Κείμενο Εργασίας 22

WORKING PAPERS

ISSN: 2407-9863

22

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING THE CASE OF KOSOVO Dr Nikolaos Giannopoulos

ΤΟΜΕΑΣ Β’

June 2015

Η Ακαδημία Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων (ΑΣΑ), είναι ανεξάρτητος επιστημονικός - ερευνητικός φορέας, μια «δεξαμενή σκέψης», με νομική μορφή αστικού σωματείου μη κερδοσκοπικού χαρακτήρα, που ιδρύθηκε το 2014 με έδρα την Αθήνα. Τα ιδρυτικά μέλη και τη βάση των μελών της ΑΣΑ αποτελούν επιστήμονες που προέρχονται από τις Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις και τα Σώματα Ασφαλείας, που είναι διδάκτορες ελληνικών και ξένων πανεπιστημίων ή κάτοχοι άλλων υψηλού επιπέδου τίτλων σπουδών, με πλούσιο επιστημονικό, ερευνητικό και συγγραφικό έργο και συνεργασία με ελληνικά και ξένα πανεπιστήμια, κέντρα μελετών και ινστιτούτα, σε διάφορα επιστημονικά πεδία. Επίσης, μέλη της ΑΣΑ είναι προσωπικότητες του διπλωματικού και ακαδημαϊκού χώρου και άλλοι επιστήμονες υψηλού κύρους με επιστημονική δραστηριότητα σε γνωστικά αντικείμενα τα οποία συνάδουν προς τους σκοπούς της. Σκοπός της ΑΣΑ είναι η ανάπτυξη επιστημονικού έργου και δράσεων στα πεδία των Στρατηγικών Σπουδών, της Άμυνας, της Ασφάλειας και της Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής, η εκπόνηση επιστημονικών αναλύσεων, ερευνών και μελετών καθώς και η παροχή εξειδικευμένων συμβουλευτικών και εκπαιδευτικών υπηρεσιών στα παραπάνω πεδία, σε φορείς του δημοσίου και του ιδιωτικού τομέα και σε φυσικά πρόσωπα, σε εθνικό, ευρωπαϊκό και διεθνές επίπεδο. Για την υλοποίηση των στόχων της η ΑΣΑ έχει οργανώσει τέσσερεις Επιστημονικούς Τομείς: (1) Ανάλυσης Στρατηγικού Περιβάλλοντος, (2) Ανάλυσης Αμυντικής Πολιτικής και Ασφάλειας (3) Ανάλυσης Συστημάτων, Τεχνολογίας και Οικονομίας, (4) Επιχειρησιακής Έρευνας, Διοικήσεως και Ελέγχου. Μεταξύ των στόχων της ΑΣΑ περιλαμβάνεται η ανάπτυξη συνεργασιών με διεθνείς οργανισμούς, με ακαδημαϊκούς - επιστημονικούς φορείς και άλλα κέντρα επιστημονικής έρευνας με συναφές αντικείμενο, καθώς και με έγκυρους επιστήμονες, στρατιωτικούς, διπλωμάτες, κ.ά., στο εσωτερικό και το εξωτερικό, ιδίως στο ευρω-ατλαντικό και το ευρύτερο μεσογειακό περιβάλλον.

www.acastran.org info@acastran.org https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses

Μελέτει το παν - Ακούων όρα - Γνους πράττε

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING

THE CASE OF KOSOVO Dr Nikolaos Giannopoulos

WORKING PAPER 22 June 2015

ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ – Νο22 / Ιούνιος 2015 Τίτλος: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO Συγγραφέας: Dr Nikolaos Giannopoulos

Εκδότης: Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA) Σχεδιασμός – ηλεκτρονική επεξεργασία: ΑΣΑ Copyright © Academy for Strategic Analyses info@acastran.org http://www.acastran.org, https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses ISSN: 2407-9863 Απαγορεύεται η αναδημοσίευση, η αναπαραγωγή, ολική, μερική ή περιληπτική, ή η απόδοση κατά παράφραση ή διασκευή του περιεχομένου του βιβλίου με οποιονδήποτε τρόπο, μηχανικό, ηλεκτρονικό, φωτοτυπικό, ηχογράφησης ή άλλο, χωρίς προηγούμενη γραπτή άδεια του εκδότη. Νόμος 2121/1993 και κανόνες του Διεθνούς Δικαίου που ισχύουν στην Ελλάδα.

About the author

Dr Nikolaos Giannopoulos has studied, tracked, and analyzed international terrorists, the global jihadist network and terrorism financing for more than one decade. He is a frequent terrorism analyst in the media, especially on the consequences of terrorism, its motives, and the implications for counterterrorism strategy.

He receives a postgraduate degree (MSc) and a PhD from the National University of Athens. He also graduated from the Hellenic national Defence College. He has numerous publications and presentations on issues related to International Security, suicide attacks and piracy as a form of terrorism.

He is member of the Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA)

Abstract After seven years of independence, Kosovo continues to face severe social, political and economic challenges that pose several threats to the development and legitimacy of the new state.

This study intends to analyze several important aspects of state-building led by the international community in the case of Kosovo. The paper puts emphasis on the particular role of the UN in this process and the principles on the base of which Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008.

Hence, arguments take into account the role of the international community in the early moments of state-building process in Kosovo, keeping always in mind the theoretical context of the paper.

Furthermore, this study argues that international involvement in Kosovo has been shaped by a preference for stability, even this has meant accepting a status quo that underlines the long-term prospects for a peaceful Kosovo.

Finally, the paper relies on the opinion given by the International Court of Justice over Kosovo declaration of independence, as well as on the right to self-determination of Kosovo as the last breakaway territory of Yugoslavia.

By assessing with a critical eye the historical origins and emergence of the state in Kosovo, this paper hopes to show what is required to make strides towards greater peace and stability.

Keywords: State-building, self-determination, security, human rights, stability, independence, peace-building, international low.

CONTENTS

Abstract Abbreviations and Acronyms

1

Introduction

2

Background and context

12

3

The international dimension

15

4

ICJ and Kosovo's Declaration of Independence

18

5.

Objectives and challenges to the consolidation of the state

20

5.1

The challenge of the North

20

5.2

Economic stagnation

22

5.3

Threats to Human Security and corruption

23

6

Conclusion

Bibliography

9

24

27

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS CSDP: Common Security and Defense Policy CSP:

Comprehensive Settlement Proposal

EU:

European Union

EULEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo DAC:

Development Assistance Committee

ESDP: European Security and Defense Policy GDP: Gross Domestic Product HUMSEC: Human Security (project supported by the European Commission) ICO:

International Civilian Office

ICR:

International Civilian Representative

ICT:

International Court of Justice

JIAS:

Joint Interim Administrative Structure

KFOR: Kosovo Force KLA:

Kosovo Liberation Army

KPC:

Kosovo Protection Corp

KSF:

Kosovo Security Force

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO: Non-Governmental Organization OIC:

Organization for Islamic Cooperation

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe SEECP: South-East European Cooperation Process UN:

United Nations

UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency UNMIK: United Nation Mission in Kosovo

8

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

1.

INTRODUCTION

State-building by the international community is not an old practice and changes of borders have occurred as a result of the Great Powers’ interests. This course of action has been applied after the Second World War in the case of Germany by the United States and its allies. In our time this practice is carried out most of the case by United Nations. Specially, in the last two decades a new phenomenon of this practice is a growing role of the European Union in different international state-building processes and missions.

Many border changes have occurred in the areas of South – East Europe based on ethnic composition, taking into account that “the right to self-determination has been violated in most of the cases, where unjustly-created ethnic borders have further created minority problems”1. Additionally, in the last two decades human security and peace-building have become core concepts and the basis for a new evolving culture of international relations.

State-building by the international community is a very complex process and usually it takes years or decades to be completed. This process focus on increasing legitimacy and accountability of the state with its constituents and building the capacity of the state to perform certain critical functions.2 State institutions are assumed to have the long-term potential for mediating and mitigating social conflicts.

Rebuilding a state after conflict is about more than repairing damaged buildings. It is about restoring the people’s trust and confidence in governance systems and the rule of low, rebuilding relationships at all levels, and providing the population with greater hope for the future. These processes are all critical to the consolidation security in fragile post-conflict situations.3 Symptoms of fragility such as weak governance and corruption feed into undemocratic processes and behaviors. Therefore, state-building agendas should include good governance based on the rule of low; human rights; and civil liberties; a free-market economy; a pluralistic democracy; and above all, socio-culture

1

George Brunner, “Nationality problems and minority conflicts in Eastern Europe”, Gutersloh, 1996, p. 104 2 OECD, 2005, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, endorsed in 2007.

3 Dragana Dulic, “Peace Building and Human Security: Kosovo Case, HUMSEC Journal, Issue 3, 2010, p.3

9

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

changes and acceptance of new values and responsibilities across the board – all these coincide with human security dimensions.

On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia and this declaration brought to an end almost nine years of international administration by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established in the aftermath of NATO’s operation in the area of Balkans.

Obviously, the state in Kosovo is weak and flawed on a number of axes, many of them connected to the exceptional characteristics and context of its emergence after the Yugoslav wars. The evidence of this state weakness can be found in numerous areas, such as low tax contribution and a system of power that is central-

ized in the hands of few. Despite ten years of extensive international involvement and unprecedented amounts of donor aid, Kosovo continues to face enormous political, social and economic challenges that threaten the sustainability and integrity of the new state.

10

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

2.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The crackdown by Serb police against the KLA in 1998, which led to the displacement of more than 200,000 Albanians, moved Kosovo onto the international agenda, leading first to the deployment of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission of unarmed observers (which failed to halt the violence), and then to the peace conference at Rambouillet, called by the Contact Group4 to negotiate a political settlement for Kosovo between the Kosovo Albanians and the Yugoslav authorities.5 Milošović’s refusal to sign the accords in March 1999 precipitated NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. After the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 ended Serbian forces withdrew and were replaced by NATO-led force and a UN administration. Under the authorization of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, UN took over the control in Kosovo and UNMIK (United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) was created as a result6. The role of UNMIK was to “establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo”.7.

UNMIK was made up of four pillars. One of the pillars was led by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and was dealing with refugees; however, it was phased out by June 2000. The other pillars, police, justice and civil administration were run directly by UNMIK, while reconstruction of the economy was under jurisdiction of the EU and institution building was managed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)8. It quickly established governmental structures in consultation with local political elites, gradually ‘kosovarised’ them by handing over administrative and political responsibility to local institutions, and democratically legitimized the institutions through elections. Thus in December 1999 UN-

4

France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom and United States.

Dominik Zaum, “States of Conflict: A case study on state-building in Kosovo”, Institute for Public Policy Research, 2009, p.6 6 Judah, Tim (2008) “Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know”, Oxford University Press, pp. 91 - 94 7 United Nations Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244, chapter 10 8 Ibid, at p. 94 5

11

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

MIK created the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS), establishing extensive local consultation mechanisms and a ‘double desk’ structure of local and international co-heads of municipal administrations and certain ministries.

Throughout the first three years of UNMIK, the international community studiously avoided addressing the question of Kosovo’s status. Only in late 2002 the then head of UNMIK, Michael Steiner, brought the issue onto the political agenda by introducing his ‘standards before status’ policy, followed by a Standards Implementation Plan a year later that was endorsed by the UN Security Council. The plan specified the standards to be achieved for a multi-ethnic, stable and democratic Kosovo. According to UNMIK, these “standards before status” were intended to improve levels of public performance, and form a more tolerant and just society. They covered eight fields: functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, sustainable returns and the rights of communities and their members, economy, property rights (including cultural heritage), PrishtinaBelgrade dialogue, and the Kosovo Protection Corps9.

This whole process led to the plan for Kosovo prepared under the leadership of the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. The central part of his final proposal, published in February 2007, was decentralization, seeing as the north of Kosovo and the Serbian enclaves were run and influenced by Serbia. The word independence was not used within the body of the plan, however, in a covering report Ahtisaari talked about “supervised independence”. He argued that the only feasible alternative for Kosovo is independence that should be supervised by the international community for an initial period of time. Kosovo would get recognition from the EU states and support, including money, but had to agree to implement the main requirements of the Ahtisaari Plan into their law. As European and Defense Policy (ESDP) missions, two organizations were deployed; the International Civilian Office (ICO) and an EU mission called EULEX. Under terms of the Ahtisaari proposal, EULEX job was to “monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo”. Its purpose was to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes10.

A deeply divided UN Security Council was unable to endorse the Ahtisaari plan, and in coordination with the US and most European states, Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, a move angrily rejected by Russia and Serbia, who requested an advisory opinion on the legality of the declaration of independence from the International Court of Justice. In addition, five European member states

9

United Nations Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244, chapter 10, at p. 109 Laureta Xhelili, “The challenges of state-building”, Lund University, 2012, p. 10

10

12

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

(Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece) have not recognized the new European state, which means that the independence remains contested. Serbia in which Kosovo previously was an autonomous province refuses to accept Kosovo as an independent state, and the majority of Serbs in Kosovo still refuses to recognize the Kosovar institutions and authorities.

As of 13 August 2014, the Republic of Kosovo has received 110 diplomatic recognitions as an independent state. Notably, 108 out of 193 (56%) United Nations (UN) member states, 23 out of 28 (82%) European Union (EU) member states, 24 out of 28 (86%) NATO member states, and 34 out of 57 (60%) Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member states have recognized Kosovo. The Government of Serbia does not recognize it as a sovereign state, but has begun to normalize relations with the Government of Kosovo in accordance with the Brussels Agreement. Kosovo had also joined the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Council of Europe Development Bank.

13

Academy for Strategic Analyses

3.

WORKING PAPER - 22

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

The declaration of independence precipitated a major reconfiguration of the international presence in Kosovo. When discussing the role of the international community in Kosovo one must be aware that there is a wide range of actors that have been involved and still are involved, and all of them play a different role. Each of these international organizations has a specific focus.

The role of UNMIK after February 2008, whose closure by the Security Council has been prevented by the Russian rejection of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, remains controversial. Even though we can see an amount of progress achieved in Kosovo under the leadership of UNMIK, the progress has been achieved as a topdown approach. UNMIK was successful with regard to many aspects of its mandate, in particular the establishment of a wide array of public institutions across Kosovo that generally enjoy wide support of the (Albanian) majority of the territory, and in particular the successful reform of the police. However, one of the major failures of UNMIK was the matter of no administration in the northern part of the country, and tolerated actions of illegal parallel structures in Kosovo. Its rapidly declining authority once status negotiations commenced, and its contested role after February 2008, have given the impression of a mission without a real mandate. This failure of UNMIK was added as a huge burden on the state building agenda in Kosovo. But judging UNMIK by its contribution to the resolution of Kosovo’s status ignores the reality that while it was expected to work towards this goal, it did not have the power to deliver it, especially once the status question became caught up in the divisions of the Security Council. Today the establishment of sovereignty and law in the northern part of the country under the Ahtisaari Plan is one of the major challenges that the government together with the international community in Kosovo are facing.

The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which had been authorized by a Joint Action of the European Council on the eve of Kosovo’s independence, took a long time to deploy into Kosovo, and only became fully operational in April 2009. It is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, with a specific focus on the judiciary.

EULEX monitors and advises the Kosovo government on all issues related to the rule of law, specifically the police, courts, customs officials, and prisons. EULEX

14

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

task is to ensure that these institutions work effectively, and to intervene in specific criminal cases, by referring them to international judges and prosecutors.

Almost six years since the EU Rule of Law mission (EULEX) was deployed, there has been no significant progress. Rule of law remains weak in Kosovo. EULEX has an executive mandate, in the field of fighting corruption and organized crime, especially in northern Kosovo, yet these are areas that continue to be criticized regularly in EC progress reports. Although, EULEX, has dealt with several corruption and organized crime cases, they constitute only a small number relative to its number of judges and prosecutors, and the time passed. In any case, it has failed to tackle high level corruption and organized crime.11 While the mission and its operational plan have been approved by all EU member states, the fact that five of them have not recognized Kosovo’s independence (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) has placed some constraints on the mission, especially with regard to the question of the applicable law: for example, should EULEX judges apply law passed by Kosovar institutions after independence? It remains to be seen whether EULEX’s mandate is robust enough in practice to take potentially controversial executive action, such as against individuals with close links to the government alleged to be involved in organized crime and corruption, or against the leadership of the parallel Serb institutions in the North.

The most obvious failure so far, has been the inability to install functioning rule of law institutions in northern Kosovo. Despite the fact that EULEX has a special mandate in that part of Kosovo, it has not managed to either install full customs controls in the border crossings, or ensure a functioning multiethnic district court in Mitrovica. This symbolizes a lack of willingness to install rule of law in the north, where smuggling is rampant.

KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force, plays the leading role in overseeing the training of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) called for by the Ahtisaari plan. The objectives of KFOR as NATO force in Kosovo were: to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order; to monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the agreements that ended the conflict and to provide assistance to the UN mission in Kosovo.12 KFOR with the help of the citizens were quite successful in re-establishing security in Kosovo. Therefore, three issues need to be addressed: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The international actors reached an agreement with the leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to transform it into the Kosovo Protection Corp (KPC). The 11 12

Seb Bytyci, “EU Enlargement and State-building in Balkans: A Comparative Analysis ”, 2011 p.3 See more about KFOR: http://nato.int/kfor/docu/about/objectives.html

15

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

rest of the KLA’s soldiers were encouraged to integrate the social processes and day-to-day life. By doing this consequently, they reached to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the former KLA soldiers in asocial and public life. Hence, the role of the international community in re-establishing security in the immediate postwar period can be considered as successful.

The Ahtisaari plan has been incorporate into Kosovo’s new constitution and an International Civilian Representative (ICR) heading an International Civilian Office (ICO), oversees Kosovo’s implementation of the plan. The ICO has a strong mandate on paper, it is inherently weak in practice, based not on the authority of an established multilateral institution such as the EU or the UN, but on the Ahtisaari Agreement (which is not recognized by Serbia) and the consent of the Kosovo government.

The ICO’s focus is just to implement the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (CSP) to ensure that there is a basis in law and in the government. The goal is to make sure that the equities of the CSP are guaranteed, to have life beyond the ICO, and to bring those values outside of the book and into the broader world of Kosovo.

Therefore, there is a lot in the book like decentralization, or religious and cultural heritage, which they are not concerned about.

16

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

4.

ICJ AND KOSOVO'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague has given its Advisory Opinion on the question of the "Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo". On 8 October 2008, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 63/3 in which, referring to Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, it requested the Court to render an advisory opinion on the following question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”

To determine whether the declaration of independence constituted a violation of these laws, the Court first addressed the question of the identity of the authors of the declarations. The Court found that the authors should be regarded as representatives of the people of Kosovo, acting outside the framework for the interim administration. In accordance with the Court’s reasoning this further means that due to the fact that there is no specific request addressed to the representatives

17

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

of the Kosovo Albanians to comply with certain aspects of Security Council resolution 1244, they cannot be considered as legally prohibited from issuing a declaration of independence.

Further interpreting Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), the Court found that it did not contain a determination of the final status of Kosovo, thus, also not prohibiting a unilateral declaration of independence by the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians in order to arrive at such a determination. The Court further based this on the argument that the requirement for a political settlement of the situation required by Security Council resolution 1244, did not address the authors of the declaration of independence but concerns only the responsibilities of the civilian presence in Kosovo, i.e. the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo and UNMIK. The Court thus concluded by ten votes to four “that the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework, adopted on behalf of UNMIK by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General”, and that “consequently the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law”.13

13

Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. 141 (July 22) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].

18

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

5. OBJECTIVES AND CHALLENGES TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE Even after fourteen years of international and almost seven years since its declaration of independence from Serbia, Kosovo continues to face ethnic and socioeconomic problems, as well as fundamental challenges to its governance and sovereignty that have the potential to undermine the progress achieved and threaten Kosovo’s stability. The social contract between citizens and the state is molded by a long history of distrust of public authorities and communal self-sufficiency. Today’s citizens still have limited expectations of their rulers. Informal systems of governance help people to survive, while widening the gap between governing and governed. Furthermore, the numerous corruption charges and the rapid rise of the politico-economic elite have weakened the public’s sense of identification with the state.

For the purpose of this study the key obstacles, challenges and root cause of fragility to the consolidation of the peaceful state will be examined. Kosovo leaks social capital, connective social tissue and the sort of networks that could function as springboard to move the nation forward. Moreover, the entrenched political economy and incentive structures perpetuate the state’s fragility.

5.1

The challenge of the North

One of the key challenges to a peaceful and stable Kosovo is the effective partition of the country along the River Ibar following independence, when Serb parallel institutions took over the municipal structures in the North.

A mirror of previous K-Albanian parallel dynamics can be found in the Serbian community in North Mitrovica and those in the central region. The Kosovo-Serbs are developing their parallel governance system as a sign of resistance, retaining Serbia’s currency, the dinar, and control by Belgrade over hospitals, university, schools and education curricula, courts, social, health and pension systems as well as their local assembly. Overall, the north constitutes a part of the national territory that is not managed by the government of Kosovo, and remains predominantly under Serbian control.

As a predominantly Serb area, North Kosovo is therefore under the de facto control of these Serb parallel structures, which substantially limits the capacity of

19

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

Kosovar institutions to extend their authority in this part of the country. These structures also constitute a significant obstacle to the representation and participation of Serbs in Kosovar institutions; they constrain the functioning of these institutions within Serb- populated areas and therefore threaten the overall territorial integrity and internal security of Kosovo.14 EULEX has not yet established a functioning customs regime in North Kosovo. During the 2008 anti-independence riots, Serbs destroyed the two border crossings in the North of Kosovo (Gates 1 and 31), creating a vacuum that facilitates the smuggling of people and untaxed goods between Serbia and Kosovo. Currently, these border points are managed by EULEX officials who merely record the entry and exit of goods.

SERBIAA

MONTENEGRO

ALBANIA FYROM

14

Paul Kingston and Ian Spears (eds.), States Within States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post– Cold War Era, Hampshire and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp 3-7

20

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

Alongside these failed attempts to establish a functioning state, it is important to note that in practice, the parallel structures and the international presence mutually reinforce each other at the expense of Kosovar authorities: the parallel structures legitimize and justify the continuation of the UN presence; likewise, the UN and OSCE presence in the North of Kosovo facilitates the de facto functioning of Serb parallel structures by hindering the exercise of authority by the Kosovo government.

5.2

Economic stagnation

The focus of international state-building efforts in Kosovo has been predominantly on political and security issues, and since 2008 in particular the rule of law. However, one of the major long-term challenges to social stability and a sustainable peace in Kosovo is the dire state of its economy.

Kosovo has the lowest GDP per capita in Europe. Unemployment is extremely high and the population is very young: 70 per cent are under 30. In a post-conflict and volatile environment such as Kosovo, youth unemployment may contribute to social unrest. Female unemployment in Kosovo is likewise high at over 70 per cent, and women are also denied property rights. The ongoing gender roles, perceptions and relations greatly influence access to the labor market. There are numerous NGOs focusing on gender issues, but there is a notable lack of women’s business associations to support, facilitate and encourage women’s entrepreneurship.

Kosovo is a rural society, with almost 72 per cent of the population living in the countryside. The majority of this rural population make their living from agriculture (predominantly subsistence agriculture), almost half of them have only primary education or less, and very few women participate in the labor market. Despite the importance of agriculture for Kosovo’s economy and the majority of its citizens, it is neither a priority for the Kosovo government (for several years after 2001 the Minister for Agriculture was a Serb, highlighting the low priority that the government assigns to it) nor the international donor community. Between 1999 and 2007, only 4 per cent of donor aid was allocated to agriculture.15 Unsurprisingly, more than 60 per cent of Kosovo Albanians and non-Serb minorities see economic problems as the main threat to stability in Kosovo. This lack of economic development thus contains a high potential for social conflict.16

15

EuropeanCommission/WorldBank(2008) Kosovo: Donors’ Conference Prospectus,Brussels,11 July 2008 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2008) Early Warning Report 23 (December 2008), Pristina: UNDP 16

21

Academy for Strategic Analyses

5.3

WORKING PAPER - 22

Threats to Human Security and corruption

Kosovo today faces several related human security challenges which are at the forefront of almost every government agency and NGO strategy, experiencing the need to give preeminence to human security as opposed to the traditional respect for the principle of state sovereignty. Daunting challenges and threats to human security in Kosovo are indeed numerous pertaining to the sectors of health, education, governance, human rights regime, labor and employment, social inclusion, property restitution, the controversial issues of law enforcement and protection of historical, cultural, and religious monuments - to mention only the most important.

In Kosovo, where there is 43 per cent unemployment, the political economy of grey and black markets predominates, and illicit wealth wields power. There is a nexus between wealth and power, since peace, national economic development and the consolidation of the state will hardly be able to prosper if the politicaleconomic incentives of the current settlement continue to be overlooked. Transnational smuggling, embezzlement of state funds, consolidation of local monopolies and fiefdoms and the control of vice markets have been crucial elements in the process of state weakening in Kosovo.

Human security approach also demonstrated that the economic development or ‘income generation’ is badly needed to address the country’s poverty and unemployment, and to generate tax revenue to enable the new democratic governance structures to function. The grim economic outlook, along with the lack of security, are some of the obstacles to the return of the remaining refugees, despite the international community’s strong policy and financial focus on this issue amounting to several billion of euro. Common to both conceptions is that threats to citizens in reality often emanate from the state itself. In sum, human security, described as freedom from fear and freedom from want, appears to be a key issue for stability in Kosovo.17 Problems with inefficient governance, high levels of corruption, election irregularities and the failure to establish the rule of law has impacted negatively on civic trust in institutions, on participation by citizens at the local level, and on civic activism.

17

Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, Princeton University Press, 2006, at p.4.

22

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

6.

CONCLUSION

Fourteen years after Serbia, Kosovo, and NATO signed the agreement that ended a decade of war in the Balkans, the European Union is still working to consolidate that peace, notably by implementing last year’s deal to normalize Serbia-Kosovo relations. Current peace-building practices in Kosovo attempt to create a particular kind of state that is presumed to have legitimacy. Yet the development of legitimate, effective states cannot be imposed from outside but rather emerges from internal negotiations, as a bottom-up endeavor.18 Kosovo faces numerous challenges. The rule of law in Kosovo, including judicial independence, and limited results in the fight against organized crime and corruption remains a major concern. The need for structural economic reforms addressing the high level of unemployment is becoming urgent. Important reforms such as electoral reform and public administration reforms need to be undertaken as a priority and the protection of minorities addressed.

The international presence in Kosovo has had a strong mandate and has been very well resourced compared with most state-building operations in post-conflict countries where developments have only limited implications for the security interests of Western countries. The case of Kosovo highlights the fact that states and international organizations intervening in post-conflict situations need to be realistic about what socio-political transformations they can actually achieve. Despite unprecedented resources and a very strong mandate, the capacity of the international presence in Kosovo to shape the state-building process has been limited, and its policies have been mostly responsive. Building peace implies changing bad habits, and transforming behaviors and structures, as well as addressing the underlying causes of fragility. In general, international missions have lacked this understanding and the necessary courage to achieve this.

The ‘Kosovo case’ points to the need of a complementary relationship between peace- building and human security, one which exists in many circumstances and should be maintained. Even more so if we bear in mind that building new state is a long, complex, and arduous process and ultimately dysfunctional if human security agenda is not properly handled.

18

Amnesty International (AI), Kosovo (Serbia): The challenge to fix a failed UN justice mission, 2008, available online at: www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SODA-7BBALA/$File/Full_Report.pdf

23

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

Kosovo is at an early stage in its fight against organized crime and corruption. Law enforcement agencies are reluctant to initiate financial investigations and the number of cases of freezing and confiscating assets ordered by the judiciary and executed by the police continues to be low. Witness intimidation is still a major concern. The new government and parliament need to show zero tolerance towards corruption and organized crime and a clear political will to the effective fight against corruption and organized crime. Kosovo’s political class needs to demonstrate its readiness to accept the outcome of independent judicial processes.

Fighting organized crime and corruption is fundamental to countering criminal infiltration of the political, legal and economic systems.

To consolidate the state and build self-sustaining peace, greater efforts must be made to curtail the sway of organized crime and cut back the shadow economy.

This will help improve the business climate and reduce the flow of illicit revenues into state structures. Moreover, business activities that contribute towards reconciliation between communities need to be supported.

Strengthening fiscal planning and effectively implementing the fiscal rule is vital.

Moreover, decisions on large infrastructure projects, such as in the transport sector, should be based on proper cost-benefit evaluations to maximize economic benefits. In view of the persistent and very high unemployment, efforts should be undertaken to facilitate private-sector development through improvements in the business environment. To that end, obstacles arising from weak administrative capacities, difficult access to finance and lengthy and complex privatization procedures should be swiftly addressed. Kosovo must ensure a properly functioning legal and judiciary system, enhance contract enforcement and effectively reduce delays in courts. Economic statistics need to be improved.

The situation in northern Kosovo remains tense. All actors should cooperate with EULEX, and refrain from taking unilateral steps. EULEX should be fully supported to carry out its mandate in north Kosovo. Further efforts should be made to allow the four northern municipalities to function under Kosovo’s legal framework.

Today, peace in Kosovo is stable but not sustainable. The path to sustainable peace is obstructed by fragile governance, fragmented ethnic power-sharing and social injustice, as well as by the overlapping and contested international presences that allow the functioning of Serb parallel structures and hold the situation of North Kosovo in limbo. These obstacles are the key factors that will shape the future of Kosovo. Kosovo has remained engaged in the dialogue and overall committed to the implementation of the April 2013 First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations and other agreements reached in the dialogue. This has led to a number of irreversible changes on the ground, with local and parliamen-

24

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

tary elections held Kosovo wide for the first time and the dismantling of the Serbian police and justice structures substantially advanced. A permanent solution for Kosovo’s inclusion in the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) was endorsed.

After nearly two years of technical and then political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under the mediation of the EU, the first normalization agreement was reached in April 2013. This agreement regulates the modalities of how to dismantle Serb parallel structures and integrate them within Kosovo's institutional system. In particular, the agreement regulates the municipal representation of Serb community in the north of Kosovo, the integration of Serb community in Kosovo's justice, police, and public services, as well as organization of local elections. Most importantly, both Kosovo and Serbia have agreed not to block each-others European integration path.

To avoid any potential destabilization in Kosovo, certain changes are necessary, including the creation of a functioning, democratic state with coherent, legal, and representative political structures, a sustainable peace between Kosovar- Serbs and Kosovar-Albanians, and promoting mutual recognition and cooperation between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia that would finally open the way for common integration within Euro-Atlantic structures, as a guarantee for long-term stability in the entire region.

State-building within a sustainable peacebuilding process is a long-term endeavor.

Peace requires profound social change. The contexts and conditions which define poor people’s opportunities and choices require gradual reshaping. State-building should not be seen as a technical exercise, nor should solutions to state fragility perpetuate the institutional weaknesses and violence rooted in traditional political practices. The underlying causes of fragility, including vested interests resisting change, need to be addressed with the necessary understanding, political will, peacebuilding focus and integrated international approach.

Considering the work that has been done till now, it can be said that the international community and notably the EU are in the last steps of this process. The last steps that are ongoing will make Kosovo a self-sustaining and viable state in the mid-term future and a successful model for other cases of international statebuilding. The success of the international community in Kosovo is at the same time a success of the European project in the Western Balkans. The European Union should catch this moment.

25

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

BIBLIOGRAPHY Adam Beha and Gezim Visoka, “Human Security as Ethnic Security in Kosovo”, Human Security Perspectives, Vol. 7, No 1, 2010 Amnesty International (AI), Kosovo (Serbia): The challenge to fix a failed UN justice mission, 2008, available online at: www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/ db900SID/SODA7BBALA/$File/Full_Report.pdf.

B. C. Smith, Good Governance and Development, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 British Accreditation Council (2008) Kosovo Accreditation Project Report London: British Accreditation Council Clark H (2000), Civil Resistance in Kosovo London: Pluto Press Economist, (2009) The ‘Kosovo and Media Freedom: No Criticism, Please’, The Economist, 2 July European Commission/World Bank (2008) Kosovo: Donors’ Conference Prospectus, Brussels, 11 July 2008 George Brunner, “Nationality problems and minority conflicts in Eastern Europe”, Gutersloh, 1996 Dragana Dulic, “Peace Building and Human Security: Kosovo Case, HUMSEC Journal, Issue 3, 2010 Dominik Zaum, “States of Conflict: A case study on state-building in Kosovo”, Institute for Public Policy Research, 2009.

Doyle W. Michael and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, Princeton University Press, 2006 Denisa Kostovicova, “Legitimacy and International Administration: The Ahtisaari Settlement for Kosovo from a Human Security Perspective”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No 5, 2008 ECMI, “Minority Issues in Kosovo”, 2009, http://www.ecmi-map.com/map/index. php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=30&Itemid=58&lang=en. (Accessed 07 January 2015) Hoogenboom, Jitske (2011) ‘The EU as a Peacebuilder in Kosovo’, A paper prepared in the framework of the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Available at: http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/CSDN/Member%20State%20Meetings/Romania/CSDN_Romania_PolicyAnalysis_EUasPeacebuilderinKosovo.pdf (Accessed February 20 2015)

26

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

International Crisis Group (2010) ‘The Rule of Law in Independent Kosovo’. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/204-the-rule-oflaw-in- independent-kosovo.aspx (Accessed February 20 2015).

Jakup Krasniqi, “Kosovo Declaration of Independence”, 17 February 2008, http://www. assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635 (Accessed on 15 February 2015) Judah, Tim, “Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know”, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Laureta Xhelili, “The challenges of state-building”, Lund University, 2012 Menocal R. Alina (2011) ‘State Building for Peace: a new paradigm for international engagement in post-conflict fragile states?’, Third World Quarterly Medija Centar, “Security and perspectives in the north of Kosovo”, 19 July 2010, http:// www.medijacentar.info/en/mc-debates/reports/298-qsecurity-and-perspecti es-inthe-north-of-kosovoq-16072010 (Accessed 15 February 2015) Montanaro, Lucia (2009) ‘The Kosovo State-building Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested State’, FRIDE Working Paper No. 91. Available at: http://www.initiativefor peacebuilding.eu/resources/WP91_Kosovo_Statebuilding_Conundrum.pdf (Accessed Feb ruary 20 2015) Oliver P. Richmond, Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding, Hampshire and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010 Paul Kingston and Ian Spears (eds.), States Within States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post–Cold War Era, Hampshire and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2005 Gezim Visoka (2011), “The Obstacles to Sustainable Peace and Democracy in Post-Independence Kosovo”, Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security, vol 01, No 02, CESRAN Weller M (2008), ‘The Vienna Negotiations on the Final Status for Kosovo’ International Affairs Woehrel, Steven (2012) ‘Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy’, CRS Report for Congress.

Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21721.pdf (Accessed March 06 2015) United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1244 (1999)”, United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1244, 1999 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2008) Early Warning Report 23 (December 2008), Pristina: UNDP Wolff, Stefan (2011) ‘Post-Conflict State Building: the debate on institutional choice’, Third World Quarterly.

Xharra J (2009) ‘Kosovo: Journalist under Fire’, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 4 June, available at: www.birn.eu.com

27

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

Zaum D (2007) “The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding” Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zaum D (2009) “States of Conflict: A case study on statebuilding in Kosovo” Institute for Public Policy Research.

Websites http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/past-events/kosovo-on-stabilizing-peace-withserbia http://www.economist.com http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=11906 http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/11/18/rule-lawlessness-eulex-kosovo/ http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm http://www.wwnorton.com/college/polisci/lenses/protect/cs_ks_kosovo.htm

28

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE-BUILDING -THE CASE OF KOSOVO, Nikolaos Giannopoulos

The Academy for Strategic Analyses (ASA) is an independent non-profit scientific and research institution, a think-tank, based in Athens. It was founded in 2014, by scientists from the Hellenic Armed Forces and Hellenic Security Corps, who hold a PhD or holders of other high level qualifications, with rich scientific, research and writing work and collaboration with Greek and foreign universities, research centres and institutes, in various scientific fields.

Moreover distinguished personalities from military, diplomatic and academic areas and other high-profile scientists, became members of the Academy.

The main task of the ASA is the development of scientific work and activities in the field of Strategic Studies, Defense, Security and Foreign Policy, the elaboration of scientific analyses, research and studies, as well as the provision of specialized advisory and educational services to public bodies, private sector and to individuals in those articles, at national, European and international levels.

In this framework, the Academy's activities are developed within scientific areas, such as: (a) Analysis of strategic environment, (b) Analysis of the Defense and Security Policy, (c) System analysis, technology and economy, (d) Operational research, command and control.

The Academy will cooperate with international organizations, academic-scientific institutions and other centers of scientific research with a related object, as well as with authoritative scientists, militaries, diplomats, etc., especially in the Euro-Atlantic and the wider Mediterranean environment.

www.acastran.org info@acastran.org https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses

29

Academy for Strategic Analyses

WORKING PAPER - 22

www.acastran.org info@acastran.org https://www.facebook.com/AcademyStrategicAnalyses 30 ISSN: 2407-9863