Κείμενο Εργασίας 52

ISSN: 2407-9863

WORKING PAPERS

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

52

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN” REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY Dr. Zenonas Tziarras

1

ΤΟΜΕΑΣ Α’

July 2016

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPERS - 52

Η Ακαδημία Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων (ΑΣΑ), είναι ανεξάρτητος επιστημονικός - ερευνητικός φορέας, μια «δεξαμενή σκέψης», με νομική μορφή αστικού σωματείου μη κερδοσκοπικού χαρακτήρα, που ιδρύθηκε το 2014 με έδρα την Αθήνα. Τα ιδρυτικά μέλη και τη βάση των μελών της ΑΣΑ αποτελούν επιστήμονες που προέρχονται από τις Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις και τα Σώματα Ασφαλείας, που είναι διδάκτορες ελληνικών και ξένων πανεπιστημίων ή κάτοχοι άλλων υψηλού επιπέδου τίτλων σπουδών, με πλούσιο επιστημονικό, ερευνητικό και συγγραφικό έργο και συνεργασία με ελληνικά και ξένα πανεπιστήμια, κέντρα μελετών και ινστιτούτα, σε διάφορα επιστημονικά πεδία. Επίσης, μέλη της ΑΣΑ είναι προσωπικότητες του διπλωματικού και ακαδημαϊκού χώρου και άλλοι επιστήμονες υψηλού κύρους με επιστημονική δραστηριότητα σε γνωστικά αντικείμενα τα οποία συνάδουν προς τους σκοπούς της. Σκοπός της ΑΣΑ είναι η ανάπτυξη επιστημονικού έργου και δράσεων στα πεδία των Στρατηγικών Σπουδών, της Άμυνας, της Ασφάλειας και της Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής, η εκπόνηση επιστημονικών αναλύσεων, ερευνών και μελετών καθώς και η παροχή εξειδικευμένων συμβουλευτικών και εκπαιδευτικών υπηρεσιών σε εθνικό, ευρωπαϊκό και διεθνές επίπεδο. Για την υλοποίηση των στόχων της η ΑΣΑ έχει οργανώσει τέσσερεις Επιστημονικούς Τομείς: (1) Ανάλυσης Στρατηγικού Περιβάλλοντος, (2) Ανάλυσης Αμυντικής Πολιτικής και Ασφάλειας (3) Ανάλυσης Συστημάτων, Τεχνολογίας και Οικονομίας, (4) Επιχειρησιακής Έρευνας, Διοικήσεως και Ελέγχου. Μεταξύ των στόχων της ΑΣΑ περιλαμβάνεται η ανάπτυξη συνεργασιών με διεθνείς οργανισμούς, με ακαδημαϊκούς - επιστημονικούς φορείς και άλλα κέντρα επιστημονικής έρευνας με συναφές αντικείμενο, καθώς και με έγκυρους επιστήμονες, στρατιωτικούς, διπλωμάτες, κ.ά., στο εσωτερικό και το εξωτερικό, ιδίως στο ευρω-ατλαντικό και το ευρύτερο μεσογειακό περιβάλλον.

Φειδίου 10, 10678 ΑΘΗΝΑ www.acastran.org asa@acastran.org https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses

Μελέτει το παν - Ακούων όρα - Γνους πράττε

2

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN” REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY

Dr. Zenonas Tziarras

WORKING PAPER 52 July 2016

3

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPERS - 52

WORKING PAPERS – Νο52 / July 2016 Τίτλος: TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY Συγγραφέας: Dr. Zenonas Tziarras

Εκδότης: Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA) Σχεδιασμός – ηλεκτρονική επεξεργασία: ΑΣΑ – Φίλιππος Παρίσης Copyright © Academy for Strategic Analyses asa@acastran.org http://www.acastran.org, https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses ISSN: 2407-9863 Απαγορεύεται η αναδημοσίευση, η αναπαραγωγή, ολική, μερική ή περιληπτική, ή η απόδοση κατά παράφραση ή διασκευή του περιεχομένου του βιβλίου με οποιονδήποτε τρόπο, μηχανικό, ηλεκτρονικό, φωτοτυπικό, ηχογράφησης ή άλλο, χωρίς προηγούμενη γραπτή άδεια του εκδότη. Νόμος 2121/1993 και κανόνες του Διεθνούς Δικαίου που ισχύουν στην Ελλάδα.

4

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

About the author Zenonas Tziarras holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick, UK where he taught World Politics. His doctoral thesis is titled, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East under the AKP: a Neoclassical Realist Account.” He has been a non-resident Foreign Policy & Middle East Expert for the think tank Strategy International, an Analyst on Security & Turkey for The Europe Levant Observatory (TELO) at the Diplomatic Academy, University of Nicosia, a member of the Academy for Strategic Analyses, and taught Greek-Turkish Relations in the Department of Social & Political Sciences at the University of Cyprus. He holds a BA in Mediterranean Studies and International Relations from the University of the Aegean, Greece, and an MA in International Relations and Strategic Studies from the University of Birmingham, UK. He has attended specialization courses in International Security at the University of Delhi, India, and training courses in Leadership and Conflict Resolution at Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey. He has presented papers at conferences in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Poland, Canada, and the UK. Among other publications, he co-edited Republic of Cyprus: Dimensions of Foreign Policy [2013, In Greek], and co-authored the forthcoming (2016) Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean: Ideological Aspects of Foreign Policy [In Greek]. He currently teaches modules related with International Relations and Security Studies at the University of Central Lancashire Cyprus for the MA in Security & Diplomacy Studies. Twitter: @ZenonasTziarras.

He is member of the Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA)

5

Academy for Strategic Analyses

6

WORKING PAPERS - 52

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

Abstract One of the most important side-effects of the turmoil in the Middle East has been the crisis in Turkey’s relations with its Western partners. However, the events taking place in the Middle East or the Syria war are not the root causes of this friction; merely a triggering factor. The real reasons lie in the multileveled transformation, a sort of “revolution”, that Turkey has been going through over the past years and particularly since the election of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) to power in 2002.

These domestic changes usher in a new era for Turkey’s political scene that has many similarities – as well as differences – with Iran’s Islamic revolution of 1979. As a result, its national identity and ideological orientation shifts, something that undoubtedly impacts its foreign policy preferences, and as such will pose significant challenges to Western actors that try to work Turkey and secure their interests in the region.

7

Academy for Strategic Analyses

8

WORKING PAPERS - 52

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

Introduction The unfolding crisis in the Middle East especially since the outbreak of the Arab uprisings and the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has had a decisive impact on the regional as well as international power balances. These complex and ever-changing geopolitical dynamics manifest in a number of areas stretching from the Levant, to North Africa to the Persian Gulf. Perhaps one of the most pivotal cases is the conflict in Syria which has proven to be a litmus test not only for the very existence of the country itself but also for the foreign policies and strategic interests of many external powers. Not least, it has revived old – or led to new – geostrategic rivalries and challenged traditional alliances.

To an outside observer it may seem that one of the most important side-effects of these developments has been the crisis in Turkey’s relations with its Western partners. Although true, the events taking place in the Middle East or the Syria war are not the root causes of this friction; merely a triggering factor. The real reasons lie in the multileveled transformation, a sort of “revolution”, that Turkey has been going through over the past years and particularly since the election of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) to power in 2002.1 Some scholars, such as Michael Rubin, realized this change early on and wrote about the Islamist ideological characteristics in AKP’s foreign policy and the challenges they posed to American and Western interests.2 Nearly a decade and a half after AKP’s election, Turkey does not only raise obstacles in American foreign policy in the Middle East but also seems to be drifting to the other (antiWestern) side more than ever before. Washington or European states often find themselves watching as Ankara undermines their efforts to either manage the refugee crisis or Syria’s conflict. From this perspective, and having in mind the radicalization of Turkish politics and foreign policy, a comparison between today’s Turkey and Iran after the 1979 revolution seems inescapable.

The historical paths of Iran and Turkey have been in many ways connected, defined by geography and affected by uneasy co-existence, antagonism, conflict as well as parallel and similar modernization processes.3 The 1979 Iranian Revolution overthrew the dictatorial albeit secular-oriented and pro-Western regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, only to replace it with the anti-Western Islamic theocracy of Ayatollah Khomeini. Virtually 1

The first draft of this paper was finalized in March, 2016. It has since been updated to include the latest developments, particularly of July, 2016 with the attempted coup against the AKP’s government. The argument remains the same and the most recent events have only strengthened it.

2

Michael Rubin, “Shifting Sides? The problems of neo-Ottomanism,” National Review Online, Aug. 10, 2004.

3

Stephen Kinzer, Reset: Iran, Turkey and America’s Future (New York: Times Books, 2010), pp. 11-13.

9

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPERS - 52

overnight the modernization paths of Iran and Turkey parted ways while the Western camp of the Cold War took a big hit as it lost an ally.

Today, at a time when Tehran is at least ostensibly on track to improved relations with the West, Turkey seems to be replacing Iran as a problematic actor through its own revolution. This is a slower and more gradual revolution but also Islamic and, arguably, as important and potentially game-changing as the Iranian one. Its effects are already visible and point to the fact that the United States (US) and other Western allies might be actually facing a “new Iran� in the making.

10

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

The Iranian Change To suggest that Iran has become a liberal democracy because of the 2013 election of moderate Hassan Rouhani, the deal on its nuclear program or the lifting of international sanctions against it, would be disconnected from reality. It is, however, undeniable that there is an observable tendency within Iran towards change and reform – the latest election results testify to that. Though this tendency is neither unchallenged nor dominant,4 it does exist and it could bear fruit in the medium or long term.

At the same time, despite insisting differences on a number of (geopolitical) issues, it is evident that some bridges are being built between Tehran and the West even as common understanding on certain areas grows. That ISIS is considered a common enemy is important for Western policies in the Middle East, even if there is hardly any consensus on the Syria conflict in general. Similarly, the role Iran could play in Europe’s energy security, not least as an alternative or substitute to Russian exports, is thought to be of significant importance by the European Union (EU).5 Regardless of how Iran’s domestic realities develop and given how global power relations are being shaped, with middle powers seeking to advance their international position and strategic interests, it would be rather unthinkable to argue that Tehran’s relations with Western states and the US more specifically will return to pre-1979 levels. And yet one cannot ignore that Iran’s re-integration into global markets and international politics could – albeit not necessarily – socialize it to different values and interests thus furthering communication and cooperation with the West.

In addition, Tehran’s new role could make the job of the US in the area easier at a time when it retreats from the Middle East and moves its attention to the Asia-Pacific seeking to keep China’s rise in check. Ideally, its other regional partners would take up the task of anchoring for and securing Western interests. That would of course be more feasible if states such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey were on board after the new state of affairs between Iran and the West. Not only is this not the case but on occasion, and increasingly so, these states seem to find themselves at odds with American and European policies on this and other issues as well. Though Israel and Saudi Arabia are central players in this dynamic, especially if their fundamental differences with Iran are taken into account,6 Turkey is emerging as a primary challenger of US interests in the Middle East and Syria in particular.

4

J. Matthew McInnis, “After Iran’s elections, the Supreme Leader’s next steps,” American Enterprise Institute, March 8, 2016.

5

The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 22, 2016.

6

Eli Lake, “Israelis and Saudis Reveal Secret Talks to Thwart Iran,” Bloomberg View, Jun. 4, 2015.

11

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPERS - 52

The Turkish Conundrum Indeed, as time goes by and domestic changes in Turkey take hold, greater divergence is displayed between Turkish and American policies. What started in the early 2000s and during the Iraq war as a mostly theoretical debate about whether the West is “losing” Turkey feels today like a tangible reality that bears challenges which could exacerbate the regional crisis, and has politicians and scholars scratching their heads.

The government of the AKP, which managed to remain in power since 2002, has had a decisive impact on Turkey’s domestic politics and its socio-political fabric. At first the change was not particularly evident, it was largely something many feared would come.

From today’s vantage point one could argue that such fears were justified. The main reason behind them had to do with the AKP’s Islamist ideological roots which could be traced to Islamist parties and movements that by 2002 had dissolved after being confronted and banned by the Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment.

In this regard, the AKP emerged as the “smart” and “evolved” version of its predecessors.

It adopted a strategy of appeasing the Kemalist generals through moderating its Islamic rhetoric and adopting pro-Western policies which were previously followed by the Kemalists. At the same time the AKP reconfigured Turkey’s foreign policy outlook by engaging the Middle East and maintaining strong ties with the US – despite disagreements over Iraq, for example. With its new outward attitude, strengthened economy and deepened democracy Turkey was seen as a country that combined effectively Islamic values with liberal economy and democracy. As such the US came to accept that, differences aside, Turkey was entitled to more foreign policy independence and that it could actually become a model for other less-democratic Muslim-majority countries of the region.7 This, the logic went, would entail more security and stability for the Middle East and beyond.

The Islamic agenda many at the beginning feared the AKP had, manifested later on. While the party and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (current president), were appeasing the Kemalists they managed to gradually consolidate their power through reforms and constitutional amendments and garner public support, especially among conservative Turks, due to a booming economy and the party’s vocal adherence to conservative values.

By the 2011 general elections, where the AKP won once again the parliamentary majority, Erdoğan’s grip on to power as well as the weakening of the Kemalist and other political opposition was indisputable.8 From there on Erdoğan became even more powerful and

7

Hürriyet Daily News, Apr. 7, 2009.

8

Ergun Özbudun, “AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift,” South European Society and Politics, Jun. 3, 2014, pp. 155-167.

12

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

dominated domestic and foreign policy decision-making. The first foreign policy challenges emerged in Turkey’s relations with Israel and Iraq. Since then Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iran, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and even the US have been added to that list.

These were the results of a domestic political and ideological transformation in conjunction with the dramatic changes in Turkey’s external environment. During the 2000s the AKP’s conservative ideology was reflected in the unprecedented economic and diplomatic relations the country developed with its Muslim neighbors and beyond.9 It was a peaceful process that, one might argue, benefited the region and gave Turkey an inspiring, constructive and often mediating role to play.

The AKP leaders, and particularly Ahmet Davutoğlu (former foreign minister and prime minister), envisioned to elevate Ankara to the leadership of the Middle East, an area they considered to be a natural extension of Turkey – the successor of the Ottoman Empire – and part of its vital geopolitical space. At first they tried to realize this vision through “soft” power.10 But the breakout of the Arab uprisings reversed their plans for it disturbed the relations Ankara had built with the different regimes and overturned its economic and political clout in the region.11 As the Syrian conflict turned into a multi-front proxy war, it became an imperative for Ankara to exchange its assertive and rather independent foreign policy for a “return” to the West, asking for American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support.

And yet the rise of ISIS and the difference of opinion over Syria brought Turkey once again at odds with Western interests. In fact Ankara has at times escalated the conflict or undermined international efforts for a compromise on Syria. Its controversial stance toward and relationship with ISIS,12 the downing of the Russian Su-24 in November 2015 and the shelling of Kurdish Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, or YPG) positions in northern Syria are only a few examples.

Importantly, the YPG has proved one of the most valuable Western (and Russian) allies against IS and as such is supported by both the US and Russia. Therefore it constitutes one of the very few things the Western and Russian camps have in common in the Syrian war, something that could work as a basis towards more collaboration and de-escalation. But Turkey sees the Syrian Kurds of YPG as a branch or extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerana Kurdistan, or PKK), an organization that has been waging a guerilla war against the Turkish state for Kurdish autonomy since the 1980s. Unlike the YPG and its political affiliate, Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, or PYD), the

9

Nader Habibi and Joshua W. Walker, “What Is Driving Turkey’s Reengagement with the Arab World?,” Crown Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Brief, Apr. 2011, no. 49, pp. 2-8.

10

Meliha Benli Altunişik, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, no. 2, 2008, pp. 41-50.

11

Nishaat Ismail, “Turkey’s quagmire since the Arab Spring,” Open Democracy, Oct. 6, 2014.

12

Burak Bekdir, “Dateline: Turkey’s Double Game with ISIS,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 22, no.2, 2015, pp.

2.

13

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPERS - 52

PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the US and EU. For Turkey, the fact that the Syrian Kurds managed to establish a de facto autonomous state (called Rojava) in northern Syria, along the Turkish-Syrian border, amounts to a national security threat of the highest priority.

Following YPG’s efforts to link Rojava’s three cantons (Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira) with operations against Turkey-supported (Islamist) rebel groups in between Afrin and Kobani, Ankara has made clear that it will do whatever it takes to prevent such a development (see map below). Moreover, Erdoğan, provocatively enough, called on the United States to choose either Turkey or the Syrian Kurdish “terrorists”, as he called them.13

Turkey’s stance towards the Syrian Kurds raised a wave of reactions with some going so far as to suggest that Turkey should be kicked out of NATO.14 Between growing authoritarianism domestically, evidence of Turkey’s support to ISIS and opposition to Western

13 14

Russia Today, Feb. 8, 2016.

Stanley Weiss, “It's Time to Kick Erdogan's Turkey Out of NATO,” Huffington Post, Feb. 24, 2016.

14

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

policies in Syria, the argument goes, NATO should stop tolerating Ankara’s trouble-making. A similar case was made by Ted Galen Carpenter in late 2015, using legitimate examples of Turkey’s problematic policies “that could embroil other members in a catastrophic war with a nuclear-armed power [i.e. Russia]”.15 These voices are multiplying even as skepticism in Washington is growing over the future of Turkey-West relations.

The situation has gotten even more problematic after the failed military coup attempt against Erdoğan and the AKP government on July 16, 2016. The massive purge that followed against all real, perceived or suspected political adversaries of Erdoğan that has led to the detention or suspension of more than 50 thousand civil servants, police, soldiers, judges and teachers, raised serious concerns in Western decision-making centers. The EU and the US supported democracy in Turkey and condemned the coup but they also cautioned that Erdoğan’s response endangers democratic principles and human rights. EU’s foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, commenting on the possibility of Turkey reinstating the death penalty, said that “No country can become an EU member state if it introduces death penalty.”16 Similarly, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry warned that Turkey’s failure to uphold the rule of law in the aftermath of the coup attempt could even threaten its NATO membership.17

15

Ted Galen Carpenter, “Is It Time to Expel Turkey from NATO?,” The National Interest, Dec. 4, 2015.

16

Maia De La Baume, “Kerry, Mogherini promise EU-NATO ‘scrutiny’ of Turkish actions after coup,” Politico, July 18, 2016.

17

Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, “Turkey coup could threaten country's Nato membership, John Kerry suggests,” The Independent, July 19, 2016.

15

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPERS - 52

Has the West lost an Ally?

In terms of Turkey’s relations with NATO and the West more generally this juncture is indeed without historical precedent. To be sure, these relations have not always been easy. One can recollect the problems of the 1960s and 1970s over the Cuban missile crisis and Cyprus or the deterioration of Turkish-American relations after the Iraq war of 2003.

All those times Turkey sought foreign policy alternatives in the Soviet Union and later Russia and the Middle East. Yet it never challenged its NATO membership or cut off ties with the West completely. Something like that would be against its own national identity which has traditionally been instilled with Western ideas and principles, driving its wish for further integration into the West.

However things are not the same any more. As Turkish national identity is being reshaped by the AKP-driven “revolution” and domestic realties are impacted by its top-down conservative social-engineering project, Ankara’s foreign policy preferences are affected as well. Turkey under the AKP is no longer committed to Western institutions such as NATO or the EU for the same reasons; pro-Western ideological incentives are not as important for they have been largely replaced by political-Islamic ones. Ankara sees these relationships through a lens of opportunism. They may not matter as sources of inspiration in its ideological outlook but there are certainly a lot they can still offer in terms of economic and security benefits.

For example, leaked minutes from Turkey’s discussions with the EU about the refugee crisis, reveal how Erdoğan bluntly blackmailed EU officials essentially telling them that unless they give Turkey the requested financial help of 3 billion euros per year (instead of a total of 3 billion over 2 years), “We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria any time and we can put refugees on buses”.18 Ankara stuck to the same approach throughout its negotiations with the EU not least trying to link the management of the refugee crisis with its EU accession process and other benefits such as a visa-free agreement, thereby exploiting a difficult humanitarian situation to maximize its political and economic gains.19 A similar strategy was followed in the case of Syria as well. In February 2016 Turkey tried to utilize the Syrian regime’s counter-offensive in northern Syria (Aleppo province) and its own shelling of Syrian Kurds as leverage toward compelling NATO into establishing a safe zone backed by a no-fly zone in Syria.20 Though the main pretext used by Turkey is usually ISIS, the refugee waves and most recently the advances made by the Syrian regime, its ultimate goal is to have NATO powers come in and serve its own interests by helping it 18

The Telegraph, Feb. 8, 2016.

19

Reuters, Mar. 8, 2016.

20

The Telegraph, Feb. 17, 2016.

16

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

disrupt the expansion of Syrian Kurdistan, crack down on YPG and work towards overthrowing Bashar al-Assad. This would also allow Turkey to have a say in post-Assad Syria as opposed to being sidelined by a US-Russia agreed plan of action.

In both the EU and NATO instances, Turkey has acted not as a partner but in a rather cunning and selfish way. It seems that, as long as Ankara is allowed to manipulate such institutions and their participating states for its own benefit, it will not demonstrate any willingness to turn away from them. Instead, it will remain ostensibly committed while continuing to challenge them and seeking strategic independence. In itself, this would not necessarily be a problem. But as we have seen time and again, this independence comes at the expense of geopolitical stability and Western interests. The latest responses from the EU and US point to the gradual understanding of this reality and the willingness to adopt a stricter stance, albeit this might prove to be “too little, too late.”

17

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPERS - 52

Conclusions: A “new Iran”?

In light of the above, the comparison between post-1979 Iran and Turkey’s domestic transformation and increasingly destabilizing behavior abroad is anything but exaggerated. Moreover, it is rather striking how over the last few years Turkey has seen deteriorating relations with some of the states Iran cut off ties with immediately after 1979, namely, Israel,21 Iraq and Egypt. For Iran the list was much longer and indicated a radical and clear foreign policy change, hostile to the West. Two main differences between 1979 Iran and today’s Turkey is that Iran was not a NATO member and that whatever domestic change Turkey has gone through is neither as deep nor as radical as Iran’s. Yet both of these differences can actually render Turkey a more dangerous state than Iran ever was.

A slow, planned and ideological-political change, such as the one taking place in Turkey for over 10 years, can be more difficult to track or assess until is too late. During this process the state swings between two realities creating the illusion that its place is somewhere in the middle because none of the two seems permanent. But sometimes domestic political changes remain aloof until triggered by external events that necessitate some response. Such seems to be the case of Turkey which, in ten years’ time, managed to turn from a (self-)proclaimed pacifist actor to a full-blown revisionist state.

The three-month state of emergency that was declared in Turkey after the coup attempt, according to Articles 119-12122 of the Constitution and the Law on State of Emergency, gives Erdoğan’s government powers such as bypassing the parliament and issuing laws; imposing curfews; confiscating property; and controlling the media and education. This process will only deepen Turkey’s top-down Islamic-authoritarian revolution and, in turn, put strain on its relations with the West.

Retrospectively, it seems that Ankara’s Western ties and NATO membership have not been able to prevent the radicalization of its domestic scene or foreign policy; after all, as Emanuele Ottolenghi put it in reference to Iran, “ideological struggles do not lend themselves to appeasement or compromise.”23 Instead, Turkey has managed to become a (for now) tacit anti-Western actor and get away with it precisely because of its participation in NATO and its increased relations with Europe. Not only that but, because of its NATO membership, it has also contributed to bringing NATO and Russia to the brink of a fullscale war over Syria. It would be reasonable to suggest that if another state of the region

21

Turkey and Israel signed a deal to normalize ties at the end of June, 2016. How this relationship will develop remains to be seen.

22

See, http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/part_iii_2.html.

23

Emanuele Ottolenghi, Iran: The Looming Crisis (London: Profile Books, 2010), p. 110.

18

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN”. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

was following the policies of Turkey, officials in Washington would by now be discussing strategies of balancing and containment.

In this sense, Turkey has become a “new Iran” thus gradually replacing the “rogue” role that Iran has had until recently. It is experiencing a deep domestic change and this translates to foreign policy decisions as well. Due to tensions in Turkey-West relations, a closer relationship with Russia and other non-Western actors is certainly on the cards. What’s more, there is still room for further Islamic radicalization in the Turkish political system, which can only make things worse, while, unlike Iran, Turkey is neither marginalized nor sanctioned – for now. Rather, it is in the position of using the West to further its own antiWestern agenda. To be sure, for the time being, the answer may not be to kick Turkey out of NATO as that would probably worsen the problem. But it would be naïve, to say the least, for Western states to accept being subjected to Ankara’s manipulation without finding ways of applying pressure towards mitigating and preventing the damage caused by AKP’s Turkey. Otherwise, not only interests and power balances but also the long-term stability of the whole Middle East will be at stake.

19

Academy for Strategic Analyses

20

WORKING PAPERS - 52

TURKEY - THE “NEW IRAN�. REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY, Zenonas Tziarras

The Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA) is an independent non-profit scientific and research institution, a think-tank, based in Athens. It was founded in 2014, by scientists from the Hellenic Armed Forces and Hellenic Security Corps, who hold a PhD or holders of other high level qualifications, with rich scientific, research and writing work and collaboration with Greek and foreign universities, research centres and institutes, in various scientific fields.

Moreover distinguished personalities from military, diplomatic and academic areas and other high-profile scientists, became members of the Academy.

The main task of the ASA is the development of scientific work and activities in the field of Strategic Studies, Defense, Security and Foreign Policy, the elaboration of scientific analyses, research and studies, as well as the provision of specialized advisory and educational services in those articles, at national, European and international levels.

In this framework, the Academy's activities are developed within scientific areas, such as: (a) Analysis of strategic environment, (b) Analysis of the Defense and Security Policy, (c) System analysis, technology and economy, (d) Operational research, command and control.

The Academy will cooperate with international organizations, academic-scientific institutions and other centers of scientific research with a related object, as well as with authoritative scientists, militaries, diplomats, etc., especially in the Euro-Atlantic and the wider Mediterranean environment.

10, Feidiou str., 10678 ATHENS www.acastran.org info@acastran.org https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses

21

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPERS - 52

Φειδίου 10, 10678 ΑΘΗΝΑ www.acastran.org, asa@acastran.org https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses

22

ISSN: 2407-9863