The strange triangle: NATO-Russia-Ukraine Xhensila Gaba
Course: Russia /CIS Instructor: Tom Hashimoto Date: June 11, 2010
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Introduction The relation between NATO and Ukraine has been considered as one of the critical and significant moments of the post-Cold War era in Europe. NATO has adopted a post-modern security format by expanding its “space of security” towards the East and Central Europe. After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine gained its independence in 1991 and entered the transition period, where the main focus was on nation-building and sovereignty. During this period, Ukraine turned towards the West seeking for national security. Ukraine was the first new independent state among CIS (Commonwealth Independent States) to enter the NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program (Root, 2000). Moreover, the Orange Revolution in 2004 led to the creation of a pro-western government in Ukraine, which highlighted the hostility between Russia and the West over Ukraine. Russia considered the NATO Enlargement as a threat to its vital interest in the region, because the more NATO extends its zone, the more Russia will feel isolated and marginalized. Russia strongly opposed that Ukraine became member of NATO by responding that if any of the countries of Central or Eastern Europe joined the Alliance, then the consequence will be the emergence of a division between Russia and the rest of the continent (Tur, 2000). Ukraine was worried about what would be the response of Russia to NATO expansion in the case that Ukraine decides to change her status from “outsider” to “insider”. Will this affect the bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine? Due to this complex situation, many critics argued that the presence of NATO in the CIS has a counterproductive influence with regard to the bilateral relation Russia-Ukraine. They state that NATO is putting in danger Russia-Ukraine friendly coexistence by making Ukraine a buffer state ( Lieven, 1997). Many believe that the case of Ukraine is a mere example of how the struggle in the international arena for political and economical interest on specific regions, can lead to negative impacts on the 2
stability and development of the “buffer state”. Thus, the result of all these disagreements and tensions with regard to the enrollment of Ukraine in the NATO’s security space is putting Ukraine in an unknown destination. Thesis paragraph This paper analyzes the relations of this strange triangle: NATO-Russia-Ukraine, where each of the triangle’s sides explains the complex bilateral relations. But what matters the most are the overall impacts that this triangle has on the regional stability and balance in the international system. I argue that the presence of NATO and its enlargement strategy is pressing the relations between Ukraine and Russia by influencing negatively on the perceptions that each of the former soviet states have for each other and also by undermining their inter-dependent relation on economic and political affairs. At first, I start by giving an analytical explanation of the new NATO and its modern mission. Second, I describe the relations between Russia-Ukraine, Ukraine- NATO and RussiaNATO. What is NATO’s goal in East Europe? Why is so important for Russia to keep Ukraine under its “zone of security”? What are some the features that make Ukraine a pivotal state for both Russia and the West? Those are some of the questions that I try to analyze in this section. Next, I list some arguments that buttress my claim about the negative impact of NATO over the CIS. Last, I provide the final remarks by summarizing my arguments. The post-Cold War NATO and the enlargement of its “security zone” The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed as an instrument of the Cold War era with the goal of providing collective defense against any external threat. With the breakup of Soviet Union and the termination of the Warsaw tractate in 1991, the NATO’s 3
mission without any bipolar world anymore, was very irrelevant. The threats against which NATO was created did no longer exist. There were European states, such as France, that wanted the formation of a western European alliance responsible for safeguarding the national security. On the other side, Britain was strongly defending the idea that there could be no other organization that can substitute at the institutional level the Atlantic Alliance and its security order. Despite many debates, the Atlanticism won and NATO remained the essential alliance for defense collaboration and also an important tool for U.S engaging in the European security problems. However, in order to survive to the new times, NATO re-established its two main goals, the collective defense and transatlantic cooperation, but also sought to manage and control the “security emptiness” in the central Europe as a result of the collapse of USSR. The main priorities of the current era are not only about deterrence, but rather commitment on behalf of a greater Europe and Euro-Atlantic community. The first step showing for an aimed expansion towards the East was NATO’s announcement with regard to the formation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which basically played the role of a forum for official connection between NATO and the emerging democracies in the Eastern and Central Europe (Root, 2000). Later, in 1997 in Portugal, the NACC was reestablished as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which gave the possibility to focus more in discussions concerning multilateral political and security-related issues. Thus, the EAPC has become the decisive instrument of NATO’s new goals: having an expanded and all-encompassing pan-European role. Another step of the “New NATO” is the declaration of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, which seeks to endorse transparency in the planning and budgeting of national defense, and also the democratic control of armed forces. Behind all these initiatives laid a persistent logic: the new NATO’s mission passed beyond the previous principles of just collective defense and moved on in active
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engagement in peace-building and peacekeeping operations on the unstable east Europe. Also, the indirect impact of undertaking such important initiatives was the suppression of the feeling of antagonism and mistrust between NATO and the East as a legacy of the Cold War. So, the New NATO had to deal with the difficult task of trust-building as well. The strange triangle: NATO-Russia-Ukraine After presenting the new strategies towards the ex-soviet states, NATO faced with the strong objection of Russian Federation with regard to its “enlargement”. Russia fear that beyond such benign program of NATO for helping and assisting the transition process of the new emerging states, the real scope was to isolate and control Russia’s influence and national security by using its neighbors, such as Ukraine, Georgia or Kazakhstan. Since the breakup of the USSR, Russia has been in a continuing crisis and its international position has declined. However, Russia still owns nuclear weapons, ranking her the second in the world. Also, Russia is a member of the Security Council (SC) inherited by the Soviet Union status. Ukraine, on the other hand, is considered an important geographical position between the Russian federation, the Black Sea and Central Europe, and for the above-mentioned reasons, Ukraine is viewed as pivotal state in a region undergoing fundamental transformations. Despite the mistrust and rivalry between NATO and Russia due to the Cold War era, still NATO clearly understands that Russia is a central actor in fulfilling the NATO’s agenda for enlargement in the region. The development of special relations with Russia and Ukraine, which were both former enemies and “outsiders” of the Alliance in the traditional period, is an integral step toward consolidating and expanding the “security zone”.
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But what makes Ukraine a pivotal state between East and West? After the breakup of USSR in 1991, the relations between Ukraine and the West were dominated by the problem of the nuclear power inherited from the USSR. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have nuclear weapons set at their territory (Tur, 2000). But Kyiv denied following up in the denuclearization process, and Peter van Ham asserts that Ukraine used the issue of nuclear weapons as bargaining tools to acquire economic, political and security guarantees from Russia and the West. Being a period of nation-building, Ukraine wanted to maintain its security environment by keeping its nuclear status. Ukraine was a young state, which was going through a period of founding of the main institutions of a well-functioning statehood, including the Armed Forces. Ukrainians wanted to avoid the likelihood of an attack against Ukraine with nuclear weapons, and also to guarantee the acknowledgment of its territorial integrity. Kyiv was repeating that the only possibility to guarantee its security was by creating a full European security system. Thus when the issue of the NATO’s enlargement was discussed, Ukraine was very enthusiastic about the idea. This nuclear problem served as an opportunity for Ukraine in asserting its the security concerns, and why Ukraine referred to the West security system, rather than Russia. Another possible reason can be the insecurities of Ukraine whether Russia would intervene or not in the democratization process and domestic politics. Ukrainian independence was accompanied with the condition of quasi-state. Thus, being a quasi-state during a transition period pushed Ukraine in searching for security. Russia is still seen as having imperialistic intention over Ukraine, because Russia refused to treat Ukraine as an equal state and declined to sign an inter-state treaty with it (Kropacheva, 2006). Thus, these reasons served as an incentive for Ukraine to seek security from the West, with a desire to go back to Europe. The principles of confirmed “neutrality” and “non-bloc” status were announced in its declaration of independence in 1990
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(Tur, 2000). These two notions “neutrality and “non-bloc” seem to have helped Ukraine resist Russian demands for political or military incorporation with the CIS, while permiting her to have close links with the Western security organizations. Moreover, Ukraine has been perceived as a pivotal state, the future of which will significantly affect regional and even international stability. In the following paragraph, I list four main reasons that make Ukraine a crucial actor between Russia and the West. First, the full consolidation of the sovereignty of Ukraine is indispensable in avoiding the reformation of a new Soviet superpower around Russian domination. The Russian foreign policy and the national security policy clearly declare the intention of a deliberate association of former soviet states. If Kyiv maintains a commitment to full sovereignty, the ground for the emergence of a new Russian-dominated union will vanish. Second, if Russia gets convinced that Ukraine cannot be subordinated to some kind of transformed association, then Moscow will have to abandon imperial fantasies and commit to the complicated, but essential tasks of democratization and domestic reform. Thus, the Ukraine’s evolution in strengthening sovereignty will be a determinant “reference point” in the alteration of the Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. Third, the development of Ukraine and its modernization will have a positive spillover effect in the whole region. Ukraine shares the borders with seven central and eastern Europeans states, all of which are in the same challenging situation as Ukraine. Adrian Karatnycky maintains, “a stable and democratic Ukraine, associated to democratic Europe, could accomplish as a medium for democratic ideas to the East (Root, 2000). Last, Ukraine is situated in the clash to dominate energy transport pipelines linking the oil and natural gas assets of the Caspian basin to European markets. Thus Ukraine might help in providing new alternatives for the transport of resources (as the West aspires). 7
Relations with Russia One of the most significant challenges of Ukraine is the relationship with Russian Federation because it has an impact on its future and undermines the fate of central and eastern Europe. there exist an economic interdependence among both sides at significant levels. Ukraine, for example, supplied over 65% of Soviet metallurgical capability and 40% of agricultural resources, while 80% of Ukrainian energy resources resulting from soviet resources (Kropacheva).Dependence on Russian energy sources was to a certain level balanced by the fact that the main pipeline connecting Russian natural gas fields to the European market passed through Ukraine, but Kyiv is also heavily dependent upon transit incomes. Despite the economic relations, Ukraine and Russia’s peoples are closely interlinked in their culture and tradition. Moreover, a potent tension of Russian national sentiment continues to regard Ukraine as an indivisible part of a big family of Eastern nations, which were artificially divided from the Motherland by antagonistic Western powers seeking “the deteriorating of Russia’s strategic and economic position in Eurasia” (Light &White, 2000). It is commonly noted that the uncertainties about the role of Ukraine in the region rotate around the concern to be left as a “buffer state” between two expanding blocs or to weaken associations with Russia.
The negative impacts of NATO on the bilateral relation Ukraine-Russia Efforts to set Ukraine as a geopolitical barrier are neither prudent nor indispensable. Russia has not apparently shown any intention to retake Ukraine by attack, and the implication of such attempt would be devastating. Although complex, the social and cultural relations between Russians and Ukrainians within Ukraine and across the state jurisdiction, with the exception of 8
western Ukraine, are also fundamentally benign. Post-communist Ukraine is too weak domestically to function as a “besieged” station of the West (Lieven, 1997). Attempts to mobilize Ukraine against Russia would contribute to domestic division and make the commission of nation-building more difficult. Also, “winning” Ukraine at the price of resistant strategic partnership between Russia and China would not be a desirable output for the West. The logic behind the enlargement initiative is to check and prevent the fall of Ukraine under any Russian-dominated union. However, Russia of the late 1990s has no enough military power, no economic funds, and no national will to overcome Ukraine or make it part of any union. Thus the intention of many western policymakers to make Ukraine a “buffer state” is somehow unjustified. NATO expansion seems to have helped in the creation of perceptions as the relation Russia-Ukraine is unfriendly. But the Russo-Ukrainian Partnership Treaty, where the Ukrainians allowed the Russians to let out most of the base on Black Sea Fleet by a very low amount of money paid as a fee (amount very low compared to the energy debts of Ukraine), shows for quite the contrary of an “unfriendly relation” (Lieven, 1997). Russia undertook several steps in consolidating the relations with Ukraine and withdrawing the perceptions of a Russian threat, and therefore not pushing forward the Ukrainian membership in NATO. The Ukrainian unstable economy represents a challenge for the West, because without the economic consolidation, the military support will be ineffective or even dangerous, because this support may give the government of Ukraine an false impression of strength in the eyes of public objection. So NATO must keep in mind that the greatest menace to the security, stability and integrity of Ukraine comes not from Russia, but from inside Ukraine - from the undeveloped economy deriving in frustration of Ukrainians, and also the threat coming from ethnic and cultural divisions—especially among the Russians in Eastern Ukraine, Crimea and Sevastopol. 9
So by turning Ukraine in a buffer state will sharpen the cleavages between ethnic groups in Ukraine. It seems like the west have not taken into account the fact that Ukraine’s national security is not threaten militarily by Russia, but from the possible use of social, cultural and psychological instruments by Russia. Another reason that supports why westernization of Ukraine could be fatal is that it effects on Russian nationalism. The importance of the bilateral relation Russia-Ukraine does not rely only upon the relations between Kyiv and Moscow, but also in the relations between peoples and the improvement of their particular senses of nationhood. The traditions of Russians and Ukrainians are very similar to each other and historically interlinked, thus the fate of each people will affect even the other one (Lieven, 1997). If Ukraine becomes ethnically discriminate, undemocratic and anti-Russian, the Russians will respond by themselves becoming more ethnically intolerant. Considering all these externalities over Ukraine and Russia, NATO’s best option is to sustain the consolidation of sovereignty within Ukraine and the other new independent states and to engage in order to establish a security cooperation, but to stay away from creating illusions about the full association until national standards can be fully achieved, and the regional security atmosphere, including relations with Russia, has become stable. Association with NATO is positive both for Ukraine and the West, but full membership is for the moment neither applicable nor politically desirable. Also, as we mentioned, the most serious threats to stability are located within Ukraine itself, in the potential for social and political instability due to economic hardship and political aggravation. NATO should encourage and support the democratization process and the consolidated emergence of the civil society as prerequisites for national stability.
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Conclusion To sum up, analyzing the triangle NATO-Russia-Ukraine requires a well-understanding of the interdependence that exists between Russia and Ukraine and also look at the goals that the west aim to achieve with regard to their enlargement program. NATO is using Ukraine as weapon to check and prevent attacks from Russia. However, Russia does not have the economic, military power, nor the willingness to interfere and make Ukraine part of any union. The perceptions of the West are unjustified at a certain point. But using Ukraine as a buffer state not only damages the bilateral relation between Russia and Ukraine, but also makes Ukraine feel like in a crossroad, where each side is the wrong one. many Russians live in Ukraine, and the traditions of both states have a common historical heritage. Many believe that separating Russia from Ukraine is like separating the mother from his child. Furthermore, the economic instability and the division between eastern and western Ukrainian will be more affected negatively if Ukraine becomes a member of NATO.
But it is important to highlight that what is
counterproductive for the current situation is the pressure for Ukraine’s membership, and not the NATO’s assistance. However, NATO should be very careful on not pushing to much on the Enlargement strategy, because it may end up in creating zones of insecurities, instead of a wider space of security.
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References Glebov, S. (2009). Concerning “strange� relations. Russian politics and law, 47(5), 52-65.
Kropacheva, E. (2006). Ukraine as a bone of contention between Russia and the West. Centre for the OSCE Research,
Lieven, A. (1997). Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West. The Washington Quartely, 20(4), 55-77.
Light, M, White, S, & Lowenhardt, J. (2000). A Wider Europe: The view from Moscow and Kyiv. International affairs, 76(1), 77-88.
Root, E. (2000). NATO's relations with Russia and Ukraine. Russian and European studies,
Tur, O. (2000). NATO's relations with Russia and Ukraine. Middle East technical university,
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