MTCR
UNDER CONTROL?
There are questions of access and influence behind a US decision to redraw part of the MTCR BY DOUGAL ROBERTSON
I
n a statement issued on 24 July this year, the White House announced the decision to move a “carefully selected subset” of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) from the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I to Category II. The decision is significant for two reasons. The first is it potentially makes high-end UAS – including armed medium altitude long-endurance (MALE) systems – available to a range of non-traditional US security partners. This means we may see more sales in the Indo-Pacific of UAS based on the successful General Atomics Aeronautical Systems International (GA-ASI) Predator B and Reaper airframes. The second is it shows how the US may be seeking to reduce Chinese influence in strategic areas by linking non-allied countries through technology. The White House statement came as no surprise to those following the UAS export debate in the US. In April 2018 President Trump had signed a memorandum approving a new Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy. The revised CAT was intended to make it easier for US defence companies to sell high-value technology to allies and partners, and called for a plan to align
UAS export policy more closely with US national and economic security interests. To those not following the UAS export debate, the vagaries of the MTCR could seem a dusty corner of international policy. The MTCR was established in 1987 to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence (CBRND) attacks. In the closing stages of the Cold War, the MTCR – a voluntary agreement between signatory nations – seemed the most effective way of preventing Soviet weapons and technology directly or inadvertently falling into the hands of rogue or pariah states. Fourteen years later in 2001, the MTCR received a further boost as partner nations sought to prevent missile technology being sold or transferred to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or Lebanese Hezbollah. The MTCR requires each member nation to control the export of technologies that could be used to deliver CBRND payloads, and these technologies are listed in an annex to the MTCR containing Category I and Category II items. The MTCR guidelines state there should be a “strong
The grouping of larger UAS with cruise and ballistic missiles under the MTCR means airframes such as the Global Hawk (above) have been restricted to a select group of customers. NORTHROP GRUMMAN
