of another engineer. 569 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit.

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to analyse, the most significant data stemmed from a comparison between the tonnage built under German orders between 25 June 1940 and 31 August 1944 and that produced by the shipyard from 1 January 1936 and 25 June 1940 (a corresponding period of time). The result is as follows:

that their maximum production capacity was 10,000 tons per year, the expert calculated the ratio of the 7,765 tons built during the Occupation at 19.4% of the shipyard’s potential over four years (7,765 / 40,000).

Tonnage launched

Gaston Barnaud also compared the tonnage ordered by the Germans with the tonnage delivered.

From 1936 to June 1940

19,179 tons

Orders placed by the German Merchant Navy

From June 1940 to August 1944 - “La Favorite”

800 tons

- “La Charente”

4,910 tons

- barge Total

2,610 tons

- three 1,000-ton freighters

3,000 tons

Total

800 tons 6,410 tons

5,910 tons Orders placed by the “Kriegsmarine” - completion of “La Favorite”

“This does not mean,” specified Gaston Bernard, “that ACSM activity from 1940 to 1944 was three times lower than during the period from 1936 to 1940. In fact, at the beginning and end of each period under consideration, it so happened that vessels had been partially built, with work still underway. For this reason, it is important to supplement the study with a comparison of the tonnage built: - first, from 1936 to 1940 - second, during the Occupation.”

250 tons

- completion of “L’Africaine”

200 tons

Total

450 tons

Total ordered by the Germans

6,860 tons

Total delivered

5,910 tons

Ratio: 5,910 / 6,860 = 86.15% Tonnage ordered / tonnage built

However, of the 6,860 tons ordered, the following tonnages were actually built during the Occupation:

Tonnage under construction

- June 1940 to August 1944

- completion of the oil tanker, “La Charente” - four 200-ton barges

200 tons

Ratio: 5,910 / 19,179 = 30.81%

- from 1936 to June 1940

Tonnage ordered / tonnage delivered

- “La Charente”

23,909 tons 7,765 tons

- one barge (total tonnage)

200 tons

- “La Favorite”

250 tons

Total

Ratio: 7,765 / 23,909 = 32.47%

Gaston Bernard noted that “in the years 1936 to 1940, tonnage built per year was never less than 4,100 tons (counting 1940 as a complete year). During the Occupation, the annual tonnage built never reached this figure, with the peak 3,105 tons being reached on 30 June 1941. Moreover, starting in 1941, the tonnage built dropped constantly, slipping to just 30 tons in the first eight months of 1944.” Given that the slipways were not continually occupied between 1936 and 1940, and

2,610 tons

3,060 tons

Ratio: 3,060 / 6,860 = 44.60%

Gaston Bernard fine-tuned this estimate by comparing these 3,060 tons with the 7,765 tons built on slipways during the Occupation, which represented 39.40%. “Though the tonnage launched by the Le Trait shipyard during the Occupation,” commented the expert, “was delivered in full to the Germans, it represented just 30% of the tonnage launched during the four years preced-

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Sabotage of the submarine “L’Africaine” operated by the Germans just before leaving Le Trait

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ing the Occupation. While the tonnage built during the Occupation accounted for just one-third of the tonnage built between 1936 and 1940, 60% of the former was never delivered. This basically means that the Germans mainly took delivery of the previously indicated tonnages, benefitting from the construction work started prior to June 1940. It should further be noted that the tonnage actually built for the Germans represented just 44% of the tonnage they had ordered. Moreover, knowing that the Le Trait shipyard had an annual construction capacity of 10,000 tons, or 40,000 tons during the Occupation, the tonnage explicitly built for the Germans did even not reach 8% of that figure. The total number of hours worked in 1938 and 1939 was 4,128,144, i.e. an annual average of 2,064,072 hours. This average was never achieved during the Occupation. 1940 comes close with 1,923,354 hours, but it should be noted that the German Occupation did not begin until June 1940, with only 178,142 hours, or barely one-tenth, being devoted to German orders. Moreover, the total number of hours recorded during the years of Occupation show the number of hours paid, and not necessarily the hours used for production. In 1942, 1943, and 1944 for example, 751,523 hours were devoted to repairing war damage: - on facilities: 673,624 hours - on ships in slips: 78,479 hours.The table showing the hour/ton coefficient for each slipway during both fouryear periods is particularly telling. It looks like this: Period 1936–1940

The period of Occupation

Slip No. 1

166

448

Slip No. 2

166

258

Slip No. 3

434

1 140

Slip No. 4

561

497

Slip No. 5

960

202

Slip No. 6

574

316

Slip No. 7

151

262

Slip No. 8

155

174

Total coefficient

229

325

Accordingly, the hours devoted to construction in relation to the tonnage built before and during the Occupation total 229 overall from 1936 to 1940, versus 325 during the Occupation, indicating a decline in productivity of about 30%.”570 In light of this data, Gaston Bernard concluded: “As for the shipbuilding division, it seems that the management of Worms & Cie, which in this case had received the order from the Ministry of Industrial Production and Labour to slow down operations, went beyond what had been requested, engaging in obstruction. In fact, not only did it not actively seek German orders, but it limited itself, in general, to solely accepting those orders imposed upon it by the Germans from July 1940 onwards. Indeed, in the presence of a German officer, it even asked to be discharged from an order for four 700-dwt barges. On the other hand, it was only on the express orders of the French Government, in execution of the agreements reached in Wiesbaden in October 1941 and under German pressure and sometimes even threats, that the Le Trait shipyard restarted work on a number of ships already under construction on 25 June 1940. They did so only after ACSM management had drawn the French Government’s attention to the potential serious consequences of delivering weapons to the Occupier, and in some cases refused to assume any responsibility for any sabotage that might ensue. The ACSM management did not always start construction immediately after accepting an order, as was the case with ‘L’Africaine.’ Moreover, the study of the ACSM accounts revealed that, throughout the Occupation, the shipyard’s construction capacity was used only to a minor extent; and that, on the other hand, the hourly productivity for tonnage built during the Occupation was markedly lower than before the Occupation. Statements made by nearly all workers and foremen during the inquiry revealed that the decline in productivity was due notably to the fact that ACSM management did nothing to encourage staff to step up production.”

570 Gaston Bernard, in his expert report of 31 December 1945, pointed out “that the hours allocated to German orders represented 2,348,628 hours out of an overall total of 7,548,143 hours recorded during the Occupation, or 31%.”

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247

248

249

1945–1959 Rebirth,

Le Trait Naval d’Hier collection

250

This conclusion was summarised by Mr Lénard, a Lawyer, in a sentence taken from a memo dated 29 October 1944: “The accusation brought against Maison Worms that it delivered weaponry to Germany, thereby helping the Reich in its war effort, has not been substantiated by the examination.” In fact, ACSM is “considered by the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction and by the officials in the shipbuilding department at the Ministry of the Navy as having been among the most resistant shipyards.”571 On 7 December 1945, André Marie, Chairman of the General Council of Seine-Inférieure department, sent the following telegram to ACSM (quoted by Henri Nitot in his memoirs): “General Council unanimously congratulates Ateliers et Chantiers du Trait on its highly patriotic stand during Occupation.” “Ready to resume work” Hypolite Worms, 7 December 1946

Hypolite Worms gave his first speech in Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262), depicting the conditions under which operations resumed in the shipyard in the initial days following the end of the war and summarising the problems raised by the challenge of reconstruction. “Despite the shortage of resources, we courageously set about clearing the rubble, re-erecting and restoring buildings; and while awaiting authorisation to go ahead with overall reconstruction, we undertook makeshift repairs to the vital facilities. Shortly thereafter, a large segment of the workforce was able to return to work, and from that point onwards, despite the extreme shortages, the Le Trait shipyard did its part to get things going again in the region by salvaging and refurbishing the Duclair ferry, enabling it to resume operations in December 1944. One by one we undertook the task of righting the damaged ships and re-installing them on their slips – the righting of ‘L’Africaine’ in particular, hit in several places, gutted inside, lying on its starboard side at a 45o angle, was accomplished with complete success on 10 February 1945. Gradually, our thoughts turned to reconstruction and modernisation projects.

Since the destruction of our facilities freed up large spaces, why not take advantage of this to redesign and improve the production layout? Since shipbuilding technology had made considerable advances throughout the world during the war – in Great Britain, Sweden, and especially in the United States – why not try to incorporate these advances and align our facilities with the state of the art? Since we, in sum, were ready to resume work, why not try to turn our shipyard into one operating with the latest technology, while maintaining its relatively modest scale in relation to the French shipbuilding giants? These ideas guided our thinking during the months following Liberation. Following the return of our Director from a long study mission abroad, we started developing the reconstruction programme – with the full approval of the departments involved.” To gain access to the resources required for this metamorphosis, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime ceased to be a division within Maison Worms and assumed the status of a public limited company. This transformation was the first step in a move to restructure Worms & Cie, during which the three other divisions were to be re-established as joint-stock companies, subdiaries of Maison Worms: Ω in 1957, the traditional activities – Shipping and Fuel Merchanting Services – were incorporated into one entity by the creation of Worms Compagnie Maritime et Charbonnière (Worms CMC); Ω and in 1964, the Worms & Cie Banking Services became Banque Worms.

571 Undated memo from Worms & Cie filed in 1944.

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1945–1959 Rebirth, modernisation and climax

Reconstruction of the assembly workshop with the mixed cargo ship “Ville de Tamatave” in the foreground, circa 1948

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Leaving the war behind (1945–1951) “The most devastated shipyard in France” Pierre Abbat, Le Calfat du Trait, 1950

Causing nearly sixty deaths in the shipyard and Le Trait, the last air raids in 1944 were the worst: “it took feats of strength to live through them and see light at the end of the tunnel: clearing the rubble, salvaging and completing the damaged ships in their slipways, restoring, rebuilding and modernising the entire complex.”572 Pierre Abbat was quick to call ACSM the “most devastated shipyard in France.” Reconstruction work went hand in hand with renewed shipbuilding. Starting in February 1945, the submarine “L’Africaine” was back in its slipway, providing employment to the workers. But there were new factors to take into account. The Second World War had profoundly changed the shipbuilding sector. More effective techniques had been developed to speed up production, with an eye to surpassing the Axis powers in the race to build ever more and ever more powerful ships. Maison Worms management was faced with a choice:573 to reconstruct the shipyard as it was prior to the war, or to seize the opportunity to modernise it, thereby increasing its competitiveness in the upcoming race for customers set to take place in France and abroad.

572 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 25, Easter 1951. 573 The question of reconstructing and possibly modernising Le Trait began to be looked at in July 1944 and the following months. See www.wormsetcie.com: memo of 25 July 1944; undated memo, filed in September 1944; undated memo, filed prior to 21 October 1944; undated memo, filed after 21 October but prior to 28 October 1944; memo of 13 November 1944 (of particular interest); undated memo, filed after 18 November 1944; memo of 21 December 1944. Speech given by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on 7 December 1946.

Robert Labbé, a Maison Worms General Partner, sent Pierre Abbat on a study mission to England, the United States and Scandinavia.574 In light of what the engineer observed there, it seemed an obvious choice to completely renew ACSM facilities, enabling construction times to be shortened and hoisting ACSM into the era of prefabrication575 and welding. Parallel to this study tour, agreements were concluded with the Odense Steel Shipyard in Denmark576 for Worms & Cie to rebuild its fleet. Large government subsidies cleared the way for the rebirth of the shipyard.

574 See www.wormsetcie.com: ACSM memo of 13 November 1944; undated memo filed after 6 March 1945; memo from Robert Labbé of 29 July 1948. 575 See P. Léonard, “Y-a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” in Revue économique, vol. 12, No. 4, 1961: “Instead of being constructed primarily in its construction slip, as was the case [before the Second World War], a ship is now assembled on the slipway from a smaller number of prefabricated sections in workshops. In other words, the speed of rotation on the slipways has accelerated, but at the cost of an increase in the time separating the start of manufacturing on the first sections of the ship, and the installation of the first prefabricated section in the slipway. The number of slipways, up to then the decisive criterion for the sector’s performance, thus ceased to be a rigid bottleneck in the growth in production. This fundamental technological change, affecting the traditional ratio between ship production and its most characteristic means of production (i.e. the slip), has been made possible by the now common use of welding for assembling the sections, sheet metal, profiles, pipes, etc. which make up a ship’s hull. Commonly used before the war, riveting imposed a series of technical constraints making the general use of the prefabrication of large sections much more difficult. Moreover, prefabrication by welding together thick metal sheets has made it possible to limit the portion of work executed outdoors, thereby reducing production vagaries attributable to temperatures and bad weather and in turn reducing the handicap of shipbuilders in the North.” 576 See www.wormsetcie.com: interview between Pierre Poulain and Francis Ley (Banque Worms) on 20 April 1977. On 10 June 1945, a contract was signed by Pierre Poulain (Compagnie Nationale de Navigation and Société de Transports Maritimes Pétroliers) with the Odense Steel Shipyard (Denmark), under the terms of which one-third of construction programmes were earmarked for France, half of which for the Worms group.

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A change in scale Creation of the Works Council With its origins in the Works Social Committee, a form of worker representation introduced by the Vichy regime for the purpose of weakening unions (Labour Charter of 1941 and with competence solely for social issues, but not for any business issues), the Works Council, applying the National Resistance Council programme of 15 March 1944, was to assert itself as the entity allowing “workers to participate in the management of a company.”577 The Government Order of 22 February 1945 required that a Works Council be created in companies with 100 or more employees (the Law of 16 May 1946 lowered this number to 50).578 In touch with the lives of workers and well-informed about changes in the overall situation of a company, the Works Council proposed measures fostering growth. “It is a bond of trust,” emphasised Pierre Abbat, “between those who, tackling the same task, share concerns that, though differing at times, are always convergent.”579 The elections of the ACSM Works Council members took place on 11 June 1945. Three groups chose their representatives: white- and blue-collar workers, foremen and those of similar grade, engineers and department heads. Meetings were held in the presence of Pierre Abbat, or his Deputy, Marcel Lamoureux. The Works Council was involved in many areas, notably the creation and management of social programmes, such as: - La Fraternelle, a mutual benefit society, which included its “child benefits” section, beneficiaries of which could come from outside the shipyard - the gardening club, the “Association des Jardins Ouvriers” - the sports club, the “Union Sportive du Trait” - “Le Bouchon” - “L’Oréade”580 - “La Lyre” - the library

577 www.ftm-cgrt.fr/33564-2/ 578 See the legislation on www.gallica.bnf.fr, and the publication “Comités d’entreprises, délégués du personnel, sections syndicales,” Journaux officiels, No. 1183, 1971. 579 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 25, Easter 1951. 580 Mandoline club that replaced the “Estudiantina.”

- the School Recreation Committee, the “Comité d’Utilisation des Loisirs Scolaires” - new apprenticeship commissions, on “recreation and childhood – vacation camps – academic leisure time activities – excursions,” on “health and safety”; and “supplies.”581 On the other hand, the ACSM’s “Amicale d’Action Solidaire,” a mutual benefit society reserved for the staff, was forced later on to break its ties with the shipyard, which was no longer part of the Works Council. The same held true for intercompany entities, such as the social security fund (“Caisse Primaire d’Assurances Sociales”) and the cooperative companies (“L’Avenir du Trait” and the “Société d’Approvisionnements Coopératifs”). Lastly, Le Calfat du Trait became the Works Council’s news bulletin. Transformation of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime into a public limited company Planned since 1944, ACSM underwent a large-scale transformation. By deed of 26 July 1945, and in accordance with the Constitutive General Meeting held four days later, Worms & Cie, “a limited partnership with capital of forty million francs, having its headquarters in Paris, at 45 Boulevard Haussmann,” has decided to cede to a company especially created for this purpose the operations of the “ship building and repair company in Le Trait, which [Maison Worms] owns.”582 A memo of 12 August 1946 highlighted the following: “The current size of the shipbuilding business as well as the difficulties and the complexity of the problems these give rise to have led us to seek a form of operation that provides greater flexibility and development opportunities than those resulting from the coexistence within one and the same company with extremely diverse branches, some of which, such as Banking Services [created in 1928] or Fuel Merchanting, or even Shipping Services, have little or nothing in common with shipbuilding.

581 Only ACSM staff were allowed to make purchases at the Works Council store. In 1947 and 1948, work focused on creating a staff canteen, where a meal was to cost 65 F, of which 25 F 25 were paid by ACSM. 582 www.wormsetcie.com. Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime, statutes, Paris, 26 July 1945.

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The current structure – which even before the war could probably have been considered outside the normal framework – seems even more paradoxical now on account of the shipyard’s modernisation, which raises very specific problems that in all likelihood will require trade union action together with our colleagues in the shipbuilding sector, a sector for which the former structure of the company would clearly be ill-suited.” The new structure was established under the name “Société Anonyme [public limited company] des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime.” Its capital was fixed at ten million francs, made up of ten thousand shares of one thousand francs each, fully held by Maison Worms. Société Worms & Cie

5,050 shares

5,050,000 F

Hypolite Worms

50 shares

50,000 F

Robert Labbé

50 shares

50,000 F

Raymond Meynial

50 shares

50,000 F

Léon Labbé

25 shares

25,000 F

Michel Leroy

25 shares

25,000 F

Mme Fauchier-Magnan

25 shares

25,000 F

Mme Blanchy

25 shares

25,000 F

4,700 shares

4,700,000 F

10,000 shares

10,000 000 F

Union immobilière France Étranger - Unife583 Total

The company was incorporated for a period of 99 years. Its headquarters remained at 45, Boulevard Haussmann. The members of its Board of Directors, numbering between three and twelve individuals, were to be selected from among the shareholders coming together in the General Meeting, whereby the latter was empowered to dismiss Board members from their duties. Each Board member was required to hold fifty shares (at least – see the table above). The Board “shall appoint all directors, engineers, representatives, proxies, employees or agents; shall determine their responsibilities, salaries and bonuses covered under general

583 Unife was a subsidiary of Worms & Cie created in 1929. See www.wormsetcie.com: memo of 16 October 1945 outlining the capital distribution of this company.

expenses, fixed or otherwise; and shall determine the terms of their retirement or their dismissal.” The Board could also take, “under all circumstances, any measures it deems appropriate to safeguard the assets belonging to the company or deposited by third parties.” The Board was responsible for purchasing patents and licenses, for registering all designs, trademarks Robert Labbé (1907–1974), and processes, and General Partner (1944–1974) for filing applications for patents. The Board was to represent the company vis-à-vis third parties and public or private administrations. It was to be chaired by Robert Labbé, General Partner of Worms & Cie, in charge of operations in the Maison Worms Fuel Merchanting and Shipping Services. Two further General Partners were appointed to the Board: Hypolite Worms and Raymond Meynial, head of the Banking and Insurance Division. On 27 December 1945, the Board of Directors “appointed Pierre Abbat, residing in Le Trait (SeineInférieure), as Managing Director of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime; Marcel Lamoureux, residing in Le Trait (Seine-Inférieure), as his Deputy; and Jean Roy, residing in Le Trait as well, as Secretary General. The Board then decided to delegate [to them] the following powers, to be exercised jointly or separately.” The powers to represent the company vis-à-vis third parties and all government administrations were delegated to Henri Nitot. The amount of the new company’s capital (which was to amount to 350 million in 1952, versus 40 million for the parent company, or almost nine times more) highlighted the scale of the financial effort imposed by the reconstruction, estimates of which (or attempts thereat) dated back to 1944 and undoubtedly swayed the decision to give the shipyard the status of a public limited company, allowing it to negotiate loans with the

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administration. ACSM management proposed that it would draw up a bi-annual statement of the company’s assets and liabilities, shedding light on any decrease in value and resulting depreciation, as needed. 5% of net earnings were scheduled to be set aside for the reserve fund and to pay “the shareholders, as their first dividend, five percent of their fully paid and nondepreciated shares; however, should earnings in a given year not allow the payment of said dividend, shareholders would not be entitled to claim it from profits earned the following years.”584 The new company reserved the right “at any time and under all circumstances, if so proposed by the Board of Directors, to pronounce its own early dissolution.” Article 45 specified: “In the event of a loss totalling three-quarters of the company’s capital, the directors shall call a general meeting of all shareholders for the purpose of debating whether or not the situation warrants the decision to dissolve the company.”585 Worms & Cie leases to its subsidiary the land and commercial property as well as the buildings, facilities and constructions for industrial and non-industrial use, located in Le Trait For the purpose of settling the situation between Worms & Cie and its subsidiary, the ACSM Board of Directors, Meeting on 28 August 1945, voted to grant Robert Labbé “the broadest powers to conclude, in the name and on behalf of the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, a lease covering the commercial property and all of the land, industrial buildings and facilities constructed at the Le Trait shipyard, including furnishings and tools, housing and non-industrial land dependent on the shipyard in question; and to guarantee the transfer to the company of ongoing contracts, along with the available stocks of raw materials, products currently being manufactured, and potentially, finished products available in the aforementioned shipyard.” The negotiations ended on 16 October 1945 with the drafting of three leasing contracts which were approved on 27 December 1945. In the first of these agreements, Worms & Cie leased to the new company the land on which the shipyard facilities were built, all the industrial buildings on

584 www.wormsetcie.com. Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime, statutes, Paris, 26 July 1945. 585 Ibid.

said land, all tools and equipment used as immovable property by its nature. The lease was granted for a period of nine years, starting on 1 September 1945,586 whereby the lessee (tenant) had the right to terminate the lease on 31 August of 1948 and of 1951. Starting on 1 September 1945, all active or passive operations affecting the aforementioned property were deemed to have been performed on behalf of the lessee, who was to be responsible for maintaining the property in excellent working order until the expiration of the lease. However, Worms & Cie retained responsibility for repairing war damage within the context of the applicable legislation. The lessee was to have complete freedom to undertake enlargements and improvements at its own expense. Ownership thereof remained with the lessee throughout the term of the lease, reverting to the lessor upon its expiry. The second of the three agreements covered the industrial property used for shipbuilding and ship repairs, as well as the customer base, goodwill, the ACSM name and the various furnishings, equipment, and tools not defined as fixtures. The duration of the second contract was the same as the first. Under the third agreement, the new company leased, under terms similar to those in the other two leases, the land for non-industrial use and the houses constructed on said land, located in the “commune” of Le Trait. This third lease thus covered a large portion of the workers’ housing estate, while the remaining property, as in the past, remained the property of the Société Immobilière du Trait, a subsidiary of Worms & Cie. With these agreements in mind, the government administrations which had signed orders with the former Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, namely the French Navy and the Merchant Navy, agreed to transfer to the new company all contracts then in effect; i.e. as of 1 January 1946, ACSM took over all assets and liabilities associated with these contracts.

586 www.wormsetcie.com. According to the three drafts of 16 October 1945, “the lease was due to come into effect on 1 January 1946, for a period terminating on 31 December 1954.” The date of 1 September 1945 was mentioned in the memo of 12 August 1946.

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Payments were set at the annual rate of 50,000 F for the business fund, furnishings, tools and equipment; 500,000 F for the industrial land of ACSM; and 400,000 F for the rent of houses and the shipyard’s non-industrial land.

Reconstruction phase (1945–1950) On 13 November 1944, the Ministry of the Navy and the Commission for Reconstruction reached agreement on an “immediate reconstruction” programme587 with a view to jumpstarting shipbuilding (once conditions had got back to normal). The flattened workshops rise from the ground while production resumes Work was divided into several slices. The first involved repairing the workshops for hulls, piping and arc welding, as well as the hydro-pneumatic station, the three-phase electric power station, the portion of the woodworking building reserved for modelling, the forging and fitting workshop and the new direct-current power plant. The companies Chouard and Féron were consulted for this phase. Moisant Laurent Savey was

587 www.wormsetcie.com. ACSM memo of 13 November 1944. See B. Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995), vol. 1, IGPDE – Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2002: “We observed that, starting in 1943, through the intermediary of the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction (COCN) and with a view to rebuilding the fleet, the shipyards were participating in developing a construction programme for 1,500,000 tons of gross tonnage (gt) over five years, developed by the Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy in association with the Central Committee of French Shipowners. But during Liberation, military operations caused considerable destruction to these same shipyards, with their production capacity being reduced to 20% of 1938 levels (200,000 gt) or 40,000 tons per year. Naturally, they turned to the government. René Fould, Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders (CSCN) at the time, recalled the situation: ‘Faced with this situation, the CSCN proposed to the government, in February 1945, that the reconstruction, modernisation and extension of the shipyards be financed by the shipbuilding companies themselves, without government support. In return, they demanded that the government immediately place a one-time order with them for 1,500,000 tons of ships. The government refused to commit to the future; since Liberation, the tonnage ordered from French shipyards amounted to approximately 400,000 tons.’”

tasked with supplying the metal structures for the small new workshops. Ordered from Schneider, the slipway crane was scheduled to be delivered sometime in 1945. Designed by the architect Chauliat,588 the office building was constructed by the Chouard Company of Bihorel. The work was booked as war damage, with a first instalment of 20 million francs being paid. By February 1946, the piping, welding and forging and fitting workshops were almost completely rebuilt, while those for putting together large assemblies and for boilermaking were still in the course of being rebuilt. The masonry workshop replaced a pile of rubble, while the workshop for surface mounting was soon to follow, as were the workshops for painting, rigging and outfitting. Workers worked in temporary shelters. The crane had to be ready for service in the coming months. Unfortunately, progress on the work was hampered by electricity rationing. Work in hand included three 1,150-dwt freighters, each fitted with two 650-HP diesel engines (“Barsac,” “Cérons” and “Ille et Vilaine”). These had been started on the orders of the German

Overview in 1946

588 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 26. They would not be completed until 1951. See also www.wormsetcie.com. ACSM memo of 13 November 1944.

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The oil tanker “La Charente”

Admiralty, then taken over and resumed on behalf of the French Ministry of Transport and Merchant Navy, and ultimately handed over to Worms & Cie as war reparations (the first two under ownership, the third under management).589 Further work included three oil

tankers (“La Mayenne” and “La Baïse,”590 which had to be adapted to Merchant Navy needs, as well as “La Charente” which was in the process of being repaired); one submarine (“L’Africaine”); one tank barge (“Ingénieur Lacroix”) for the French Army Munitions

“Barsac” and “Cérons” (cargo ships owned by Worms) – “Ille et Vilaine” (a freighter operated by Worms) German Admiralty

French State

Worms & Cie

Keel laid

Under the name

Launch

Under the name

Placed in service

Under the name

8 Dec. 1941

“Dustenbrouck”

24 March 1947

“Calvados”

1947

“Barsac”

10 Dec. 1941

“Schulensee”

20 August 1947

“Manche”

1948

“Cérons”

12 January 1942

“Kronshagen”

7 June 1948

“Ille et Vilaine”

1948

“Ille et Vilaine”

589 Management of the freighter, “Ille et Vilaine,” was quickly assigned to Maison Scotto Ambrosino & Pugliese Fils, located in Oran (see the following speech by Hypolite Worms), to which it was sold in 1948.

590 Launched on behalf of the Navy on 21 May 1947 and 30 November 1948, respectively, “La Mayenne” and “La Baïse” were lent to the Ministry of the Merchant Navy, with their management entrusted to the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers. They were returned to the French Navy in 1949. Seized by the British, the oil tanker “La Charente” was returned to France in 1945 and restored by ACSM.

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Department, plus three others to be fitted with 260HP engines for the Office National de la Navigation (“Courlis,” “Lutetia,” and “Djinn”591); two ferries; towing equipment; two steam engines for freighters; and boilers for the passenger liner “Arromanches,” etc. The teams were also performing welding work on freighters. Labour shortages Needed to get shipbuilding going again, men were cruelly lacking after the war. Working hours frequently exceeded 50 hours a week, and workers were on the job nearly every day. Putting off potential recruits, the problem of the difficult nature of the jobs performed in this sector was compounded by the loss of staff killed during the air raids 1941–1944 (a gift of 200,000 F from Worms & Cie was intended for the families of the employees killed during these raids). In the early postwar years, ACSM thus had to cope with a high demand for labour. The shortage was discussed at Works Council meetings. To solve it, plans were drawn up to bring in foreign workers – notably Italians. The latter were soon to arrive, especially around 1946, thereby preventing production bottlenecks due to labour shortages: “After the war,”

591 The barge “Courlis” (see illustration below) was operated by the Raffinerie du Nord, but listed by Maurice Quemin (Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires […], 1993) under the name of Purfina Transports; “Lutetia” and “Djinn” sailed on behalf of the Société Fluviale & Maritime (Soflumar), see footnote 550, p. 227.

highlighted Maurice Quemin and Jean Lootvoët, “a further search for staff was conducted to help the shipyard get back on its knees following its reconstruction. In 1947, it was the Italians’ turn to disembark in Le Trait. […] Other than the language, they were like us, and for four years, we saw many arrive. And so, this small cosmopolitan town in the middle of the Normandy countryside entered the 1950s, becoming a small town like so many others.”592 A rational production cycle Several projects were studied to optimise the space available to ACSM. They were submitted for approval by the respective Navy, reconstruction and planning departments. The number of projects (18) bore witness to the difficulties encountered in selecting the best production cycle. Engineers, particularly Pierre Abbat, were preoccupied with the problem of optimising space.593 In 1946, despite the discussions surrounding the definitive reconstruction project, the broad outlines of the programme were known. Workshops and platforms were needed, designed to a rationalised production

592 Conference of 16 September 1989 at the Seine Marine Museum in Caudebec-en-Caux. 593 The main debate focused on the use of slips Nos. 1 and 2, the largest to be modernised. In relation to project 17, project 18 included one additional workshop and assembly platforms, the creation of the continuous circuit leading to a fitting-out quay, and equipping slips Nos. 1 and 2 with highperformance lifting equipment.

Maurice Quemin collection, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1993

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The rebuilt industrial site

layout “where materials could be assembled continuously during the different manufacturing stages.”594 Space had to be made available at the head of the slipways to receive the prefabricated sections. The bombing damage provided the opportunity to relocate old workshops and add others, adapted to state-of-the-art techniques. The American example Pierre Abbat used his travels to find the most rational production cycles and innovative techniques. At the beginning of 1947, he travelled to the United States where the shipbuilding industry was booming: counting 38 companies in 1939, the sector had 84 in 1944. Designed with workshops dedicated to prefabricating and welding sections, these most recent companies had widely contributed to the Allied victory. Abbat compared the features of the shipyards in Vancouver; of the Walsh-Kaiser Company, Inc. in Providence, Rhode Island; of shipyards in Portland, Oregon; of the California Shipping Corporation (Calship) in Los Angeles; of Marinship in San Francisco; and of the Saint John’s River Shipbuilding Company in Jacksonville, Florida.

594 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 1, February 1946.

But the one shipyard that drew his particular attention was the last shipyard to be established in the Second World War, the Swan Island Shipyard on the west coast in Portland, one of the three ‘Kaiser’ shipyards in the region.595 Equally logical, ACSM ordered American equipment. Le Calfat du Trait recounted: “For those who, in 1944, saw all our cranes, one after the other, destroyed; for those who cut their hands to shreds clearing away the mangled metal, how satisfying to see once again the giant arms of the Titans, the jibs of American cranes thrusting into our sky.”596 These cranes were able to lift prefabricated sections of ships weighing 20 to 40 tons. While awaiting the resumption of French production, steel was ordered from the United States, but deliveries took a long time coming.

595 Shipyard created in 1943. During a discussion with the members of the association, Le Trait Naval d’Hier, mention was made of seeing cranes similar to those at ACSM in an American TV film from the 2000s (the title of which was forgotten). See Pierre Abbat’s reports on shipbuilding in the United States: “L’industrie américaine de la construction navale pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 2, March 1946, and “Le Chantier Kaiser de Swan Island,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 3, May 1946. 596 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 8, November 1948, and No. 11, March 1949.

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7 December 1946: launch of the submarine “L’Africaine” for the French Navy

Speech by Hypolite Worms “The resurrection of our shipyard” Under normal circumstances, this ceremony marking the resurrection of our shipyard would be a joyous occasion. However, its nature has been completely transformed by the catastrophic news we have just received. A 550-ton former German submarine disappeared two days ago while conducting deep submergence trials off Toulon. In addition to the crew and Navy dockyard personnel, Chief Engineer Isabelle and Lieutenant Commander Mottez were on board, both of whom had declined our invitation to attend the launch of “L’Africaine” due to this mission. We share in the cruel sorrow that has struck the French Navy, bowing with great emotion before the victims of this disaster. Since Lieutenant General Kahn and the Chief of Staff of the Navy are consequently unable to come to Le Trait, we greet their representatives, Engineer General Genon and Captain (N) Derrien. We greet the officers and engineers whose presence at this ceremony is testimony to the solid and cordial ties that have bound our shipyard to the Navy for many years; the Prefect of the Seine-Inférieure department; the Chairman of the General Council; the men and women who serve as MPs for our district in the National Assembly; the Mayor of Le Trait, a member of the General Council; the high-ranking officials from our Normandy metropolis who want to see for themselves how important our company’s resurrection is for the region’s economy; Mr René Fould, Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders, as well as those who agreed to accept our invitation from among our colleagues at the “École Polytechnique,” the Naval Academy and the Marine Engineering Academy. The submarine “L’Africaine” was one of a series of similar Aurore-class vessels ordered on 31 March 1938; construction started on 9 November that same year. The close proximity of that date with today’s date indicates that the approximately eight-year period over which construction was spaced was not normal. Its construc-

tion was marked by the war, the invasion, the occupation and the Liberation. The history of the construction of the submarine “L’Africaine” reflects the history of our shipyard, and more broadly with the history of France. It differs only in the local nature of the sorrowful incidents dotting its history, and which you will allow me to retrace briefly. When the war broke out in September 1939, ACSM, whose workforce, initially disorganised by the mobilisation, gradually regrouped and even swelled at the beginning of 1940, as a result of various measures, to a size exceeding its pre-war figures, dedicated its activity to national defence under the control of the French Navy: fitting out the auxiliary fleet and constructing submarines and submarine chasers. At the beginning of 1940, we set about converting and fitting out eleven ships belonging to the auxiliary fleet, delivering the 3,700-ton collier “Égée” and submarine chasers No. 13 and No. 14. A third subchaser, No. 15, was launched on 23 May 1940, while a fourth, No. 16, was launched during the afternoon of Saturday, 8 June 1940. The next day, Sunday, 9 June, was a critical day for our region: oil storage depots were set ablaze throughout the departmental region, bridges were destroyed, Rouen was invaded, with one entire neighbourhood was devoured by flames. In the afternoon of that same day, we were able to send off submarine chaser No. 15 under its own power and chaser No. 16 in tow. These two vessels made it to Cherbourg, then Lorient, but only chaser No. 15 was able to reach England; No. 16 had to be sunk, as it was impossible to tow. That same day, shipyard employees and their families crossed to the left bank of the Seine by makeshift means; during the day of the 10 June, while the fire was abating in Rouen to the east and another fire was raging in Caudebec to the west, under a heavy sky rendered apocalyptic by the thick, dark smoke billowing out of the burning oil tanks, everyone took to the road, intent on reaching the fallback positions in the

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The submarine “L’Africaine”

southwest region assigned by the Navy. The signing of the Armistice on 25 June made these positions useless. Everyone returned home. But the German Navy had taken possession of the shipyard, and it was to remain under the control of the occupier for the next four years. The shipyard only appeared to be in operation, since no German ships were repaired in Le Trait, and our productivity slowed to such a point that only two ships were launched over the course of the next four years. Nonetheless, our activity enabled us to wrest out of the stalags (POW camps) not only all of our staff – namely 125 members – held prisoner there, but also more than twenty prisoners who had never actually belonged to our workforce. Despite the threats and the outbursts of anger of these German representatives, and despite the harshness of the measures taken, we had the good fortune of keeping the submarine “L’Africaine.” As a reminder, construction of this vessel began in November 1938, and was scheduled to be delivered in 1941. On 24 October 1940, the occupation authorities ordered the shipyard to terminate its construction, an order renewed in December and underscored by a written warning in March 1941. Despite these repeated injunctions, construction on

“L’Africaine” resumed in February 1942, albeit at a slow pace. But despite this intentional slowdown, despite the aerial attacks and interruptions caused by the numerous air raid warnings, it became impossible in early 1944 to stop the submarine approaching its completion. Indeed, its launch was scheduled for the end of the first half of 1944, nearly three years after its initially scheduled completion date. Using various pretexts, we were able to postpone that date. Following the D-Day landings, as their dreams vanished, the Germans had to give up this target. At the least, they tried to make the shipyard unusable, with “L’Africaine” bearing the brunt of their destructive operations. After the initial clearing of the rubble and a few temporary repairs, the shipyard set about righting “L’Africaine” and returning it to its slipway. Carefully planned in conjunction with the Navy, and executed with precaution, this exceptional operation met with complete success on 10 February 1945; the restoration and completion of the submarine “L’Africaine” was then undertaken in accordance with Navy instructions. Starting in the second half of 1941, the shipyard and the city of Le Trait became the target of air raids, several of which

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Laying of a section – March 1946

unfortunately caused many victims. In the second half of August 1944, during the final phase of the Normandy battle, Le Trait had to endure, day and night, daily and incessant attacks (bombing, machine gun fire and shellfire), exacerbating the damage caused by previous air raids. The retreating enemy added to the shelling. Three times – on Sunday, 20; Tuesday, 22 and Thursday, 24 August – the Germans systematically shelled more than thirty carefully selected locations, bringing further destruction through explosives and fire. We observed this dreadful scene, unable to distinguish between the explosions of aerial bombs and those of explosives on the ground, both occurring simultaneously. On the evening of 30 August, among the still-smoking ruins of the shipyard destroyed beyond repair, among the general chaos, the piles of rubble and the dead horses, the Liberation forces found ships under construction in their slipways, gutted, overturned, offering a sorrowful scene of desolation. According to our count, 217 bombs, most of them 500kg ones, hit the shipyard during the nine air raids in 1941, 1942 and 1943. In the course of the fighting from 18 to 30 August 1944, at least a further 56 hits were sustained, causing not just considerable material damage, but also irreparable grief. All the buildings had been hit, with some, including the management offices and the general warehouse, completely destroyed. All roofs had been blown off, all the lifting equipment and cranes had been flattened, and

many of the machines were affected. However, right from the very start, a spontaneous act of faith engulfed us all in the face of this frightening desolation. Despite the shortage of resources, we courageously set about clearing the rubble, re-erecting and restoring buildings; and while awaiting authorisation to go ahead with overall reconstruction, we undertook makeshift repairs to the vital facilities. Shortly thereafter, a large segment of the workforce was able to return to work, and from that point onwards, despite the extreme shortages, the Le Trait shipyard did its part to get things going again in the region by salvaging and refurbishing the Duclair ferry, enabling it to resume operations in December 1944. One by one we undertook the task of righting the damaged ships and re-installing them on their slipways – the righting of “L’Africaine” in particular, hit in several places, gutted inside, lying on its starboard side at a 45o angle, was accomplished with complete success on 10 February 1945. Gradually, our thoughts turned to reconstruction and modernisation projects. Since the destruction of our facilities had freed up large spaces, why not take advantage of this to redesign and improve the production layout? Since shipbuilding technology had made considerable advances throughout the world during the war – in Great Britain, Sweden and especially in the United States – why not try to incorporate these advances and align our facilities with the state of the art? Since we, in sum, were ready to resume work, why not try to turn our shipyard into one operating with the latest technology, while maintaining its relatively modest scale in relation to the French shipbuilding giants? These ideas guided our thinking during the months following Liberation. Following the return of our Director from a long study mission abroad, we started developing the reconstruction programme – with the full approval of the departments involved. Without hesitation, despite the gaps in the legislation on repairing war damage, despite the lack of a longterm programme for new construction, despite the absolute uncertainty reigning over possible means of financing a modernisation and reconstruction programme of this nature, we immediately set about the task at hand, buoyed by the understanding spirit displayed by the French Navy and the Merchant Navy. We alone assumed responsibility, with the fullest confidence in the future of our shipyard.

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And now, allow me to provide an assessment: new buildings have already been constructed. The majority of the others have been repaired or rebuilt. Two slipway cranes have partially restored the shipyard’s usual appearance, destroyed by the enemy. On a plot of land largely filled with rubble, we are going to lay the foundations for our new sheet metal and assembly workshops. Our shipyard will be getting a new fitting-out quay equipped with lifting and handling machinery, enabling us to introduce prefabrication methods with an eye to increasing productivity and reducing ship construction times. But these physical facilities, as nearly complete as they are, would ultimately be practically valueless, were they not operated by skilled workers. In this respect, in the presence of the members of our Works Council, I doff my hat in deference to our staff who, after enduring many harsh ordeals during the years of occupation with an admirable spirit of teamwork; who, for months and months were exposed to the dangers of aerial attacks, yet selflessly remained at their workplaces; and who, at the first beckoning, all resumed their daily work and have already achieved magnificent results. One figure serves as a measure of our recovery and an illustration of our resurrection: our electricity consumption. Reaching slightly more than 200,000 kWh in December 1936, our annual consumption went up to 280,000 kWh in December 1939. In December 1944, consumption was down to 9,000 kWh, but gradually rose to 30,000 kWh in June

1945, 78,000 kWh in July 1945, 115,000 kWh in June 1946, and 126,000 kWh in October 1946, ultimately reaching 150,000 kWh in November – a figure that would have been exceeded in December, had we not been threatened with dire penalties. Not only has our staff already to a large extent regained its former productivity, but it has patiently and courageously accepted, despite the inconveniences still resulting from often precarious and imperfect working conditions, the extra effort, at all echelons of the hierarchy – management, engineers, foremen, draughtsmen and workers – necessitated by our reconstruction. It is impossible to list all the constraints to which the workers were subject, often leading to increased physical fatigue and demanding from them not only energy, but also fortitude. May it suffice to call attention to the team of carpenters and riveters who, working in the most impractical positions – flat on their stomachs or lying on their backs –, had to perform repairs to the hull and fittings of the oil tanker “La Mayenne.” Each and every one of us, whatever his position in the company, will continue to be fully devoted to the accomplishment of our task; we will firmly maintain our will in view of the prosperity of the French maritime industries essential to our country’s greatness. All this within the context of this shipyard of Le Trait – our “raison d’être” –, of which the Navy, with its ever-invaluable encouragement, has readily agreed to be, if I dare say so, the godfather of its resurrection.

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Back to normal At the beginning of 1948, ACSM management reduced working hours, thus returning to a more normal pace. Saturday was once again “a day without work.” On 24 February 1948, the canteen was opened, complementing the facilities available to workers. Within one year, 110,000 meals were served.597 The restaurant encountered problems balancing its budget. Prices increased too rapidly and steeply, rising from 55 F on the opening day to 62 F on 20 April, then to 65 F on 11 October 1948. A bar complemented the canteen. Staff could order “a stiff drink” in the words of Le Calfat du Trait: 35 F for an anis aperitif and 30 F for all other drinks. A Works Council store was also opened, where patrons could find foodstuffs and hardware. On 16 October 1948, stock was taken of the progress on work on the industrial complex. Certain roads, offices and the fitting-out quay still needed to be constructed, while a new workshop for hulls was in the process of being modernised. Soon, fifty-six thousand square metres would be in use. ACSM had orders for

the next two years, and the workforce was growing.598 In December 1948, the Works Council held discussions about the possibility of a bonus payment to reward the employees’ efforts, one indication that the end of the reconstruction was near. The question of bonuses was not a simple one, with Pierre Abbat recalling the random nature of shipbuilding: “For the company according bonuses, this constitutes an expense that must be seen within a possible operating context. In a long-term industry such as ours, which does not operate on a regular schedule and for which the unit is a ship, it is almost impossible to link in absolute terms the idea of a bonus to that of the earnings for a fiscal year. The figures will not actually be known until one or two years later, and sometimes even longer.”599 Another sign that things were returning to normal: the entrance exam for the ACSM apprenticeship school. In 1948, 58 individuals applied, 36 of whom were accepted, while two dropped out. Total enrolment at the school rose to 67 young men: future boilermakers, tracers, draughtsmen, fitters, electricians, carpenters and salesmen. Moreover, starting in 1948, government loans were again granted to companies such as the mutual benefit society, La Fraternelle, for the purpose of building new housing. At the beginning of 1949, twelve applications were at an advanced stage of approval. Without doubt, the shipyard was well on its way to recovery, and new housing was needed. January 1949 truly ushered in the era of prefabrication. A member of ACSM staff since June 1942, Marcel Lamoureux’s work on applying new working methods gained the acknowledgement of the Works Council.600 That month, workers started on the in-workshop assembly of sections, with the first prefabricated 20-ton section being lifted to the slipway for the 16,902-dwt oil tanker “Champagne,” under construction for the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers.601

The sheet metal workshop in the early 1950s (the tracing room was located upstairs)

597 This represented 120 tons of vegetables, pasta and other ingredients, 5 tons of jam, compote and cheese. Meat was rare and therefore expensive, see Le Calfat du Trait, No. 11, March 1949.

598 The workforce numbered 1,109 blue-collar workers, 71 apprentices and 331 white-collar employees, for a total of 1,421 employees. Together with the 80 employees (thereabouts) who worked for the Société Immobilière du Trait and the canteen, the workforce reached 1,500 people. 599 “Gratification de fin d’année,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 9, December 1948. 600 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 27, August 1951. 601 Vessel whose keel was laid on 13 December 1948 and which was launched on 26 October 1950.

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Rue Clemenceau during the 1950s

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7 June 1948: launch of the barge “Courlis” and the freighter “Ille et Vilaine” for the French Navy

Speech by Hypolite Worms “An ardent desire to serve” Ladies, Gentlemen, My dear friends, Today, you are attending a dual launch which once again unites river and sea. But a second feature is even more significant: the barge and the freighter represent the last in their series of four and three, respectively. Undertaken under duress, these former German orders were, despite that very duress, delayed beyond the timeframe needed, for a period extending over several years. As a result, they all, without exception, now boost our national assets. Allow me to pay homage to all the artisans of this magnificent achievement. With the “Courlis” now launched, let me welcome Mr Folliot, representative of the Office National de la Navigation, as well as the head of the Raffinerie des Pétroles du Nord, the company which will be operating this vessel: Mr Pierre, along with his Deputy, Mr de Saint-Martin. We would also like to welcome Miss Michèle Scotto, godmother of the “Ille et Vilaine,” who so graciously accomplished today’s key task. As head of Maison Worms, I speak not only as a shipbuilder, but also as a shipowner. In this capacity, I am pleased to welcome our guests, and especially the representatives of the company Scotto, Ambrosino et Pugliese, owners of the new ship. Given the highly cordial relationship uniting our two companies, please bear with me for not resorting to rhetorical devices, instead allowing me to express myself in the very simple language of friendship. Although our friendship goes back a long way, it assumed a more direct rapport nearly 18 years ago, when in 1930 Maison Worms took control of the Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire. Naturally, we wished to maintain with its agents, at that time Maison Scotto, the trust bestowed on it by our predecessors.

This amicable and fully trusting relationship was quickly to extend to my own Maison Worms, in all its business fields. The “Ille et Vilaine,” whose name – with all due respect to its godmother – is no doubt temporary, as temporary as the management allocated to you, and which will soon change, I hope, into a proper title of ownership, is a new and fortunate link. Of which I am particularly proud. Let me now turn my attention to Chief Engineer Desforges, who has kindly accepted to stand in for René Courau, our new Secretary General of the Merchant Navy, 1st Class Chief Engineer in Marine Engineering. May I start by congratulating him on his flattering appointment as head of this Department, already witnessed in outstanding services. His actions in the past serve as a guarantee for us of the work he will pursue there in the future. We also send our regrets to Chief Engineer Siegman who was to have been among us today. We owe much to you, in more ways than one. In fact, not only do shipowners owe you their gratitude to you for your efforts to reconstruct the merchant fleet – your main preoccupation, no doubt – but also the whole shipbuilding sector, which now benefits from your fortunate understanding in the many negotiations conducted at Place Fontenoy. And I should not forget the particularly kind support that your administration bestowed upon Le Trait, a shipyard which had to endure so much. Seeing Mr Laval here, the Chief Engineer of the Ponts et Chaussées and currently the Managing Director of the Port of Rouen, it would be unbefitting of me not to thank all those who, at local level, helped us with the immense task of restoring French maritime power. I began by telling you that I would use very simple language. Nonetheless, please forgive me if the tenor of my words now becomes more eulogising, as I recount the exemplary history of Maison Scotto, Ambrosino et Pugliese.

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Hypolite Worms in 1948

Is this not an opportune – and in certain respects edifying – moment, after having just pointed out everything we owe to a government measure quite naturally directed toward the greater interests of our country, to show, via the example I have been tasked with illustrating, how worthy of these efforts are those who reap their benefits, albeit within the framework of private interests, but all the same, who display an ardent desire to “serve”? What a journey! It started in 1874, the year when Antoine Ambrosino, a young 14-year-old sailor, arrived in Oran after sailing from the Gulf of Naples, leaving his home country to seek his fortune on the coasts, where hope springs eternal. We can readily imagine the energy he must have invested in 16 years up to 1890, the year when your current company was created and also the year in which the Oran cabotage service was inaugurated, your flagship service that has been in operation for what will soon be more than 50 years. As I recall, this regular service began with a sailing ship with deadweight tonnage of 60 tons, the “Carmen,” pulled by the tugboat “Pharaon.” In retrospect, we can all but smile at how far you have progressed since then,

since that anachronistic fantasy which never really worried anyone at that time. Was it a surprise for anyone to see the French flag flying on the “Procida” several years later? Though undoubtedly the name of a small island in the Gulf of Naples, let us not risk diplomatic complications by saying right away that it was also the name of an 1,800-ton ship acquired by your company in 1930, thanks to the introduction of shipping loans? That acquisition, illustrative of the magnificent progress already made, was to become the embodiment of a family event, and from that moment onwards, we understood that the name “Procida,” indicating the cradle common to your three founders, was selected in tribute to them, to be written in gold lettering on the prow and stem of what was then your most beautiful vessel. A true symbol, paying tribute to the amount of work invested throughout these laborious and difficult years and to the ardent patriotism of three families devoted to French interests, and upon whom our empire bestowed French nationality. Now a symbol overtaken by the development of your business since that time, a business now extending to the most diverse fields within the shipping trade: cabotage and ocean-going navigation, lightering, a shipping agent – all of which now make you one of the most powerful shipping organisations in North Africa. Winding up, how could I fail to recall that, in 1914, your first generation of partners sent off seven of its children in defence of the French borders, three of whom are now managers, and all three of whom were injured and decorated at the front. This contribution to France’s defence was repeated by the second generation under conditions that were just as magnanimous, when the hour of sacrifice came a second time in 1939. Are there many families who can take pride in such devotion? We know that this is the – highly justified – reason behind your greatest source of pride. It is similarly a great source of pride for me to raise my glass to the health of Maison Scotto, Ambrosino et Pugliese, and to its ship – may it be a source of good luck! I raise my glass as well to the prosperity of the Merchant Navy, and in honour of this French community represented here with such dignity.

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The new shipyard and its operations602 Of the 26 hectares of land belonging to ACSM and the 56,000 m2 of covered surface, the administrative building took up a total surface area of 3,200 m2. It housed the management, engineering design, manufacturing and staff offices. The historian, Béatrice Maheut, assessed that outside communications numbered 500 conversations per day. A telephone operator in the reception area welcomed visitors. “The production office drew up the schedules for the various workshops. These took the form of graphs showing the use of the workforce and the amount of time the slipways would

payments and, if needed, paid invoices owed by ACSM. It took care of paying social security contributions, determined the sales tax and ordered its payment. It was also responsible for calculating and paying income taxes. The labour office oversaw activities such as drawing up payslips, paying family benefits, documenting work accidents and gathering statistical information on staff. The “maintenance-tooling” office decided upon modifications to a building, the relocation of a workshop, changes to a network or a power distribution system, the installation of a new overhead crane or any new development at ACSM. The “cost-price” office kept the

Le Trait, offices reconstructed – building designed by Mr Chauliat, certified architect, and built by Chouard

be occupied, as well as the completion forecasts. It also planned launches and the assignment of slipways.” The activities of the accounts department included keeping track of the accounts required for the financial statements, as well as managing communications with the store. It drew up client invoices and received

602 B. Maheut, “Histoire des chantiers du Trait. 5e partie,” Musée maritime de Rouen, No. 7, 1985. The description of the shipyard is based primarily on this very complete article by Béatrice Maheut.

book values of each ship and each workshop up-todate, thereby justifying ACSM expenses. It also made any estimates needing to be sent out. The secretariat was a department responsible for ordering office equipment, finished products for ships (anchors, portholes, etc.) and raw materials (sheet metal, electrodes, etc.). The design office gave the first shape to a ship, and every single part of a ship was designed there.

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The industrial complex included the sheet metal workshop (126 x 129 metres) equipped with a tracing room; “the mechanical workshop with an adjacent mechanical welding workshop” measuring 207 by 38 metres; the piping workshop, boiler workshop, the workshops for electrics and welded sections; and there was even a carpentry workshop and various finishing workshops, making it possible to perform various sawing, painting, rigging, fitting-out and assembly work. The workshops formed a group of buildings covering 4,250 m2, with storage areas, lifting and handling machinery.

Eight launch slipways measuring between 135 and 190 metres were divided up as follows: - two slipways measuring 189 metres in length - four slipways measuring 135 metres, one of which was covered - one 145-metre slipway - one 161-metre slipway “To handle sections weighing up to 75 tons, and to load them directly onto trucks, freight cars, barges, or seafaring ships, ACSM had six kilometres of railway track, ten shipyard rail cars, 20 vehicles and forklifts, 57 jib cranes, 28 overhead cranes, 10 large cranes,” according to Béatrice Maheut.

Map of the industrial complex in 1946 – Le Trait Naval d’Hier collection

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Prefabrication, oxy-fuel cutting, welding “From this point onwards, instead of fixing one sheet of metal or a corner piece at a time, workers will mount a section made up four or five sheets of metal and many profiles. This will have considerable consequences: the cranes will no longer be ‘the eye of a needle,’ surrounded by low-weight components waiting to pass through. Quite the contrary, they will become the gateways through which prefabricated sections will move smoothly. Each crane operation will involve 20 or so tons, instead of just 5 tons – or in most cases much less. A further consequence: a large part of the work, the greatest part even, will be performed under the best possible conditions on the ground, since the work will be done indoors, and workers will be able to select the best positions to perform their welding, thereby maximising productivity,”603 wrote Le Calfat du Trait in March 1949. With the change in organisation, prefabrication, welding and the upcoming increase in production capacity, the future of the shipyard seemed promising. Prefabricated sections were assembled in a large 126-m2 workshop. The pace of work was accelerated through the use of equipment such as automated oxy-fuel cutting, automated arc-welding machines for rectilinear welds, and prefabrication production lines. “After the sheet metal has been cut to size on the automated flame-cutting tables,” stated Béatrice Maheut, “the sheet metal is placed contiguously on the production line. The pieces are then joined together through spot welding, with the finished section then moving along the conveyor belt.”604 Next, the joints were welded together using an automated arc-welding machine. Faced with increasingly fierce competition worldwide, management was obsessed with upgrading facilities. “State-of-the-art machinery was installed in the large hull workshop; first and foremost, an oxy-fuel cutting table with its own photodetector, enabling the sheet metal to be cut according to the paper template,” explained Béatrice Maheut. A second flame-cutting machine cut the metal sheets based on drawings at a scale of 1:10, eliminating one stage of design office

603 “Dans nos chantiers : le montage à bord du premier élément préfabriqué du pétrolier ‘Champagne,’” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 11, March 1949. 604 B. Maheut, Histoire des chantiers du Trait, op. cit., p. 55.

work: that of tracing cuts on sheets of metal. Sandblasting was also introduced into the workshops, serving to remove the mill scale from the surfaces of metal sheets. Additionally, just before machining, an automated painting machine sprayed the sheet metal with a coat of paint to stop any corrosion during the outdoor construction stages.605 Serial construction This way of operating, suited to serial construction, provided management with the opportunity to propose multiple orders to shipowners, with not just one vessel being built, but several at a time. This allowed the creation of “xxx”-class ships, or the accelerated construction of twin oil tankers or mixed cargo ships (for example, the keel of the “Ville de Tamatave” was laid in slipway No. 1 on 25 June 1947, and that of the “Ville de Tananarive”606 in slipway No. 8 on 28 April 1948). This new way of operating offered the triple advantage of making accounting easier, keeping to budgets and providing more work. The end of 1949 was marked by the celebration – with a one-year delay – of the centennial of the parent company, founded in 1848. To mark the occasion, employees received a special bonus. Gifts were also offered. Another topic at the time: the Works Council came back to the recurring problem of power failures. Discussions also focused on heating the workshops.607 There were verbal accounts of the “cagnards,” braziers built to keep workers warm outdoors, as they were often exposed to glacial air currents sweeping through a ship’s skeleton.

605 Ibid., pp. 55–65. The drawing office was able to make blueprints of ships on paper. 120 blueprints for an oil tanker’s hull, 190 for its fittings and installations, and 100 for its piping had to be drawn in order to determine the scope of the work, before the actual construction started on the ship. 606 The freighters “Ville de Tamatave” and “Ville de Tananarive” ordered by the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire, both measured 148.60 metres in length, 18.80 metres in width, and could carry a maximum load of 10,500dwt. They were launched on 23 September 1949 (see the following speech given by Hypolite Worms pp. 273–275 and p. 286) and on 31 May 1950, respectively. 607 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 17, December 1949, and No. 18, January 1950.

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23 September 1949: launch of the freighter “Ville de Tamatave” for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire

Speech by Hypolite Worms “It is not merely a question […] of having […] ships fitted with state-of-the-art nautical features. Above all, satisfactory operating conditions are needed to allow these ships to perform the services expected of them”

Mr Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, As Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire, it is my special pleasure, Mr Minister, to share in the welcome and the thanks that Robert Labbé addresses to you. May I add that all friends of the Merchant Navy, gathered here today, behold with deep affection the crowning achievements of your efforts as head of your Department. How could they forget that, under your leadership, the French Merchant Navy, which owned 556 ships weighing 2,340,357 tons on 1 September 1948, now numbers 641 ships with gross tonnage of 2,643,975 tons on 1 September 1949, an exceptional step forward? It is also my pleasure to personally thank Mr Aymard de Courson, the close associate of the High Commissioner of the Republic in Madagascar, who on many occasions has displayed his eminent competence in financial matters for the greater good of the colony. I also greet Louis Guesde, Administrator of the Colonies, head of the Administration of Tamatave, the Madagascan province foremost in our minds today; Mr Allain, Chairman of the Tananarive Chamber of Commerce; and Jules Venot, Chairman of the Manajara Chamber of Commerce, two of the most senior and most respected colonists in Madagascar, where they represent Charente and Burgundy, in other words, the two French provinces that undoubtedly supply the most French men and women to the “Grande Île” in the Indian Ocean.

Finally, it is my greatest pleasure to thank Senator Toto Lehibé of Madagascar, and Senator Grimaldi of the Comoro Islands, who have agreed to honour us with their presence, even though their colleagues were retained yonder by the duties of their tasks. Today, we are taking delivery of the third “Ville de Tamatave.” I correctly say the ‘third.’ The first was constructed in 1899 by James Laing in Sunderland. Weighing 3,750 tons, the vessel saw service on shipping lines in the Indian Ocean. Its career ended 23 years later, after being sold to a shipowner in Marseilles. The second, with its 4,992 tons of gross tonnage, was launched from this very spot in 1931 and, like its predecessor, immediately entered service on shipping lines in the Indian Ocean. It came to a glorious end on 24 January 1943, in the service of the British Admiralty. The “Ville de Tamatave,” the third bearing this name, now takes its place in our new fleet – a fleet which suffered gravely in the war, but which is rapidly regaining its pre-war size. It is almost the sister ship of the “Malgache,” the qualities of which are well-known. But this new vessel benefits from major improvements, the details of which I will spare you, because even the uninitiated can grasp their scope through a summary examination of the superstructures. I will confine myself to pointing out that we went from a 12-passenger freighter to a 30-passenger mixed freighter, with particular care paid to their comfort. We are certain that all these changes will be appreciated, and that they will help improve France’s sea-going

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connections with its colonies in the Indian Ocean. Our company would like to maximise these ties, and to this end, is working in harmonious and amicable partnership with the Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes, whose Chairman I am pleased to greet here today: Mr Anduze-Faris. Furthermore, our company will soon be entering three further ships into service, all similar to the “Ville de Tamatave,” bringing its modernised fleet up to five homogeneous and fast vessels. Henceforth, efficient services linking France and the Indian Ocean will be far easier to achieve. Our Company pledges to continue investing all its energy here, as proven so many times over nearly three quarters of a century. All echelons of its staff, whether sea-going or on land, in France or in Madagascar, will continue to serve with exemplary conscientiousness. In this respect, I wish to convey my thanks to all of them here. All this takes place under the orders of our Director General Bucquet, whose merit, hard work and devotion are such, Mr Minister, that you felt compelled to nominate him to the Order of the Legion of Honour. Yet these operations are also dependent on other factors. It is not merely a question of having well-constructed ships fitted with state-of-the-art nautical features. Above all, satisfactory operating conditions are needed to allow these ships to perform the services expected of them.

Here is where shipping problems parallel those of the economy in general. What good are fast freighters when the ports are not equipped to turn around vessels with no time wasted, when the hours saved at sea are lost on land? What is the use of increasing tonnage and improving turnaround times when the land-based transport network – roads, canals, railways – is insufficient to ensure the rapid and secure transport of high volumes between the sea and the hinterland, all indispensable for making the most of the ships’ capacities? We must urgently get back at least to the situation in 1938, when the ratio between days at sea and days in port was 58 to 43 percent. Now, in 1948, this ratio has been completely reversed, standing at 41 to 59 percent. No one appreciates more than I the effort invested over all these years to give Madagascar the transport network and port equipment it needs; Mr de Chevigné has provided new impetus, the details of which can be taken from the speech he gave in Tananarive on 17 August 1949, on the occasion of the opening of the second ordinary session of the Madagascan Assembly of Representatives. That same occasion brought a comforting assessment of a management team which has succeeded in restoring order after the troubles, thus creating the conditions vital to Madagascar’s economic renewal. I hope that you will not hold it against me when I point out in conclusion what, in our opinion, deserves to be achieved as quickly as circumstances

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allow. I am speaking of the roads; in our opinion, the road from Tananarive to Majunga must be one of the first to be improved. As for the railways, how could we fail to join in the chorus of the High Commissioner, who, starting this year, wants to re-establish the link to the large port of Brickaville, without which connections between Tamatave and Tananarive are so dangerously slowed? And we would very much like to see this break in the transport network attracting the same amount of interest as that shown in establishing an AntsirabeFianarantsoa-Manakara line, a line which would make for a more secure and higher-volume link between the coast and the Central Highlands. As for the ports, we welcome wholeheartedly the work underway to improve the port of Tamatave, and the assurances that work will soon start on improving the ports of Diego Suarez, Tulear and Fort Dauphin. Finally, we are very much awaiting the construction of the Pangalanes Canal, which promises to have a very positive impact on the Madagascan economy.

It goes without saying that you will always find our Company supporting those intent in modernising port installations and facilities, and more generally in boosting the island’s prosperity. Our Company will carry on lending its assistance, as it has done in the past. And I believe there is no need to add that we are similarly interested in the renewal of the obsolete rolling stock on Reunion; in the plans for a new port capable of replacing Port-des-Galets; and in expanding connections between the Comoro Islands and Madagascar, which can only serve to improve the economic situation of the “Grande Île” and its dependencies. As it leaves this shipyard and prepares to journey toward the warm seas and distant lands of the southern hemisphere, where the French flag has been flying for nearly three centuries, I would like to dedicate the “Ville de Tamatave” to the definitive return of this prosperity, which will be a great boost to France’s image and for which so many of our compatriots since Gallieni have given the best of themselves – and often their lives.

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Increasing safety and optimising working conditions On 28 March 1949, ACSM management and the Works Council introduced a 50-hour week (against the statutory 40-hour week in force since the laws of the Popular Front).608 The week was divided into five 10-hour shifts. Workers started their shift at 7.05 a.m., office workers at 7.15 a.m. Everyone knocked off at 6.45 p.m. Workers had one hour and forty minutes off for breaks, including lunch. As for the annual vacation break, the company closed between 22 July and 8 August. This break applied to everyone except facility maintenance staff.

Preparation of the launch of “Ville de Brest” on 19 June 1962 – removing shores

608 In the 1950s and 1960s, this schedule was not respected in France due to the economic boom.

High-risk trades Management decided to improve facilities for its workers, ordering changing-rooms and planning to build a bicycle garage. But it was occupational safety that was increasingly given the priority. Workspaces were cluttered up and accidents happened: one man fell into a hole after a protective panel was removed. Another worker, “wanting to get out of the way of the load transported by the overhead crane,”609 found himself obstructed and was slightly injured. Another “was injured by a metal explosion,”610 calling into question the condition of the equipment or its extreme use. One death was lamented in the third quarter of 1949. On 5 September, a worker had his left leg amputated. As a result, ACSM communications highlighted safety, as demonstrated by warnings published in Le Calfat du

609 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 12, April 1949; No. 17, December 1949 and No. 18, January 1950. 610 Ibid.

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Trait. A collective effort had to be made to change work habits. At the beginning of 1950, three serious accidents occurred within ten days, one of which was fatal. A man was crushed by a frame after making a mistake while operating the crane, reversing onto the components he was dismantling. In 1958, two work medals were awarded posthumously following work accidents. Colleagues attended the burials after requesting permission from management. Shipbuilding, with its ties to metalworking, was clearly a high-risk sector, along with the construction and transport sectors.611 Frequency and severity of accidents at ACSM (1952–1957): Year Frequency Degree of Severity 1952 (1st quarter)

5,86

4,11

1952 (2 quarter)

6,60

3,02

1953

7,05

2,67

1954

8,21

5,29

1955

7,21

3,73

1956

8,02

5,14

1957

10,93

6,04

“One month without a work-related accident” The instructions issued by the Health & Safety Committee called for vigilance. Stretchers and first-aid equipment were to be found throughout the industrial complex: in the infirmary, the hull workshop, the riveting warehouse, near the main gates, as well as on the bridges of ships under construction.612 Management made the site safe. But old habits die hard, and staff were reluctant to wear helmets and adopt low-risk behaviour. The struggle to improve working conditions was to last the entire decade. It was only by dint of statistical analyses, testimonies from the injured (the account of a man who was blinded after refusing to wear safety glasses; that of a man who had fallen

611 Y. Saillard and A. Sebert-Samier, “Une analyse sectorielle des accidents du travail,” Économie et statistique, No. 73, December 1975, pp. 67–74. 612 “Un peu de ‘La Sécurité,’” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 12, April 1949.

on his head, but was saved by his helmet), mandatory requirements and safety reminders in Le Calfat du Trait that the workers were ready to change their ways. The social security agency even organised a “month without a work-related accident” challenge within the department. Statistics shed light on the injuries most common among the workers: one quarter were to the eyes. Though, by chance, there were no fatal accidents between 1951 and 1953, the infirmary handled 1,591 injuries during the first quarter of 1954 (293 were victims of ophthalmic lesions: 53 of arc-welding mishaps, and 240 of foreign substances penetrating the eye). Health & safety recommendations included scaffolding panels, the ventilation of confined areas, the capturing of smoke and dust, good-quality gloves, preventive measures for welders (particularly vulnerable to skin and eye injuries), scrap collection, the availability of drinking water, use of plastic earplugs. Toilets for the disabled were installed, as were urinals on board ships. Heating was installed in the canteen and towels were made available in the changing rooms, etc. Despite these measures, the table above seems to demonstrate an upward trend in accidents (which also became more serious). The reason for this paradox stemmed, it seems, from the activity itself. The accident risk could be tied to the work pace.613 The higher number of accidents could be linked to the increase in production, as confirmed by the table below: ACSM output rose quickly from 1953 onwards. Improved health The carpentry workshop provides a good illustration of the efforts made to improve working conditions. The massive wooden furnishings intended for the ships had previously been assembled by mortise and tenon held together by a fish glue [made of fish skin and bone] “that continually simmered and smoked in red copper pots.”614 This process had run its course. A system to vacuum dust and shavings was installed so that the air would no longer be “polluted and darkened by the dust particles released by the machinery,”615 as some were irritants and caused skin and respiratory problems.

613 Y. Saillard and A. Sebert-Samier, op. cit. 614 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 37, July 1953. 615 Ibid.

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Number of ships constructed per year at ACSM

A battle was waged against alcoholism. “I would like to draw attention to the size and frequency that [this scourge] is taking in the shipyard, where most work requires considerable muscle-work,”616 warned the shipyard’s doctor. Among the causes, he listed the distance of the workers from their place of work and overly long days. He had beverage distributors installed, offering syrup or water-based refreshments (hot “Potalux” beverages in the winter). While wine was consumed at that time at workplaces in France,617 in Normandy, cider (“besson”) was also favoured by workers. Water was out of the question, despite the fact that the work was hard and required proper hydration. The doctor also

616 “Rapport de M. le docteur Gourio,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 51, 1957. 617 G. Noiriel, Les ouvriers dans la société française, Paris: Le Seuil, 2002 (1st edition, 1986).

highlighted poor eating habits, and the overly large portions of products consumed: processed meats, bread, starches and sauces. He pointed to the deplorable dental condition of a great number of workers, “forcing them to drink liquids.”The doctor was also struck by workers’ back problems: lower back pain, problems with spinal disorders, degenerative disc disease, sacrolumbar deformities, sacroiliac joint arthritis, rheumatism and arthrosis.618 For some, alcoholism was a remedy for their suffering, especially when there was a vital need to work in order to feed their families, which sometimes were large.619

618 “Rapport de M. le docteur Gourio,” op. cit. 619 A reminder of the post-war baby-boom.

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31 May 1950: launch of the mixed cargo ship “Ville de Tananarive” for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire (NCHP) The ceremony “On 31 May 1950, at the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime in Le Trait, the ‘Ville de Tananarive’ was launched, presided over by Mr Courau, Secretary General of the Merchant Navy, representing Mr Chastellain, Minister for Public Works, Transport, and Tourism. Numerous VIPs insisted on honouring this ceremony with their presence, including: Mr Marbot, Chief of Staff for Mr Chastellain; Mr Foulon Chief Engineer; Mr Vieille Engineer General in Marine Engineering; Mr de Saint-Aubin Engineer General; Mr David, head of the Madagascar Delegation to Paris, representing Mr Bargues, High Commissioner of Madagascar; Mr Paumelle and Mr Léger, Senators for the Seine-Inférieure department; Mr Capdeville, MP for the Seine-Inférieure department; Mr Ramarony, Chairman of the Merchant Navy Commission at the National Assembly; Mr Abel Durand, Chairman of the Merchant Navy Commission with the Council of the Republic; Mr Delfau, Chairman of the Upper Council of the Merchant Navy; Mr Duyeau, MP for Madagascar; Mr Mairey, Prefect of the Seine-Inférieure department; Mr François CharlesRoux, Chairman of the Universal Company of the Maritime Canal of Suez; Mr Anduze-Faris, Chairman of the Messageries Maritimes;

Mr Jean Marie, Chairman of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique; Mr Guineaudeau, First Deputy of the Mayor of Tananarive; Mr Galtier, Director of Economic Affairs in Tananarive; Messrs Randria and Zafimahova, Senators of Madagascar; Mr Randjala, Local Councillor of Tananarive. The Le Trait shipyard was represented by its Chairman, Mr Robert Labbé; Mr Nitot, Executive Director in Paris; Mr Abbat, Managing Director in Le Trait; Mr Lamoureux, Deputy Director; and Mr J. Roy, Secretary General. The NCHP was represented by its Chairman, Mr Hypolite Worms, and its Board of Directors: Messrs A. Bucquet, Executive Director; A. Deloche, Managing Director; and F. Deschodt, Deputy Director. Last but not least, as with the ‘Ville de Tamatave,’ a delegation of staff from general management, the colonial agencies, and officers and crew travelled to Le Trait to attend the launch of its sister ship. At 11 a.m., after the VIPs had arrived and been greeted by Mr Robert Labbé, Mr Abbat took them on a tour of the shipyard. This tour was followed by the religious christening ceremony for the vessel, celebrated with great zeal by His Excellency, Msgr Martin, Archbishop of Rouen, alongside Mrs A. Bucquet, godmother of the vessel. 280

After saying prayers, Msgr Martin sprinkled holy water, then wheat and salt onto the hull of the ‘Ville de Tananarive.’ That done, the launch went ahead. Few people understand the difficulties of a launch, and we think it would be interesting to reproduce here the speech given at the microphone by an ACSM

engineer, in which he explained the techniques employed during the various phases of the launch: ‘The launch takes approximately two minutes, though we have been preparing it for one month. Clearly, launching the 6,000-ton ‘Ville de Tananarive.’ without any mishap is a risky operation. The energy exerted by this mass must be transferred from the slipway, on which the ship was built, to the launch cradle on which it slides down the slipway. Throughout its construction, the ship rested on fixed and solid supports. In the centre, under the keel, and extending over the entire length of the ship,

the line of keel blocks supported the bulk of the ship’s weight. These blocks are made of concrete and wood, and their height is carefully regulated. As the hull is being constructed, shores or vertical wooden props are placed on either side of the line of keel blocks to prop up the ship and keep it from leaning. For the ship to slide into the water, these fixed supports have to be removed and replaced with a cradle supporting the ship and allowing it to slide down two suitably greased runners. Launch equipment is basically comprised of two parts: the first part is fixed and attached to

The mixed cargo ship “Ville de Tananarive” under construction

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the slipway: the ‘bilgeway,’ a sloping ramp; the second part is moveable and tied to the ship; these are the ‘sliding ways’ which move with the ship. The ways slide along the bilgeway; the sliding is made possible by smearing tallow and grease onto the side that slides down the bilgeway rails. Tallowing is the riskiest step in preparing for the launch. The success of the launch depends first and foremost on the quality of the tallow and how it is applied. The components of the sliding ways are identical to those of the bilgeway; they are also smeared with tallow, and placed end to end

between the ship and the bilgeway, starting at the front of the slipway. To get the ship to rest on the sliding ways, pieces of wood are mounted between the hull and the ways, held securely in place by wooden wedges called ‘shims.’ The pieces of wood at the bow and the stern, much higher than those in the middle, in accordance with form of the ship, are called ‘poppets.’ The sliding ways, the poppets and the various pieces of wood used to allow the ship to rest on the bilgeway all comprise the ‘launch cradle.’ To transfer the weight of the ship gradually off the blocks and shores and onto the launch cradle, we begin by driving wedges into the cradle, lifting the ship a bit. Next, axes and sledgehammers are used

to remove the shores and building blocks upon which the boat was constructed. Once the final block has been removed, the ship rests entirely on its cradle, and consequently, on the layer of tallow and grease. Because the ship on its cradle must not slide on its own before the last blocks are removed and before the scheduled launch time (which depends on the tide), buffers – one on each side – called ‘dogshores,’ together steady the sliding ways and bilgeway, holding the cradle in place. The dogshores are rammed away at the precise hour of the launch. During the launch, when the ship’s stern is sufficiently immersed, the thrust of the water causes the ship to float, 282

while pivoting the ship around the bow extremity of the cradle, called the forefront, which is still resting on the launch ramp and continuing to slide. Extremely high pressure is exerted on the bow extremity of the cradle and ship – around 1,600 tons in this case. Therefore, the bow cradle must be very sturdy. With the ship continuing to slide, the bow in turn becomes sufficiently immersed, and the ship floats on its own. But due to its speed, around 6 m/second, the ship would end up on the opposite bank, were not a braking system applied: 20 filled crates weighing a total of 140 tons are dragged by the ship over the ground, stopping the ship in the middle of the river. Most of the preliminary operations have now been completed. The carpenters are removing the final blocks. The ship is now resting entirely on its tallow, the dogshores are keeping it from sliding. All we now need to do to launch the ‘Ville de Tananarive’ is to ram them away.’ As he finished these final words, Mrs A. Bucquet, the godmother, smashed the traditional bottle of champagne onto the bow of the ship, at the precise moment (12.35 p.m.) when the ‘Ville de Tananarive’ slid down of its slipway into the Seine, while the music launched into a stirring Marseillaise. After the launch, Mr Robert Labbé and Mr Hypolite Worms gave the customary speeches at the lunch offered to the VIPs attending the ceremony.” Bulletin of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire, No. 2, June 1952

Launch of the mixed cargo ship “Ville de Tananarive” for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire – 31 May 1950

Speech by Robert Labbé “Re-establishing a level playing field for our industry and foreign industries” We are delighted over the excellent conditions under which the “Ville de Tananarive” was launched a short while ago, the fifth vessel constructed in Le Trait for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation. We extend our wishes for the prosperity of the ship’s owners, along with the hope that their ship enjoys a long career. Despite previous commitments, Mr Courau, Secretary General of the Merchant Navy, truly wished to honour us with his presence here today, standing in for Mr Chastellain, whose parliamentarian obligations prevented him from coming. I would ask him to convey our deep regrets to the Minister for Transport – we would have dearly liked to have greeted him here, our long-time neighbour and highly competent administrator from our old Normandy metropolis, and such a highly-esteemed politician. As for us, Secretary General, I will simply express my joy at having you among us today to preside over this launch. Since the first days of the Liberation, we have worked together on reconstructing Le Trait; earlier today, you were able to see with your own eyes the result of our efforts – and we are very well aware of the major role played by you. We also highly treasure the presence at your side of Senator Abel Durand, Chairman of the Merchant Navy Commission at the Council of the Republic. Whereas all too many prefer to relegate the country’s shipping activities to the second tier of public officials’ concerns, Senator Abel Durand is leading the good fight down the path so easily justified by history and by the example of other nations. We are infinitely grateful to him.

I also thank all those who attended this morning’s launch ceremony, including its charming godmother. The deputies and senators of the Seine-Inférieure department and overseas France; the high officials, whose intelligent understanding is always on alert; our colleagues with whom we are in lockstep as we pursue our daily work; as well as all those, be they directly or indirectly involved in shipbuilding. All know what an important place our industry holds in this country. And I would like to highlight the seriousness of the problems now facing the industry. Considerable achievements have been accomplished since the Liberation, in a spirit of deep understanding on the part of the government authorities, yet also at the cost of substantial financial commitments on the part of ACSM. These have allowed its production to be restored on foundations worthy of our era and our country. These achievements have been described by those more qualified than myself: I merely want to mention them. The reasons for maintaining an active and prosperous shipbuilding industry in France have also been highlighted on numerous occasions. My colleague, Mr Lefol, listed them just recently in terms that leave nothing to add. For my part, I would like to try very simply to dispel any ambiguity. There has never been any discussion in this country on the necessity for shipping companies to conduct their business on a level playing field, to purchase their ships under the same terms as their foreign colleagues. We would like the same to hold true for French shipbuilding, with exactly comparable factors being used when comparing French prices with those of foreign competitors. Can we speak of a level playing field when metal prices in France are appreciably higher than those currently charged on foreign markets? Can we speak of a

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level playing field when the burden of French taxes and customs duties, much higher than that of our foreign competitors, makes ships built in France much more expensive than those built abroad? I do not think that, by asking for such flagrant inequalities to be corrected, our industry can be considered as wanting to solve its problem through government subsidies. In my view, however, the negative impact of these factors, as weighty as they are, is surpassed by that of other factors which have recently surfaced on the heels of the economic development observed in competing countries. As eliminating the disparities to which I have just alluded would not suffice to restore a level playing field, this makes the current circumstances so serious. Many foreign shipbuilders are now offering construction contracts almost without a price review clause, either because the contracts themselves do not stipulate any parameters for materials or wages, or because the advantages gained through a very low interest rate accorded by their central banks mean that French shipping companies do not even have to contemplate an exchange rate risk. Taking account of the size of the interests at stake, I do not think that our industry can currently make any commitments exceeding a two-year period without stipulating a review clause. By the way, in doing so, we are merely emulating many other French industrial sectors when they enter into long-term contracts with the government. Moreover, we would like to highlight the height of the financial incentives granted by our foreign colleagues to companies giving them large contracts: in many cases, long re-payment schedules are negotiated which, in relation to the construction cost, are only possible through a very low interest rate. It thus comes as no surprise that French shipping companies, whose operating conditions have been subjected to appreciable burdens over the last two years, are attracted by terms that offer the dual advantage of making funds available that are currently very difficult to procure at all in France, and, when available in France are offered at interest rates which I prefer not to mention?

If we ask for these last two problems to be examined in detail by your departments, Mr Secretary General, it is not because we are calling for a subsidy but rather for a level playing field for our industry and foreign industries. We are all the more convinced that our point of view is highly reasonable, knowing how much the French shipping industry would normally prefer to earmark its orders for our national industry. I will not insist on the references of our industry, as all of you gathered here, Gentlemen, have them in mind. We can make the claim, without being chauvinistic, that the quality of our production, further enhanced by the upgrades to our facilities over the past five years, would in itself be a reason for the majority of French shipping companies to give preference to French shipyards over offers, even interesting ones, from abroad. For its part, the French Navy, not even taking into account the construction that it may have to entrust to private industry, needs to have at its disposal a maintenance and refitting structure that can be used in the event of a crisis, not only for its own vessels, but also for those of the merchant fleet. For this reason, I do not think that, at the very moment when the public authorities are doing their utmost to find ways of maintaining a satisfactory level of economic activity in this country, the fate of an entire industry can deliberately be neglected. Directly or indirectly, the hard-working population risks seeing its faith in the future of our shipyard compromised – a shipyard which itself has not hesitated to take on major financial commitments based on well-defined reconstruction and replacement programmes. No doubt, these programmes are continuing as planned, but unfortunately, for many long months, private-sector orders for new vessels have been going to foreign shipyards. Thus, this is a particularly serious time for French shipbuilding. Solutions are hardly easy, since the very nature of our industry prevents us from resorting to the one protective measure of great benefit to all, customs duties. This would re-establish a level playing field for the industry in question and for its workers, while at the same time boosting the Treasury by means of customs receipts. The inescapable reality is there before us: to confront the tragedy staring us in the face, the poten-

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tial measures all call for sacrifices on the part of the Treasury, even though said sacrifices are not subsidies in any form. Winding up such a fine day, Mr Secretary General, these are the reflections resulting from the status of our industry; as a leader conscious of his responsibilities, it is my duty to present them to you. I know that, with your full knowledge of all these problems, with your great experience of men and situations,

you will do everything to find a solution justifying the worthiness of those who, at all echelons of our hierarchy, devote their very best to our industry, to the importance of the interests at stake, which events have made extremely urgent. It is thus with complete trust that I raise my glass in your honour, Mr Secretary General, in honour of our industry and of the Merchant Navy, and of its latest ship, the “Ville de Tananarive.”

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Launch of the mixed cargo ship “Ville de Tananarive” for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire – 31 May 1950

Speech by Hypolite Worms “We were forced to place this order abroad” “My initials words will be to thank you, Mr Secretary General, for your presence among us. We are happy to greet you at this launch ceremony, where you will welcome a new vessel into the French merchant fleet which you have the difficult but compelling mission of leading. In all truth, the ‘Ville de Tananarive,’ the vessel of which we are taking delivery today, is not a new vessel, since we already know all its capabilities. In fact, its sister ship, the ‘Ville de Tamatave,’ built and launched from this very spot several months ago, has already completed its maiden voyage in the Indian Ocean, to our fullest satisfaction, giving an initial demonstration of the huge services that we can expect of our Company’s fleet upon completion of its modernisation plans by the end of next year. But it is this very problem of modernising the merchant fleet, which Mr Robert Labbé has just sketched from a shipbuilder’s point of view and about which I in turn would like to say a few words, this time examining it from a shipowner’s point of view, which unites us. We recently ordered a ship needed to complete our fleet. This order was not for a vessel replacing a ship lost in the last war, but for a new mixed freighter needed to tackle new tasks and paid for fully out of our own pocket. Yet, we were forced to place this order abroad, because the construction cost was appreciably lower there, and because it is our duty towards our Company to go where the production price is the most advantageous for us. Need I say, despite the amicable feelings we have for our foreign friends, that we would have preferred to have placed this order with a French shipyard? But we were unable to do so. As things stand, should we need to build a further ship, we would again do

so with a foreign shipyard, for the same reasons. All shipping companies are in the same situation, and are being increasingly forced to act likewise, despite their desire to assign the work to needy French workers and shipyards. I am well aware, Mr Secretary General, that these worrying problems are familiar to you. I have only touched on them not only because I am aware of the extent of your attention, but also because I wanted to inform you of a concrete case that our Company recently faced. There is an urgent need for the public authorities to put forward appropriate remedies, unless the serious consequences of such a situation are being viewed all too light-heartedly. For that matter, we are well aware that any such remedies will not be easy to apply. I would feel bad if I was to wind up on such a pessimistic note. The renewal of our Merchant Navy, achieved through a flexible collaboration between the government and private industry, is proof of what our country is capable of, even after terrible ordeals. I firmly hope that France will overcome the difficulties still assailing it, whether in the field of shipping or elsewhere. All Frenchmen need to understand that work is the key to the prosperity and strength of nations.” While he was giving his speech, the NCHP delegation and the ACSM delegation gathered around the tables of the “Clos Fleuri” to end the day, fond memories of which were kept by all. After being fitted out in Rouen, the “Ville de Tananarive” sailed off on 4 July 1950 to undertake its maiden voyage in the Indian Ocean.

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First signs of problems: the resurgent question of a lack of competitiveness Orders become increasingly rare During the Works Council meeting of 6 March 1950, Pierre Abbat questioned his audience on the shipbuilding sector’s lack of competitiveness. His comments came as a shock. In a call for tenders from Brazil, the French had to compete with Scandinavian, Dutch and Japanese shipyards. “Where foreign shipyards bid 100 francs,” Pierre Abbat pointed out, “we came in at 150 F or 160 F.”620 In Le Trait, concerns grew: the order book for 1952 was empty. There was only work for the next two years: “This period constitutes the timeframe needed between starting and finishing work on a ship.”621 The problems seemed to dawn just as the brand-new buildings were being completed. Yet Abbat sought to provide reassurances regarding the balance sheet for the fiscal year 1948–1949: ACSM was managing “to break even.” If this continued, “while the shipyard might not be a prosperous one, it would at least be healthy and operating normally.”622 The following months, questions about the future of the shipyard seemed to be crop up regularly, with Pierre Abbat sharing his thoughts in his responses. He placed great hope in government protection for the sector: “Shipbuilding must survive. The government seems inclined to examine this national problem. A government commission has already visited shipyards in southern France and the Loire Valley. It will most likely visit our region in July [1950]. We are reckoning with a status report on shipbuilding being drawn up around October.”623 From a national perspective, this fact-finding mission gave rise to debates in the Assembly on the terms of the future law on State aid to shipbuilding.

620 “Au Comité d’entreprise,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 19, April 1950. 621 Ibid. 622 “Au Comité d’entreprise,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 21, June 1950. “We are not worse off than other shipyards on the national scale,” added Abbat. 623 Ibid.

1950: SFIO wins the Mayoral election, CGT gains a firm foothold Also in 1950, the workers’ joint commission elected CGT and CGT-FO (labour unions) members as employee representatives; René Biville and Raymond Brétéché, figures in the regional union movement, were re-elected, the local equivalents of the charismatic union leaders encountered after the World War.624 CGT and CGT-FO delegates would be continuously elected until the closure of ACSM, reflecting a strong culture of worker solidarity.625 The election of Brétéché626 from the French Section of the Workers’ International – SFIO to the position of Mayor of Le Trait in 1945 counterbalanced the omnipresence of ACSM management on the Boards of Directors of local associations, and contrasted with the election of Achille Dupuich prior to the war.627 Elections were closely followed, with only a handful of blank or invalid ballot papers.628 The editors of Works Council bulletins seemed to suggest a conflict-free understanding between the workers and management, but can we believe everything we read? Certain rare clues reveal conflicts, such as a strike in

624 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 19, op. cit., and No. 20, May 1950. See also G. Noiriel, op. cit. 625 When the more moderate CFTC requested to join the ACSM Works Council in 1950, the justice of the peace in Duclair rejected the request on grounds that the CFTC was not sufficiently representative. Similarly, the mutual benefit society, the ACSM Amicale d’Action Solidaire claimed 1,453 members in May 1950. See Le Calfat du Trait, No. 19 and No. 20, op. cit. Brétéché was also active in this Association, proof that the worker movement inside the company was very active. 626 It is true that Brétéché was able to benefit from the postwar Communist wave, but his election demonstrated undeniably strong worker solidarity, constant until the election of the Communist Roland Paris, a friend of Colette Privat (member of the Communist Party – see footnote 856, p. 380), from 1977 to 2001. 627 The interpenetration between the civilian, working and company worlds at that time is still visible in Le Trait in the names of streets or buildings: Rue Worms, Pierre Abbat Residence and Rue Achille Dupuich on the one hand, Biville Residence and Rue Brétéché on the other. 628 See, for example, the elections of employee representatives on 26 September 1957: with 1,323 registered voters, 1,206 votes were cast, 22 of which were blank or invalid. The final result: 18 CGT representatives, 4 CGT-FO and 1 CFTC. Le Calfat du Trait, No. 52, October 1957.

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1950 referred to between the lines.629 Testimonies shed light on its cause: demands for a wage increase. To complicate matters, as of 16 October 1950, orders for ships dried up. The company was not far from experiencing a “blank” year. Nonetheless, the programme underway required an increase in the labour force; the ships under construction had to be finished: - the 16,902-dwt and 17,601-dwt oil tankers “Champagne” and “Roussillon,” construction of which started on 13 December 1948 and 13 October 1949 respectively, for the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers (SFTP), and which were to be launched on 26 October 1950 and 18 September 1951 (see below); - the 16,500-dwt oil tanker “Saint Patrice” for the Association Pétrolière, whose keel was laid on 15 November 1950. It was launched on 11 February 1952; - the mixed cargo ship “Nossi-Bé” for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire, started on 2 July 1950 and launched on 10 July 1952. Fortunately, the year was saved in extremis by the conclusion of a new firm contract with the SFTP to build the “Beauce,” a 17,810-dwt oil tanker. Its keel was laid on 8 October 1951 and it was launched on 17 March 1953. This success must not mask reality: the fragility of ACSM. The SFTP, like the NCHP, was a subsidiary of Worms & Cie and led by Hypolite Worms who gave precedence to his shipyard. Consequently – and Pierre Abbat was well aware of this – the order could well have been placed on account of the plan devised by Jean-Roger Truptil, Chairman of the Consortium of Shipbuilding Companies, which provided financial support to private shipowners (of which the SFTP was a beneficiary).630

629 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 23, November 1950. The strike was called for reasons associated with recording workers’ hours. The cause of the strike was not mentioned in the bulletin. Accounts mention the arrival of CRS – Republican Security Companies in the 1950s. In 1954, workers were opposed to timekeeping. Four years later, in 1958, another violent strike broke out, causing damage to materials, of which there is no record in the Worms archives. 630 See B. Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1955), op. cit., chapter VII, in particular. Cassagnou quotes a report by J. R. Truptil: Financement des commandes privées à la construction navale, September 1949.

True prices Gaston Defferre, Minister for the Merchant Navy, was represented by Mr Desplants for the launch of the “Champagne” on 26 October 1950631 (see below). G. Defferre went to Le Trait in February 1951, a sign of the government’s involvement in resolving the lack of competitiveness of French shipyards. Naturally, this was an opportunity to enquire about the ongoing debates on the sector’s future. The Minister reminded everyone that the measures under consideration were not to be seen as a “subsidy”. It was more a question of the sector adapting to the new scale of the market and its foreign clients. This position predated the strategies progressively adopted in plans, notably the 4th and 5th Plans: a “return to true prices,” working to make the French industry more competitive.632 This position ended up forcing companies to merge so as to create sizeable entities adapted to the world market. At the end of the year, Pierre Abbat and Tony Larue, the ACSM’s accountant, closed the books on fiscal year 1950. While ACSM had made a profit, earnings – taking into account the random nature of the sector – could not sustain the distribution of dividends. The ACSM Director decided to assign 66 million francs to reserves “to offset future problems.”633 Building up reserves and maintaining liquidity were to become the policies adopted in the ensuing years, especially as military programmes were in decline and shipowners, fearing a collapse of freight rates, were no longer ordering new ships. This prudence and lack of trust in the future pushed management to regularly adopt rational production programmes in the factory.

631 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 23, November 1950, and No. 25, Easter 1951. 632 J.-C. Asselain, Histoire économique de la France du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours, vol. 2, Paris: Le Seuil, 2011 (1st ed., 1984), p. 13. 633 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 26, May 1951.

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26 October 1950: launch of the oil tanker “Champagne” fitted out by the SFTP

Speech by Hypolite Worms “Our attachment to ships also stems from our understanding of them as standard-bearers of civilisation” Ladies and Gentlemen, May I begin by adding my now traditional, but very sincere thanks to those that my friend, Robert Labbé, has just expressed to you all as our host. I do not intend to make a long speech. I especially have no desire to speak to you once again, after so many far more eloquent speeches, about the problems faced by the shipping industry. Nor have I any desire to speak of the anguishing problems of French shipbuilding, the construction of French ships in foreign shipyards, or the prospects emanating from the facilities restored to the German Merchant Navy and German shipyards. I will not do so, because you are all just as well aware of them as I am; and also – quite frankly – because today, I wish to speak to you about something else. What can one speak about on the occasion of the launch of such a magnificent ship? Well, very simply: about boats and the shipping trade, which we so love and which is why we are gathered here today. I am coming to an age where I can talk about the past, to an age where confessions are also permitted, confessions we call memories, when those who remember believe they hold something of importance. So let me begin with a confession. One day, a somewhat curious individual asked me: “When you fill out the registration form when registering at a hotel, what do you write down as your profession?” I responded that I wrote “shipowner” because, of all my activities, that was the one of which I was most proud, the one I loved the most, and very simply the one stated on my ID card. And then I explained the reasons for this choice to my young friend.

I will not repeat them here, as that would take too long. I would just like to remind you all that my family, over one century ago, was already chartering ships; that one hundred years ago my grandfather was already a shipowner and that, as far back as I can remember, I see the sea, the sea and boats. I also see seafarers, these mariners with their clear and intrepid gaze, out of whom the sea continually seems to get the most, through being accustomed to danger, through the likeminded need to work, through the continual contemplation of a natural element of supreme beauty. In a shipowner’s passion for the profession, there is a feeling of belonging to the most beautiful organisation in the world: the Merchant Navy. And we know full well that, in the hearts of those who work in this noble field, from the lowest- to the highest-ranking, the sense of fellowship and pride exists in us all. I am not going to make a fool of myself by quoting any of the poetry of renowned poets relating to the sea, which Paul Valéry described for all eternity in just a couple of words: “That sea, forever starting and re-starting.” But you will permit me to confirm that the feeling grabbing us at every launch derives, to a large extent, from the impressive sight of this enormous mass gliding effortlessly towards the waves, as well as from the poetic images of far-off seas and exotic countries to which the new ship will set sail on leaving the slipway. May I add that contemplating a ship about to float becomes more precious with each passing day. As fast as travelling by ship is, it remains a miracle in our century: the miracle of moving slowly. In doing so, it leaves with us an impression all too rare today: that of the immensity of our world, a world which we still believe not to have yet been fully discovered, not fully known; that our world is not “finite,” to quote a famous phrase.

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Speaking on behalf of the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, the youngest of France’s large shipping companies, you perhaps do not understand why I take such pleasure in poetry and memories. Let me say that our attachment to ships also stems from our understanding that they are standard-bearers of civilisation. France’s prestige in the world would never have been what it was and what it is, had France only held sway over land, and not over the sea. French prosperity would be very fragile, had it not been upheld by all its sea-going trade, still by far the most important portion of its commerce.

The “Champagne” has just enlarged the SFTP fleet. The first in a series, it will allow us to rebuilt our fleet – to a large extent destroyed during the war. It belongs to a series we intend to continue, partly within the context of the reconstruction programme for the French merchant fleet, partly under the plan to rejuvenate our older vessels. This new ship will go far, in search of the wonderful oil that has transformed the lives of mankind. Born from the combined labour of engineers and workers of all ranks who designed and built it, may this ship ever serve only peacetime activities, and may it ever be only an instrument for the creative work of mankind. To all of you here today, I address our heartfelt thanks for the magnificent vessel delivered to us today.

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The Defferre Law of 24 May 1951: a turning point in the government’s shipbuilding policy The renewal of the French fleet after the destruction caused during the war allowed order books, and especially that of ACSM, to be filled. The SFTP’s order for the “Beauce” marked the entry into a new period, that of the “private-sector regime” in the words of Abbat. From 1945 to 1951, ACSM customers were made up of first the Navy and the Office National de la Navigation, and second the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire, the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers and Worms & Cie, in other words, of the government and the ACSM’s parent company, along with its subsidiaries. However, starting in 1950, orders placed as war reparations and the rebuilding of both the Merchant and Military Navy dwindled. Clearly, management of the French shipyards regarded this decline as the loss of a market that up to then had been reserved for them. Thereafter exposed to foreign competition, particularly from Great Britain (whose prices were 20% to 30% lower), companies counted on the State aid granted to the sector to keep them “afloat.” Trade-offs for State aid But a true turning point came when the government adopted the Law of 24 May 1951.634 Government subsidies, traditionally intended to cover the difference between the cost of manufacturing in France and that payable on the world market without any real quid pro quos, had hitherto always been granted to shipowners who placed orders with French shipyards. Under the new law, they became subject to new obligations placed

634 See B. Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995), op. cit. In particular, the part, “Le crédit à l’armement.” Chapter “VII - II. Le Crédit à l’armement. A. De la réflexion à la mise en œuvre d’un système de bonifications d’intérêts.”

on shipbuilders: workforce ceilings, modern accounting techniques635 and a cut in profits. The State levied a tax of 50% on earnings exceeding 3% of turnover, rising to 75% on earnings exceeding 6% thereof.636 The purpose of these measures was to limit the number of shipyards, boost productivity, and push them into restructuring and standing on their own financial feet. There was no longer any question of the sector being sustained without any trade-offs. In reality, the measure cost the government dearly.637 Its impact was even in part the opposite of what was originally intended.

635 Journal officiel, débats parlementaires […], 3rd session of 12 June 1956 – p. 2533: “The Commission is fully aware of the importance of this financial aid to shipbuilding, which goes back to the Law of 24 May 1951, the so-called Defferre Law; yet is surprised to note that the provisions in effect for several years regarding the application of the accounting plan have gone unheeded. Indeed, the regulation stated that, as of 1 January 1953, ‘the benefit of the law may only be accorded to companies which have standardised their accounting and financial statements within the framework of the principles defined by the accounting plan.’ How come then that, since 1 January 1953, we continue to grant aid to shipbuilders without this requirement, set forth right from the start, being met? How to explain such a delay in the preparation of this accounting plan? The Commission des Finances is even more annoyed by this situation, confirming that shipyard payments of the levy on earnings as set forth in the law were extremely low, reaching around 75 million in 1954 and 267 million in 1955. The Commission des Finances is anxious to see this deficit remedied, gaining the certainty that accounts can be easily checked and that the levy on shipyard earnings can be clearly calculated.” 636 See B. Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995), op. cit. And J. Domenichino, Une ville en chantiers. La construction navale à Port-de-Bouc, 1900-1966, Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1989, p. 250. 637 Gross tonnage (gt) grew from 181,000 tons in 1950 to 223,000 in 1951, and 322,000 in 1955. Although productivity has increased, modernisations expected by the French Government have been slow in coming in some shipyards and in particular in Port-de-Bouc. Statistical data reproduced by J. Domenichino, Une ville en chantiers, op. cit. And “Écho : Inquiétudes au sujet des barèmes fixant le montant des allocations d’aide à la construction navale,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 30, March 1952.

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18 September 1951: launch of the oil tanker “Roussillon” fitted out by the SFTP Specifications Length overall

165.160 metres

Width

11.700 metres

Depth at deck line

11.700 metres

Volume of the oil tanks

22,720-m3

Deadweight

17,601 tons

Burmeister and Wain engine: 6,000-HP at 118 RPM, Type 874–VTF 140, built by the Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire-Penhoët

“Many VIPs came to Le Trait for the occasion, including: On behalf of SFTP: Mr Angot, Mr Borius, Mr Cayrol, Mr Desprez, Mr Le Cerf, Mr Bara, Mr Duret, Mr Achard, Mr Douxami, Mr Guillard, Mr Bohuon, Commander Garnier. On behalf of ACSM: Mr Robert Labbé, Chairman; Henri Nitot, Director General; Pierre Abbat, Director General of Operations. On behalf of the Merchant Navy: Mr Courau, Chief

The oil tanker “Roussillon” under construction

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Engineer in Marine Engineering and Secretary General of the Merchant Navy; Mr Lellouch, Engineer General in Marine Engineering; Mr Charvet, Engineer in charge of the project; Messrs Labbay, Charrier, Antonietti, Galanti, Dumas. On behalf of the Central Department of Naval Construction and Weapons: Mr Lambotin, Engineer General in Marine Engineering; Mr Sabine, Chief Engineer in Marine Engineering; Mr Lang, Engineer General in Marine Engineering; Mr de Saint-Aubin, Engineer General in Marine Engineering and Chairman of the Public Procurement Commission. Various VIPs from the region of Rouen and Le Havre, including Mr Jean Mairey, Prefect of the Seine-Inférieure department. Representatives of the shipbuilders: Messrs Puech, Fonquernie, Bonneil, Nepveu, A. Augustin-Normand (father), A. Augustin-Normand (son), Birot, Director of the Chantiers Navals de Caen in Blainville-sur-Orne, Norguet, Chief Executive Officer of the Export Group of Steel Ships and Sea Equipment, etc. Given the late hour of the tide, lunch took place at the ‘Clos Fleuri’ before the launch, during which the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime Chairman Robert Labbé and SFTP Board member Mr Cayrol took turns speaking.” La Revue nautique, October 1951

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Launch of the oil tanker “Roussillon” fitted out by the SFTP – 18 September 1951

Mrs Cayrol, godmother of the oil tanker “Roussillon,” with Jean Roy, ACSM Secretary General

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Launch of the oil tanker “Roussillon” – 18 September 1951

Speech by Robert Labbé “Frequent examples come to us from abroad regarding the major material advantages stemming from adopting certain standard practices” “After praising the SFTP and complimenting the godmother, Mrs Cayrol, and thanking the VIPs present, Mr Labbé, Chairman of the company, thanked Mr Cayrol in particular, highlighting his place of eminence within the French oil industry. He then went on to speak of the future of oil shipping: ‘I would simply like to say – and for many reasons, I believe I have permission – how many French shipyards, including ACSM for which the construction of oil tankers is one of its oldest traditions, look confidently to the future of French oil shipping. Without a doubt, the construction programmes of our friends in oil shipping are set to grow appreciably in the years to come. My wish is that the greatest share be reserved for French shipyards. Today, thanks to the noteworthy work of Mr Gaston Defferre at the conclusion of the last legislative session, our industry now has a statute enabling it to face the international market under normal terms. Immediately upon arriving at the Place Fontenoy, his successor Mr André Morice – and may his colleagues present today kindly send him my expression of respect and deference – endeavoured to update the regulation enforcing the law. We have the fullest faith in him, as well as in his colleagues in the other ministerial departments, that the first practical outcomes will soon be seen. In this respect, Gentlemen, I would like to draw your attention to several points. First of all, I do not believe that this statute should become the lever for standardisation or theoretically systematic planning. Each shipping company operates its fleet under specific constraints, requiring an individual profile best matching profitability needs.

But he must also not go to the other extreme. In the case of oil tankers, in particular, it should be possible to seek, for the various types of ships to be built, a certain harmonisation at least in the field of propulsion systems, auxiliary devices and, ultimately, all the features which, if each company obstinately follows its own ideas, burden shipbuilders with lengthy design studies, thereby generating inordinate delays in their construction and fitting. While many factors contributing to our construction costs, notably the cost of steel, remain beyond our control, examples frequently come to us from abroad regarding the major material advantages stemming from adopting certain standard solutions – I do not believe that those among our shipowner friends who have accepted them regret having done so. In this respect, could there not be concerted action between the French shipyards and their future French clients? No doubt the shipyards, and thus the shipping companies, would draw tangible benefits from this; but this would also be just as profitable for our many subcontractors, whose production costs and delivery times influence the desired optimisation of construction costs. Indeed, we should never forget that we are basically an assembly industry. When explaining the better position of the shipyards in certain foreign countries, one often mentions the facilities available to them in their sub-contracting industries. Obviously, we will never achieve in France the annual production volumes achieved by several of our neighbours. Most likely, we will always be handicapped in this regard, as in other industrial sectors. Nevertheless, we must not neglect any factor likely to improve our position. Much progress has already been

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made in the field of standardisation; but here again – and this is something I very much want to underline –, there should be no question of our clients, who order ships for the purpose of operating them and not for them to look like those of their neighbours, not making critical use of their intelligence. In any event, a long and fruitful collaboration between all the interested parties should lead to a definite improvement in our manufacturing conditions in the coming years. At a time when, in response to our request, the statute is set to soon become reality, we must, on behalf of our shipping companies, shipbuilders and sub-contractors, do everything in our power to make the French shipbuilding industry efficient and highly productive. However, all this would be in vain if, at the same time, the statute’s enforcement were to be envisaged in an overly narrow manner. I appreciate better than most the weight of the task incumbent upon the government, and more particularly upon the ministers in charge of public finance and economic affairs; they have infinite problems to solve, the complexity of which are sometimes beyond com-

prehension, but we know that the future always smiles on hardy and reasonable achievers. While requesting that the law providing State aid to shipbuilding play a major role, we are not however calling for our country to be given factors of debatable economic value, the very principle of which risks being controversial. Ships for France are not a luxury these days, something that can wait, but a true necessity. Oil tankers in particular are essential elements of the economies of great modern nations. I would thus very much like to see the Minister for the Merchant Navy, who I know, following our recent discussions, is fully aware of the importance of this problem, gaining the fullest support of his colleagues in enforcing a system for which our industry has been waiting so many years. We will provide him our fullest and most loyal support, within the framework of the captivating human and industrial collaboration which ends up with such a moving work: the sea-ship.” La Revue nautique, October 1951

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Launch of the oil tanker “Roussillon” – 18 September 1951

Speech by Mr Cayrol “The use of oil products has developed in all countries far more quickly than we estimated several years ago” “Mr Cayrol thanked Mr Labbé, saying how Mrs Cayrol had been deeply touched by the honour bestowed upon her to preside over the launch of the oil tanker ‘Roussillon.’ ‘For all of us, the word ‘Roussillon,’ he said, ‘calls to mind the province of origin of a great Frenchman, Marshal Joffre, and by selecting this name for our next ship, we discreetly pay tribute to the victor of the Battle of the Marne.

We also sought to keep the memory alive of one of our oil tankers that disappeared during the war; one of the first ships purchased by our company in 1938, it was operated under highly satisfactory conditions under the command of Captain Bohuon, who is among us today and who continues to fulfil with great devotion the duties of ship captain for our company. In a moment, we will watch the launch of the ‘Roussillon,’ the last oil tanker to be allocated to us by the Minister for the Merchant Navy to replace tonnage we lost during the war. I will not use this opportunity to mention once more, before as informed an audience as you, the problem associated with French shipping companies placing orders with French shipyards. Temporary measures were taken last year, allowing our company in particular to order the oil tanker ‘Beauce’ from the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, which I believe, will be built on the same construction slipway as the ‘Roussillon.’ Other measures are foreseen in the new law on shipbuilding, and I fervently hope that the enforcement decree currently being studied translates the theoretical principles and the good intentions found in this law into the language of business and concrete outcomes. For more than five years, I have been chairing the Commission for the Modernisation of Fuels, the purpose of which was – and continues to be – to periodically examine the role and programmes of all industries affected by oil-related issues in France and in the French Union. In this respect, I recall that the first conclusions adopted in 1946 for the development of the tanker fleet were relatively modest, foreseeing that in 1955 this fleet should be in a position to transport eight million tons, i.e. 50% of the tonnage intended for mainland France, and that it would be desirable to earmark about 10% of the fleet for transport abroad: this involved increasing the tonnage of the oil fleet from 212,000 tons at the beginning of 1946 to nearly 920,000 tons in 1955.

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This forecast has been exceeded by a wide margin, with 920,000 tons reached on 1 July of this year. Taking into account the orders underway, we expect to reach a total of around 1,200,000 tons in 1954. Does this mean that the shipping companies and public authorities were overly rash in their prior and planned investments for modernising our tanker fleet? I absolutely do not believe so, because we must take into account the fact that the use of oil products has developed in all countries far more quickly than we estimated several years ago: France is set to import more than 17 million tons in 1951, i.e. far more than the tonnage initially foreseen for 1954 and of which the French tanker fleet will transport slightly less than 50%. I thus call upon our oil shipping friends and colleagues, many of whom are here today, to take advantage of the current circumstances and legal provisions ensuring the full capacity utilisation of their fleets to pursue their efforts – so willingly undertaken in the past – to replace old vessels, to further develop their fleets and to use every opportunity to participate in international traffic. The currency battle is only just beginning. Soon, without outside assistance, France will have to wage the battle through its own means. French oil shipping owes it to itself to do its utmost in this struggle vital for the economy of our country. With this hope in mind, I raise my glass to the success of French oil shipping, to the Ateliers et Chantiers

de la Seine-Maritime and to all those who, with their heads or their hands, assisted in the construction of the ‘Roussillon.’ I wish this new oil tanker a long and happy career.’ The launch The guests then headed for the shipyard where the oil tanker ‘Roussillon,’ majestic on its launch slipway, waited to be freed. Amidst a large crowd, the blessing was said by the Most Reverend Dom Grammont of Bec-Hellouin Abbey. Then, after the godmother had ritually smashed a bottle of champagne onto the hull, the ship slid majestically down the slipway to make contact with its element, thus starting a career which we hope will be long and fruitful.” La Revue nautique, October 1951

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Construction of the oil tanker “Pluviôse” for the Compagnie Nationale de Navigation – CNN

Growth of ACSM: the paradoxical zenith? (1952–1959) A fragile recovery In May 1951, ACSM signed a further contract with the SFTP, this time for the construction of the “Languedoc,” a 19,754-dwt oil tanker. Work began on 21 August 1952, with delivery scheduled for 1953. In addition, the SFTP donated 50,000 F to the ACSM’s mutual benefit society, the “Amicale d’Action Solidaire.” Business was picking up! The Compagnie Générale Transatlantique ordered two berthing docks. Workers even received a 16.5% wage increase as of 10 September 1951. Bonuses were paid at the end of 1950 and 1951. Some corporations were experiencing a slowdown, causing workers to be posted to other sectors. One statistic shed light on the fragile nature of the recov-

ery: iron ore extraction grew faster than steel production in France.638 Disruptions in the steel industry were impacting construction at ACSM.639 Full employment of the labour force depended on steel supplies. Moreover, the market for shipbuilding was shaken by the Korean War (1950–1953) which brought on inflation, resulting in a steep rise in the cost of raw materials as well as delays in deliveries: “By way of example,” recounted

638 J.-C. Asselain, Histoire économique de la France, op. cit., p. 122. 639 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 28, November 1951; and No. 35, March 1953. The shortage of sheet metal meant that there were 1,000 fewer tons in 1952 than in 1951, resulting in delays on the “Languedoc.”

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Le Calfat, “Mr Abbat told us that it currently takes around 30 months to construct an oil tanker in France, because deliveries of sheet metal are spread over 12 months. By comparison, back in 1935, we completed construction on the ‘Shéhérazade’ in just 18 months, with far fewer resources.”640 This was a way of expressing the extent of the consequences of the Korean War. The shipyard navigated between optimism and concern. In issue No. 29, Le Calfat du Trait enthusiastically proclaimed: “1952 is set to be a good year for our shipyard.” The reason: once again, the government had stepped in, promising to have 8,000 tons of steel delivered instead of the 5,000 tons initially foreseen, thus allowing the shipyard to meet its delivery dates and guarantee employment. 1952: Worms & Cie transfers nearly all its production assets to ACSM Still in 1952, a financial transaction increased ACSM’s capital: the transfer, approved by Worms & Cie, of the majority of the parent company’s industrial and urban complex. In a document dated 15 September 1952, “approved and ratified in accordance with the law, Worms & Cie transferred nearly all of its production assets in Le Trait, receiving in return 25,000 shares valued at 10,000 F each, created by way of a capital increase and bringing the company’s capital up from 100 million F to 350 million F.”641 The order book swelled with two minesweepers for the French Navy (“Orion” and “Sagittaire,” whose keels were laid on 26 and 28 August 1952 respectively);

two oil tankers, one for Atlantic Oil Carriers (“Atlantic Lady,” whose keel was laid on 7 April 1953), the other for the Compagnie Nationale de Navigation (“Pluviôse,” whose keel was laid on 9 January 1954); two catalytic storage tanks for Esso; one floating roof for the Compagnie Française de Raffinage; and eight boilers. Work was assured at least until 1955. Abbat also won a contract to construct the oil tanker “Presidente Jorge Montt” for the Chilean Navy (the keel of this vessel, based on the “Beauce,” was laid on 13 June 1954). This order brought to light the synergies developed by Maison Worms between its various departments. Work was being performed for the Chilean Government through the intermediary of the Ciave – the Comptoir International d’Achat et de Vente à l’Étranger – an organisation created in 1944 for the purpose of financing international trade, which Worms & Cie joined in 1951 (alongside the Banque de l’Indochine and the CIC) and which, under its leadership, was to become a leading French expert on financing large industrial complexes abroad. On the deck of the minesweeper “Orion,” launched on 20 November 1953

640 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 29, January 1952. See also Nos. 30 (March 1952) and 36 (April 1953). Later, in 1953, ACSM started using light metals from the Société Centrale des Alliages Légers factory in Issoire. 641 www.wormsetcie.com. See the background information provided in a memo of 19 May 1959, as well as the memos of 16 and 19 November 1959; the capital contribution agreement and the assemblies relating to the capital increase; document of 4–5 January 1960: capital of 10 million F “increased to 350 million francs, following various personal and property contributions made by the company, Worms & Cie. Said contributions were approved by an extraordinary general meeting of company shareholders on 29 September 1952. The minutes of this assembly were registered in Paris on 29 September 1952, under No. 176A.” See also the memo from Robert Malingre to Robert Labbé, dated 11 January 1960.

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Table showing the nature of the work covered by the contract won by the Ciave (promotional brochure highlighting achievements between 1951 and 1970 – cf. www.wormsetcie.com – 1970 archives) Year

Work to be performed

1952

Ship construction: Oil tanker: 17,000 tons Collier: 6,000 tons Two freighters, each weighing 7,000 tons

Client

Shipyards

Chilean Government

Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, Chantiers de St-Nazaire Penhoët US$ 12,830,000 Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire

1951: aerial view

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Total amount

Portrait of Pierre Abbat published in Le Calfat du Trait in October 1952

The 1950s were largely devoted to the construction of oil tankers (13 of the 29 ships constructed over the decade).642 Diversification would come later.

October 1952: the death of “Father” Abbat643 We intentionally chose “the death of ‘Father’ Abbat” as the title for this section. ‘Father’ or ‘mother’ followed by the family name is common usage in Normandy vernacular. Yet in this case, the title is used here to highlight how the workers viewed Abbat: as a father and guardian figure. What strikes us when going through the minutes of Works Council meetings are the often eulogising terms used in reference to ACSM management – the texts

642 According B. Maheut, “Histoire des chantiers du Trait. 5e partie,” op. cit., lists 13 prefabricated oil tankers for the period 1947–1959: “Champagne,” “Roussillon,” “Saint Patrice,” “Beauce,” “Languedoc,” “Atlantic Lady,” “Pluviôse,” “Presidente Jorge Montt,” “Artois,” “Stanvac Lirik,” “PortVendres,” “Kongsdal,” “Caltex Strasbourg.” 643 See R.-C. Flavigny, “M. Pierre Abbat,” Précis analytique des travaux de l’Académie des sciences, belles-lettres et arts de Rouen, Rouen, 1954, pp. 298–299.

often come close to hagiography.644 The clubs always referred to Pierre Abbat and his decisions with respect and deference – had he not protected the workers in 1940 during the German requisitions? ACSM management paid 50% of the dues for the ACSM “Amicale d’Action Solidaire,”645 which in turn kept its account with the Worms & Cie Banking Services. Pierre Abbat was not only the company Director but also the Honorary Chairman of the “Amicale.” Accordingly, we can understand the trauma felt by the whole town when Abbat was killed in a car accident. Hypolite Worms attended the funeral, as did the French Government in the shape of André Marie, Minister for National Education at the time. VIPs from the Seine-Maritime department were also present: Mr Chastellain, Mayor of Rouen; Mr Thoumyre, Chairman of the Rouen Chamber of Commerce, of which Pierre Abbat was a member; Mr Kahn on behalf of the Marine Engineering engineers; Mr Flavigny, Vice Chairman of the Rouen Academy of Sciences, Literature and Arts; Mr Montalembert, MP and Mayor of Ermenouville; the abbot of Saint-Wandrille; representatives from the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire, the Société Française de Transports

644 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 58, May 1960, illustrates this point well: “At Worms & Cie, everything is done noiselessly and without ostentation. Everyone, from the partners to the humblest of employees, works each day with faith, fortitude and continuity. The climate there is family-oriented. Everyone is convinced they are participating in important and lasting work.” This turns a blind eye to certain problems: alcoholism among many employees and the strikes of certain years. The minutes of the Works Council meetings have this to say about the ACSM bosses: Hypolite Worms is “more alert than ever and very much in shape,” they always greeted his clear-sighted decisions. Abbat was never contested. Contemporary accounts still refer to him with great respect. As for the Director General in Paris: “Mr Nitot’s face is well-known among long-time Le Trait residents. They can still see him coming out of his house in the morning and heading toward the office, cane in hand, his eagle eye scrutinising the daily developments of the countryside.” “On top of his lively character […] Mr Nitot has a heart of gold.” “He dreams of an ever-more prosperous shipyard, sparing neither time nor effort to bring in shipyard orders; the friendship that has bound him for so many years to the local shipyard managers assure a perfect communion of ideas and a consistent unison of viewpoints.” See Le Calfat du Trait, No. 23, November 1950. 645 The ACSM “Amicale d’Action Solidaire” had an account with Banque Worms and money deposited with ACSM.

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Pétroliers, the Worms & Cie Banking, Fuel Merchanting and Shipping Services; as well as shipbuilding representatives from all over France. Through his actions and publications, Abbat had gained national prestige and even a certain worldwide renown. The article published in Le Calfat du Trait highlighted the talents of Pierre Abbat (his taste and ability to learn languages): “Whereas, in the founding days when growth in Le Trait was burgeoning, H. Nitot was the master builder of our workers’ housing estate, his successor, Mr Abbat, also appreciably developed housing in the community. Apart from the 45 new homes built by ACSM in 1939– 1940, Mr Abbat, as Treasurer of the SHLM [low-cost housing organisation], of which Mr Nitot, Council Secretary, was the driving force, had the following built: - in 1940/1941: 12 four-room houses - in 1949/1950: 25 five-room houses - in 1950/1952: 40 six-room houses, 24 of which were earmarked for ACSM staff.646 In perfect harmony with Mr Roy, his Secretary General and Director of the housing company, Mr Abbat carried out the reconstruction of the bombed houses and promoted property ownership for many shipyard employees and workers, continuing the work initiated by Mr Nitot through according sizeable grants to purchasers.” “Advised by Mr Roy, and with the assistance of the Rouen National Fund for Family Allowances, Mr Abbat developed a school of home economics in our town, few of which exist elsewhere in communities of our size. Large-sized, well-lit classrooms and a teaching kitchen allow young women from Le Trait and the surrounding region (students came from Duclair, Jumièges, La Mailleraye and Caudebec-en-Caux) to take classes not only in sewing, embroidery, housecleaning, drawing and childcare, but also in French, maths and typing. Pierre Abbat attended every celebration organised by the School.”647 Pierre Abbat symbolised the interconnection between ACSM and the town of Le Trait, and his personality was well liked. Even today, it is said that he knew each and every employee. The management

646 Some houses were constructed under the heading of war damage, for example a dozen or so built in 1952–1953. 647 “Obsèques de Monsieur Abbat,” Le Calfat du Trait, No. 33, October 1952.

style changed with his successor, Marcel Lamoureux and the new methods he introduced: staff considered the man to be more distant. Results of the exam for the Certificate of vocational aptitude at the ACSM school of home economics648 Year Students examined Students who passed 1952 9 7 1953 10 9 1954 14 11 1955 11 11 1956 11 7

Production grows The credo of Marcel Lamoureux: increase productivity Under the direction of Lamoureux, ACSM experienced its most spectacular growth, undoubtedly initiated by the efforts of Abbat. The order book was filled for a whole decade, and the workforce increased to nearly 2,000 workers. The 1950s were marked by a tremendous effort to improve productivity. With Le Trait having less space available than competitors, it was forced it to exploit every available square metre. It was known as one of the most modern shipyards, if not the most modern one in the region. When the shipyard closed for good and its workers had to seek work elsewhere (notably at the Ateliers et Chantiers du Havre), the men were surprised to find working conditions and methods that were far less advanced. For Lamoureux and his management team, the goal was to lower production costs so as to align them with those of ACSM’s competitors, at least its European competitors. Government measures and the change in its policy towards the sector pushed the shipyard irremediably in this direction. All departments were streamlined. For example, the workers in the carpentry shop, who in the past were craftsmen responsible for making an item from start to finish, became specialised, becoming tracers, machine operators, cabinetmakers or veneering specialists. Efforts were made to keep delivery dates, a key condition for winning further orders. Working overtime on Saturdays became commonplace. The fifty-hour week

648 Data drawn from Le Calfat du Trait (1952–1956).

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Launch of “Ville de Djibouti” on 17 September 1955: from left to right, Robert Labbé, Marcel Lamoureux, Viviane Clive, H. Worms daughter and Hypolite Worms.

was exceeded. Lamoureux watched over discipline scrupulously. Following his orders, workers clocked in on entering a workshop and not at the shipyard gate as before. The morning “snack” had to be eaten at the workplace so as not to interrupt work past the allotted time: “Certain workers have the habit of eating during the afternoon and stopping work at their convenience. This practice has to stop,” he told the Works Council.649 In 1958, he even shafted the “snack” break by fifteen minutes, with it now having to be taken between 8.35 and 8.45 a.m. Nothing was left to chance: for example, he had shoulder bags handed out to welders, not only to free their hands as they climbed ladders, but also so as not to waste time. Alcoholism was one possible consequence of this tightening of discipline, a way of alleviating the overly strict work regime which became increasingly pronounced, reflecting demands to boost productivity.650 The Director proposed creating a small but original department: the improvements office. Each ACSM worker was invited to make suggestions aimed at stepping up productivity or quality, or reducing consumption of raw materials, space or time. This led to the legal problem of intellectual property: who owned the invention? Management’s response? ACSM. In exchange, the worker received a bonus (600 F, 6,000 F, 13,500 F or 30,000 F, depending on

649 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 43, January 1955. 650 We would like to point out that the stories narrated by shipyard retirees contain a host of amusing anecdotes, as if the pressure at work was also resolved through jokes.

the impact of the contribution), and sometimes even a promotion. Time clocks made their first appearance, as recounted by André Chevalier, a worker taken on as a technician around 1948.651 In 1953, experts from the Société Continentale de Méthode et d’Analyse du Travail analysed the organisation of ACSM. Staff training was also mentioned. Older workers trained the new arrivals, while training sessions and “study days for work simplification techniques”652 were introduced. The entrance exam for the apprenticeship centre653 took place as always, but shipyard management was considering the possibility of delegating responsibility to the French National Education, and in particular to its Technical Training branch. At the start of the 1954 academic year, the school became a subsidiary of the centre in Barentin, which assumed responsibility for the 14-year-old apprentices on four-year apprenticeship contracts. The number of students in each year rose from 25 to 40 or so, and young apprentices without a contract could now receive a government grant. The entrance exam attracted 73 candidates from the Seine-Maritime in 1954. Be that as it may, according to some, the students seemed far less competent upon completion of the programme than at the time when an apprentice, benefiting from the “on-the-job” training received in a given organisation, could immediately be set to work. This measure constituted financial relief for ACSM,654 whose financial balance sheet remained profitable. This strategic choice was necessary, as Lamoureux repeatedly told staff representatives, because the coming years were set to be difficult – always this look to the future. Moreover, on account of the delivery delays caused by the shortage of steel, no bonus was distributed when the “Languedoc” was launched on 21 December 1953. Protesting against this decision, the workforce spontaneously held a demonstration during the launch (for SFTP) of the oil tanker on 21 December 1953. On the other hand, an end-of-year bonus was readily paid.

651 Account taken from the Le Trait Naval d’Hier in 2016. See Le Calfat du Trait, No. 37, July 1953. 652 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 37, July 1953 and No. 40, April 1954. 653 Apprenticeship centres started in 1941, created by the Vichy regime. 654 In 1954, expenditure on apprenticeships amounted to 12 million francs. See Le Calfat du Trait, No 44, May 1955.

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The Neuville neighbourhood in Le Trait, in the 1960s

The relaunch of housing construction The shipyard headcount reached 1,559 in January 1953, going up to 1,816 in December. This was further proof that business had boomed that year, driving the need to relaunch housing construction programmes. Backed by two 10-million F advances payments from two French public financial institutions, the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations and the Caisse d’Épargne, the mutual benefit society La Fraternelle, through the intermediary of its property credit section, was able to grant fourteen new loans. In 1955, fifteen additional loans were granted. As a barometer of ACSM growth, the number of new houses increased considerably: thirty or so were constructed in 1957, and forty were planned for 1960 and 1961. Each year, a dozen loans made it possible for workers to purchase housing in Le Trait or in the surrounding area. Companies were noticeably turning their backs on social programmes throughout France. Since the 1950s, ACSM itself had delegated a number of functions to the municipality.655 From that point onwards, the expansion of housing and its overriding policy had to be done in concert with the local authorities. The new housing estates were altogether different from the houses in the workers’ housing estate, deviating from the original urban planning agenda, at the risk of completely altering it. The housing development on the Rue du Chevalier Borda featured 60 houses, while that of the Archimède neighbourhood provided for 115

655 B. Maheut, Histoire des chantiers du Trait, op. cit.

apartments. A further 150 new homes were developed as low-income housing.656 The shipyard attracted staff from Yvetot, Barentin, Pavilly, Duclair, La Mailleraye, Yainville, Caudebec-en-Caux, among others.657 Eleven coaches transported 80 employees each from the surrounding areas, meaning that nearly half the workforce came from outside Le Trait.658 ACSM introduced an additional ferry to bring in staff from La Mailleraye. Observing population movements in the Seine Valley revealed one aspect of daily life in the mid-20th century: while many men from the area commuted to Le Trait, women commuted in the other direction, leaving Le Trait for Barentin and Pavilly to work in the textile mills. Very few women were employed as blue-collar workers in the shipyards,659 though many worked as whitecollar employees in the ACSM offices. Thus, while the men worked for ACSM benefited from the social works offered by the company, the women earned their living in the working world, for example at Badin, the emblematic textile mill in Barentin.660

656 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 50, March 1957. 657 B. Maheut, op. cit. 658 Account from the association, Le Trait Naval d’Hier and Le Calfat du Trait, No. 53, July 1958. 659 In 1970s at the Ateliers et Chantiers du Havre, a female welder surprised the men with the quality of her work. (According to an account gathered by Le Trait Naval d’Hier). 660 J. Souday, “Du paternalisme à la culture d’entreprise : l’exemple des Établissements Badin et fils de Barentin de 1941 à 1987,” Mémoires de la protection sociale en Normandie, No. 10, 2011/2012.

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Bonuses and gratuities During the first half of 1954, a strike broke out among tracers, who were demanding wage increases. A bonus was then scheduled upon delivery of the oil tanker “Atlantic Lady” to Atlantic Oil Carriers, part of the Livanos group (launched on 5 May 1954). A year-end bonus was distributed (one portion prior to the July vacation break; the other afterwards, as was normal); yet the bonus was lower than in 1953, as 1954 results were not as good as in the previous year: other than “Atlantic Lady,” only two sea barges were completed (“Criquet” and “Fourmi” launched on 3 June and 6 July), both for the French Navy. The building of these two ships was financed by the United States (contract of 28 May 1952); the order was sent by dispatch of 29 September 1952. These units were transferred to France, the first on 24 March 1955 and the second on 24 June 1955. In 1953, total bonuses amounted to 32,600,000 F, while at the same time 17,500,000 F were paid as dividends. Seen on an individual basis, this represented an 11,250 F per person on top of wages in 1953, versus 11,000 F in 1954.661 Workers’ remuneration was thus made up of wages, year-end bonuses, delivery bonuses and incentives (from 10 F to 15 F per hour).

1953 1952

Workers’ bonuses 32,600,000 F 21,000,000 F

of them involving cyclists on their way to work (3,103 cases reported in 1948, versus 8,109 in 1953). This all reinforced the impression that business was booming. Renewal of the workforce and productivity gains Around 1955, many ACSM pioneers retired (some left at 60, well ahead of the statutory retirement age of 65); among them were many managers returning to their region of origin (Vince and Rialland returned to the Nantes region), lending credence to the sense of uprooting felt around 1920. These men had worked 30 to 40 years at the shipyard.663 The end of their employment did not always mean that they no longer worked for the benefit of the company, as was the case with the Engineer Rialland who oversaw, in Nantes the construction of the machines to be fitted in ACSM ships. Though rare, transfers between the Worms & Cie subsidiaries did occur: one could work for the one or the other. For instance, Rialland worked as project coordinator for the SFTP. Another example was that of the woman who worked in the management of the shipping division in Paris and Le Havre, and who recommended her sons to the SFTP and banking division.664 The renewal of the workforce helped in gaining acceptance for the new work methods. Was it possibly one of the reasons

Dividends 17,500,000 F 6,000,000 F

Health & safety measures continued to be rolled out. Wearing a helmet was mandatory for workers working on onboard assembly, painting, scaffolding, riveting and piping; then for men engaged in fitting-out, rigging, onboard electrical work, carpentry, ironwork, tracing and assembly and boilermaking. Safety checks were conducted on scaffolding because staff were modifying the structure.662 A spotlight was also put on commuting accidents, which were constantly on the rise, with half

661 According to testimonies, in 1949, a worker received 237,000 F for 52 hours of work per week, or an average of 103 F per hour. In 1961, a junior draughtsman received 594 New Francs, on a 47-hour basis. 662 Some retirees interviewed in 2015 reported that the heaviest worker in the shipyard was used to test the stability of the scaffolding. If it held, then all shipyard workers were permitted to work on it.

On the right, the oil tanker “Languedoc” (SFTP) in slip No. 2, ready for launch; and on the left, in slip No. 1, the oil tanker “Atlantic Lady” (Atlantic Oil Carriers)

663 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 53, July 1958. 664 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 49, December 1956.

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for the increase in productivity? Equipment was also modernised. 1949: an air suction system; 1951: a fiveplate electric press and electric sanders; 1953: complete modernisation programme; 1954: purchase of overhead cranes and machine tools; 1955: space optimisation, and regrouping of the mechanical workshops; 1956: alternating current replaces direct current on board ships; 1958: new fitting-out quay; 1959: Wanson heating systems installed on board ships under construction, bringing temperatures up to 14oC; 1960: installation of a steel sheet shot blasting machine and modifications to tracing methods. The fitting-out quay was a sizeable development and investment. Installed on 19 April 1958, it enabled completion of the oil tanker “Port-Vendres,” whose keel had been laid on 22 May 1957, intended for the company Soflumar.665 The loan report of 11 June 1957 stated that “the medium-term loan requested would be used to finance the construction of a fitting-out quay on the Seine (cost estimated at 420 million francs) where ships could be moored after their launch. This would result in sizeable savings, as they would no longer have to be towed to Rouen or Le Havre. In addition, the company could now undertake repair work.”666

665 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 53, July 1958. It publishes a detailed description of the new fitting-out quay. 666 See wormsetcie.com. ACSM memo of 19 May 1959, on the long-term, amortizable loan from Crédit National of 205 million francs, granted on 12 September 1957: it was paid first in four equal instalments of 5 million francs on 30 June of each of the years 1959 to 1962, inclusive; and second in ten equal payments of 18.5 million francs on 30 June of each of the years 1963 to 1972, inclusive. On 30 September 1958, the outstanding balance to be reimbursed was 205 F million. These two latter credits were obtained as partial financing to construct and equip the fitting-out quay on the Seine, “allowing the vessels to moor in complete safety after being launched and offering substantial savings, since they will not have to be towed to Rouen or Le Havre. Moreover, the goal is to considerably reduce the amount of time the slipways are occupied, thus increasing their flexibility of use and, to a certain degree, their throughput, notably as a result of the increased productivity of the trades engaged in finishing work.” Moreover, the company could undertake repair assignments (work estimated at 420 million; but where costs rose to 500 million. Duration of construction: 10–12 months. Financing would be assured by: 70 million from the company’s working capital and profits; 205 million as a long-term loan examined at the same time; 145 million as a medium-term loan). See also 11 June 1957 – loan report (on the borrowing company).

1956: the technical and commercial partnership with the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM) As we have seen, changes took place nearly every year, in response to the pressure and direction imposed by increasingly strong worldwide competition. While ACSM made spectacular gains in its productivity and boosted its workforce, in order to survive, its management decided to seek the support of a partner. In 1956, closer ties were forged in a technical and commercial partnership with the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, based in La Seyne.667 The goal of the agreement was to “compete on an equal footing with established or newly formed groups.”668 Indeed, the 1950s were marked by mergers.669 Management hoped that this partnership would allow it to accept more orders. In its opinion, the two companies enjoyed complementary means of production. The FCM focused on building engine systems (which was not the case for ACSM),670 cruisers and escort vessels, as a result of its larger slipways, whereas ACSM was better suited for building submarines. This partnership was backed by a 175-million franc investment loan. The partnership was buoyed by changes in labour market rules, upsetting budgets. 1955 was punctuated by a strike, “work disruptions,” and “demands to be heard.”671 The reasons? Wage agreements were under preparation and were creating tensions. Terms were quite favourable to staff: daily working hours to be reduced from 10 hours to 9.5 hours; application to short-term workers;672 new terms for clocking in; payment of a uniform year-end bonus of 7,000 F; reduced working hours on Saturdays;

667 See www.wormsetcie.com. Memo of 9 June 1950 from Agence Économique et Financière. As a reminder, ACSM had participated in founding the Export Group of Steel Ships and Sea Equipment thus once again demonstrating their desire to create outlets for themselves. 668 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 48, August 1956. 669 See G. Noiriel, op. cit., p. 210, and J.-C. Asselain, op. cit. 670 www.wormsetcie.com. Report of 10 December 1963: “Regarding the reconversion plan, ACSM, which does not build engines, as it is especially well suited to work primarily with sheet metal, first sought to develop boiler manufacturing activities. […] Note also that its expenses for supplies are relatively larger than for other shipyards, since the company must buy the engines, when the shipowners do not provide them directly.” 671 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 45, July 1955. 672 The term in French refers to workers with short-term contracts.

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a decrease in overtime; the expansion of the canteen (due to the increased size of the workforce). The growth of ACSM led management to solve logistical problems: for instance, buses transporting workers were overcrowded and there were not enough changing rooms. Operating expenses increased as a result. Work is assured until 1958, but losses are foreseen These agreements pushed up costs by 700 million francs. Management feared that these costs could place the company in financial hardship. The 4.6% wage increase put pressures on cost prices and general expenses. In March 1956, the administration of Guy Mollet adopted a law providing for a third week of paid vacation. It was impossible to pass these increases in labour costs onto the sales prices of ships. Under these conditions, Lamoureux foresaw financial losses in 1955. The ACSM accountant confirmed his fears. The profit and loss statement revealed a loss of 63 million francs on com-

pleted orders, mitigated by “adjustments to prior fiscal years.”673 The final deficit was 49 million francs. Work continued: construction of three minesweepers for the French Navy (“Sagittaire”674 as well as “Croix du Sud” and “Étoile polaire” for which construction began on 17 December 1954 and 3 December 1955 respectively); one trawler (“Joseph Duhamel II” – keel laid on 10 August 1954 and launched on 23 May 1955); four oil tankers (“Pluviôse” – launched on 8 February 1955; “Atlantic Lady” – launched on 5 May 1954; “Stanvac Lirik” – keel laid on 21 May 1955 and launched on 4 December 1956 for Petroleum Shipping Co, Ltd.; “Presidente Jorge Montt” – launched on 14 January 1956); one diesel electric propulsion trawler (“Cap Fagnet” – keel laid on 13 January 1956, and launched

673 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 48, August 1956. 674 Placed in the slipway at the same time as the minesweeper “Orion” launched on 20 November 1953, “Sagittaire” was launched on 12 January 1955.

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Launch of the trawler “Joseph Duhamel II” on 23 May 1955 for the Pêcheries de Fécamp

Launch of the mixed cargo ship “Laurent Schiaffino” on 9 June 1956 for the Société Algérienne de Navigation, Charles Schiaffino & Cie

on 3 December 1956 for the Pêcheries de Fécamp); one submarine (“Morse” – keel laid on 27 December 1956); four mixed cargo ships (“Ville de Djibouti” – keel laid on 22 January 1954 and launched on 17 September 1955 for NCHP; “Laurent Schiaffino” – keel laid on 15 June 1955 and launched on 9 June 1956, for the Société Algérienne de Navigation Charles Schiaffino, as well as the “Ville de Rouen” and “Ville de Dunkerque,” for which construction started on 29 February 1956 and 7 June 1956 respectively; boilers and floating roofs; plus an order for an ore-bulk-oil carrier on behalf of the Compagnie

Générale d’Armements Maritimes675 (most likely the “Longwy”). Work was assured until 1958.676 But steel was still in very short supply and prices skyrocketed: twenty francs per kilogram more than the official price set by the European Coal and Steel Community. In addition, the oil transportation sector was changing. The industry giants – clients of the SFTP – were building integrated fleets, meaning that Shell as well as Mobil, BP and Fina no longer needed the SFTP. “The years 1955–1960,” recounted Henri Petit and JeanPierre Blavec in their book celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the SFTP, “represented a transition period for the shipping industry in general and especially for the SFTP, a period marked by the arrival of the first 50,000-dwt ‘super tankers.’ The race for ever-higher tonnage can be traced back to this era, culminating in vessels with 550,000-dwt at the end of the 1970s. Charterers demanded larger and faster ships than the 20,000-dwt vessels built up to that point.”677 The depth of the Seine ruled out any launch of such giant ships. The last SFTP order, placed on 8 March 1955, was for the 20,000-dwt “Artois,” construction on which started on 27 December 1956. It was launched on 7 December 1957. Despite these hurdles, the company managed to break even in 1956.678 In mid-1957, the accountant provided an assessment: earnings were high enough to cover prior losses and to break even, better reflecting the reality of the company’s finances. Management decided to increase the B wage rate by 10%, distributed a delivery bonus for the mixed cargo ship “Ville de Rouen” (launched on 13 May 1957 for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation) and maintained and even increased year-end bonuses. For good reason. Alongside the “Artois” and “Ville de Rouen,” the

675 Le Calfat du Trait states that it was a ship for the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, but the order has been transferred to the Compagnie Générale d’Armements Maritimes – CGAM. See M. Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, op. cit., 1993, p. 274. 676 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 48, August 1956. 677 H. Petit and J.-P. Blavec, 50 ans de la Société française de transports pétroliers (1938-1988), Marseilles: Éditions P. Tacussel, 1995, p. 113. 678 Two ships were launched in December 1956 – the first time in 30 years that two ships were launched in the same month. See Le Calfat du Trait, No. 49, December 1956.

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“Artois” and “Ville de Rouen” under construction

following vessels left their slipways: the minesweepers “Croix du Sud” (launched on 13 June 1956) and “Étoile polaire” (5 March 1957) for the French Navy; the “Ville de Dunkerque,” a freighter launched on 24 September 1957 and fitted out by the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire; the oil tanker “Port-Vendres,” launched on 19 April 1958 for Soflumar (Société d’Armement Fluvial et Maritime). To offset the decrease in working hours, management started restructuring, with more employees in the preparation offices than in previous years (in general, older workers who earned a better salary). Feeling that work was going well in 1957, Lamoureux and Roy decided to promise a bonus in June. The order book was still full in 1958, assuring work for the workers.

1959: Business slows down The end of the decade was overshadowed by clouds on the horizon. Other than the “Port-Vendres,” construction started on just two ships in 1957: the oil tanker “Kongsdal” on 11 December for the Norwegian shipping company Moltzau’s Tankrederi, and the mixed cargo ship “Ville de Nantes” on 6 November 1957 for NCHP – and just three in 1958: on 23 April, the oil tanker “Caltex Strasbourg” for the Société Outremer de Navigation Pétrolière; on 5 May, a ship caisson ordered by the Naval Constructions Directorate for the Homet dry dock in Cherbourg and on 5 September, the orebulk-oil carrier “Longwy” for the Compagnie Générale d’Armements Maritimes.679

679 “Kongsdal” was launched on 30 August 1958; “Ville de Nantes” on 26 February 1959; “Caltex Strasbourg” on 22 June 1959; the ship caisson on 3 July 1959; and “Longwy” on 3 November 1959 (see hereinafter).

311

Launch of the 14,290-dwt oil tanker “Port-Vendres” on 19 April 1958 for the Société d’Armement Fluvial et Maritime – Soflumar

312

Assembling prefabricated sections in the slip No. 2 of the 20,100-dwt oil tanker “Kongsdal” launched on 30 August 1958 for the Norwegian shipowner A/S Moltzau’s Tankrederi – Moltzau & Christensen

313

In 1958, the French economy nose-dived:680 the budget deficit worsened because of the Algerian War, growth slowed, government debt increased and the franc was devalued.681 The company’s finances were not in good shape, with losses amounting to 7,660,000 F the following year.682 Orders were put on hold, and one was cancelled. Demand slumped, and government aid to shipowners was to be interrupted. Turnover (1955–1958)683 Fiscal year 1955–1956

4,226 million francs

Fiscal year 1956–1957

6,698 million francs

Fiscal year 1957–1958

5,592 million francs

Headcount (1956–1958) January 1956

Construction of the submarine “Morse” in the slip No. 6 (covered at the request of the French Navy) and launched on 11 December 1958

2,019

January 1957

2,014

January 1958

2,112

January 1959

1,973

Management sought orders in related fields, beefing up its floating roof manufacturing department and acquiring a “Foster Wheeler”684 license. It also focused on projects associated with the oil industry, for example for the company Sopeg in the Sahara or for the Argentinian company YPF.685 Overtime went down. Despite the accumulation of alarming signs, bonuses were still paid. A labourer, for example, received a yearend bonus of 12,500 F in 1958, as well as 3,500 F paid

680 D. Woronoff, Histoire de l’industrie en France du XVIe siècle à nos jours, Paris: Le Seuil, 1994, p. 535. 681 See M. Niveau and Y. Crozet, Histoire des faits économiques contemporains, Paris: PUF, 2012 (1st ed, 1966), p. 534. 682 www.wormsetcie.com. ACSM Balance sheet, 1959– 1963. 683 The following two tables show data listed in the memo of 19 May 1959. 684 See Wikipedia: Foster Wheeler was formed in 1927 from a merger between a power company (created by the Foster family) and the Wheeler Condenser & Engineering Company, which at the start of the 20th century, was a large construction company of boilers and refinery equipment. Amec Foster Wheeler has since become an international organisation that includes an engineering company and an equipment manufacturing company. 685 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 55, February 1959.

on delivery to the Navy of the submarine “Morse” (launched on 11 December 1958). But there were real concerns. An unemployment fund was created. The company tried to show the government how important it was not to abandon this vital sector. Miners, metalworkers and railway workers were the key figures in the working world at that time. Steelworkers were celebrated in the press and cinemas, because theirs was a fascinating trade. Like steelworkers, shipyard workers – because they played an important role in upholding the prestige of the country, because they “contributed to the defence of national interests” – were featured regularly on the front pages of newspapers during everspectacular ship launches. These were clearly the stars of the region’s workforce, even eclipsing those of Standard Oil who took second place in Le Trait. In the minds of some at ACSM, the town and the company were synonymous.686 Each technological ‘first,’ like the oceanographic research vessel “Président Théodore Tissier” in 1933, was an event attended by the population of the entire district. Some remember seeing the Le Trait shoreline – a great place to watch a ship being launched – absolutely full of people. Le Calfat supported the need to support ship-

686 For example, the children of Standard Oil workers could have missed out on seeing the Christmas tree decorated by ACSM during the 1940s and 1950s. Brétéché had to intervene to have them invited. Other anecdotes mentioned excluding “those from Standard” from social life in Le Trait.

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building, highlighting that the government had everything to gain: “Withdrawal of the State Aid Law would lead to our French shipping companies placing their orders abroad, causing a drain on currency.”687 Since the end of war, the government had been dictating the pace of economic growth in an effort to modernise the country. The Third Plan (1958–1961) intended to prepare France for the Common Market by encouraging economic players to put their focus on competitiveness. Faced with uncertainties about the future, no investment programme at ACSM was adopted at the end of 1958. Between 1952 and 1959, the shipyard shifted its activities to focus on constructing methane carriers and ore carriers. Yet, many threats darkened the horizon: the increase in labour costs; international tensions hitting shipping, particularly the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the uncertainties of the Cold War; and above all the conclusions of a report compiled for the government by the Merveilleux du Vignaux Commission on shipbuilding capacities, which was published as a White

687 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 56, April 1959.

Paper.688 The prospective report foresaw a reduction in the number of shipyards. Victims of the recommended cuts were workers in the shipyards of Port-de-Bouc, ACSM and its partner, the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée. The sentence had been handed down: certain shipyards were given a deadline to convert to other industries, for example metalworking. State aid would be provided to ensure the re-employment for the workers. The companies listed for closure had until 1961 to do so.

688 “A white paper is an authoritative report or guide that informs readers concisely about a complex issue and presents the issuing body’s philosophy on the matter. It is meant to help readers understand an issue, solve a problem, or make a decision.” Source: Wikipedia (English version).

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3 November 1959: launch of the “Longwy” fitted out by the Compagnie Générale d’Armements Maritimes largest ship constructed in Le Trait at that time, and first ore-bulk-oil carrier to sail under the French flag Specifications Length overall

186.20 metres

Width

23.40 metres

Height

9.17 metres (14) metres

Gross tonnage Deadweight Fully loaded

18,047 tons 21,250 tons 29,000 tons

Propulsion

1 8-cylinder 10,760-HP Sulzer diesel engine

Speed

14,5 knots

First ship entirely prefabricated and welded in the workshop

316

December 1959: the White Paper on Shipbuilding recommends a cut in the number of shipyards The initial purpose of the White Paper was to “enlighten the government on the volume of budget loans committed to assisting shipbuilding as of the 1960 budget.” Jean Domenichino maintained that the Merveilleux du Vignaux Commission “felt that the scope of its role also included tackling the problem of ‘adapting the production capacity of the French shipbuilding industry to the foreseeable needs of the national economy.’” Although initially a secondary consideration, this question quickly took centre stage, because, as the authors noted, it exposed “the real problem: that of restructuring shipbuilding […]. The Commission’s conclusions were subsequently examined during two limited Ministry Council meetings held on 12 June and 30 July 1959, then studied in greater depth by an inter-ministerial working group which published its findings on 3 November of that same year. In the meantime, the Ministry for Transport communicated its initial reaction to the Chamber of Shipbuilders (5 August) and personally and separately received all shipyard heads from 1 to 15 September.”689 The conclusions contained in the White Paper led to an analysis of the shipbuilding market and an assessment of its evolution. Oil traffic had increased over the period 1951–1957690 from 250 million to 450 million tons, which should have made it possible to focus on the construction of oil tankers. However, this activity was subject to international tensions and diplomatic vagaries (the Algerian War between 1954 and 1962 and the Suez crisis in 1956 were just two examples) which led to higher transport costs and disruptions to shipping lines. Moreover, commercial aviation was increasingly competing with passenger liners. How necessary was it to maintain production overcapacity?

689 J. Domenichino, “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière; les Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence de Port-de-Bouc (1950-1965),” Le mouvement social, Éditions Ouvrières, No. 156, July–September, 1991, pp. 45–73. 690 P. Léonard, “Les fluctuations cycliques dans les transports maritimes,” Revue économique, vol. 11, No. 1, 1960, p. 30.

Experts were consulted: “Construction costs are the subject of international quotations, reflecting the high degree of market freedom; moreover, at any moment it is possible to know, with relative precision for a current ship, the price that any builder will demand.”691 Costs went down between 1951 and 1954, but rose again until 1956, then started to drop in 1957. The scale of this oscillation was “nearly as exceptional as that of freight itself.”692 Common sense and calculations led to the conclusion: “The increase in the cost of ships has quickly lowered shipping companies’ incentive to invest. A review of shipyard order books reveals that shipyard orders come in waves. The elasticity of their production does not allow them to weather such oscillations in orders, which from one year to the next, may vary by a ratio of 1:10. Although shipyard production since the end of the war has an average doubled every six years, the companies cannot cushion such fluctuations by adjusting the volume of their supply […]. Under these conditions, such demand increases will inevitably worsen contract terms to the detriment of clients (price increases, longer delivery times, reduction in loan percentages, clients having to assume the risk of production costs rising during construction).”693 The major shipbuilding nations all took stock in 1959– 1960. Great Britain, Japan, the United States and Italy all published studies, all coming to the same conclusions: the experts noted a rapid increase in the production of merchant vessels, with a parallel saturation of demand. Construction techniques were improving, allowing ships to be built faster, and more and more shipyards were being built. Technological innovations prompted by the Second World War had caused production rates to accelerate after the war and up to the late 1950s, but demand had not kept pace. With shipping markets deemed uncertain, simultaneously maintaining too many shipyards over the long run through government aid was seen as incurring the risk of sudden and very high unemployment.694

691 Ibid. 692 Ibid. 693 P. Léonard demonstrated very well the cyclical nature of shipbuilding contracts. 694 P. Léonard, “Les fluctuations cycliques dans les transports maritimes,” op. cit., and “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” Revue économique, vol. 12, No. 4, 1961.

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Order book for shipyards worldwide since 1948 (all types of vessels – expressed in gross tonnage):695 Years 1948 1949 January July 1950 January July 1951 January July 1952 January July 1953 January July 1954 January July 1955 January July 1956 January July 1957 January July 1958 January July 1959 January July

Absolute values

In this context, ways to reconvert ACSM had been studied for several months, assured Lamoureux in 1960. The necessary career changes affected – or were expected to affect – approximately one-third of the workforce. However, at the same time, orders guaranteed work for several years. Overtime started to rise again, and workers even worked night shifts. The work pace remained intense up into the 1960s, especially since management tried to limit hiring. Thus, and in spite of everything, Lamoureux “continued to think positively about the future of ACSM” – as he confided to members of the Board of Directors –, “thanks to the efforts made in productivity and restructuring” and to the “well-filled” order book.696 In 1959–1960, ACSM worked for Mobil Oil in Notre-Dame de Gravenchon and for Esso in Gonfreville-l’Orcher to manufacture floating roofs, thereby playing for time. Management decided on its umpteenth investment programme, the goal of which, naturally, was to lower production costs, improve facilities and the use of space – a true reconfiguration was underway (installation of sheet metal shot blasting, new tracing methods, the concentration of finishing workshops) – but also to re-orient production with an eye to conversion. Market studies were carried out. A boilermaking school was set up, the teachers of which were former shipyard workers. ACSM was shifting its focus towards metalworking. After having promoted a sense of rootedness, mobility was now being encouraged little by little,697 causing, gradually at first, incomprehension in Le Trait, then a revolt set to peak in the late 1960s.

Differences

9,204,187 8,023,342 7,525,644

- 1,180,845 - 497,698

6,760,528 6,814,411

- 765,116 + 538,883

7,894,478 11,739,263

+ 1,080,067 + 3,844,785

14,274,591 15,858,472

+ 2,535,328 + 1,583,881

15,629,780 14,437,239

- 228,692 - 1,192,541

13,052,574 11,875,317

- 1,384,665 - 1,177,257

11,249,398 12,596,534

- 623,919 + 1,347,136

17,820,545 21,612,409

+ 5,224,011 + 3,791,864

29,248,256 35,061,879

+ 7,635,847 + 5,813,623

34,511,214 31,240,368

- 550,665 - 3,270,846

27,295,119 24,855,731

- 3,915,249 - 2,439,388

695 Data drawn from P. Léonard, “Les fluctuations cycliques dans les transports maritimes,” op. cit.

696 Le Calfat du Trait, No. 58, May 1960. H. Worms paid a special bonus to his employees on the fiftieth anniversary of his title as General Partner of Worms & Cie. 697 G. Noiriel, op. cit., p. 223.

318

Launch of the self-unloading bulk carrier “Gypsum Countess” on 5 August 1960 for Panama Gypsum Co., Inc.

319

1960–1972 From bad to worse – the ﬁnal chapter for ACSM

320

“If the shipping industry is experiencing difficulties, shipbuilding is suffering a tragedy” Christian Bonnet, Journal officiel, débats parlementaires, 19 November 1959

ACSM had gone through critical periods (the 1930s, the Second World War) since its establishment, but the extent of the looming crisis was unprecedented. Although the company was still making profits in 1959, the White Paper published in December of that year left it with little hope: Le Trait was evidently not going to be among the four or five shipyards (of the fourteen operating in France) “named by the Merveilleux du Vignaux Commission to form ‘the powerful and economically sound backbone of French shipbuilding.’”698

The unprecedented boom of the 1950s Between 1950 and 1960, shipbuilding went through an unprecedented boom: worldwide production grew by 139%, with gross tonnage climbing from 3,489,000 to 8,359,000 tons and its annual growth rate reaching 12.3%. In France, 443,000 gross tons were launched in 1958 while 217,000 tons of new ships were produced in 1951. This boom can be traced back to a combination of several factors. ► More efficient production techniques Technological innovations – oxy-cutting of steel plates, prefabrication of a ship’s various sections in workshops, welding instead of riveting – shortened the occupancy time of slipways and helped rationalise

µ The Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat: launch of the oil tanker “Béarn” on 23 April 1960, for the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers (SFTP)

698 Report issued by the Merveilleux du Vignaux Commission, Chief Counsellor at the Court of Auditors, p. 5, quoted by Jean Domenichino, in “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière; les Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence de Port-de-Bouc (1950–1965),” in Le mouvement social : bulletin trimestriel de l’Institut français d’histoire sociale, No. 156, July–September 1991, Éditions Ouvrières, p. 56.

methods and construction processes;699 this rationalisation, particularly in the best-equipped yards, spurred the shift from custom-built vessels to standard ships produced in series.700 Another notable transformation was the construction of vessels capable of carrying increasingly heavy loads. The average unit tonnage for oil tankers doubled between 1945 (16,000 dwt)701 and 1960 (30,000 dwt). When the Suez Canal closed during the first Suez Crisis (October 1956 to March 1957), this trend intensified: freed from the constraints on the ship’s draught imposed by the Canal, builders increased the deadweight of oil tankers and other ore-bulk carriers to satisfy the demands of shipping companies keen to offset the additional costs caused by the obligation imposed to ships to sail round Africa via the Cape of Good Hope. Increased transport capacity led to savings in financing (the higher the ship’s tonnage, the lower the investment cost in relation to deadweight tonnage), in payroll (a 30,000-ton ship required fewer crew members than two 15,000-ton ships), fuel consumption, duties and taxes, etc.

699 See Pierre Léonard, “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” in Revue économique, vol. 12, No. 4, 1961, p. 568: “By way of example, in just six years a French shipyard, through the use of prefabrication and a systematic policy of series production, has managed to reduce the time needed to construct the metal hull of an average-sized freighter from 110 to 60–65 hours per ton, or a saving of over 40% for a series-produced ship. Between the first ship and the fifth, the impact alone of series production makes it possible to save, for the entire freighter, 20% of shipyard hours, [item] corresponding to approximately one-third of the vessel’s production cost. At the end of the day, shipyards will be producing more and larger ships using fewer slipways, with less and less shipyard work per unit of gross tonnage.” 700 Ibid. Pierre Léonard emphasised that standardisation was suitable for certain classes of ships: oil tankers and bulk carriers. 701 Deadweight tonnage (dwt): the maximum load that a ship is able to transport.

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In “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” Pierre Léonard stated that “between 16,000 dwt and 30,000 dwt […] the cost to transport one ton of crude oil from the Middle East to the English Channel [is] reduced by one quarter.” This same search for productivity prompted an increase in the speed of passenger liners and line freighters (20 knots in 1960 versus 10 knots in 1945, with average tonnage transported increasing from 4,650 gt702 in 1950 to 7,400 gt in 1960). ► More and more shipyards and an increasingly competitive world market World supply was marked by the rise of Japan to become the world’s leading shipbuilding nation in 1956 (its 24 main shipyards produced 1,340,000 tons in 1960–1961); and by the market entry of a new generation of builders (Spain, Poland, Yugoslavia), followed by several emerging countries (Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ireland, Israel).703 This surge in production capacity occurred at the expense of Great Britain (16% of world production in 1960, versus 38% in 1950, and 51% in 1930). It also affected the six other members of the European Free Trade Association704 as well as the six members of the European Economic Community,705 which, despite an increase in their respective production (production in EFTA countries more than doubled and that of the EEC quadrupled between 1950 and 1960) declined. In 1950, these thirteen countries accounted for 74.1% or 2,586,000 gross tonnage of worldwide production; in 1960, the 5,276,000 gross tonnage launched by their

shipyards accounted for no more than 63% of the total. Other countries now produced 37% (3,800,000 tons out of a total of 8,356,000 tons in 1960).706 ► Exceptional growth in trade Backed by “the surge of industrial production worldwide and the exceptional growth of trade”707 (the amount of freight transported doubled in ten to eleven years), maritime transport posted a growth rate of around 7%, while the tonnage of the world fleet increased by 4 to 4.5% on average per year. “The share carried under the French flag also increased,” wrote Bernard Cassagnou in Les mutations de la marine marchande française de 1945 à nos jours. “French imports carried by French vessels surged from 40% in 1938 to 58% in 1955 and to 68% in 1960. […] As regarded French exports, the share moved from 55% in 1938, to 47% in 1953 and 58% in 1960. At the time, these percentages were higher than those of Great Britain, West Germany and Italy.” These growth phases alternated with sharp downturns on shipping markets (cyclical by nature). For example, 1952–1954 and 1957–1961 were marked by decreases, while the Korean War (June 1950 to July 1953) and the Suez Crisis threw international trade into a panic, causing demand for transport to explode: the former, to develop safety stocks of raw materials; and the latter, to compensate for the extended sailing times caused by the Canal’s closure. 15 million gross tons were on order at the end of 1951, against 7 million at the end of 1950 – and 30 million in 1956–1957, or one-third of the world fleet.708

702 Gross tonnage or gross registered tonnage (grt): total inner capacity of a ship. 703 See Pierre Léonard, op. cit., p. 572: “Typically, developing countries are benefiting from the depressed state of shipping markets not only to build up merchant fleets under relatively cheap conditions, but also to get the shipbuilders, with whom they have placed their orders, to set up shipbuilding companies in their countries. To fill their threatened order books, many large shipyards, by providing technical and financial support, have readily contributed to setting the conditions for a future increase in market competition.” 704 The EFTA was established by the Convention of 4 January 1960 between Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 705 The EEC covered France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy, signatories to the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957.

706 In 1950, these countries’ share was 26%, with 903,000 gt, out of a total of 3,489,000 gt; in 1930, their share was 16.5%, with 477,000 gt out of a total of 2,889,000 gt. 707 Bernard Cassagnou, “Les mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995)”,ˮ Recherches contemporaines, No. 6, 2000–2001, p. 38. 708 See Pierre Léonard, “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?”ˮ, op. cit., and Bernard Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (19451995), vol. 1, IGPDE – Comité pour l’Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 2002.

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► State incentives: the case of France More or less in line with the majority of producing countries,709 French shipbuilding had benefited from subsidies ever since the adoption of the Defferre Law710 of 24 May 1951. This post-war legislation sought to encourage shipping companies to place their orders in France, thereby neutralising French shipyards’ lack of competitiveness (due to the burdens of the French tax system, customs protection, the rationing of materials, etc.) on the international market and compensating for the (fluctuating) gaps between their production costs and the prices offered abroad (20–30% lower in England, for example). In return for this financial aid, builders undertook to enhance their productivity and participate to the fullest possible extent in the effort to reconstruct the Merchant Navy. The goals of this policy were to: - stabilise the balance of payments by avoiding a flight of capital spent on purchasing or (above all) chartering ships abroad;711 - stimulate foreign trade by encouraging the export of a portion of production; this export drive also benefited from the devaluations of the franc in August 1957 and December 1958;712 - safeguard the safety of the country’s supplies, and thus, its independence;

709 For example, in Italy, the Tambroni Law of 17 July 1954, offset “the inferiorities of the regulatory system (fiscal and customs) for the Italian shipbuilding” by keeping on “unemployed workers in the company, even if this meant receiving government funds to pay for this particular subjection (system of the disoccupati)” – Ref. Pierre Léonard, op. cit. 710 Gaston Defferre, Minister for the Merchant Navy (12 July 1950–11 August 1951). The Law of 24 May 1951 was revoked in 2001 on the order of the European Commission. 711 In fact, even subsidised, shipbuilding created value: a ship was used for 20 years on average, and even at a high price, it was always more cost-effective to purchase than to charter. Cf. B. Cassagnou, in Recherches contemporaines, op. cit.: “In 1952, the Merchant Navy is still using 1.5 million gross tons of ships chartered abroad. This is one reason why shipping is a main contributor (200 million dollars) to the balance of payments deficit totalling 1,060 million. The shipping industry – i.e. the sum total of all shipping companies – plays a key role in the French economy, with its turnover reaching 261 billion old francs [equivalent to 4.2 billion Euros in 2016] in 1959. The industry employs 60,000 seafaring and sedentary staff and accounts for 4% of world tonnage.” Total = 130 million grt in 1960. 712 The franc was devalued by 20% in 1957 and by 17.55% in 1958. The “heavy franc” came into effect on 1 January 1960.

- protect employment in areas or regions where shipbuilding was the only – or almost the only – economic activity (as was the case with eleven of France’s fourteen main shipyards),713 and in the companies which, little integrated into diversified groups,714 were unable to offer their workforces redeployment opportunities.

“Beyond the needs of the national and international market”715 – market saturation and the collapse of demand Although intimately bound to one another, shipping companies and shipbuilders nevertheless had differing interests (the one sought to buy at the lowest price what the other sought to sell at the highest price), especially as they were part of discordant economic cycles. In an increasingly uncertain economic climate, the lag between the circumstances (most often exacerbated by international tensions) under which orders were placed, the time required to build a ship and the context in which it was delivered (as shipping market circumstances have changed) was one reason for market saturation: for example, the surge in ships ordered during the Suez Crisis but delivered long after the turmoil had subsided flooded the market and led to a drop in demand, a decline in freight rates and massive decommissioning. Beyond this hiatus aggravated by the worldwide economic slowdown in 1958 and 1959, the dynamism of the shipbuilding industry itself was at issue. “The balance,” wrote Pierre Léonard in 1961, “between the rapidly growing supply of new ships [nearing 10% per year] and the equally growing – albeit to a lesser extent [it varied between 6.5% and 8.5% per year] – demand no longer existed.”716 Worldwide merchant tonnage hovered

713 Pierre Léonard, “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” op. cit., pp. 585–586. “Of the fourteen main French shipyards, eleven were located in cities with no other dominant industrial activity or in weakly developed regions: Le Havre (two companies), Le Trait, Saint-Nazaire, Nantes (three companies), La Pallice, Bordeaux, La Ciotat, Toulon. The exceptions to this rule were the shipyards of Dunkerque, Rouen and Marseilles.” 714 Ibid., p. 592: The shipyard in Le Trait belonged to the Worms group (shipping), while the Bordeaux shipyard belonged to the Schneider group (metallurgical industry). 715 Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit., pp. 54–55. 716 Pierre Léonard, op. cit.

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around 110 million tons,717 while maximum shipbuilding capacity was 11 million tons per year. This meant that the shipyards were capable of replacing every ton in service within ten years. Yet, ships were operated for twenty years on average, and the fleet doubled every seventeen years. This distortion reduced to nothing 15–35% of production, “or 1.7 to 3.9 million grt, a gap that could only increase over the medium term, in the absence of a political crisis generating exceptional and unforeseeable demand.”718 The collapse of demand also stemmed from technical innovations and the “race for high tonnage” unleashed by technical progress. While still far from the supertankers displacing several hundreds of thousands of tons (such as the 555,000-dwt “Prairial” capable of transporting 667,380-m3 of crude oil), the trend started in the 1950s was proving irreversible: the commissioning of the first 50,000-dwt oil tankers whetted the appetite of shipping companies, with mid-tonnage ships being gradually supplanted by these “giants of the seas.” In the same vein, large bulk carriers of 30,000 or more deadweight tonnage increasingly made inroads.719 Allowing a reduction in the number of vessels needed, the cost-effectiveness of these ships resulted in the growth rate of the merchant fleet (approximately 3.5% per year) falling behind that of seaborne trade, causing orders for new vessels to dwindle. “For this reason,” noted Pierre Léonard, “while world traffic in dry goods increased by 42% between 1951 and 1957, the corresponding fleet in service only grew by 22%.” Competition from rail (proven effective in the transport of goods) and civil aviation (emerging in the transport of passengers) also influenced shipbuilding insofar as it increasingly put pressure on maneuver margins (above all on freight rates) and growth potential of shipping companies. For example, the passenger liner “France,” “the jewel of French shipbuilding and shipping built with public money,” was already doomed on decommissioning in 1962 by the “entry of the Boeing 707–120 B into the transatlantic passenger market, and

717 Bernard Cassagnou, in Recherches contemporaines, op. cit., reported (p. 29) that on 1 January 1962, the French fleet totalled 4.8 million grt: passenger ships: 12%; freighters: 43.5% and oil tankers: 44.5%. 718 Pierre Léonard, op. cit., p. 581. 719 Their introduction went hand in hand with the construction of major international port complexes, linked by sea to the production centres of raw materials.

the advent of mass air transit.”720 These problems were compounded in France by: ► The adverse effects of State aid “The subsidies received under the Law of 1951,” wrote Jean Domenichino, “did not all lead to the intended results. Designed to promote a certain conversion of shipyard activity in the long term, they achieved the opposite, causing an increase in shipbuilding capacity and reflecting the classic phenomenon whereby any product benefiting from State aid is favoured by the producers.”721 The paradox here was that “the more the shipyards produced, the dearer they became” for public finances. Unable to rival international prices, French shipyards failed to prevent shipping companies placing orders elsewhere in the world or to develop a foreign clientele. ► Decolonisation and its impact on the French flag Between 1956 and 1960, twenty-two African countries were granted independence; seventeen722 were former French colonies or protectorates (Madagascar). However shipping services with these territories were the monopoly of the French fleet. “Sheltered from foreign competition, French shipping companies, both large or small, defend[ed] valuable – even marginal – market shares in a private and protected area, which assure[d] the viability of their activities.”723

720 Bernard Jardin, Un demi-siècle de pavillon français (1960-2010), June 2011; on the website of the French Institute of the Sea. 721 Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit., p. 55. The following quote, by the same author, comes from La construction navale en Provence : essor et déclin d’une industrie, text posted on https://fresques.ina.fr. 722 Having joined Liberia (26 July 1847), South Africa (31 May 1910), Egypt (28 February 1922), and Libya (24 December 1951), were the following countries: in 1956, Sudan (1 January), Tunisia (20 March), Morocco (7 April); in 1957, Ghana (6 March); in 1958, Guinea (2 October); in 1960, Cameroon (1 January), Senegal (4 April), Togo (27 April), Madagascar (26 June), Democratic Republic of Congo (30 June), Somalia (1 July), Benin (1 August), Niger (3 August), Burkina Faso (5 August), Ivory Coast (7 August), Chad (11 August), Central African Republic (13 August), Congo (15 August), Gabon (17 August), Mali (22 September), Nigeria (1 October), Mauritania (28 November). 723 Antoine Frémont, “De la Compagnie générale transatlantique à la CMA-CGM,” in Revue d’histoire maritime - histoire maritime, outre-mer, relations internationales, La marine marchande française de 1850 à 2000, Pups, 2006.

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“In the years 1945–1962,” wrote Bernard Dujardin, “marked by the colonial conflicts at the end of the French empire, the French flag experienced an ephemeral apogee, climbing to fourth place in the world. Booked cargoes and military freight between French ports and those of its overseas colonies filled French ships’ holds. Decolonisation signalled the end for this monopoly. […] When André Malraux stated: ‘Every colony is born with a sign of death on its forehead,’ he might as well have said: ‘Every colonial flag is born with a sign of death on its forehead.’”724 Bernard Cassagnou provides the

724 Bernard Dujardin, “Le pavillon français, une compétitivité à conquérir,” L’Ena hors les murs, No. 428, 2013, pp. 31–32.

meaning of this expression: “Decolonisation forced French shipping companies to redeploy their fleets,”725 revealing their lack of competitiveness. “In 1961 […] the French Government became aware of the precarious means of the French fleet to fend off competition in the context created by the onset of the international shipping crisis in 1957 and the impact of French decolonisation on the use of ships. […] For shipping companies operating the lines to French overseas territories, this meant the collapse of de facto or de jure protections and consequently, under the new shipping relations established between these countries and France, the definition of new statutes, sometimes completely different. […] The new, independent governments could finally realise their ambitions to trade with countries other than France and to operate several ships under their national flags. […] In Algeria, French shipping experienced the scheduled end to its decadesold monopoly on seagoing traffic with France in 1961. ‘On top of this inevitable upheaval’726 came the prospect of increasing foreign competition when the Treaty of Rome came into effect in 1958. Its anti-protectionist clauses allowed the new Common Market countries not only to invest in African fleets, but also to divert shipments intended for France to Northern European ports.”727 ► The discovery of oil in Algeria The discovery of natural gas deposits in Algeria in 1954 (we shall return to this topic later) was followed by that of two oil fields in January and June 1956.728 The nationalisation of the Suez Canal, which threatened supplies of Middle Eastern oil to France, hastened the implementation of a proper infrastructure to exploit these resources. In 1960, Algerian crude oil accounted for more than 20% of liquid hydrocarbon imports into France and more than 32% in 1962.

725 Bernard Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995), vol. 1, op. cit. 726 Lucien Poirier, Économie maritime, course given at the ENSTA (French Graduate School of Engineering), 1977, p. 102, quoted by Bernard Cassagnou. 727 Bernard Cassagnou, op. cit. 728 Research and exploitation licences had been granted to four French companies: Société Nationale de Recherche et d’Exploitation des Pétroles en Algérie (SN Repal); Compagnie Française des Pétroles – Algérie (CFPA); Compagnie de Recherche et d’Exploitation Pétrolières au Sahara (Creps); and Compagnie des Pétroles d’Algérie (CPA).

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Aerial view – at the fitting-out quay, the tank-landing ship (LST) “Dives” launched on 28 June 1960; in slip No. 1 the self-unloading bulk carrier “Gypsum Countess” and in slip No. 2 the ore carrier “Penchâteau”

Saharan deposits, the strategic importance of which influenced the Algerian War of Independence (1954– 1962) – at least in its duration, had an impact on shipbuilding: as they were closer to France than those in the Persian Gulf, fewer tankers were needed to transport the extracted oil. “The experts at the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation,” wrote Pierre Léonard, “calculated that Europe’s supply of crude oil from North Africa instead of from the Middle East, for each 5-million-ton tranche, resulted in a savings in ships equal to 21 T2 oil tankers729 (considered as a unit of measure).”730 ► French Navy programmes entrusted solely to Navy arsenals In 1962, the government decided to entrust all French Navy shipbuilding to the Navy arsenals. This made a big gap in shipyard order books, since “traditionally 30 to 50% of new warships were dedicated to

729 Ship with deadweight tonnage of 16,500 tons and a speed of 15 knots. 730 Pierre Léonard, “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” op. cit., p. 574.

private shipyards.”731 This change doomed some of them to disappear (notably Augustin Normand, in 1964). The late 1950s and the ensuing years were marked by considerable overcapacities in the world shipbuilding market, which Great Britain and Japan estimated at one-third of their capacities.732 As for seagoing oil transport, “endogenous fluctuations of the market, independent of any specific catastrophic situation, resulted in surplus (decommissioned) tonnage in 1959 equal to 10% of the fleet in service.”733 The consequence: “Prices of new ships [in 1961] for the most current types of ship hovered in the area of 60% of 1957 prices.”734

731 See Rapport au Sénat sur la loi de finances 1962 – session du 14 novembre 1961. “The decision to create the Directorate General of Armaments in 1963 leads to defence being turned in on itself and military shipbuilding being reduced to arsenals alone,” cf. Alain Merckelbagh, Et si le littoral allait jusqu’à la mer : la politique du littoral sous la Ve République, Éditions Quæ, 2009. 732 See Pierre Léonard, op. cit., p. 583. 733 Ibid., p. 574. 734 Ibid., p. 587.

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And the report published by the Merveilleux du Vignaux Commission estimated “that the imbalance between supply and demand was not cyclical and indeed had a strong chance [or risk] of increasing in 1963.”735 Downsizing production The crisis was thus structural in nature, forcing governments to make decisions. In France, a lot was at stake: 39,500 people were employed in the sector,736 or 60,000 if subcontractors were added. Unlike 1951, it was no longer a question of stimulating productivity, but rather of downsizing production, especially since the Treaty of Rome imposed a reduction in subsidies, which had reached 131 billion francs between 1954 and 1958. The 30 July 1959 meeting of the Council of Ministers set the ceiling for subsidies at 97.2 billion until 1963,737 an amount that dropped to 19 billion during the following period. The workforce was to drop to 27,000 persons between then and 1965, and to 17,000 in 1970. Ideally, the number of shipyards was to drop to three, or one per maritime facade. Rumours circulated that the three would be Dunkerque, Saint-Nazaire and La Ciotat. “It was an obvious break with the practices of 1951,” wrote Jean Domenichino. From that point onwards, State aid became one of the primary means used by the government to intervene in an industrial sector [financed by private capital] and to impose its assessment of future developments through “a policy oriented not towards maintaining an increasingly uneasy and unpredictable and artificial situation, but toward the realistic choice of true remedies.”738 Since the “realistic choice” meant adapting French shipbuilding to the needs of the market, estimated at 400,000 grt per year – in contrast to the total ship-

735 Cf. Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit., p. 55. 736 Ibid. The average workforce evolved as follows – 1953: 39,464 people – 1954: 39,208 people – 1955: 39,917 people – 1956: 39,674 people – 1957: 39,876 people – 1958: 39,447 people. 737 Ibid. In 1960: 28.2 billion; in 1961: 25.5 billion; in 1962: 24.3 billion; in 1963, 19.2 billion. 738 Footnote (p. 56) in the document by Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit.: “Livre blanc, p. 16 : excerpt from a letter from the Prime Minister, Michel Debré, to the Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders, Abel Durand, dated 17 August 1959.”

yards’ capacity of 700,000 grt – in plain language this involved eliminating sizeable production capacities. Subsidies were assigned a double task: to help those shipyards “the situation of which remains sufficiently healthy, allowing them to face international competition”739 and to contribute to the necessary reconversion of shipyards who needed to “work on creating new non-shipbuilding activities […]” in order “to reclassify the highly skilled workforces and assign them to other tasks.”740 In the context of this struggle among French shipyards and in the face of international competition, ACSM suffered from three major handicaps impeding its ability to overcome these threats: - its production capacity (estimated at three 20,000-grt oil tankers per year on the basis of a 48-hour working week) did not put it in the leading bunch of companies within the sector; - its location on the banks of the Seine made it impossible for the shipyard to build vessels in excess of 24,000; 26,000; 27,000; or 30,000 tons,741 at a time when the “race for high tonnage” was dominating the market; - its location in a region suffering from an “industrial monoculture” to use the expression of Pierre Léonard, while the specific nature of its industry did not allow it to redeploy all or part of its workforce in the other subsidiaries belonging to the Worms group. If solutions were to be found, it was up to ACSM to create them. To do so, they had to innovate in cuttingedge techniques, intensify their reconversion efforts, and create partnerships.

739 Ibid.: “Livre blanc, p. 17.” 740 Ibid.: “Livre blanc, p. 13 and p. 18.” 741 The maximum production capacity was estimated in various ways, depending on the documents (advertisements, loan requests, annual reports, etc.).

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The battle for survival “With more than 2,000 blue- and white-collar workers, technicians and engineers, [and a] very large industrial complex spread over 26 hectares of land, of which 50,000 m2 were under cover,”742 the Le Trait shipyard was ready to fight. It enjoyed a sound financial structure and highly efficient production facilities.

A sound financial structure Since being incorporated as a public limited company in July 1945, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime’s share capital, initially 10 million old francs,743 had been increased on three occasions. On 3 August 1949, in an Extraordinary General Meeting, it was increased to 50 million old francs, by drawing on the special revaluation reserve (the par value of the shares went up from 1,000 to 5,000 francs). On 15 June 1951, in application of the provisions approved by the Ordinary and Extraordinary General Meeting, share capital was raised to 100 million old francs by incorporating 50 million francs, 25 million of which were taken from the special revaluation reserve and the other 25 million from the general reserve (par value of the shares: 10,000 francs). On 29 September 1952, the shareholders increased share capital to 350 million old francs by issuing 25 thousand shares with a par value of 10,000 francs each, created as payment for the contribution in kind by Worms & Cie of tangible and intangible assets valued at 821 million francs,744 encompassing the main part of its industrial site and production assets in Le Trait. At the end of 1959, a further capital increase was scheduled.

“In 1952,” stipulated a memo of 19 November 1959, “Worms & Cie made a contribution in kind to the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime SA, in the form of its fixed assets which had already been reconstructed. The contribution of the remaining fixed assets was postponed until these had been fully replenished. Now that said reconstruction has been completed, the contribution in kind of the remaining land, buildings and equipment shall be finalised, so that Worms & Cie, while retaining only its banking activity, will no longer own the shipyard, but only a share [100%] in said shipyard. Since the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime SA does not own the aforementioned fixed assets, it could not benefit from depreciations in their value. […] Going ahead with consolidating the ACSM balance sheet, it seems justifiable to incorporate into the company’s share capital, in parallel with the contribution of the remaining fixed assets, the sum of 210 million francs resulting from the accumulation of aforementioned depreciations not booked as such by the company, but which it would have been entitled to do, had the fixed assets been fully contributed sooner. In our opinion, this retroceding seems to be the only possible solution.” The contribution was to lead to the ACSM clearance of accounts from the Worms & Cie books, in particular settling the war damage accounts, the total amount of which was over 337 million francs.745 Above all, the aim of the transaction was to bolster the company’s financial stability vis-à-vis its competitors. A memo of 17 November 1959 assessed “the optimal level of ACSM capital” in comparison to six companies (see table on next page746) and concluded: “We can justifiably consider an amount of 600 million.”

742 Undated document on ACSM, filed in 1961. 743 On 1 January 1960, the new franc replaced the old franc: each new franc (NF) being worth one hundred old francs. 744 Cf. memo from Robert Malingre, head of financial and administrative services at Maison Worms, to Robert Labbé, dated 11 January 1960.

745 Cf. memo from Robert Malingre to Robert Labbé, dated 9 October 1959. 746 The memo specified that Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée was highly involved in activities other than shipbuilding.

Ready for the fight

Large assembly workshop – 1960–1965

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Share capital (in old francs) - Chantiers de l’Atlantique

2,000,000,000

- Ateliers et Chantiers de France

765,000,000

- Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde

540,000,000

- Chantiers navals de La Ciotat

720,000,000

- Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée

2,279,440,000

- Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence

525,000,000

The Extraordinary General Meeting of shareholders was convened747 on 12 December 1959, first, “for the purpose of deliberating the capital increase and the subsequent amendment of the articles of association,” and second, of appointing “auditors in charge of the report required by law.” The contribution agreement was signed on 30 November 1959 by Raymond Meynial on behalf of Worms & Cie, in his capacity as its General Partner, and Robert Labbé, on behalf of ACSM, in his capacity as Chief Executive Officer. The agreement covered: - t otal land of 12 hectares 48.6 ares,748 valued at 10 million francs; - the industrial complex (building for sharpening saws, acetylene plant, launch slips, infirmary, a wharf, administrative building housing the executive offices), valued in excess of 97 million francs (97,190,684 F); - housing (the Georges Leygues Pavilion, a villa located at 3, Rue du Maréchal Foch, a house on Rue Denis Papin 6/8, four 2-apartment houses located on the Rue de Dunkerque) with a total value of more than 24.5 million francs (24,563,632 F); - various utilities (fencing, pits, pipelines, drinking water facilities, and changing rooms) valued at more than 25 million francs (25,680,588 F); - equipment and tools (presses, forge and electric ovens, tools for fitting, woodworking, electrical maintenance, sheet metal and welding); all valued at 25 million F;

747 Convening notice signed by Henri Nitot, Board Secretary, and proxies of 26 November 1959. 748 A memo of 16 November 1959 listed the parcels that were not transferred to ACSM in September 1952, based on the land registry of Le Trait; stating that several lots had been “corroded by the Seine” or exchanged for plots of land within Le Trait.

- various furniture and furnishings, for the most part located in the office building, all estimated at more than 8.4 million F (8,416,355 F). In addition to these assets, ownership of which was scheduled to be transferred on 31 December 1959 for a total price of 190,851,259 F, Worms & Cie undertook to transfer a receivable amounting of 209.209,148,741 F to ACSM.749 As a result, total contributions reached 400 million francs, to be paid for via a capital increase of 250 million francs.750 Said capital increase was ultimately approved by the Extraordinary General Meeting of 28 December 1959, which subsequently modified Article 6 of the articles of association: “share capital is now 600 million francs (6 million new francs); divided into 60,000 shares with a par value of 10,000 francs each, all of the same class and fully paid up, numbered from 1 to 60,000.” The size of ACSM’s share capital was now higher than that of the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence and the Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde. In addition to its permanent capital (paid up share capital + earnings retained in reserves and depreciation), ACSM (particularly to pre-fund ship construction; i.e. to purchase materials and supplies while waiting for payment of the amounts owed by public and private clients) had the following financial means at its disposal:751 1) Loan from the Consortium of Shipbuilding Companies (4%, 1946), repayable at constant annual instalments until 8 October 1970, inclusive. On 30 September 1958, the outstanding balance was 118,365,000 F.

749 The contribution agreement of 30 November 1959 stipulated: “The sum of two hundred and nine million one hundred and forty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty-one francs, representing a portion of the open creditor account itemised in the accounts of ACSM SA as ‘Worms & Cie – Le Trait’ in the name of the limited partnership of Worms & Cie and amounting to two hundred and fifty-four million two hundred and eighty-two thousand three hundred and thirtyfour francs on 30 November 1959.” 750 See the memo from Robert Malingre to Robert Labbé dated 11 January 1960. All the deeds: contribution agreement and the minutes to the general meetings of 12 and 28 December 1959, along with their appendices, were received by Mr Chalain, notary, on 4 and 6 January 1960; they were registered on 8 January 1960 and filed with the Commercial Court Registry at the Seine Tribunal on 15 January 1960. 751 Cf. the ACSM memo of 19 May 1959. An annual cash position was presented by ACSM to the Banque de France starting in 1959.

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2) Long-term loan from the credit institution, Crédit National of 50 million old francs, granted on 11 October 1950 and to be repaid in ten annual instalments of 5 million francs, payable on 15 October, 1956 through 1965, inclusive. On 30 September 1958, the outstanding balance was 40,000,000 F. 3) Medium-term credit of 100,000,000 F granted by the Crédit National on 19 June 1957, useable up to: - 100,000,000 F, until 21 June 1959; - 80,000,000 F, until 21 June 1960; - 60,000,000 F, until 21 June 1961; - 30,000,000 F, until 21 June 1962. On 30 September 1958, this credit was valued at 100,000,000 F. 4) Long-term loan from the Crédit National of 205 million francs, granted on 12 September 1957 and to be repaid: - in four instalments of 5,000,000 F, payable annually on 30 June, 1959 to 1962, inclusive; - in ten instalments of 18,500,000 F, payable annually on 30 June, 1963 to 1972, inclusive. As of 30 September 1958, the outstanding balance was 205,000,000 F. These last two credits were obtained to partially finance the construction and equipping of a fitting-out quay on the Seine. A second long-term loan for 3 million francs was taken out on 23 November 1960 with the Normandy Regional Development Company; along with a third for 5 million francs in December 1963, again with the Crédit National. The increase in equity resulting from the capital increase served as a guarantee of financial solvency, as did the backing of Maison Worms. The backing of Worms & Cie: the men of Maison Worms Meeting at the company headquarters at 45, Boulevard Haussmann in Paris, the ACSM Board of Directors was chaired by Robert Labbé, General Partner of Maison Worms since 1944 and Honorary Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders. Board members were: - Hypolite Worms, General Partner of Worms & Cie since 1911; - Raymond Meynial, who becamed General Partner of Worms & Cie in 1949; as well as three legal entities: - Worms & Cie, represented by Jacques Barnaud752

752 Jacques Barnaud was a General Partner of Worms & Cie from 1930 to 1944, and from 1949 to 1962.

(nominated on 23 December 1949, approved on 12 July 1950); - the Union Immobilière pour la France et l’Étranger (Unife), a company founded by Maison Worms in 1929, and fully owned by it; - and the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, represented by Pierre Chevalier; in 1956, FCM became a Board member of ACSM (appointment ratified at the General Assembly of 31 August 1956), as a result of a technical and commercial cooperation agreement between the two companies which gave ACSM access to FCM know-how in ship engine construction. Board Meetings, with Henri Nitot, Executive Director of the company, as Secretary, were held in the presence of two representatives of the Works Council, René Biville and Raymond Brétéché. On 26 January 1960, the Board welcomed two new members (subject to approval at the future General Meeting): - Henri Nitot; - and Pierre-Ernest Herrenschmidt753 (1906–1999), who had been named General Partner of Worms & Cie six days earlier. On that same day (26 January 1960), the Board members set forth in a circular: “As Henri Nitot, Executive Director of our company, has expressed his wish to retire, we have decided to appoint him as Honorary Executive Director, in acknowledgment of the eminent services rendered to our Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime for nearly forty years. We have appointed Joseph Brocard, previously Deputy Director General, to replace him as Executive Director of our company. He will assume his duties effective Tuesday, 26 January.”

753 See Roger Mennevée, Les Documents de l’Alll of March 1963 (changes to Worms & Cie deed of incorporation since 20 January 1960): “Born in Paris on 15 February 1906, and a graduate of the Free School of Political Science (section: public finance) in 1926, Pierre-Ernest Herrenschmidt, after performing his military service (November 1928 to October 1929), entered the Inspectorate of Finance on 15 May 1931. Named Inspector, 1st-class, on 1 January 1942, he became Director of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Finance on 4 January 1946, and was assigned as Director of the Crédit National, by Decree of 15 May 1946. He was promoted to Commander of the Legion of Honor, and Honorary Inspector General of Finance on leaving the public administration to become a General Partner of Worms & Cie on 20 January 1960.”

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The appointment of Pierre Herrenschmidt was mentioned in a short article published in Carrefour on 18 October 1961, penned by Gilles Roches: “Pierre Herrenschmidt (55 years of age), Honorary Inspector of Finances left the management of the Crédit National in January 1960 to become General Partner of Worms & Cie. He serves as Director for the following companies: Antar Pétroles de l’Atlantique, Pechelbronn, Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, Société d’Investissements Vendôme, Société d’Assurances pour le Commerce Extérieur, Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire,” all companies belonging to the Worms group.

Impact on the order book For example, in December 1959, Worms Compagnie Maritime et Charbonnière (Worms CMC) signed a contract for the construction of the 3,600-dwt collier-bulk carrier “Yainville,” to be delivered in 1961. The keel was laid on 14 April 1960 in slipway No. 6. In addition to this vessel, ACSM started construction on: - in slip No. 1 – the 18,410-dwt ore carrier “Pentellina”

for the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest, a Worms & Cie affiliate (absorbed by Worms in 1968); the order was co-signed by the Union Navale, and the vessel was on the ways in July–August 1960; - and in slip No. 2 – the 12,302-dwt cargo ship “Ville du Havre” for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire. This vessel, the keel of which was laid on 16 November 1960, was the first in a series of four vessels ordered from Le Trait;755 - the “Mostaganem” and “Bidassoa” completed the order book. The former was a 5,500-dwt cargo liner for the SA Les Cargos Algériens – its keel was laid in slipway No. 8 on 10 August 1960 – while the latter was a 2,235-dwt landing ship tank (LST) for the Navy: it occupied slip No. 7 between 30 January 1960, the date on which its keel was laid, and 29 December 1960, its launch date. Its specifications were identical in every detail to the LST “Dives” (keel laid on 7 August 1959) launched from slipway No. 8 on 28 June 1960. More than 40,000 tons were thus under construction. 1960 was also marked by the end of construction and launch of: - the 3,700-dwt bulk carrier “Eldonia” on 31 March 1960 – shipping company: Union Navale - the 2,235-dwt LST “Dives” (see above) - the 10,720-dwt self-unloading bulk carrier “Gypsum Countess” on 5 August 1960 – shipping company: Panama Gypsum Co., Inc. - the 8,432-dwt ore carrier “Penchâteau” on 5 November 1960; shipping company: Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest. On top of these were two barges built between 28 October 1959 and 18 January 1960 for the Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin, for a price of approximately 300 million francs, according to a contract signed on 27 July 1959. All these contracts ensured that slipways Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8 were occupied throughout 1960.

754 In an undated document summarising the activities of Worms CMC, filed in 1961, it is noted: “Worms & Cie, formerly shipbuilders, entrusted this branch of its business activity to its subsidiary, the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, in Le Trait (headquartered in Paris, at 47, Boulevard Haussmann) in 1945.” In a brochure published on 20 February 1961, Worms CMC wrote: “This yard is completely equipped to build vessels of any specification up to 24,000 tons dead-weight.”

755 The book, Les 100 ans de la Havraise péninsulaire (Charles Limonier, 1992), states that these were “freighters with two decks, ‘full scantling’ vessels with poop deck and long – forecastle, fully welded.” They were baptised “Ville du Havre,” “Ville de Brest,” “Ville de Bordeaux” and “Ville de Lyon” (see next paragraph).

The impact of the Worms group on the ACSM’s reputation As at the time as when the shipyard had formed one of its four divisions, Maison Worms made every effort to promote ACSM in the documents presenting the group’s activities, or in inserts published in newspapers and specialist magazines. The Worms group’s maritime subsidiaries did the same in their presentation brochures: Worms Compagnie Maritime et Charbonnière (Worms CMC),754 Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire, Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, all three of which were clients of the shipyard and promoted the vessels built for them by ACSM. ACSM thus benefited from this support from Maison Worms which, as often as it could, directed orders to its shipyard from companies within its maritime group.

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28 June and 29 December 1960: launch of the landing ship tanks (LST) “Dives” and “Bidassoa”

Specifications

333 333

Length

102.1 metres overall (96.6 pp)

Width

15.5 metres

Height

3.2 metres

Gross Tonnage Deadweight Full load

1,750 tons 1 400 tonnes 4,225 tonnes

Propulsion

2 Pielstick diesel engines 2,000-HP

Speed

11.5 knots

1961: the last year of normal activity On 13 February 1961, the collier-bulk carrier “Yainville” was launched in the presence of Robert Labbé, Hypolite Worms, ACSM Director Marcel Lamoureux, André The collier-bulk carrier “Yainville” in slip No. 6

Marie,756 Mr Brétéché, General Councillor and Mayor of Le Trait, and Mr Passerel, Mayor of Yainville, as well as numerous guests, including several reporters who covered the launch in the local press.757 Worms CMC took charge of the ship on 7 April 1961. At that time, the newspaper Paris-Normandie published an article entitled, “Navire au port, le cargo neuf ‘Yainville.’” According to the article, this vessel, “intended to transport bulk goods and timber, can also be used to transport cars, as a removable intermediate deck can be installed in each of its four holds.” The same newspaper again referred to the “Yainville” on 5 November 1963, citing its specifications: “This ship, a regular sight in Normandy ports, has a gross tonnage of 2,662 tons and net tonnage of 1,537 tons. Length: 97 m; width: 13.50 m; speed of 13.5 knots.” This was the last vessel bearing the Worms colours (blue flag adorned with a white disk) built in Le Trait. The ore carrier “Pentellina” left slipway No. 1 on 6 April 1961. The cargo ship “Ville du Havre” left slipway No. 2 on 10 August 1961 and was delivered to NCHP on 25 January 1962. “Mostaganem” was launched on 14 September 1961. Only two of the vacated slipways of the five operated were immediately reoccupied. Slip No. 1 was used as of 12 April 1961 for the construction of the “Ville de Brest,” the second 12,264dwt freighter ordered by the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire; while on 10 August 1961, slip

756 MP for the Seine-Maritime department, André Marie was Minister for Justice (1947–1948 and 1948–1949), President of the Council (26 July to 5 September 1948), and Minister for National Education (1951–1954). In addition, he served as Chairman of the Fédération Française des Universités Populaires. 757 See the article of 14 February 1961 entitled “Le ‘Yainville’ a été lancé au Trait pour la Cie Worms” in Le Havre libre. Moreover, in an interview granted to Francis Ley in 1977 for the purposes of the book Cent ans boulevard Haussmann, Pierre Darredeau, Director of the Shipping branches first in Le Havre, then in Algiers, as well as coordinator of Shipping Services in North Africa in 1950–1960, said the following about the freighter: “As for our bulk carriers in 1961, we had the ‘Yainville,’ which we operated in conjunction with the Union Navale, and the ‘Château-Margaux.’” On 3 April 1964, the loan department of Crédit National wrote: “In a letter of 24 March 1964, Crédit Naval has requested on behalf of its client [Worms & Cie, or Worms CMC?] that we release the mortgage registration taken out on ‘Château-Yquem,’ with the balance of the loan being guaranteed by the 3,000,000 F mortgage taken out on the ‘Yainville.’”

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No. 2 welcomed the “Stylehurst,” a 21,700-dwt ore carrier intended for the English shipping company, Grenehurst Shipping Co. Ltd. While slip No. 8 was vacant for just four months (until construction started on 15 January 1962 on the cargo ship “Saint François”), slip No. 7 remained empty from 29 December 1960

to 25 November 1962, i.e. for 24 months. Slip No. 6 remained vacant from 13 February 1961 to 1 December 1964, or for more than 45 months. This vacancy was a sign of a recession that was going to worsen. The worrisome situation was aggravated by the deaths, a few weeks apart, of Hypolite Worms and Jacques Barnaud.

10 August 1961: launch of the cargo ship “Ville du Havre,” the first in a series of four vessels ordered by NCHP

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6 April 1961: launch of the ore carrier “Pentellina” for the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest and the Union Navale

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1962: the grief-stricken Maison Worms Hypolite Worms died suddenly on 28 January 1962 at the age of 72. Considering his lifetime activities from 1914 to 1962, it is striking that, over the course of the years and with the assistance of expert partners, he transformed the Maison Worms he had inherited into a powerful group open to shipbuilding, shipping, trade, banking and financial services, and industrial activities. In a speech given in Port Said in January 1950, he himself described the development of the bank and the group to their present proportions: “In 1928, we created the Banking Services of Maison Worms. […] Thanks to the men at its helm, this division has since become one of the most active private banks in France, perhaps one of the largest business or commercial banks in France. […] This is why Maison Worms, originally a Fuel Merchanting and Shipping company, has now become a multi-faceted company, because being a business bank implies its interest in the commercial and industrial affairs under its umbrella, and which, thanks to its involvement and its resources, it has helped develop, and is now involved in a whole new range of activities.” Twelve years later, upon the death of the leader of Maison Worms, these words assumed even greater truth and depth. At the time of Hypolite Worms’ death, Jacques Barnaud himself was seriously ill. The fellowship and trust between these two men had been as indestructible as they were fruitful. For over thirty years, the Banking Services had benefited from the skills and financial talent of Jacques Barnaud. During his last few months at the helm of Maison Worms, before passing away on 15 April 1962, he provided one last service by redefining the tasks of the partners. Despite these deaths, Worms & Cie had to move forward, while its company name had to live on. Thus, in March 1962, Hypolite Worms’ widow was named a General Partner, but without managerial duties, while two new Board members were appointed: Guy Brocard758 and the son of Jacques Barnaud, Jean Barnaud (a former Navy officer who joined NCHP in 1948 and was serving as its Executive Director at the time). Upon his father’s death, a new partnership deed

Hypolite Worms (1950s)

was signed (July 1962), under which Jean Barnaud was appointed a General Partner, joining Raymond Meynial, Robert Labbé and Pierre Herrenschmidt. The positions formerly occupied by Hypolite Worms were distributed among the latter two: Robert Labbé assumed the chairmanship of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation, while at the same time, since he was already serving as Chairman of Worms CMC, resigning as ACSM Chairman. Pierre Herrenschmidt became Chairman of ACSM, at the same time replacing Hypolite Worms as head of the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers and as a Board member of the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest. At the beginning of March 1963, Robert Labbé assumed the chairmanship of the Central Committee of French Shipowners.

758 Joining Worms & Cie Banking Services in 1937, Guy Brocard became a member of its management team in 1944, before becoming its Director General in 1951.

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In his memoirs, Henri Nitot established a causal link between the deaths of Hypolite Worms and Jacques Barnaud and the demise of ACSM four years later: “I believe,” he wrote, “that even in the face of difficult industrial circumstances, neither would ever have abandoned the shipyard which they considered their life’s work; they felt responsible for its survival, for a place where, through their efforts, two successive generations of workers had been employed in full job security, where many families had gone through great pains to build their small houses, sheltered in their minds from any incident; and as great patrons, they certainly would have considered that their honour required them to spare so many honest workers and employees the concerns, indeed the deficiencies, of any resettlement.”

Ω The ore carrier “Stylehurst” at the fitting-out quay, after its launch on 4 May 1962 for Grenehurst Shipping Co. Ltd The cargo liner “Mostaganem” launched on 14 September 1961 for the Cargos Algériens

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Innovating for survival In the face of the crisis, the main priority of ACSM was to stay at the forefront of progress and attempt to make up for its infrastructural handicap (slipways unsuitable for constructing giant ships) by building ‘high-tech’ vessels. Along with its partner, the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, ACSM launched into cryogenic techniques, building liquefied petroleum gas (methane) carriers. The two companies were not however the sole builders in contention, facing competition from the Chantiers de l’Atlantique and the Chantiers de France et de Dunkerque. The epic story of transporting liquefied natural gas – LNG Ever since the discovery of gas deposits in Hassi R’mel in the Algerian Sahara (reserve estimated in 1965 at 1,000 billion cubic meters) in 1956, the logistics of importing this fuel to France had been under study. “In the face of the events in Algeria, the idea of building a gas pipeline linking Northern Africa and Europe has been abandoned, with thoughts instead turning to LNG tankers to deliver the fuel by sea. Naval architects are stepping

up their research into transporting liquified gas, as the distinctive feature of methane is that it reduces its volume 600 times at cryogenic temperatures.”759 “In June 1959,” reported Niko Wijnolst and Tor Wergeland, in Shipping Innovation,760 “the Chairman [sic] of Worms & Cie, Mr Labbé, visited the United States to attend the 5th World Petroleum Congress Conference in New York.” He was accompanied by “a brilliant engineer-consultant in Marine Engineering,”761 Audy Gilles, who at the time was Managing Director of the Société de Mécanographie Japy (an important subsidiary of Worms & Cie) and who “through his highly valued technical knowledge, [had already] been providing invaluable services to Le Trait for years.” He was set to play a leading role there. “By that time,” continued the authors of Shipping Innovation, “it was clear to him [Robert Labbé] that although considerable progress has been made in France, economies could well be achieved by taking a licence from the US group, which by now had successfully shipped several cargoes of LNG [liquefied natural gas] across the Atlantic in the prototype ship ‘Methane Pioneer.’ The Americans, however, felt so sure about themselves that they refused to grant him a licence. Therefore, the French decided to continue with their own studies.” To do so, Robert Labbé brought together engineers, naval architects, shipping companies and financial partners in a structure set up in (April?) 1960762 under the name of Méthane Transport and sponsored by Gaz de France (future Engie). The number and names of the partners making up this research company, with capital of 2,600,000 NF, varied according to the sources: a pool of banks including Worms & Cie, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the Banque Industrielle de l’Afrique du Nord, Vernes & Cie;763 five shipping companies and even “a group of the main shipyards,”764 to

759 Cf. www.gtt.fr/fr/qui-sommes-nous/histoire. 760 IOS Press BV, The Netherlands, 2009. 761 This and subsequent quotations are taken from the memoirs of Henri Nitot. 762 La Correspondance économique devoted an article to the creation of Méthane Transport in its issue of 16 April 1960. 763 See Roger Mennevée, Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, published in March 1963, and “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie en 1964,” published in Les Documents de l’Alll, in April 1965. 764 See the article published in Paris Normandie on 18 October 1963, penned by André Renaudin.

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which Bernard Cassagnou765 added Gaz de France (on its own), Air Liquide, and the Société d’Exploitation du Gaz d’Afrique du Nord. The goal of Méthane Transport was to finance the testing of transporting liquefied gas by sea; Robert Labbé served as its Chief Executive Officer.766 Trials on the Liberty ship “Beauvais” The available information on the origin and development of this activity is very fragmented and often contradictory. However, we can piece together that: - in the very early 1960s, the Ministry of the Merchant Navy, “under the guidance of Jean Morin, at that time its Secretary General,” was interested in the “behaviour at sea of tank prototypes in a variety of shapes and materials, separated from the ship’s hull by a ‘secondary barrier,’ itself protected from the cold by balsa wood or perlite,”767 together forming a system capable of transporting LNG. The Ministry called upon Méthane Transport to test its effectiveness. “Objective: to test the lab theories in practice and to compare the solutions implemented onboard. The tanks, their insulation, their anchoring, as well as all accessories (pumps, piping, valves and safety devices) [must be] observed in minute detail.”768 Méthane Transport worked with four (or rather, three) shipyards:769 the shipyard in Le Trait in partnership with the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, the Chantiers de l’Atlantique in Saint-Nazaire, the Chantiers de France770 et de Dunkerque,

765 See Bernard Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995), op. cit. 766 See Roger Mennevée, op. cit. 767 In Le magazine des ingénieurs de l’armement, Caia No. 97, March 2012, see Alain Grill’s account: “Profession ? Ingénieur du génie maritime.” 768 Cf. “GDF Suez, 50 ans d’innovation dans le GNL” on http://pelhammedia.fr. 769 Bernard Cassagnou, op. cit. 770 This company name was only used from 1967 (after the Bordeaux shipyard had closed) to designate the company created in 1960 through the merger of the Bordeaux and Dunkerque shipyards; between 1960 and 1967, the company was known as the Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque et Bordeaux (France-Gironde); which may explain why some authors erred on the number of (four) companies involved in the research: the Chantiers de France et de Dunkerque were in fact one and the same company.

- to conduct the trials, Méthane Transport made available the Liberty ship “Beauvais” (formerly, “JohnLowson”), a Second World War supply ship which the State (according to some) or Méthane Transport (according to others) acquired in July 1959; according to Ludovic Dupin, the shipping group included Gaz de France, Air Liquide, Technip and CMP,771 - the ship was decommissioned in Dunkerque, and its management entrusted to the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest772 “on behalf of Méthane Transport,”773 - in February 1961, the “Beauvais” was in Nantes and in March the transformation of the ship into an experimental gas carrier began at the Chantiers de l’Atlantique774 (in Saint-Nazaire?). The companies participating in the trials installed on board three self-supporting tanks of their own invention (Ludovic Dupin mentioned only a single “small 500-m3 tank”), whereby the main difficulty had been to achieve welds of sufficient quality to satisfy the demands of the classification companies: • one of the three tanks, “prismatically shaped (and) constructed of aluminium alloy,” was built by the Chantiers de l’Atlantique, • the second, this time “a multi-lobed tank,” was “constructed of 9% nickel steel and built by the Chantiers de Dunkerque-Bordeaux,” • the third was “cylindrical, and constructed of 9% nickel steel, built by the Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime and the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée.”775 In addition, “a large variety of handling equipment, control systems, valves and pumps, insulation materials will be tested and evaluated during the trials.”776

771 Cf. Ludovic Dupin, “Il y a 50 ans, quand les Français étaient les rois du gaz,” in L’Usine nouvelle, June 2015. 772 Some sources refer to this company as Société Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest, although it had not been established before 1968. 773 “GDF Suez, 50 ans d’innovation dans le GNL,” op. cit. 774 The fact that the latter firm resulted from the merger in 1955 of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire, based in Nantes and Saint-Nazaire, and the Chantiers de Penhoët, based in Saint-Nazaire, undoubtedly explains why some mistakenly reported that the conversion took place in Saint-Nazaire. 775 Cf. Commandant Boudjerra, “Rétrospective du transport de gaz naturel liquéfié (1910-2010),” for master’s degree, 2008–2009. 776 Ibid.

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The website of the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL) states that “James Coolidge Carter of Costa Mesa, California, provided a submerged electric-motor pump (SEMP) for use on one of the three tanks on the ship.”777 The reconversion was completed in February–March 1962 and trials began in March; they were to last six months.778 According to an anonymous account found on the Internet, “the manoeuvres with gas on board were performed by the shipyards that designed each tank. Inside the Roche Maurice gas plant in Nantes, Gaz de France had installed a pilot station for the liquefaction and storage of liquid methane. The nearby wharf was equipped with marine loading articulated arms connecting the storage tanks to the ship. Gaz de France personnel oversaw the loading and unloading operations at the Roche Maurice wharf, thus enabling the staff and crew of the ship, and the shipyard personnel performing the onboard manoeuvres, to be trained in handling LNG. Their training specifically included lessons on how to fight methane fires. As a result, no incidents of note ever occurred during the loading and

777 Cf. “LNG Shipping at 50” on https://giignl.org. 778 Ibid. “In July 1962 members of the Methane Transport research group, along with several others, were invited to a tank test in Oslo. The invitation was from shipowner Øivind Lorentzen and Texas-based investor Carol Bennett who wanted to demonstrate the viability of a membrane tank system based on an idea developed by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) engineer Bo Bengtsson. Attending, and impressed with the tests carried out using liquid nitrogen, were Pierre Verret from Gaz de France, Audy Gilles from the Worms group and Jean Alleaume and Gilbert Massac from Gazocéan. Following these observations, Gazocéan acquired the Norwegian patents and set about making substantial changes to the original design and registering new patents. In time, and through cooperation with Conch Océan, the Gazocéan membrane concept was to become the basis for the Technigaz Mark I containment system. Conch Océan was established as a 60/40 Conch/Gazocéan joint venture in 1967.”

unloading operations.”779 Simultaneously, in May 1962, the economic viability of the project took a decisive step forward with the creation of Gaz Marine, a company devoted to transporting liquefied methane.780 Its share capital of 5 million NF, divided into 50,000 shares of 100 NF, was subscribed by Gaz de France (50%); Gazocéan (17.50%) – a shipping company founded in 1957 by Gaz de France and NYK Line, and specialised in the transport of LNG; the American company, Bennett (10%)781 in the name of a Texas investor; the remaining 22.50% were distributed in equal parts between Worms & Cie, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, and the Union Européenne Industrielle et Financière. ACSM wins the contract On 26 June 1962,782 thanks to qualities of the experienced process, ACSM won the call for tenders recently pitting them against their colleagues:783 Gaz Marine

779 Cf. “1950-1961, Beauvais entre à Shimazu 2” on https:// www.flickr.com – the author of this account described the six phases of the trials: 1. At the Saint-Nazaire quay: key [sic] chilling of liquid nitrogen 2. At the Roche Maurice quay: alongside the Gaz de France methane liquefaction station: filling the LNG into each tank and empting; checking the related equipment 3. At sea: series of voyages with tanks 2 and 3 full, and tank 4. in travel position on ballast At sea: series of trials with tank 1 full, and tanks 2 and 3 in travel position on ballast 5. At sea: succession of transfers between tanks, with intermittent reheating of tanks to check resistance to repeated thermal shocks 6. At sea: emptying the gas tanks and reheating. The “Beauvais” returned to Roche Maurice between each phase to adapt its cargo to the requirements of the subsequent phase. The results for all tanks proved satisfactory, as did the pumps; only the electric submersible pump experienced a blockage, but this was easily fixed.The results for all tanks proved satisfactory, as did the pumps; only the electric submersible pump experienced a blockage, but this was easily fixed. 780 The sources refer to an article on Gaz Marine, published by La Correspondance économique on 12 May 1962, which could not be found. 781 See footnote 778. 782 See protocol of 20 July 1962. The order is dated 27 June 1962 according to “GDF Suez, 50 ans d’innovation dans le GNL,” op. cit. 783 See “Vingt mille lieues sur les mers” on http://www. paris-normandie.fr.

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placed an order with ACSM for one 25,000-cubic metre methane carrier.784 The tested and approved technique was “self-supporting,” involving the use of cylindrical tanks made of a material recently developed by the Aciéries Françaises: steel with a 9% nickel and very low carbon content. The cylindrical shape of the tanks made it possible to obtain the highest possible reduction in their weight and in the cost of the components keeping them in place. Insulation – of primary concern, since methane is transported at a temperature of minus 161 degrees below zero centigrade and under pressure of one bar – was guaranteed either by modern materials such as Klegecell, applied using special arrangements devised by ACSM, or by perlite, a powdery insulant. “The trials on the ‘Beauvais,’” wrote Audy Gilles in 1963 in Nouveautés techniques maritimes, “confirmed what several technicians had already been thinking; namely, that it was likely that several different processes could be used successfully to construct tanks for methane carriers, along with the tank insulation. In sum, one could say, a bit schematically, that the construction of a methane carrier requires more technological ‘knowhow’ than patented ideas. Performing the experiments on ‘Beauvais’ has been costly, but it has put the group of shipyards involved in the tests in a position to accept orders for methane carriers.”785 Alain Grill wrote in Le magazine des ingénieurs de l’armement: “Never again in my career was I to find such synergy meticulously orchestrated by the Secretary General himself, Jean Morin. […] Nor will I ever forget this maritime venture, when, as General Manager of Chargeurs Réunis, we took a stake in Gazocéan; nor when, in Malaysia, having become the Chief Executive Officer of the Chantiers de l’Atlantique, I signed the largest contract of my career: five 130,000-m3 methane carriers.”786 Gaz Marine and ACSM signed a protocol, under which Gaz Marine demanded from ACSM that FCM “be involved in the execution of the construction contract so as to ensure that under all circumstances, the construction and completion of this ship will be brought to a successful conclusion.”

Although both shipyards had participated in the technical tests and although ACSM was committed to building the hull of the future methane carrier while its engines were to be constructed by FCM, this latter firm had not agreed to be named in the contract as a builder with “joint and several” liability. On the other hand, FCM agreed to sign an agreement on 20 July 1962 as the primary sub-contractor, and to perform the obligations set forth in Article 1 of the contract under the following terms: “In addition to the contractual obligations as principal sub-contractor; and in the event that the shipbuilder fails to perform its obligations, FCM agrees to assume full responsibility for the commitments agreed to by the shipbuilder. […] Formal notice shall be served by the shipowner on the shipbuilder demanding the execution of said obligations by a specified deadline. In the event that the shipbuilder fails to react to said notice, and one month after expiry of said deadline, the shipping company may, at its own risk, proceed to substitute the principal subcontractor for the shipbuilder, notwithstanding any possible recourse by either party to arbitrage, subject to all rights and means of the parties. In the event that the substitution is enacted, Gaz Marine will make any payments owed following said substitution in execution of the present contract, directly to FCM. […] Worms & Cie, on behalf of ACSM, will provide surety to FCM for any commitment hereinabove entered into by ACSM.” It seems that the contract signed between Gaz Marine and the Le Trait shipyard had no impact on the trials that continued throughout July: “On 2 July,” reported an article from GDF-Suez, “the ‘Beauvais’ sailed up the Loire to unload its cargo at the Roche-Maurice facility, using the marine loading arms [MLA].”787 And OuestFrance reported that, that same month “in the vicinity of Belle-Île, the sea trials of the ‘Beauvais’ are being conducted with twenty-six sailors and about fifteen engineers and technicians from several shipyards on board […] all of them volunteers, given the dangerous nature of its cargo of 100 tons of methane. […] Each evening, the inhabitants of Belle-Île, mingling curiosity with concern, observe this black and red hull moored

784 See the article in La Correspondance économique of 29 June 1962. 785 Words quoted in “1950-1961, Beauvais […],” article published on https://www.flickr.com. 786 Cf. “Profession ? Ingénieur du génie maritime,” op. cit.

The methane carrier “Jules Verne” under construction Ω

787 “GDF Suez, 50 ans d’innovation dans le GNL,” op. cit.

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one nautical mile from Le Palais. Converted into a laboratory ship in Penhoët, this former Liberty ship, with one of its masts serving as a gas exhaust pipe, has something worrying about it.”788 The Hassi R’Mel and Arzew gas complex Once the Evian Accords (18 March 1962) had ended the Algerian War, Gaz de France intensified its relations with the former colony. In May 1962, GDF and SEHR789 signed “the first major gas contract between France and Algeria.” The agreement provided for the construction of a plant (operated by the Compagnie Algérienne de Méthane Liquide) in Arzew, a port located 40 km from Oran, for the purpose of liquefying the natural gas transported from the Hassi R’mel gas field via a 510km pipeline with an annual capacity of 3 billion-m3. In addition to GDF, British Methane / British Gas Council participated in the venture. The foundation stone was laid on 15 September 1962,790 in the presence of the newly elected President of Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella, the French Ambassador and other officials. At the same time, work began on a methane terminal in Le Havre. This future Gaz de France plant, with a total storage capacity of 36,000-m3, received around half a billion-m3 of natural gas every year and covered 40% of the Paris region’s annual gas consumption via gas pipelines laid specifically for this purpose.791 The “Jules Verne,” the first French methane carrier, is built in Le Trait In Le Trait, the keel of the methane carrier, soon to be known as the “Jules Verne,” was laid on 17 April 1963 in slipway No. 2 under construction No. 171. Six days earlier (11 April), ACSM had launched two ships: the butane carrier “Copernico” (freeing up slipway No. 2) for the Chilean shipping company, Naviera Interoceangas SA; and the hydrographic survey vessel

“Astrolabe”792 for the French Navy. This dual launch provided an occasion for Pierre Herrenschmidt to deliver a speech, during which he announced “the conclusion of a technical cooperation agreement between ACSM and FCM. The latter company,” he stated, “owns shipyards in La Seyne (Var department) and in Le Havre-Graville which employ a total of 3,500 people. The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime in Le Trait, downstream from Rouen, has a workforce of 2,000. The two shipyards have already established a research company for the seagoing transport of liquefied gas. In this respect, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime will soon be starting construction on the first French methane carrier.” Published in Le Monde on 13 April, this information was reproduced in Agence économique et financière on 16 April 1963, under the heading: “Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée. An agreement has been reached with the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime which seeks to strengthen the ties that the two companies have forged within the technical and commercial field over the past years. We should recall, first, that the two companies share boards members, and second, that they have adopted a joint policy to construct ships designed to transport liquefied gas.” The attention accorded by the Worms shipping group to the innovations led Robert Labbé, in May 1963, to establish Techni-Marine, a limited liability company,

792 Along with the “Boussole” this ship was listed as a hydrographic auxiliary vessel in the ACSM’s General Meeting report of 29 June 1965.

788 Cf. “1962 : Un inquiétant prototype méthanier,” on https://www.ouest-france.fr. 789 SEHR: Société d’Exploitation des Hydrocarbures d’Hassi R’Mel. See “50 ans d’innovation dans le GNL,” at http://www.engie.com. 790 See L’Algérie indépendante (1962-1963) : L’ambassade de Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, by Anne Liskenne, Jean-Noël Jeanneney, Maurice Vaïsse, Armand Colin, 2015. 791 Cf. “50 ans du GNL - 1962-1965 : construction du premier terminal”; this article on http://Ing.gdfsuez.com is no longer available.

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The “Jules Verne” in slip No. 2; the “Ville de Bordeaux” in slip No. 1 and the “Ville d’Anvers” at the fitting-out quay

for the purpose of “undertaking technical studies and research on seagoing transport; these studies shall focus primarily on the design and operation of specialised ships, as well as on ways of reducing their production costs and operating expenses; to provide advice [… and…] to undertake, on behalf of third parties, any study or project related thereto. The share capital of 100,000 F is fully paid up by the various partners:

Inside the tanks of the “Jules Verne”

Worms CMC,793 Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest, Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation, Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, Société Maritime des Transports Pétroliers, all companies affiliated directly or indirectly with Worms & Cie; Audy Gilles served as one of the managers of TechniMarine, together with Mr Neufville, Technical Director of NCHP.”794 In October 1963, an article written by André Renaudin appeared in Paris Normandie:795 “Le Havre, methane port – The model for the first methane ship under construction at ACSM in Le Trait was presented in Paris yesterday evening. […] Numerous VIPs from the world of shipping, LNG and banking, were welcomed by the representatives of Gaz de France and

793 The minutes of the Worms CMC Board Meeting on 24 May 1963 show that the level of the company’s participation in SARL Technimarine was 20%. 794 Cf. Roger Mennevée, Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, published in March 1965. This article refers to a press conference given on 15 May 1963, by Robert Labbé, in his capacity as Chairman of the Central Committee of French Shipowners, regarding the programme to redeploy the French merchant fleet. Mennevée summarised Labbé’s words as follows: “The government must provide subsidies to shipping companies to help them demolish their old ships; additional subsidies to help them order new ships; and further subsidies to make them easier to operate.” 795 Paris Normandie on 18 October 1963.

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its affiliated companies, Méthane Transport and Gaz Marine. The ACSM management team – its Chairman, Mr Herrenschmidt; Managing Director, Mr Lamoureux (he was to retire shortly thereafter), and the current Deputy Director, Mr Grillat – were present. Mr Grillat has been given the special assignment of overseeing ACSM activities next year. […] The first French methane carrier will thus succeed the ‘Beauvais’ in 1964. On each trip between Arzew and Le Havre, [the ship] will transport the equivalent of 13.8 million-m3 of gas, the annual gas consumption of a conurbation like Rouen or Rennes. It is scheduled to be commissioned in the fourth quarter of 1964. We know that an agreement was concluded in 1962 with the Société d’Exploitation des Hydrocarbures in Hassi R’Mel (Sahara). As a result of this contract, Gaz de France will receive 420 million-m3 of gas, which will then be sent to the Paris region.” The “Jules Verne” is launched on 8 September 1964 The first methane carrier built in France was also the largest ship ever launched in Le Trait. The launch marked the shipyard’s technical apogee, but also sounded its death knell, as we shall soon see. Measuring 201 metres in length, 24.70 metres in width and 16.50 metres in depth, the ship was designed to transport 25,500-m3 of LNG (equivalent to 15,300,000-m3 of gas) per voyage in its seven separate tanks. The FCM propulsion unit develops 13,000-HP (maximum 15,000-HP) from eleven Turbo-Reducers, allowing a speed of 17 knots. “The liquid gas unloaded in Le Havre is regasified at the port and piped to the Paris region, where it is stored in natural underground reservoirs in Beynes, in the Yvelines department.”796 In the sixteen months (and one week) of its construction, most of the shipyard’s workforce were assigned to the “Jules Verne.” “1964,” stated the annual report to the General Meeting of 29 June 1965, “was dominated, as in the previous year, by the construction of the methane carrier.” Nevertheless, other ships were also built during this period.

The “Jules Verne” at the Le Havre gas terminal Ω

796 Account of Charles Duguet, Secretary General of ACSM, of 23 January 1978.

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Other ship orders Three ships were launched in 1962: - the ore carrier “Stylehurst” was launched on 4 May for Grenehurst Shipping Co. Ltd. - the cargo ship “Ville de Brest” left slipway No. 1 on 19 June, with the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire taking delivery on 18 August; - the 7,350-dwt (maximum) cargo ship “Saint François,” on which construction started in slipway No. 8 on 15 January 1962, was launched on 17 October; she left the fitting-out quay a month later to become part of the fleet of the Compagnie de Navigation Denis Frères, – operating in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) and Haiphong, then on the west coast of Africa as of 1955. Four vessels were launched in 1963, construction on three of which had started in 1962: - the 7,870-dwt cargo ship “N.O. Røgenæs,” occupying slipway No. 1 between 25 July 1962 and 27 May 1963, was delivered on 18 November 1963 to the Norwegian shipowner, Niels Røgenæs (ACSM built a total of eight ships for Norwegian shipping companies); - the two hydrographic survey vessels “Astrolabe” (previously mentioned) and “Boussole,” under construction in slipway No. 7 on 25 and 26 November 1962 (or 5 February 1963) respectively, were launched on 11 April and 27 May 1963 and delivered to the French Navy on 5 and 27 February 1964; - the 3,400-m3 butane carrier “Copernico” (previously mentioned), the keel of which was laid on 15 November 1962 in slipway No. 2, was launched on 11 April 1963; the Chilean company, Naviera Interoceangas SA, took delivery on 2 September. Work undertaken in 1963 also included the conversion (engines, holds, etc.) of the “Ville de Tananarive” and the “Ville de Tamatave,” delivered to the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire on 26 March and 25 May 1963. On 1 March of that same year, construction started on a 14,597-dwt freighter under the name of “Mont Aigoual” in slipway No. 8: in anticipation of operating difficulties, the owner, the Société Générale des Transports Maritimes (SGTM), sold it to NCHP; the ship was launched as the “Ville d’Anvers” on 2 March 1964 and delivered on 12 May 1964. Still in 1963, construction on the third of four freighters ordered by NCHP in 1959 began in slipway No. 1: the “Ville de Bordeaux,” (12,304-dwt) which was launched on 11 April 1964, and delivered on 6 August. On 15 April

1964, slipway No. 1 was occupied once more, this time by the “Ville de Lyon,” the fourth cargo ship for NCHP. Turning to the 1964 ship orders, the shipyard went ahead with the conversion of the 13,000-ton oil tanker “Betty Maersk” into a molten sulphur carrier for the Société Nouvelle des Pétroles d’Aquitaine (in which Maison Worms had an interest). Re-named the “Président André Blanchard,”797 the tanker was delivered on 23 May 1964. On 15 July 1964, construction began in workshop on the first in a series of five pushers ordered by the Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine; named the “Dauphin,” the vessel was equipped with two 152-HP engines. 1 and 15 December 1964 marked the start of construction on two other pushers, the “Montcalm” and the “Dupleix” fitted with two 540-HP engines each. Between 3 September and 20 October 1964, ACSM set about lengthening seven barges for Union Normande, Soflumar, Citherna, and the Société de Transports par Automoteurs-Citernes. On 14 and 23 September 1964, the keels were laid in slipway No. 2 for two ferry boats, the “Stena Danica” and “Stena Nordica” for Stena AB, the Swedish shipping company founded by Sten A. Olsson.

797 See a press clipping from an unspecified newspaper of 12 April 1964: “The ‘Président André Blanchard.’ On 10 June, this molten sulphur carrier will be placed in service on behalf of the SNPA [Société Navale des Pétroles d’Aquitaine]. This date coincides with the inauguration of the sulphur loading facilities in Bayonne, the future home port of this ship.” In the foreground, the hydrographic survey vessel “Boussole” and, floating on the Seine, the two tanks for butane carrier “Copernico”

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The butane carrier “Copernico” launched on 11 April 1963 for the Chilean company, Naviera Interoceangas SA

As reported in the annual report of 29 June 1965, just one order was placed in fiscal year 1964 for 1965: for “one reefer (3,400-grt) intended for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation, [and which was] awarded to [the] company under the terms of a contract signed on 19 June 1964.” The ship was the “Ivolina,” a reefer on which construction started on 15 January 1965 in slipway No. 8. Although a few other contracts had been signed, management undoubtedly considered them less important than the contracts for oil tankers or large freighters. An overly diversified order book The order book for 1962–1964 was characterised by diversity: first and foremost, a diversity of clients, a number of whom came from abroad: Panama Gypsum Co., Inc., Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin, Grenehurst Shipping Co. Ltd., Niels Røgenæs, Naviera Interoceangas – Chile, Stena AB, Lignes Maritimes du Détroit – Morocco, among others. Had ACSM benefited from Worms’ list of customers? The fact remains that ACSM seemed to succeed where its competitors struggled: opening up to international markets and exporting. Diversity also characterised production: freighter, oil tanker, ore carrier, methane carrier, butane carrier, liquide sulphur tanker, reefer, ferry boat, freezer trawler, pusher, etc. While this range bore witness to the

shipyard’s wide-ranging know-how, it played against the company insofar as “made to measure” made it impossible to save on manufacturing costs as achieved through series production. Quite the contrary, “made to measure,” because of the supplement overtime required, caused price estimates to skyrocket, with the shipyard unable to pass on these extra costs to its clients. In this regard, it should be mentioned that the launch deadlines, as reported in memos, Board Meeting minutes and loan requests issued by the company, etc. were systematically exceeded (often by several months). For instance, a report of 18 May 1965 mentioned about the “Jules Verne” whose technological success was unfortunately not matched by financial success: “Part of productive hours are accounted for by overtime (needed in particular for the completion of the ‘Jules Verne’), and many production workers had to exceed the weekly schedule of 46.15 hours.” After experiencing its first losses in 1962 (3.4 million francs), operations continued to be in the red, with deficits mounting from year to year: 5.6 million francs in 1963, 7.6 million francs in 1964. This imbalance was attributable to pure shipbuilding activity which was less and less profitable. That is why ACSM decided to reposition itself, focusing on the reconversion of its activities while in 1963 the municipality of Le Trait launched into the creation of a 26-hectares industrial zone.

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The cargo ship “N. O. Røgenæs” launched on 27 May 1963 for the Norwegian shipowner Niels Røgenæs

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Final launches for the French Navy 11 April and 27 May 1963: the hydrographic survey vessels “Astrolabe” and “Boussole”

Specifications Length overall

42.70 meters

Beam

8.20 meters

Draught

2.40 meters

Mean displacement

350-dwt

Maximum speed

12.5 knots

Crew

36 (including 3 hydrographic officers)

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Towards “despecialisation”ˮ “Diversifying and intensifying its reconversion activities” ACSM 29 June 1965798

The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime was one of the first shipbuilding companies to complement its core business by developing its boilermaking operations, then to compensate for the weakening of its main business by directing its activities toward mechanical construction, bundling for the steel industry, prefabrication, etc. – sectors likely to ensure job security for a portion of its workforce, and to lift the shipyard out of its geo-economic isolation. Floating roofs and boilermaking activities For decades, ACSM developed hydrocarbon storage facilities under various American licences (in particular, floating roofs under licence from Chicago Bridge): in 1962, it obtained an exceptional order for a refinery in the Philippines, and in 1964, for another one in Thailand. It then became involved in the construction of metal water towers, tubular structures intended for oil drilling, and rotary filters. ACSM also used Foster Wheeler licences to build boilers, and a Sigma licence for certain components used in free-piston generators. The company manufactured conventional boilers for industrial facilities, orders procured by the company as a result of its relationships with engineering companies. ACSM undertook maintenance and servicing work. A Crédit National report of 10 December 1963 described the facilities dedicated to this industrial activity. “Two ‘naves’ have been reserved exclusively for reconversion to other activities, and during our visit,” remarked the author of the report. “We saw boilers being constructed for a refinery in Thailand; - a 3,800 m2 mechanical workshop, leased to Constructions Mécaniques of Le Trait [discussed later in this chapter]. This workshop is beginning to be equipped with large-size machine tools, though it seemed to lack several precision machines, such as jig boring machines.

Drawing and photo of a floating roof published in Le Calfat du Trait

In addition to these two main workshops, others included: - a workshop under construction, to where the manufacture of floating roofs is to be transferred; - a slipway (No. 6) covered several years ago at the request of the French Navy and now converted into a workshop through the construction of a cement floor(see page 354); - a well-equipped woodworking and cabinetmaking workshop;

798 Annual report to the Ordinary General Meeting of 29 June 1965.

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Grain silo and water tower built by ACSM in the Nancy region

- a small workshop specially developed in 1960 for the series production of prefabricated building components,799 [discussed later in this chapter]; - a 750o stress-relief furnace, measuring 12 metres long. The shipyard thus has a range of high-value facilities, all making an excellent impression,” concluded the inspector. New industrial specialties To develop its traditional boilermaking activities, ACSM lacked an appropriate salesforce. The head office in Paris handled shipbuilding contracts and large orders regarding the reconversion activities (those dealing with large assemblies, for example). The shipyard itself enjoyed great autonomy. But there was a service missing between the two, a dedicated and specialised salesforce. For this reason, the Crédit National report

799 These components were intended for schools, laboratories and engineering offices. They were mounted by a construction company in Le Havre.

recommended that a “sales department be set up and that, in addition to the chairman, one or more members of senior management be made personally responsible for conversion and full employment of the workforce in the coming years.” This gap was partially filled by closer or strengthened ties with industrial companies via shared subsidiaries: - Wean Damiron engineering office (share capital of 2,520,000 F), specialised in steelmaking facilities and equipment for metalworking industries; founded in 1956 as a joint venture between the American group Wean-McKay and the French Damiron & Cie; - Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM), an established partner since 1956. ACSM and FCM

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In the foreground, the two barges ordered by the Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin and delivered in 1960 – in the background, slip No. 6 (covered)

together established an office dedicated to seeking new outlets in expanding sectors, which employed a director, two engineers, an executive assistant, three parttime employees and four secretaries.800 This move to set up specialised companies resembled the way the shipyard’s LNG operations had been structured. Les Constructions Mécaniques du Trait In March 1962, ACSM partnered with Wean Damiron to create Les Constructions Mécaniques du Trait (CMT), an SARL company co-managed by Pierre Herrenschmidt and Paul Damiron. Its goal was to increase the shipyard’s production capacity within the mechanical engineering sector (manufacture of large industrial equipment intended in particular for the steel industry) and machine welding. Headquartered in Le Trait, CMT had a share capital of 4 million francs. According to the Crédit National report of 10 December 1963, ACSM “brought in its mechanical workshops valued at 2 million francs, while Wean Damiron made a cash contribution of the same amount,” but curiously a few pages later, the 3,800 m2 workshop in question is presented as “leased by ACSM to CMT.” Moreover, the

800 See ACSM report of 18 May 1965.

90 employees listed as belonging to CMT continued to be on the ACSM payroll – as if the company were merely an extension of ACSM, without actual content. In its first full year of operations, CMT achieved a turnover of approximately 4 million francs, a portion of which (500,000 F) was work invoiced to ACSM. The other sales were secured through the intermediary of Wean Damiron. A 50% increase in growth (from 4 to 6 million francs) was expected for the second year, it being understood that “CMT has no other client than its two shareholders [who] have agreed that all work will be performed at cost price, so as not to make either profit or loss.” In 1963, “the shipyard […] employed 1,985 persons, of whom 1,837 worked for ACSM and 148 for CMT.”801 Botalam Still in the steel industry, ACSM, in an attempt to maintain manufacturing activity at a certain level, acquired patents in 1963 to manufacture bundling machines initially exploited by the mechanisation department of the company, ABG.802 An agreement was concluded

801 Crédit National report of 10 December 1963 regarding ACSM. 802 See the memo of 20 January 1964; in a memo of 9– 11 June 1964, these investments are indicated as 3,080,000 F.

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with ABG, following which ACSM founded Botalam SARL on 22 June 1963 with share capital of 2.3 million francs (quickly increased to 3 million). ACSM held 70% of the shares, while the remaining 30% were held by ABG, Wean Damiron and FCM. The owner of the patents, Botalam sold the bundling machines constructed by ACSM to its clientele within the steel industry. This subsidiary was headquartered at 9, Rue Tronchet, to where the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime had recently relocated its general management. “With an eye to transforming its Banking Services, Worms & Cie had [indeed] asked [its subsidiary] to return the premises it occupied at 47, Boulevard Haussmann, and 14, Rue Auber. ACSM thus moved its general management to 9, Rue Tronchet, in a building belonging to the insurance company, the Mutuelle Générale Française-Vie, while its headquarters remained at 45, Boulevard Haussmann.”803 Valued at approximately 8 million francs in June 1964, the Botalam order book listed solely export contracts (to the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium).804 The ACSM annual report dated 29 June 1965 stated that “Botalam devoted the bulk of its activities in 1964 to manufacturing equipment for automatic bundling machines used in the rolling mill at the Ijmuiden steel plant in the Netherlands. While the first financial year of operations ended with a loss, completing the first installation of this size suggests that interesting sales prospects to arise for the company.” Euro Moteurs At nearly the same time as Botalam was set up, ACSM helped found a European engine company – Euro Moteurs – an SARL company with its headquarters in Paris at 45 (or 53) Avenue d’Iéna. Its share capital of 50 thousand francs (divided into 500 shares valued at 100 francs each)805 was shared among the Ateliers et

803 At that time, the ACSM Board was made up of Pierre Herrenschmidt, Chairman; Joseph Brocard, Vice Chairman; Raymond Meynial; Guy Brocard; Worms & Cie (represented by one of its General Partners, Robert Labbé); and Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Pierre Chevalier). 804 See the Crédit National report of 10 December 1963; memo from the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime to the Worms & Cie Banking Services dated 9–11 June 1964; ACSM memo of 1 October 1964. 805 See the merger agreement of 5 April 1966, received by Mr Chalain, notary, on 3 May 1966.

Chantiers de La Rochelle-La Pallice, the Établissements Brissonneau et Lotz, and the Matériel Électrique SW. Paul Bastide, Executive Manager of the Ateliers et Chantiers de La Rochelle-La Pallice, along with Pierre Herrenschmidt, co-managed Euro Moteurs, the goal of which “in France, its overseas territories, and abroad, was to study, research and technically upgrade all original processes or resources potentially applicable to all types of engines, particularly a prototype barrel-type diesel engine, known as a Girodin Moteur, as well as all mechanical, electrical or electronic machinery and parts.”806 Praia In the course of 1963, ACSM, in partnership with FCM and the Ateliers de Menpenti, contributed to the formation of the Société de Prospection des Activités Industrielles d’Avenir (Praia), an SARL company with a share capital of 200,000 F. Its purpose was to engage in prospective studies and business development. In 1964, ACSM participated in this subsidiary’s share capital increase of 250,000 F, at the conclusion of which ACSM and FCM each owned 50% of the company.807 From one investment programme to another With a view to financing its “despecialisation,” ACSM drafted an investment programme targeting the redeployment of approximately 20% of its workforce in 1960. This plan, estimated to require the expenditure of 4,780 million francs, was approved by the public authorities in February 1961. In addition, in November 1960, the company received an equipment grant of 576,000 F, at an interest rate of 12%. ACSM was also authorised to participate for 3 million francs in a group loan issued by the Normandy Regional Development Company.808 The 1963 annual statement valued the total investments committed to reconversion since 1960 at 7.9 million francs (out of

806 Cf. Roger Mennevée, Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, March 1965. 807 Cf. Roger Mennevée, “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie en 1964,” published in Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, in April 1964. Among the financial transactions in which Worms & Cie participated or lent its assistance, the capital increase for the Regional Agency for the Economic Development of Normandy was mentioned. 808 See Crédit National report of 10 December 1963.

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total fixed assets of 48.6 million francs). Although the initial financing programme had been fully achieved, ACSM could be proud to have met its targets: - turnover from activities other than shipbuilding had grown continually over the last three fiscal years: 7,860,000 F in 1961, 15,810,000 F in 1962 and 21,314,000 F (or 21.5% of the total results of 91,973,000 F) in 1963.809 Nonetheless, changes in the economic climate forced the company to consider a second phase, which necessitated the redeployment of 40% of its workforce within the boilermaking sector in 1965, to the benefit of approximately 200 people. With that goal in mind, a second financing plan was submitted to the public authorities in May 1963 which amounted to 9,526,000 F,810 of which 3,080,000 F for acquiring patents for the bundling machines – patents on the basis of which Botalam was established – and for covering the development expenses for a new diesel engine manufactured by Euro Moteurs. In addition, the firm sought financial assistance from a) the Economic and Social Development Fund (FDES): a loan of 5 million francs; and b) Crédit National: a long-term loan of 1.7 million francs and a medium-term loan of 2 million francs. On 17 December 1963, a request to mobilise funds for this latter financing was sent to six banking institutions (including Worms & Cie) to cover said loan with Crédit National for a five-year period (20 December 1963 to 19 December 1968). In the letter sent to the banks, ACSM referred to an important point: “Crédit National will terminate its commitment to mobilise funds in full at the end of the first year, if [the] company has not gone ahead with a capital increase through fully paid-up cash subscriptions, securing for the company, including share premium accounts, at least 2 million francs.” This condition was fulfilled in November 1964.

809 In a memo of 2 July 1965, it was indicated that “turnover, excluding taxes, earned by the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, as a result of all of their reconversion activities, including sub-contractor contracts, reached 27,134,000 F in 1964, representing a 40% increase over the corresponding figure in 1963: 19,090,000 F. This figure now constitutes 34% of total turnover for the company.” 810 See the memo sent by ACSM to the Worms & Cie Banking Services on 9–11 June 1964: the second investment programme amounted to 12,306,000 F – out of this total, 2,780,000 F were earmarked for the shipbuilding division for the purpose of renewing old facilities and improving productivity.

Fifth and final capital increase On 12 November 1964, the shareholders were informed that, in execution of the decisions taken by the Board of Directors811 that same day under the powers conferred on it by the Extraordinary General Meeting of 29 July 1964, the company’s share capital would be increased from 6 to 8 million francs through the issuance of 20 thousand new shares with a par value of 100 francs, to be subscribed in cash, at par, and fully funded through either cash or compensation. The rights associated with said 20 thousand new shares were exercisable as of 1 January 1964.812 The notice published in Les Petites Affiches indicated that the company headquarters was located at 9, Rue Tronchet, Paris.813 The capital increase was achieved on 30 November 1964. It was realised in full by Worms & Cie, “which offset a portion of ACSM’s outstanding debt to it, which amounted to 4,751,912 F at 26 November 1964. This still left ACSM in debt to Worms & Cie to the tune of 2,750,000 F in round figures.”814 This operation can be partially explained by the commitment made to the lending institutions (Crédit National) to improve the company’s financial situation; an additional goal was to strengthen ACSM’s weight in the perspective of a merger with one or several of its competitors – such a project was already under consideration – and to counter the threat of closure arising from such an eventuality. The more financial weight the company had, the less risk it ran of being the one absorbed and disappearing.

811 See its composition in footnote 803, page 355. 812 Insert in Les Petites Affiches of 12–13 November 1964. See the memo from Pierre Herrenschmidt to Robert Labbé on 13 November 1964. 813 From the archives, it is not possible to establish the precise date on which the headquarters moved from Boulevard Haussmann to this address; the move occurred between June 1963, the date on which the general management moved there, and November 1964, the date on which the insert was published in Les Petites Affiches. 814 “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie in 1964,” published in Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, in April 1965.

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“The government’s pressing demand” Le Figaro, 29 January 1965

From several potential mergers to a two way-merger Three potential mergers were studied between July 1962 and April 1966, the date on which the last of the three was realised: - first, with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat (CNC) and the Chantiers & Ateliers de Provence (CAP); - second, with those same companies plus the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée; - and finally, with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat alone. The intention was the same each time: to meet the requirements of the public authorities. Each of the potential mergers was based on a letter sent by the government on 7 April 1962. Although this letter unfortunately could not be found in the ACSM archives and in the available bibliographic or digital sources, it is referenced in several memos, thus making it possible to reconstruct its content: sent by Prime Minister Michel Debré (8 January 1959 to 14 April 1962) to the Minister for Transport and Public Works, the government, using the 1959 White Paper as its basis, expressed its desire to reduce the number of shipyards in operation. To that end, the government made the payment of public subsidies conditional on a concentration of the shipbuilding sector. This basically meant that several companies would have to give up shipbuilding, merge with other shipbuilders or, at worst, cease to exist. On this point, a CNC memo of 20 September 1965, was particularly telling: “It is important that the managing directors of both companies [ACSM and CNC, in this instance] present a programme […] to the public authorities that achieves the goals set forth in the letter from Mr Debré; namely, proposing that two shipbuilding companies [of the three involved in the merger] stop making use of the State Aid Law.” “In a social climate fully mindful of the threat of closure,”815 the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime was to attempt to negotiate its future in the

815 ACSM memo of 13 February 1965.

best possible way. It should be noted in this regard that during the period when closer ties were being forged with CNC, the latter was engaged in a project to build a “great form,” in other words a giant slipway allowing the construction of 350,000-dwt ships. This project was conceived by CNC at the end of the 1950s, taken over in 1962, financed from 1965 onwards via a specially dedicated company, and completed on 8 February 1969, the day of the inauguration of the 360-meter long and 60-meter wide slipway. Proposed merger with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat and the Chantiers & Ateliers de Provence The Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat was one of the four largest shipyards in France. Its roots went back to the company formed in the mid-1830s by Louis Benet (the son of a shipowner based in La Ciotat) from a shipyard for sailing boats established by master carpenter Joseph Vence. The 1848–1851 crisis forced Louis Benet to sell his shipyard to the Messageries Maritimes, which in turn sold it in 1916 to the Société Provençale de Constructions Navales (created for this purpose); following its bankruptcy, the Société Provençale was purchased in January 1940 by the Terrin group (Société des Ateliers Terrin, created in 1891) and renamed Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat. The Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence (CAP) was established in 1899 in Port-de-Bouc by Alfred Fraissinet, manager of the Compagnie Française de Navigation (also known as the Compagnie Fraissinet) of which he was one of the heirs, and by Jules Charles-Roux, a shipowner, industrialist and politician. At the end of the 1950s, the Fraissinet group, expecting that the new criteria for allocating public subsidies imposed by the White Paper would hinder the company’s ability to grow, decided to withdraw from shipbuilding. Fraissinet group sold 80% of its shares to a group of financiers made up of the descendants of the Marseilles banker, Périclès Zarifi, himself one of the founding shareholders of CAP. Jean Domenichino816 was to remark: “This transaction was

816 “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit., p. 58.

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The Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat (Bouches-du-Rhône department)

hard to explain at the time. Indeed, if the shipyard was still profitable, people did not understand why the Fraissinet family wished to part with it. […] Nor did people understand the Zarifi decision – assuming CAP was doomed in the short term – except to acknowledge that there had been an error in judgment. The purpose of the transaction was clarified the following year. Upon the death of François Charles-Roux, Board member of the company and a descendant of the first Chairman of CAP, the Board of Directors named as his replacement Jean-Marie Terrin, a shareholder of Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, and Chairman of the Société Provençale des Ateliers Terrin in Marseilles. Not only was Zarifi the son-in-law of Terrin, but he himself was a shareholder in Chantiers de La Ciotat. Thus, Zarifi’s purchase of the Fraissinet shares made complete sense: it disguised how the Chantiers de La Ciotat had taken control of the shipyard in Port-de-Bouc.” Thus, when ACSM started talks with CNC and CAP, it was not with two partners, but with CNC alone. On 24 July 1962, ACSM, CNC and CAP drafted a protocol for the purpose of “engaging in joint policies within technical and commercial fields [and of ] studying a

total or partial merger of their assets.”817 The underlying reasons for this – and subsequent – initiatives were set forth in the memorandum of understanding (MoU): “- the difficult situation of shipbuilding; - the position of the public authorities vis-à-vis the sector, as set forth in the letter dated 7 April 1962; - the de facto solidarity among the shipyards as a result of the government’s position; - the extent of the potential for ship and industrial construction within the three companies, as well as the growth potential; - the efforts made, as well as the results already achieved, in reconversion; - the importance of CNC in the shipbuilding field; - the position of CAP in the field of mechanical engineering; - the importance of the shipping activities associated with the Worms group, and the commercial potential of this group.” Indeed, the intrinsic value of ACSM was far less interesting for its partners than its links to the Worms shipping group, which was the real target. In fact, “ACSM gave the assurance on behalf of the Worms group that the Worms shipping companies would try

817 Protocol agreement of 24 July 1962; the following quotations were taken from this document.

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their utmost to place their orders with ACSM/CNC/ CAP grouping at a price and quality comparable to those of the competition.” Backed by these commitments, the three shipyards decided to do everything possible, both technically and commercially to: “- no longer compete for projects or orders, but combine their efforts to make best use of the respective strengths of each company, and thus to be in a position to offer more competitive bids; - concentrate on activities best reflecting each company’s technical experience and potential; - streamline and concentrate their shipbuilding activities pursuant to the commitments made to the public authorities; - continue to develop their non-shipbuilding activities, with a view to their various establishments or subsidiaries becoming increasingly complementary; - finally, complete the planned mergers within twelve months.” In this spirit, the three companies agreed to “take into account the vital interests of the shipyards’ workforces which, in all three cases, are located too far away from regional industrial centres for them to find work easily. It is further specified that the Chantiers de La Ciotat will maintain its shipbuilding activities, but that both CNC and the newly formed company will take all steps to maintain shipbuilding and reconversion activities of the two other shipyards so that their combined workforce will not risk more than a 20% decline; all measures are to be studied in conjunction with the public authorities (labour services, land use planning agencies and industrial expansion services) with a view to retaining the staff. […] It is also agreed that the Société de Constructions Mécaniques du Trait will be given every possible means to develop its manufacture of large industrial equipment, particularly that used in the steel industry. To achieve these objectives, the three companies agree to establish […]: - a management committee tasked with defining a joint technical, commercial, financial and social policy, and with overseeing its enforcement. - a coordination committee entrusted with implementing the policy defined by the management committee […]; - and a study committee tasked with preparing the merger.”

This initial agreement was not pursued for reasons that cannot be determined from the archives. The fact remains that the previously described policy of “despecialisation” followed by ACSM was largely inspired by the objectives expressed in this memorandum of understanding. In April 1964, a second project was launched, this time including ACSM’s official partner, Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée. It is interesting to note that the MoU, conceived without FCM, was drafted four days after Gaz Marine forced ACSM to include FCM in the contract to construct the methane carrier “Jules Verne,” for which FCM had refused to serve as co-builder. A four-way merger Towards the end of January 1965, ACSM announced that its sales related to its reconversion activities had increased by 5% over 1964 and now represented 28% of total turnover.818 At the same time, the press announced that ACSM, along with the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat819 and Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence, had just signed a protocol “in application of the merger agreement agreed last April, with a view to concentrating their business activities.” “This concentration, long demanded by the public authorities and one of the conditions for granting financial aid to the shipyards,”820 stated Le Monde on 29 January, was the response “to the growing competition from Japanese shipyards in particular,” expressed Le Figaro the same day, adding that “these companies have just decided, effective immediately, to start pooling their assets for the purpose of making better use of their resources. The gradual specialisation of their establishments, the pooling of their design departments and facilities, is expected to enable them, through

818 Cf. memo from the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime of 20 January 1965. 819 See the memo of 13 January 1965 from Banque Worms: On this date, an overdraft facility of 225,000 francs was granted by Banque Worms to the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence. This credit, which was scheduled to end on 30 June 1965, corresponded to Banque Worms’ share in a 6 million syndicated loan. Approved by the Banque de France, this agreement cancelled and replaced an authorisation granted on 16 December 1964 and amounting to 168,750 F. 820 Cf. letter sent on 7 April 1962, by the Prime Minister to the Minister for Transport and Public Works.

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increased productivity, to reduce their cost prices and simultaneously develop their reconversion to new business activities.” For its part, Le Monde inferred that “a new company will be established between now and next autumn, led by Mr Herrenschmidt [and for which] several coordination committees will now set about the preparatory work.” The newspaper added “that it has taken several months of discussions and the resolution of difficult personal issues to arrive at the merger, [which] is set to lead in the short run to the closure of one of the four shipyards involved (Port-de-Bouc), and in the long run to the closure of two of them.” The protocol defining the method for assessing the respective contributions was signed on 8 February 1965; one month later (3 March 1965), Cabinet Roux, specialising in business valuation, was tasked “with estimating the market value of the various land and residential buildings; determining the replacement value of the industrial or office buildings, as well as the equipment, large tools, facilities, fixtures and fittings (excluding standard small tools) comprising the industrial and real estate complexes, defined as: 1- for FCM: the Mazeline workshops in Le Havre and the shipyard in La Seyne near Toulon. 2- for CNC: the shipyard of La Ciotat; 3- for CAP: the shipyard of Port-de-Bouc; 4- for ACSM: the shipyard in Le Trait and adjoining properties.” CNC alone was valued at 189,286,080 F (May 1965), while Le Trait was valued at 148,602,730 F (1 June 1965). Economic goals of the project The four companies held a meeting on 10 February, the minutes of which were written up by ACSM three days later (13 February 1965); ACSM used the occasion to review the directions it had followed over the course of the three previous years and its solutions for the future. “Between 1962 and February 1965, ACSM has had to follow a very prudent and rather conservative policy, since the company needed to focus all its efforts on the construction of the ‘Jules Verne.’ […] This policy resulted in high turnover and work levels, but also to heavy losses,821 particularly on the methane carrier, because of the sacrifices made on orders taken to ‘cover’ the

821 Memo from Audy Gilles to Guy Brocard, on 29 April 1965. This document contains a large amount of information on operating costs, salaries, etc.

construction of the ship and to reassure personnel.” A memo of 2 July 1965 explained these losses as being the result of the innovative techniques employed in the construction of the “Jules Verne” and the ferry boats “Stena Danica” and “Stena Nordica,” innovations that had distorted cost estimates and forced the shipyard – unplanned – to turn to external specialists, within a highly competitive environment where prices were trending downwards. These losses had been compounded by additional expenses generated by the pace of work, quite intense at times, and overtime. Nonetheless, efforts were ongoing in three directions:  Reduction in production costs It should be noted that the gap between ACSM quotes and those of French or foreign shipyards has narrowed markedly since September 1964: these savings were the result of the in-depth restructuring of certain departments and from the implementation of a methods Department. They should continue to grow due to a workforce reduction of 200 people, 150 of whom should have been made redundant.  Improved technical and commercial bases of reconversion While 75% of ACSM investments have been earmarked for reconversion since 1962, and while fullest autonomy has been granted to the Industrial and Technical Equipment Department (SEIT for short), the foundations for reconversion (GEM columns, Saviem, silos, etc.) have been laid, paving the way for future development (slaughterhouses, the treatment of dairy waste water, prefabricated constructions, close relations established with Procofrance, Hydrocarbon, Didier Werke, etc.). Reconversion accounted for more than 30% of turnover (two points higher than at the end of January) and of the workforce (250 men in SEIT, 90 at Constructions Mécaniques du Trait); the figures for SEIT had consistently improved from 1962, while those of the Société de Constructions Mécaniques remained poor.  The search for solutions allowing the shipyard to end its isolation Now that “the methane carrier is on the verge of setting sail,” two solutions were considered, “both of which result from certain basic observations.” The shipyard has been designed for an annual minimum of 2.5 million hours, mainly used in the construction of oil tankers. This was to a certain extent repetitive work involving fairly simple ships and a minimum of

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finishing work. However, oil tankers were no longer being built at a size compatible with the dimensions of the slipways in Le Trait; and the evolution of shipping was such that series production was very rare for ships other than oil tankers. While a certain repetition was noticeable over the past few months in the “ferry boat” category, these boats featured significant passenger facilities, for which Le Trait is not specially equipped. Despite its efforts to mitigate these issues, the shipyard continued to be burdened excessively because of: - its distance from any industrial centre, which did not make it possible to eliminate or reduce corporations and secondary services as it was the case elsewhere; - the scope and quality of the work demanded by the construction of submarines a few years previously and of the “Jules Verne” more recently and the search, over the past two years, for new boats which, in response to the new needs of shipping companies, were becoming increasingly varied. Taking into consideration the know-how of the teams and the quality of manufacturing at ACSM, the first solution ruled out the ceasing of shipbuilding in Le Trait “as resquested by the government.” It proposed instead to transform ACSM into a yard building ships of 3,000 to 8,000 dwt which did not require a lot of armament works. The shipyard, of which the centralisation of its commercial prospecting, projects, design, execution and supply departments was to relieve a significant part of its overheads, would operate with a much reduced team of engineers and would perform, in line with the quotas now limiting its potential, between 2 million and 2.5 million productive hours per year. This solution, with its limited social repercussions, involved tough negotiations with the public authorities and could be considered only within the framework of a four-way merger. The only other solution was to give up shipbuilding and focuse on the company’s reconversion activities. However, the limitations of such a scenario seemed to lie in the impossibility of adapting the entire site (buildings and means of production) to new areas of specialisation. Moreover, this second option would apply to only 800 workers, 600 of whom were blue-collar workers, out of the total workforce of 1,800; these 800 workers would produce 1.4 million hours of work per year, for revenues of around 50–60 million francs. But the feasibility of this second option was impossible to assess other than through in-depth studies, a source of

concern and demoralisation for the workforce, at least for the thousand workers who would interpret the audit as a redundancy plan, without hope of finding new work in the region. And the public authorities would have to be convinced of the solid economic grounds for such a wide-ranging redundancy plan, just as Maison Worms itself would have to agree to bear such social responsibilities “without denying its past or breaking with its reputation.” And what about all the investments devoted to shipbuilding for which depreciation was still running? No, in reality, this second option was no solution at all. Those who drew up the plan decided “to consider the four-way merger as a key goal, to begin immediately with centralising the sales, design and procurement departments, and to do nothing that might compromise the implementation of the collective redundancies.” Nonetheless, they agreed to study whether the company could break even by limiting its operation to the reconversion activities, to inform the public authorities of the social limitations of this reconversion, and to form a consultative committee with Pierre Herrenschmidt, Guy Brocard and Audy Gilles for the purpose of “handling all important questions that will undoubtedly arise in the upcoming months.”

Time for evaluation The more the shipyard works, the more money it loses As part of its action plan, the shipyard was subjected to a thorough examination, with attention focused on the workforce and its evolution over the course of the last three years. The annual average workforce had declined slightly: 1,803 in 1962; 1,796 in 1963; and 1,770 in 1964. While figures for while-collar staff workers (540–550) and management staff (44–47) remained fairly constant, there was a jump in the external labour force: from 71 people in 1962, the number had shot up to 294 in 1963 and 260 in 1964. This trend was confirmed by the variations in the number of hours worked by the permanent workforce, a total of around 2.7–2.8 million hours, while the hours worked by temporary workers increased more than fivefold: from 136,831 hours in 1962 to more than 600,000 in 1963 and 650,000 in 1964. This jump correlated with the rise in the tonnage produced: 12,900 tons in 1962; 20,922 tons in 1963 and 18,500 tons in 1964, explained primarily by the highly techni-

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cal nature of the work undertaken (on the methane carrier and ferry boats). Indeed, the increased workload did not translate into hiring, but into the increasingly massive recourse to specialist labour from outside, which aggravated the rise in overheads: from nearly 19.5 million in 1962 to more than 21.3 million in 1963 and 23.6 million in 1964, in turn leading inexorably to a drop in turnover: 93.7 million in 1962, 92.5 million in 1963 and 90.3 in 1964. In fact, the more the shipyard worked, the more money it lost. The coffers are emptying while the loans are increasing Up until 28 February 1965, the company had at its disposal a 16-million-franc bank credit line, but this was no longer sufficient: in March, the overdraft for the year was estimated at 25 million, then 30 million. ACSM solicited its bankers – starting with Banque Worms, which had already committed 15 million: in its argument, ACSM asserted that “the scheduled capital increase would lower its debt by 5 million francs” (since that operation had taken place a few months earlier – in November 1964 – this information leads one to believe that another increase was possibly planned). The BNCI, Sofibanque and BIFC were willing to put up funds, but Crédit Lyonnais refused and the Société Générale procrastinated. Mobilisable credits amounted to 32.3 million, middle-term credits to 38.6 million and long-term credits to 10.5 million. “Under the assumption that ACSM gradually ceases its operations – only fulfilling current orders – and without taking into account the latest order for a ferry boat for Morocco,” stipulated a memo of 15 March 1965, “the company is set to post a loss of 38 million francs, without counting the direct and indirect implications associated with the shutdown of operations. This figure is higher than the company estimated (32.5 million). […] This would result in a residual overdraft of 34.7 million, offset by fixed assets and participations. Realisation of the merger currently under consideration, by way of bringing in fixed assets as well as medium- and long-term investment credits, would, over time, reduce the cash position by 12.5 million plus the costs of business interruption.”

First wave of dismissals (March 1965) and deterioration of the social climate On 25 September 1964, less than fifteen days after the launch of the “Jules Verne,” the construction of which confirmed the excellence of the shipyard’s technical know-how, the uncertainties which hampered the future of shipbuilding in Le Trait and weighed heavily on the reconversion of the activity, sparked a two-hour strike in which workers, engineers and managers participated. In the following days, trade unions, elected representatives (including the Mayor of the town) and the population mobilised to support the action plan: on 4 December, the staff stopped working; a protest march through the town and a meeting were organised. On the 7th, the massive unemployment that the merger could cause (10,000 shipbuilding workers have lost their jobs since 1960) and its impact on the local economy were discussed by the Haute-Normandie Regional Council. On the 10th, work in the shipyard was stopped again. On the 22nd, a delegation was received by Jean Morin, Secretary General of the Merchant Navy, who, in response to questions about the government policy directions, declared: “There will be no more orders or subsidies for naval construction in Le Trait.” The brutality of this declaration was softened by the UDR MP Chérasse who assured to have obtained from the Minister for Public Works and Transport, Marc Jacquet, the promise of “building three cargo ships for the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, three submarines for Pakistan Navy and four cargo ships of 4,000-dwt for Morocco.” Hope calmed tempers – for a short time however. February 1965: ACSM management announced that, in order to remain competitive, the shipyard was forced to dismiss 155 people. Its decision was made known in mid-March. For the workforce, it was like a bolt out of the blue, especially since “they are working 46 hours a week”822 and only a short while before, “overtime was being done in the departments hit by the redundancies.” The metalworking section of the CFDT immediately announced its decision to use all means “to defend the dismissed workers – in particular the 36 workers

822 This and the subsequent quotations (except the one from Le Monde) are taken from the article, “Le Trait et son chantier naval, 7 années de lutte,” by Serge Laloyer in Le fil rouge, 1999.

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Le Courrier cauchois (27 March 1965): On 25 March, 1,800 metalworkers, together with the inhabitants of Le Trait and many mayors from the region, marched through the streets of Rouen

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aged between 50 and 60 – and full-employment,” wrote Le Monde on 17 March. “The metalworkers organise the struggle to defend their jobs, supported by the population of Le Trait and the neighbouring towns where ACSM employees live. On 18 March, the workers march through the streets of Le Trait, proclaiming ‘work for all,’ ‘retirement at 60,’ ‘a reduction in working hours’ and ‘the setting-up of new factories.’ Shopkeepers close their premises in solidarity.” The next day, “300 metalworkers gather in Yvetot and march in an impressive procession. On 25 March, the anger spreads to Rouen where 1,800 metalworkers, along with residents of Le Trait and numerous mayors from the region, arriving in 30 coaches, march through the city’s streets. At the head of the demonstration, the dismissed employees wear placards stating ‘Dismissed after 40 years of irreproachable service,’ ‘Dismissed after 44 years of irreproachable service,’ etc. Under their berets, caps or hats, incriminated Serge Laloyer, the looks in the eyes of these men – who, through their work, their sweat, their entire lives, had made ACSM a success […] – put the blame on the merciless logic of capitalist profits. At the Prefecture, they demanded an end to the dismissals and information on the company’s intentions.” The information given in the press and by commentators could not provide much hope to ACSM staff and the population of Le Trait. On 5 April 1965, L’Aurore wrote that the management of four shipyards, including the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, had just signed an agreement to merge and pool their assets. Roger Mennevée, in the April issue of his Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, wrote: “The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, which had already had to cut back its workforce […] should stop building ships – this part of its operations should be transferred to the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, already linked to ACSM – and to redirect its efforts towards boilermaking and specialised mechanical engineering. It is noteworthy that this solution is far more positive than what the government had previously been considering, which included nothing less than shutting down the shipyard owned by ACSM in Le Trait, near Le Havre.”823

Finding ways to stem the haemorrhage The 155 dismissals did not resolve the problems. On top of the 16.6 million in losses accumulated since 1962 came the expected deficit of 20 or so million in 1965 (to a large extent due to losses on ships delivered: 14.3 million). Amortisations totalling approximately 3 million were expected due to the negative balance sheets of several participations. Shareholder equity, valued at 25 million in 1961, fell to 11 million at the beginning of 1965; the cash position continued to deteriorate: shortand long-term debt at the beginning of 1962: 101,747; year-end 1962: 112,767; year-end 1963: 211,949; yearend 1964: 244,356. To enable the company to reconvert its activities, 10 million francs were invested in equipment and tooling, and 5 million in stakes in other companies. Continually increasing since 1961, turnover from nonshipbuilding activities dropped in 1964: 16,343,000 F versus 21,314,000 F in 1963. The fact was hard to accept: ACSM, “which has generally sought to reconvert into fields compatible with its equipment and the skills of its workforce, has found itself faced with fierce competition in this sector from long-established specialised firms. Up to now, the company has had no opportunity in obtaining profitable serial contracts – other than for floating roofs. The results of the companies in which ACSM has acquired stakes in the past few years, notably in Botalam and Constructions Mécaniques du Trait, to boost its reconversion activities, have similarly not met up to expectations.”824 To allow the company to recover, various scenarios were studied and their related costs evaluated: reconversion activities with or without floating roofs, with or without water towers, etc.,825 estimation of the value of the industrial equipment, as well as ACSM production costs, according to whether the order was for a ship or another product, knowing that the disparity stemmed little from the cost of the materials used and a lot from labour costs.826 A fair hourly rate determined the competitiveness of the shipyard, and especially its viability. For that reason, cost-saving efforts focused mainly on the workforce.

823 Cf. Roger Mennevée, “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie en 1964,” published in Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, in April 1965.

824 ACSM memo of 18 May 1965. 825 ACSM memo of 9 April 1965. 826 ACSM memo of 30 April 1965, to Audy Gilles; and memo of July 1965.

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Audy Gilles827 reconciled the data provided by ACSM under the following assumptions that: - “general expenses will remain the same [in 1965] as in 1964; - annual man-hours [will] amount to 2,200,000; - of these 2,200,000 hours, 200,000 [will be] provided by external labour; - of these 2,200,000 hours, 450,000 [will be] allocated to non-shipbuilding orders, and 1,750,000 to shipbuilding orders; - of these 450,000 non-ship-building hours, 100,000 [will be] allocated to floating roofs, and 350,000 to other orders; - the shipbuilding orders [will be] charged at 14.50 F per man-hour (before application of subsidies); - the non-shipbuilding orders [will be] charged at 14.40 F per man-hour, and orders for floating roofs at 23.50 F; - the orders [will] not cause losses on raw materials; - the number of production hours listed on quotes [will be] strictly respected,” in other words, assuming that operating conditions would be under control as much as possible, he reckoned with 5 million francs as the loss for the year. An amount that the dismissals could reduce by 2 million francs. Audy Gilles underlined: “If we are […] unable to offset this loss […], we must consider closing nearly the entire shipyard, and dismissing approximately two-thirds of our workforce (more than 1,000 people). […] It must be pointed out that if the shipyard’s current financial status has not recovered before the conclusion of the four-way merger plan, ACSM will automatically be targeted as one of two shipyards to be closed, and it will be difficult to keep ACSM from bearing the major share of the losses caused by this closure.” These were calculated at “approximately 25 million francs (10 million in indemnities, and 15 million in yield losses).” The only way for the company to break even again and to survive in the new merged group was to increase employee productivity, halt investment, not replace retirees and employees who voluntarily resigned, bring down overheads and cut expenditure on outside labour and supplies.

Although Pierre Herrenschmidt could be very pleased with the 12,258,000 F in orders booked in just four months in 1965 (1 January to 30 April), proportionally higher than the 16,264,000 F booked for the whole of 1964,828 the Board of Directors, during the General Meeting of 29 June 1965, lamented that “the efforts made to fill the order book [have] been disappointing,” while at the same time acknowledged that the contracts had been signed, after months of negotiations, by the Moroccan company Limadet in Tangiers, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique or the Société Havraise de Pêche. For its part, the workload in the non-shipbuilding division was expected to improve noticeably due to a large order for metal water towers. “Considering that it should be possible to redeploy part of its workforce in industrialised construction, notably in school facilities, ACSM [before halting its investments] has taken a 500,000 F stake in the Société Technique de Préfabrication, the commercial intention of which is to provide engineering services for this type of construction. ACSM also has participated in the establishment of the Compagnie pour l’Étude et la Réalisation d’Ensembles Industriels, Agricoles et Alimentaires (Cetral), a company based at 71, Rue du Moulin Vert in Paris, with worldwide operations, in which the Le Trait shipyard took a 20% share (500,000 F), along with Tunzini, Alfa-Laval, SchwartzHautmont and Frankel; the first activities involve the construction of slaughterhouses.”829 In 1964 “Botalam has devoted the bulk of its activities to manufacturing automatic bundling machines used in the rolling mill at the Ijmuiden steel plant in the Netherlands. While the first fiscal year resulted in a loss, by setting up the first installation of this size, interesting commercial prospects should open up for the company. […] The Constructions Mécaniques du Trait [has] not succeeded in overcoming the acute crisis besetting the mechanical engineering industry, posting

827 Memo from Audy Gilles to Guy Brocard, on 29 April 1965.

828 Memo from Pierre Herrenschmidt to Audy Gilles, on 12 May 1965. A memo of 2 July 1965 specifies that total non-shipbuilding orders concluded between 1 January and 31 May 1965 reached 16.5 million francs. 829 Cf. The ACSM annual report of 29 June 1965 and Roger Mennevée, “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie en 1964,” op. cit.

“The crisis […] is now reaching an exceptionally grave level” ACSM General Meeting, 29 June 1965

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a loss roughly equal to its annual amortisation as of 31 December 1964.” The company’s balance sheet clearly shows that the crisis faced by European shipbuilding has now reached an exceptionally serious level and that in France the capital goods sector is seriously impacted. Thus, “at the invitation of the public authorities, the management of ACSM, FCM, Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat and Chantiers de Provence, all four involved in the construction of large ships, have decided to study, with the assistance of experts, the possibility of grouping their companies together, with a view to improving productivity within the group’s shipbuilding activities and to extending their reconversion activities. Should the envisioned merger come to fruition, the public authorities would be amenable to applying to the whole sector certain measures favourable to both the shipbuilding and the non-shipbuilding sectors.”830 The future would decide otherwise. “The foreseeable failure of discussions on a four-way merger” Chantiers Navals de la Ciotat, 20 September 1965

On 19 March 1964, CAP management announced that the order book was empty. 900 employees were dismissed between 1964 and 1966, while numerous strikes and union struggles tried to prevent the closure. CAP was forced to file for bankruptcy. In February 1966, the company went into liquidation. 400 employees were dismissed, while 150 were transferred from Portde-Bouc to La Ciotat.  The Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM) being dismantled After an initial wave of 244 dismissals and 331 early retirements in autumn 1965, a rumour spread that FCM was in default with payment. The financial crisis was so dire that it was difficult for FCM to complete construction on its final ship. Neither the resignations and appointment of a new head of the company, “nor the numerous appeals for workforce mobilisation […] to prevent the closure planned by the government [… nor the] marches swelled by the local population and the clergy to such centres as Toulon, Draguignan, Marseilles and Paris”832 were to any avail. “Losses growing and growing, headcounts dropping from 3,000 to

Within just a few months, two of the four companies involved in the concentration plan ceased to be associated with it:  The Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence (CAP) forced to file for bankruptcy After CAP was taken over by Georges Périclès Zarifi (spouse of Lucile Terrin), a son-in-law of Jean-Marie Terrin, another son-in-law, Baron Jean d’Huart (spouse of Françoise Terrin), assumed leadership of the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence. “From a single company, it split into three distinct entities, separating the Port-de-Bouc site from its ship repair and machine engineering divisions. In addition, between 1962 and 1964, CAP assets were used to form four companies specialised in heavy machinery manufacturing. By setting up the companies on-site, the Terrin group was able to receive reconversion grants amounting approximately to the sum spent in 1960 to purchase CAP shares. At the same time, the CAP sales department was dissolved.”831

830 General Assembly of 29 June 1965. 831 Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale provençale et de la Basse-Seine des années 1960. Étude comparative,” Les Ports normands : un modèle ? Actes du colloque Rouen - Le Havre 1998, textes recueillis par E. Wauters, Presses Universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 1999, pp. 215–224.

832 This and the subsequent quotations are taken from the article “Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (19141966),” by the industrial draughtsman at FCM, Jean-Pierre Guiol, see https://sites.google.com.

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2,000, [and] the lack of orders force the company to declare bankruptcy. […] On 11 February 1966, a legal administrator is appointed and the contract workers is dismissed.” FCM was soon broken up: after ceasing activities on 1 July 1966, the shipyard in La Seyne, which had received assistance in the form of a governmentbacked guarantee, was taken over by the Herlicq group, which renamed it, Constructions Navales et Industrielles de la Méditerranée (CNIM). The facilities in Le Havre were purchased by Draesser-Dujardin, while the Établissements de Graville became a subsidiary of the Ateliers et Chantiers du Havre. Merging with CNC alone An underlying motivation: building of the “great form” in La Ciotat On 30 April 1965, Audy Gilles and Baron d’Huart, General Manager of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, initiated closer ties between Le Trait and La Ciotat with an eye to merging the two shipyards. “Now that the foreseeable failure of discussions regarding a four-way merger has become a reality,” stated two documents

signed in La Ciotat, “it is imperative that the leaders of the two companies present an alternative programme meeting the objectives defined in the letter from Mr Debré [i.e. the letter of 7 April 1962] and proposing the closure of two shipyards. CNC has already practically assumed the destinies of CAP, and thus, in exchange for the services rendered in the past, present and future, CNC has been assured of the CAP’s waiver of the State Aid Law. In the four-way agreements, ACSM was the second company earmarked for closure. Its Senior Management acknowledge that the size of the company does not allow it to remain competitive at that time. Under these conditions, ACSM management is ready to provide CNC with a letter renouncing any benefit of the Aid Law, effective as of 1969, if in return CNC allows ACSM to resolve its particular problems. Additionally, the Worms group, the owner of ACSM, is prepared to write off the debt owed to it by ACSM and to take a direct financial stake in the capital of La Ciotat, the terms of which shall be documented [elsewhere].”833 With this in mind, in mid-September 1965 ACSM was requested to “begin dismissing workers, managers and white-collar staff, both in Le Trait and in Paris,”834 for the purpose of “bringing the hourly wage rate down to 14.50 F, including all related expenses.” An executive committee was formed, made up of equal numbers of Worms and CNC representatives, but headed by a Chief Executive from CNC. It was incumbent upon CNC, within three months, to establish a joint entity responsible for sales, purchasing and design work. Moreover, it was understood that “any profits or losses from orders currently on the book will remain on the books of the Worms group, whereas La Ciotat will take over all orders after this agreement is signed.” Since “the reorganisation of the profession and the closing of two establishments were to benefit to all the other companies, principally Penhoët,” an agreement was to bring the Chantiers de l’Atlantique to share in the expenses of this transaction, “by assuring Le Trait a minimum volume of non-shipbuilding orders allowing the rapid retraining of ACSM staff.”

833 See CNC memos of 17 and 20 September 1965, which present several differences; thus, in the former, the failure of discussions was “confirmed,” whereas in the latter, it was “foreseeable.” 834 This and the subsequent five quotations were taken from CNC memos of 17 September 1965, entitled “Base d’un accord entre les CNC et les Chantiers du Trait.”

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Finally, in the ultimate event of a merger, it was planned that “the land on which the ACSM shipyard was built would be separated from the asset contribution and grouped within a real estate company of which the Worms group would retain ownership.” This time, the merger was underway and nothing could stop it. The financial situations of both companies were evaluated and compared: earnings, working capital and cash, debts and loans, government grants, forecasts (especially the risks related to credit transactions and bad debt), […] were all examined in detail.835 At the heart of the matter, the issue of hours worked;836 their recording and the analysis of their variations and costs, kept experts and analysts busy – since savings were to be made on labour. The magnitude of the scheduled dismissals was of concern to public authorities on account of the social repercussions. The number of employees was reduced to 1,500 in December 1965. From summer 1965 to spring 1966, La Ciotat and Le Trait worked to define the mechanisms leading to closer ties, and notably “to determine the parity rate between the shares of the two companies, and the share of ACSM short-term debt which, after conversion into longterm debt, the merged company had to be taken into account.”837 While negotiating with the Merchant Navy over the cooperation that CNC “is ready to give to the banks and the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique to find a solution to the problems caused by the financial status of the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence,”838 CNC required “clear and formal assurances from the public authorities”839 regarding: - “the allocation of the CNC, ACSM and CAP quotas to the company arising from the merger, starting on 1 January 1966. The quota for the consolidated company would rise to 100,000 grt out of the 350,000 grt authorised by the framework legislation,” an increase assessed in light of the capacities of the future giant slipway or “great form” (359 m long, 60 m wide,

835 See memos (unsigned) of 29 September; 6 and 8 October 1965; ACSM memo of 15 November 1965; memo to the Central Tax Inspectorate of 1 December 1965; loan depreciation table of 31 December 1965. 836 See ACSM memo of December 1965, entitled “Relevé général des heures travaillées.” 837 Cf. CNC memo of 6 January 1966, to the Merchant Navy. 838 Cf. CNC memo of 19 January 1966, to the Merchant Navy. 839 Cf. CNC memo of 6 January 1966, to Merchant Navy.

212,460 m3), currently under construction in La Ciotat, - “the granting to the newly merged company, within the framework of the terms of the draft Finance Law for 1966, of long-term credit at low interest rates intended to finance CNC investment programmes and ACSM reconversion, - to the benefit of CAP, the acceptance in principle of an imminent request for FDES credit of approximately 12 million francs, for the purpose of maintaining and developing industrial activity that would employ at least 500 people in Port-de-Bouc.” This last request was cancelled on 19 January 1966. On 1 February 1966, Worms & Cie, along with Hall Montaigne Rond-Point and Cema (Compagnie Européenne de Matériels), together holding 87% of CNC’s capital and jointly referred to as Groupe Intra Bank (GI),840 signed a protocol for the merger of their respective subsidiaries: the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime and the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat. Article 2 stipulated that “in the face of the general economic climate, that of shipbuilding and that of CNC and ACSM specifically, Worms and GI, as principal shareholders of these two companies, are convinced, confirm and herewith acknowledge that it is in their mutual interest to merge. GI and Worms herewith agree to pursue everything incumbent upon them to ensure that the legal procedures required to complete this merger are undertaken, pursued, and brought to a conclusion as soon as possible; all to be performed in conformity with the principles, on the bases and under the terms, according to the valuations and parities which are hereinafter stipulated, and which have been agreed upon by the parties hereto after careful study.” To this end, Banque Worms reaffirmed its position

840 Originating in Lebanon, the group GI was founded in 1951 by Yousef Beidas (among others), and became one of the largest financial institutions in the Middle East, active in Africa, Europe, and the United States. Through the Société du Hall Montaigne and the Compagnie Européenne de Matériel (Cema), GI purchased 87% of the shares of Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat at the end of 1965, one year before its collapse. The entry of Intra Bank into the CNC capital is poorly documented, thus making it difficult to imagine: it seems that Jean-Marie Terrin lost control of the company in 1963 (see the article by Xavier Daumalin on the Terrin family in Dictionnaire historique des patrons français, under the direction of Jean-Claude Daumas, Flammarion, 2010). See “Questions écrites à l’Assemblée nationale,” Journal officiel, 25 February 1967.

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towards the companies over which it served as joint and several guarantors, and for which it guaranteed “all credit extensions as well as all facilities of any kind,” namely, among others, to ACSM, the Constructions Mécaniques du Trait, as well as to Wean Damiron and the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence.841 Audy Gilles replaces Pierre Herrenschmidt “As the first step in restructuring the two companies (ACSM–CNC) and simultaneously marking the final launch of an era of mutual interest and unity,” Pierre Herrenschmidt resigned from his duties as Chairman at the Board Meeting of 14 March 1966;842 Audy Gilles took over his post. Joseph Brocard continued as Vice Chairman. Further Board members were Guy Brocard, Henri Nitot, Worms & Cie, represented by Raymond Meynial; Unife; and the Société des Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, represented by Mr R. Gambert. René Biville served as Secretary of the Works Council and Bernard Lemarchand as one of its members. On 17 March, La Correspondance économique announced that: “Within the framework of the policy pursued by the government to concentrate the activities of shipyards, the urgency of which has recently been highlighted in La Seyne and Port-de-Bouc,843 a merger agreement between the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime and the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat is about to be signed.” The private agreement through which ACSM agreed to merge with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat was authenticated on 5 April 1966.

841 Memos of 20 January and 10 March 1966. 842 Pierre Herrenschmidt, “having accomplished the missions that he was to carry out,” (ref. Francis Ley) also withdrew from Worms & Cie management where he was replaced by Guy Brocard; he resigned as Chairman of Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, and the various positions he held on the boards of group affiliates. 843 In February 1966, the Port-de-Bouc shipyard was occupied by the workers, who were opposed to having the car ferry “Provence” fitted out by CNC, and prevented its launch. The vessel was ultimately towed to CNC, once CAP staff had been was assured that they would be transported to La Ciotat every day to finish fitting out the vessel, the last CAP built. See on http://www.ina.fr, the news film broadcast by ORTF on 17 March 1966 on the shipbuilding crisis in France. 11’50’’ into the film, reporting focused on the situation in Le Trait.

It was filed, along with an acknowledgement of signatures, in the Register of Notarial Acts of Mr Chalain, a notary in Paris, on 3 May 1966. CNC is summoned to explain itself On 4 April 1966, Jean Morin, Secretary General of the Merchant Navy, sent the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat the following letter: “During their meeting with Mr Bettencourt [Secretary of State for Transport844] on 25 March 1966, your representatives discussed the problems that arose with regard to registration for the benefit of shipbuilding aid on various orders placed prior to the merger of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat and the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime. […] We were concerned about the position taken by your representatives on several fronts. It seemed that, should the new company have to engage in arbitration, said arbitration would risk giving priority to the orders concluded by the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat to the detriment of those to be executed in Le Trait, regardless of any industrial policy concerning the reconversion efforts of Le Trait. […] First of all, I would like to remind you below of the vessels recorded in the 1966 budget allocation both in your establishment in La Ciotat and in that of ACSM. […] I am taking this opportunity to inform you of my concerns regarding the reconversion efforts in Le Trait. In line with your commitments made in this regard in your letter of 6 January 1966 and with the assurances provided by the Minister for the Economy and Finance, and the Minister for Infrastructure, in their response dated 24 February 1966, I would be obliged if you would inform me of your intentions in this area as quickly as possible. […] Please forward to me, as agreed in the same exchange of letters, the commitment to cease all subsidised shipbuilding in the shipyard of Le Trait, under the terms which were set forth for you.” Admiral Deroo, Chairman of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, responded on 20 April 1966: “I am making it my duty to dispel any concerns you may have regarding the attitude of the general management of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat and the industrial policy

844 André Bettencourt (1919–2007) was General Councillor for the canton of Lillebonne; MP and Mayor of Saint-Mauriced’Ételan; and Chairman of the Haute-Normandie Regional Council. Director of L’Oréal, and also founder of the newspaper, Le Courrier cauchois. See Jean-Pierre Chaline, “André Bettencourt (1919-2007),” Études Normandes, 2008/1.

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that it intends to follow for the reconversion activities in Le Trait. The explanations later in this text will, I am sure, help dissipate the negative impression and provide the necessary clarification of our arrangements. It troubles us to know that we are under suspicion [on the part of the public authorities…]. In a first phase, we are under an obligation to proceed with a certain number of dismissals, which we regret more than anyone. These must take place immediately and are indispensable for bringing the hourly rate at Le Trait down to a competitive level, thereby eliminating a huge portion of overhead costs; failing to do so would quickly place our company in financial difficulty. The overheads are as follows: Le Trait

Paris

Total

Management staff

Workers payed on a monthly basis

140

152

Workers payed on a hourly basis

[…] As regards employment, we have accepted a certain number of new orders negotiated by the former management, as follows: - 1 Malagasy freighter; - 1 ore carrier, for the Union Navale; - 2 ‘Daphné’-class submarines for Pakistan. These orders, on top of the work in hand, assure a full workload for the shipbuilding workforce in Le Trait – 540 production workers – until May 1968. The reduction of shipbuilding staff thereafter will be gradual, reaching zero by the end of 1969 after completion of the second Pakistani submarine. The workforce in reconversion activities – currently about 150 productive workers – is expected to increase gradually, compensating for the decrease in shipbuilding staff. We believe that the two-year period available to us for the reconversion is reasonable to allow us to gradually bring new boilermaking activities to Le Trait. We have embarked on prospecting, without delay, in order to achieve this goal. At the same time, we are looking at all external reconversion opportunities that may arise with a view to facilitating the settlement of new companies on the Le Trait premises capable of employing part of the available labour force. The 23 hectares of land with their rail siding, over which we dispose, along with our sizeable

real estate holdings, and the favourable treatment measures recently decided by the government on behalf of the municipality of Le Trait are expected to make our task easier, although, of course, it is not yet possible for us to indicate the respective proportions of internal and external reconversion activities that we will reach in two years. We are currently negotiating with a company that employs 500 workers in the Paris region, which we hope to convince to come to Le Trait. The fact remains that the entire rescue operation poses considerable problems at the human, technical, and financial levels, and its success cannot be envisioned without close cooperation and perfect harmony between your departments and the general management of this company.” The success of the ACSM conversion was all the more expected by the public authorities as it was the counterpart of a long-term loan of 50 million francs granted to La Ciotat to finance the construction of the “great form.” Second wave of layoffs (April 1966) Two days later (22 April 1966), ACSM informed the National Employment Fund that: “Within the general context of the merger of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime and the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, [the shipyard is] obliged […] to lay off 200 people with immediate effect. The measure affects 185 people in Le Trait and 15 in the head office in Paris. […] We have tried to soften [this measure] as much as possible,” it stated, “by focusing the cuts on management and monthly employees; only 44 hourly employees are affected out of a workforce of 1,017, 19 of whom are older than 60 […] and likely to benefit from the early retirement system. We further hope that those employees reaching their sixtieth year between now and 31 December will be considered as having already met the conditions for early retirement” and that a temporary allowance agreement will protect those “workers who, after being dismissed, are unable to find jobs paid at the same level as at ACSM.”

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Paris-Normandie headlines on 26 April 1966: “No to layoffs at the Le Trait shipyard – Le Trait has come down to Rouen – The impressive procession of shipyard workers has crossed the city”

It’s all over for ACSM Inhabitants of Le Trait take to the streets The first Constitutive Extraordinary General Meeting of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat took place on 25 April 1966; it approved the principle of the merger and the resultant contribution in kind; it increased share capital for the pending takeover of ACSM and appointed two auditors to oversee the contributions. That same day, 2,000 workers from Le Trait, the Rouen region and from shipyards in Le Havre organised a march on Rouen.845 An article in Le Monde reported on this protest: “Shipbuilding workers from Le Trait and Le Havre demonstrated in Rouen. They marched to the Prefecture, where the General Council devoted its entire session to the crisis in the shipyards and the scheduled layoffs. At 4 p.m., some two thousand people marched behind placards and banners along the city’s main arteries, to repeated shouts of ‘No layoffs!’ At the same time, elected department representatives met to examine several demands that had been filed, first by the Communist

845 See “Le Trait et son chantier naval, 7 années de lutte,” by Serge Laloyer, op. cit.

Group calling for ‘all measures to be taken to ensure that employment is safeguarded in the long term at the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée in Le Havre’; and second by Mr André Marie, who protested against the decision to cease all shipbuilding in Le Trait as of 1 January 1969. Mr Bettencourt, Secretary of State for Transport and occupying the post of General Counsel, stated during an interview that, had the shipyard in Le Trait not merged with La Ciotat, it would have had no other choice but to file for bankruptcy, an outcome which would have been even more disasterous for the region’s population. He added that the public authorities would do their utmost to fill the ACSM order book until the end of 1968 so as to limit the number of layoffs, and to promote the reconversion of ACSM and the settlement of new companies.”846 On 16 May 1966, the General Meeting of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat ratified the merger by way of the takeover of the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime.

846 See Le Monde of 23 April 1966.

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13 May 1966: the final ACSM General Meeting ACSM held its final Ordinary General Meeting on 13 May 1966. It was an opportunity for the Board of Directors to take stock of the fiscal year 1965 and the first four months of 1966, in a context where the ACSM results continued to be hit by “the crisis affecting shipbuilding for several years now […] whilst efforts made in the ground sector have led to marked growth in reconversion activities.” The year 1965 was marked by: - The “Jules Verne” delivery to Gaz Marine on 22 February. On 28 March at the Le Havre terminal, the methane carrier unloaded the very first cargo of liquefied natural gas in France: 25,000-m3 of methane at minus 160oC, thereby inaugurating the LNG supply chain between France and Algeria; - The launch of “Ville de Lyon” on 14 October. The vessel was registered under the NCHP flag in December and joined her sister ships, “Ville du Havre,” “Ville de Brest” and “Ville de Bordeaux”; - And the delivery of the “Stena Danica” and “Stena Nordica” ferry boats, on 18 and 30 June, to the Swedish shipping company, Stena AB (Sten A. Olsson). These two 2,690-grt and 640-dwt vessels designed to transport 1,000 passengers and 140 cars, were launched on 3 and 15 May, respectively. On 12 May 1966, the day before the General Meeting, the 3,510-dwt reefer ship “Ivolina” joined the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation fleet (launch: 10 December 1965). This was the first fully automated French ship and the last of the sixteen vessels built by ACSM for NCHP.847

847 The fifteen others were: “Ville de Tamatave,” “Ville de Majunga,” “Malgache,” “Ville de Tamatave,” “Ville de Tananarive,” “Nossi-Bé,” “Ville de Djibouti,” “Ville de Rouen,” “Ville de Dunkerque,” “Ville de Nantes,” “Ville du Havre,” “Ville de Brest,” “Ville de Bordeaux,” “Ville de Lyon” and “Ville d’Anvers.” The 17th, ordered by Denis Frères in 1962 and christened “Saint François,” was sold in 1969 to NCHP and renamed “Ville de Djibouti.”

The pusher “Dauphin” built for the Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine and launched on 23 December 1964

Within the domain of river navigation, five pushers848 and ten barges (built in a workshop from 10 July 1965) were launched by crane for the Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine: - “Dauphin,” fitted with two 152-HP diesel engines, on 23 December 1964, - “Montcalm,” fitted with two 540-HP diesel engines, on 10 February 1965, - “Dupleix,” fitted with two 540-HP diesel engines, on 20 February 1965, - “Marsouin,” fitted with two 400-HP diesel engines, on 8 November 1965,

848 The minutes of the Board Meeting state that seven pushers were delivered to the CSS. However, in Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, Maurice Quemin listed only five. And since he based his catalogue of vessels on the construction numbers, we considered that the minutes included a typographical error, and changed the seven into a five. The launches of “Montcalm” and “Dupleix” are dated 1 and 22 March 1965 in the newspaper Le Marin. Information on the engines for these vessels, as provided by Mr Quemin, does not tally with the information available on the Internet. Thus, on a website dedicated to river pushers, “Montcalm” is presented as having two 1,025-HP Caterpillar V12 engines; “Dupleix” with two 800-HP Caterpillar V12 engines; “Marsouin” with two 300-HP Caterpillar engines; and “Narval” with two 325-HP Mitsubishi engines. These ships, which were still operating in 2009, had probably received new engines.

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The ferry boat “Stena Nordica” launched on 15 May 1965 for Stena AB

Fittings and furniture for ferry boats, made by ACSM

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The reefer “Ivolina” launched on 10 December 1965 for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – the first fully automated ship built in France (Georges Derouard collection)

The ferry boat “Ibn Batouta” – the launch of this vessel on 10 March 1966 is the last by the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime

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- “Narval,” fitted with two 400-HP diesel engines, on 5 December 1965, - and ten barges between 17 and 30 September 1965. In addition to these vessels, representing turnover of approximately 5 million francs, the Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine took delivery of the floating dock “Nautilus,” placed on the slipway on 28 February 1966 and launched on 25 April 1966. One month earlier (25 March 1966), the Compagnie Générale d’Équipements pour les Travaux Maritimes (GEM) had taken delivery of a jack-up barge. The very last vessel launched by ACSM before being taken over by CNC was the 2,893-grt ferry boat “Ibn Batouta” the order for which was signed on 1 March 1965 by the Moroccan shipowner, Lignes Maritimes du Détroit – Limadet; its keel was laid on 23 September 1965 in slipway No. 2, from which it was launched on 10 March 1966; it was commissioned on 15 July 1966. Three orders were ongoing on the day that the General Meeting was held: - the 7,914-dwt semi-container ship “Rochambeau” ordered on 12 December 1965 by the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (keel laid in slipway No. 1 on 5 August 1966); Maurice Quemin stated that this ship, “along with her sister ship ‘Suffren’ (built in SaintNazaire), was one of the first semi-container ships built in France, supporting the transition from conventional freighters to full container ships,” 849 - the 1,665-dwt freezer trawler “Marie de Grâce” ordered by the Société Havraise de Pêche on 25 June 1965 (keel laid on 15 March 1966), - and her sister ship “Névé” ordered by the Société Navale Caennaise on 30 June 1965 (keel laid on 15 April 1966). A third trawler of this class was the subject of an agreement in principle, signed on 28 June 1965, by the Mauritanian shipping company, Guelfi, which would later be cancelled. As for the reconversion activities, despite the crisis that persisted in the areas of large-scale boilermaking and mechanics, the Board confirmed a 12.3% increase in the volume of orders and a 11.4% increase in 1965 deliveries over 1964, though lamented that this “marked

849 Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, op. cit., 1993, p. 339. The construction of the “Rochambeau” began on 1 June 1966 according to an inventory kept by Le Trait Naval d’Hier.

but all too recent” improvement had no impact on the results for fiscal year 1965 which posted a loss of over 7.4 million francs before accounting for depreciation, but after Worms & Cie had written off an eightmillion franc debt. Having presented the financial statements, the shareholders held an Extraordinary General Meeting devoted to the merger. On 13 May 1966, “at 11 a.m., the shareholders of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, a public limited company with share capital of 8 million francs made up of 80,000 shares with a par value of 100 francs, with its headquarters in the 8th arrondissement of Paris, at 9, Rue Tronchet, and entered in the Trade and Companies Register of the Seine department under No. 56 B 13032, came together for an Extraordinary General Meeting at the ACSM headquarters convened by the Board of Directors via individual letters sent via registered mail to all shareholders on 25 April 1966. […] Audy Gilles presided over the Meeting. Worms & Cie and the Union Immobilière pour la France et l’Étranger, both shareholders, present and accepting, and representing both by themselves and as proxies the largest number of shares, are asked to serve as scrutineers. […] The Chairman makes documents [required for an informed vote] available to assembly members […] and […] states that: ‘the first Extraordinary General Meeting of the shareholders of the Société des Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, held on 25 April 1966, has approved the agreements regarding the merger and the contribution in kind made for this purpose […].’ The General Meeting, after having been informed of a private deed signed in Paris on 5 April 1966 and filed in the records of Mr Chalain, notary in Paris, on 3 May 1966, under which the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, for the purpose of its merger through takeover with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, brings to said company its total assets as well as all of the liabilities, in accordance with the clauses and terms, and for a total net value, after deducting liabilities, of 14,786,569.90 F, as set forth in said deed, in return for the allocation of 75,000 shares with a par value of 50 F, fully paid up, possession to be enjoyed as of 1 January 1966, to be created through an increase in the share capital of the absorbing company; - approves said merger, along with all agreements, in part or as a whole, setting forth its terms;

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- votes to merge the company known as the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime through takeover with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, in conformity with said agreements; - gives the Board of Directors all requisite powers to reach the ultimate conclusion of this contribution and merger. […] The Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime shall be dissolved ipse jure and placed in voluntary liquidation, without it being necessary to confirm such in any new deed or subsequent deliberation. The General Meeting names Marcel Angenault as Commissioner and Comptroller representing the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime.” The contributions were valued at 191,703,733.32 F,850 and included, among other things, land with a surface area of 23 hectares 15.33 ares connected to the SNCF, buildings and other constructions, etc., erected on said land, facilities and sidings, various plots of land and constructions used primarily for residential purposes and distributed over the territory of Le Trait and various communities within the Seine-Maritime department, other parcels of land; equipment, tools, facilities, fixtures and fittings, furnishings for industrial and commercial purposes; fixed assets; intangible assets of business capital (leases, patents, property rights); loans; holdings; deposits and securities; inventories; work in hand; amounts owed by clients; advances paid to suppliers; amounts owed by debtors; investment securities, etc.; available bank funds, etc., and the deduction of liabilities amounting to 176,917,163.72 F at 31 December 1965. Consequently, the value of the net assets brought into the merger was 14,786,569.60 F. The difference between the value of the contribution (14,786,569.60 F) and the par value of the compensatory shares (3,750,000 F), i.e. 11,036,569.50 F, was viewed as a merger premium.851 16 May 1966 was scheduled as the date CNC would take possession of said assets. The CNC General Meeting took place on 16 May 1966, presided over by Admiral Deroo, Chairman of the Board of Directors; serving as scrutineers were the two shareholders representing the largest number of shares: Hall Montaigne Rond Point and the Compagnie Européenne

850 Independent auditors’ report for the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, dated 16 May 1966. 851 See the memo of 18 January 1967, from the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat.

de Matériels (Cema). The Meeting adopted the conclusions reached in the independent auditor’s report on the contributions, approved the ultimate conclusion of the in-kind contribution, the merger, and the capital increase (up from 30 to 33.750 million francs); as a consequence, the company’s articles of association were amended. By virtue of said decision, the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime was ipse jure dissolved on that date. From one State request to another ACSM, for which the project of creation designed by Hypolite Worms in 1916 was re-scaled in 1917 at the request of the government, thus went out of existence in 1966 as a result of public authorities intervention! Fifty years apart, these two requests answered each other and cancelled each other out. Many have explained how the merger could have been prevented, had ACSM specialised in building mediumsized high-tech vessels, for example submarines – if the Navy had continued to conclude contracts with private companies. Others have upheld that the merger would have made more sense – and no doubt been more successful – had it been carried out with a shipyard in SaintNazaire, Nantes or Dunkerque, i.e. a company from the same region, with the same corporate culture, the same points of reference. Henri Nitot expressed that very sentiment, when in 1977 he stated that “the restructuring scheme recommended by the government [had] not been sufficiently studied in depth; it would have been more logical and efficient for the mergers to have been done by region; for example, merging the shipyards bordering the English Channel.”852 Be that as it may, the merger could not be avoided. First, because it was the will of a government seeking to save taxpayers’ money (with limited foresight, since the mergers were to sentence thousands of workers to unemployment and devastate entire cities and regions); and second, because the merger conformed to the European directives which will impose an increasingly strict limitation of public aid and encourage the sector to be dominated by a few shipyards capable of building ever larger ships. In the immediate term, the fifth

852 Interview conducted with Francis Ley on 28 April 1977, for the purpose of the book Cent ans boulevard Haussmann.

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five-year plan (1966–1970) allowed for the continuing existence of just five large shipyards:853  The Chantiers de l’Atlantique in Saint-Nazaire, able to launch ships up to 300,000 tons,  The Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, in La Ciotat and Le Trait, with a capacity of 300,000 tons,  The Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque et Bordeaux, in Dunkerque and Bordeaux (capacity: 150,000 tons),  The Constructions Navales et Métallurgiques de la Méditerranée (CNIM) in La Seyne-sur-Mer and in Le Havre (capacity: 50,000 tons),  The Ateliers et Chantiers de Nantes, in Nantes (capacity: 30,000 tons).

The cycle of crises triggered by the second oil shock in 1979 led to the merger in 1982 of CNIM, CNC and the Ateliers et Chantiers de France-Dunkerque (formerly, Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque et Bordeaux) to become the Chantiers du Nord et de la Méditerranée (Normed), a group whose judicial liquidation was ordered by the court on 27 February 1989. In the meantime, CNC went through a period of trials and tribulations. In the months following the merger with ACSM, its main shareholder, the Intra Bank group, declared bankruptcy.

The “stormy” launch of the freezer trawler “Névé,” on 12 December 1966, for the Société Navale Caennaise Her sister ship, “Marie de Grâce,” for the Société Havraise de Pêche, was launched a month earlier, on 12 November 1966

853 Cf. Journal de l’année, Éditions 1967, Larousse.

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Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat – Établissements du Trait “The Chantiers de La Ciotat virtually without an owner” Paris-Normandie, 3 February 1967

Since October 1966, Banque Worms, which “in line with the terms of the protocol of 1 February 1966, […] provided CNC with a line of credit for 10 million francs,”854 had grown worried by the lack of transparency in CNC transactions. In a letter of 12 October, the issue was raised with the general manager of Banque Worms, Philippe Papelier, “of the respective participation of Worms & Cie and the shipyard in the expenses for interest payments and taxes” incurred as a result of the agreements related to the CNC/ACSM merger, agreements about which those responsible for their application at Worms were “only partially informed.” On 18 January 1967, the financial services tried to estimate the value of CNC shares “provided to ACSM shareholders in compensation for the merger-contribution of 16 May 1966,” protesting that “no post-merger financial statement has been drawn up or even sketched” by La Ciotat. These questions took a particular turn when the news burst of the failure of Intra Bank. On 3 February 1967, Paris-Normandie published an article under the heading “The Chantiers de La Ciotat, which took over ACSM in Le Trait, is virtually without an owner.” “The fate of the French branch of the Intra Bank and the future of one of the most dynamic French shipyards, the Chantiers de La Ciotat with which ACSM in Le Trait has merged, will play out in Paris over the next few days. The Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine decided yesterday, for the second time, to postpone for at least two weeks its decision on the bankruptcy of ‘Intra France.’ This postponement will allow the continuation of negotiations undertaken since the beginning of the week between representatives of the large Lebanese bank and the French authorities and private groups. The Lebanese have nothing to lose. Since the new banking law – known in Beirut as the ‘Intra Law’ – came

into effect on 16 January, no bank has gone bankrupt in Lebanon. In addition, say the Lebanese, the Paris branch can very easily repay its French debtors, as its assets are nearly five times its liabilities. This new postponement will be used by the Lebanese envoys to negotiate the re-opening of the Paris offices of Intra Bank, and the sale of its majority holding in the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat. Intra Bank holds nearly 80% of the capital through two subsidiaries, Hall Montaigne and Cema (Compagnie Européenne de Matériel). The Chantiers de La Ciotat is currently one of the few French shipyards in good shape. Its order book, which includes two 80,000-ton and one 130,000-ton oil tankers, guarantees good capacity utilisation until 1969. And CNC managers are developing a ‘form’ large enough to build 200,000-ton oil tankers, thus enabling them to survive the evolution toward large tonnages for this type of transport. But since the collapse of Intra Bank in October 1966, La Ciotat has been virtually without an owner, possibly posing problems for the financing of its investments. A trusted source has told us that three French groups may be in contention to purchase the business. Intra Bank negotiators have apparently contacted Groupe Schneider in Paris, through the intermediary of its subsidiary, the Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque et Bordeaux (France-Gironde); Groupe Herlicq, which has recently purchased the Chantiers de La Seyne, near Toulon; and Banque Worms, the former shareholder of ACSM in Le Trait, purchased by La Ciotat.” Banque Worms did not go ahead with any such move, and later withdrew from CNC. For us, the history of the Chantiers de La Ciotat ends here. The analysis of the CNC archives as well as the study of the development of this company until its incorporation into Normed and the conversion of the shipyard into the construction of mega-yachts are outside the scope of this work. We will limit ourselves to evoking the last years of the Le Trait shipyard.

854 Cf. Worms & Cie memo of 7 October 1966.

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Construction of the semi-container ship “Rochambeau” started in mid-1966

“What are all these people going to do?” René Bonnet, ACSM head of Human Resource, 17 March 1966, Reportage By French Televison (Ortf – Ina)

“Let’s suppose we are in 1969,” a television reporter suggested to René Bonnet, on 17 March 1966, “and someone said to you: ‘Shipbuilding in Le Trait is finished! What are you going to do?’” “Well, I don’t yet know,” answered the interviewee, “there’s been talk of creating an industrial estate in Le Trait. It is being backfilled, but I must say that the estate is being built in an area known as Le Malaquis which is currently a swamp; i.e. the land needs to be filled, the

site connected to the public infrastructure, and then, industrialists must want to relocate there. […] Currently, there are nearly 1500 people [working in Le Trait]; some of them could reasonably find a new job, but not here. Anyway, who is going to come here? If it’s a boilermaking company, […] sure, we can make boilers. But what if the company makes boxes or whatever, who will they use? Most likely women and workers without defined skills. But what will become of us, engineers, managers, white-collar staff or supervisors? The designers, the draughtsmen? What are all these people going to do?”

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The elected officials swung into action The workforce fell to 1,200 employees at the beginning of January 1967. The threat of a permanent closure became increasingly oppressive with each passing day. The semi-container ship “Rochambeau” was the only ship launched that year on 11 April. Its construction had started in mid-1966. Successive layoffs had a strong impact on the municipality’s income. The financial imbalance was all the more alarming as the new industrial zone was slow to emerge. The municipality was forced to increase local taxes by 52% to restore its accounts. The threat loomed over all the local activities, small businesses and trades. In fact, the whole region was threatened by an economic disas-

11 April 1967: launch of the “Rochambeau” commissioned by the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, the only launch having taken place that year

ter due to the end of shipbuilding in Le Trait set for 1 January 1969. The feeling of injustice is aggravated by the announcement of a probable participation of the State of seven billion francs for the financing of the large slipway of La Ciotat. The granting of additional time to complete the construction of two Pakistani submarines in Le Trait fooled no one: “As the progress of construction work that is underway or in the pipeline should not be accompanied by the taking of new orders, there will be increasingly significant reductions in the workload of various workshops! These initial drops will certainly be seen before the end of this summer of 1967!”855 On 25 April, the Seine-Maritime Regional Council, where the newly elected member of Parliament, Colette Privat,856 sat, unanimously demanded the opening of

855 Extract from a booklet titled Triste bilan d’une législature. L’assassinat des chantiers du Trait, dated March 1967. 856 Member of the Communist Party, member of Parliament for the 4th constituency of Seine-Maritime (1967–1968).

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a parliamentary inquiry. Its purpose was the application of the decree of 25 April 1966.857 In actual fact, until then, no industrialist had benefited from the “highly conditional advantages”858 granted to companies engaging in investment programmes dedicated to the redeployment of the staff of shipbuilding companies. The elected officials questioned the government again in June. On 22 December, after a strike movement and demonstrations on 13 and 16 December, the union officials were received by Jean Morin, the Secretary General of the Merchant Navy, who committed to appoint a government delegate. At the same time, Colette Privat alerted the Minister for Transport, Jean Chamant,859 “about the fact that shipbuilding was nearing its end, that symptoms of underemployment were already showing and that no serious effort for reconversion activities had been made.” She urged him “to consider the extension of subsidised shipbuilding for the required time to avoid any disruption in the activity of the shipyards.” In January 1968, while the Works Council was trying to obtain new orders from CNC, Mr Monod, Deputy General Delegate, ensured “that the questions generated by the shipyard of Le Trait and by the new industrial area would henceforth be examined on the national scale, and that consequently an inter-ministerial commission would be formed, at the earliest, to plan the future of the shipyard and the region, and that a coordinator appointed by the government [...] would take up the problem.” However, days and weeks went by without anything happening, except for the increasingly shared conviction that the minister’s promises were “for the sole purpose of buying time for the La Ciotat Shipyard management and allowing to complete the dismantling of the Le Trait shipyard.” Even the weather conditions seemed unfavourable. The launch of the cargo ship

857 This decree provided for assistance to companies involved in investment programmes (up to a minimum of 300,000 F) dedicated to the creation of at least 30 permanent jobs reserved for the reclassification of the staff of shipbuilding companies. 858 This quote and the following ones are taken from the comments of Colette Privat during the debate session at the National Assembly on 3 May 1968. 859 Minister for Transport from 6 April 1967 to 20 June 1969 and 7 January 1971 to 6 July 1972.

“Mananjary,” which had been scheduled on 15 January 1968, ordered by the NCHP and intended for the Société Malgache de Transports Maritimes, was postponed up to 19 January. The operation was purely technical, “excluding any ceremonies or celebrations.”860 Neither Admiral Deroo, Chairman of Les Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, nor Baron d’Huart, the Managing Director, attended. “Several hundred workers shouted: ‘Work for all’ and ‘We want boats.’” “This ship,” Le Marin said on the day of the launch, “is, actually, the penultimate merchant vessel to be built in Le Trait, the last being the ore carrier ‘Sabinia,’ intended for the Union Navale.” “After that, it’s the unknown,” added Le Courrier cauchois.

The launch of the 14,905-dwt cargo ship “Mananjary,” built for the Société Malgache de Transports Maritimes, scheduled for 15 January 1968 and delayed to 19 January

860 Le Courrier cauchois of 20 January 1968.

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The ore carrier “Sabinia,” ordered by the Société Navale Caennaise and the Union Navale. Scheduled for mid-March 1968, its launch was delayed to 15 May 1968 by work stoppages and demonstrations. Several thousand people took to the streets on 21 March, in Rouen, marching and chanting: “Sabinia will not leave.” The red flag was raised on the ship as a sign of protest

From the red flag of anger to the black flag of mourning “‘Sabinia’ will not leave!” The muteness and inaction of the government enhanced by the stubbornness of CNC spurred the staff to take an extreme action: preventing the ore carrier “Sabinia” from leaving the slipway. “We know,” stated Colette Privat, “what it means for the shipbuilding workers, who love their profession and their fine craftsmanship, to forego the launch which, in some way, honours acknowledges the work of their own hands.”861 Scheduled for 18 March, the launch of the bulk carrier was at stake in an arm wrestling engaged by the workers to get the public authorities to comply with their commitments and to get the management of the CNN to give work to Le Trait. Work stoppages followed walkouts. A demonstration was organised on 21 March to stop the dismantling of two cranes.

861 Debate session at the National Assembly on 3 May 1968.

On 28, “all the shipyard employees – workers, technicians and managers – accompanied by all that Le Trait had as an active population, representatives of local companies, elected officials – MP, the General Councillor, Mayors of the respective cantons – left Le Trait, which then became a ‘ville morte,’ to join a powerful demonstration at procession up to the Prefecture,”862 under the banner “‘Sabinia’ will not leave.” The red flag was raised on the ship as a sign of protest.863 The details of this day were reported by the press. Le Courrier cauchois of 30 March 1968 stated: “No dismissal in Le Trait this year, is the only assurance that could be given to the demonstrators who came to Rouen.”

862 Ibid. See Le Courrier cauchois on 16 March 1968: “The launch of ‘Sabinia,’ a cargo ship of 17,400 tonnes, is no cause to rejoice”; the same newspaper on 23 March: “Employment concerns for the future have delayed the launch of ‘Sabinia’”; idem in Le Marin on 29 March. 863 Le Marin dated 14 June 1968: “Strike on the Seine.” According to Paul Bonmartel, the red flag was raised on one of the cranes on 17 May 1968, see Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, 1917-1972, p. 104.

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“The hour of truth” Georges Chedru864, at the National Assembly, 3 May 1968

The fate that awaited the shipyard on strike and the “workers who show a fiery will to not let Le Trait die” as well as the National Shipbuilding Policy, were debated on 3 May 1968 in the National Assembly. “Internal reconversion is not making any headway,” lamented the parliamentarians while “the decision to stop aid to construction for Le Trait has been taken two and a half years ago.” “The land-based activity had even been reduced for a while. This reduction resulted in […] the closure of the shipyard’s subsidiaries that had been reconverted into other activities. […] Apart from too limited boilermaking works, the internal reconversion only happened […] by the manufacturing of specialised […] equipment for fire-fighting, and boilers. […] However, this activity only represents approximately a hundred jobs while the shipyard has […] more than twelve hundred employees. […] Until recently, the management seemed to have pinned all its hopes on a process of prefabricated construction. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that this process will be competitive and, in any case, its development will be too late to resolve Le Trait’s problem of full employment without delay.” Admittedly, the shipyard obtained the order for two submarines, but their construction “will not allow enough of the workforce to be employed as of the end of 1968.” Under these conditions, “the government must facilitate the transition, either through orders for ships not availing of the aid to shipbuilding – warships, French or foreign fishing vessels – or through orders for heavy boiler-making, civilian or military, directly or by subcontracting. Lastly, the external reclassification, which has only received encouragement in principle in Le Trait until now, must take form quickly.” To enable the staff to locally find jobs corresponding to their qualifications, the continuation of shipbuilding activity for some time still appears to be absolutely necessary – “the government could use its authority to obtain […] subcontracts for the shipyard of Le Trait […] and to confirm the contract, under discussion, of twenty-five Cuban shrimp vessels; secondly, in setting up large-scale reconversion activities as soon as possible: finally, in directing new businesses to the industrial communal

864 MP, party of Independent Republicans, for the 5th constituency of Seine-Maritime (1966–1973).

zone under favourable conditions.” CNC, for its part, started making threats: On 7 May, before the Works Council, Admiral Deroo, who every week made the trip to Le Trait, declared that the repeated strikes in the past weeks “could lead to the permanent closing of the shipyard.”865 “The delay of the ‘Sabinia’ is a disaster,” stated Jean d’Huart, who decided that the ship would be launched on 13 May at 2 p.m. “The Secretary of the Works Council replied: ‘The workers have been scorned, deceived and abused in their trust, deeply marked in their hearts and minds by the events they have experienced. Some hope was rekindled with the construction of serial housing. However, now, since the 1967 holidays, the planned housing construction has not materialised. At the end of 1967, underemployment prevailed. The first quarter of 1968 showed the end of shipbuilding, without any long-term reconversion perspectives, which we have been hearing about for several years now. The root of the problem is not to leave the ships lying on the slipways, it is, in fact, the opposite. If the workers ask for ships, it is to have them delivered to the ship-owners. The root of the problem is [the fact] that the workers […] must have written commitments on the fate that awaits them. We are ready to initiate discussions.’” Jean d’Huart replied: “We are ready if the work conditions return to normal in Le Trait.” On 15 May 1968, the launch of “Sabinia” was put to a vote and executed after a two months postponement from the date originally decided. Only the workers essential to the operations and some managers of the La Ciotat shipyard were present. A placard placed at the front of the ship claimed: “She is leaving but the fight goes on.” Two days before, a strike was called in support of the student movement. The events of May–June 1968 in Le Trait Paul Bonmartel chronicled eloquently the events of May–June 1968,866 which make up one of the last pages of the shipyard’s history. “On Friday, 17 May, 8.45 a.m., the shipyard siren sounds. All the staff are gathered near the large offices inside the company. The indefinite strike with occupation of the premises is adopted by a majority of hands raised. The pickets are guarding the exits: gates and doors are closed, and the

865 This quote and the following ones are taken from Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, op. cit., p. 104. 866 Ibid., pp. 104–107.

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telephone exchange is blocked. A heating of a submarine section, started at night, is underway. The unions allow the welding team to finish the job. The women employees go home. The red flag is hoisted on a crane, it will be replaced at 10 a.m. by a tricolour flag. The wives come to seek information; they will have to bring something to sleep on and eat for the strikers. The first week-end passed in a friendly atmosphere. There are picnics in front of the large offices, an orchestra leads dancers, a movie is screened and Sunday mass celebrated. The discipline becomes stricter over the following days. The management sends a note: ‘The Director of the establishment protests against this indefinite strike with confinement of the staff of the establishment, executives867 and members of the management who do not wish to be a part of the strike and the coercive measures that have been taken,’ stated Georges Raynaud. The three unions form a strike Committee. They organise life at the shipyard: watch towers, provisions, leisure time. The men go to collect provisions and money in the countryside. The petrol stations are managed by strikers who provide fuel on presentation of vouchers from the Committee. […] The unions decide to introduce exit passes: one for two men. The first one leaves at 10 a.m. and returns at 9 a.m. the next day. His colleague then leaves at 10 a.m. During the hour in between, there is a general meeting where the political and union leaders speak, give the latest information and boost morale. 200 workers made available by the suppliers joined the movement. In the city, the construction work of the Brossolette residence has stopped.” Paul Bonmartel quoted from the notes taken by an employee: “On 17 June, the representatives go to the general management in Paris. On the 18th, report of the agreements signed the day before. There is a secret vote.” “Tuesday, 18 June, 10.58 a.m., the siren sounds,” Bonmartel continued. “It’s over! The strikers take it upon themselves to clean up the establishment. Work resumes on Wednesday the 19th at 7.05 a.m. A part of the days of unemployment will be paid, another will be recovered and the last one will be lost for the employees. Salaries increase by 10%, the SMIG

867 Le Marin dated 14 June 1968 states that the executives were released on 21 May and they also went on strike.

16 May 1968: above, the women bringing supplies to the strikers Opposite, the picket line at the entrance of the company – in the background, the workers seated on the surrounding perimeter wall ©Loik Prat in Mai 1968, par celles et ceux qui l’ont vécu, Éditions de l’Atelier, 2018

(minimum guaranteed interprofessional wages) by 30%, and holidays are extended. An OP2 (level 2 professional worker) earned 883.03 francs in March 1967. In December 1968, he earned 1,106.62 francs (gross wages).” The 32 days of strike, the commitment, the bitterness of negotiations seemed to have exhausted the staff’s resistance. Only one strike was organised in 1969: on 11 March to demand an increase in wages. The protest seemed to have slowed down after the death of René BiviIle, General Secretary of the CGT (labour union), who was buried on 19 September 1969. The activity during the year focussed on the assembly of two bare hulls on the slipway, one for the bulk carrier “Alain L.D,” and the other for the sister ship, “Robert L.D,”

384

both ordered by the Compagnie Louis Dreyfus from Chantiers de l’Atlantique, one of whose subcontractors was Le Trait. The first hull was launched on 22 March and the second one on 31 July 1969. On the day before (30 July), the submarine “Shushuk” left slipway No. 6, where the construction of a second vessel of the same type continued. This second submarine, the “Mangro,” was also intended for the Pakistani Navy and would be launched on 7 February 1970. From 11 December 1969, and alternately until June 1970, the twenty shrimp vessels ordered by the Cuban Government were launched. They carried out their tests on the Seine, and then gathered in Le Havre from where they set sail for Cuba. While Christofle opted to set up in Yainville, the new industrial zone attracted two companies (Normab and the Société Européenne de Produits Pharmaceutiques which offered a reclassification opportunity to a few dozen workers. 698 hourly-wage earners (down by 145 Shrimp vessels built between 1969 and 1970 for the Cuban Government

The submarine “Shushuk,” launched on 30 July 1969, and the submarine “Mangro,” launched on 7 February 1970, both for the Pakistani army

386

over the last 18 months), 317 workers hired by the month and 35 executives worked on the shipyard on 26 March 1970, on the day of the launch of the “Green-Fish,” the first of the two tugs & offshore supply vessels intended for Feronia International Shipping (Fish). The second one, the “Brown-Fish,” was launched on 23 April. The financial result of these two projects said Jean d’Huart to the Central Establishment Committee on 25 June “is one of the reasons why the Établissements du Trait is not profitable from the point of view of the construction of small ships.”868 In the eyes of the employees, the ploy was cruel: according to rumours, 500 jobs would be shelved in September. In the meantime, everyone was busy assembling the hull of a Soviet freighter. TMT: take it or leave it! In the autumn of 1970, news (confirmed by the press at the beginning of July 1971) spread: shipbuilding should be replaced at Le Trait by “a department of industrial equipment, the purpose of which was boilermaking for land use.”869 The company which should take the name of TMT – Travaux Métalliques du Trait (also referred to as Travaux Métallurgiques du Trait), should take on only 585 people. 171 should be reclassified to Christofle, 79 would take early retirement and 180 should be transferred to La Ciotat. It is “a terrible measure to take or leave” said Raymond Bretéché, the Mayor. This was followed by strikes, demonstrations and “ville morte” opérations. At the end of November, the staff repeatedly prevented the launching of the hull of the “Kandalakshskiy Zaliv,” the first of the two reefer cargo ships ordered by the Soviet Fishing Fleet Department – Sudoimport (USSR) whose finishing was to be done by CNC. “We do not create the TMT if the cargo ship does not leave,” threatened the management. On 1 December, 85% of the staff voted in favour of the launch, which took place the next day without an official ceremony. The ship “carrying a black flag as a sign of mourning”870 left the slipway and then towed to La Ciotat. Some of the conditions set out by the unions as pre-requisites to the launch were met. “Thus,” Le Marin reported on 11 December 1970, “a plan will be prepared

868 The information and quotes of this paragraph (apart from the newspapers extracts) are taken from Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, op. cit. 869 Le Courrier cauchois, 3 July 1971. 870 Le Marin, 11 December 1970.

so as to avoid temporary unemployment between two jobs as much as possible: an effort will be made to match the dates of layoffs with the dates of rehiring in the local industries. Workers placed on pre-retirement could keep their accommodation and the right to complementary health insurance. The union representatives would remain at the shipyard until the launch of the ‘Taganrogskiy Zaliv.’ […] On the other hand, CGT declared that the creation of TMT would be effective from 1 January 1971 and the workers would be offered a greater choice in the possible reclassifications. But CGT noted that several points were not yet satisfied, mainly the payment of 90% of the gross salary of employees in pre-retirement and the maintenance of employment until the pre-retirement of employees aged 58 and 59 years.” “From the moment we learned that the shipyard was screwed up,” recalled a former employee quoted by Paul Bonmartel, “we fought to save our rights.” “At the beginning of 1971, everyone feared a summons from the management. A team leader returned to the workshop: ‘Guys! You won’t see me from tomorrow.’ Everyone was thinking: ‘When and how much?’ The amount of the layoff pay varied from one employee to another. A team leader receives 5 months’ salary, a young worker not too much, that is the law! The employees hired by Christofle keep their accommodation. If we go to La Ciotat, we discuss conditions.” 11 May 1971: the last launch The end was finally here. It happened on 11 May 1971, “in deathly silence,” observed Le Marin,871 when the Soviet refrigerated cargo ship, “Taganrogskiy Zaliv,” construction No. 199, was launched. This last launch “brings the fifty years of service to the French and foreign ship-owners to an end” and concludes the history of the ships built in Le Trait. Notwithstanding the press articles praising the success of the reclassification in Le Trait, and despite the promises of the public authorities, and especially despite the determination and professionalism of the 550 employees, with eight work stoppages in March 1972 forcing the management to increase wages by 6%, the verdict came through: TMT was not profitable. After having operated for hardly a year, its liquidation was scheduled

871 Le Marin, 11 June 1971.

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Launch on 11 May 1971, “in deathly silence,” of the hull of the Soviet reefer cargo ship, “Taganrogskiy Zaliv,” the last launch from Le Trait

for 31 December 1972. The waves of layoffs whittled down the workforce month after month. The first oil shock had not yet plunged the Western economies into recession and the populations into rampant unemployment; workers, whose qualifications were recognised, found employment fairly fast in companies that had started to set up there or among those in the surrounding area or in other departments.

“Little by little, the workforce dispersed,” noted Henri Nitot at the end of his memoirs, “but not without the families having experienced a lot of anguish and concerns, and no one ever really knew how to show them signs of compassion and friendship that would have sustained their courage in these trying circumstances. And so we came to the final closure [on 31 December 1972], not without La Ciotat shipyard having scavenged Le Trait shipyard for all the equipment and tools likely to be of industrial interest to them.” The archives were burned.

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Mission well accomplished Over half a century, ACSM accomplished its mission: in the aftermath of two world wars, it actively participated in the revival of the French merchant and military fleets. The last vessel built numbered 199 – yet, taking into account the vessels listed under the same number (for example: ten barges were listed under No. 178, twenty shrimpers under No. 196) as well as the cancelled orders (for example: the submarines “L’Andromaque” and “L’Armide”),872 204 vessels and other machines873 were built in Le Trait between 6 May 1920, the date on which the first keel was laid, and 11 May 1971, the launch date of the final hull. 154 ships and engines expanded the fleets of private shipping companies; 50 (not taken into account “La Favorite,” “La Charente” and “Ingénieur Lacroix”) were commissioned by the French State, including the oceanographic research vessel “Président Théodore Tissier.” For the French Navy, ACSM built 3 oil tankers, 3 torpedo boats, 8 submarines, 4 submarine chasers, 4 minesweepers, 2 landing ship tanks, 2 hydrographic survey vessels, 2 sea barges, 2 filter barges and 1 ship caisson. Its know-how and reputation in submarine construction enabled the company to become suppliers to the Pakistani Navy in 1966. For the shipping companies, ACSM produced the widest range of vessels: cargo ships, colliers, oil tankers, ore carriers, methane carrier, butane cargo, selfunloading bulk carrier, semi-containership, reefer cargo ships, passenger liners, ferry boats, split hopper barges, filter barges, tank barges, flat-bottomed river boats, crane pontoons, mooring and boarding pontoons, platforms barges for unloading and pumping, ferries, floating dock, pushers, tugboats, tugs & offshore supply vessels, freezer trawlers, cod-fishing boats, shrimpers. 34 vessels were delivered to Maison Worms and its shipping subsidiaries: 11 cargo ships to Worms & Cie and

Worms CMC; 16 to the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire (17 with “Saint François” bought in 1969); 5 oil tankers to the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers; and 2 ore carriers to the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest. Several foreign clients ordered from ACSM: - Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S (Norway) - Anticosti Shipping Co., Ltd. (Canada) - Westfal Larsen & Co. A/S (Norway) - Petroleum Maatschappij La Corona (the Netherlands) - Atlantic Oil Carriers (Liberia) - Chilean Navy - Petroleum Shipping Co., Ltd. (Panama) - A/S Moltzau’s Tankrederi – Moltzau & Christensen (Norway) - Panama Gypsum Co., Inc. (Panama) - Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin - Grenehurst Shipping Co., Ltd. (Great Britain) - Niels Røgenæs (Norway) - Naviera Interoceangas SA (Chile) - Stena AB – Sten A. Olsson (Sweden) - Lignes Maritimes du Détroit – Limadet (Morocco) - Société Malgache de Transports Maritimes (Madagascar) - Pakistani Navy - Cuban Government - and lastly, Sudoimport (USSR). The ships that were the pride of the inhabitants of Le Trait have long since ceased to be in service. The garden city of Le Trait is the sole achievement of the ACSM and Maison Worms on the banks of the Seine that has stood the test of time. The families who live there today are perpetuating the collective work built up in this part of Normandy.

872 The list followed by M. Quemin in Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires according to the construction numbers attributed to the units whose keel has been laid, shows some gaps – for example, No. 7 “Château-Lafite” succeeds No. 4 “Cérons” and No. 14 “Capitaine Bonelli” succeeds No. 8 “ChâteauYquem,” etc. Construction numbers 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 likely correspond to contracts that have been cancelled. 873 Cf. the distillation tower built in 1967 under No. 193 for the Compagnie Française de Raffinage.

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Le Trait in the 1970s

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Ships and other equipment built in Le Trait between 1920 and 1971 The information (hold, construction number, name, shipowner, type of ship, deadweight tonnage (dwt), or gross registered tonnage (grt), dates of placing in the slipway or laying the keel and launch) was drawn up by crosschecking the 1987 and 1993 editions of Maurice Quemin’s book, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ? which show some differences; a note from Worms & Cie dated 28 January 1937; a listing of the ACSMs sent by Serge Lepême of the association Le Trait Naval d’Hier, articles collected in Le Journal du Trait, Le Calfat du Trait, Le Courrier cauchois and Le Marin; Charles Limonier’s book, Les 110 ans de la Havraise péninsulaire, published in 1992, and Henri Petit and Jean-Pierre Blavec’s book, 50 ans de la Société française de transports pétroliers - 1938-1988, published in 1995. It is in these two books that the tonnages the two companies’ ships were recorded. When research did not make it possible to decide between the divergent data, these are listed one after the other and separated by a slash. Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

Keel laid down Launch date

“Léoville”

Worms & Cie

Steam cargo ship 1,235 dwt

20.10.1920

03.09.1922

“Sauternes”

Worms & Cie

Steam cargo ship 1,235 dwt

12.10.1921

09.11.1922

“Barsac”

Worms & Cie

Steam cargo ship 1,235 dwt

24.05.1922

18.01.1923

“Cérons”

Worms & Cie

Steam cargo ship 1,235 dwt

28.09.1922

03.06.1923

“Château-Lafite”

Worms & Cie

Steam cargo ship 3,358 dwt

25.01.1923

22.06.1924

“Château-Yquem”

Worms & Cie

Steam cargo ship 3,358 dwt

30.03.1923

08.02.1925

“Capitaine Bonelli”

SA de Navigation Les Armateurs Français Ex-French State

Collier 4,700 dwt

06.05.1920

29.11.1921

“Chef Mécanicien Armand Blanc”

Société Commerciale du Nord Ex-French State

Collier 4,700 dwt

01.07.1920

25.02.1922

“Capitaine Le Diabat”

Société Commerciale du Nord Ex-French State

Collier 4,700 dwt

31.03.1921

10.05.1922

“Capitaine Prieur”

Jules Cavroy & Cie Ex-French State

Collier 4,700 dwt

29.04.1921

03.07.1922

“Capitaine Edmond Laborie” Ex-“Capitaine Jean Laborie”

Société Commerciale du Nord Ex-French State

Collier 4,700 dwt

08.12.1921

22.03.1923

“Dionée” Ex-“Capitaine Yves Le Cain”

Compagnie Africaine d’Armement Ex-French State

Collier 4,654 dwt

31.03.1922

27.11.1923

“Vaccares”

SA de Navigation à Vapeur Daher (Marseilles)

Steam cargo ship 4,510 dwt

26.07.1922

05.01.1924

“P.C. 51”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works) of the Seine-Inférieure department (Rouen)

Split hopper barge 200 dwt

03.11.1923

17.04.1924

“P.C. 52”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works) of the Seine-Inférieure department (Rouen)

Split hopper barge 200 dwt

10.11.1923

17.04.1924

391

Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

Keel laid down Launch date

“P.C. 53”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works) of the Seine-Inférieure department (Rouen)

Split hopper barge 200 dwt

16.01.1924 / 26.01.1924

22.06.1924

“P.C. 54”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works) of the Seine-Inférieure department (Rouen)

Split hopper barge 200 dwt

04.02.1924

22.06.1924

“P.C. 55”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works) of the Seine-Inférieure department (Rouen)

Split hopper barge 200 dwt

28.04.1924

06.08.1924

“P.C. 56”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works) of the Seine-Inférieure department (Rouen)

Split hopper barge 200 dwt

02.05.1924

06.08.1924

Société Auxiliaire de Manutention et de Navigation (Rouen)

Pontoon for 4-ton crane

24.11.1923 / 09.02.1924

01.04.1924 / 02.04.1924

“Balidar”

Dieppe Chamber of Commerce

Steam tugboat (600 HP) 134 grt

17.04.1924

03.09.1924

“Leo”

Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S (Norway)

Steam cargo ship 1,517 dwt

23.04.1924

14.12.1924

“Lynx”

Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S (Norway)

Steam cargo ship 1,517 dwt

23.05.1924

22.03.1925

“Nova”

Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S (Norway)

Mixed cargo ship 1,482 dwt

28.06.1924

26.07.1925

“Lucie Delmas”

Compagnie Delmas Frères & Vieljeux Ex-Société des Hauts-Fourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de Denain & Anzin

Steam cargo ship 2,200 dwt

19.07.1924

06.05.1925

Compagnie Générale Transatlantique

“Ostrevent” Ex-“Saint Éloi”

Société des Hauts-Fourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de Denain & Anzin (Société Anonyme d’Armement L. Ravasse & Cie)

Mooring pontoon (Le Havre) Mooring pontoon (Le Havre) Collier 1,737 grt - 2,311 dwt

“Rennes”

Chemins de Fer de l’État (Dieppe–Newhaven line)

“Le Loing”

22.06.1924 22.06.1924 22.09.1924

30.09.1925

Steam cargo ship 725 dwt

07.01.1925

23.08.1925

French Navy

Motor oil tanker 6,476 dwt

21.08.1925

04.04.1927

“Fleurus”

Anticosti Shipping Co. Ltd (Canada)

Steam liner 1,122 grt

28.03.1925

28.03.1926

“Soroka”

Det Norsk Russiske D/S - Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S (Norway)

Steam cargo ship 2,460 dwt

06.01.1926

21.11.1926

“Keret”

Det Norsk Russiske D/S - Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S (Norway)

Steam cargo ship 2,462 dwt

02.02.1926

19.04.1927

“Adriatique”

La Morue française & Sécheries de Fécamp

Cod fishing trawler 885 dwt

19.01.1926

08.08.1926

“Caucasique”

La Morue française & Sécheries de Fécamp

Cod fishing trawler 885 dwt

19.01.1926

01.02.1927

“Marne”/ “Seine”

Union Normande

Self-propelled tank barge 183 dwt

31.07.1926

07.07.1927 / 01.08.1927

392

Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

Keel laid down Launch date

“Meuse”/ “Marne”

Union Normande

02.08.1926

07.07.1927

“Moselle”/ “Meuse”

Union Normande

03.08.1926

07.07.1927 / 01.08.1927

“Seine”/ “Moselle”

Union Normande

03.08.1926

01.08.1927

4 4 3

48 49 50

“Basque”

Ministry of the Navy Ministry of the Navy French Navy

29.09.1927 04.10.1927 20.08.1926

01.07.1928 01.07.1928 25.05.1929

“Orkanger”

Westfal Larsen & Co. A/S (Norway)

Self-propelled tank barge 183 dwt Self-propelled tank barge 183 dwt Self-propelled tank barge 183 dwt Filter barge Filter barge Torpedo boat (1,500-ton series) 1,380-dwt Motor oil tanker 10,540 dwt

14.04.1926

20.05.1928

“Megara”

Petroleum Maatschappij La Corona (Netherlands)

Motor oil tanker 10,920 dwt

07.05.1927

29.12.1928

“Mirza”

Petroleum Maatschappij La Corona (Netherlands)

Motor oil tanker 10,900 dwt

04.07.1927

20.10.1929

“Mérignac” Ex-“Auguste Maurice”

Worms & Cie

Steam cargo ship 860 dwt

08.07.1928

08.10.1929

“Antiope”

French Navy

630-ton submarine “Diane II”-class 565 dwt

28.12.1928

18.08.1931

“Amazone”

French Navy

630-ton submarine “Diane II”-class 565 dwt

07.01.1929

28.12.1931

“Charles Schiaffino”

Société Algérienne de Navigation pour l’Afrique du Nord, Charles Schiaffino & Cie

Steam cargo ship 5,500 dwt

07.01.1929

16.03.1930

“Oréade”

French Navy

630-ton submarine “Diane II”-class 565 dwt

16.08.1929

23.05.1932

“Ville de Tamatave”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

07.05.1929

22.01.1931

“Ville de Majunga”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

25.05.1929

19.07.1931

“La Sibylle”

French Navy

Steam mixed cargo ship 7,265 dwt Steam mixed cargo ship 7,265 dwt 630-ton submarine “Diane II”-class 565 dwt

28.10.1930

28.01.1933

“Bac du Hode-Berville”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works)

Boarding pontoon

29.11.1930

16.09.1931

“Bac du Hode-Berville”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works)

Boarding pontoon

29.11.1930

24.10.1931

“P.C. 61”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works)

Split hopper barge 390 dwt

21.05.1931

23.12.1931

“P.C. 62”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works)

Split hopper barge 390 dwt

22.05.1931

23.12.1931

393

Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

Keel laid down Launch date

“P.C. 63”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works)

Split hopper barge 390 dwt

16.06.1931

23.12.1931

“P.C. 64”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works)

Split hopper barge 390 dwt

19.09.1931

19.03.1932

“P.C. 65”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works)

Split hopper barge 390 dwt

24.09.1931

19.03.1932

“P.C. 66”

Ponts & Chaussées (Public Works)

Split hopper barge 390 dwt

24.09.1931

19.03.1932

“Charles Nungesser”

Transit & Transport Jules Roy (Rouen)

Tugboat 750 HP

27.06.1931

28.10.1931

“Georges Madon”

Transit & Transport Jules Roy (Rouen)

Tugboat 750 HP

27.06.1931

27.11.1931

“Cap Blanc”

Société Anonyme de Gérance et d’Armement – Saga

Steel freighter 3,690 dwt

08.02.1932

30.11.1932

“Cap Cantin”

Société Anonyme de Gérance et d’Armement – Saga

Steel freighter 3,690 dwt

09.09.1932

12.03.1933

“Vénus”

French Navy

630-ton submarine “Minerve I”-class 856 dwt

27.06.1932 / 26.07.1932

06.04.1935

“Président Théodore Tissier”

Ministry of the Merchant Navy for the Marine Fisheries Scientific Office

Oceanographic research vessel 412 dwt

04.11.1932

23.09.1933

“N° 7” (Caudebec-en-Caux)

Ponts et Chaussées (departmental ferry service)

Ferry 67 dwt

12.12.1933

05.04.1934

“Le Trait”

Worms & Cie

Freighter 1,585 dwt

01.09.1933

29.07.1934

“L’Incomprise”

French Navy

14.04.1937

“Bouclier”

French Navy

“Shéhérazade”

Compagnie Auxiliaire de Navigation

Torpedo boat 02.11.1934 “La Melpomène”-class 609 dwt Torpedo boat 17.10.1934 “La Melpomène”-class 609 dwt Oil tanker 28.07.1934 18,500 dwt

“Danaé”

Société Navale Caennaise (ex-G. Lamy & Cie)

Steam collier 3,450 dwt

02.09.1935 / 29.09.1935

21.05.1936

“Dioné”

Société Navale Caennaise (ex-G. Lamy & Cie)

Steam collier 3,450 dwt

20.03.1936

27.11.1936

“Saint Louis”

Entreprise d’Acconage et de Remorquage – Tugboat L. Schiaffino (Algiers) 1,250 HP

18.05.1936

28.01.1937

“Cérès”

French Navy

630-ton submarine “Minerve I”-class 856 dwt

10.08.1936

09.12.1938

“François L.D”

Louis Dreyfus & Cie

Motor cargo ship 9,000 dwt

21.09.1936

03.05.1938

394

10.08.1937 12.10.1935

Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

“Malgache”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire Mixed cargo ship de Navigation – NCHP 8,960 dwt Ex-French Navy

“UF 2” Ex-“La Favorite” (Q 195)

“Kriegsmarine” (Germany) Ex-French Navy

“Aurore”-class 29.07.1938 / submarine 07.11.1938 1,170 dwt submerged

12.09.1942

“L’Africaine” (Q 196)

French Navy

“Aurore”-class 01.09.1938 / submarine 09.11.1938 1,170 dwt submerged

07.12.1946

“CH 13” - Calais

French Navy

Submarine chaser

16.02.1939

23.03.1940

“CH 14” - Diélette

French Navy

Submarine chaser

16.02.1939

21.04.1940

“CH 15” - Paimpol

French Navy

Submarine chaser

27.02.1939

23.05.1940

“CH 16” - Nantes

French Navy

Submarine chaser

27.02.1939

08.06.1940

“Égée”

Société Navale Caennaise (ex-G. Lamy & Cie)

Steam collier 3,400 dwt

02.11.1938

28.01.1940

“La Charente” Ex-“Ostfriesland” Ex-“La Charente”

French Navy Ex-“Kriegsmarine” (Germany) Ex-French Navy

Supply oil tanker 7,580 dwt

04.05.1939

19.06.1943

“L’Andromaque” (Q 203)

French Navy

“Aurore”-class submarine

10.07.1939

Cancelled order

“La Mayenne”

French Navy

Supply oil tanker 7,600 dwt

21.09.1939

21.05.1947

“L’Armide” (Q 207)

French Navy

“Aurore”-class submarine

01.11.1939 / 16.03.1940

Cancelled order

“La Baïse”

French Navy

Supply oil tanker 7,600 dwt

30.05.1940

30.11.1948

100

“Pluviôse” (Q 219)

French Navy

Submarine chaser

Cancelled order

101

“Ventôse” (Q 220)

French Navy

Submarine chaser

Cancelled order

102

“Germinal” (Q 221)

French Navy

Submarine chaser

Cancelled order

103

“Floréal” (Q 222)

French Navy

Submarine chaser

Cancelled order

105

“Ingénieur Lacroix”

French Army Munitions Department Ex-“Kriegsmarine” (Germany)

Non-self-propelled tank barge 700 dwt

19.08.1941

31.12.1943

106

“Courlis”

Purfina Transports Ex-“Kriegsmarine” (Germany)

Non-self-propelled 11.10.1941 tank barge, then selfpropelled - 700 dwt

07.06.1948

107

“Lutetia”

Société Fluviale et Maritime – Soflumar

Non-self-propelled 12.06.1946 tank barge, then selfpropelled - 700 dwt

13.01.1948

395

Keel laid down Launch date 28.05.1937

19.07.1939

Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

108

“Djinn”

Société Fluviale et Maritime – Soflumar

Non-self-propelled 04.11.1946 tank barge, then selfpropelled - 700 dwt

30.01.1948

109

“Ville de Tamatave"

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Mixed cargo ship 10,845 dwt

25.06.1947

23.09.1949

110

“Ville de Tananarive”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Mixed cargo ship 10,520 dwt

28.04.1948

31.05.1950

111

Worms & Cie Ex-French State Ex-“Kriegsmarine” (Germany)

Cargo ship 1,150 dwt

08.12.1941

24.03.1947

112

10.12.1941

20.08.1947

113

Worms & Cie Ex-French State Ex-“Kriegsmarine” (Germany) French State (operated by Worms & Cie) Ex-“Kriegsmarine” (Germany)

Cargo ship 1,150 dwt

”Barsac” Ex-“Calvados” Ex-“Dustenbrouck” “Cérons” Ex-“Manche” Ex-“Schulensee” “Ille et Vilaine” Ex-“Kronshagen”

Cargo ship 1,150 dwt

12.01.1942

07.06.1948

114

“Champagne”

Société Française de Transports Pétroliers – SFTP

Oil tanker 16,902 dwt

13.12.1948

26.10.1950

115

“Roussillon”

Société Française de Transports Pétroliers – SFTP

Oil tanker 17,601 dwt

13.10.1949

18.09.1951

116

“Saint Patrice”

Association Pétrolière

Oil tanker 16,500 dwt

05.11.1950 / 15.11.1950

11.02.1952

117

“Nossi-Bé”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Mixed cargo ship 9,706 dwt

12.06.1950 / 02.07.1950

10.07.1952

118

“Beauce”

Société Française de Transports Pétroliers – SFTP

Oil tanker 17,810 dwt

08.10.1951

17.03.1953

119

“Orion”

French Navy

Minesweeper 380 dwt

26.08.1952

20.11.1953

120

“Sagittaire”

French Navy

Minesweeper 380 dwt

26.08.1952 / 28.08.1952

12.01.1955

121

“Languedoc”

Société Française de Transports Pétroliers – SFTP

Oil tanker 19,754 dwt

21.08.1952

21.12.1953

122

“Atlantic Lady”

Atlantic Oil Carriers – Livanos group

Oil tanker 19,775 dwt

07.04.1953

05.05.1954

123

“Pluviôse”

Compagnie Nationale de Navigation – CNN

Oil tanker 20,000 dwt

09.01.1954

08.02.1955

124

“Presidente Jorge Montt”

Chilean Navy

Oil tanker 17,750 dwt

13.06.1954

14.01.1956

125

“Criquet”

French Navy

Sea barge (for setting 27.08.1953 antisubmarine nets) 850 dwt (full load)

03.06.1954

126

“Fourmi”

French Navy

Sea barge (for setting 11.09.1953 antisubmarine nets) 850 dwt (full load)

06.07.1954

127

“Ville de Djibouti”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Mixed cargo ship 8,745 dwt

17.09.1955

396

Keel laid down Launch date

22.01.1954

Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

Keel laid down Launch date

128

“Croix du Sud”

French Navy

Minesweeper 400 dwt

17.12.1954

13.06.1956

129

“Étoile polaire”

French Navy

Minesweeper 400 dwt

03.12.1955

05.03.1957

130

“Joseph Duhamel II”

SA Les Pêcheries de Fécamp

Trawler 1,470 dwt

10.08.1954

23.05.1955

131

“Stanvac Lirik”

Petroleum Shipping Co. Ltd

Oil tanker 11,460 dwt

21.05.1955

04.12.1956

132

“Morse”

French Navy

“Narval”-class submarine 1,441 dwt

27.12.1956

11.12.1958

133

“Laurent Schiaffino”

Société Algérienne de Navigation, Charles Schiaffino & Cie

Cargo ship 5,300 dwt

15.06.1955

09.06.1956

134

“Cap Fagnet”

SA Les Pêcheries de Fécamp

Cod fishing trawler 1,600 dwt

13.01.1956

03.12.1956

135

“Ville de Rouen”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Mixed cargo ship 11,083 dwt

29.02.1956

13.05.1957

136

“Ville de Dunkerque”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Mixed cargo ship 11,083 dwt

07.06.1956

24.09.1957

137

“Artois”

Société Française de Transports Pétroliers – SFTP

Oil tanker 19,530 dwt

27.12.1956

07.12.1957

138

“Port-Vendres”

Société d’Armement Fluvial et Maritime – Soflumar

Oil tanker 14,290 dwt

22.05.1957

19.04.1958

139

“Kongsdal”

A/S Moltzau’s Tankrederi – Moltzau & Christensen (Norway)

Oil tanker 20,100 dwt

11.12.1957

30.08.1958

140

“Caltex Strasbourg”

Société Outremer de Navigation Pétrolière

Oil tanker 18,010 dwt

23.04.1958

22.06.1959

141

“Longwy”

Compagnie Générale d’Armements Maritimes

Ore-bulk-oil carrier 21,250 dwt

05.09.1958

03.11.1959

142

“Ville de Nantes”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Mixed cargo ship 8,908 dwt

06.11.1957

26.02.1959

143 1

144

148

149

6 6

Sir R. Ropner (Holdings) Ltd (Great Britain) Oil tanker 20,000 dwt “Pentellina”

Cancelled order

Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest + Union Navale

Ore carrier 18,410 dwt

15.07.1960 / 10.08.1960

06.04.1961

Naval Constructions Directorate (Homet dry dock – Cherbourg)

Ship caisson

05.05.1958

03.07.1959

“Penchâteau”

Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest – CNCO

Ore carrier 8,432 dwt

18.11.1959

05.11.1960

150

“Eldonia”

Union Navale

Bulk carrier 3,700 dwt

15.05.1959

31.03.1960

151

”Yainville”

Worms CMC

Collier-bulk carrier 3,600 dwt

14.04.1960

13.02.1961

397

Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

Keel laid down Launch date

152

“Mostaganem”

Les Cargos Algériens

Cargo liner 5,500 dwt

10.08.1960

14.09.1961

153

“Saint François”

Compagnie de Navigation Denis Frères

Cargo ship 7,350 dwt

15.01.1962

17.10.1962

154

“Dives”

French Navy

Landing ship tank (LST) 2,235 dwt

07.08.1959

28.06.1960

155

“Bidassoa”

French Navy

Landing ship tank (LST) 2,235 dwt

30.01.1960

29.12.1960

156

“Gypsum Countess”

Panama Gypsum Co. Inc.

Self-unloading bulk carrier 10,720 dwt

10.07.1959

05.08.1960

157 158

Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin

1 platform barge for unloading 1 platform barge for pumping

28.10.1959

16.01.1960 et 18.01.1960

159

“Ville du Havre”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Cargo ship 12,302 dwt

16.11.1960

10.08.1961

160

“Ville de Brest”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Cargo ship 12,264 dwt

12.04.1961

19.06.1962

161

“Stylehurst”

Grenehurst Shipping Co. Ltd (Great Britain)

Ore carrier 21,700 dwt

10.08.1961

04.05.1962

162

“N. O. Røgenæs”

Niels Røgenæs (Norway)

Cargo ship 7,870 dwt

25.07.1962

27.05.1963

165

“Astrolabe”

French Navy

Hydrographic survey vessel (patrol ship) 330 dwt

25.11.1962

11.04.1963

166

“Boussole”

French Navy

Hydrographic survey vessel (patrol ship) 330 dwt

26.11.1962/ 05.02.1963

27.05.1963

167

“Ville de Bordeaux”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

30.05.1963 Cargo ship 12,304 dwt – 17,809 m3

11.04.1964

168

“Ville de Lyon”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

Cargo ship 12,308 dwt

15.04.1964

14.10.1965

169

“Copernico”

Naviera Interoceangas SA (Chile)

Butane carrier 2,174 dwt - 3,400 m3

15.11.1962

11.04.1963

170

“Ville d’Anvers” Ex-“Mont Aigoual”

Cargo ship 14,597 dwt

01.03.1963

02.03.1964

171

“Jules Verne”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP ex-SGTM Gaz Marine

Methane carrier 25,500-m3 of LNG

17.04.1963

08.09.1964

172

“Stena Danica”

Stena AB - Sten A. Olsson (Sweden)

Ferry boat 14.09.1964 1,000 passengers and 140 cars – 640 dwt

03.05.1965

398

Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

“Stena Nordica”

Stena AB - Sten A. Olsson (Sweden)

Ferry boat 23.09.1964 1,000 passengers and 140 cars – 640 dwt

15.05.1965

In 174 workshop

“Dauphin”

Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine

1st pusher (2 x 152-HP engines)

15.07.1964

23.12.1964

175

“Montcalm”

Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine

2nd pusher (2 x 540-HP engines) – 75 dwt

01.12.1964

10.02.1965 / 01.03.1965

176

“Dupleix”

Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine

15.12.1964

20.02.1965 / 22.03.1965

177

“Ivolina”

Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – NCHP

3rd pusher (2 x 540-HP engines) – 75 dwt Reefer 3,510 dwt

15.01.1965

10.12.1965

10.07.1965

17 to 30.09.1965 by crane

173

In 178 workshop

Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine

10 barges 700 dwt

Keel laid down Launch date

179

“Ibn Batouta”

Lignes Maritimes du Détroit – Limadet (Maroc)

Ferry boat 23.09.1965 1,000 passengers and 140 cars – 600 dwt

10.03.1966

180

“Marsouin”

Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine

24.09.1965

08.11.1965

181

“Narval”

Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine

4th pusher (2 x 400-HP engines) 5th pusher (2 x 400-HP engines)

08.10.1965

05.12.1965

182

“Rochambeau”

Compagnie Générale Transatlantique

Semi-container ship 7,914 dwt

01.06.1966 / 05.08.1966

11.04.1967

183

“Marie de Grâce”

Société Havraise de Pêche

Freezer trawler 1,665 dwt

15.03.1966

12.11.1966

184

“Névé”

Société Navale Caennaise

Freezer trawler 1,665 dwt

15.04.1966

12.12.1966

Guelfi

Freezer trawler 1,665 dwt

Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine

Floating dock 200 dwt Jack-up barge 490 dwt Ore carrier

28.02.1966

25.04.1966

17.01.1966

25.03.1966

Ore carrier 18,112 dwt

06.1967

15.05.1968

01.02.1967

19.01.1968

“Daphné”-class 20.11.1967 submarine 860 dwt (surface) 1,043 dwt (submerged) “Daphné”-class 20.08.1969 submarine 860 dwt (surface) 1,043 dwt (submerged)

30.07.1969

185 1

186

187

“Nautilus”

Compagnie Générale d’Équipements pour les Travaux Maritimes - GEM

188 1

189

“Sabinia”

Société Navale Caennaise (ex-G. Lamy & Cie) + Union Navale

190

“Mananjary”

Société Malgache de Transports Maritimes Cargo ship (Madagascar) 14,905 dwt

191

“Shushuk”

Pakistani Navy

192

“Mangro”

Pakistani Navy

399

Cancelled order

07.02.1970

Slipway N°

Ship

Shipowner

Type

Compagnie Française de Raffinage

Distillation column

1967

Bare hull of a 16,400-dwt bulk carrier for the Chantiers de l’Atlantique Bare hull of a 16,400-dwt bulk carrier for the Chantiers de l’Atlantique 20 shrimp vessels 125 dwt each

22.03.1969 (completed in Saint-Nazaire)

Tugs & offshore supply vessels (2,100-HP) 20.05.1970 Bare hull of a 11,816-dwt reefer for the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat Bare hull 20.11.1970 of a 11,746-dwt reefer for the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat

26.03.1970 23.04.1970

In 193 workshop 1 194

“Alain L.D”

Louis Dreyfus & Cie

195

“Robert L.D”

Louis Dreyfus & Cie

7+8

196

F-7 CNC, F-8 CNC, F-12 CNC, F-16 CNC, F-18 CNC, F-23 CNC, F-25 CNC, F-28 CNC, F-29 CNC, F-30 CNC F-13 CNC, F-14 CNC, F-17 CNC, F-19 CNC, F-20 CNC, F-21 CNC, F-22 CNC, F-24 CNC, F-26 CNC, F-27 CNC “Green-Fish” “Brown-Fish”

Cuban Government Flota Camaronera del Caribe

Keel laid down Launch date

31.07.1969 (completed in Saint-Nazaire) 11.12.1969 for the first one End of June 1970 for the last one

Flota Camaronera del Sur

Feronia International Shipping (Fish) Inc.

197

198

“Kandalakshskiy Zaliv”

Soviet Fishing Fleet Department Sudoimport (USSR)

199

“Taganrogskiy Zaliv”

Soviet Fishing Fleet Department Sudoimport (USSR)

400

02.12.1970 (completed in La Ciotat) 02.12.1970 (completed in La Ciotat)

401

The jack-up barge delivered to the Compagnie Générale d’Équipements pour les Travaux Maritimes (GEM) on 25 March 1966

402

List of the names of organisations, institutions, administrative services, etc., in English and French Occurrences in the text

Original names

Association of Labour Employers in the Ports of France

Association des employeurs de main-d’œuvre dans les ports de France

Association of Professional Journalists of Normandy

Association des journalistes professionnels de Normandie

Autonomous pension fund

Caisse autonome de retraites

Captain (Navy), Captain (N)

Capitaine de vaisseau

Central Bureau for the Distribution of Industrial Products

Office central de répartition des produits industriels

Central Committee of French Shipowners

Comité central des armateurs de France – CCAF

Central Department for Maritime Stewardship

Service central de l’intendance maritime

Central Department of Naval Construction and Weapons

Direction centrale des constructions et armes navales

Central Directorate of Naval Construction

Direction centrale des constructions navales

Central Directorate for Naval Industries

Direction centrale des industries navales

Central Markets Committee

Commission centrale des marchés

Central Society of French Architects

Société centrale des architectes français

CFDT – Metalworking section

Chamber of Manufacturers and Constructors of Equipment for Railways and Tramways

CFDT (Fédération générale des mines et de la métallurgie) - section métallurgie Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens // French Confederation of Christian Workers Confédération générale du travail-Force ouvrière // General Confederation of Labour-Worker’s Force Chambre syndicale des fabricants et des constructeurs de matériel pour chemin de fer et tramways

Chamber of Shipbuilders

Chambre syndicale des constructeurs de navires – CSCN

Chief Manufacturing Engineer

Ingénieur en chef des fabrications

CFTC CGT-FO

Commanding Admiral in France (“Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich” Amiral Commandant en France – KAF) Commissioner for Maritime Transport and the Merchant Navy

Commissaire aux transports maritimes et à la marine marchande

Commission for Reconstruction

Commissariat à la reconstruction

Commission for the Distribution of Subsidies to Maritime Companies and Commission de répartition des subventions allouées aux sociétés et aux Academies écoles maritimes Commission for the Mediterranean

Commission de la Méditerranée

Commission for the Modernisation of Fuels

Commission de modernisation des carburants 403

Occurrences in the text

Original names

Committee for Historical and Scientific Works

Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques

Committee for Industry, Commerce and Shipping in Le Havre and the Seine Estuary Committee for the Relief of Deportees of the Coup d’Etat of 2 December 1851

Comité de l’industrie, du commerce et de l’armement du Havre et de l’estuaire de la Seine

Consortium of Shipbuilding Companies

Groupement de la construction navale

Delegate General of the French Government within the Occupied Territories

Délégué général du gouvernement français dans les territoires occupés

Delegate General for Franco-German Economic Relations

Délégué général aux relations économiques franco-allemandes

Department of Economic Studies at the Commissariat for Maritime Transport and Merchant Navy

Service des études économiques du Commissariat des transports maritimes et de la marine marchande

Department for War Material Licences

Service des licences de matériels de guerre

Directorate General of Armaments

Direction générale de l’armement – DGA

Director General of the Propellants and Explosives Department

Directeur général des poudres et explosifs

Disabled Navy Personnel Fund

Caisse des invalides

Drac (Regional Directorate of Cultural Affairs)

Direction régionale des affaires culturelles

Economic and Social Development Fund – FDES

Fonds de développement économique et social – FDES

Executive Committee for Imports

Comité exécutif des importations

Comité de secours aux déportés du Coup d’État du 2 décembre 1851

directeur du CNPF (Conseil national du patronat français) Executive Committee of the CNPF (National Council of French Employers) Comité Today: Medef (Mouvement des entreprises de France) Export Group of Steel Ships and Sea Equipment

Groupement d’exportation de navires et engins de mer en acier

Extra-Parliamentarian Commission of the Merchant Navy

Commission extra-parlementaire de la Marine marchande

Franco-American War Cooperation

Affaires militaires et industrielles franco-américaines

(Franco-German and Franco-Italian) Industrial Trade Department

Service (franco-allemand et franco-italien) des échanges industriels

Free School of Political Science

École libre des sciences politiques

French Army Munitions Department

Service des poudres de l’armée

French Association for the Advancement of Science

Association française pour l’avancement des sciences

French Delegation to the Anglo-French Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping // Shipping Executive // Anglo-French Shipping Executive

Délégation française au Comité exécutif permanent franco-anglais des transports maritimes

French Department for Monitoring Works and Manufacturing

Service français de surveillance des travaux et fabrications

French Garden Cities Association

Association des cités-jardins de France

French Graduate School of Engineering

École nationale supérieure de techniques avancées – Ensta

French Institute of the Sea

Institut français de la mer – IFM

French Major Ports Association

Association des grands ports français

French National Coal Board

Bureau national des charbons

404

Occurrences in the text

Original names

French National School of Fine Arts

École nationale supérieure des beaux-arts

French Procurement Mission in the Scandinavian Countries

Mission française d’achat dans les pays scandinaves

French Shipbuilding Consortium

Consortium national des constructions navales

French Steelworkers’ Union

Chambre syndicale de la sidérurgie

Foreign Procurement and Sales Office

Bureau des achats et des ventes à l’étranger

General Committee for the Defence of the Interests of the Port of Dunkirk Comité général pour la défense des intérêts du port de Dunkerque General Movement of Funds

Mouvement général des fonds

German Order Service

Service des commandes allemandes – SCA

German Shipbuilding Supervisory Committee

Comité allemand de surveillance des chantiers navals

Health & Safety Committee

Comité d’hygiène et de sécurité

Higher Commission for the Safety of Maritime Navigation

Commission supérieure de sécurité de la navigation maritime

Higher Council for Maritime Navigation

Conseil supérieur de la navigation maritime

Higher Council for Sea Fisheries

Conseil supérieur des pêches maritimes

Institute for Disabled Navy Personnel

Établissement des invalides de la marine

INSEE – National Institute of Statistics (and Economic Studies)

Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques

Inter-ministerial Commission for the Supervision of Shipyards

Commission interministérielle de contrôle des chantiers maritimes

International Council for North American Fisheries

Conseil international des pêcheries de l’Amérique du Nord

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea

Conseil international pour l’exploration de la mer

Lieutenant (Navy), Lieutenant (N)

Lieutenant de vaisseau

Low-cost housing company – SHBM

Société d’habitations à bon marché – SHBM

Marine Engineering Academy

École nationale supérieure maritime or École du génie maritime

Marine Fisheries Scientific Office

Office scientifique des pêches maritimes

Maritime Transport and Merchant Navy Commission

Commissariat des transports maritimes et de la marine marchande

Maritime Transport Department // Maritime Transport Service

Direction des transports maritimes // Service des transports maritimes

Maritime Transport Executive Committee

Comité exécutif des transports maritimes

Merchant Navy Committee

Comité de la marine marchande

Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee (“Committee of Five”)

Comité consultatif de l’armement (“Comité des Cinq”)

Mutual benefit society

Société de secours mutuels

National Congress of French Geographical Societies

Congrès national des sociétés françaises de géographie

National Fund for Family Allowances

Caisse d’allocations familiales

405

Occurrences in the text

Original names

National Provident Fund for French Seamen

Caisse nationale de prévoyance des marins français

National Resistance Council

Conseil national de la Résistance

Naval Academy

École navale

Naval Constructions Directorate

Direction des constructions et armes navales – DCN

Navy’s Study Bureau

Bureau d’étude de la Marine militaire

Navy Supervisory Department

Service de surveillance de la Marine

Norman Seine River Meanders Regional Nature Park

Parc naturel régional des boucles de la Seine normande – PNR

Normandy History Society

Société de l’histoire de Normandie

Normandy Regional Development Company

Société de développement régional (SDR) de Normandie

Organisation Committee for Naval Construction

Comité d’organisation de la construction navale – COCN

Paris-Sorbonne University

Université Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV)

Plenipotentiary General for Labour Deployment

Plénipotentiaire général pour l’emploi de la main-d’œuvre

Provident Fund

Caisse de prévoyance

Public Procurement Commission

Commission des marchés publics

Railway Advisory Committee

Comité consultatif des chemins de fer

Rouen Academy of Sciences, Literature and Arts

Académie des sciences, belles-lettres et arts de Rouen

Seine Marine Museum in Caudebec-en-Caux

Musée de la Seine normande de Caudebec-en-Caux – MuseoSeine

Seine Pilotage Department

Service du pilotage sur la Seine

Social Hygiene Alliance

Alliance de l’hygiène sociale

Society of Friends of Parisian Monuments

Société des amis des monuments parisiens

Superior Commission for Control and Supervision of Shipping Credit Agencies

Commission supérieure de contrôle et de surveillance des sociétés de crédit maritime

Superior Commission for the Institute for Disabled Navy Personnel

Commission supérieure de l’Établissement des invalides de la marine

Supervisory Service for Works and Manufacturing

Service de surveillance des travaux et fabrications

Supreme Council for French Overseas Territories

Conseil supérieur de la France d’outre-mer

Technical and Shipping Personnel Department

Service technique et du personnel navigant

Technical Committee for Shipbuilding

Comité technique des constructions navales

Technical Service for Naval Constructions

Service technique des constructions navales – STCN

Trade Federation of Coastal Captains

Fédération des capitaines au cabotage

406

Occurrences in the text

Original names

Trade Federation of Navigators

Fédération des navigateurs

Traffic Bureau of the Maritime Transport Department

Bureau des trafics de la Direction des transports maritimes

Transport Priorities and Programmes Service

Service des programmes et priorités de transport

UIMM

Union des industries et métiers de la métallurgie // Union of Metallurgical and Mining Industries

Union of Industrialists of Seine-Maritime

Union des industriels de la Seine-Maritime

Works Social Committee

Comité social d’établissement

407

408

Table of contents Introduction “Industrial activity sprung up in an abandoned corner” Le Trait: a river crossing or “narrow place”?

Border territory between Jumièges and Saint-Wandrille Wood: a coveted source of wealth The Seine, source of nourishment Forest clearance The ferry

A Normandy village still half-asleep (19th century) Le Trait and its inhabitants Demographic change Arrival of the railway The industrialisation of the Seine valley: from farmer-soldier to farmer-worker

7 10 11 11 12 12 13 14 14 14 15 16 16

1914–1917 “Present and future needs”

“The powerful Maison Worms”

20 20 22

“An uncontested authority in the world of the Merchant Navy” Hypolite Worms and Georges Majoux: a taste for entrepreneurialism

“What [Maison Worms] could not procure from others, it resolved to build on its own: by creating a shipyard, its very own shipyard” The “initial project” The official version Two Worms ships destroyed in 31 months of war (August 1914 to March 1917) The shrinking and redeployment of Shipping Services What was required by State contracts “Lack of repair” “Shipyards […] were overladen with orders or had oriented their operations towards war production”

First steps Choosing the site “Roughly halfway between Rouen and Le Havre” Saint-Martin-de-Boscherville or Le Trait? Assembling the land parcels for ACSM – – and for the garden city The builders: Louis Achard, the Director; Joseph Lanave, the Chief Engineer; Gustave Majou, the “architect of public housing”

409

24 24 24 25 26 28 28 30 30 30 32 32 33 35 36

“The government’s urgent entreaties”

39 39

Anatole de Monzie The man “for whom the position of Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy has been created” “I have had the pleasure of knowing you for twenty-six years” The department of the Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy: “somewhat misbegotten” 1917: “One leader… just one leader!” Hypolite Worms and the “Comité des cinq”

“The thorny issue of tonnage” The price paid for the decline in the French Merchant Navy Licensing or the need to “turn partial control into total control” Agreements with England Soaring prices 13 April 1917: an advance of 160 million francs to purchase or construct ships

“Victory for the Entente,” Admiral Jellicoe said the day before yesterday, “is in the hands of the shipyards” Sales of ships prohibited almost everywhere Build ships – but with what means? “The very scarcity of sheet metal is becoming a real problem” State intervention and private initiative: “A semi-mixed economy”

1917–1939 “Transformation from a rural community to an industrial centre” So many challenges to be overcome The miraculous birth of a shipyard? The first companies on site (March 1917 to December 1918) Veuve Hottat et Fils for the slipways and workshops, J. Cohier for 32 houses and Péqueur for the wharf Petrol is lacking, Hottat goes on strike, and relations with Maison Worms become strained Marcel Duchereau, the building engineer, agrees to build three additional workshops and 16 houses The Hottat affair grows acrimonious The strategy changes following the bankruptcy of Veuve Hottat et Fils: several parties divide up the tasks and share the risks (December 1918 to May 1920) The lack of labour: the requisitioning of prisoners, many of them Russian Duchereau throws in the towel Prices of supplies skyrocket Strikes and problems with applying the Law of 23 April 1919 Rail transport problems

410

39 40 41 41 42 44 44 46 46 47 48 49 49 50 51 52

56 58 58 59 59 61 64 64 67 67 69 69 69 70

How can decent housing be provided for 3,000 future Le Trait residents? Georges Majoux at the centre of discussions on public housing Creation of the Société Immobilière du Trait Between conflicts and cooperation with elected officials and the administration: supplying the town and shipyard with water, gas and electricity

“The shipyard created the town” “When we arrived, there was nothing, absolutely nothing” The response of Worms & Cie: build a garden city to help employees put down roots Half-timbered Normandy houses versus North French miners’ homes Henri Nitot’s thesis An ideal city, or a certain concept thereof Bringing city conveniences to the country: providing the garden city with business structures, education and social welfare “La Coopé,” the “blue bus,” the market Best practices for sanitary facilities, health, education, entertainment, etc. The benefits of a family-run company

A period of intense activity (1921–1927) Worms & Cie and the French National Coal Board fill the order book 29 November 1921: launch of the “Capitaine Bonelli” and inauguration of the shipyard “A complete success” 29 November 1921: launch of the collier “Capitaine Bonelli” – “A tribute to the glory of the French Navy and French shipbuilding” – Speech by Mr Hypolite Worms: “For the greater good of the country” Six years of guaranteed work 60 million in sales contracted in 1919 The State, a much-coveted client 4 April 1927: “Le Loing,” the first oil tanker delivered to the French Navy and the first motor ship built at Le Trait – Speech given by Hypolite Worms: “The watchful and benevolent assistance of public authorities” Foreign companies turn to Le Trait – – as do French shipowners The momentum soon petered out 20 May 1928: the “Orkanger,” the largest oil tanker built to date by ACSM 25 May 1929: the “Basque,” the first torpedo boat delivered to the French Navy Hypolite Worms’ plea to the French Major Ports Association (Le Trait, 12 June 1929): “Help us!”

411

72 72 73 74 76 76 78 78 80 81 82 82 83 85 86 86 87 87 88–93 94 95 95 96–100 101 101 101

104–105 106–107 108–113

Day-to-day life in Le Trait (how residents go about their working and social lives) The Société Immobilière du Trait: guidance, supervision, motivation Worms & Cie, a key economic player in the Seine Valley Alexandre Vince, Chief Engineer and developer of social works The shipyard: a “penitentiary,” a “prison”? Shipbuilding injuries An apprenticeship contract at ACSM in 1929 The garden city, a “political city”? The cost of living Multi-ethnic Le Trait An industry without unemployment before the economic crisis, but without specialised workers

116 116 118 119 120 120 121 122 123 125

Between socio-economic difficulties and technical successes (1930–1938)

128

125

Crisis hits shipbuilding in the 1930s: market distortions and a lack of competitiveness 128 16 March 1930: launch of the steam cargo ship “Charles Schiaffino” built for the Société Algérienne de Navigation pour l’Afrique du Nord, Charles Schiaffino & Cie – Speech by Hypolite Worms: The ills befalling shipbuilding 129–138 The battle for public procurement contracts 139 Construction activity bears up in 1931–1932 141 Constructed at Le Trait: the submarines “Antiope,” “Amazone” (1928–1931), “Oréade,” “La Sibylle” (1929–1933), “Vénus” (1932–1935), and “Cérès” (1936–1938) 142–143 “Our customers are vanishing into thin air” 144 The first lay-offs 144 “Le Trait,” the “boat for the unemployed” 144 23 September 1933: launch of the oceanographic research vessel “Président Théodore Tissier,” for the Marine Fisheries Scientific Office – Speech given by Hypolite Worms: “We are counting on you!” 146–151 Diversifying and innovating 152 In pursuit of orders 152 - Representative Pradeau - Role of elected officials, notably André Marie 153 - Advertising 154 Diversifying the ACSM offering: construction of boilers, oil tanks and floating roofs 156 Pierre Abbat in the forefront of technological advances 157 Drawing inspiration from what others do best 157 “Shéhérazade,” the world’s largest oil tanker 159 12 October 1935: launch of the “Shéhérazade,” the supertanker built for the Compagnie Auxiliaire de Navigation (CAN) 160–167 The nadir of 1935 168 Social tensions from June 1936 to the beginning of 1937 168 “L’Incomprise,” “Cérès” and the others 172 The launch of the “Malgache” on 19 July 1939: final moment of community 172 19 July 1939: launch of the “Malgache,” a mixed cargo ship for the NCHP – Speech by Hypolite Worms: May “the worldwide fleet remaining at the disposal of the Allies […] embrace the task that lies ahead” 173–177

412

1939–1944 Under the yoke of the German occupiers and the Allied air raids

178 179

Preamble

From the Phoney War to the “Blitzkrieg” (September 1939 to June 1940) “Nothing noteworthy happened for several months” Maintaining “a somewhat satisfactory financial balance” “Sheltered by the Siegfried and Maginot Lines” Ships under construction for the French Navy in early 1939 General management on official missions Jacques Barnaud at the Ministry of Armaments, then of Finance Hypolite Worms in London “The storm broke out” The “lightning war” and the ensuing debacle Initiatives taken by Abbat and Nitot compensate for the lack of military authority Evacuation of Le Trait (9–10 June 1940) “I have no means of destroying any of the facilities or ships under construction” The scramble to Nantes (19 June to beginning of July 1940)

From the Armistice of 22 June 1940 to the Franco-German Agreement of 16 September 1941

181 181 181 182 184–185

186 186 187 191 191 194 195 196 198 199 199 202 203

“We decided to head back” Except for Hypolite Worms, who was still in London The Worms Agreement of 4 July 1940 Henri Nitot meets the occupation authorities: the “temporary” agreement of 8 July 1940 203 Jacques Barnaud ceases to manage the business affairs of Worms & Cie (early July 1940) 204 Law of 20 July 1940: termination and liquidation of contracts concluded with the State 204 25 July 1940: ACSM re-opens its doors 205 3 August 1940: German officers inspecting the shipyard 206–207 208 The list of orders in hand Spoils of war in theory and in practice 208 Ending the confusion 209 The Technical Service for Naval Constructions – STCN and René Norguet, head of service 210 The resumption of ACSM activities is ensured by the construction or conversion of barges 210 24 August 1940: Formation of the German Order Service (SCA) 211 “Since the conflict is continuing, France must contribute to the war effort, irrespective of whether such obligations are contained in the Armistice Agreement” 212

413

The shipyards caught up in politics While awaiting instructions from the government: what to do with the submarine “La Favorite”? The Secretary of State for the Navy encourages companies to play for time 27–29 September 1940: Henri Nitot in Vichy The French Admiralty seeks compensation for the “pillage” of the occupied zone The Germans threaten the shipyards 8 October 1940: construction work resumes on “La Favorite” 15 October 1940: the manufacture of war material is forbidden by law Darlan’s ulterior motives ACSM is commissioned to build three 1,150-ton freighters for the German Navy The submarine “L’Africaine” enters the scene 25 October 1940: Maison Worms under the iron rule of the Occupier Von Ziegesar, Commissioner-Administrator of Worms & Cie The slander of the collaborationist press The hostility of Laval In the clutches of the Occupier Waiting for Wiesbaden All construction work must be endorsed by the French Admiralty 28 November 1940: the SCA secretly authorises construction work to continue on “La Favorite” Cessation of work on “L’Africaine” Will the oil tanker “La Baïse” have to be demolished? Obtaining supplies becomes increasingly difficult “A showdown or negotiations” The French Admiralty blocks the licences The Reich ups its demands 27 December 1941: France responds by creating the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction (COCN) Advances and setbacks The Germans go on the offensive: the case of “L’Africaine” The keel of barge No. 105 is laid in slipway No. 7 between two air raids (Summer 1941) 16 September 1941: the Franco-German Agreement on shipbuilding in the occupied zone is signed 3–9 October 1941: The Germans take over as project managers for “La Favorite,” “L’Africaine” and “La Charente”

414

213 213 213 214 215 215 216 217 217 218 219 219 219 219 220 221 221 221 221 222 222 223 224 224 224 226 226 226 227 228 228

Avoidance and dithering (end of 1941 to August 1944) Between shortages, air raid warnings and air strikes Shortages of materials The oil tanker “La Charente” is rechristened “Ostfriesland” 12 September 1942: launch of “La Favorite”; ACSM is taken hostage December 1942: 120 workers from Le Trait are sent to Gdansk 19 June 1943: launch of the “Ostfriesland” August–September 1943: new attacks by Allied bombers Praise for Pierre Abbat Further requisitioning of workers The final work Landing of the Allies and liberation of the shipyard (6 June 1944 to 30 August 1944) 30 August 1944: Le Trait is liberated “Nothing but ruins and desolation” Final assessment: “The tonnage built for the German did not even reach 8%” of the shipyard’s capacity “Ready to resume work”

231 231 231 234 234 237 238 240 240 241 241 242 242 243 243 251

Rebirth, modernisation and climax (1945–1959)

252

Leaving the war behind (1945–1951)

253 254 254

A change in scale Creation of the Works Council Transformation of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime into a public limited company 254 Worms & Cie leases to its subsidiary the land and commercial property as well as the buildings, facilities and constructions for industrial and non industrial use, located in Le Trait 256 Reconstruction phase (1945–1950) 257 The flattened workshops rise from the ground while production resumes 257 Labour shortages 259 A rational production cycle 259 The American example 260 7 December 1946: launch of the submarine “L’Africaine” for the French Navy – Speech by Hypolite Worms: “The resurrection of our shipyard” 262–265 Back to normal 266 7 June 1948: launch of the barge “Courlis” and the freighter “Ille et Vilaine” for the French Navy – Speech by Hypolite Worms: “An ardent desire to serve” 268–269 The new shipyard and its operations 270

272

Prefabrication, oxy-fuel cutting, welding

Serial construction 272 23 September 1949: launch of the freighter “Ville de Tamatave” for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire – Speech by Hypolite Worms: “It is not merely a question […] of having […] ships fitted with state-of-the-art nautical features. Above all, satisfactory operating conditions are needed to allow these ships to perform the services expected of them” 273–275

415

Increasing safety and optimising working conditions 276 High-risk trades 276 “One month without a work-related accident” 277 Improved health 277 31 May 1950: launch of the mixed cargo ship “Ville de Tananarive” for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire (NCHP) – Speech by Robert Labbé: “Re-establishing a level playing field for our industry and foreign industries” – Speech by Hypolite Worms: “We were forced to place this order abroad” 280–286 First signs of problems: the resurgent question of a lack of competitiveness 287 Orders become increasingly rare 287 1950: SFIO wins the Mayoral election, CGT gains a firm foothold 287 True prices 288 26 October 1950: launch of the oil tanker “Champagne” fitted out by the SFTP – Speech by Hypolite Worms: “Our attachment to ships also stems from our understanding of them as standard-bearers of civilisation” 289–290 The Defferre Law of 24 May 1951: a turning point in the government’s shipbuilding policy 291 Trade-offs for State aid 291 18 September 1951: launch of the oil tanker “Roussillon” fitted out by the SFTP – Speech by Robert Labbé: “Frequent examples come to us from abroad regarding the major material advantages stemming from adopting certain standard practices” – Speech by Mr Cayrol: “The use of oil products has developed in all countries far more quickly than we estimated several years ago” 292–299

Growth of ACSM: the paradoxical zenith? (1952–1959) A fragile recovery 1952: Worms & Cie transfers nearly all its production assets to ACSM October 1952: the death of “Father” Abbat Production grows The credo of Marcel Lamoureux: increase productivity The relaunch of housing construction Bonuses and gratuities Renewal of the workforce and productivity gains 1956: the technical and commercial partnership with the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM) Work is assured until 1958, but losses are foreseen 1959: Business slows down 3 November 1959: launch of the “Longwy” fitted out by the Compagnie Générale d’Armements Maritimes, largest ship constructed in Le Trait at that time, and first ore-bulk-oil carrier to sail under the French flag December 1959: the White Paper on Shipbuilding recommends a cut in the number of shipyards

416

300 300 301 303 304 304

306 307 307 308 309 311 316 317

1960–1972 From bad to worse – the final chapter for ACSM “If the shipping industry is experiencing difficulties, shipbuilding is suffering a tragedy” The unprecedented boom of the 1950s “Beyond the needs of the national and international market” – market saturation and the collapse of demand Downsizing production

The battle for survival Ready for the fight A sound financial structure The backing of Worms & Cie: the men of Maison Worms The impact of the Worms group on the ACSM’s reputation Impact on the order book 28 June and 29 December 1960: launch of the landing ship tanks (LST) “Dives” and “Bidassoa” 1961: the last year of normal activity 6 April 1961: launch of the ore carrier “Pentellina” for the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest and the Union Navale 1962: the grief-stricken Maison Worms Innovating for survival The epic story of transporting liquefied natural gas – LNG Trials on the Liberty ship “Beauvais” ACSM wins the contract The Hassi R’Mel and Arzew gas complex The “Jules Verne,” the first French methane carrier, is built in Le Trait The “Jules Verne” is launched on 8 September 1964 Other ship orders An overly diversified order book Final launches for the French Navy – 11 April and 27 May 1963: the hydrographic survey vessels “Astrolabe” and “Boussole” Towards “despecialisation”: “Diversifying and intensifying its reconversion activities” Floating roofs and boilermaking activities New industrial specialties Les Constructions Mécaniques du Trait Botalam Euro Moteurs Praia From one investment programme to another

320

321 321 323 327 329 329 329 331 332 332

333 334 336 337 339 339 340 341 344 344 346 348 349 351 352 352 353 354 354 355 355

355 356

Fifth and final capital increase

417

“The government’s pressing demand”

357

From several potential mergers to a two way-merger Proposed merger with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat and the Chantiers & Ateliers de Provence

357 357

A four-way merger

359

Economic goals of the project

360 361

Time for evaluation The more the shipyard works, the more money it loses

361

The coffers are emptying while the loans are increasing

362

First wave of dismissals (March 1965) and deterioration of the social climate

362

Finding ways to stem the haemorrhage

364

“The crisis […] is now reaching an exceptionally grave level”

365

“The foreseeable failure of discussions on a four-way merger” Merging with CNC alone – An underlying motivation: building of the “great form” in La Ciotat

366

Audy Gilles replaces Pierre Herrenschmidt

369

CNC is summoned to explain itself

369

Second wave of layoffs (April 1966)

370

367

371

It’s all over for ACSM Inhabitants of Le Trait take to the streets

371

13 May 1966: the final ACSM General Meeting

372

From one State request to another

376

Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat – Établissements du Trait

378

“The Chantiers de La Ciotat virtually without an owner” “What are all these people going to do?” The elected officials swung into action From the red flag of anger to the black flag of mourning “‘Sabinia’ will not leave!” “The hour of truth” The events of May–June 1968 in Le Trait TMT: take it or leave it 11 May 1971: the last launch

378 379 380 382 382 383 383 387

Mission well accomplished

389

387

Ships and other equipment built in Le Trait between 1920 and 1971

391–400

List of the names of organisations, institutions, administrative services, etc., in English and French

403–407

418

Digital legal deposit May 2022 Legal deposit paper print run May 2022 Printed in Luxembourg by Imprimerie Centrale SA in May 2022

Book design: Frédéric Van de Walle and Christian Lebailly

www.wormsetcie.com

420

50 years of shipbuilding on the banks of the Seine

Articles inside

VI. 1960–1972 From bad to worse – the final chapter for ACSM

V. 1945–1959 Rebirth, modernisation and climax

IV. 1939-1944 Under the yoke of the German occupiers and the Allied air raids

II. 1914–1917 “Present and future needs”

I. “Industrial activity sprung up in an abandoned corner”

Introduction