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ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, Pol. Kapalidis
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ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP Polychronis Kapalidis
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Η Ακαδημία Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων (ΑΣΑ), είναι ανεξάρτητος επιστημονικός - ερευνητικός φορέας, μια «δεξαμενή σκέψης», με νομική μορφή αστικού σωματείου μη κερδοσκοπικού χαρακτήρα, που ιδρύθηκε το 2014 με έδρα την Αθήνα. Τα ιδρυτικά μέλη και τη βάση των μελών της ΑΣΑ αποτελούν επιστήμονες που προέρχονται από τις Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις και τα Σώματα Ασφαλείας, που είναι διδάκτορες ελληνικών και ξένων πανεπιστημίων ή κάτοχοι άλλων υψηλού επιπέδου τίτλων σπουδών, με πλούσιο επιστημονικό, ερευνητικό και συγγραφικό έργο και συνεργασία με ελληνικά και ξένα πανεπιστήμια, κέντρα μελετών και ινστιτούτα, σε διάφορα επιστημονικά πεδία. Επίσης, μέλη της ΑΣΑ είναι προσωπικότητες του διπλωματικού και ακαδημαϊκού χώρου και άλλοι επιστήμονες υψηλού κύρους με επιστημονική δραστηριότητα σε γνωστικά αντικείμενα τα οποία συνάδουν προς τους σκοπούς της. Σκοπός της ΑΣΑ είναι η ανάπτυξη επιστημονικού έργου και δράσεων στα πεδία των Στρατηγικών Σπουδών, της Άμυνας, της Ασφάλειας και της Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής, η εκπόνηση επιστημονικών αναλύσεων, ερευνών και μελετών καθώς και η παροχή εξειδικευμένων συμβουλευτικών και εκπαιδευτικών υπηρεσιών στα παραπάνω πεδία, σε φορείς του δημοσίου και του ιδιωτικού τομέα και σε φυσικά πρόσωπα, σε εθνικό, ευρωπαϊκό και διεθνές επίπεδο. Για την υλοποίηση των στόχων της η ΑΣΑ έχει οργανώσει τέσσερεις Επιστημονικούς Τομείς: (1) Ανάλυσης Στρατηγικού Περιβάλλοντος, (2) Ανάλυσης Αμυντικής Πολιτικής και Ασφάλειας (3) Ανάλυσης Συστημάτων, Τεχνολογίας και Οικονομίας, (4) Επιχειρησιακής Έρευνας, Διοικήσεως και Ελέγχου. Μεταξύ των στόχων της ΑΣΑ περιλαμβάνεται η ανάπτυξη συνεργασιών με διεθνείς οργανισμούς, με ακαδημαϊκούς - επιστημονικούς φορείς και άλλα κέντρα επιστημονικής έρευνας με συναφές αντικείμενο, καθώς και με έγκυρους επιστήμονες, στρατιωτικούς, διπλωμάτες, κ.ά., στο εσωτερικό και το εξωτερικό, ιδίως στο ευρω-ατλαντικό και το ευρύτερο μεσογειακό περιβάλλον.
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ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, Pol. Kapalidis
ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP Polychronis Kapalidis
WORKING PAPER 17 April 2015
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Academy for Strategic Analyses
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WORKING PAPER – Νο17 / April 2015 Τίτλος: ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP Συγγραφέας: Polychronis Kapalidis
Εκδότης: Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA) Σχεδιασμός – ηλεκτρονική επεξεργασία: ΑSA Copyright © Ακαδημία Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων info@acastran.org http://www.acastran.org, https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses ISSN: 2407-9863
Απαγορεύεται η αναδημοσίευση, η αναπαραγωγή, ολική, μερική ή περιληπτική, ή η απόδοση κατά παράφραση ή διασκευή του περιεχομένου του βιβλίου με οποιονδήποτε τρόπο, μηχανικό, ηλεκτρονικό, φωτοτυπικό, ηχογράφησης ή άλλο, χωρίς προηγούμενη γραπτή άδεια του εκδότη. Νόμος 2121/1993 και κανόνες του Διεθνούς Δικαίου που ισχύουν στην Ελλάδα.
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ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, Pol. Kapalidis
About the author Polychronis Kapalidis (Bsc, MA) is a Lieutenant in the Hellenic Navy. He graduated from the Hellenic Naval Academy in 2003 and has served on frigates and submarines. From August 2013 he holds a MA in International Relations and Global Security from Plymouth University. Since 2010 he teaches in several Navy courses, while from September 2014 he is appointed as a part-time Lecturer at the Hellenic Air force Technical NCO Academy (STYA). His research interests are focused on Maritime Security, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, in the Balkans and the Middle East. He is a Member of the Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA)
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ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, Pol. Kapalidis
INTRODUCTION The United States of America and Israel have a unique, a ‘special relationship’ (Graeber, 2007:135; Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:138; Little, 2008:78). Several observers have compared it to a durable but ‘informal alliance’ while others have likened it to an unstable ‘common-law marriage’ (Little, 2008:78). No matter how it is described, this relationship has become a key feature of Middle Eastern politics. Both states share common concerns and pursuit common goals (Graeber, 2007:132). As it will be analysed later on it the paper, this is an intertwined, ‘two way’ relationship (Graeber, 2007; Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008). In order to determine whether US policies in the Middle East (ME) have been shaped by Israeli interests this report will have to look at the topic through this special relationship between the two states. Aiming to set the framework for further analysis, the paper will examine US and Israeli interests in the region, separately at first. Moving on, it will focus on the aspects of this relationship, examine its roots and explore common interests in order to reach a final verdict. This analysis will support the paper’s main argument that although Israel is a big concern of US policies in the region, it is not the only one; hence US policies in the ME are affected but not shaped by Israeli interests. Before analysing, through a historical sketch, US involvement in the ME, it would be useful to look at how the US conceptualizes the region. Douglas Little (2008) describes the way US is applying its policies at the ME as ‘American Orientalism’1. It is true that, today, the US dominates the ME to an unprecedented extent (Hudson, 2009:308). Even though in the past, several state actors competed over the ME, there are no longer any noteworthy challengers to American predominance. Despite this US hegemony, ME is regarded by American policy-makers as ‘posing an unprecedented threat to national security’ (Hudson, 2009:309). Since 9/11, one of US’s main concern is national security, and in this context the ME is regarded as a breeding ground for terrorist movements aiming at the American homeland. The way US governments have attempted to eliminate this threat will be described further below. Finally, one key note has to be made. It is widely agreed, in academia and international politics that the Palestinian-Israeli dispute is one of the most serious causes of instability in the modern ME (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:155). It has proved ‘the most divisive issue in contemporary Middle Eastern politics’ (Baxter 1
For further discussion, see Little, 2008
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and Akbarzadeh, 2008:136). Due to its importance and to the limited length of this paper, the issue will not be analysed thoroughly. Though, it has to be stated that, by resolving this conflict many regional issues would be settled (Graeber, 2007:135). As described by the Iraq Study Group Report ‘The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability’ (Baker et. al., 2006:7).
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ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, Pol. Kapalidis
US INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST US involvement in the region could be divided, historically in five major periods. The first period was the colonial era, the second was around the Second World War, the third focused on the challenges in the 1970’s and the Cold War, the fourth was the post-Cold War era, and the last one initiated after the horrific events of the 11 September 2001 (Hudson, 2009). Yakub Halabi in his book US Foreign Policy in the Middle East (2009) has demonstrated how these phases affected US interests in the region and what ideas/ theories shaped America’s foreign policy in the region2. This part of the report will focus on how US foreign policies have changed, throughout these periods, in order to serve its interests in the ME.
The era of Innocence3 During the colonial period US relations with the ME revolved mainly around trade and missionary activity (Hare, 1972). Unlike France, Britain and Russia, the US had chosen to eschew a colonial role in the ME (Hudson, 2009:309). Actually the US was seen ‘as a natural ally of Arab anti-colonial movements’ (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:136). Especially after the end of the First World War, the Arabs indicated that, if they could not have their independence, they would rather be governed by the US, than Britain or France (Hudson, 2009:309). Since the US was disconnected from the abuses of colonial policy in the area, Americans were seen as ‘good people’ and were spared from the Arab anger against European imperialism during the 1920’s and 1930’s (Dobson and Marsh 2001; Quandt 1970; Halabi, 2009; Hudson, 2009).
The traditional trio: Cold-War rivalry, oil and Israel The end of the Second World War marked the begging of the ‘great divide’4 in US relations with the ME (Hudson, 2009:310). The US and the Soviet Union showed great interest in controlling the developments in the region. Rashid Khalidi (2009) aptly describes the three characteristics that made the Middle East such a unique 2
Halabi (2009: 2-3) divides these 5 periods in a slightly different way: I. 1945–73, II. 1974–7, III. 1979–2001, IV. 2001–2003, V. 2003–present 3 Concept taken from Hudson, 2009 4 Described by US veteran ‘Arabist’ ambassador Raymond Hare
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case. Firstly, its location, where ‘it abutted directly on the vital southern flank of the Soviet Union’ (Khalidi, 2009: 108). Secondly, it was ‘a passageway for EastWest transit, whether by land, sea or air’ (Khalidi, 2009:111). Finally, and most importantly the Middle East contained most of the world’s reserves in oil and gas. Hence, America’s foreign policies in the region were driven, onwards, by the traditional trio of anti-Communism, oil and Israel (Hudson, 2009:309, Chomsky and Achacar, 2007; Graeber, 2007; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007; Halabi, 2009). At first, perhaps the most pressing issue was the strategic and economic importance of the region in the growing Cold-War confrontation against the Soviets (Covarrubias and Lansford, 2007:xvii). This was widely perceived by John C. Campbell (1958:4-5) who stated that ‘the entrenchment of Soviet power in that strategic region {the ME} would bring a decisive shift in the world balance, outflanking NATO. Soviet control of Middle Eastern oil could disrupt the economy of the free world. And the triumph of communism in the heart of the Islamic world would be the prelude to its triumph through Asia, Africa and Europe’. Hence, the US had to intercept the spread of Soviet influence in the region. US foreign policy officials attempted to expand their influence in the ME both in geo-strategic and political-economic level. Efforts to build military alliances5 largely failed. Political and economic projects, offered by the Eisenhower administration, promising financial aid and security assistance6 to the ME states, followed the same unsuccessful path. Even when in some limited cases, for example Lebanon, the offer was accepted it brought more instability than security in the state (Hudson, 2009:310). Local governments were reluctant to make alliances with the US, because, based on their interests, the real geo-strategic threat was Israel, not the Soviet Union (Hudson, 2009:311). It was accurately spotted by leading US government officials that the unconditional support for a Zionist state in Palestine would jeopardize the relations of the US with the emerging Arab nationalist currents (Hudson, 2009:311). When the Cold War eventually ended, US allies found themselves on the winning side, and the, weakened, Arab nationalist camp ‘no longer had a superpower to patron to constrain the USA and Israel’ (Hudson, 2009:312). Before looking at the challenges that US foreign policy had to deal with during the 1970’s, the importance of the second factor of the traditional trio has to be
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Notably, the Middle East Command Proposal and the Middle East Defence Organization in 19512. For further discussion see, Bryson, T.A (1977) American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975: A survey, Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press 6 The 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state.
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pointed out. As Hudson (2009:312) describes ‘US commercial interest7 in Middle Eastern oil pre-dates Hare’s ‘great divide’’. But it was not until the Second World War that oil acquired the strategic security aspect (Halabi, 2009; Chomsky and Achcar, 2007:56). Given the fact that the US had, and continues to have its own oil reserves, its interest in ME oil was not based on the state’s dependence on it, but on the fact that controlling oil reserves is ‘a lever of world domination’ (Chomsky and Achcar, 2007:54). This combination of economic and strategic interests led US policy-makers to draw a new policy in the ME (Chomsky and Achcar, 2007). It was based on two pillars: a) to exclude Soviet influence from the region and b) to prevent any internal force from nationalizing Western oil-producing companies that could lead to restriction of production, rise in prices and potential overturn of established regimes (Hudson, 2009:312). In this context, President Franklin Roosevelt declared in 1943 that ‘the defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence of the United States’ (Hart, 1999). But it was Saudi Arabia, and King Faisal, who during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War imposed a partial boycott on the US and its European allies (Hudson, 2009:313). Along with Libya8 and Iran, these oil-producing countries, because of growing world demand, the proliferation of small independent companies, and domestic nationalist pressure, set in motion the ‘oil revolution’ of the 1970’s (Hudson, 2009:313). US’s goal to prevent nationalization of Western oil-producing companies was lost, since the balance of oil power shifted from these companies to the producing states. The Arabs had activated ‘the oil weapon’ (Hudson, 2009:313). The Iranian Revolution of 1979-80 posed another ideological, this time, threat to the US, and created a core of potential instability in the region. US foreign policy had to find ways to block the expansion of the revolution in the rest of the Arab World (Halabi, 2009:2). The revolution, along with the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-8 led to a second major price hike in 1979. This time the US had taken all the necessary measures to protect itself, by adopting a comprehensive new energy policy ‘designed to blunt the oil weapon in the future’ (Hudson, 2009:313). The ‘oil weapon’ withered around 1986, when world oil prices collapsed and OPEC9 and non-OPEC producers alike lost their collective effectiveness (Hudson, 2009:313). The main concern for the US over oil was now the ‘protection’ of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ‘from regional (Iranian) and exogenous (Soviet) inroads (Hudson, 2009:313).
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US oil companies started operating in the Middle East in 1928 (the Red Line Agreement) following the nationalist revolution of Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in 1969 9 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 8
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Contemporary challenges: terrorism One of the biggest challenges for the US was the threat of terrorist attacks, not only in the American homeland but all around the world. As Chomsky (2007:6) states terrorism did not appear suddenly in the attacks of 9/11. The Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 was characterized as a ‘watershed event’ in transnational terrorism (Kiras, 2011:368). After 1979 ‘the phenomenon of transnational Islamist networks prepared to utilize terrorist tactics against the United States especially and the West in general’ became a global one (Hudson, 2009:317). Others spot the evolution of terrorism from a local to a transnational threat, even further back in time, around 1968 (Kiras, 2011:368). No matter when it actually commenced, the several attacks prior to 9/1110, among which the attack on New York’s World Trade Centre in 1993, were treated in a relatively ad hoc manner (Gerges, 1999). The attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York came as a natural consequence of this relative inaction. Michael Cox (2011:77) brings up another aspect of these attacks, as he aptly concludes that, ‘September 11 effectively brought the postcold war era to an end and in the process transformed US foreign policy’. Despite this transformation in US foreign policy, commercial interests (especially oil) and qualified support for Israel would still remain constants of American policy (Hudson, 2009:328).
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For details on prior to 9/11 terrorist attacks, see Hudson, 2009,pp.317-9 and Kiras, 2011,pp.368-9
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A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP The relationship between Israel and the US is certainly a unique one, but is very complicated, and surely not a simple one. As it was mentioned above, when Campbell wrote about the traditional trio of US interests in the ME he referred to this relationship by supporting that ‘the American commitment to Israel is to its continued independent existence, not to its existing boundaries or policies (Campbell, 1958:351-2). In order to examine this intertwining between the two states in order to reach to a conclusion, this part of the paper will look, briefly, at the Interests of Israel in the region, describe the influence of the Zionist movement in US domestic policies and analyse how this influence has affected US policies in the ME.
Israel’s concerns Israel’s primary goal is survival (Graeber, 2007:133). Hence, its foreign policy is based on survival in a community ‘relatively hostile to its very existence’ (Graeber, 2007:133). As indicated by Yitzhak Mualem (2012:201) ‘Israel’s existence as a sovereign Jewish state is constantly being put to the test’. Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Israelis had to confront several times with their neighbours, having the support, in many levels, of the US (Smith, 2009). Because of this continuous threat the Israelis rely on the US to supply, or at least influence, their defence posture (Graeber, 2007:134). Although in recent years, political parties in the country disagree upon the level of dependence on the US, it is this close relationship that has acted as a deterrence factor to any hostile act against Israel (Graeber, 2007). In this context, trying to reduce the level of dependence from the US and establish its existence, position and strength in the international arena, Israel has developed a remarkable world-class military establishment (Mualem, 2012). Indeed arms sales have become a prominent issue in Israeli foreign policy (Mualem, 2012:201). This policy has a dual goal: primarily to achieve economic development and secondary to upscale Israel’s influence in the international arena by ‘shaping the domestic policy of the recipient state’ (Mualem, 2012:201). It could be argued that, in the twenty-first century Israel has become a regional superpower (Hudson, 2009:314). Despite these developments, Israel continues to be strongly related to the US. As Chomsky (2007:62-3) points out, when US interests clash with Israel’s
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arms sales policy11, the government of the latter comply with the desires of the former.
Influencing US domestic policies In order to determine why the US pursue specific policies in the ME and if these policies are shaped by Israeli interests, it is essential to examine the internal workings of American ME policy. As Hudson (2009:320) suggests ‘Middle Eastern policy is decisively shaped by domestic American politics’ since the ME is deeply embedded in them. On this basis it is necessary to identify the role of the so-called ‘Israel lobby’ in domestic American politics. Since Jews did not have an established state before 1948 they had been dispersed all around the world. The Jewish diaspora in Europe and especially in the United States became very wealthy and established several institutions that supported the creation of a Jewish state (the ‘World Zionist Organization’ (WZO) and its sub-institutions, the ‘Jewish Agency for Palestine’ and so forth) (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:26-33). Through these institutions Jews participated in the economic and political life of those states. As Hudson (2009:322) indicates ‘while American Jews make up less than 5 per cent of the population, they have concentrated in key states, and they are politically active in terms of campaign contributions and voter turnout’. Thus, the network of organizations that make up ‘the Israel lobby’ is one of the most powerful lobbies in Washington (Tivnan, 1987; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007:111). Perhaps the most notable amongst these groups is the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)12. As John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt point out, in a remarkable book that strongly criticizes the ‘Israel lobby’, (2007:115) ‘the bulk of the lobby is comprised of Jewish Americans who are deeply committed to making sure that U.S. foreign policy advances what they believe to be Israel's interests’. These lobbying efforts of the Israeli community have been influencing both the Congress and the White House for decades, while it channels money and votes in election campaigns (Tivnan, 1987; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007:151; Hudson, 2009:320-2). It has been so effective, especially in the US Congress, since the latter regularly authorizes massive, unconditional financial aid to Israel13 (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007:199; Hudson, 2009:321). It came as no surprize when former US President Bill Clinton once described AIPAC as ‘stunningly effective’ and ‘better than anyone 11
Noam Chomsky mentions two cases, in 2000 and 2005, of cancelled sales of military equipment from Israel to China, forced by US government officials. See Chomsky and Achcar, 2007, pp.62-3. 12 Although Chomsky (2007:65-70) supports, in a controversial, nonetheless, statement that, the most powerful part of the ‘Israel lobby’ is the liberal intellectual community in the USA. 13 Around $3 billion annually (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007:199; Hudson, 2009:321)
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else lobbying in this town’ (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007:153). Its influence is so vast that ‘criticism of the ‘Israel lobby’ has been considered by many American politicians and analysts to be a ‘taboo subject’’ (Hudson: 2009:322). As argued in the introduction, this paper supports that although the power and influence of the ‘Israel lobby’ is notable in US domestic politics, it is not enough to shape US foreign policy. Though, it is certainly affected, influenced, by Israeli interests, promoted by the lobby (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). As previously described by Chomsky (2007:62) ‘if these {US and Israeli} interests ever come to conflict, {US} geopolitical planners win’. In this context, the final part of the paper will focus on the birth and evolution of this ‘special relationship’ and the influence that both states exercise to each other.
Two close ‘allies’ In an effort to spot the roots of this close alliance between the US and Israel it is necessary to go back to the Second World War period. Although the US was not the major force behind the establishment of Israel, it acted as the midwife in its birth in 1948 (Baxter and and Akbarzadeh, 2008:25; Little, 2008:80-7; Hudson, 2009:314). Hudson (2009:314) aptly describes these early stages of the relationship when he states that ‘the USA faced the task of helping arrange a settlement that would see it {Israel} through infancy and ensure it a prosperous life’. Even though, in the 1940’s antagonists over Palestine were, more or less, evenly matched in the US, the White House and President Harry S. Truman issued a statement recognizing the new state of Israel just eleven minutes after it came into being (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007:24; Little, 2008: 86; Hudson, 2009:313). This immediate US support over the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was granted to the influence of the Zionist movement in US domestic policy (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007:118; Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:37; Hudson, 2009:313). The Zionist movement was able, through its influence to the US media and the writings of pro-Israeli scholars, to portray Israel as weak and besieged, ‘a Jewish David surrounded by a hostile Arab Goliath’ (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007:81). Along with the Holocaust that Jews suffered during the Second World War, American sympathy towards the Zionist movements increased during the early stages of the creation of the state of Israel (Graeber, 2007:124). As stated above, this sympathy was translated into political, military and financial aid14 towards the newly formed state (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). This unconditional support, especially with regards to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, was criticized by several 14
See Mearsheimer and Walt, pp. 77-110
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policy-makers and academics, since it could cause great unrest and deteriorate US relationship with the Arab world (Moore, 2002). But the US government considered the costs as bearable, since ‘they did not include loss of access to Arab oil nor the complete loss of the Middle East to the Soviet Union’ (Hudson, 2009:314). As Graeber (2007:133) indicates, although US support towards the creation of the state of Israel would ‘hinder regional instability’, the US Congress considered it as an opportunity to ‘extend an arm of US interests’ into the ME. Washington’s moral obligation to Israel built the strong foundations of this ‘special relationship’ (Moore, 2002). This alliance exists on multiple levels: moral, economic, strategic and regional (Graeber, 2007:123). Even though the moral aspect of this relationship was made apparent in the post-WWII period, it was not until 196715 that American foreign policy officials began to see Israel as something more than a burden; an emerging asset for expressing US interests in the ME. The US government was impressed with Israel’s military prowess and was persuaded that on a regional level, it could act as a regional buffer against Soviet interests, at that time (Gaeber, 2007:126; Baxter and and Akbarzadeh, 2008:179; Hudson, 2009:314). The 1973 War and the oil embargo that followed ‘pushed the two states even closer’ (Baxter and and Akbarzadeh, 2008:136). The US/Israeli relationship is centred on securing Israel and securing vital American interests in the ME (Graeber, 2007). It is a two-way relationship which benefits both states. From the US perspective, Israel is regarded as one of the first lines of defence in supporting US strategic decisions in the region. From Israel’s perspective, the US is regarded as a means to secure economic and military aid, and mainly to advance its defensive posture in the region (Graeber, 2007). It is not only the obvious US support over the Palestinian/Israeli issue, but the entire foreign policy that US has adopted in the ME that supports, or at least does not confronts with, Israel’s concerns. Even when in 2001, following the events of 9/11, US foreign policy had to reform, by adopting the ‘war on terror’ and the effort to democratize the region, the protection of Israel still remained an indirect goal of this policy (Dalacoura, 2005; Youngs, 2006; Norton, 2009:129).
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The 1967 War against Egypt, Jordan and Syria, see Smith, 2009 ,pp. 230-40
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CONCLUSION Coming to a conclusion, it has become apparent that the United States of America and Israel have built a very strong relationship. No matter how politicians and scholars define it - ‘unique’ or ‘special’ relationship, ‘beneficial alliance’ and so forth – it is one that is built around common interests and concerns in the Middle East. Israel is a proponent of US interests in the region and its interests have found great support amongst American politicians, much of which is credited to the efforts of ‘the Israel lobby’. As for the topic argument, there is no consensus amongst politicians or academia as to whether US policies in the Middle East are shaped, defined, affected or guided by Israeli interests. While there are some (Graeber, 2007) who support that US foreign policy is driven by regional policies of Israel, others (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007) suggest that Israeli interests, promoted by ‘the Israel lobby’, continue to influence US approach to the ME. A more radical view, expressed by Chomsky (2007:53) claims that, looking at the bigger picture ‘if the Middle East didn’t have the major energy reserves of the world, then policymakers today wouldn’t care much more about it than they do about Antarctica’. As stated in the introduction and described in the report, although Israel is a main concern of the US in the Middle East, it is surely, not the only one. Hence, the facts stated throughout this paper have led me to conclude that US policies in the region are affected, but certainly not shaped, by Israeli interests.
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ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, Pol. Kapalidis
Bibliography Baker, J., Hamilton, L., Eagleburger, L., Jordan, V., Meese, E., O’Connor, S., Panetta, L., Perry, W., Robb, C. and Simpson, A. (2006), The Iraq Study Group Report, Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace Baxter, K. and Akbarzadeh, S. (2008) US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The roots of anti-Americanism, Oxon: Routledge Campbell, J.C. (1958) Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Chomsky, N. and Achcar, G. (2007) Perilous Power: The Middle East and US Foreign Policy, Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War and Justice, London: Penguin Books Covarrubias, J. and Lansford, T., (ed.), (2007) Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition or Support for US Foreign Policy, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Cox, M. (2011) ‘From the Cold War to the World Economic Crisis, in Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. (ed.), The Globalization of World Politics, 5th ed., New York: Oxford University Press Dalacoura, K. (2005) ‘US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: a critique’, International Affairs, 81(5), pp.963-979 Dobson, A .P. and Marsh, S. (2001) US Foreign Policy Since 1945, New York: Routledge Fawcett, L. (2009) ‘Alliances, Cooperation, and Regionalism in the Middle East’, in Fawcett, L. (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press Gerges F.A. (1999) America an Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Graeber, D.J. (2007) ‘The United States and Israel: The Implications of Alignment, in Covarrubias, J. and Lansford, T., (ed.), Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition or Support for US Foreign Policy, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Halabi, Y. (2009) US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From Crises to Change, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Hare R. A. (1972) ‘The Great Divide: World War II’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 401(1), pp.23-30 Hart P.T. (1999) Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership, Bloominghton: Indiana University Press Hinnebusch, R. (2009) ‘The Politics of Identity in the Middle Eastern International Relations’, in Fawcett, L. (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press Hudson, M.C. (2009) ‘The United States in the Middle East’, in Fawcett, L. (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press Khalidi, R. (2009) Sowing Crisis, Boston: Beacon Press
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Kiras, J.D. (2011) ‘Terrorism and Globalization’, in Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. (ed.), The Globalization of World Politics, 5th ed., New York: Oxford University Press Little, D. (2008) American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, 3rd ed., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press Mearsheimer, J.J. and Walt, S.M. (2007) The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Moore, J. (2002) ‘Destabilizing the Middle East: US policy toward Palestine, 1943-1949’, Journal of Church and State, 43(1), pp. 115-34 Mualem, Y. (2012) ‘Israel's foreign policy: military–economic aid and assisting Jewish communities in distress – can the two coexist?’, Israel Affairs, 18(2),pp.201-218 Norton, A.R. (2009) ‘The Puzzle of Political Reform in the Middle East’, in Fawcett, L. (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press Quandt, W.B. (1970) United States Policy in the Middle East: Constraints and Choices, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation Sluglett, P. (2009) ‘The Cold War in the Middle East’, in Fawcett, L. (ed), International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press Smith, C. (2009) ‘The Arab-Israeli Conflict’, in Fawcett, L. (ed), International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press Tivnan, E. (1987) The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy, New York: Simon and Schuster Youngs, R. (2006) Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September 11, London: Lynee Rienner Publishers
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ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST USA AND ISRAEL: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, Pol. Kapalidis
The Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA) is an independent non-profit scientific and research institution, a think-tank, based in Athens. It was founded in 2014, by scientists from the Hellenic Armed Forces and Hellenic Security Corps, who hold a PhD or holders of other high level qualifications, with rich scientific, research and writing work and collaboration with Greek and foreign universities, research centres and institutes, in various scientific fields. Moreover distinguished personalities from military, diplomatic and academic areas and other high-profile scientists, became members of the Academy. The main task of the ASA is the development of scientific work and activities in the field of Strategic Studies, Defense, Security and Foreign Policy, the elaboration of scientific analyses, research and studies, as well as the provision of specialized advisory and educational services to public bodies, private sector and to individuals in those articles, at national, European and international levels. In this framework, the Academy's activities are developed within scientific areas, such as: (a) Analysis of strategic environment, (b) Analysis of the Defense and Security Policy, (c) System analysis, technology and economy, (d) Operational research, command and control. The Academy will cooperate with international organizations, academic-scientific institutions and other centers of scientific research with a related object, as well as with authoritative scientists, militaries, diplomats, etc., especially in the Euro-Atlantic and the wider Mediterranean environment.
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