Hypolite Worms' mission to London by Worms & Cie

AS HEAD OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION TO THE ANGLO-FRENCH PERMANENT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR (NOVEMBERMISSIONHYPOLITESHIPPINGWORMS’TOLONDON1939TOJULY1940) www.wormsetcie.com

HEAD OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION TO THE ANGLO-FRENCH PERMANENT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR (NOVEMBERSHIPPING1939TOJULY 1940)

HYPOLITE WORMS’ MISSION TO LONDON

Text written by Christian Lebailly Based on the Worms & Cie archives

Hypolite Worms’ report on his mission to the French authorities 31 in Vichy on 1 August 1940: the “Worms” agreements of 4 July 1940

Accusations brought against Hypolite Worms for “having sold 52 the French Merchant Navy to the English”

Use of the “Worms” agreements 58

the French Delegation to the Anglo-French 16 Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping and results obtained between 1 December 1939 and 10 June 1940, the date on which communications between London and Paris broke Isolationdownof

the French representatives in London 24 (10 June to 19 July 1940)

The Maritime Transport Mission 7–11 – and the Anglo-French Permanent Executive Committee for WorkShippingdoneby

Paul Morand, Head of tHe frencH Mission for econoMic Warfare in Great Britain, to M. daladier, frencH President of tHe council, Minister of foreiGn affairs, london, 20 sePteMBer 1939

“It is essential to have the most efficient methods when using the available resources for France and England. What matters is to buy as priority the goods that are most likely to support our enemies’ war effort, to buy these goods on the markets which are most accessible to Germany, to turn these resources to satisfy our war needs, to avoid competition between our two countries which would lead to higher prices.”

The labour mobilisation plan drawn up by the French General Staff: a law passed in July 1938 provided for the collective requisition as well as individual requisition of labour. French nationals, men, women and minors, forming part of the companies’ staff were, on the basis of a mobilisation order, compelled to remain at their work place or to hold any other position they would be attributed. The Ministry of Labour adopted those measures by an order dated 24 August 1939.

On 3 September 1939, Great Britain and France, true to their commitments to Poland, declared war on its invader, Hitler’s Germany. In November, Anatole de Monzie, Minister for Transport, and Alphonse Rio, Minister for the Merchant Navy, appointed Hypolite Worms, the eponymous head of Maison Worms, to a special mission in Great Britain as part of the agreements thatArthur Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier had concluded with the aim of coordinating the war effort of their two countries. For this purpose, several executive committees based in London were created (aviation, raw materials, supplies, etc.). These committees reinforced the action of the missions, which had been active since the beginning of the conflict.

1 The Worms archives cited in this monograph are marked in green and underscored (mostly under the date) in the footnotes. These documents can be con sulted on the website www.wormsetcie.com – under “Archives” – by referring to the “Recueil annuel d’informations” (annual collection of information) and/ or to the separate file corresponding to their date of issue. The main documents used in this chapter are: a memo of 13 August 1940 entitled “Répartition des attributions entre le Comité franco-anglais des transports maritimes et la Mission des transports maritimes”; an undated memo, filed under 1940, entitled “Résumé des travaux de la délégation française au Comité exécutif franco-anglais des transports maritimes (1er décembre 1939-10 juin 1940)”; an undated and untitled memo, filed under 1940, on the creation, functioning and dissolution of the AngloFrench Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping; the copy, dated 23 November 1939, of Hypolite Worms’ service order issued by the Minister for the Merchant Navy.2On the subject of the dominant position of the City in international maritime activities, see the memo sent in 1977 by Georges Bertaux to Francis Ley (Banque Worms) on the founding of the Société de Courtage et d’Affrètements Pétroliers. In this document, Georges Bertaux stated that in 1936 “the international market place for shipping freight was the Baltic Exchange, located in London at 24–28, St Mary Axe. At that time, every European broker had a correspondent broker in London. Indeed, all foreign shipowners (especially the Scandinavian and Greek ones who owned the largest share of free shipping tonnage) used London as their base for offering their ships.”

4 https://www.britannica.com: “The voyage charter is the most common. Under this method a ship is chartered for a one-way voyage between specific ports with a spec ified cargo at a negotiated rate of freight.”

The Maritime Transport Mission –

Planned before the outbreak of the Second World War, the French Maritime Transport Mission,1 headed by Pierre de Malglaive, Director of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (known as the French Line), began its work with the Board of Trade in London2 on

3 September 1939.3 Its role was to supply, on the London market, the ships France needed for its imports (coal, oil, ocean-going transport, etc.). To achieve this objec tive, the Mission concluded voyage charters4 and was tasked with executing the general agreements reached with neutral countries, with taking over the ships assigned to France, with drawing up and signing charter parties, freight arrangements, etc. Moreover, it looked after the French vessels coming to England to take on cargoes of coal for France. This organisation, as efficient as it was, nevertheless quickly came up against a major hurdle: demand for shipping became so high that the voyage charters, hired in competition with the various departments of the British Ministry of Shipping and those of other import ing countries (Belgium, Switzerland, etc.) were proving to be insufficient.

3 That same day, Great Britain (at 11 a.m.) and France (at 5 p.m.) declared war on Germany, in fulfilment of their mutual assistance commitments towards Poland (the Anglo-Polish Treaty of 25 August 1939), whose borders had been breached by German troops on 1 September 1939. Cf. André Kaspi, in collaboration with Nicole Piétri et Ralph Schor, La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, chronologie commentée, Bibliothèque Numérique Perrin, 1990. On the functioning of the French economic services in England, see Documents diplomatiques français : 1939 (3 septembre-31 décembre), vol. 1, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2002, pp. 374–382.

The author of this quote illustrated his point by refer ring to two draft tonnage agreements that the British government was about to sign, one with Sweden (see next page) and the other with Yugoslavia.

September 1939 – general mobilisation in France

5 Documents diplomatiques français, op. cit., p. 375.

A further problem: the absence of French representa tives in the discussions held by the English. “For the negotiations with the neutral countries in general,”

“The main difficulties we are facing,” emphasised Y. Méric de Bellefon, Director of the French Economic Services in Great Britain, in a report sent on 10 October 1939 to Mr Corbin, French ambassador to London, “are linked to the question of charters which has not been settled yet. […] In order to better foresee the use of freight, our Allies are asking us to provide them with comprehensive plan listing the needs of France and its colonies for at least two months; they would like, quite rightly, not to miss any occasion and to use every opportunity of grouping all purchases to be made on the same production site, particularly on the regular shipping lines.”5

pointed the Merchant Navy delegate in a letter sent from London on 3 November 1939 to Alphonse Rio, Minister for the Merchant Navy, in Paris, “I consider that the current system of keeping us informed of the talks and then presenting us with a draft agreement is insufficient. […] This very day, I have just let it be known that we consider the presence of your representatives in London at these negotiations to be a form of inter-allied cooperation as conceived in France and that, if for a reason I am unaware of, our presence is not desired in these meetings, we will consider ourselves authorised to start our own negotiations.”

Ships involved: oil tankers (1°), liners (2 °) and tramps6 (3 °).

1° - All oil tankers not required for imports to Sweden will be offered to French charterers.

2. This representative shall inform the Ministry of Shipping each time a Swedish ship is available in a foreign port for transporting complete cargoes. This notification

4. Ships unloading cargoes from overseas in the United Kingdom or France (at an Atlantic or Channel port) shall normally continue their voyage to Sweden, taking on, whenever possible, cargoes from the United Kingdom or France. Moreover, ships unloading cargoes in a French port on the Bay of Biscay may take on loads for the United Kingdom whenever one will be offered to them and if a full load for Sweden is not immediately available. These arrangements shall be made between the repre sentative of the Swedish shipowners in England and the Ministry of Shipping.

The following is planned:

1. Swedish shipowners shall have a representative in the United Kingdom.

6 A tramp is a ship which is not assigned to a regular route but takes on cargoes when and where they are offered and to any port.

2 ° - Swedish lines will do their best to organise their ser vices to Sweden in such a way that the space available for loads to the United Kingdom and France will not be lower than 75% of a ship’s total capacity. At the end of each quarter, the Swedish lines will provide information on the total amounts of cargo transported during the quarter to neutral countries other than Swedish ports and on any unused space on the liner vessels which have completed their voyages in said quarter.

5. Freight rates will be kept at reasonable levels. Freight will be payable in sterling.

Draft agreement between the royal Swedish government and HM British government on tonnage matters

7 See note 12, page 11.

3 November 1939

3. The empty ships available for full cargo shall be chartered-in on a voyage basis. British charterers shall be able to have the ship loaded at the port of their con venience in the region where the ship will be located. It is agreed that British charterers may request that the cargoes be transported to French ports.

3° - When a Swedish ship not used on a regular line has completed her voyage in an overseas or Mediterranean, Spanish or Portuguese port, the Swedish Licensing Board will ensure, before granting a new license, that the ship has been offered to British charterers […] unless she is carrying a full cargo destined solely for Sweden. In order for this provision to be applicable, time charters7 will not have to cover more than one voyage. The United Kingdom undertakes not to transport on Swedish ships chartered under this agreement any muni tions or war material.

shall be given as early as possible before the ship starts loading, and the British charterers shall have the ship at their disposal for at least seven days.

All Swedish tonnage not needed for Sweden’s regular imports and exports shall be used as far as possible for the freight traffic of the British Empire and France. Swedish exports to destinations in Great Britain and France as well as Swedish imports from these two coun tries are to be transported on Swedish ships, insofar as the available tonnage and war conditions allow such.

6. An agreement will be reached between the Swedish War Insurance Board and the British War Risks Insurance Office for the reinsurance of Swedish ships: transporting a full load between Sweden and France or Great Britain; and transporting loads taking up at least 75% of the ship’s capacity to Great Britain or France; the insured value of each ship shall not exceed the prewar insured value by more than 25%; […] the rate of ballast bonuses […] shall be that set […] by the Ministry of Shipping in agreement with the UK War Risks Club, increased by 5% per voyage or 10% for 91 days.

9 Appointed President of the Council following the resig nation of Léon Blum (7–8 April 1938), Édouard Daladier held this office until 18 May 1940, cf. footnotes 42 page 21 and 44 page 22.

10 Prime Minister of Great Britain from 28 May 1937, Sir Arthur Neville Chamberlain was replaced by Winston Churchill on 10 May 1940.

11 “L’effort économique de guerre franco-britannique,”ˮ op. cit., p. 7. On the activity of Jean Monnet (1888–1979) as head of the Franco-British Economic Coordination Committee, see Luc-André Brunet, “Jean Monnet et l’organisation des économies alliées pour la guerre (1939-1940),” 2018, at https://oro.open.ac.uk.

The last one was the most important committee, as it had the task of coordinating the maritime transport needs of the two countries, of jointly negotiating ton nage agreements with allied and neutral countries, and of allocating to each of the two countries the volumes obtained under time charters.12

The responsible minister of each committee was in charge of appointing the French representatives and having their choices approved by the President of the “ItCouncil.isessential,” stated a confidential memo of 13 October 1939, “that the French and British members be chosen in such a way that they are invested with all the necessary authority by their respective ministries, and that their ministers confer on them sufficiently extensive powers enabling the executive committees to take the necessary quick decisions. This is of utmost importance if we want the executive committees, which need to be full-time bodies responsible for a common action and administrative task, to be able to function in an efficient manner.”13

The issue of coal, due to “its special nature,” is treated “in a special way.”14 Since mid-October 1939, it has been processed by the French Coal and Mineral Mission, based in London with the aim of maintaining a regular supply for France.

12 https://www.shippingandfreightresource.com: “Time charter is a contract in which the shipowner hires out the ship to the charterer for a stipulated period of time for a remuneration known as hire, generally a monthly rate per ton deadweight or a daily rate. The charterer can employ the vessel as she deems fit in terms of the route and cargo but within the terms as agreed, but the ship owner continues to manage his own vessel through the master and crew who remain his” employees.

8 Several sources date this agreement to 17 November 1939. See Documents diplomatiques français, op. cit., p. 717 ; “L’effort économique de guerre francobritannique,” by Roger Auboin, in Politique étrangère, No. 1 – 1940 (pp. 5–12); Inventaire des archives de la guerre. Série N 1920-40, p. 337, on https://vdoc.pub, etc. The date of 16 November 1939 is given in the memo enti tled “Résumé des travaux de la délégation française au Comité exécutif franco-anglais des transports maritimes (1er décembre 1939-10 juin 1940),” which is the reason why it was retained.

13 Memo of 13 October 1939 entitled “Mécanisme pour coordonner l’effort de guerre franco-britannique en matière économique” and quoted in the Documents diplomatiques français, op. cit., pp. 403–405.

14 Documents diplomatiques français, op. cit., p. 404, IR/FRAN_IR_000245https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/and.

An agreement was concluded on 16 November 19398 between French President of the Council of Ministers Édouard Daladier9 and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain10 for pooling all resources of the two countries indispensable for conducting the war. For this purpose, the two governments decided to establish an Anglo-French coordination body. This organisation was to have its seat in London; it was chaired by Jean Monnet, “acting as an allied official designated by the two governments,”11 and would consist of a number of executive committees made up of equal numbers of French and British representatives:

– and the Anglo-French Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping

Ω Committee for Supplies, Ω Committee for Armament and Raw Materials, Ω Committee for Oil, Ω Committee for Aeronautic (production and purchasΩing),Committee for Economic Warfare, Ω Committee for Shipping.

15 Appointed several times as minister since 1913, notably as Minister of Finance and Minister of National Education, Anatole de Monzie was Minister for Transport and Public Works from 29 October 1925 to 23 June 1926 and reassumed this portfolio on 23 August 1938.

The appointment of Hypolite Worms on 23 November 1939

16 Master foreign-going, appointed Minister for the Merchant Navy on 13 September 1939, Alphonse Rio held this position until 16 June 1940.

Ω his competences in shipping, financial and commercial matters: he was a shipowner engaged in cabotage (the Worms fleet) and deep-sea navigation (Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire – NCHP),17 and was chairman of an oil tanker company (Société Française

18 The SFTP was established on 19 September 1938 under a model conceived by the Worms & Cie Banking Services, which combined in its shareholding the power of the State (the Office National des Combustibles Liquides) and the private initiative (Worms, Dreyfus, Desmarais, Compagnie Navale des Pétroles, Compagnie Auxiliaire de Navigation and Saint-Gobain). Still in the oil sec tor, Maison Worms founded the Société de Courtage et d’Affrètement Pétrolier – Socap in 1936, a company specialised in brokering and chartering, and provided financial support to the Société de Transports Maritimes Pétroliers – STMP.

des Transports Pétroliers – SFTP),18 the shipping agent of his maritime group and of numerous shipping com panies in France and the rest of Europe, a shipbuilder (Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime – ACSM)19 and a British coal merchant; he has extended the activ ities of Maison Worms to include Banking Services in Ω1928,the links he has established with Anatole de Monzie since the First World War,20 Ω his authority: he was treasurer of the Central Committee of French Shipowners, Ω his reputation and his relations in the French and international shipping sector, Ω his family ties to the United Kingdom: his wife, Gladys Mary Lewis-Morgan, was born in Cardiff (a port city of which her father had been Lord Mayor), while his daugh ter, Marguerite Viviane, lived in London with her first husband, Robert W. K. Clive, a British subject, related to Lord Robert Clive of India (1725–1774) and son of Sir Robert Henry Clive (1877–1948), a diplomat. The main role of the Executive Committee for Shipping was to ensure liaison between the French Merchant Navy and the British Ministry of Shipping; to study with British representatives the ways of pooling the import requirements of the two countries and their trans port; to obtain from the British government the ships indispensable for France; to negotiate agreements for the time chartering of Allied and neutral ships with a view to satisfying British and French needs equitably; to reach understanding on shipbuilding programmes and on assigning the thereby obtained tonnage to the French and British merchant navies; and generally to

19 See 50 Years of Shipbuilding on the banks of the Seine – ACSM and its garden city (1917-1972) by Christian Lebailly and Mathieu Bidaux, www.wormsetcie.com, 202021.See Hypolite Worms’ speech of 5 November 1938.

17 Shaken by the cumulated effects of the drop in freight, an excess in ship orders (two freighters were built in 1926 by ACSM for the Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation à Vapeur – CHP) and the loss of several lin ers, the CHP, founded by Eugene Grosos in 1882, faced serious cash flow problems as of 1928. To overcome the risks associated with the disappearance of this shipping company which strengthened the French presence in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius, Reunion, Madagascar), the State asked Worms & Cie to come to the rescue of the company: on 1 June 1930, a lease-holding company, the Société d’Exploitation de la Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation à Vapeur, was established under the aegis of Maison Worms; in the form of a lease, it took over the facilities and the fleet, ensuring operations until January 1934, when it took over all CHP assets – its share capital was increased and its company name became Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire. Hypolite Worms was its first Chairman. In 1940, he was to join the board of another shipping company, the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest, itself the result of the January 1939 merger between the Compagnie Nantaise de Navigation à Vapeur – to which Maison Worms developed close links in the inter-war period – and the Chargeurs de l’Ouest.

On 23 November 1939, Anatole de Monzie,15 Minister for Transport and Public Works, and Alphonse Rio,16 Minister for the Merchant Navy, appointed Hypolite Worms as head of the French Delegation to the AngloFrench Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping. The appointment of Hypolite Worms (1889–1962) was based on:

The English Delegation consisted of Sir Cyril Hurcomb, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Shipping and chairman of the Executive Committee for Shipping; Sir John Niven, Director of the commercial services Division; T. G. Jenkins and Sir Julian Foley, secretaries to the Ministry

Apart from Hypolite Worms, the French Delegation was made up of Henri Cangardel,21 delegate, Raymond Meynial and Robert Labbé, both secretaries.22

21 A Director of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, Henri Cangardel (1881–1971) was Chairman of this major French company from 1940 to 1944. At the time he became a member of the French delegation, he was also head of the Maritime Transport Mission, succeeding Mr de Malglaive.

23 The Maritime Transport Mission was to remain active until November 1942.

London docks in 1939. Following a period of downturn in September–October during which there was practically nothing to be loaded onto the freighters, Hypolite Worms wrote to Joseph Denis, secretary general of Maison Worms: “Since I left Paris [at the end of November 1939], the situation has changed completely: there are no longer enough French ships for the national cabotage”

The French Delegation to the Anglo-French Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping was not a substitute for the Maritime Transport Mission23 – the two organi sations worked hand in hand. The Mission retained its function as a voyage charterer and, working as the rep resentative of the French Ministry of the Merchant Navy in London, dealt with all questions relating to charter parties, freight payment and insurance – in short, the Mission was responsible for implementing the agree ments reached by the Committee for Shipping.

organise the transport of supplies necessary for France and United Kingdom on a joint basis.

22 A grandson of Henri Goudchaux who headed Maison Worms from 1893 to 1916, Robert Labbé (1907–1974) joined Worms & Cie in May 1938 as an authorised rep resentative. Raymond Meynial (1902–1996) had held the same position in the Banking Services of Maison Worms since October 1932. In a letter sent to Joseph Denis, Secretary General of Worms & Cie, on 6 December 1939, Robert Labbé stated that Mr Gauthier was in charge of finances at the Mission.

1414

Hypolite Worms’ diplomatic passport

Hypolite Worms arrived in London with his colleagues24 on 29 November 1939; his mission order was the following:

In this capacity, he will be responsible above all for the negotiations with the English representatives and for the arrangements which are to be studied by the Executive Committee for Shipping under the programme that will be communicated to him by Mr Daladier and AssistedMr Chamberlain.byMr Cangardel,

24 A memo addressed to Joseph Denis on 15 April 1940 requested the renewal of the diplomatic visa on Mrs Worms’ passport so that she could join her husband on official mission in London.

The aim of the French Delegation was to obtain from Great Britain a maximum amount of shipping tonnage, either by retroceding British vessels to France or by providing France with a maximum of neutral and allied ships with which time charters were to be concluded.

was basically that of the Ministry.26 Robert Labbé and Raymond Meynial were housed at 3, Grosvenor Square, London W1.27

He is appointed as head of the French Delegation to the Anglo-French Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping, where he will be assisted in his functions by Monsieur Cangardel, head of the Maritime Transport Mission in London.

The French Delegation moves to London (29 November 1939)

To be better able to follow the negotiations and be in permanent contact with the departments of the Ministry of Shipping, Hypolite Worms, in agreement with the Minister for the Merchant Navy, demanded to be installed in the building where the Ministry of Shipping had moved a few days earlier (3 November 1939). His address, Berkeley Square House, London, W1,

Monsieur Hypolite Worms is tasked with a special mis sion in England.

The Minister for the Merchant Navy,Rio

25 This designation is ambiguous: is it the AngloFrench Permanent Executive Committee or the Mission for Economic Warfare? The head of the latter was Paul Morand (1888–1976), a diplomat and writer, who was appointed to this post at the end of August/beginning of September 1939. See in Documents diplomatiques français, op. cit., p. 91, a letter dated 13 September 1939 in which Paul Morand informed Georges Bonnet, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that he had presented the members of his Mission to the new British Minister for Economic Warfare, Sir Ronald Hibbert Cross.

26 Cf. letter from Robert Labbé to Joseph Denis, Secretary General of Worms & Cie, dated 10 January 1940.

27 Cf. letter from Robert Labbé to Joseph Denis dated 6 December 1939.

Mr Hypolite Worms shall repre sent France in all inter-allied negotiations on the purchase and chartering of neutral ships. In this respect, [both] shall liaise with the French representative to the Executive for Economic Warfare, 25 keeping him informed.

30 See page 20 on oil imports.

28 A memo sent on 3 November 1939 by the delegate of the French Ministry of the Merchant Navy to his minis ter, a copy of which was addressed to Hypolite Worms by Commandant Le Terrier, reported on a draft tonnage agreement between the Swedish and British governments as well as the terms of an Anglo-Yugoslavian agreement on the chartering of ten ships. Appointed on 1 September 1939 to the Directorate of the Coal Fleet at the Ministry of the Merchant Navy, Commandant Le Terrier is quoted in a letter sent on 12 December 1939 by Joseph Denis to Robert Labbé concerning the sending of mail between London and France.

Resumption of negotiations with the Greek shipowners The Ministry of Shipping had also attempted to con clude an agreement with the representatives of the Greek shipping companies based in London,31 but the negotiations had been unsuccessful. Making best use of his personal ties to certain Greek shipowners, Hypolite Worms was granted full authority by Sir Cyril Hurcomb to negotiate alone with them on behalf of the two coun tries. Following several weeks of discussions, an agree ment was jointly signed by the representatives of the two Allied governments. This agreement guaranteed France and the United Kingdom, for the duration of the war, 500,000 tons of ocean-going ships on extremely advantageous terms, since the war risks run by this fleet were covered by the British Insurance Office.

Work done by the French Delegation to the Anglo-French Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping and results obtained between 1 December 1939 and 10 June 1940, the date on which communications between London and Paris broke down

des Alliés avec la Norvège29; ses premières applications françaises” (see page 17). When the contract was updated – as planned – six months later (in May 1940), Hypolite Worms managed to get a certain number of oil tankers directly allocated to France.30

While England alone had negotiated the duration con tracts with foreign shipping companies for the benefit of France and United Kingdom before the creation of the Executive Committee for Shipping, Hypolite Worms, as soon as he took office, managed to gain the assurance from the Ministry of Shipping that, from them on, no contract would be signed without the French Delegation having participated in the negotiations. Later it was further agreed that all tonnage agreements would be signed jointly by representatives of both countries.

Up to then, just one agreement 28 had been reached by the British government. Concluded with the Norwegian shipowners, it related to 250,000 tons of freighters and 150 oil tankers with a deadweight of 10,000 tons on average. As France had not been directly involved in negotiating this agreement and thus could not receive direct allocations, all the French Delegation could do was to request each month from United Kingdom the tonnage necessary for its oil imports by voyage char ters. These demands were always granted. The agreement was the subject of an article in the Bulletin quotidien de la société d’études et d’informations économiques of 17 January 1940 entitled “L’accord

29 Based on various reports published by the Journal of Commerce in January and February 1940, the Bulletin quotidien de la société d’études et d’informations économ iques devoted a new article to Norwegian fleet and the effects of the war on the use of its tankers and tramps (see footnotes 6 page 9 and 32 page 17). The foreword states that “the total Norwegian fleet – without speaking of the particular importance that the vicissitudes of the war give to everything affecting northern countries – is the fourth largest in the world, after Great Britain, the United States and Japan, with 4,834,000 gross tons out of 68,500,000 tons.”

31 The question of chartering Greek vessels, especially those used to “help out in the Madagascar traffic,” is referred to in two memos, one addressed to Hypolite Worms on 1 March 1940 and the other to Robert Labbé on 19 April 1940.

Tonnage agreement with the Norwegians

Although some of these clauses might appear to us to be very onerous, this agreement indirectly bears witness to Norwegian independence despite pressure from the Germans.

2) The agreement sets the charter rates for the different categories and according to the tonnages. These are payable in sterling.

As regards oil tankers, it is taking somewhat longer for the agreement to come into full effect.

The Allied chartering agreement with Norway; its first French applications

As reported on 11 January 1940 by the Journal de la marine marchande , the French Maritime Transport Mission had already time-chartered 25 to 30 Norwegian tramps. These are mainly small vessels to be used for transporting 75,000 to 80,000 tons of coal per month, mainly to small French ports.

a. war risk insurance policies (which sometimes exceed the amount of the freight) must be taken out with the Norwegian War Insurance Club according to the value of each ship, with the shipowner handing over to the char terer any “profit” distributed by the Club. The agreement imposes no ban on sailing in dangerous waters. b. The charterers shall pay crews “war bonuses.”

A. The agreement

Bulletin quotidien de la société d’études et d’informations économiques, 17 January 1940

1) The Norwegian shipowners have undertaken to make available to the Allies some 150 oil tankers of at least 8,000-dwt,33 as they become available, of which at least 50% shall be “clean”. Approximately 200,000 tons are expected to be ready by 31 December and an additional 250,000 tons in the first two months of 1940.

B. First French applications

The main provisions of the agreement reached on 11 November 1939 between the British government and the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association have just been made public. This agreement provides the Allies with a large number of oil tankers and ships specialised in tramping.32 Although this agreement was negotiated by Great Britain alone, our country is now participating in its application by means of the French Maritime Transport Mission in London.

d. In the event of a ship being immobilised due to prob lems with the crew or a delay in refuelling, the charterer shall pay the full freight rate for 72 hours: after this period and until the return to service, the charter will only be due in case of problems with the crew (which, of course, is the crew of the Norwegian shipowner), in this case the char terer shall pay half of the charter of the ship for 7 days and none after these 7 days.

c. And a maximum of 10,000 Norwegian crowns for the death or injury of a crew member resulting from an act of war.

3) The financial charges incumbent on the charterers are as follows:

32 Tramping: Shipping services which operate inde pendently of a regular line. Activity of a shipowner who systematically places his ship on the charter market. 33 DWT (deadweight tonnage), abbreviation indicating the maximum load a vessel can carry.

As for the tramp ships, the Norwegians shall provide the Allies with as many ships as possible, as soon as they become available. It is estimated that nearly 450,000 gross tons already chartered by the Allies shall remain available to them: on top of this tonnage, 140,000 gross tons are expected to become vacant before 31 March in the USA; and a further 240,000 tons later on.

In fact, the premiums to be paid by the two gov ernments were very much lower than those of the Norwegian agreement in which the risks were covered by the Norwegian Insurance Club. The Greek agree ment worked perfectly during the first half of 1940, with France receiving at least 50% of the ships.

Pooling of shipbuilding programmes

On returning to Paris, I would like to express my great satisfaction with the results obtained in our conversations in London with Sir John Gilmour 36 and his colleagues from the Ministry of Shipping. I congratulate you on the skill and intelligence you have shown in preparing and con ducting the negotiations with my British colleague which resulted in a common agreement on almost all points.

34 A memo from the general management of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime (Worms shipyard), signed by Henri Nitot, mentions a file (unfortunately unfindable) sent to Hypolite Worms on 20 December 1939. It contained letters and circulars from the Ministry of the Merchant Navy, the Chamber of Shipbuilders and the Central Committee of French Shipowners on a pro gramme for building merchant ships.

35 Alphonse Rio’s visit to London was preceded by that of Raoul Dautry, Minister for Armaments, in honour of which Charles Corbin, French ambassador to Great Britain, gave a luncheon attended inter alia by Winston Churchill and Hypolite Worms (see Excelsior newspaper of 20 January 1940).

The terms of the agreement on pooling shipbuilding programmes were discussed for many weeks. The scheme finally adopted was based on the principle of maintaining the respective size of the British and French fleets as of 3 September 1939, while taking account of the losses suffered and the acquisitions made after this date. It was further decided that the price applied to France would be exactly the same as that invoiced by the English shipyards to the British government.

In contributing in such a favourable and also active way to a policy of close collaboration between the British and French governments in the use of their merchant fleets, you have done an enormous service to France.

36 The British Minister for the Merchant Navy since 13 October 1939, Sir John Gilmour died on 30 March 1940. He was succeeded by Robert Hudson on 4 April 1940, who was replaced by Ronald Cross from 14 May 1940 until 1 May 1941.

the end of his stay, Alphonse Rio wrote the following to Hypolite Worms: Dear Monsieur Worms

The British Council of ministers accepted this pro posal and the French government gave its consent, as confirmed by Alphonse Rio during a trip he made to London at the end of January 1940.35 On 30 January, at

A memo sent by Henri Nitot to Hypolite Worms on 6 February 1940 states the following: “The realisation of the programme for building merchant ships envisaged by the Ministry of the Merchant Navy is set to come up against a number of difficulties, not only with regard to the supply of metallurgical materials (the order book of the Comptoir Sidérurgique currently exceeds production capacity by 3 or 4 times), but also with regard to the sup ply of auxiliary equipment. We therefore need to imme diately check out what support we can find in Britain for the construction of this equipment.”

On starting his mission, Hypolite Worms requested the British government to coordinate ship purchases be coordinated in order to prevent any competitive bidding that would push up the prices. It was thus decided that orders for ships in the United States would be placed jointly and purchases shared equally between the two countries.

In asking you to go to London, I was well aware of how delicate the mission I was entrusting to you was. I also knew that your excellent competences were a guarantee for success. Recent events have completely justified my choice, upholding the decision I took.

Ship purchases abroad

Hypolite Worms, after gaining the approval of the French Minister for the Merchant Navy, took the initia tive to ask the British government to apply the principle of pooling the means of production for shipbuilding.34

Yours sincerely A. Rio

One of the most urgent and delicate tasks of the Executive Committee for Shipping was to organise the supply of British coal to France, a matter not covered by the tonnage agreement. At the end of painstaking discussions, Hypolite Worms ensured that the num ber of British ships placed at the disposal of France for the transport of coal would be considerably increased footnotes 44 page 22, 46 and 47 page 24.

According to the calculations, this agreement would give France an annual tonnage of new ships varying between 100,000 and 150,000 tons. The events of June37 were to prevent the signing of this agreement, the terms of which had been finalised.

The French Delegation also served as a liaison body between the French Ministry of the Merchant Navy and the British Ministry of Shipping, especially during the first months, helping to secure urgent reinforcements of ships, whether freighters for use in transporting air craft and trucks from the United States or liners for use in transporting troops from French colonies to the Metropole.

and that, in addition, a statement of the units to be loaded would be prepared each month for the follow ing month, in order to permit the regular supply of coal grades most needed by France. French imports of coal thus rose from some 500,000 tons in November 1939 to: Ω 700,000 tons in December, Ω 800,000 tons in January–February 1940, Ω 900,000 tons in March, Ω 1 million tons in April, Ω 1.3 million tons in May.

At the request of the French government, efforts in June 1940 were considerably increased: some 2 million tons should have been imported that month. However, France’s signing of the armistice with Germany on 22 June 1940 completely changed the expectations. Had the situation continued as planned, monthly imports for July would have reached 2 to 2.5 million tons, a ton nage deemed sufficient by the French Ministry of Public Works. The participation of the British fleet in this effort had risen from 200,000 tons in November to 800,000 in May and was expected to exceed 1 million tons in June.

37 Cf.

Ω the Swedish shipowners who made available to the Allies all Swedish ships not needed for supplying their Ωcountry,theDanish shipowners, who agreed to offer on the London freight market all ships not needed for their imports. This agreement enabled France and Great Britain, on the day the Wehrmacht invaded Denmark

Liaison body

Charter contracts with Northern European shipowners

In addition to the Anglo-Greek agreement, contracts were concluded with:

The policy for importing British coal

39 A memo of 6 May 1940 with the heading “Extrait de la communication téléphonique de Mr Worms du 5” lists the Danish and Norwegian tonnages assigned to France, distinguishing between ships of more than 1,500 gross registered tonnage and those of less than 1,500 grt.

Ω the Dutch shipowners, who adopted the same meas ures as the Norwegians as soon as their territory was invaded by the Germans (10–16 May 1940). 41

40 To protect the port of Narvik and the “Iron Road” from the Germans who were threatening to occupy Norway, in January 1940 the Allies prepared a military intervention under the pretext of coming to the assistance of Finland which had just been attacked by the Soviet Union. On 27 March 1940, Hitler decided a counterattack which he launched on 9 April. The Germans were able to take hold of the majority of Norwegian ports in just two days. On 7 June 1940, King Haakon VII and his government fled to London. Between 3 and 8 June, the Allies showed some resistance, but ultimately pulled out in order to concen trate on operations in France. The Germans held on to Norway, maintaining a dominant position in Scandinavia until the end of the war. Cf. André Kaspi, La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, op. cit., pp. 65–66 and 68.

11 May 1940 – A French regiment crossing Valenciennes. On 10 May 1940, the attack on Belgium by German troops triggered the application of the Dyle-Bréda plan, which provided for an Allied defensive front in Belgium and the Netherlands (source: www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr ©Photographe SCA/ECPAD/Défense)

As stated above, the Norwegian agreement of 11 November 1939 having been signed by Great Britain alone, the latter ensured supplies to France each month through voyage allocations. But, on revising the agree ment in May 1940, it was agreed that a certain number of Norwegian ships would be retroceded to France on the basis of time charters, in accordance with the needs

20 (9 April 194038), to seize a number of Danish ships39 docked in Allied ports, Ω the Norwegian shipowners, who, when defeated by German troops (9 April to 8 June 1940), 40 handed over to the Allies nearly their entire fleet, with the exception of their freighters used on regular shipping services outside Europe,

41 On 10 May 1940 (the day on which Neville Chamberlain handed over power to Winston Churchill), Germany, in order to get around the Maginot Line, invaded the Netherlands in violation of the country’s neutrality. The Battle of Holland lasted just one week. While an airborne commando unit landed in the Hague with the aim of capturing the royal family, on 12 May, Princess Juliana and Prince Bernhard managed to leave the country on a British destroyer for London where Queen Wilhelmina joined them and established a gov ernment in exile. On 14 May, the Germans demanded in an ultimatum that Rotterdam be surrendered, or the city would be bombed. But while negotiations were under way following a second ultimatum, Luftwaffe bombers were flying towards the city and were not called back: Rotterdam was destroyed. On the morning of 16 May, General Winkelman, the Commander of the Dutch army signed the deed of capitulation. Fighting continued for a few more days in Zeeland but stopped following the bom bardment of Middelburg. Cf. André Kaspi, La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, op. cit., pp. 67–68.

Oil imports

38 Despite its declaration of neutrality and the conclu sion of a non-aggression treaty with Germany, Denmark was invaded on 9 April 1940 during the Operation “Weserübung”. Christian X of Denmark and his govern ment ordered the army not to resist.

Afterships.long

My dear friend

Dividing up the tonnage

Once the charter agreements had been concluded, the main task incumbent on the French Delegation was to distribute the tonnage available equally between Great Britain and France. Taking into account the needs of the French and British missions, statistical studies were undertaken to determine the respective import pro grammes and to arrive at a basis for dividing up the

discussions with the interested departments, the Executive Committee for Shipping concluded that France needed 17 million tons of ships to make its imports safe, while Great Britain needed 47 million tons (these figures excluded imports of coal and oil which were dealt with separately). The ratio was thus 1:3.

that the French oil fleet could not satisfy. Thus, in a first instance, some ten tankers were allocated to France.

Yours sincerely

Complementary charters

On 14 May42, Anatole de Monzie, the French Minister of Public Works, sent the following letter to Hypolite Worms:

I […] would like to congratulate you on the results you have obtained. If the expected pace is achieved, we will be able to get by. At any rate, thanks to your efforts, we have now left this period of uncertainty. You have accomplished what Rio and I asked you to do as our intermediary.

De Monzie

At the same time, Hypolite Worms negotiated the assignment of a certain number of British ships to France. Thus, he encouraged Her Majesty’s Ministry of the Shipping to take charge of importing into France most of the goods from the East Indies, South Africa and Australia. This amounted to about 1 million tons a year and required Great Britain to make available some 400,000 tons of shipping capacity, at the same freight rates as those applied by the British government for meeting the needs of its own ministerial departments.

42 Beginning on 10 May 1940, the day the Germans unleashed the Battle of the Ardennes, the military situa tion of France quickly deteriorated, with Sedan captured on 13 May and Dinant on 14 May. This breakthrough opened the door to wide-ranging enemy operations in the hinterland. On 17 May, a Reich decree announced the pegging of the French franc to the German Mark. On 18 May, Paul Reynaud – the former Minister for Finance under Édouard Daladier and his successor as President of Council of Ministers (a position he held together with that of Minister of War) – went ahead with a cab inet reshuffle: Reynaud took over the National Defence and War portfolio, while he appointed Daladier Minister for Foreign Affairs. Marshal Pétain entered the govern ment as Vice President of the Council. Georges Mandel left the Ministry of Colonies to take over the Ministry of the Interior. Maurice Gamelin was replaced as head of the Army by General Maxime Weygand. On 20 May, the Germans issued a decree concerning the French terri tory occupied by them, stating that “all manufacturing, industrial, food, agriculture, forestry and woodworking companies were to continue operating, unless reasons of force majeure required other decisions.”ˮ

“Operation Dynamo” (26 May to 4 June 1940): evacuation of British, French, and Allied soldiers encircled by Germans troops in DunkirkΩ

In reality and taking account of the duration of voy ages – much quicker for France because one third of the overall French import programme stemmed from North Africa, while the English imports came mainly from America, South Africa, Australia and the Far East – the ratio increased from 1 for France to 4.5 for Great Britain. But as the respective size of the French and British fleets was 1:7, France needed to receive a share of tonnage significantly higher than the ratio of the import programmes. With these conditions as background, the French Delegation managed to obtain: Ω 60% of all Danish and Norwegian ships, against 40% assigned to Great Britain, Ω 50% of the whole Dutch43 and Swedish fleets, against 50% assigned to Great Britain. These percentages meant that at the start of June 1940 France had time charters for the duration of the war for more than 2 million tons of allied or neutral ships. On top of this came the equivalent of 400,000 tons of British ships which were to transport 1 million tons coming from the Crown’s dominions. These two tonnages, added to the requisitioned French fleet, and taking into account the rotation of the ships, were to ensure the import of 17 million tons of goods, i.e. 100% of all French needs.

On 5 June, as part of his third cabinet reshuffle, Paul Reynaud succeeded Édouard Daladier as Minister for Foreign Affairs, while Daladier quit the government. Anatole de Monzie was replaced by Ludovic O. Frossard as Minister for Transport and Public Works, while Yves Bouthillier took over from Lucien Lamoureux as Minister for Finance. On 6 June, the exodus of the French popu lation began.

The goal assigned to the Executive Committee for Shipping was thus fully achieved. However, the imple mentation of the agreements became increasingly difficult due to the degradation of relations between Great Britain and France caused by the occupation of an increasingly large part of France by the Wehrmacht.

44 On 21 May 1940, the German troops reached the English Channel. Beginning on 20 May, the bombard ment of Dunkirk by the Luftwaffe led the Allies to evacu ate the British Expeditionary Force and part of the French troops. This operation, known as “Operation Dynamo,” ended on 4 June 1940. On the circumstances of a similar action, see the article of Maurice Guierre published in Paris-Normandie on 22 March 1955 on the evacuation of Le Havre (24 May to 12 June 1940) and the role played by the Worms freighters, including the “Cérons” until its loss on 12 June 1940.

43 In a letter addressed to Joseph Denis on 26 May 1940, Robert Labbé indicated that “France will be assigned, either permanently or provisionally (the question is pending), a large number of small Dutch coasters, most of them motorised. By separate post,” he added, “I will let you have a copy of the letters drafted in this respect, including the list of vessels involved. The question of management will probably be settled fairly quickly, as all will soon be in France for their first voyages.”

On 21 May 1940, 44 Hypolite Worms received the follow ing service order from the French Secretary of State for the Navy: In the event of a breakdown in telephone communications between the Maritime Transport Department [in France] and your services, I authorise you to take on my behalf all decisions belonging to the tasks assigned to the French Delegation to the Executive Committee for Shipping, espe cially as regards any questions resulting from the general inter-allied tonnage agreements and which would have to be solved without delay. Please notify me of the decisions taken as quickly as possible, either by encrypted telegram for important decisions or by letter in all other cases. Telegrams needing to be encrypted are to be passed on to the naval attaché in London. I am sending a similar order to Mr Cangardel authorising him to take all decisions helping to ensure as best as possible the functioning of the Maritime Transport Mission in London and the execution of the operations covered by said Mission.

45 Inspector of Finance in 1923, Emmanuel Monick (1893–1983) held the position of governor of the Banque de France from 7 October 1944 to January 1949, after which he became CEO of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (now BNP Paribas) until 1962. He was also Chairman of the Banque Ottomane between 1954 and 461975.On

Isolation of the French representatives in London (10 June to 19 July 1940)

47 Cf. the testimony of Emmanuel Monick, Washington, 8 April 1946, reproduced on page 39. The armistice was signed on 22 June in Rethondes. On 23 June, Pétain appointed Pierre Laval and Adrien Marquet as ministers of State. On 27 June, Laval became Vice President of the Council. After having left Bordeaux, now in the occu pied zone, for Clermont-Ferrand on 29 June, the pub lic authorities moved to Vichy on 1 July due to a lack of suitable space in Clermont-Ferrand. Cf. André Kaspi, La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, op. cit., pp. 69–70, 76–77 and 79.

“On the necessity to pursue the war in accordance with our British Ally”

Emmanuel Monick was about to go to Bordeaux to affirm the intention of the British Cabinet in London to continue the fight and to set forth the advantages of remaining on Britain’s side. Hypolite Worms tasked him “to tell all his friends in France that he fully shared his point of view”: he handed him a letter which he “requested him to use in this sense and in which he confirmed his most formal sentiments on the need to continue the war in accordance with the British Ally.”47

On 10 June 1940, 46 communications between London and Paris were cut off. As a result, the French Delegation could no longer send reports on its activities to the Ministry of the Merchant Navy as the Delegation had been doing almost daily.

On 18 June 1940, while France was waiting for Germany to reply to its request for an armistice, Hypolite Worms discussed with Emmanuel Monick, the French financial attaché in London, Britain’s determination to continue the war, its chances of success and the interest for the French government to take this into account in its decisions.

The signing of the Franco-German armistice on 22 June 1940, in Rethondes, in the forest of Compiègne, in the train carriage where the armistice of 11 November 1918 was signed

10 June 1940, due to the advance of the Wehrmacht troops and the impending occupation of Paris, General Weygand urged the public authorities to quit the capital which was then declared an open city. The core depart ments of the ministries left for Tours where the Council of Ministers decided that the government and parliament had to withdraw. That same day, the Italians declared war on France. On 12 June, General Weygand and other leading figures came out in favour of an armistice. Paul Reynaud and a number of ministers opposed them, cit ing the agreement of 28 March 1940 under which France and Great Britain had undertaken not to conclude sepa rate armistices. On 13 June, Paul Reynaud met Winston Churchill to hear his position on France possibly signing an armistice. On 14 June, the day Paris was occupied and the Loire reached by German troops, the government, deeply divided as to whether the war should be con tinued, left Tours and moved to Bordeaux. On 16 June, Paul Reynaud who wanted to continue the war outside mainland France, was forced to resign. He was replaced by Philippe Pétain as President of the Council. The lat ter formed a new government in favour of requesting an armistice.

HyP olite WorMs quoted By eMManuel Monick 45 , 8 aPril 1946

The dissolution of the Executive Committee for Shipping was announced on 6 July 1940. This event was the occasion for Sir Cyril Hurcomb to congratulate Hypolite Worms on the high quality of their relationship and the results obtained.

Cyril Hurcomb

A change in circumstances Conceived in November 1939, a few days after the dec laration of war, the Anglo-French plan for pooling the resources of the two countries was pursued under con ditions increasingly different from those at the outset.

I venture to think that our collaboration was not only friendly but successful up to the point which circumstances allowed. I shall always retain the most grateful recollec tions of our joint work and of my French colleagues, and among them, Mr Meynial and Mr Labbé.

Dear Worms,

I appreciate greatly the kind terms in which you have announced my formal letter notifying the dissolution of the Shipping Executive.

No trace of the work performed by the French Delegation between 10 June and 19 July could be found in the archives of the Ministry of the Merchant Navy. The main (and perhaps only) source is a special report written by Hypolite Worms and submitted by him to the Secretary of State for the Merchant Navy, after his return to France.

Before outlining the contents of this report, it is useful to emphasise the circumstances in which the Committee operated between May and July 1940, and the extent of work the carried out.

Your own knowledge and wide experience, and the excel lence of our personal relations, made my official task as chairman far easier than it would have otherwise been. Yours very sincerely,

on the situations of the various Maison departments –a collection of letters relating to the information that Hypolite Worms exchanged day after day with the heads of the Merchant Navy and other shipping bodies. The recurrent subjects in these letters were the following:

Ω the rotation of ships in the ports, 49

Within this corpus we find: Ω 2 letters addressed by Hypolite Worms to the Ministry of the Merchant Navy on 10 February 1940 (see pages 27 and 28).

The government official who had decided to set up the Anglo-French coordination body, like the ones who had appointed the members of the various missions and delegations, have stepped down from office, such as Neville Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier in May 1940 or Anatole de Monzie and Alphonse Rio in June 1940. In addition to the difficulties caused by the exodus of the public authorities, first to Tours, then to Bordeaux and Clermont-Ferrand, and finally to Vichy, as well as the impossibility for the French representatives in London to have their decisions endorsed, the delegations were confronted with the change of the attitude – and even the hostility – of England, which ceased to assert itself as the Ally of France (at least that of Vichy) follow ing the signing of the armistice on 22 June 1940. The majority of French opinion became convinced of this hostility following the 3 July 1940 attack against French Navy warships anchored in Mers el-Kebir in Algeria (on the eve of the signing by Hypolite Worms of the agree ments bearing his name). In this operation, known as “Operation Catapult,” the Royal Navy destroyed French warships, causing 1,297 deaths and 351 injuries. The attack provoked the breaking of diplomatic relations between Paris and London. 48

Ω insurance against war risks,50 especially in the case of coal imports,51

54 Cf. memo of 4 March 1940 from Hypolite Worms and that of 19 April 1940 to Robert Labbé.

The size of the task

49 See the crossing reports of the Worms freighters: “Château-Yquem” and “Château-Latour” (13 October to 11 November 1939), annexed to the letter sent to Hypolite Worms by Joseph Denis on 21 December 1939; idem 5 March 1940: report of the “Lussac”ˮ from 3 to 27 February 1940; idem 8 March 1940: report of the “Jumièges” from 15 to 24 February 1940; idem 14 April 1940: reports of the “Caudebec,” “Normanville,” “Kerkena,” “Espiguette” and “Jumièges,” in March and up to 14 April 1940 – these documents report delays of between 9 hours and more than 94 hours, some of which were due to demining operations; see also the informa tion sent to Hypolite Worms by the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire on 20 January 1940

The charter contracts have for the most part been negotiated and concluded with shipowners whose respective countries have gone to war, whose territory has been occupied and whose government has gone into exile (as was the case for example with Norway and the Netherlands). In their fight against Germany, these States may have feared that the enemy would benefit from the chartering arrangements with France once the French government signed the armistice.

48 Cf. André Kaspi, La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, op. cit., p. 113.

The extent and complexity of the functions assumed by the Delegation can be seen by the diversity of the subjects covered by the Maison Worms archives. The main focus of the work was, as already discussed above, to negotiate and conclude charter agreements meeting French needs. However, to accomplish this task, the delegates had to have not only an overall vision when doing their daily work, but also a detailed one of the shipping context, at least at European level and sometimes at a global level. Therefore, the archives contain – in addition to the memos sent mainly by Joseph Denis

51 Cf. memos of 20 May 1940 from Hypolite Worms to Joseph Denis; of 27 May 1940 to Hypolite Worms and the information send by Worms & Cie Paris to Hypolite Worms on 28 May 1940 on the Worms fleet.

52 Cf. memo of 6 February 1940: table on the diesel con sumption of NCHP freighters “Malgache” and “Ville de 53Metz.”ˮCf.memo of 12 February 1940: tables of the crews of the 2,500-/4,000/10,000-ton freighters and the 15,000-ton oil tankers.

Ω the ships’ fuel consumption,52

Ω the servicing of ports in France, Reunion and ΩMadagascar,54and,moregenerally, the difficulties encountered in finding or loading ships, the problems associated with the fluctuations in freight rates, the requisitioning of ships for transporting troops and equipment.

50 Cf. memo of 6 February 1940 addressed to Hypolite Worms by Worms & Cie Paris.

Ω the composition of the crews,53

1. The statement of imports received in France and the French colonies coming from abroad or the French colonies.

Head of the French Delegation to the Executive Committee for Shipping to the Minister of the Merchant Navy Foreign Trade statistics

In order for me to gain indispensable statisti cal information, please let me know whether it would be possible for you to send me the fol lowing every month (as of 1 September):

2. The statement of these same imports, dis tinguishing between those received by sea and those by land.

Mr Hypolite Worms

10 February 1940

3. The statement of goods seized by the French Navy as contraband goods, indicating whether or not these goods are included in the preceding 4.figures.The statement of ships entered into mainland and colonial ports, indicating their nationality (French, British or other) and distin guishing between those with and without cargo on board.

As the British authorities are providing me with the same information with regard to the United Kingdom, the Crown dominions and colonies, I request you to regularly send me the above-listed information. This will allow me to conduct my negotiations with my English col league in full knowledge of the facts. For my part, I will send you the information you consider necessary in the same field.

3. A list of losses / gains affecting the French fleet.

Mr Hypolite Worms

2. An evaluation, based on the latest information received from the shipowners managing the vessels, of the turnaround times on the various maritime lines.

Use of the French merchant fleet

1. A statement showing the current status of the French fleet, broken down by shipping lines and special assignments, including a detailed list of the ships undergoing repairs.

Head of the French Delegation to the Executive Committee for Shipping to the Minister of the Merchant Navy

Like me, you will see that these tables, in terms of both ship assignments and transport pro grammes, reflect a constantly changing state of Underaffairs. these circumstances, I consider it indis pensable that the following information be pro vided to me each month by your ministry:

10 February 1940

4. The planned loading programmes, showing the quantities where the transport can be consi dered as ensured by French vessels or vessels chartered by the French government, and the quantities where transport resources are lacking.

I wrote to you at length on 30 January, sharing with you my observations gained from going through the tables annexed to your letters of 6 and 14 January.

The morale of the Merchant Navy officers and crews, especially those working along the East coast of England, leaves a lot to be desired.

Ω A memo sent on 1 March 1940 to Robert Labbé on the development of freight rates between 1913 and 1919 for the transport to France on neutral ships of rice from Saigon, wheat from La Plata, cotton from the USA and coal from Great Britain, Ω a draft management contract drawn up by the Chargeurs Réunis and sent to Hypolite Worms on 13 March 1940, Ω The following memo of 29 March 1940 on crew morale:

a) They are pointing out that the Army gives permission, whereas they are refused leave.

revealing the ship’s movements by creating postal sectors which would have to function in such a way that the letters reach the ships at their ports of call? Last but not least, the men, again comparing their situation to that of members of the armed forces, would like to benefit from free postage. In my view, it would be relatively easy to satisfy these – not unjustified – demands.

Merchant Navy

Some sailors and officers have not been given any permis sion for months. They usually only have a few hours on land when in port.

b) When, by chance, their ship is in dock for repairs and their captain takes the initiative to grant them 24 hours leave, they have to pay the full fare when travelling by rail, while members of the armed forces travel free. Without wanting to claim the same scheme, since their pay is different, they would like to benefit from the travel vouchers granted in peacetime to members of the armed forces on leave. We have been informed that sailors from the s/s “Bourgogne,” without regular leave for the last 8 months, had recently spent 600 francs per trip to spend 24 hours in Brittany while their ship was in dock for c)repairs.Asthe movements of their ships are not known in advance, it is impossible for them to give their families their addresses. As a result, their letters have difficulties reaching them or often with a major delay. This situation is one of the main sources of discontent. Would it not be possible to remedy the situation without

Further documents:

The causes of this bad morale are relatively easy to elimi nate. This is why we consider it a good idea to speak with you about this, in the hope that your House can use its influence to eliminate them and thereby contribute to the necessary collective spirit.

The crews consider their current role to be just as dangerous as front-line soldiers. However, they have the feeling that, first, their crew commanders and, second, public opinion, do not do them justice in this respect and that they are neither enjoying any material benefits nor any of the moral prestige accorded to the latter.

55 Liner: “Any cargo or passenger ship running sched uled service along a specific route with published ports of call, excluding ferries and other vessels engaged in short-sea trading,” see https://stringfixer.com/pt/Head_ 56sea.Among the telegrams exchanged between Hypolite Worms and the Ministry of the Merchant Navy on the one hand, and between him and Henri Morin de Linclays on the other hand, see those dated 21 June 1940, 25 June 1940*, 27 June 1940*, 29 June 1940*, 5 July 1940*, 11 July 1940 (1), 11 July 1940 (2), 12 July 1940*, 16 July 1940*, 18 July 1940. The dates followed by an asterisk refer to telegrams reproduced in the following chapter: “Hypolite Worms’ report on his mission.” Director of the New York branch of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique since 1933, H. Morin de Linclays headed the “French Shipping and Transportation Mission to the United States, act ing for some fifteen French shipping and transportation interests, including those of the French government,”ˮ see Report of the attorney general to the Congress of the United States on the administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended for the period from June 28, 1942 to December 31, 1944.

The information contained in this correspondence could have made it possible to retrace the activities of the French Delegation to the Committee for Shipping following the termination of communications between Paris and London on 12 June; activities culminating in the conclusion of the agreements bearing the name of Hypolite Worms on 4 July 1940. But it seemed more relevant to let Hypolite Worms himself recount what happened via the report he submitted to the French authorities at the beginning of August 1940, backed up by the many telegrams and memos he refers to.

In the report on his mission to London dated 1 August 1940 (see the following chapter), Hypolite Worms annexed more than 60 telegrams exchanged with Henri Morin de Linclays from the French Shipping and Transportation Mission in New York56 between 14 June and 16 July 1940.

Finally, we would like to quote an extract from a memo sent by Robert Labbé to Joseph Denis on 15 April 1940: Dear Mr Denis

In the course of our negotiations with the Ministry of Shipping in view of sharing the allied fleets between France and England, proportionate to their seaborne import pro grammes, we have requested that space be permanently reserved for us on board the British liners55 linking the British Empire and France, in the event of no regular services serving these regions. Responding favourably to our request, the Ministry of Shipping has also informed us that it is going to help us out on the Madagascar line. [...] Mr Worms has given his agreement to this arrange ment. I intend to make it clear to the Ministry of Shipping official that such an arrangement is valid only in the exceptional circumstances we are going through. [...] Robert Labbé

The repatriation of the missions gave rise to “laborious negotiations which dragged on from 5 July until two days before the departure.”59 The British government initially envisaged to retain the French representatives (in particular to prevent information concerning British defence from being disclosed to the Germans). The authorities then consented to all French civil and mil itary personnel returning to France, with the exception of a few members of information departments and of the Ministries of the Air Force and Armaments.

59 Cf. Documents diplomatiques français : 1940 (11 juillet30 décembre), vol. 2, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009, p. 213.

French Delegation to the Anglo-French Executive Committee for Shipping in London

Hypolite Worms’ report on his mission to the French authorities in Vichy on 1 August 1940: the “Worms” agreements of 4 July 1940

On 17 July, Hypolite Worms was still at his post, nego tiating with the Ministry of Shipping and the War Risks Insurance Office the question of the insurance of the neutral vessels chartered by France (see page 47). On 19 July, he drafted the following declaration:

On 25 June 1940, the heads of the French delegations took the decision to return to France.57 As Hypolite Worms was to personally state later on,58 “the situation of [his] Maison in England and [his] family situa tion” would have made it possible for him “to envisage [remaining in London], especially as [he had] never doubted the outcome of the war.” “However,” he emphasised, “I saw it as my duty to return to France with a view to safeguarding the heritage of my ancestors and the interests of my staff (workers and employees) which numbered several thousand. I wanted to prevent at all costs that my companies came under the thumb of the enemy.”

I, the undersigned, Hypolite Worms, head of the French Delegation to the Anglo-French Executive Committee for Shipping in London, certify that Miss Simone Traverse is to travel to Marseilles, and eventually to Paris, to make contact with the Ministry of the MerchantLondon,Navy.19 July 1940

Hypolite Worms

The eventful return to France

57 Information provided by Raymond Meynial during an interview given in the context of preparing the book La Maison, des hommes, des métiers, une histoire, by Christian Lebailly, which came out in 1993. It should be noted that Marshal Pétain adopted a law on 23 July 1940 “depriving French people who have left France of their 58nationality.”ˮCf.interrogation by the judge Georges Thirion dated 26 September 1944. For more on Thirion, see footnote 95, page 55.

64 This quote, as well as all others of Maurice Pasquelot, was taken from his book Les dossiers secrets de la Marine, op. cit., pp. 60–62.

60 Renaud de Rochebrune and Jean-Claude Hazera, in Les Patrons sous l’Occupation. II, Odile Jacob, 1997, date the departure of Hypolite Worms two days earlier: “On 17 July,” they wrote on p. 201, “he boarded the ‘Orduña’ for Lisbon, a neutral port and a hub for all emigrants during the war.”

The freighter reached Lisbon on the morning of 25 July, three and a half days after leaving Liverpool. All passen gers had to stay on board until the next day, the time needed for the customs officers to search all the lug gage.

65 See the letter addressed to the Minister for Finance by Emmanuel Monick on 16 July 1940 “when leaving [his] post in London with the embassy.” The letter con cerned the measures which he “had been forced to take in the absence of any communications with France on the subject of organising the winding up of the French Missions in Great Britain”; see in particular the informa tion he provides on the fact that “the French government decided to entrust to Paul Morand the leadership of a department tasked with winding up the economic and commercial affairs of the French government in Great Britain” and that as a result “Paul Morand has asked [him] to set his remuneration as head of the department tasked with winding up the French Missions in Great Britain to a sum equal to that [Emmanuel Monick] had received in London.”

On the morning of that same day,60 he left London with the Diplomatic Mission and the French delegations for Liverpool, where the British government had made available to the returnees a 1,000-passenger liner, the “Orduña,” which usually sailed between Valparaiso and Southampton. “The whole Mission took place on board, military officers, diplomats and their families,”61 reported Maurice Pasquelot in Les dossiers secrets de la Marine, Londres-Vichy, 40.44.62 “There are almost 800 people.63 A suite was reserved for Prince Alexander of Yugoslavia.” The passengers had to wait two long days before the ship was authorised to sail. It raised anchor on 21 July at 9 p.m., heading for Lisbon. After being part of “a convoy of a dozen ships heading for Canada,”64 the “Orduña” sails alone. “All of a sudden, it’s magic,” enthused Maurice Pasquelot, “hundreds of lamps illuminate the upper decks. We are sailing due south, all lights on. A ship’s officer informs us that the Germans were warned that the ‘Orduña’ is a diplomatic vessel and have agreed not to attack it.”

Paul Morand,65 head of the Blockade Mission, gained the authorisation of the French Embassy in Portugal for the delegations to leave for Vichy, the city where the government had been located since 1 July 1940. For this purpose, two special trains were chartered. One of the two was scheduled to leave for Cerbère, a French commune in the Eastern Pyrenees just over the Spanish border, on 26 July, the second on 27 July. As shown by the visa in his diplomatic passport, Hypolite Worms was part of the first group.

NB. The visas from the immigration offices stamped on the back of Hypolite Worms’ diplomatic passport enabled us to retrace his return journey – see reproduction on p. 6114.In the interview made in preparation of La Maison, des hommes, des métiers, une histoire, Raymond Meynial stated that Madame Worms was already in the free zone 62 Nouvelles éditions latines, 1977, p. 60.

63 According to the Documents diplomatiques français: 1940, op. cit., p. 213, note 3: “The total headcount of the economic missions was 340 people.”

“It was only after several submissions from the French ambassador in Madrid […] that the obstacles were able to be overcome and the train […] was authorised to con tinue its journey [on 29 July at 4 p.m.].

squeezed up in their compartments66 like herrings, did not fade for a moment. This state of mind helped them gain the sympathy of the local authorities.”67 On 30 July, Hypolite Worms reached first Port-Bou, then Cerbère.

Over the three days spent at the border, the good mood of the badly fed passengers, without comfort and hav ing to spend the day in the blazing sun and the night

His train arrived at the Portuguese-Spanish border post of Valencia de Alcántara on the 26 July around 5 p.m. and did not leave. “The Comte de Rose, secretary at the French Embassy in London, who prepared the depar ture of the French,” stated Maurice Pasquelot, “had foreseen nearly everything. The only thing he had not done was to send Madrid a list with the names of all passengers (but how could he know that the Spanish would want to know them?).”

Yet some passengers did not have a Spanish visa, while several officers were travelling in uniform. The Guardia decided to prevent the train from leaving and to check everybody. “On the platform […], a few curious and disturbing characters pace up and down,” reported Maurice Pasquelot. “It was clear to everybody that they were of Germanic origin. Very probably, they were members of the German secret police.”

66 Maurice Pasquelot gave an eloquent account of these living conditions: “We finally left the hell of Valencia [...]. Those two days in the Extremadura sunshine at the end of July had been unbearable. The civil guard forbade us to leave the station and we had a lot of trouble get ting supplies […]. There were eight hundred passengers on board the train and the station had just one restau rant. […] Only able to make tortillas, the Spanish cook increased their price from meal to meal. The small chil dren lacked milk […]. Apart from a quick wash which we took turns in the [nearby] river, taken despite the orders of the civil guards, we were dirty. [...] We had no beds and took turns to sleep on the seats of our compartments. We were very tired. The announcement of our departure was welcomed with joy.”

67 Documents diplomatiques français : 1940, op. cit., p. 214.

The onleftHypoliteonNavigationthebelonging“Orduña”passenger-liner(1913–1950)toPacificSteamCy,boardwhichWormsEngland21July1940

On 1 August, Hypolite Worms was authorised to “enter the Admiralty building on official purposes” and to present to the Secretary of State for the Navy 71 a report on his activities between June and July 1940 in his capacity as head of the French Delegation to the Anglo-French Executive Committee for Shipping. In a memo addressed to the Minister for Industrial Production on 31 August 1940, Admiral Darlan was to state that “no minutes were issued following the presentation made by Mr H. Worms, a pres entation made up solely of a commentary on the agreements reached.”

July 1940, a circular signed by Admiral Darlan, Commander-in-Chief of the French Maritime Forces, informed of the provisional organisation of the Secretariat of State of the Navy. On 22 July 1940, a sec ond circular, this time signed by Rear Admiral Auphan, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, regulated the functioning of the Merchant Navy services for which he was respon sible.

I am here to report on my mission and to deal with a num ber of issues made difficult through the breakdown of rela tions between the two governments.

68 The address used on Hypolite Worms’ correspondence from Vichy was the Hôtel Majestic.

70 The people listed by Hypolite Worms in this letter are: Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie, Director of the Worms & Cie Banking Services; Jacques Barnaud, a general partner of the Maison since 1930 at the sides of Hypolite Worms and Michel Goudchaux; Joseph Denis, Secretary General of Worms & Cie already mentioned several times – and Louis Vignet, managing Director of the Fuel Merchanting 71Services.On15

On 12 June, I was cut off from all communications with the French government, preventing me from reporting on my activities in London.

On 10 August, he wrote the following lines to a friend68: Your letter […] reached me in Vichy where I have been for the last eight days, having come straight from London via Lisbon, Madrid and Barcelona, a trip that lasted two weeks.69 […]

69 In their Les Patrons sous l’Occupation, Rochebrune and Hazera stated (p. 201) that Hypolite Worms “makes a detour via his villa in Cap-Ferrat where he leaves his family in safety. He arrived in Vichy on 1 August.”ˮ

I therefore had to take on some serious responsibilities. Once I have been discharged of my mission, I will return to Paris. I imagine this will be in the course of next week. You will be interested to know that the Maison’s headquar ters reopened in Paris on 2 July. Apart from Mr Barnaud, are there Messrs Denis, Ladurie, Vignet and most of the staff. I am looking forward to seeing them all again. Mr Goudchaux will be staying in Bordeaux for a little longer.70 […]

Vichy – Hôtel du Parc and Le Majestic

I would like to remind you that, following the German invasion of Norway,75 a new agreement was reached with the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association (I sent you a copy thereof), under the terms of which a large proportion of the Norwegian fleet was made available to France and Great Britain. Similar agreements were at that time being negotiated with the Dutch and Swedes. These were con cluded under conditions which at that time seemed very advantageous. Their implementation included the sharing of ships at the disposal of France and those at the disposal of Britain.

74 See page 22.

Dividing up of the neutral vessels between France and Great Britain

1 August 1940, M. Hypolite Worms, head of the French Delegation to the Executive Committee for Shipping to the Secretary of State for the Navy

Up to the time communications with Ministry of the Merchant Navy were interrupted, I regularly informed you of the names of the ships allocated to France, leaving you to assign them to ship managers and to decide on their cargoes.

In the wake of these initial allocations, i.e. after balancing the proportions to reflect the needs of both countries, the shares were revised as follows: Ω 30% for France, Ω 70% for Great Britain. However, when the invasion of Northern France76 forced the French government to purchase considerable amounts of steel from the United States, you called on me to obtain the ships necessary for transporting it. For this reason, I requested that our share of long-haul ships be the same as that of Great Britain. My request was granted. The distri bution was therefore made as follows: Ω 50% for France, Ω 50% for Great Britain.

72 The post of Secretary of State was held by François Darlan (1881–1942) from June 1940 to April 1942.

I am now going to report to you on my activities from the 12 June up to my departure from London.

73 The public authorities were then in Tours, where they arrived on 10 June 1940. They moved to Bordeaux on 14 June. See footnotes 46 and 47 page 24.

I would also like to remind you that, due to the lack of French shipping tonnage, I managed to arrange for the tonnage to initially be divided up as follows: Ω 60% for France, Ω 40% for Great Britain.

In line with the latest information given to me in the last telephone conversations with the heads of your Ministry and given the substantial amount of steel to be imported from the United States, I assigned to the North Atlantic traffic and under the management of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, all the ships that were suitable for this voyage owing to their position and tonnage.

As the interruption of communications between Paris and London prevented me from reporting to you72 daily on my activities, I had to, as of 12 June73 and on the basis of the powers conferred on me by your mission order of 21 May,74 take a number of decisions in the interest of the country, both with regard to the execution of the current agree ments and in the face of the new situation brought about by the cessation of hostilities reached between France and Germany.

76 Cf. footnotes 42 page 21 and 44 page 22.

75 On the German invasion of Norway, Denmark and Holland, see footnotes 38, 40 and 41 page 20.

All these vessels were insured or reinsured by the War Risks Insurance Office, and the British government was refusing to cover voyages to French ports. The whole fleet of ships assigned to France therefore risked no longer being insured from one day to the next.

Continuing the war at the side of the British, the Dutch and Norwegian governments were themselves compelled to refuse their ships to sail to French ports.

On signing the armistice, most of the ships allocated or time-chartered to us became unusable for the following reasons:

The agreements signed jointly by Great Britain and France with these countries had been negotiated for the continua tion of the war. The British government consequently con sidered that the ships covered by these agreements were to be used entirely for transporting goods to Great Britain and could not be authorised to sail to French ports.

What I wanted to avoid at all costs was to have our coun try bear the considerable costs of ship charters, insurance, crew bonuses, etc. which amounted to 15–20 million francs a day if it seemed that the ships were to remain stuck in the ports without being insured against the risks of war. On the other hand, the French government ran a considerable capital risk, as these ships were no longer insured: the two million tons made available to us repre sented a value of around 7–8 billion francs at an exchange rate of one pound sterling = 176 francs.

With regard to the neutral ships time-chartered by France in execution of the Anglo-French agreements, the fact that England refused to allow them to pass the control bases and cancelled their insurance policies made their voyages absolutely impossible.

The available ships in the Far East were assigned to Indochina traffic, with the two companies, Messageries Maritimes and Chargeurs Réunis,77 made responsible for their management. This was the situation at the time the armistice was requested.

78 Several Worms freighters in ports of Great Britain at the end of June 1940 were seized by the British authorities: the “Bidassoa” on 1 July 1940; the “Normanville”ˮ and the “Margaux” on 3 July as well as six Worms ships converted into patrol boats at the beginning of the war.

A friend of Hypolite Worms, Jacques Barnaud and Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie, without any family relationship to Jacques Doriot, the founder of the PPF, a French fas cist and anti-Semitic political party, (with whom, however, he is confused in certain publications), Georges F. Doriot (1899–1987) first cropped up in the Maison Worm archives for the mid-1930s: he was in charge of representing the company’s interests and of organising its mainly – but not exclusively – financial affairs in Holland, Canada and the United States. To understand the friendship between him and Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie, see the letter that the latter addressed to him on 25 May 1940: “When [illegible name] hands you this letter, the first act of this major drama will be over. A miracle is still possible, but it is better [in life] not to expect miracles. In these terrible hours – terrible as such and terrible because we can see no end to them – I turn my thoughts towards you – and towards [Edna, the wife of G. Doriot], entrusting to you my wife and my three kids. If the Hitler dictatorship takes hold of this country – and how can you prevent it without tanks and planes – I would rather see those dear to my heart perish than to condemn them to what the Poles and Czechs are suffering. Unless at some point they can be sent to Spain and from there to America. Georges, you are the only one who one day might attempt such. I know that you will do it with all the means at your disposal. If ever you succeed, I will entrust my family to you as if they were yours.” Georges F. Doriot set up the first venture capital company in 1946 and was in 1957 the founder of Insead (Institut Européen d’Administra tion des Affaires), the private business school considered to be one of the best in the world.

Finally, the British authorities intercepted all ships head ing for French ports, wherever they were in the world, and redirected them to British ports.78

The return of the vessels to their owners raised certain prob lems needing to be negotiated with the British authorities.

Consequences of the armistice for the chartering of neutral ships by France

77 In a letter sent from Worms & Cie Paris (possibly by Jacques Barnaud – the signature is illegible) to Georges F. Doriot on 27 May 1939, the writer stated that “there is much talk of privatising the [Compagnie Générale] Transatlantique. A vast consortium is being assembled quietly, consisting of Lazard, the Banque de Paris and Fabre, to merge, under their leadership, the Chargeurs Réunis, les Messageries Maritimes and the ‘Transat’ into one major French company.”

“A major capital risk” assessed at around 7–8 billion francs

79 On the position of Emmanuel Monick and Hypolite Worms about the continuation of the war by France, see page 24.

Your letter only reached me this morn ing. I immediately dictated the annexed paper, in the hope that H. [i.e. Hypolite Worms] will find it of use. Moreover, it fully reflects the feelings I have for him. I am glad of the information you have given me on him. Please tell him that he may make use of this paper as he sees fit, without any need to be worried and as widely as he wants.

Ω How to try and retain neutral vessels for our colonial traffic?

Ω How to prevent the cargoes on board ships intercepted and redirected by the English and subject to seizure from being auctioned off, i.e. nearly always at a price lower than the purchase price?

These questions, for which the starting point was Maritime Transport, actually interested all Missions, and especially the financial attaché at the French Embassy, [i.e. Emmanuel Monick 79 , see below his declaration of 8 April 1946].

recognise myself as having the right to let France run the risk of operating non-insured vessels.

Indeed, the general points, which I felt needed to be dealt with, were the following:

Ω How to prevent the impossibility for ships to sail to France due to the position taken by Great Britain caus ing an influx of vessels onto the market and, consequently, a collapse in freight levels? And under these conditions, how to prevent Great Britain from taking over the char ters that we were forced to cede at lower rates, giving rise to claims against the French government for considerable damages on the part of the shipowners with whom we had signed the charter parties?

Washington, 8 April 1946

My dear friend

[Signature illegible]

Ω How to deal with the questions regarding the insurance of all these ships so that there would be no gap between the date the policies expired and the new date on which they were to be taken over by Great Britain? I did not

I am not intending to return before the end of the first two weeks in May. Please give my sincere regards to H. W. Very kindly

How to settle the financial issues resulting from both our past commitments and the new agreements to be con cluded?

M. Hippolyte Worms then tasked me with tell ing all his friends in France that he fully shared my point of view: he even handed me a letter which he requested me to use in this sense and in which he confirmed his most formal senti ments on the need to continue the war jointly with our British Ally.

Washington, 8 April 1946, Emm. Monick

I. As financial attaché in London at the start of the war, I had many occasions to meet Mr Hippolyte [sic] Worms, who was the repre sentative of the Minister of the Merchant Navy in Great Britain.

II. At a later date and acting on my own authority, I proposed to the British Treasury a financial agreement on the opening of recipro cal credits in view of liquidating and clearing the war accounts.

I, the undersigned, Emmanuel Monick, Governor of the Banque de France, herewith declare:

Well aware of his patriotic sentiments, I did not hesitate to inform him of my intention to leave for Bordeaux on 18 June 1940 with a view to drawing the attention of the French govern ment, which had just called for an armistice, to the serious consequences of this move, to affirm the intention of the Cabinet in London to con tinue the struggle and to set forth the advan tages for us to remain at the side of England.

M. Hippolyte Worms, for his part, took exactly the same attitude as me. Similarly, acting on his own initiative, he negotiated the transfer, for the benefit of the British government, of all charter contracts signed before the armistice by the Maritime Transport Mission on behalf of the French government. I took part in these negotiations to cover the financial aspects. Let it be said that Mr Worms conducted these in the sense of fully supporting our British Ally.

Telegram sent by Hypolite Worms

Telegram from the Ministry of the Merchant Navy

All allied vessels, i.e. Norwegian and Dutch ones, in all ports are herewith transferred to England. Also settled is the issue of their cargoes, thereby preventing them from being requisitioned. I explained the main terms of this agreement to you in my telegram of 5 July [cf. below] The agreement was based on the agreement in principle given by you to me in your telegram of 27 June [cf. below] , replying to the suggestions made to you in my telegram of 25 June [cf. below] . Your telegram also called on me to try to retain the neutral vessels for colonial traffic.

Telegram sent by Hypolite Worms

In full liaison with the financial attaché, I therefore reached an initial agreement with the Ministry of Shipping.

The “Worms” Agreement of 4 July 1940 80

Ministry of the Merchant Navy, Bordeaux

Report of Hypolite Worms (continued)

25 June 1940

80 The full English text of this agreement of 4 July 1940 is reproduced on pages 43 and 44.

Diplomatic corps

Ministry of the Military and Merchant Navy 5 July 1940

Please pass on to Mr H. Worms, head of the French Delegation to the Anglo-French Executive Committee for Shipping, Ministry of Shipping, the following message from the Minister for the Merchant and Military Navy: “Agree in principle with the terms of your telegram n° 1191, 25 June. Do not renew any charters and keep me informed of all charter party transfers and terminations. However, please try and retain until further notice the neutral tonnage currently in service on French colo nial lines.” Jean-Marie.

Hypolite Worms

PleaseUrgent urgently cable me your instructions regarding all for eign ships time-chartered by France – stop – Unless otherwise stated by you, I intend to terminate all charters or negotiate their transfer in the best interests of France – stop – Pending reply, I shall not renew any.

Bordeaux, 27 June 1940

[Corrected copy]

Following my telegrams of 25 and 29 June and your reply of 27 June, the Embassy attaché and I have reached an agreement with the Ministry of Shipping to transfer and cancel without payment of damages all charter-parties for all allied and neu tral vessels time-chartered by France, leaving aside for later discussions the question of neutral vessels on French colonial traffic – stop – Moreover, all cargoes of ships so transferred,

81 Fob = Free on board: Goods are bought or sold fob when the price does not include transport, duties and 82insurance.Statements on which categories of revenues are declared.

whether such ships are at sea or being loaded, will, without exception, be purchased by the British government at the con tracted fob81 price plus insurance and freight costs in line with the British schedules82 – stop – With regard to cargoes of coal, the Mines Department will take back non-shipped cargoes at a price close to the contracted price and will agree with the Coals Mission on all remaining – stop – This applies to all ships in British ports, at sea, in French or foreign ports, with the excep tion of neutral vessels serving French colonial traffic which will be discussed later. French government must in return accept to release vessels chartered to France and not used for French colonial traffic which are at present in French metropolitan or colonial ports – stop – The execution of this agreement in all its aspects will take several weeks of work for me and a cer

tain number of the staff of the Shipping, Armaments, Supply and Coals Missions to definitively complete all transfers and to settle all debit accounts for freight, insurance, etc. and all credit accounts for payment of cargoes – stop – If as a result of the latest events, diplomatic relations are interrupted, what must I do? If the British authorities allow us to depart, we risk, by not resolving this situation, being subjected to major claims for damages from all countries owning ships, as the charter-parties will continue to run. The same goes for the car goes. Instead of being subject to an amicable agreement, these will be seized and sold. This could amount to a total loss of hundreds of millions or even billions, depending on the greater or lesser goodwill of the shipping companies of all countries covering fifteen hundred thousand tons – stop – Should you instead want me to stay in London until everything has been settled, what will be our official status and how could I get immunity and permission from the British government to return in France once my mission is fulfilled? How will we be able to settle our debts and receivables if the financial attaché is no longer there? Please urgently cable me yourHypoliteinstructions.Worms

3 - all cargoes on board these transferred ships, after hav ing been rerouted by the British authorities, would be pur chased at current prices, f.o.b. plus the freight paid, on the basis of the British compensation rates.

The agreement foresaw the following:

In my letter of 10 July, I communicated to you the agree ment I had obtained from the Ministry of Shipping in respect of cargoes on board neutral or allied time-chartered ships. As regards cargoes on board non-time-chartered ships, it has been agreed between the representatives of the Ministry of Shipping and of the British Treasury that an agreement should be reached between each mission and the ministry concerned, and that this agreement will be similar to that of 4 July. The same letter sent to all heads of Missions in London.

As regarded the taking over of the cargoes on board foreign voyage-chartered ships, this agreement was no longer my responsibility as it no longer had anything to do with time-chartered ships, the sole aspect of my mission.

1 - all time-chartered vessels to France and in British ports would be taken over by Great Britain at current prices, without any claims for damages on the part of the ship owners,

Report of Hypolite Worms (continued)

2 - same provisions for all vessels of British allies in all ports and for all neutral vessels, with the exception of ships on French colonial traffic which I had been able to leave out for later discussion in order not to delay the signing of this agreement,

This thus dealt with the issue of the ships on time charter to France, their insurance and their cargoes, without any great loss to France.

Settlement of the issue of time-chartered ships

I therefore left it up to each purchasing mission to nego tiate with the respective British ministry the terms and conditions for taking over these cargoes. However, in the course of our meetings with the British Treasury, I was given the assurance that similar terms and conditions could be obtained. I advised the heads of the other mis sions correspondingly [cf. below] .

Letter sent by Hypolite Worms to the heads of the French missions in London Westminster House, Dean Stanley Street,London,SW116 July 1940

Monsieur Hypolite Worms to Monsieur Thibault, head of the Coals Mission

The “Worms” agreement of 4 July 1940

The “Worms” agreement of 4 July 1940 (continued)

Ministry of the Military and Merchant Navy Received your telegram of 27 June. Am acting in line with your instructions. Am transferring and cancelling all charterparties subject to certain conditions imposed by me in agree ment with financial attaché for reimbursing the value of cargoes en route under terms which I will cable you once they have been approved by British Treasury – stop – Pursuant to your instructions, am going to discuss with Ministry of Shipping possibilities for retaining until new further notice neutral tonnage serving French colonies. However, draw your attention as of now to problems surpassing goodwill of ship owners – stop – These ships have been chartered in line with agreements signed by Ministry of Shipping and myself in view of the war continuing. For its duration, these ships are insured against war risks by British War Risks Committee –stop – Maintaining certain charter-parties for France entirely dependent on agreement of British authorities. They will cer tainly want to retain for themselves the benefit of the contracts thus conceived – stop – I fear in particular that British gov ernment will not accept providing war risk coverage for ships sailing from French colonies to French ports – stop – Will keep you informed of the status of my negotiations.Hypolite Worms

The problem of the ships on French colonial traffic

In this respect, I had very great difficulty obtaining a response from the British authorities who did want at all to define to me their blockade policy vis-à-vis France. We should not confuse shipping agreements and block ade ones. I explained to you the attitude of the Ministry of Shipping with regard to the neutral vessels, which it wanted to see transferred in their entirety. But the fact that they were laying claim to these vessels did not mean that the British government was totally and forever against the possibility of letting certain goods pass through the English control bases.

29 June 1940

Report of Hypolite Worms (continued)

Following the conclusion of this agreement, I wanted to come back to the issue of ships on French colonial traffic. But, as you will remember, I drew your attention to the difficulties I knew we would come up against in my tele gram of 29 June.

Report of Hypolite Worms (continued)

Due to the urgency attached to settling the issues of insur ance and ship charters, it was not possible to wait for a decision of principle on the question of a blockade, a deci sion which could be a long time in the making, and, as a consequence to make the “Shipping” situation depend ent on that of the blockade policy, which was entirely the responsibility of the Foreign Office.

Telegram sent by Hypolite Worms

12 July 1940 2944-45 (encrypted) 9 p.m. Castellane

Pending such, and given that: Ω the British government refused to continue insuring the vessels [cf. letter below], Ω it refused to let them sail to France and was determined, for the time being, to intercept them, Ω the British Treasury refused to advance to France the necessary Sterling for paying for new charters of these same vessels, it appeared to me that there was no other solution than to also transfer these ships. But, in light of your telegram of 27 June, I did not see myself empowered to do such with out consulting you.

Castellane

Baudouin Vichy

Telegram sent by Hypolite Worms

Report of Hypolite Worms (continued)

From Mr Hypolite Worms to the Ministry of the Military and Merchant Navy With reference to your telegram of 27 June, Ministry of Shipping insists on the transfer of all ships, including neutral ones on colonial traffic for the reasons set forth in my telegram of 5 July – Retaining neutral vessels on colonial traffic implies that the British government will allow certain overseas traffic to French ports, a principle on which it seems that the British government is not ready to fix its policy. – Under these condi tions and to avoid the payment of very large amounts on char ters, insurance and crew bonuses without knowing whether the vessels will be used, suggest that you allow me to transfer all these ships to the Ministry of Shipping, which implies that they would be allowed to leave immediately all French main land and colonial ports – Should at a later date the British and French governments reach agreement on allowing certain traffic to pass through British control bases, I have reason to believe that we could at such a time envisage an agreement with the Ministry of Shipping on the supply of an equivalent tonnage of ships.

A few days before my departure, the Ministry of Shipping rejected my request to retain the neutral vessels on colo nial traffic, and I cabled to you that Great Britain was demanding that all vessels assigned to France on time charter, in execution of the agreements signed by France and England, be handed over to it. I informed you of this in my telegram of 12 July [cf. below] , adding that, in agree ment with the Ministry of Shipping, if England changed its policy on France, it seemed that there would be no major objection to letting us take over a certain number of ships.

I write to call your attention to the fact that, in accordance with the terms of the charter parties, a number of neutral vessels on time charter to the French government and now in ports in France or in French possessions are insured against war risks with the Office. The certificates of insurance issued in the name of the owners of the vessels contain the following clause:

83 In a memo sent on 26 July 1940 to the Secretary of State for the Navy, the Minister for Foreign Affairs won dered what attitude to be taken towards neutral ships in French or colonial ports. He recommended that they be detained until “Hypolite Worms details the situation to the French authorities in a way allowing them to take a reasoned decision.”ˮ He went on to state that “to put pressure on France, the War Risks Insurance Office has cancelled all policies covering these ships.”

“The assured warrants that the ship shall not engage in any trade prohibited by HM government in the United Kingdom.”

Monsieur Worms

This Office considers itself bound to warn the owners concerned that the operation of this clause might render it impossible for them to recover a loss and that consequently the certificate must be considered of no value to the owner.

Obtainment of a 30-day delay as of 17 July 1940 during which the neutral ships will continue to be insured by England

[Signature illegible]

As regards Swedish vessels on time charter to the French government in respect of which this Office is interested as the reinsurer, I am instructed to inform you that the Swedish War Risks Insurance Club has been notified that the Office is unable to accept any further business or renewals in respect of vessels on time charter to the French government.

Yours faithfully,

Dear Sir,

edge of the facts.83 Should this decision be in line with my suggestions, these ships should be sent to and released at the nearest British port. They should arrive there within thirty days of 17 July, the date of the Ministry of Shipping letter signalling its agreement, as you will see on reading it.

Letter from the War Risks Insurance Office

I have therefore taken the initiative to negotiate a new agreement giving us a 30-day option during which the neutral ships not handed over to England and currently in French mainland or colonial ports would continue to be insured by the War Risks Insurance Office, on the under standing that, during this 30-day period, I would have the time to discuss this problem in detail with you, and that you would be able to arrive at your decision in full knowl

Report of Hypolite Worms (continued)

147/8 Leadenhall Street, London EC3

The French Transport Mission Westminster House Dean Stanley Street, SW1

17 July 1940

Yours faithfully,

Report of Hypolite Worms (continued)

With reference to the letter from the War Risks Insurance Office of 17 th July and our subsequent discussion of the position regarding war risk insurance of neutral vessels on time charter to your government and now in ports in France or in French possessions, I write to say that the Ministry of Shipping would be prepared to accept transfer of the time charter from your government of each of the neutral vessels concerned if delivery is given at a British port within the next four weeks, and on the understanding that this will be done, would also be prepared to continue for the same period the war risk insurance cover while the vessel is in port and for the voyage from the port where each vessel now lies to the nearest British port to give delivery. The Ministry of Shipping is also prepared to agree that when delivery has been effected payment of hire and other payments for charter’s account by the Ministry would be antedated to the time when each vessel sails from the French port. This arrangement would apply as regards both Greek and Swedish vessels.

Letter from Sir Cyril Hurcomb To Hypolite Worms

Dear Sir,

The date for Great Britain to take over of the charter-parties is set to 28 June 1940 Before leaving, I wanted to start implementing the first signed agreement. For the large majority of vessels delivered, I reached an agreement with the Ministry of Shipping to decide on the date on which the charters were to be transferred. In nearly all cases, this was set to 28 June.

On the other hand, in order to preserve the benefits of this agreement for our country vis-à-vis the foreign shipowners, 1. I had meetings with the representatives of the shipown ers of each country or with their official representatives, telling them that: France would settle all amounts due to them, in com pliance with the financial agreement reached between the French Embassy’s financial attaché and the British Treasury [cf. below], 2. I had assurance from the Ministry of Shipping that it would take over our time charters under the same terms and conditions, i.e. without any loss to them.

Berkeley Square House Berkeley17London,SquareW1thJuly1940

Sir Cyril Hurcomb French Transport Mission Westminster House 2, Dean Stanley Street Millbank, SW1

3. From the account, there will be paid sums due to persons in the sterling area by the French government and organ isations organised by the French government in respect of goods supplied and services rendered.

If you are prepared to accept this agreement concluded by me, and which complements the general agreement, for the neutral ships currently engaged in colonial traffic, the result of these various agreements will be that France will be able to release, at no great loss, the 1,900,000 tons of neutral and allied ships assigned to it by the Anglo-French agreements, that all the goods seized will be paid for by England at current prices, instead of the low prices possibly achieved when auctioning them off after they have been requisitioned; and that France will be able to con firm its commitments to all allied and neutral countries, in particular Sweden, Norway, Holland and Greece, from whom we had chartered ships, and that France did not leave them alone to face the Ministry of Shipping which might have, in the absence of these amicable agreements, benefited from these new circumstances to modify the concluded contracts for all ships assigned to France.

1. The Treasury will open a French Liquidation Account at the Bank of England.

To complete the execution of this agreement, I left behind in London, within the organisation of the Maritime Transport Mission, an agent who is well informed of all my negotiations and who is to fix, vis-à-vis both the Ministry of Shipping and the shipowners or their official representatives, all execution details and to settle all charter accounts, under the supervision of the representatives sim ilarly left behind in London by the financial attaché.

84 In the report sent by Emmanuel Monick to the Minister for Finance on 16 July 1940 and cited in footnote 65 page 32, a chapter is devoted to the “Shipping” agreement con cluded by Hypolite Worms.

5. The Treasury will, if necessary, make advances to the French liquidation account.

2. There will be paid into the account: a – sums due by British government departments to the French government or to persons in France, b – the balances of the French government account No. 1 and sub account “A” at the Bank of England and the accounts of French government missions in London, after setting aside the amount required to wind up the work of the missions.

4. Payments from the Account shall only be made if they have been concluded in a schedule which has been approved in writing by the Financial Attaché of the French Embassy or someone nominated by him.

Financial agreement concluded on 6 July 1940 by Emmanuel Monick84 , the French Embassy’s financial attaché, and S. D. Waley from the British Treasury

6. Any eventual surplus on the account after the repay ment of any advances will be kept on a suspense account to the credit of the French government for settlement after the war.

Emm. Monick and S. D. Waley 6th July 1940

Report of Hypolite Worms (continued)

On the other hand, as I had the occasion to indicate to you above, and as stated in my telegrams, I am deeply convinced that it will be possible, once France and England reach agreement on the principle of free trade between

The points handled in these telegrams are as follows: “degaussing”85 designation of the ships purchases of ships position of the ships orders given to the ships “Normandie”ˮ

As you will see from these telegrams, I had the occasion to give Mr Morin de Linclays a number of instructions which I think you will agree to.

Communications with the French Shipping and Transportation Mission in New York

As early as June 12, in preparation for the steel imports, I wanted to know the exact situation of transports in North America. In the course of June and July, I directly contacted Mr Morin de Linclays, as I had been authorised to do by your Department during our last telephone com munications.

85 Operation making ships undetectable to magnetic mines.

Transport of military aircraft in July 1944 from New York to Liverpool on board the “Bourgogne,” a Société Française de Transports Pétroliers oil tanker chartered by the US War Shipping Administration as of September 1943

France and its colonies, to obtain either from the Ministry of Shipping or from certain groupings of neutral shipown ers, the ships needed for this transport. Benefiting from the goodwill of the Ministry of Shipping, I tried to assess whether it would be possible to envisage a swap of French vessels moored in English ports against English vessels in French mainland or colonial ports. I dis cussed the matter with my colleagues from the Ministry of Shipping and, after several days of reflection, I was told that the British government was in favour of this solution, the realisation of which in my mind is worthy of being pursued, if you agree, despite the current requisitioning of French vessels moored in English ports.

As Mr Morin de Linclays also had no links to your Department, I requested him to inform me of all issues that he was unable to solve on the spot. This explains the series of telegrams exchanged with him.

Telegram sent by Hypolite Worms

4 August 1940

To Sir Cyril Hurcomb

Approval of the agreements by the French authorities

The growing difficulties in communicating with London incited Hypolite Worms to confirm the above telegram a few days later.

Message from Hypolite Worms

Vichy10August 1940

The agreement concluded by Hypolite Worms on 4 July 1940,86 as well as the provisions taken to ensure that the ships chartered by France and located in mainland and colonial ports were insured against war risks, were approved by the authorities, as confirmed by Hypolite Worms on 4 August to Sir Cyril Hurcomb and the War Risks Committee.

Fenez, a member of the Maritime Transport Liquidation Committee, to pass on to Sir Cyril Hurcomb at the Ministry of Shipping the translation of the following urgent communication from Mr Hypolite Worms – stop – Re your letter of 17 July and following provisional agreement reached in London, French government has decided to release all neu tral ships chartered for colonial traffic which may freely leave French and colonial ports. Shipowners must give their cap tains instructions as to which ports they should head for. But as my trip to Vichy took two weeks and as a result the basic decision could only be taken in the last few days, it will there fore be impossible for all ships to reach the nearest British port to be designated by shipowners before 16 August, date of the changeover of war risks insurance cover, I am calling on Hurcomb to request the War Risks Committee to maintain the insurance for all ships which will not actually have arrived before 16 August – stop – Please inform Samuelson and Lusi of the decision taken so that they can keep their captains informed. Given the above, 4 July agreement will extend in all its clauses to neutral vessels on colonial traffic. Liquidation of all time charters for ships settled definitively – stop – Please confirm receipt and agreement.

86 See an explanatory memo (undated) on the Worms agreements issued by the Secretary of State for the Navy and filed under 1940.

87 In several letters, Hypolite Worms stated 2 August as the date he arrived in Vichy. This is not confirmed either by the date of the report he sent to Secretary of State for the Navy nor by the permit issued to him to enter the admiralty building; these are both dated 1 August. This was possibly a way of prolonging by one day the deadline negotiated with the War Risks Committee.

Director general Ministry of Shipping London

My journey to Vichy having taken a fortnight, I only arrived here on the second of August87 – stop – Hence delay – stop –Besides understand that Foreign Office have withdrawn from French acting Consul general use of code so I believe you have not received coded telegrams which I sent you on the 6th and 8th of August – stop – This latter telegram was advising you that French government agreed release immediately all neutral vessels on colonial traffic and that instructions had been sent to ports that ships were free to leave at once or immediately after discharge for those with cargoes on board – stop – Please arrange for instructions to be sent to captains as to destination they are to proceed to – stop – But owing to delays due to length my return journey and withdrawal official French code which has prevented your receiving my previous telegrams must ask you arrange for War Risks Committee extend insurance for French account on ships which cannot materially reach first British port within the thirty days specified your letter 17 th July and for the number of days necessary to enable them reach such port – stop – French government confirming the above through American Embassy.

Very Pleaseurgentrequest

As soon as you are able to, you will return to the Admiralty to place yourself at my disposal again.

Accusations brought against Hypolite Worms for “having sold the French Merchant Navy to the English”

Hypolite Worms left Vichy for the first time to go to Paris in mid-August 1940. On 11 August, he was tasked by the Secretary of State for the Navy with a ten-day mission in the French capital in a capacity as delegate of the Admiralty (see below orders signed on 11 and 13 August 1940 by Rear Admiral Gabriel Auphan). Hypolite Worms was accompanied on his mission by his secretary, Raymond Meynial.

Hypolite Worms’ return to Paris (September 1940)

Admiral of the Fleet F. Darlan Secretary of State for the Navy

Commander-in-Chief of the French Maritime Forces To Mr H. Worms, Admiralty Delegate

By order of Rear Admiral Gabriel Auphan

I would be grateful if you would go to Paris with your secretary, Mr Meynial, on official business.

Vichy, 13 August 1940 Secretary of State for the Navy French Admiralty

One paragraph in this report provides information on the presence of Maison Worms and its head in Vichy. M. Hypolite Worms left Vichy about September 1940 and never returned there except on one or two occasions at the end of 1940 or early 1941 to see the shipping section of the Ministry over business matters. The firm had no activity there. It only kept a clerk and a typist in a small office89 in order to keep contact with the Office des Changes of the French government as did all other banks. The Firm had no branch there.90

90 Dated 20 September 1947, this document, written in English, responded to the attacks launched against Maison Worms by William H. Langer, Professor of History at Harvard University, in Our Vichy Gamble, a work published by Alfred A. Knopf Inc., in spring 1947.

On 28 August 1940, he sent Mr Revoil, the head of the Worms branch in Marseilles, a letter from Vichy which began as follows:

Dear Monsieur Revoil, I have just returned from Paris. I will be staying here for a few days, and it is possible that I might come down to see you in Marseilles, should the circumstances allow me to take a few days off at Cap Ferrat, something I would like to do. Whatever the case, I will ring you up. […]

Boite postale 56

88 Dated 20 September 1947, this document, written in English, responded to the attacks launched against Maison Worms by William H. Langer, Professor of History at Harvard University, in Our Vichy Gamble, a work published by Alfred A. Knopf Inc., in spring 1947.

Vichy, 28 August 1940

He finally left Vichy in September 1940, as stated in a document entitled Statement prepared by Worms & Cie relating to its wartime history and the French judicial pro ceedings which ensued.88

89 This office may have been located at 48 Avenue Eugène Gilbert, the address used on a telegram sent to George F. Doriot by Raymond Meynial on an unspecified date and filed under 1940. See also a letter from Hypolite Worms to Jacques Barnaud dated 22 September 1940.

German patrol on the Avenue Foch in Paris

There is now no longer any risk of either the shipowners or the French treasury incurring heavy losses. From a technocratic point of view, everything is perfect. But for the collaborationist press in Paris, Worms has become the shipowner who has handed over part of the French merchant fleet to the British. On 3 July 1940, the Royal Navy fired the French warships sheltered at Mers-elKébir, the attack provoking a wave of hostile reactions against Great Britain. The shipowner is known for main taining excellent relations with this country. Does the family-run company not owe its success to the import of British coal? Did Hypolite Worms not learn his trade on the other side of the Channel? Is he not married to an Englishwoman? His Majesty’s government had, moreover, not made things easy for him: the agreement he negotiated was signed on 4 July, the day after the attack on Mers-el-Kébir!”

The French merchant fleet, the interests of which had been entrusted to this bizarre representative, was thus com pletely in the hands of England. This takeover prepared the way for the cruelest blow to our merchant fleet and our sailors: the sequestration of the largest share of our ships and their crews in the British ports.92

As soon as the Worms agreements became known to the public, their author became the target of a violent campaign orchestrated by the collaborationist press. The first article appeared on 21 October 1940 in ParisSoir91; it was signed by Rudy Cantel. How can we tolerate that Mr Hypolite Worms, head of the French Delegation in London during the 1939–40 war, is still engaged in any activity? Through his well-reasoned action, Hypolite Worms has centralised the whole French merchant fleet in England. Voluntarily, this bizarre “newly converted” Catholic had left the French mission at 2 Dean Stanley Street to set up his office at the Ministry of Shipping’s headquarters in Berkeley Square, just below the British minister’s office.

91 Other articles in the same vein were to follow on 23 October 1940, 24 October 1940, 3 November 1940, 11 November 1940 and 13 November 1940. On top of these, there were attacks from G. de Brehville in Au Pilori, from Dauphin-Meunier in Aujourd’hui, and the articles in La France au travail, L’Œuvre, Le Franciste, L’Appel, France Europe, etc., many of which were taken up by regional newspapers.

92 See page 37 and footnote 78 on the seizure of French ships (especially ones belonging to Worms) in the British ports in the first days of July 1940.

the French merchant fleet through chartering as many foreign vessels as possible: Greek, Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch. Always this attitude of rendering service to the State. Then the armistice is concluded. What to do with the contracts signed for the duration of the war when the conflict ends prematurely for France? The British are threatening to requisition the ships and auction off the cargoes. Hypolite Worms has pledged his personal credit in this affair, especially to charter a large part of the Greek fleet, and he obviously does not want to fall out with his professional environment. It is therefore very much in his interest for the contracts to be honoured, one way or another. Whatever the case, the vessels are now blocked, as can be read in a report submitted by Hypolite Worms to the Vichy authorities. By remaining their charterer, France risks having to pay 15–20 mil lion francs a day in running fees for nothing, as well as losing a lot of money if the cargoes are auctioned off and having to reimburse the owners in the event of the freighters being destroyed. The “treacherous Albion,” in the guise of the War Risks Insurance Office, is threatening to stop insuring the vessels. Hypolite Worms thus spent several days negotiating, soon after the defeat, an amicable agreement allowing the British to take over the contracts on the initial terms.

The collaborationist press on the rampage

93 Op. cit., pp. 195–196 and 201.

“The collaborationist press in Paris is going on the rampage against Maison Worms from the summer and autumn of 1940,” commented Renaud de Rochebrune and Jean-Claude Hazera in the chapter of their book Les Patrons sous l’Occupation entitled “Worms, quartier général de la synarchie?”93 “The press is questioning the personal role played by Hypolite Worms, the Worms & Cie head, in Anglo-French relations. As we know, following the declaration of war he was sent by the government to London with the official title of ‘head of the French Delegation to the Executive Committee for Shipping’ to fulfil an important mission: to strengthen

94 Several times a minister in the 1930s, Pierre Laval (1883–1945) re-entered the government on 23 June 1940, at first as Minister for Justice. He worked on getting the Constitutional Law of 10 July 1940 adopted, a law investing Philippe Pétain with full constituent powers. On 12 July 1940, he was appointed Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, while Pétain became both head of State and leader of the government. Wikipedia (French version): “From July to December 1940, Laval conducted an active policy of collaboration, proposing an alliance with Germany. This proved worrying for certain members of his govern ment. But above all, he worked too autonomously for the taste of Pétain. Mindful of his authority, the latter considered that Laval’s unpopularity among the French population risked reflecting badly on the regimeˮ and led Pétain to sanction him.”

On 17 October 1944, Hypolite Worms made the follow ing statement to the same judge: In August and September 1940, I went several times to Vichy to meet up with Admiral Auphand, Director of the Merchant Navy, on account of the mission I had under taken in England.

On 3 July 1940, the day before Hypolite Worms signed the agreement transferring the neutral ships chartered by France to Great Britain, the latter attacks a squadron of the French Navy at Mers el-Kebir

Questioned on 27 September 1944 by the judge Georges Thirion,95 Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie was to state: We were exposed to the hostility of certain French circles who supplied the Germans with input for the campaign they intended to undertake against us. Mr Pierre Laval, in particular, declared himself a determined opponent of our Maison.

“Laval, in particular, declared himself a determined opponent of our Maison” GaBriel le roy l adurie, 27 seP teMBer 1944 In the eyes of the Maison’s management, the rampage against the Maison in the pro-Nazi press was stirred up by one man: Pierre Laval.94

95 A judge at the Tribunal de la Seine, Georges Thirion was appointed in the context of the legal proceedings brought against Hypolite Worms, as the main share holder of Worms & Cie, and Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie, as Director or Banking Services, between 23 September 1944, the date they were suspected of collaborating with the enemy, and 25 October 1946, the date the accusation was declared null and void by the Cour de Justice.

However, even though, Renaud de Rochebrune and Jean-Claude Hazera emphasise in their book Les Patrons sous l’Occupation,96 “even if the shipowner is persuaded not to engage in politics, he has some very strong views in favour of Great Britain. And he does not hide them at a critical moment in time, at the begin ning of the Occupation, when the new strongman of the country [Pierre Laval] is wanting to tip French politics in favour of the Germans and against the English.

During the days in June when the government was wavering between the armistice wanted by the Marshal and his friends and continuing the war, this spoilsport had already convinced Emmanuel Monick, financial attaché in London, to make the journey to Bordeaux to convince the French government of the fierce English will to continue the war. Arriving in Vichy in the middle of summer, he repeats this view. ‘Convinced as I was of the impossibility of an invasion of England from a technical perspective and still backing its decision to resist, I put my views to the ministers to whom I had to report on my mission and whom I knew personally

I would like to point out to you that Mr Worms was offi cially entrusted with an important mission to Great Britain during the war on behalf of the French Merchant Navy.

On 19 August 1943, Pierre Laval declared that he would not have been dismissed by Petain on 13 December 1940 if he had ordered the arrest of Hypolite Worms as he intended to do at the end of October 1940

through previous business encounters with them [...], Darlan, Auphan, Baudouin, Piétri, Lémery, Bouthillier,’ he explained to the examining magistrate in 1944.”97

To silence the Maison’s detractors, François Darlan sent the following letter on 28 October 1940 to General La Laurencie, General Delegate of the French government in the occupied territories:

97 Hypolite Worms to Georges Thirion on 17 October 1944: “I note that the subject of this campaign has been to accuse me of having had – either personally or through the intermediary of politicians claiming to be members of my group – a hostile attitude towards the FrancoGerman collaboration. I am therefore entitled to be sur prised to see the same campaign being taken up today to demand my arrest and my indictment, something that is both absurd and contradictory.”

96 Op. cit., pp. 195–196 and 201.

During one of these visits, having heard that Mr Laval was making hostile remarks about me and my Maison, I asked him for an audience. I was received by Mr Laval. He was aggressive and reproached me for having opposed his pol icy. I assured him that I had done nothing against him and that I followed a personal rule of abstaining from all political activity. Mr Laval spoke of certain persons in my entourage, and especially Mr Le Roy Ladurie, whom he accused of being a monarchist. Mr Laval insisted that he would, in his own words, “break the back” of anyone trying to oppose him. I have not seen Mr Laval since, neither has Admiral Darlan or any other minister. I have never taken part in any political meeting, whether private or other. I have always been guided by the principle of not being interested in the private lives or political opinions of my staff. All I required of them was to be devoted to the inter ests entrusted to them by me. If any persons belonging to Maison Worms or in any business relationship with it have played a political role or performed any activity outside their professional work, they have done so at their own responsibility and independently of Maison Worms and myself. I intend to fully affirm the principle of this complete separation.

I have become aware of certain articles published recently in the Parisian press attacking Mr Hypolite Worms in quite strong words.

The French government was able to appreciate, both during this mission and at its conclusion, the merits, talent and independence of Mr Worms. Expressing our country’s gratitude, I personally congrat ulated him last August. I continue to consider him as an adviser listened to by the Navy. The insulting imputation that Mr Worms handed over of all or part of the French merchant fleet to England is a pure invention.

F. Darlan

Three days earlier, on 25 October 1940, Maison Worms had been placed under the control of a German admin istrator with the most extensive management powers, and the Le Trait shipyard (ACSM–Worms) under that of the Kriegsmarine. Worms & Cie was the only French company, apart from the Banque de France and foreign banks based in France, to have been subject to such a However,measure. Laval did not relent. For instance, a report of 19 August 1943 has this to say: Some 8 days ago, the rumour spread in Paris, and has since been confirmed, that President Laval intended to have Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie arrested; Mr Laval was sup posed to have spoken of this move at a meeting of Veterans’ Legion in Vichy. The Paris Police Prefect Mr Bussières would have been in charge of this arrest but would not have been able to carry it out because of the absence of Mr Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie who was resting away from his Underhome.these circumstances and going back on his original intention, Mr Laval is said to have decided not to go ahead with this arrest. But this gesture of leniency did not go down well among the Veterans, leaving an impression of indecision. There was a tendency to accuse Mr Laval of having been too soft-hearted, especially as he was said to have declared during the same speech that he had intended to have Mr Hypolite Worms arrested one and a half monthsbefore 13 December.98 This led his audience to conclude that, had he gone ahead with this arrest before 13 December, the 13 December would not have happened.

98 This was the 13 December 1940, the date on which Pierre Laval was relieved of his functions as Vice President of the Council by Marshal Pétain who declared to him: “You no longer have my trust.ˮ He was replaced first by Pierre-Étienne Flandin (13 December 1940 to 9 February 1941), and then by François Darlan (9 February 1941 to 18 April 1942). While the latter fell into disgrace, Laval, backed and pressured by Göring, came back to power on 18 April 1942, the date he was appointed chief of the government, a position he was to hold until 19 August 1944. In a radio speech he gave on 22 June 1942 he outlined his policy objectives, expressing his “desire to re-establish normal and trusting relations with Germany and Italy. This war will inevitably lead to a new Europe. […] To construct this Europe, Germany is currently involved in gigantic fights […] I wish for the Germany’s victory because otherwise Bolshevism [will] establish itself everywhere.”

If a sizeable slice of our merchant fleet is being detained by Great Britain, after having taken refuge there on 17 and 25 June, this is the result of an act of force on the part of the British government.

At the beginning of the war, Mr Hypolite Worms was in Great Britain as the representative of the Minister of the French Merchant Navy.

Use of the “Worms” agreements

Although considered as proof of treason by the collaborationists, the Worms agreements were to be used by Marshal Pétain’s lawyers in their defence proceedings, as referred to in an article dated 16 August 1945 in Le Monde entitled “The final hearing in the Pétain trial”: Chairman of the Bar Payen is demonstrating that Marshal Pétain sought opportunities to come closer to England, as proved by the Worms agreements under the terms of which our vessels were to be transferred to England once the armistice was signed.

99 An English translation of the main information contained in this report is provided on page 2 of the document dated 20 September 1947 entitled Statement prepared by Worms & Cie relating to its wartime history and the French judicial proceedings which ensued.

Merchant ships in convoy in the Atlantic

In this capacity, he negotiated with the British government the agreements bearing his name after the signing of the armistice between France and Germany. At his own initiative and in breach of the clauses adopted by Pétain which prohibited France from dealing with or even negotiating with foreign powers at war with Germany, H. Worms, with the full backing of Mr Monick, at that time financial attaché to the French Embassy, negotiated the transfer to the British government of all ship charter contracts signed before the armistice by the Maritime Transport Mission on behalf of the French government. As a result of this transfer, the whole merchant fleet in the service of France came under British control. England took over the cargoes at cost price, especially the military equipment on board these ships.

This use of the agreements as evidence of the Marshal Pétain’s pro-English convictions was refuted by the report submitted by Messrs Pradelle and Zacarie, rapporteurs to the National Interprofessional Purge Commission.99

In May 1947, Worms & Cie again turned to this lawyer in dealing with a claim from the owners of 26 Norwegian ships who, “making complicated calculations based on the highest freight rates recorded during the war, demanded from the French government several million pounds sterling and an even larger sum of millions of dollars,” claiming that “contrary to the commitments given by the French government, their ships had been detained in North African ports instead of being released to a British port where they would have been taken over by the English government, which was taking over all the commitments entered into by the French government.”100

- memo of March 1941 – statistics on the French Merchant Navy: situation before the war and in March 1941 – overall tonnage, number of ships with a dead weight exceeding 500 tons, classification of the tonnage by type of ship, average age, speed, equipment, State ownership and pri vate ownership, etc.;

The terms of application of the 4 July 1940 agreement have been the subject of several studies. For instance, in a report dated 1 October 1942, Mr de Grandmaison, a lawyer at the Court of Appeal, ruled on the respon sibilities of French insurance companies in covering damage to the ships and cargoes concerned by said agreement on the one hand, and, on the other hand, on the problems related to the legal classification and competence of French commercial courts in settling any such disputes.

- reports on the position of the ships belonging to Worms, NCHP and SFTP throughout the conflict, see the archives from 1939 to 1945 on the website www.wormsetcie.com

M. Worms was to give instructions for the steamers “Dalcross” and “Tilsington Court,” destined for French ports, the cargoes of which (shells, rifles, machine guns) had been completed to head for Liverpool.

England took over all the commitments of France with regard to allied or neutral merchant tonnage.

100 The archives also contain documents relating to the situation of the Merchant Navy during the war. This documentation, which has not been used in this mono graph, has great historical value: - memo of 24 August 1940 on the supply difficulties of France (which was “not in a position, in normal times, to meet its needs itselfˮ) as a result of the measures taken since the armistice, and especially because of the division of the country into two zones, one of which was equiva lent to an “impassable wallˮ – see also for the measures envisaged and the main import needs;

It is understandable that such service to the allied cause led to Mr Worms – married to an Englishwoman, whose only daughter had married an Englishman and was suspected (rightly) of being Anglophile – being the target of many attacks from newspapers in the pay of Germany which appeared in the occupied zone (Paris-Soir of October 24, 1940), all the more so because Mr Worms, having returned to France to take over the management of his Maison in Paris, seemed to defy his opponents.

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