EU foreign policy

Understanding the peculiarity of EU foreign policy: The role of institutionalization in enhancing further cooperation and integration within foreign policy domain Xhensila Gaba

Course: EU structures and institutions Instructor: Aida Hasanpapa Date : June 24, 2011

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Introduction European Union is still on the struggle for giving a final shape to its identity, but it founds itself caught on the trap of the dichotomous debate between intergovernmentalist versus supranationalist theorists. Because this debate usually limits and frames the understanding of the peculiar nature of the European Union, then it only contributes in strengthening an “undefined� Union, which is being dragged from one extreme of the spectrum to the other thanks to the split views of scholars. It seems like the time is ripe to change the lenses that we see EU and start to build bridges that would unify the two perspectives and maybe would position EU somewhere within the spectrum by finding an optimal point, rather than either of the extremes. In the pursuit of the identity of EU, it is essential to focus on its structural composition and how those components function in inter- relations (institutions with each other) and intra-relations (within the institutions themselves) in the Union. Common Foreign and Security Policy is one of the three pillars of the Union established on the Maastricht Treaty, and one of the most controversial ones due to its alignment more toward the intergovernmentalist approach, and therefore being the contrary of the aspired way of doing things in the Union, which is the Community method (Smith, 2004). Skepticism about the ever unification of the foreign policy of EU has reached high levels and this policy domain is the one that mostly feeds the skeptical views on an integrated Union, probably sometimes leading to speculative results. Since the failed attempts of the 1950s for creating the European Defense Community, many of the European integration theorists have been discouraged, and there was the perception that those failures shadowed the progress made during these decades in the institutionalization of the cooperation that exists between

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European member states (Smith, 2004). The Maastricht Treaty is a good reference for the integration progress of EU, but still many argue that beside socioeconomic policy domain (which has been successful), the integration of foreign policy remains still a tentative.

Even though it is true that the Europe is still fragmented and weak in terms of building a centralized institution for foreign policy, yet it would be unfair to state that the European members are unable to speak in a single voice when dealing with world affairs. Despite some sporadic cases where EU states have made unilateral decisions, such as the case of Iraq, yet we can observe a general tendency that the national foreign policies have converged to the same interests with regard to many international problems. Still, challenges to an integrated foreign policy are not to be denied, especially in the high politics, such as conflict prevention, defense and military or security studies, whereas states seem less reluctant to give up their sovereignty in the soft part of the foreign policy. However, foreign policy analysis has always suffered from the comparison with the economic integration, which is unfair in a way, because they involve totally different interests, and the costs of the lost sovereignty in political issues remain sensitive to the members. So, we might assume that the integration process will take another dimension, which will mirror in a way the peculiar nature of EU foreign policy. Although the economic integration has not been an enough prerequisite for political integration as well, (so basically the functionalist theory has experienced a failure with regard to foreign policy domain), still it would be wrong to derive pessimistic views for the future nature of foreign policy only because Euro skeptics like to associated it with the failure of the first attempts of integration. The nature of foreign policy is dynamic rather than “frozen�, because some institutional development has been observed with the European Political

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Cooperation in 1970s, and then the creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1990s, passing from a limited “talking arena� to a more rule-governed structure. We might think that some internal spillover effect within the foreign policy domain has taken place by enhancing further cooperation. Foreign policy in EU is often addressed as merely a domain where the interest formation occurs in rational analysis of cost/benefit, and where the decisions are taken in intergovernmental basis. Because of this approach, we fail in understanding the real dynamics with regard to EU foreign policy. Why has the attitude of European states changed over time? What makes them adapt their interests and lead their national foreign policy into convergence with the EU shared norms? And moreover, how were those norms created, developed, maintained and incorporated domestically? What is the linkage in this domain that whether deliberately or not, influences in the way decision are taken when referring to foreign policy issues?

Thesis statement I argue that due to its peculiar nature, foreign policy can be better described as a multi-level governance, in which the institutionalization of EU shared values has a positive impact over the domestic politics, as they adapt and converge toward common foreign policy.

Literature review Perspectives of how the interests are formed within member states have split the scholars into two major and competing groups: rationalists versus constructivist approach. Rationalists argue that states decide to get involve in a particular structure that limits their sovereignty only when the benefits of integration will exceed the costs of a

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lost sovereignty. Their interests are fixed and shaped domestically and when brought to the table, then bargaining of interests between member states prevails by reflecting the “lowest common denominator� (Gordon,1998). Rational theory is part of Realism, according to which survival, power and self-interest are at the core of every decision taken by member states.

On the other hand, there stands its antithesis: the constructivist view. This approach maintains that although states have some previous interests from their domestic reality, still when they join the table of a certain institution, those interests are likely to be deconstructed and then reshaped again by getting closer to the common shared values.

So, constructivists assert that interests are endogenous variable in the process of interest formation. Moreover, they put more emphasis on the socialization of the elites and also the exchange of ideas between them (Smith, 2004). Cooperation, rather than bargaining is at the core of decision-making. Another theory that explains the on-going process of foreign policy in EU is the socio-historical institutional theory. They focus on the development of the institutions by tracing the process made. This approach emphasizes the importance of the institutions in providing a context in which the negotiations can be regulated and directed in a formal way. They emphasize the relation between structure and agent, as a reciprocal contribution in trust building. Furthermore, the European integration theorists have been active in the debate about the intergovernmental or supranational nature of decision-making. The intergovernmental approach maintains that the decision are taken by unanimity and the member states have the right of the veto if they don’t like their sovereignty to be threaten much. The supranational approach on the other hand focuses more on the Community Method for taking a decision. Qualified

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Majority Voting represents a method in which all the member states have weighted rights to vote for a certain issue. The supranational approach ranks as more important the interests of the Union, whereas the intergovernmental approach emphasizes the individual interests of the member states. With regard to foreign policy, it gives the impression to be more aligned towards the intergovernmental approach, but I think that due to the institutions, elites are having more formal contacts with each other; therefore socialized people are more willing to reshape their interests, because they trust that cooperation is possible. They adapt with the interests of the other, and expect the same thing from the others, because they believe that agreements will be kept. Also with regard to the decision making process, it would be more appropriate to place foreign policy within a mixed approach of both intergovernmental and supranational view, which could be the transgovernmental approach (Gordon, 1998). According to it, the members conduct discourse away from the intergovernmental scheme, and ideas and interests are discussed before decisions take place. However, once you join the table of discussion, the process of socialization and sharing ideas is inevitable. From egoistic rationality, institutions are facilitating in creating a social rationality, in which the members think that there are benefits in comforting with the common EU values rather than not doing it.

Institutionalization helps in enhancing trust and credibility, and if the institutions were lacking, then states would rely on self-interested decision-making.

The role of institutions within the policy domain First negotiations about integrating foreign policy have been made since in 1950s, but EDC failed whereas at the same time period, the single market was created, meaning that major steps were done in the economic field but failed attempts in political issues.

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Then the other attempt made in 1970s seemed to contribute, although in limited framework, in coordinating the interests of the members. EPC was what was needed at the time, informal, inexpensive and allowing the members to make their rational choices.

EPC helped in structuring the conversations by creating a complex transgovernmental network of policy experts who contributed in eroding away the monopoly over foreign policy. So although EU foreign policy remained decentralized, still it was quite a solid network of deliberate forums, which began to develop its own culture of cooperation including standards of behavior, shared understandings and a common language. Then two decades later, the EPC passed the authority to CFSP. Since EPC did not manage to accomplish its mission with regard to Yugoslav crises, then obviously the circumstances would demand for another system of foreign policy. CFSP represented the codification of the rules by professional experts who were already within the framework of foreign policy. This codification allowed for an increase in meetings, because more trust was enhanced; so EU foreign policy had been quite important in consensus building and problem solving. Coordination pre-empted any unilateral action, and also communication mechanisms played a role in passing on the message of the need of prior consultation.

The agenda of international issues expanded and more issues were brought in the attention of EU member states. So the strongest and the healthiest an institution is, the more trust members have in addressing those institutions for discussing, negotiating their interests, collaborating, reshaping their interests. In the 1950s, the institutional development was weak and therefore members were reluctant in trusting it, let alone surrendering to EDC their political sovereignty. As the EPC had a positive impact in coordinating the national foreign policies into a forum where discussions took place, then

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the following CFSP experienced progress because of a prior positive institutional influence in the consensus building. Cooperation remained at the core of each issue.

Therefore, an internal spillover effect within the domain of foreign policy have occurred, meaning that the spillover has come as a result of institutional development, rather than from the economic integration, as functionalists maintained. The institutionalization of cooperation has had an impact in adjusting national foreign policy, because member states have adapted their policies in order to converge with the EU common interest.

Institutions and policy adaptation But how can we measure the level of their adaptability? How has institutionalization of foreign policy enhanced further convergence? There are four important criteria to be mentioned as indicators of adaptability and also effectiveness of joint actions: actions, functions, instruments, consistency. There is an increase in the overall number of EPC/CFSP actions taken each year. There is an expansion of the types of issues discussed in EPC/CFSP. There is an expansion of the policy tools used to meet the goals and more linkages between the external policies of the EC and those formulated within ESC/CFSP. Below I provide evidence in three main foreign policy objectives of EU: conflict prevention, human rights and security issues, and the three of them illustrate the tendency of EU members to adapt their national foreign policy enhanced by the institutional development.

The first case is the conflict between Israel and Palestine and gives an overview of the evolution of the attitudes of EU states toward conflict prevention as one of the foreign policy objectives. European attention was focused in the Arab-Israeli conflict, whereas at the beginning in 1950s, the issue was not even discussed. The establishment of EPC

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changed the situation and provided a stable forum for interested EU states, particularly France, to argue their views on this topic. They decided to write a joint paper on the subject and the discussion was institutionalized in the Arab-Euro Dialogue. Ireland which had few interests before on the issue, recently it learned to change and reshape its position with regard to the Middle East within the context of EPC. In addition, Danes and the Germans, who traditionally supported Israel, gradually moved toward the EPC position, which was more sensitive to Arab views.

The second case is about the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa which is a foreign policy objective having in focus the human rights. This issue has brought many disagreements among EU member states, where the smaller states have taken the lead in disturbance to UK, France and Germany. Later, they showed a compliance in adjusting the focus of the three largest member states onto broader ethical concerns, instead of material interests alone. The Dutch in particular played a leading role and were partly responsible for EPC’s first actual act against apartheid, the 1977 Code of Conduct for Community Companies with interests in South Africa, with established numerous protections for the black workers. EPC gradually and very effectively convinced all EU states to increase the pressure on the white minority government. The EU’s effort clearly linked a general common interest (protection of human rights) and a foreign policy position (opposition to apartheid).

The last case is about the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is an example of showing how the agenda of EU foreign policy expanded. The issues concerning security or nuclear weapons were not part of that agenda before, but because of institutional development and policy adaptation, the members managed to consider the possibility of

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finding a common approach to this issue, which was becoming more actual and part of the reality. The need for common action represented a necessity for the time, and the institutions facilitated the agreement of member states on such issues. The EU members signed the NPT in 1975 (except France).

Conclusion The foreign policy integration has been seen with more skepticism than any other policy domain, and the reason for that is that sovereignty matters and it is a sensitive issue for most of the European states. Leaving the political authority in the hands of a centralized single institution sounds as a threat which many states fear. Unlike the economic integration, the political integration, and especially the foreign policy integration, has quite a peculiar nature and therefore should not be analyzed with the same instruments, because if so, chances are for the distortion of the reality to take place.

However before calling the need for a common foreign policy, we should ask whether the word “common� makes sense in the case of European Union. The nature of foreign policy reflects the stage of development of the EU as a whole (Koenig, 2004). To have a common foreign policy, you need as a prerequisite a common identity, which is not fully established or can be defined. National identity stills prevails, but progress has been done substantially. Neither the rationalist view nor the constructivist view is enough to explain what is going on in the foreign policy domain, but instead we should try to build bridges between these two competing approaches. The institutional perspective is the most adequate one with regard to foreign policy because it analyzes the relation between agent and structure as an important and essential tie for enhancing further cooperation and building trust and consensus. Although in the foreign policy still prevails the unanimity

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rule for the decision to be taken, there can not be called any more purely intergovernmental. The right term would be transgovernmental approach, in which the decisions are discussed before taken, so due to the socialization process, the interests are being continuously reshaped and the need for cooperation derived from a strong institution that serves as an incentive for enhancing cooperation. It is true that institutions are created because of interests of the states but then the story goes on in a cyclic way, meaning that the institutions affect the interests as well. It seems that once you build an institution, you are caught in the lock-in effect, it is impossible to shut it down, because vested interests exists within it and also ties that can not be so easily dissolved. Through process tracing, we can make some predictions about the future of foreign policy. Since it has been subject of a tendency towards reinforcement of a healthy institutionalization, the trust has been build and more policies that are domestic have been adapted and converged to the same direction as the common EU values. What we need is a foreign policy identity, not just joint actions for the sake of contextual interests. So even though central and supranational authority is lacking in this domain, we can not state that integration is lacking as well, it depends on the theoretical approach we use and it depends on the ability to properly segment the phases of integration. Cooperation and consensus building remain at the core of it.

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References

Gordon. H. P. (1998). Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy. International Security, 22.(3).p. 74-100.

Koenig. A.M. (2004),Explaining government preferences for institutional change in EU foreign and security policy. International Organization, 58 (1), p.137-174.

Smith. M.E. (2004),. Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign policy Cooperation. European Journal of International Relation. 10 (1).

P.95-136 Smith. M. E (2004). Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation, p.1-284

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