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THE “HUMANITARIANISM” OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY INTERVENTION, Pol. Kapalidis
THE “HUMANITARIANISM” OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM RWANDA AND KOSOVO TO LIBYA AND SYRIA Polychronis Kapalidis
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September 2016
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Η Ακαδημία Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων (ΑΣΑ), είναι ανεξάρτητος επιστημονικός - ερευνητικός φορέας, μια «δεξαμενή σκέψης», με νομική μορφή αστικού σωματείου μη κερδοσκοπικού χαρακτήρα, που ιδρύθηκε το 2014 με έδρα την Αθήνα. Τα ιδρυτικά μέλη και τη βάση των μελών της ΑΣΑ αποτελούν επιστήμονες που προέρχονται από τις Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις και τα Σώματα Ασφαλείας, που είναι διδάκτορες ελληνικών και ξένων πανεπιστημίων ή κάτοχοι άλλων υψηλού επιπέδου τίτλων σπουδών, με πλούσιο επιστημονικό, ερευνητικό και συγγραφικό έργο και συνεργασία με ελληνικά και ξένα πανεπιστήμια, κέντρα μελετών και ινστιτούτα, σε διάφορα επιστημονικά πεδία. Επίσης, μέλη της ΑΣΑ είναι προσωπικότητες του διπλωματικού και ακαδημαϊκού χώρου και άλλοι επιστήμονες υψηλού κύρους με επιστημονική δραστηριότητα σε γνωστικά αντικείμενα τα οποία συνάδουν προς τους σκοπούς της. Σκοπός της ΑΣΑ είναι η ανάπτυξη επιστημονικού έργου και δράσεων στα πεδία των Στρατηγικών Σπουδών, της Άμυνας, της Ασφάλειας και της Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής, η εκπόνηση επιστημονικών αναλύσεων, ερευνών και μελετών καθώς και η παροχή εξειδικευμένων συμβουλευτικών και εκπαιδευτικών υπηρεσιών στα παραπάνω πεδία, σε φορείς του δημοσίου και του ιδιωτικού τομέα και σε φυσικά πρόσωπα, σε εθνικό, ευρωπαϊκό και διεθνές επίπεδο. Για την υλοποίηση των στόχων της η ΑΣΑ έχει οργανώσει τέσσερεις Επιστημονικούς Τομείς: (1) Ανάλυσης Στρατηγικού Περιβάλλοντος, (2) Ανάλυσης Αμυντικής Πολιτικής και Ασφάλειας (3) Ανάλυσης Συστημάτων, Τεχνολογίας και Οικονομίας, (4) Επιχειρησιακής Έρευνας, Διοικήσεως και Ελέγχου. Μεταξύ των στόχων της ΑΣΑ περιλαμβάνεται η ανάπτυξη συνεργασιών με διεθνείς οργανισμούς, με ακαδημαϊκούς - επιστημονικούς φορείς και άλλα κέντρα επιστημονικής έρευνας με συναφές αντικείμενο, καθώς και με έγκυρους επιστήμονες, στρατιωτικούς, διπλωμάτες, κ.ά., στο εσωτερικό και το εξωτερικό, ιδίως στο ευρω-ατλαντικό και το ευρύτερο μεσογειακό περιβάλλον.
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THE “HUMANITARIANISM” OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY INTERVENTION, Pol. Kapalidis
THE “HUMANITARIANISM” OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM RWANDA AND KOSOVO TO LIBYA AND SYRIA
Polychronis Kapalidis
WORKING PAPER 53 September 2016
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Academy for Strategic Analyses
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ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ – Νο53 / September 2016 Τίτλος: THE “HUMANITARIANISM” OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM RWANDA AND KOSOVO TO LIBYA AND SYRIA Συγγραφέας: Polychronis Kapalidis Εκδότης: Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA) Σχεδιασμός – ηλεκτρονική επεξεργασία: ΑΣΑ – Filippos Parisis Copyright © Academy for Strategic Analyses asa@acastran.org http://www.acastran.org, https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses ISSN: 2407-9863 Απαγορεύεται η αναδημοσίευση, η αναπαραγωγή, ολική, μερική ή περιληπτική, ή η απόδοση κατά παράφραση ή διασκευή του περιεχομένου του βιβλίου με οποιονδήποτε τρόπο, μηχανικό, ηλεκτρονικό, φωτοτυπικό, ηχογράφησης ή άλλο, χωρίς προηγούμενη γραπτή άδεια του εκδότη. Νόμος 2121/1993 και κανόνες του Διεθνούς Δικαίου που ισχύουν στην Ελλάδα.
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THE “HUMANITARIANISM� OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY INTERVENTION, Pol. Kapalidis
About the author
Polychronis Kapalidis (Bsc, MA) is a Lieutenant in the Hellenic Navy. He is an External Partner and Associate Lecturer of the Dartmouth Centre for Seapower and Strategy, Plymouth University. He graduated from the Hellenic Naval Academy in 2003, the Hellenic Navy Command and Staff College in 2016 and has served on frigates and submarines. From August 2013 he holds a MA in International Relations and Global Security from Plymouth University. Since 2010 he teaches in several Navy courses, while in September 2014 he was appointed as a part-time Lecturer in International Relations and Defence Studies at the Hellenic Air force Technical NCO Academy (STYA). His research interests are focused on Maritime Security, Peacekeeping Conflict Resolution and Refugee Studies, in the Balkans and the Middle East. He is a Member of the Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA)
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THE “HUMANITARIANISM” OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY INTERVENTION, Pol. Kapalidis
Abstract The dilemma of ‘Doing something or doing nothing’ when prolonged unsettlement occurs within a state’s borders that includes loss or fear of loss of human life is far from new. The ongoing civil war in Syria was the starting point for this working paper to dig deep in time and question the true motives of those who decide when to use military force to halt such atrocities or not. Through a qualitative analysis this paper will examine four case studies, namely Rwanda, Kosovo, Libya and Syria, in an effort to offer valuable insights on the main research question; Is Humanitarian Intervention Possible?. Keywords: Humanitarian, Intervention, R2P, Rwanda, Kosovo, Libya, Syria, UN.
Introduction ‘The dilemma of what to do about strangers who are subjected to appalling cruelty by their governments has remained with us throughout the post-1945 world’ (Wheeler, 2000:1). This quote by Nicholas J. Wheeler, the first sentence in the introduction of his book Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (2000) describes in the most apt way the debate around humanitarian intervention. This dilemma has two main aspects, the legal and the moral one. This working paper will focus on the moral argument researching if a military intervention could actually be humanitarian in its purpose. Not surprisingly, though, the fact that military intervention can be humanitarian is regarded by some people as an obscene oxymoron (Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003:1). The question of ‘Doing something or doing nothing’ arises in cases where a government has turned the machinery of the state against its own people, or where the state has collapsed into lawlessness (Wheeler, 2000). Intervening for humanitarian reasons might usefully be divided into short and long-term outcomes. The former aims at an immediate alleviation of human suffering through the termination of atrocities and/or the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need. The later focuses on more broad issues, such as addressing the underlying causes of human suffering by promoting conflict resolution and constructing/rebuilding viable polities (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:517). Forcible, military intervention in this case, as practice has shown, is most likely to be a shortterm palliative that does little to address long-term needs. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), tried to address both short and long-term
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goals, with the Responsibility to Protect Report (R2P) in 2001, as it will be discussed later on it the paper. In order to answer the topic question this working paper will firstly, set the background with regards to the development of the notion of humanitarian intervention. It will then look, briefly, at the debates surrounding the notion. Having established the framework of analysis, the paper will focus on the case studies. The case studies chosen are, on purpose divided in pre and post-R2P interventions, in order to point out how this report has altered the decision-making process and practice regarding these interventions. The findings will be used to support my main argument that humanitarian intervention is not truly possible. Before concluding, the working paper will suggest what could be done to address this issue.
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Setting the background The customary right to humanitarian intervention, goes back in history, and preceded the UN Charter, as it was used in the legal arguments offered to justify the British, French and Russian intervention in Greece in 1827 and the US intervention in Cuba in 1898 (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:513). Humanitarian intervention in its contemporary form could be divided in two main categories: cold-war and post-cold war cases (Wheeler, 2000; Bellamy et al., 2004; Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011). The normal response of states to humanitarian outrages during the cold-war era was of non-intervention nature. As Wheeler (2000:2) suggests ‘the UN Charter restricts the right to use force on the part of individual states to purposes of self-defence, and it was widely accepted during the cold war that the use of force to save victims of gross human rights abuses was a violation of the Charter’. Justifying the use of force on humanitarian grounds in the post-cold war era remained highly contested, with China, Russia and members of the Non-Aligned Movement1 (NAM) defending the traditional interpretation of state sovereignty. As the 1990’s progressed and during the beginning of the century a new norm of Security Council-authorized humanitarian intervention had emerged (Wheeler, 2000; Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011). As the states mentioned above, although reluctantly accepting this norm, remained very uneasy with this development, Western states took the lead in advancing ‘a new norm of armed humanitarian intervention’ (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:516). This fact led scholars to describe the post-cold war period as a ‘golden era’ for humanitarian activism (Weiss 2007:136). The authorization to the Security Council (UNSC) to decide upon humanitarian intervention is empowered under the Chapter VII provisions of the UN Charter, which authorizes the use of force to maintain 'international peace and security' (Wheeler, 2000:1). Looking at this statement with purely legal terms, as ‘restrictionists’ support, in order for the UNSC to have jurisdiction to act there has to be a threat to ‘international peace and security’; hence, it cannot authorize military intervention on humanitarian grounds alone (Wheeler, 2000:41). It is obvious that there is considerable controversy about how far this permits the Council to authorize intervention to stop humanitarian emergencies taking place inside state borders. In order to breach this gap in the interpretation of the norm, the UNSC, since the 1990’s has expanded the list of what can be accounted as threats to peace and security, to include human suffering, state failure, refugee movements and ethnic cleansing.
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The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a group of states which are not aligned formally with or against any major power bloc. As of 2012, the movement has 120 members and 17 observer countries.
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Defining the norm: for & against Humanitarian intervention Before proceeding to the case studies it is mandatory to look at the definition of humanitarian intervention. As one would expect from the previous paragraphs, the definition of the term is hotly contested. J.L. Holzgrefe (2003:18) defines humanitarian intervention as: ‘the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied’.2 Wheeler suggests that for an intervention to qualify as humanitarian it has to fulfil four requirements based on Just War tradition: there must be a just cause, a so called ‘supreme humanitarian emergency’, the use of force must be a last resort, it must meet the requirements of proportionality and it must have a high probability of achieving a positive humanitarian outcome (Wheeler, 2000: 33-40). The development of the notion has benefited from various arguments of lawyers, social constructivists, philosophers and Just War theorists which have all contributed to our understanding of the practice of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000:12, Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011: 512-515). Wheeler (2000), through a solidarist approach, develops the argument about the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention between the former along with pluralists and realists3, in order to reach to the construction of a theory of humanitarian intervention, whose principles are mentioned above. In this context, on the one side, defending the right of humanitarian intervention are the counter-restrictionists4. They support their claims in two levels, as mentioned above; the legal and the moral. On the legal debate they argue in favour of a legal right of humanitarian intervention based on interpretations of the UN Charter and customary international law. On the moral side they claim for a moral duty of humanitarian intervention stemming from the main proportion that ‘all individuals are entitled to a minimum level of protection from harm’ by virtue of their common humanity (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:513).
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As Holzgrefe point out this definition focuses on the question about the use of force and does not include non-forcible interventions such as economic, diplomatic or other sanctions. See Holzgrefe (2003).
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For further analysis on the debate see Wheeler, 2000, pp.27-51
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e.g. M. Reisman, F. Teson, S. Caney, B.D. Lepard.
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On the other side, there are theorists and practitioners that question the legitimacy and practise of humanitarian intervention such as the English school of pluralists and solidarists5. These objections to humanitarian intervention, advanced by various groups, can be summarized in three main categories. Restrictionist lawyers support that there is no basis for humanitarian intervention in the international law. Realists argue that states do not intervene for primarily humanitarian reasons, since they are not willing to risk the lives of their soldiers to save strangers, while applying principles of humanitarian intervention selectively, and support that the concept can be abused by some states in favour of their self-interest (Franck and Rodley 1973; Parekh, 1997; Chesterman, 2001; Ayoob, 2002). Even liberals argue that states are established by the informed consent of their citizens; hence it is impossible for outsiders to impose human rights (Mill, 1973). All these arguments will be explored through the case studies that follow to support my main argument that humanitarian intervention cannot be truly possible.
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Pluralists support that states and not individuals are the principal bearers of rights, while solidarist support that individuals have rights, but they can be enforced only by their states.
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Inaction and Action: Rwanda and Kosovo ‘The genocide in Rwanda showed us how terrible the consequences of inaction can be in the face of mass murder. But the conflict in Kosovo raised equally important questions about the consequences of action without international consensus and clear legal authority. On the one hand, is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate? On the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked?’ (United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 1999). This statement by Kofi Annan leads the working paper to its second part where these two case studies will be examined at first, so they could be linked, through the R2P report, with the latter two, Libya and Syria. As Wheeler (2000:15-18) suggests, although the interventions in northern Iraq and Somalia demonstrated a new practice of legitimate humanitarian intervention, they run up against the international {non} response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. It is estimated that between April and July 1994, in Rwanda, more than 800,000 people were killed, and around 2,000,000 people became refugees (Murray, 2008:123). It was only after the genocide ended that France decided to take action, requesting for SC authorization6 for a limited military intervention aiming to create a safe humanitarian zone in the west of the country (Wheeler, 2000; Jones, 2011:52). The Resolution determined that the massacre in Rwanda constituted ‘a threat to peace’ (Holgrefe, 2003: 42). This late French intervention raised questions as to why international society failed to intervene when the genocide began in early April 2004 (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:516). This inaction of the international society to stop the Rwandan genocide was acknowledged by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1994, when he stated that ‘We must all recognise that… we have failed in our response to the agony of Rwanda, and thus have acquiesced in the continued loss of human life’ (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1994:291). Some scholars and regional organizations blamed the US, the major actor with supreme military capability to stop the genocide, for this inaction of the SC. It was suggested that in the aftermath of the debacle in Somalia the US was disinclined to support another intervention in Africa, by ‘repeatedly and deliberately undermining all attempts to strengthen the UN military presence in Rwanda’7, taking into account the absence of US national-interest concerns in the region (OAU/IPEP, 1998; in Ayoob, 2002:89; Murray, 2008). It was not only the US that was blamed for inaction. The IPEP also concluded that the performance of France was even worse (Ayoob, 2002:90). According to Bellamy and
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Granted with the adoption of SC Resolution 929, 22 June 1994
7 The view of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
in 1998 to investigate the genocide in Rwanda
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Wheeler (2011:515) the French intervention in Rwanda was an example of abuse, since the French ‘were covertly pursuing national self-interest’. The failure of the UNSC to prevent and stop the Rwandan Genocide demonstrated the limits of the evolving norm of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000:viii). In this case, it was not about the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention that blocked effective SC action, but the fact that in the first weeks of the genocide no government was prepared to risk its soldiers to save strangers in a region with no state self-interests (Wheeler, 2000, Ayoob, 2002, Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:516). This guilt from the Clinton administration over the US failure to act in Rwanda could be a factor in leading NATO to launch its operation to rescue the Kosovars (Wheeler, 2001:126). On 31 March 1998 the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted SC Resolution 1160, in response to the actions of Serb forces against Kosovo Albanians, condemning the use of excessive force against civilians (Morris, 2004:110). As the situation was deteriorating the UNSC adopted SC Resolution 1199 on 23 September demanding a halt to hostilities and urging both sides to ‘take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation’ (Morris, 2004:112). NATO, suspecting that Russia and China would veto the authorization from the UNSC for the use of force, used this Resolution to advance its planning for air strikes and eventually took action in March 1999 (Ayoob, 2002:91, Morris, 2004:113). It was NATO’s first ‘humanitarian war’ aiming to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo (Wheeler, 2000:16; Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:516). While humanitarianism provided the primary impulse for action, there certainly were other more complex motives8. It was an intervention that learned from lessons of the past. It was a low risk mission, since there were no soldiers deployed on the ground, unlike Somalia and it was immediate and effective, unlike Rwanda (Wheeler, 2000:31). While Rwanda can be criticized for being too little, too late, Kosovo was criticized for being too much, too soon (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:516). In this context, the decision to act without explicit UNSC authorization raised great debates (Wheeler, 2000; 2001; Ayoob, 2002; Morris, 2004; Bellamy and Wheeler 2011). Thus, its advocates claimed that morally it seemed as a ‘just cause’, and that the use of veto in the UNSC cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the defence of human rights (Wheeler, 2001:114, Ayoob, 2002:91). On the other hand, it received heavy criticisms from other states such as Russia, China and India as well as scholars, which argued that humanitarian intervention without UNSC authority jeopardizes the foundations of international order and confuses the discussion around the very idea itself (Wheeler, 2000; 2001; Ayoob, 2002, Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011). The UN Secretary-General was sufficiently seized by the seriousness of this development to express his concern about the danger to international order if states used force without Council authorization, though tempering this statement by posing a dilemma if the genocide in Rwanda could be prevented by a similar coalition of states9 (Wheeler, 2000:41; 2001:114).
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See Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011, p.516
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Secretary General’s Annual Report to the General Assembly, 20 September 1999.
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From Kosovo to Libya and Syria In an effort to codify the norm of humanitarian intervention the Responsibility to Protect10 report was published by the ICISS, which was established in response to Kofi Annan’s challenge over international discord on the issue. The report attempted to resolve the tension between the competing claims of sovereignty and human rights (Evans, 2008; in Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:521). It addresses the notion of sovereignty as responsibility instead of control, attempting to create an international political consensus towards ‘intervention for human protection purposes’ (ICISS, 2001:xiii; Pattison, 2008:262, Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:521). It was adopted in 2005 in the World Summit11, and it was reaffirmed by the UNSC in 2006 and 200912. The responsibility to protect provided the political framework, the tools, to prevent future Rwandas and Kosovos, amongst other past interventions (Bellamy 2009; Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:521). Liberals support that oppressed peoples should themselves overthrow tyrannical government, because as stated above, it is impossible for outsiders to impose human rights (Mill, 1973). This claim was contested during the events of the ‘Arab Spring’, especially in the cases of Libya and Syria. The adoption of the responsibility to protect by the UN, as mentioned above, was an important precursor to the application of the norm in Libya (Jones, 2011). In this context, when Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi threatened to crush a civilian uprising, the UNSC moved swiftly to adopt a SC Resolution13, invoking ‘the responsibility to protect’ (Jones, 2011:51). It had a sense of unity and resolve, since it was combined with the Arab League’s call for action. The authorization to take military action was finally granted less than a month after the former Resolution, through the UNSC Resolution 1973 (UNSC/10200, 2011). This rare case of action against a member state of the UN14 was reached with no veto from any of the permanent members of the SC (UNSC/10200, 2011). There were though, five abstentions (Brazil, Germany, India, China and Russia). Although the abstentions alone do not constitute a veto, the outcome of the voting showed underlying divisions, proving that the norm of humanitarian intervention is still under contest (Jones, 2011:51).
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The Responsibility to Protect, argues that when a state is unable or unwilling to uphold its citizens’ basic human rights, such as in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, the international community has a responsibility to protect these citizens by undertaking humanitarian intervention (ICISS, 2001)
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Not at its full content, it claimed that the norm of the responsibility to protect was adopted in 2005, see Weiss, 2006
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SC Resolution 1674 and SC Resolution 1819
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SC Resolution 1970 in 26 February 2011 adopted sanctions but not use of military force
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Korea in 1950, Iraq in 1990 and Somalia in 1992
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Furthermore, it could be argued that once more the motives were not primarily humanitarian, since the US ‘was concerned about the political fallout in the region’, following the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt (Jones, 2001:53). Either way, the decision to hold back any use of force in Libya until there was both regional support and a SC Resolution has strengthened international attachment to ‘the responsibility to protect’ (Jones, 2011). As Bruce Jones concludes ‘had the Security Council not voted to act in Libya… we would likely have seen major civilian bloodshed in Benghazi’ (Jones, 2011:56). Shortly after the uprising in Libya, the ‘Arab Spring’ reached Syria. The on-going conflict, commenced in mid-March 2011, has resulted so far in more than 70,000 people killed and around 1.3 million refugees (The New York Times, 2013). On 3 August 2012 the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution demanding all in Syria to ‘immediately and visibly’ commit on ending violence (UN General Assembly/11266, 2012). Further attempts were made to adopt a SC Resolution, in October 2011 and February 2012, condemning the violence and demanding for peaceful negotiations, which were vetoed by both Russia and China (ICRtoP, 2012). Several states have been very critical over the vetoes posed by these two permanent UNSC member states. Even though the official stance of the opposed member states was that the resolutions did not impose balanced demands on the armed opposition to cease violence, and that it would have obstructed a Syrian-led political process, it is argued that they are reluctant to act because NATO-led operation in Libya had gone beyond the United Nations mandate to protect the Libyan people, aiming at regime change (Bolopion15, 2011: The Guardian, 2011). The underlying causes are still to be explored, since the situation in Syria has not eased down yet. As the current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (UN General Assembly/11266, 2012) stated in his speech on 3 August 2012 ‘the conflict in Syria is a test of everything this organisation stands for. I do not want today's United Nations to fail that test.’
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Philippe Bolopion is U.N. director at Human Rights Watch
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Self-interest and humanitarian motives The case studies developed above show that the norm of humanitarian intervention and its application have developed over the years and as I argue the decision to intervene is taken mainly according to state self-interests and security threats. Apart from the motives that lead to intervention the outcome of this intervention is equally important (Bellamy, 2004). Even though, recently most states have agreed to humanitarian norms in principle, they violate them in practice (Wheeler, 2000:8). As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith support, the legitimating function of language contrasts with the motivations for the action (Hollis and Smith, 1990:176-181). This main argument along with the specific points that follow support this working paper’s claim that a military intervention can never be truly humanitarian. Firstly, it is argued that interventions that begin with humanitarian credentials can all too easily degenerate into ‘a range of policies and activities which go beyond, or even conflict with, the label ‘humanitarian’’ (Roberts, 1993:448). As argued above, this claim applies at the cases of Libya and perhaps Kosovo (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011: 524). Wheeler (2000:9) aptly describes this, as ‘states can always find a justification for their action because the rules are sufficiently indeterminate’. They can be stretched and widened to fit under the ‘umbrella’ of ‘humanitarian cause’. In most cases ‘justification is a necessary but not sufficient explanation of an action’ (Wheeler, 2000:10). It is important to explore the additional motivating ‘off-the-board’ reasons that lead governments to the use of force (Hollis and Smith, 1990:185). According to realists ‘genuine humanitarian intervention is impudent because it does not serve national interest’ (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:514). Powerful actors will only choose to intervene when it suits them to do so and in this context will be guided by calculations of national interest. As Ayoob (2002:85) suggests it ‘is never sure whether decisions taken on behalf of the international community are truly the result of altruistic motives or are driven by the national interests of states that have a stake in intervening in particular crises or locales’. Thus, in the cases of Kosovo and Libya, there were accusations of underlying motives, other than humanitarian that led to prompt action, whereas in the case of Rwanda ‘it was believed by Western policy-makers that there were not significant national interests at stake’ (Wheeler, 2001:126). Syria seems to be a unique case where national interests lead states -in this case primarily Russia and China- to object potential intervention. Self-interest inevitably, results in selectivity. Decisions to intervene or not are largely based on strategic and economic considerations, making selectivity seem inevitable (Ayoob, 2002:86-88). As James Mayall (1996) suggests, it would be utopian to expect states to intervene to stop human rights violations unless specific security motives are
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present. This selective application of principles of humanitarian intervention results in an inconsistency in policy and fails to treat like cases alike (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:514). Why did NATO decided to intervene in Kosovo and not in Rwanda or Darfur? Why Russia and China did not veto the decision to intervene in Libya but do so in Syria? The divergence in responses dictated by national interest used to be focused on Western governments but as the latter question implies non-Western governments as well have adopted similar practices Wheeler, 2000:120; Jones, 2011:55). This pursuit of national interest, along with the absence of an impartial mechanism for deciding when humanitarian intervention is permissible has led states to abuse the norm, by espousing humanitarian motives as a pretext to cover their primary goals (Franck and Rodley, 1973; Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:514). As pluralists support, the most powerful states would be free to pose their own definition of moral values on weaker members of international society (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:514). As presented above in Rwanda, France was accused of abuse in their late intervention whereas in the cases of Kosovo and Syria, Russia and China were blamed for abusing the right to veto, invested in them as permanent members of the UNSC (Wheeler, 2001:119; ICRtoP, 2011). Hence, it is self-interest not sovereignty that has traditionally been the main barrier to intervention (Chesterman, 2001).
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A glance to the future How may practises alter in the future so military intervention can be truly humanitarian in its purpose? It has become apparent that context, cynicism and complexity will always be present in international political debates about the use of force for humanitarian reasons (Jones, 2011:57). As Morris (2004:119) concludes ‘it is in the interests of all that international attention to massive abuses of human rights is not selective but timely, principled, and consistent’. Looking at the debate about motives and outcomes, as Bellamy argues ‘intentions are products of motivations and outcomes are shaped by the strategies that one adopts to achieve ones aims. Thus, where interventions are informed by a primarily humanitarian intent, it is likely that the interveners will pursue strategies conducive to enhancing human welfare in the target country’ (Bellamy, 2004:230). Adopting a more practical approach on how the issue could be resolved, there are two main adjustments that could improve the situation. Firstly, with the jurisdiction still remaining in the UNSC, the power of veto ‘should be suspended in cases where human rights abuses are so appalling that there is an outcry for international action’ (Wheeler, 2001:125). This veto power creates a ‘visibly discriminatory system’ that brings into question the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions authorized by the UNSC (Ayoob, 2002:88). Under this restriction the UNSC look unable to apply uniform criteria for intervention to any future crisis. Secondly, in this context, in order for these criteria to be considered legitimate, moral and effective, they must be very stringent, restrictive, and non-discriminatory (Ayoob, 2002:92). The effort of the ICISS to establish such criteria through the R2P report was an important step to the right direction, but the fact that only the principal of the responsibility to protect has been adopted by the UN, so far, hints that this ‘long-term agenda’ is unlikely to generate new political will on the part of major actors to ‘incur the costs and risks of saving strangers in the near future’ (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:524).
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Conclusion To sum up, in an effort to address the topic question this working paper tried to set the framework around the notion of humanitarian intervention by describing how it was developed and by looking, briefly, at the main theoretical arguments around it. Following that, it focused on four case studies, examining them in pairs and probing how the work of the ICISS altered the development and practice of the notion in the latter two. The findings from the case studies where combined with the theoretical arguments to support my belief that military intervention can never be truly humanitarian. The final part of the working paper focused on potential developments that could reverse the answer to the question. Coming to a conclusion, although most states agree on the principle of humanitarian intervention, they continue to act based on self-interest. Ban Ki-moon has identified the challenge of translating R2P ‘from words into deeds’ as one of the cornerstone of his Secretary-Generalship (Ban Ki-moon, 2007). Although there is rhetorical endorsement over his approach, it has not translated into political will to act accordingly (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011:523). Decisions to intervene continue to be, more or less, subject to the logic of realpolitik, making such interventions not humanitarian in character (Ayoob, 2002:96). As Morris (2004:119) aptly concludes ‘humanitarian interventions are, and are likely to remain, very rare’.
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Bibliography Annan, K. (1999) Secretary General’s Annual Report to the General Assembly, Press Release SG/SM7136 GA/9596 Ayoob, M. (2002) ‘Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 6(1), pp. 81-102 Ban Ki-moon (2007) Annual address to the General Assembly, Press Release SG/SM/11182 Bellamy, A., Williams, P. and Griffin, S. (2004) Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge: Polity Press Bellamy, A. (2008) ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention’, International Affairs, 84(4), pp.615-639. Bellamy, A. and Wheeler, N.J. (2011) ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’ in Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P., (ed.) The Globalization of World Politics An introduction to international relations, 5th ed., New York: Oxford University Press Bolopion, P. (2011) After Libya, the question: To protect or depose?, available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/25/opinion/la-oe-bolopion-libya-responsibility-t20110825>, accessed at 16/04/13 Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1994) ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda’, UN and Rwanda 1993–1996, Press Release S/1994/640 Chesterman, S. (2001) Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press Chomsky, N. (1999) The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press Evans, G. (2008) The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Franck, T. and Rodley, N. (1973) ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Force’, American Journal of International Law, 67(2), pp.275-305 Hollis, M. and Smith, S. (1990) Explaining and Understanding International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R.O. (2003) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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ICRtoP (2011) UN Security Council Fails to Uphold its Responsibility to Protect in Syria, available at: <http://icrtopblog.org/2011/10/07/un-security-council-fails-to-uphold-its-responsibility-to-protect-in-syria/>, accessed at 15/04/13 ICRtoP (2012) After the Double Veto: International Community Must Re-Double Efforts to Uphold RtoP in Syria, available at: <http://icrtopblog.org/2012/02/08/after-thedouble-veto-international-community-must-re-double-efforts-to-uphold-rtop-insyria/>, accessed at 15/04/13 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) The Responsibility To Protect. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre Jones, B.D. (2011) ‘Libya and the Responsibilities of Power’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 53(3), pp.51-60 Mayall, J., (ed.) (1996) The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Mill, J.S. (1973) ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’, in Himmelfarb, G., (ed.) Essays on Politics and Culture, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith Morris, N. (2004) ‘Humanitarian Intervention in the Balkans’, in Welsh, J., (ed.) Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press Murray, L.G. (2008) Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism: Rise and fall of a policy, New York: Routledge OAU/IPEP (2000) ‘International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide on Rwanda and the Surrounding Events’, Special Report Parekh, B. (1997) ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’, International Political Science Review, 18(1), pp.49-70 Pattison, J. (2008) ‘Whose Responsibility to Protect? The Duties of Humanitarian Intervention’, Journal of Military Ethics, 7(4), pp. 262-283 Roberts, A. (1993) ‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights’, International Affairs, 69(3), pp.429-449 The Guardian (2011) NATO to end Libya campaign on 31 October, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/22/nato-end-libya-31-october>, accessed at 16/04/13 The New York Times (2013) Military in Syria Is Accused of Massacre, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/19/half-syrian-population-aidyear>, accessed at 15/04/13 UN General Assembly (GA/11266) (2012) Resolution for Syria, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, available at:
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THE â&#x20AC;&#x153;HUMANITARIANISMâ&#x20AC;? OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY INTERVENTION, Pol. Kapalidis
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