ONLINE MONITORING OF THE ICC AND DEVOLUTION PROCESSES IN KENYA
JULY 2013 - SEPTEMBER 2013
INTRODUCTION This report is a compilation of findings from online discussions, between 22 July and 31 September 2013, about two pertinent issues in Kenya: devolution, a cornerstone for governance in the country, and the ongoing trials at the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the Kenyan President, his deputy and a radio journalist. As part of our Umati Project, we have looked at understanding the online discussions around these two topics and the kinds of conversations they have sparked online. Content was also analyzed to determine the level of hate (and dangerous) speech contained. Our online monitoring efforts are informed by the increasing adoption of social media and online readership of mainstream media publications, blogs and forums participation by Kenyans. The online space has, over time, become a vital tool for both communication and expression, especially with the increased mobile and Internet penetration in the country. A growing number of Kenyans rely on social media for real-time updates on many topics and events. The option to interact with the content, which is at the core of social media platforms/networks, continues to attract people who want to share their views, analyses and reactions. Social media allows anyone to be a content creator, leading to the proliferation of groupings around content of interest, as well as the democratization of influence. Internet freedom in Kenya is a crucial facilitator for freedom of expression and access to information. Large volumes of information are being disseminated at any given time, with most social media content not being regulated. There is also a responsibility associated with this freedom since the Internet also facilitates the ability to spread misinformation, disinformation, as well as hate and dangerous speech. For the last the two months, an Umati monitor has manually scanned various online platforms most notably: Facebook pages, blogs, online forums, Twitter, online newspapers and their comments sections. This report offers findings from the study of how the two thematic issues have been covered online, the debates and reactions they have been generating, and whether or not there has been hate and dangerous speech around these topics.
BACKGROUND DEVOLUTION ON AUGUST 4TH 2010, A DRAFT CONSTITUTION WAS SUBJECTED TO A REFERENDUM, IN WHICH 67% OF KENYAN VOTERS APPROVED IT. THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010 WAS THEN SIGNED INTO LAW ON AUGUST 27TH 2010 BY THEN PRESIDENT MWAI KIBAKI. ONE OF THE KEY CHANGES INTRODUCED TO THE COUNTRY’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE WAS DEVOLUTION. In particular, Chapter 11 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 spells out the objectives and principles of the devolution process. It provides a two-tier system of Government: National and Counties. Article I (4) of the Kenyan Constitution recognises the fact that sovereign power of the people is exercised at both national and county levels. Enshrined in the first schedule of the constitution is the creation of 47 counties with delineated functions and responsibilities. Devolution should therefore be understood as a process and not an event. In this report, devolution is taken to mean a form of decentralisation which involves statutory granting of powers from the central government to government at sub-national level, such as a regional, local or state level. This definition is adopted from Chapter 11 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 on devolved government.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) CASES ON KENYAN POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE At the close of 2007, widespread violence broke out in Kenya following the announcement of results from the December 27th presidential elections. In the ensuing days, official figures state that about 1,200 people were killed, there was massive destruction of property in some areas, and 350,000 Kenyans were displaced from their homes. On 31st March 2010, the International Criminal Court Pre-Trial Chamber II authorized the chief prosecutor to open an investigation into crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Kenya in relation to the post-election violence of 2007-2008. The situation in Kenya is the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) fifth investigation.
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
OBJECTIVES
METHODOLOGY
Monitoring of the topics of ICC and devolution under the Umati Project aimed to: 1. Study online conversation patterns/trends around devolution and the ICC cases; 2. Understand the extent to which online hate speech was used in conversations around the ICC and Devolution; 3. Inform the Kenya Working Group on Media Monitoring around issues of devolution and ICC cases.
We employed qualitative content analysis of the online platforms popularly used by Kenyans (social networks, blogs and forums). Key findings were then documented in an online Google Form, which acted as a coding sheet. Coding of the content was done based on broad themes and topics, taking care of reliability and validity of measurement. Both quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis were applied to the collected data to extract the following key findings.
KEY FINDINGS THE DIRECTION A CONVERSATION TAKES IS HIGHLY DETERMINED BY WHO DRIVES IT, AND HOW IT IS FRAMED. CONVERSATION DRIVERS AND REACTIONS ELICITED A key driver of public discourse in Kenya is the mainstream media. News headlines and coverage of issues from mainstream media influences what is generated on independent blogs, discussed or reacted to online. Broadcast media on television, in particular uses opinion poll questions around news items to invite people to share their thoughts. The online platforms of the broadcast media houses mirror the same polls to also prompt online engagement. Other influential conversation drivers include politicians who leverage social media to broadcast information, or who are quoted or invited to talk about various issues on mainstream media. Administrators of popular pages on Facebook, individuals on Twitter and bloggers also steer conversations in the Kenyan online space.
In assessing hate and dangerous speech, the Umati Project employs a framework that factors in a speaker’s influence over an audience, as the speech content is analyzed. Other key factors include the audience’s susceptibility, the social and historical context of the speech, as well as the language used and means of spreading the speech. This implies that leaders in various societal sectors such as politics or religion may have more influence over an audience as compared to common (unknown) citizens or anonymous commenters/speakers. This influence can catalyze actions and reactions from an audience, online and offline. For instance, renowned politician and current Senator for Machakos County, Johnstone Muthama made ethnic remarks stating his hate of members of the Asian community and criticising the County Governor for appointing a Kenyan of Asian origin to the County’s Executive Committee. As a result of these statements, he was questioned by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission. His remarks indeed elicited strong reactions from the public, mostly in support of him and against Asians. Some of the comments included: “You people haven’t obviously worked for Asians, they are the most racist cocksuckers you have ever seen. To them Africans rank lower than dogs, let them go to their country, our people should come first,”
(blog commenter). Although many of the comments were in support of what the senator said, other members of public spoke against him and even insulting him on his utterances. One such example was, “stupid muthama….glue sperm...naked mind and empty skull senator.”
Another example of the online space being used by influential individuals to spread (mis)information was when a renowned TV reporter leaked the name of an alleged ICC witness on Twitter, but he quickly then deleted the message. The (mis)information, however, had already spread like wildfire online. His influence as a journalist saw his tweet garner attention and spark reactions, even though he had erased it from the public archive. In the ensuing days, the ICC court issued a stern warning to local journalists, social media users and bloggers over witness exposure.
How a given piece of information is presented or framed in public discourse is a key consideration, as it influences the behavioural and attitudinal outcomes. News stories can be understood as narratives conveying certain perspectives,which include information and factual elements, but also carry implicit messages that are to be embedded in meaningful contexts and organized to render coherence. A trend observed in the Kenyan mainstream media and blogosphere coverage of the ICC cases has been the mention of tribes and key politicians’ names. This kind of framing tends to elicit reactions, with some bordering on dangerous speech. Two leading newspapers in the country recently gave headlines titled: “Kalenjins seek to block videos on rite of passage” (Daily Nation) and “Is the Kalenjin age old tradition under trial at the ICC?” (The Standard Newspaper). Though such headlines did not spur any reactions on the news sites themselves, the same news links on the Facebook pages of these two media houses generated negative reactions toward members of the Kalenjin tribe. One such negative comment was, “That is evidence that these Kalenjin murderers circumcised luos during PEV, backward people,” (Facebook Commenter).
Another personal blog headline then read, “Madame Fatou Bensouda, Your ICC Cases Are Principally Built Around the Clashes Between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin; Truth Be Told, the Two Communities Have Entered a Rapprochement; Give this Rapprochement a Chance!” From our data collected on dangerous speech, it has been noted that tribal hate speech online in Kenya is largely polarised among three tribes: Luos, Kikuyus, and Kalenjins. By mentioning these tribes in a headline, further hate speech comments on the blog post in response to the headlines have been noted.
The ICC cases have consistently been in the news headlines (on broadcast and print media), making the subject dominant in the current national discourse. Most news items on the cases report on the events as they occur. Typical coverage highlights witness testimonies, the court’s ruling on different motions brought before it, what various political and government figures have said about the cases, and so on. A focus on the background context and putting the cases into perspective is minimal, and often left to print media publications (op-ed sections). Analysts
Analysts have offered that Kenyan media has framed the trials as a political contest, in which Kenya is pitted against the West, possibly setting the public mood and informing the reactions as found in comment sections of blogs and newswire coverage of the cases. While the devolution process is ongoing, there is less engagement with news content around it. One possible reason for this could be that Kenyans do not fully understand what this new form of government entails or demands from them, as evidenced by a baseline survey report, which saw 45.8% of its respondents unable to describe what devolution is. Further analysis by gender also indicated that more men than women have information on how devolved governments work (for more, see appendices).
While public participation that is, involvement in the making or influencing of decisions is a key theme within the devolution narrative, and a national value under Article 10 (2) of the Constitution, news coverage and popular online conversations have barely framed the concept to draw online interaction. Several media houses have introduced sections of their broadcast and print coverage that highlight news events at county levels, but the overall devolution process and what it demands from citizens and other stakeholders is yet to fully take root. Devolution coverage has seemingly been more skewed towards events around elected officials (Governors, Senators, County Representatives) as compared to the process or the institutions. It could be interpreted that this is in a bid to introduce devolution-related issues through the use of familiar names. Media houses should identify what is worthy of national prime time coverage and online/print news headlines, since events around devolution should be more pertinent on a micro, local level (as opposed to the ICC cases). Nonetheless, the chart below shows that coverage of the ICC cases and devolution is quite equal across the monitored online platforms (online news sites, blogs, facebook pages and groups, Twitter) during the two months of the study. Despite the national and media fascination with the ICC cases, there would likely be greater long term national benefit from civic education brought through increased media analysis of devolution processes.
DEVOLUTION (439)
46% 54% ICC (516)
FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF ICC AND DEVOLUTION COVERAGE ACROSS PLATFORMS. TOTAL NUMBER OF ENTRIES COLLECTED = 955 (DEVOLUTION =439; ICC =516).
MISINFORMATION FOUND CIRCULATING IN ICC CONVERSATIONS The rising popularity of online social network sites in Kenya, such as Facebook and Twitter, has created waves in information sharing and discovery. With social media enabling users to consume and also create new content at the same time, there has been a shift in information dissemination, from a few dedicated news sources to many more diverse individuals creating and spreading news. While this shift has democratized content, the potential for anyone to create content has also make these online platforms fertile ground for the spread of misinformation, with possible undesirable consequences.
With the widespread coverage of the ICC cases both on traditional and new media, an increasing eagerness to keep tabs on what transpires in the courtroom has been noted. On occasion, this has even led to misinformation being propagated online. For instance, as the first witness in the case against the deputy president William Ruto took the stand, a photo of the alleged witness went viral online. This forced the court to go into an emergency private session to discuss the security of the witnesses and even saw a stern warning issued by the prosecuting judge, to members of the press, bloggers, social media members and their web hosts. The judge warned against attempts to reveal the protected witnesses’ identity and informed that such conduct would be investigated and culprits prosecuted.
Misinformation online around devolution is not maliciously circulated, but rather a result of reposting of content that is simply incorrect. Such incorrect content is a result of sheer ignorance and misunderstanding around the nature of devolution and all that it entails. This misunderstanding is demonstrated both by the common layperson but also by political leaders themselves. For example, several counties have begun charging fees for travel through their county and for import/export from their counties. It has even gone so far as Nyeri, Embu, Kwale, Kilifi, Murang’a and Kajiado counties impounding vehicles that pass through their counties for not possessing a branding permit. The new Constitution is clear, under Article 209 (5): “Taxation and other revenue raising powers of a county shall not be exercised in a way that prejudices national economic policies, economic activities across county boundaries or national mobility of goods, services, capital or labour.” The new levies/charges are thus in clear violation of both the old and new constitutions. The introduction of such taxes is illegal and a result of misinformed government leaders.
MOST CONTENT AROUND ICC CASES AND DEVOLUTION ORIGINATE FROM MAINSTREAM MEDIA Most ICC and devolution data collected originated from online mainstream media sites as compared to other online platforms. The online mainstream media sites consisted of daily newspapers, weekly newspapers, and regional newspapers. Online newspapers offer ample space and opportunity for extensive discourse and coverage of both ICC cases and devolution. Some of the areas that covered these two topics included the local news section, counties section, opinion and letters to editors, editorial/commentary and also in special features magazine inserts. These sections were a key source during data collection on both ICC and devolution.
A likely reason as to why most of the data around the ICC cases and devolution were found on online news sites, is that most news around these two topics is media-generated content, as opposed to citizen-generated content. Without mainstream media coverage in the Hague for example, most Kenyans would not know what is happening at the ICC as they are not physically there observing. There is a greater chance that the topic of devolution could generate more citizen-driven news, since those at the grassroot-level are the ones witnessing and experiencing the process of devolution themselves. However, many of these citizens at the grassroots appear to still not fully understand the devolution process and also may not yet be generating content online. Therefore, at present, most of the online content produced on these two issues still stems from mainstream media.
County government leaders and counties have taken to social media (Facebook and Twitter), with several Twitter and Facebook pages bearing the names and titles of these leaders and counties. But effective use of the platforms is still wanting. While the pages welcome questions and comments on the happenings within their governments, they are not responded to effectively and leaders are dormant on discussing the devolution issues. Most of the devolution discussion on Facebook and Twitter has revolved around political alliances, especially notable when a section of the governors threatened to call for a referendum if the county governments were not allocated more funds. Some online users also raised uproar when the county governments spending figures were released on June 11, 2013.
Online discussions on ICC have attracted more comments and conversations than the issue of devolution, both on news websites as well as social media. Most online platforms like blogs and other discussion forums appeared to shy away from discussing devolution perhaps because they believe many people will not find the topic interesting to read. Nonetheless, comparing coverage of ICC cases and devolution across different online platforms as seen in Figure 2, illustrates that news sites dominate content creation around the two issues. Certain online platforms seem to be more objective than others, especially on the ICC cases. For example, Twitter was observed to have more well-rounded discussions without notable biases, while Facebook (pages and groups) and blogs appeared to be more biased in their sympathies towards one particular individual or tribe. Such biases lead to portrayal of the trial proceedings as a conflict or clash between the prosecution and defense.
100%
75%
50%
25%
0% NEWS SITES
ICC DEVOLUTION
BLOGS
HATE SPEECH ON DEVOLUTION AND ICC The current definition of hate speech is defined broadly in Kenyan law. Under Article 13 of the NCIC Act of 2008, a person who uses speech that is threatening, abusive, insulting, or involves use of threatening, abusive and insulting words, commits an offence if such person intends to stir up ethnic hatred. The act only mentions ethnic hatred and leaves out other forms of hate that can be based on religion, gender, nationality, sexual preferences or political affiliations. Given that Umati had to use a conclusive workable definition of hate speech in order to facilitate the identification and collection of hate speech incidents on ICC and devolution monitoring from the internet, we adhered to Professor Susan Benesch definition on dangerous speech, which she defines as a hate speech with highest potential to catalyse violence.
To some extent, devolution and ICC cases have fueled tribal sentiments, ethnic suspicions and animosities. However, on the whole, the levels of hate speech specifically around ICC and devolution are low, with only 1% (n=10) of hate speech on devolution and 4% (n= 36) on ICC. Most of the comments were either offensive or moderately dangerous with only one comment on the ICC being extremely dangerous. The hate speech that does exist around devolution appears to be fueled by factors including different ethnic composition within a county, which brings about ethnic intolerance against members within clans; different political interests among members in the counties; historical and social contexts; job appointments by an ethnic basis; and unequal resource allocation.
A study conducted by the NCIC revealed use of coded language and stereotypes against ethnic communities in counties. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission of Kenya identified five potential counties as hotspots for violence in the devolution rollout. The commission cited Bungoma, Lamu, Mombasa, Nakuru, Homabay as those in which tension could mount over fear of marginalisation, however, our Umati monitoring has not found any particular geographic region specified in online hate speech around devolution. Worth noting is that hate speech on devolution occured along all forms of hate speech (religion, race, tribal, political affiliations, gender), unlike ICC cases whereby hate speech collected was mainly tribal.
HATE SPEECH ON DEVOLUTION AND ICC All of the hate comments collected related to the ICC cases related to tribal lines. The ICC cases have, over time, influenced tribal hate speech and especially towards and between three tribes, namely Kikuyus, Kalenjins and Luos. Hate speech around the ICC cases has been observed to be brought about by rumors and propaganda being spread on the online platforms, which then promote tribes to write slander against each other. For instance speculations that those testifying against William Ruto (of the Kalenjin tribe) are Kikuyus, and those testifying against Uhuru Kenyatta (of the Kikuyu tribe) are Kalenjins. These two tribes have been verbally attacking each other online alleging betrayal.
As also noted in earlier Umati reports, most hate speech comments around ICC and devolution were collected from Facebook, followed by blogs. Twitter and online news sites had the least number of hate comments. Little or no hate speech was collected from the comments’ section of online news sites possibly due to the fact that before a comment is posted on most of these news sites, editors must first approve the post or comment.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Mainstream media remains central in the constitutional implementation of devolution in Kenya and coverage of the ICC cases. As noted in our findings, mainstream media has been observed to be the key driver in spreading of online information with regards to devolution and the ICC cases. This research found that mainstream media currently is the key driver of the online narratives around devolution and the ICC cases. As such, it is crucial that the mainstream media players realize that they have a responsibility not just to provide facts and statistics, but also to provide analysis of the important issues, putting the facts within a wider context that the public can make sense of and ensuring that the public remains focused on the issues that matter. Even in this age of citizen journalism, mainstream journalists continue have an important role in strengthening public dialogue, and providing citizens with clear analysis of the issues from an unbiased perspective. That said, citizens should not just be passive consumers of media content. Given the various tools available to engage with and create new content, citizens also have a responsibility to understand relevant topics, and contribute to the discussions.
Based on the findings of this report, mainstream media has a substantial responsibility given the heavy reliance of the Kenyan public on media-generated content. Mainstream media should keep watch to ensure accountability and transparency in governance structures. This will be done by assessing loopholes like corruption, tribalism, ethnicity, regional imbalance and any other malpractices going on in the counties. There is also a big need for training of journalists on devolution matters and ICC cases so as to ensure that objectivity when reporting and to ensure that the right words are used so as not to incite hate or dangerous speech and also reduce misinformation among the public. According to a survey done by the Media Council of Kenya on the monitoring of devolution issues, 4% of articles analysed had breaches of code of conduct for the practice of journalism. From the study, stories were found to have provocative and alarming headlines and articles had negative stereotypes and insults that dehumanised a group of people (Media Council of Kenya, Media Coverage of Devolution process in Kenya Report, Chapter 3). We recommend that objectivity be practised by reporters, journalists, editors and bloggers and care taken that credible sources are used to reduce the risk of spreading misinformation. Journalist training efforts should be supported to strengthen the skills of local journalists.
Devolution has been interpreted and understood differently by different players, even those within Government itself. Online platforms should be leveraged to educate and sensitise the public on the principles, structures, powers and functions of devolved government and even more generally on devolution. Use of such platforms by NGOs, local Governments, and other stakeholders can help to add additional complimentary voices to discussions around devolution apart from just the mainstream media reporting. Social media platforms offer an untapped avenue to share hyper localized information and ensure county residents are more aware of the developments taking place. There is an opportunity for media and county governments to work together to improve public understanding of the devolution process. County governments could provide space for journalists and bloggers, to operate, file stories, conduct interviews and subsequently provide civic education to the public on devolution, so as to ensure more coverage on devolution on all platforms (traditional and new).
Findings from the Umati Project’s monitoring continue to be used in informing the Kenya Working Group on Media Monitoring, especially around issues of devolution and ICC. We hope this work will enable the general public to have a greater understanding of the Kenyan online space, as well as online hate speech and the potential effects of such speech. Our next report, to be released at the beginning of November 2013, will delve into the ongoing hate speech levels online in the months following the Kenyan elections.
REFERENCES Constitution of Kenya. (2010). Chapter 11. Retrieved from http://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdf. London, S. How the Media Frames Political Issues. (1993). Retrieved from http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/frames.html. Media Council Of Kenya. (2013). Media Coverage of Devolution Process in Kenya, http://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/index.php/publications/media-monitoring-reports. Mutung’u, G. New media in Kenya, Time for Regulation. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.article19.org/join-the-debate.php/72/view. Nguyen, Dung T., Nam P. Nguyen, and My T. Thai. "Sources of Misinformation in Online Social Networks: Who to suspect?." MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE, 2012-MILCOM 2012. IEEE. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.cise.ufl.edu/~mythai/files/Milcom12-Dung.pdf. Society for International Development, Uraia Trust, Amkeni Wakenya, Usawa Ni Haki. The Status of Governance in Kenya (Baseline Research Report). (2012). Retrieved from http://www.strategicafrica.com/newsite/SID%20Baseline%20final%20%20%20report%20.pdf. The ICC Kenya monitor, Background of ICC cases in Kenya. Retrieved from http://www.icckenya.org/background/. Susan, B. Voices that Poison. Retrieved from http://voicesthatpoison.org.
APPENDIX: Additional tables and charts from “The Status of Governance in Kenya” by SID, Amkeni Kenya, Uraia, and UN Women (http://www.strategicafrica.com/newsite/SID%20Baseline%20final%20%20%20report%20.pdf).
% SHARING OF POWERS/ DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL LEADERSHIP TO SMALL BRANCHES / TAKING POWER TO THE PEOPLE
13.3
DECENTRALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE/ CASCADING MAJOR GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS TO THE COUNTY
10.3
BRINGING RESOURCES TO THE GRASSROOTS/ TAKING PUBLIC SERVICES CLOSER TO THE PEOPLE/ EQUALITY AND EQUAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION
11.4
NOT VERY SURE BUT ECONOMICS AND DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT POWER
6.0
DEVOLUTION INVOLVES EQUAL BENEFICIARIES/ RECOGNIZING DIVERSITY/ PROTECTING RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
3.1
TE ACT OF GOVERNING THROUGH COUNTY/ DIVIDING THE COUNTRY INTO SEGMENTS/ GOVERNMENT AS A COUNTY
6.4
CHANGE/ NEW BEGINNING/ CONSTITUTION
1.6
LEADERSHIP OF HIGH QUALITY
0.8
PRACTICE PEACE AT GROUND LEVEL
0.5
GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT
0.2
OTHERS
0.2
DON'T KNOW
45.8
TOTAL
100
FIGURE 2: UNDERSTANDING OF HOW DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT WORKS.
I HAVE SUFFICIENT INFOERMATION ON HOW DEVELOPED GOVERNMENT WILL WORK DISAGREE
NO IDEA/ OPINION
707
607
769
580
2663
26.5%
22.8%
28.9%
21.8%
100%
537
469
714
652
2372
22.6%
19.8%
30.1%
27.5%
100%
1244
1076
1483
1232
5035
AGREE
MALE
FEMALE
TOTAL
TOTAL
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
SOME OF THE CONVERSATIONS THAT SPARKED CONVERSATIONS AROUND ICC AND DEVOLUTION INCLUDED:
ICC
DEVOLUTION
WITHDRAWAL BY KENYA FROM THE ROME STATUTE
DEVOLVED FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES BY COUNTY GOVERNMENTS
BID TO MOVE TRIAL TO KENYA OR TANZANIA
COUNTY BUDGETS AND IMPLEMENTATION
WITNESS EXPOSURE, WITHDRAWAL AND INTIMIDATION
PUSH FOR NEW REFERENDUM FOR COUNTY GOVERNMENTS
TRIALS MOVING BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
LAND AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION BETWEEN COUNTIES
ALLEGED COACHING OF WITNESSES
ETHNIC COUNTIES AND ANIMOSITIES IN COUNTIES
FEAR OF POWER/LEADERSHIP VACUUM
JOBS IN NEW DEVOLVED GOVERNMENTS
ICC CALL FOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT REPLACEMENT
COUNTY GOVERNMENT WRANGLES WITH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
WWW.IHUB.CO.KE/UMATI