Winter 2015 by American Foreign Policy Magazine

american foreign policy Winter 2015

Volume XIV, Issue I

From the Editor-in-Chief

Staff Editor-in-Chief Molly Reiner ’17

Dear Readers, This Winter, AFP sought to explore the troubling rise of jihadi activity in the Middle East, with the increasing success of both the Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham), and the Nigerian extremist group Boko Haram. We also made sure not to overlook other important global events that usually become overshadowed by such news from the Middle East.

President Jamal Maddox ‘16 Publisher Patricio Elizondo ’16

Thus, we begin this is issue of American Foreign Policy with a consideration of U.S. immigration policy in light of this summer’s influx of children from Latin America. Written by Lauren Wodarski, this article posits that the emphasis of this crisis should be placed on humanitarian concerns, rather than the logistics of the immigration itself. This issue also features a discussion of a possible independence referendum in Catalonia, Spain written by Adriana Vitagliano, as well as an in-depth consideration of the relationship between Israel and China and the role that the United States plays in this burgeoning diplomacy, which I have written.

Managing Editor Tucker Jones ’16 Editors

Our cover article shifts to an exploration of the relatively unchecked growth of Boko Haram, written by Michael Smerconish. With today’s focus on the wild growth and gruesome violence of the Islamic State, other equally concerning radical Islamist organizations have gone largely under the radar. Despite initial media attention and social media outcry in response to the mass kidnapping executed by Boko Haram earlier this year, public attention has dropped off despite the continuation of violence and the Nigerian government’s incapacity to stop it. In his article, Michael brings the Boko Haram problem back into focus.

Richard Peay Michael Smerconish Joyce Lee Sarah Kim

’17 ’18 ’17 ’17

Layout

In the “Talking Points” and exploration sections, our editorial staff takes snapshots of certain phenomena related to the Islamic State in the Middle East and Beyond. In “AFP Explores the News,” Eli Schechner provides an account of the ISIS recruitment situation in Europe, the United States, and Australia, most notably in the unlikely world of rap music. Finally, in “Talking Points,” Michael Smerconish links the progress of Arab Spring conflicts on the fifth anniversary of its beginning to the increased ISIS presence throughout the Middle East.

Daniel Elkind ’17 Production Manager Molly Reiner Eli Schechner Michael Smerconish Jamal Maddox Joe Margolies

For short news articles, updated weekly, please check out our AFP blog, which can be found on our website at www.afpprinceton.com. Addtionally, if you are a Princeton student interested in getting involved, our team would love to have you on board! Send me an email at mreiner@ princeton.edu with any interest or questions.

’17 ’18 ’18 ’16 ’15

Copy Editors Grant Golub ’17 Scarlett Grabowska ’17 Joyce Lee ’17

Sincerely, Molly Reiner Editor-in-Chief

Editors-in-Chief Emeriti Tucker Jones ’16 Joe Margolies ’15

Blog Editor

Molly Reiner ’17 AmericAn Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. AmericAn Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or AmericAn Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. This publication strives to use all Creative Commons licensed images. Please contact AFP if you feel any rights have been infringed. All correspondence may be directed to: AmericAn Foreign Policy, 3611 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.afpprinceton.com

AFP Advisory Board

Wolfgang Danspeckgruber: Director, Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Cecilia Rouse: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School

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AFP

A mericAn F oreign P olicy Winter 2015 Volume XIV, Issue I

ta b l e o f co n t e n ts

Children at the Border Immigration Issue or Humanitarian Crisis? Lauren Wodarski’ 18

An Enigmatic Threat Boko Haram Makes Significant Gains in Nigeria Michael Smerconish ’18

8 9 10

Indecent Proposal The Prospect of an Independent Catalonia Adriana Vitagliano ’16

The Chinese-Israeli Relationship When Actions (and Dollar Signs) Speak Louder than Words Molly Reiner ’17

15 16 17 18

AFP Quiz

Michael Smerconish ’18

Global Update Editorial Staff

In Context

Michael Smerconish ’18 Some Unlikely ISIS Recruits AFP Explores the News Eli Schechner ’18 Global Gallery The World in Pictures The Editorial Staff Revisiting Unresolved Conflicts The Confluence of the Arab Spring and ISIS Michael Smerconish ’18

Photo Credits: The BBC, Flickr, Scrape

Cover Image by Joe Margolies ‘15

Winter 2015

u.s. domestic Policy

children At the Border immigrAtion issue or humAnitAriAn crisis?

his past summer, the American public was bombarded by news reports of the “Immigration Crisis.” Tens of thousands of child refugees, dubbed “Unaccompanied Alien Children” by the Department of Homeland Security, crossed the border. Once caught by border patrol, they were placed in overcrowded shelters as they awaited deportation hearings. Or at least that is the picture the media seemed to paint, a picture that sounded more like an invasion of “aliens” than a crisis involving thousands of child victims. The media largely failed to provide the public with the full stor y. In reality, the inf lu x of child immigrants to the United States is an incredibly complex issue. These children were, and are, not simply pining for a spot in the American education system, hoping for a better life, or pushing their luck against a f lawed U.S. border security system. They are f leeing extreme violence and unrest in their home countries. Many were not caught at the border; they turned themselves in, approaching border patrol agents for help. This is therefore not the ty pical undocumented immigrant narrative. And thus, while off icials in Washington lobbied for increased spending on border security, and the Governor of Texas called out the National Guard, another voice tried to rise above the din. This voice labeled the socalled “immigration crisis” a humanitarian refugee crisis instead, giving credit to the fact that these children, of ten as young as 5 and 6 years old, willingly submitted to incredibly dangerous journeys from Central America as a last hope of escape from unspeakable gang violence. Coming from Central America,

Lauren Wodarski ’17

most of ten Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, these children risk their lives traveling in groups led by untrustworthy “coyotes” across Mexico. The coyotes frequently charge exorbitant amounts and prey on poor, ner vous families who hope that a border crossing will keep their children from being k illed by gang violence or subjected to rampant sexual abuse. Kristyn Peck, Associate Director of Children’s Ser vices for the U.S. Conference of

“These children were, and are, not simply pining for a spot in the American education system, hoping for a better life, or pushing their luck against a flawed U.S. border security system. They are fleeing extreme violence and unrest in their home countries.” Catholic Bishops, says that while on an assessment trip to these three Central American countries, she asked a young Honduran mother why she had sent her children to the United States. The mother replied, “I k now the journey is dangerous, but it is dangerous here.” The question of why these three countries are so dangerous is a complicated one, but we can begin to answer it by discussing the issue of gang violence. According to the Wall Street Journal, Latin America has recently surpassed Africa as the most dangerous place to live in terms of homicides and gang violence. Massive transnational gangs like the MS-13 have caused the child

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murder rate in countries like Honduras to rise 77% in the past year alone. Certainly then, these children have a well-founded, legitimate desire and need to leave their home countries. Today for example, there are currently over one million Syrian refugees in Turkey, seek ing asylum from the intense violence between Kurdish forces, the Syrian Government, the Free Syrian Army and Islamic militants. Turkey has made immense efforts to accommodate these refugees, and has refrained from sending them back to their home countr y. Though the conditions in Central America are markedly different, the fact that both cases involve people f leeing danger is undeniable. The United States’ approach to this immigration crisis is f lawed because it has been labeled an immigration crisis instead of the humanitarian crisis it so clearly has become. Regardless of how this crisis is def ined, both parties in Washington have been reluctant to take any action, and today, the issue seems to have been pushed to the back burner. Just because the number of children being apprehended at the border has dropped signif icantly does not mean that a solution is no longer needed. According to statistics from the Department of Homeland Security, border patrol apprehended around 5,000 undocumented children immigrants in July, about half the total of the previous month. The Administration claims that the drop has in part been because of “proactive talks” with the presidents of Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. Yet the drop is likely because of another administration policy, one of “aggressive deterrence,” where it is made clear that children will be sent home as soon as they arrive. An “aggressive deterrence” campaign aligns with the proposal discussed by lawmakers earlier in the summer to change the Traff icking Victims Protection Reauthorization act of 2008. Section 235 currently stipulates that any unaccompanied alien child of a countr y that is contiguous to the United

U.S. Domestic Policy

A border patrol officer talks with a child. Image Courtesy of Jennifer Whitney of the New York Times

States (Canada or Mexico) is subject to an expedited deportation process. This means the children undergo a quick screening and are then returned to the child ’s countr y of nationality or habitual residence. All other unaccompanied alien children must have a proper immigration trial, with counsel to represent them in legal proceedings, consistent with Section 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The proposed change would rid the Traff ick ing Victims Protection Act of its “continuous clause” and allow for expedited deportation of all unaccompanied alien children. Yet human rights proponents f ind fault with this law. They claim that the proposed changes would curtail important legal rights for immigrants. If this immigration inf lu x is in fact a humanitarian crisis, then the cases of these children should be more thoroughly examined before they are sent back to their home countries. Immigration law yers propose that the focus be shif ted from deportation to asylum trials. A good portion of the Central American children have cases for asylum, which would be ignored in a speedy trial process where young k ids with little k nowledge of Eng-

lish or the American legal system would be ignorant of their rights. This is not a permanent solution. It doesn’t solve the problem of overcrowded shelters. And it doesn’t even touch on the mess of our immigration system, which certainly

“[...]this is a case of children coming to America for safety. It has less to do with comprehensive immigration reform and more to do with targeted humanitarian policies to ensure all recent immigrants from Central America with legitimate appeals are given the opportunity request asylum.” needs comprehensive immigration reform. But this is a case of children coming to America for safety.

Winter 2015

It has less to do with comprehensive immigration reform and more to do with targeted humanitarian policies to ensure all recent immigrants from Central America with legitimate appeals are given the opportunity to request asylum. The United States claims to be a countr y that comes to the aid of others, one that opens her doors to the “poor huddled masses yearning to be free.” There are evident humanitarian aspects of this recent immigration crisis, and thus the ty pical deportation processes should not be expedited, but rather bolstered, so as to provide as many immigrants as possible the change to be granted amnesty through the immigration courts. To ignore this problem would be against our values as Americans, and possibly deadly to the thousands of Central American children who, if sent back to Honduras or El Salvador, would be headed back to countries plagued by endemic gang violence. Afp

Lauren may be reached at wodarski@princeton.edu

AFricA

Boko Haram militants near the village of Kolofata, Cameroon. Image courtesy of The Accra Report.

An enigmAtic threAt Boko hArAm mAkes signiFicAnt gAins in nigeriA

n the days and weeks following April 14, 2014, social media erupted with talk over the #BringBackOurGirls campaign, a response to the abduction of close to 300 female Nigerian students by the terrorist group Boko Haram. The internet was quickly flooded with pictures of celebrities; the likes of Michelle Obama, Justin Timberlake, and Ellen DeGeneres, among others, posted photos of themselves holding signs with slogans like “REAL MEN DON’T BUY GIRLS.” More than eight months after the fact, however, and public outcry has ceased despite the fact that only 57 of the girls have been “brought back.” As the eyes of the world have become locked on the Islamic State, formerly known as The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and a deteriorating Middle East, Nigeria’s domestic terror issues have only worsened. While the US is justified in its decision to focus on the greater threat that is the Islamic State, continued logistical and intelligence aid to Nigeria must be-come a greater priority. Boko Haram, a term given to the

Michael Smerconish ’18

group by the Nigerian public that roughly translates to “Western education is forbidden,” turned to violence in 2009. In protest of a seemingly antiIslamic law that required motorcycle riders to wear helmets, Haram clashed with the Nigerian military, resulting in over 800 casualties. Although Boko Haram’s leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed in the exchange, he was immediately replaced by one Abubakur Shekau. Five years later, and now notorious for such large scale acts of violence, the group is at its peak in terms of size and territorial control. Recent months have witnessed the most destructive period in the group’s history, a narrative that began with Yusuf ’s founding of the organization in 2002. Since the highly publicized kidnapping of the Chobik schoolgirls in April, Haram has carried out over forty separate attacks and killed over 1,700 civilians. The attacks, which have predominantly occurred in the country’s northeast, ranged from suicide and car bombs to full on assaults of villages and public gatherings. The group’s kidnappings have

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also con-tinued, most notably with the abduction of the wife of Amadou Ali, Cameroon’s vice prime minister.

“Recent months have witnessed the most destructive period in the group’s history [...] Since the highly publicized kidnapping of the Chobik schoolgirls in April, Haram has carried out over forty separate attacks and killed over 1,700 civilians.” Boko Haram has attempted to impose strict Islamic law, known as Sharia, over its areas of control long before ISIS declared an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. Founded on a staunchly anti-Western platform, Boko Haram forbids its populace from any “Western” habits, including participation in elections, smoking and drinking, or ownership of particular

types of clothing. This same basis has also been the motive for the group to specifically target Nigeria’s more secular schools. According to a 2013 report from Amnesty International, “At least 50 schools [had] either been burned or seri-ously damaged [by Boko Haram] and more than 60 others [had] been forced to close.” Most alarming to the governments

“Current estimates, though information from the region has generally been very limited and consistently unreliable, suggest that Boko Haram controls an area roughly the size of West Virginia.” of Nigeria and of surrounding countries, however, was the group’s capture of Gwoza and Bama, cities with a combined population of 600,000. With Bama existing as a gateway to the far more populous Maiduguri, many have feared the worst for the city of over 1,000,000. While Nigerian troops recently claimed to have re-captured Bama, the area still remains very much contested. Current estimates, though information from the region has generally been very limited and consistently unreliable, suggest that Boko Haram controls an area roughly the size of West Virginia. If one were to judge the group solely based on international and media response, however, its threat to regional wellbeing would not seem so se-vere. In the wake of escalated Boko Haram insurgence, the reaction of the United States and the greater global community has been ostensibly lesser than the response to ISIS. While the US has begun airstrikes both in and outside of Syria, its aid to Nigeria has been far subtler. In place of direct military action, the U.S. has only provided for finite amounts of logistical and military training for Nigerian forces as well as some intelligence aid to the govern-

Africa

ment. Although recent attempts by Boko Haram to infiltrate neighboring Cameroon have garnered increased attention from the U.S., our national effort still pales in comparison to that taken in the Middle East. So why the lack of concern towards a jihadist group that has caused hundreds of thousands to flee their homes in the past few months alone? Why the ease at which we have forgotten the cruel abduction of over two hundred female students? The best answer lies not within Nigeria but within the superior administrative capabilities and larger international appeal of the Islamic State. Given the difficulty of confronting both Boko Haram and ISIS at once, the US has labeled the Islamic State the more dangerous threat and therefore made the group its center of focus. As one US official told NBC News, “[Boko Haram’s] foreign fighter recruitment is not as extensive, and they aren’t yet as adept at competently governing the areas they control [as ISIS].” Furthermore, unlike Haram, which has recruited almost the entirety of its members from within the Nigerian northeast, ISIS boasts projections of having thousands of foreign fighters. What is terrifying in this regard is Boko Haram’s admiration for, and eager-ness to learn from, the Islamic State. John Campbell, a former U.S. ambas-sador to Nigeria, noted that “Shekau likes to copy and mimic some aspects of ISIS and he was one of the fewer jihadi leaders who welcomed ISIS’s declaration of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria.” Recently, there have even been circulating rumors of an imminent alliance between the two groups. Even so, the current US policy of military inaction may likely be the most pragmatic for the time being. The US has been forced to choose between Boko Haram and ISIS and, according to majority of experts, has chosen correctly. The optimal approach, for now at least, seems to be for the US to augment its intelligence and operational support to Nigeria while also adopting an outlook of regional containment for Boko Haram. Cooperation with neighboring countries, particularly Cameroon on the northeast border, is essential in ensuring that the group does not

Winter 2015

continue expanding. Bringing additional countries into the strategic discussion would also lessen one of the greatest challenges beleaguering the fight against Boko Haram: the Nigerian government itself. Though overseeing Africa’s largest defense budget, economy, and population, the government has failed in coordinating the group’s suppression. Instead, the country has witnessed numerous instances of Nigerian soldiers fleeing Haram’s assaults, on occasion taking refuge in neighboring Cameroon. Nigeria’s sheer lack of coordination and intelligence capabilities is epitomized by Abubakur Shekau. The Cameroon military earlier this year claimed to have killed Shekau in a series of standoffs with Boko Haram. In response, Nigeria bizarrely asserted that the deceased in question was only a doppelgänger and the real Abubakur Shekau was killed by its own military back in 2009. Shekau has become “one of the world’s least understood mass killers,” according to the Washington Post. “No one knows how old he is. Some say he’s 35. Others say 44. Twice he was believed dead, and twice he reemerged to usher in a broader and more diabolic campaign of killings across northern Nigeria. The idea of Abubakar Shekau, it appears, cannot be killed.” While Shekau’s actual existence is in question, the enigma encapsulates the uncertainty of Boko Haram’s magnitude and territorial breadth. Such matters of general intelligence should be an area of focus for the US in its continued support of Nigeria. With Nigeria and neighboring countries possessing the military strength to dismantle the group, it is in the best interest of the US to assist them with superior operational assistance. Given the eerie similarities between ISIS and Boko Haram, as well as Haram’s affection for its jihadist counterpart, amplified aid today would hopefully avoid another call for direct military intervention further down the road. Afp

Michael may be reached at mas13@princeton.edu

euroPe

indecent ProPosAl the ProsPect oF An indePendent cAtAloniA

early three months after he introduced his first referendum proposal in September, Catalan regional president Artur Mas has rolled out a new plan for the region’s independence, calling for yet another vote on Catalonia’s possible secession. Mas has expressed a desire to hold early regional elections that will focus on the issue and has declared his intent to create a coalition of pro-independence parties. The early vote, Mas hopes, will also serve as a definitive referendum on the secession question; the formation of the aforementioned coalition yields the highest likelihood of winning an absolute majority in the elections, which, under Mas’s vision, will be followed by a vote to formalize Catalonia’s secession within 18 months. On September 29th, the Madrid Constitutional Court banned the first referendum on independence planned by Mr. Mas. This injunction came a week after the Catalan Parliament approved the Law on Consultations, which authorized the use of a non-binding consultation vote regarding secession from Spain. According to polls at the time, 80% of people in the region–which with 7.5 million people, contains 16% of Spain’s total population– wanted the opportunity to vote on the issue, with estimated 45-50% of these citizens in favor of secession. However, the referendum proposed by Mr. Mas was firmly rejected by the central government and viewed as a “grave attack on the rights of all Spaniards,” according to Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. Following Mr. Mas’s call for referendum, Mr. Rajoy questioned the constitutionality of the Law on Consultations and called upon the power of the Constitutional Court to review the issue. The central government in Madrid held that such a vote must be given to the entirety of Spain’s population in order to keep with Spain’s 1978 constitution. Thus, though the vote proposed by Mr. Mas was to be non-binding, it would still be illegal.

Adriana Vitagliano ’16 Nevertheless, on Sunday, November 9, nearly 2 million Catalonians voted in the symbolic referendum in clear defiance of the central government. Due to the lack of formal electoral proceedings, voters were registered by around 41, 000 volunteers at over 1,200 polling stations. Overall, 5.4 million Catalans and foreign residents were eligible to participate in the vote. The ballot posed the question “Do you want Catalonia to become a State?” and if the response was yes, asked, “Do you want this State to be independent?” The results showed over 80% of voters answered yes to both questions, 4.5% answered no to both questions, and around 10% answered yes to the first and no to the second.

“For the EU, the Catalonian situation represents a conflict of values.” These results reinforced the opinion that had been dramatically demonstrated on September 11th, when 1.8 million people gathered in Barcelona along two of Spain’s largest avenues, Diagonal and Gran Vía, to form a giant, 11km long “V” for “victory” and “vote.” The consistency in the numbers of participants across these separate events seems to confirm that the upsurge in pro-independence sentiment is not simply an irregularity or fluke, but a determined movement that cannot easily be derailed. Due to the natural comparisons drawn between Scotland and Catalonia, many viewed the “no” vote in Scotland as a blow to the independence movement in Catalonia. Pro-secession supporters, however, have insisted that the rejection of independence in Scotland is not a setback. For Catalonia, the Scottish rejection

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of independence was not as important as the existence of the vote itself. Catalonia claims to be fighting for the right to vote more than the right to independence. The vote in Scotland succeeded in bringing the issue to the international stage as well as catalyzing negotiations with the UK for greater autonomy, such as increased selfgovernment and control over budgeting. In Catalonia, the same sort of negotiations is impossible because the region already possesses many of these powers. In this sense, the results of a “no” vote would be much less productive than in Scotland. For many Catalan people, it seems the current level of autonomy is no longer enough. Why does pro-independence sentiment exist in Catalonia? As one of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities, Catalonia is entitled to its own Statute of Autonomy and right to legislative powers. However, the central government still wields significant control over regional operations. This is at the root of one of the main concerns of the Catalan government: the gap between the amount of taxes the region contributes and the amount of tax money that is returned to the region via public spending. The Catalonian community contributes 25% of Spain’s total revenue. However, the general sentiment of many citizens Catalonia is that their money is largely used to support poorer regions within Spain while it should instead be reinvested into Catalonia. This type of fiscal imbalance occurs frequently in countries characterized by federal systems. In the case of Scotland, for example, this imbalance takes the form of a surplus. In Catalonia, on the contrary, the imbalance is instead a deficit, as the relatively rich region funds other parts of Spain. Since the mid 20th century, Spain’s history has been characterized by conflict between the drive for a single national Spanish identity and the forces behind the persistence of a national Catalan identity. Under Franco, the Catalan language and Catalan culture were completely repressed. It was illegal to speak Catalan in public or publish works in Catalan, and many prominent scholars were forced into exile. The people of Catalonia rebounded from this oppression with newfound pride in their language, culture, and history. The last decade saw a peak in these sentiments, bolstered by increasingly “Catalan” gov-

ernmental policies. Catalan, not Castilian Spanish, is the official language of the region as well as the language of the workplace and educational system. Today, approximately 50% of the Catalan population identifies Catalan as their mother tongue; over 75% speak it, and close to 100% of the population can understand it. In fact, it has more speakers than many other official EU languages, including Danish, Finnish, and Slovak. In size and population, Catalonia is not far from Switzerland (8 million, 32,114 km2) or Denmark (5.6 million, 43,094 km2), both of which are ranked within the top 10 countries worldwide with the highest GDP. Economically, Catalonia currently provides 20% of Spain’s total GDP and according to the OECD Review of Higher Education in Regional and City Development, the GDP per capita is higher than the EU average. What if the vote is held? Critics have been fast to point to the danger that a formal, binding vote poses to state stability, a concern voiced in large part by European Union. For the EU, the Catalonian situation represents a conflict of values; an obligation to state stability is counteracted by a commitment to the organization’s democratic foundations. In the case of a vote in favor of independence, Catalonia’s secession could result in a domino effect throughout other regions; the success of the Catalan’s efforts could encourage other separatist movements throughout the EU and potentially destabilize the entire continent. Yet rejection of a formal referendum would seem to directly defy the respect for the majority will and thus threaten the core tenants of democracy. This analysis is largely dependent on the definitions of state and nation, and dissecting this distinction provides insight for further understanding of the forces at play. The objective of the EU, as stated in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, is to “organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples,” Thus, the goal is to integrate the political units within the union as well as the societies within these units–not only the states, but also the nations. While a strictly nationalistic view would identify any nation as a state, a dual system recognizes that several nations may exist within one state. The

Europe

UK, for example, would be viewed both as a single state but also a trio of nations. This perspective would align with the idea that the current conflict is a direct result of the forced marriage of two distinct groups under one state structure. If Spain is viewed as a dynamic system of coexistence rather than a singular, unified nation, then the problem stems from a divergence in attitudes and objectives matched by a condition of uneven redistribution. As one member of a plurality of parties, Catalonia is questioning what is viewed as a lack of reciprocity represented by the historical fiscal imbalance. Madrid, on the other hand, may perceive the issue as one of a selfish refusal to cooperate for the benefit of the nation as a whole. Essentially, the problem is rooted in the question of whether Spain is a nation-state: is Spain one Spanish nation or is the Catalan nation one of many Spanish nations. What happens next? In his book Exit, Voice or Loyalty, economist Albert Hirschman identifies two potential responses to dissatisfaction with an organization. A party can either “exit”, by leaving the organization, or “voice”, by initiating a dialogue with the objective of achieving change that improves the situation. Keeping within this mentality, the following question arises: if the choice of “voice” is eliminated-and the people’s ability to express the will of the majority is suppressed– will the last resort of “exit” become the only option? The answer to this question is inevitably tied to a long string of follow-ups. Firstly, how would an independent Catalonia fit into the larger EU picture? The nation would be forced to reapply for EU membership, a lengthy process made all the more difficult by the fact that both the UK and Spain have veto ability. The issue of monetary policy is also prominent; the new Catalonian currency would have to be pegged to the Euro, or the independent nation would continue to use the Euro. Since as of recently it appears unlikely that a legal and binding vote will be held anytime soon, it seems these questions, along with the voice of the people of Catalonia, will continue to simmer, waiting for answers. Afp

Adriana may be reached at adrianav@princeton.edu

Winter 2015

AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Monthly Michael Smerconish ’18 1. In late November, President Obama announced the resignation of the occupant of which US Secretarial position? A. Secretary of State B. Secretary of Defense C. Secretary of Commerce D. Secretary of the Treasury 2. Which of the following presidents earned one of TIME magazine’s four “Person of the Year” 2014 runner-up positions? A. Dilma Roussef B. Enrique Peña Nieto C. Xi Jinping D. Vladimir Putin 3. Earlier this year, Pope Francis announced plans for his first US papal visit in September of 2015 to attend a conference on the theme of family in which city? A. Los Angeles B. Philadelphia C. Dallas D. Boston 4. Malala Yousafzai recently became the youngest individual to win a Nobel Peace Prize at the age of: A. 17 B. 19 C. 21 D. 23 5. The UN plans to hold its 2015 climate change conference in which of the following countries? A. France B. The Netherlands C. Switzerland D. Canada

Answers on page 17

A: Elections for the Knesset, the

parliament of ISRAEL, have been set for March 17th. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu disbanded his cabinet and called for the dissolution of parliament in December.

B: First Lady of ZIMBABWE Grace C: As a humanitarian gesture, Mugabe is promoted to the head of the women’s wing of Zimbabwe’s ruling Zanu-PF Party, positioning her as a likely successor to her husband, Robert Mugabe.

G: Protests continue around the world H: American photojournalist Luke over the September murder of forty three students in MEXICO’s Guerrero state. Protesters have demanded a thorough investigation from the Mexican government.

Somers and South African teacher Pierre Korkie were killed by al-Qaeda kidnappers during a failed hostage rescue mission in YEMEN.

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URUGUAY accepted and resettled six Guantánamo Bay detainees amidst ongoing U.S. efforts to close the detention facility in Cuba.

I: Typhoon Hagupit battered THE

PHILIPPINES in December. However, improved emergency protocols in the wake of the devastating Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 mitigated the loss of life.

D: A court in EGYPT acquitted

Hosni Mubarak, the country’s former president, of conspiracy to kill 239 protesters during the 2011 overthrow of his government. Mubarak’s two sons were also cleared of corruption charges.

E: Struggling to accommodate

the arrival of thousands of Syrian refugees, SWEDEN’s voters increasingly support the anti-immigration, nationalist Sweden Democrats Party, according to a new poll.

F: The UNITED STATES Sen-

ate Select Committee on Intelligence released a 600 page report detailing the “enhanced interrogation techniques” employed by the Central Intelligence Agency following the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

G LOBAL U PDATE

Umar Farooq, a spokesman and director of operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan for al-Qaeda was killed in a U.S. drone strike in the province of Waziristan, PAKISTAN.

K: US President Barack Obama

and Chinese President Xi Jinping jointly announced a groundbreaking climate change accord at the November 2014 APEC Summit in Beijing, CHINA.

Winter 2015

L: Three doctors in three days have

died while treating ebola patients in SIERRA LEONE. Ten Sierra Leonean doctors have now succumbed to the disease. Source: Ha’aretz, The BBC, NPR, Reuters, Al Jazeera

AsiA

the chinese-isrAeli relAtionshiP When Actions (And dollAr signs) sPeAk louder thAn Words

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What religion are you?” asked our Shanghainese tour guide as my family and I climbed the stairs to view a particular jade Buddha in China’s coastal city of 24 million. “We’re Jewish,” my mother responded, and after a moment of language-barrier related confusion, our guide nodded in recognition. “Jews are very clever, very clever,” she responded. Over the past two decades, this fairly widespread and historically rooted Chinese view of Jews as intelligent and capable has propelled the People’s Republic to pursue an economic relationship with Israel, the Jewish State. The blossoming relationship has been accompanied by numerous efforts on the part of Chinese diplomats to pull the Israeli public into China’s good graces, signaling that Chinese outreach to Israeli businessmen and citizens is not merely a series of economic exchanges and cooperations, but a calculated effort to fold Israel into China’s motley crew of alliances and partner nations. However, in the context of China’s existing Middle Eastern partnerships, namely Iran, the question arises: why is China interested in growing a relationship with Israel, a country mired in very public hostility with more than one established Chinese ally? The answer lies simply in the value of an Israeli business relationship. It would seem impossible for China to maintain dealings with Israel, Iran, the United States, Turkey, and the Emirates, among other countries that create a conglomerate about as cohesive as one would expect from a group containing Ayatollah Khamenei and Bibi Netanyahu. However, to China, a partnership with Israel represents yet another vital rung on its ladder to the top of the global trade food chain. Thus, the Chinese are pursuing an economic relationship with Israel regardless of the interests of their other allies. In Israel, China sees an avenue not only toward economic cooperation but also toward normative cooperations due to what China deems is a shared history. For Israel, many of

Molly Reiner ’17

China’s methods and goals are cause for future concern, yet in many respects China’s sketchy global presence doesn’t necessarily represent an imminent threat to Israel. China’s pursuit of Israel has been under way since 1992, when diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic and the State of Israel formally began. However, Sino-Jewish cooperation is by no means limited to the past 22 years. There have been Jewish communities, although small, stationed in the Chinese city of Kaifeng since the Song Dynasty. An amazing yet largely overlooked element of recent modern history is the role of Jews who fought for Mao Zedong’s People’s Liberation Army during the Chinese Civil War that took place during and after WWII. One prime example among a few is Jakob Rosenfeld, a Viennese doctor who was sent to Dachau and Buchenwald after the Nazi annexation of Austria. After being released from Buchenwald in 1939 and forced to leave Europe, Rosenfeld fled to China, one of the only countries accepting refugees without visas. Later prominent enough to be photographed next to two architects of the People’s Republic Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi, Rosenfeld became an extremely important general and doctor in the People’s Liberation Army, and is venerated by modern Chinese leaders for his role in establishing their nation. The Chinese government still honors him today with an exhibit in the Chinese National Museum and a statue in Shandong Province. Regardless of whether Israel wishes to be associated with an overtly communist tradition, the government of the People’s Republic of China is endowed with a deep respect for the enduring perseverance and hard working spirit of the Jewish people and, transitively, of the State of Israel. It is this degree of cultural appreciation that has framed the modern SinoIsraeli relationship. After the 1992 opening, the relationship has remained largely economic. Trade between the two nations has multiplied 220 times, increasing from

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“In the context of China’s existing Middle Eastern partnerships, namely Iran, the question arises: why is China interested in growing a relationship with Israel.” $51 million in 1992 to $11 billion in 2013. Today, the China-Israel trade balance is tipped dramatically in favor of the PRC. Though Israel provides only .02% of China’s total imports ($3 billion in 2013), as of 2013, Israel bought $8 billion in Chinese exports, making China Israel’s secondlargest trading partner after the United States. And, though they represent a microscopic fraction of China’s total imports, the goods that China does buy from Israel are a huge boon to the Chinese economy and an asset to the Chinese population. China buys primarily from the electronic, minerals, and chemicals sectors, all aimed at propelling Chinese development in the agriculture, military, and technology sectors, the current weak points of the otherwise extremely powerful Chinese economy. The Chinese government began their investment entrée into the Israeli market in 2011, with China National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina)’s purchase of 60% of Israeli agro-chemical company Makhteshim Agan, now known as Adama. The 2.4 billion dollar deal was the largest Chinese investment in Israel at that time, and marked what would be the sustained presence of the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises in the Israeli marketplace. Earlier this year, when Israeli dairy company Tnuva controversially sold a majority share to Chinese manufacturer Bright Food, it became clear that China’s turn-of-the-decade hopes of cultivating economic ties with Israeli companies are quickly becoming reality. Though company mergers play a major role in the burgeoning relationship, the China-Israel investment partnership also includes major research and infrastructure projects that promise to change not only the economic but also the geopolitical landscape, including the so-called “Red-Med” project, a proposed high-speed rail from Eilat to Ashdod

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Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang share a toast at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Image courtesy of The Tablet Magazine.

on the Mediterranean coast. Proposed as a possible alternative to the Suez Canal, this railway and China’s interest in it highlights just how little the Chinese government cares about angering Arab nations in their Israeli partnership and, simultaneously, how interested they are in profiting from a relationship with Israel.

“Though China clearly benefits greatly from a Sino-Israeli relationship, Israel also reaps an important benefit from China apart from the obvious economic gain.” The PRC is interested mainly in Israeli innovation in food production, a specialty of the nation faced with water shortages and harsh growing conditions. A nation of 1.3 billion people, China would benefit greatly from innovations in foodgrowing technology that could increase the quality of life for many Chinese. Of the $1.7 billion in Chinese investment in Israel from 2005-2013, $1.4 billion of the total was aimed at agricultural technol-

ogy development and project implementation. In the first half of 2014, according to the Heritage China Global Investment Tracker, Chinese investment in Israeli agriculture rose to $2.4 billion in the first half of this year, just under two thirds of the entire Chinese investment in Israel during that time period, which totaled $3.8 billion. The only agricultural sector worldwide that receives more Chinese investment is that of the United States. However, China is not only encouraging business mergers and investment as a means of pursuing economic gain, but also looking to forge human-tohuman relationships in the Israeli government as a means to strengthen the foundation of their burgeoning business partnerships and growing what China believes to be existing cultural ties between the Chinese and Jewish peoples. In this task they have been quite successful. Beijing has already founded a Confucius Institute, a center for Chinese language and culture study, in Tel Aviv. From first-hand experience I can share that the Confucius Institute, which holds competitions and hosts a trip to China for Mandarin students around the world that I have participated in, is the epitome of the Chinese propaganda machine. It works to envelop foreigners in the generosity and benevolence of the Chinese government. The most recent effort toward

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cultural exchange by the Chinese government in Israel can be described as nothing less than a spectacle. In May 2014, the first Israel-China Economic Summit and the Tel Aviv MIXiii tech conference hosted 400 Chinese officials and businessmen in Israel. These meetings coincided with the launch of a $300 million nanotechnology cooperation agreement between Israeli and Chinese universities, meetings between Netanyahu and Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Liu Yandong, and the signing of a trade agreement between chief scientist of Israel’s Economy Ministry Avi Hasson and China’s vice minister for technology and innovation Wang Zhixue. This 2014 megaconference precisely illustrates the Chinese strategy: promote the epitome of China-Israel person-to-person cooperation as a means to drive home the current and potential success of a continued business relationship. In light of this goal, the Chinese government has every intention of continuing its relationship-building activities with the prominent Israeli officials that run the valuable business opportunities and tech agreements. Additionally, the Chinese are taking their message of ‘friendship’ and openness to the Israeli people themselves. China’s appeal to the Israeli population has

come in the form of a series of op-eds written by Gao Yanping, China’s Ambassador to Israel. The Ambassador proves this point for me in her article published in the Jerusalem Post ahead of former Israeli President Shimon Peres’ visit to Beijing, where she writes, “As an ancient Chinese saying goes, “Amity between people holds the key to sound relations between states.”” In the article, Gao highlights cultural understanding between Chinese and Jews through the ages and the current human relationships forming between Chinese and Israeli citizens before even mentioning the successful economic cooperation between the two nations. Ambassador Gao also published an opinion piece in the Hebrew edition of Ha’aretz newspaper criticizing Japanese actions and appealing to Israelis to band together with China against the return of the fascism that caused both peoples such pain in the twentieth century. The Chinese appeal to the Israeli moral conscience is an interesting propaganda tool. Though China operates its foreign policy in an almost entirely amoral fashion, it employs the potent tool of shared emotional history to strengthen its profitable business relationships. And the propaganda doesn’t end there. While Ha’aretz Hebrew edition is clearly aimed toward Israelis, the Jerusalem Post is an English language publication, and is widely read by English-speakers who are interested in Israel but live outside of the country. Thus, the Jerusalem Post’s op-ed was a backhanded assertion to the United States of China’s commitment to fostering a relationship with Israel, despite initial U.S. reluctance. It is perhaps a direct reference to the U.S. prohibition of the Israeli sale of

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the Phalcon airborne warning and control system to the Chinese in 2000 during the last days of the Clinton administration and before the so-called U.S. “pivot to Asia” that took place much later in the decade. The effects of an extensive Sino-Israeli partnership on the currently strained U.S.-Israel relationship may not be completely beneficial for the Israelis. China, after all, has been accused of various acts of cyber crime against the United States. The United States has historically opposed the sale of Israeli military technology to the Chinese, and rightfully so. The only trading partner more important to Israel than China is the United States, and the latter relationship contains much more gravitas than simply the benefit of economic convenience. However, for now at least, during the recent uptick in Israel-China relations, the United States has remained relatively quiet on the partnership. As open and welcoming as these Chinese propaganda tools seem, they may have a harmful effect on Israel’s overall wellbeing, epitomized by the tense nature of USChina relations. The most harmful of the methods is the assertion of moral equivalency between China and Israel that China brings into its fights with Japan, a democratic nation with very strong ties to the West. The Chinese government has a very shady conception of human rights, and, though this sort of record is not exactly a stumbling point in global diplomatic relations (see the U.S. and Saudi Arabia), Israel may want to be cautious in associating itself with countries that reject democracy, deny freedom of religion, and have a history of cultural oppression of minorities and dissenting political factions.

Netanyahu introduces Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong at a Press Conference in Jerusalem. Image couresy of Times of Israel

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The second problem is China’s reluctance to take a hard line against Iranian nuclear development, an activity deemed by Israel to threaten its very existence. Though this seems to be an obvious stumbling block on first consideration, there is reason to believe that this problem may not be as severe as it seems. Of course, China relies immensely on the energy resources of a few of Israel’s enemies, but it also relies on metals from Australia and natural gas from Russia, and there is simply very little variation if any PRC official political opinion on the policies of these countries behind the initial value of their contribution to China’s rise. China’s reaction to Sino-Israeli talks on Iran’s nuclear program illustrates this point. An anonymous Israeli official that briefed the Chinese on Iran’s nuclear capabilities told the New York Times in 2010, “The Chinese didn’t seem too surprised by the evidence we showed them, but they really sat up in their chairs when we described what a preemptive attack would do to the region and on oil supplies they have come to depend on.” Nuclear Iran? Fine. Nuclear Iran and no oil? It is in this scenario that China has a real problem. The Chinese government emphasizes economic impact almost primarily when making geopolitical decisions, so as long as a nuclear Iran would threaten these goals, China is likely to join, albeit quietly, the side of Western nations against Iranian nuclear development The secret of China’s ability to negotiate these difficult geopolitical scenarios lies in China’s favorable combination of powerhouse economics and hush-hush geopolitical opinions. This case applies to Israel especially. Part of the success of the SinoIsraeli relationship so far can be attributed to the fact that the two economies complement each other so perfectly. According to Amir Lati, a member of the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Northeast Asia department, “It’s an ideal partnership because the two economies don’t compete with each other…One focuses on high-tech and the other on manufacturing and huge infrastructure projects.” Even more promising is China’s relative absence from the geopolitical debate surrounding Israel and the Palestinian Territories, following the party line of non-intervention in the affairs of a sovereign nation that has been touted since the beginning of the PRC. Realists to the core, Chinese politicians and businessmen are focused completely on making a profit as opposed to a political point.

Another signal that Sino-Israeli relations will continue to improve is the current unlikelihood of an Arab boycott, an economic weapon that often does a lot of damage in terms of Israeli relationships with other countries. It is this threat that prevented a healthy Israeli-Japanese trade relationship until relatively recently. Today, however, with Syria and Iraq mired in a terrible civil war, Egypt fighting Muslim Brotherhood influence domestically and Hamas influence in the Palestinian territories, and Saudi Arabia possibly (and surprisingly) looking toward Israel in the midst of threats from the Islamic State and Iran, many of the Arab states are otherwise engaged. In other words, China has unencumbered access to Israeli markets, and is prepared to take full advantage of it. Though China clearly benefits greatly from a Sino-Israeli relationship, Israel also reaps an important benefit from China apart from the obvious economic gain. This is the at least partial bypassing of the boycott, divest, and sanction (BDS) movement that has taken hold in many European countries against Israel. China’s lack of interest in such political judgments in the face of a clear profit contribute to this residual boon for the Israelis, and shows that the People’s Republic brings the valuable commodity of political neutrality to the table in its dealings with Israel. However, from a different Israeli perspective it could be asserted that a partnership with China, though profitable now, will potentially become dangerous in the future. This possibility hinges on whether China will be forced to pick sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict in years to come, and actually place a political rather than economic stake in the Middle East in order to continue receiving the flow of oil on which they rely so much. The Sino-U.S. relationship also plays a considerable role, as a significant cooling between Washington and Beijing could mean a Washington more vocal against the Sino-Israeli partnership. For now though, no one seems to be pressuring China or Israel to make such a decision. There is a Yiddish proverb that says, “You can’t dance at two weddings at once.” Right now, China is partying at both. Afp

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In Context

Compiled by Michael Smerconish ’18 “It is our considered view that the detainees who were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques provided information that was useful and was used in the ultimate operation to go against Bin Laden.” Director of CIA John Brennan in a press conference following the release of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the abuse of torture by the CIA

“Scripture tells us that we shall not oppress a stranger, for we know the heart of a stranger -- we were strangers once, too. My fellow Americans, we are and always will be a nation of immigrants. We were strangers once, too.” President Obama in addressing the nation to announce his new plans on immigration reform.

“He shot them in the head right there in the disco. Right outside there were some policemen, but they were in our pockets, so they didn’t do anything.” A member of the Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel, speaking as to the corruption of police and violence of narco-trafficking in the country.

“It is not our design or desire that we see a Russia that is isolated through its own actions. In fact we are convinced that Moscow could rebuild trust and relationships if it simply helps to calm turbulent waters, if it takes steps now to implement the Minsk protocol.”” John Kerry speaking on Ukraine-Russia tension

Molly may be reached at mreiner@princeton.edu

Sources: CNN, Whitehouse.gov, The New Yorker, Reuters

Winter 2015

middle eAst

Some Unlikely iSiS RecRUitS AFP exPlores the neWs “Imagine back then I was only six. Just picture what I’ll do now with a loaded stick. Like boom, bang, fine, I’m wishing wishing you were dead. Violate my brothers and I’m filling you with lead.” In “The Beginning,” 24-yearold British-Egyptian rapper AbdelMajed Abdel Bary (performing under the names L. Jinny or Lyricist Jinn) recalls his father’s arrest for terror-related charges while Bary was growing up in Egypt. His conventional lyrics of a troubled childhood are, as Bary raps, “the beginning of the story,” a story which leads to a hill in the southern Syrian city of Raqqa. Bary is believed to be the identity of “Jihadi John,” a nickname given to the Islamic State (ISIS) fighter seen in released videos of the beheadings of hostages James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David Haines, Alan Henning, and Peter Kassig. But Bary represents the beginning of a far more alarming trend: the effectiveness of ISIS recruiting among young, Western, want-to-be jihadists. With an impressive social media presence, ISIS uses its enlist-

Eli Schechner ’18

ment successes as a tool to lure further recruits, such as Austrian teenagers Samra Kesinovic and Sabina Selimovic, known as ‘jihadi poster girls.’ A recruitment video employs Australian 17-year-old Abdullah Elmir as an ISIS spokesman to declare a jihad on Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Some estimates suggest that nearly 15,000 foreign fighters from eighty different countries have joined the fight to establish a caliphate. Specifically, ISIS has been oddly successful in enlisting Western rappers—Bary is not alone. Minnesota native Douglas McAuthur McCain, who performed as a rapper in Sweden and went by the name “Duale ThaslaveofAllah,” was killed in Syria fighting for ISIS at the end of August. Al-Hayat, ISIS’s wildly successful propaganda arm, is believed to be managed by Abu Talha Al-Almani (“The German”), who rapped in Berlin under the name “Deso Dogg.” Why this specific demographic? First, the tactic. In addition to publicizing young recruits as ‘success stories,’ Al-Hayat uses social

media in a way which appeals to the Western adolescent. With highdefinition, Hollywood-style trailers, Al-Hayat glorifies dying for the Islamic State. Al-Hayat operates several Twitter accounts, including one called @ISILcats, the Islamic State of Cat, which posts images of ISIS fighters alongside kittens (dubbed ‘mewjahideen’). Second, the message. AlHayat preys on the vulnerability and disillusionment of this target generation. Al-Almani raps (translated from German), “Innocent children die. There is chaos and destruction everywhere. Angels shed tears of black blood, and the Devil is proud of his brood.” Al-Hayat identifies these sentiments, as well as Bary’s, as products of an immoral Western world astray from purist Salafi interpretations of Islam fixed only in the utopian caliphate ISIS envisions. These two factors coalesce precisely at the time when modern forms of media give ISIS unprecedented reach. Conducive to ISIS’s vision of a global caliphate, Al-Hayat’s influence has opened a new front that extends beyond Iraq and the Levant to London, Berlin, Sydney, and even Minneapolis, uniquely and frighteningly close to home. Afp

Eli may be reached at elis@princeton.edu

Rapper-turned-Jihadist Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary. Images courtesy of Twitter.

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AFP

Protest of the recent lack of indictments in the Michael Brown and Eric Garner cases, Seattle, Washington. Image courtesy of Flickr.

Greenpeace vandalizes the Nasca lines in Peru, December 11, 2014. Meanwhile, protestors occupy Hong Kong, December 12, 2014. Images courtesy of Flickr.

gloBAl gAllery the World in Pictures Compiled by The Editorial Staff

AFP Quiz Answers Multiple Choice Monthly 1. B 2. D 3. B 4. A Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visits Afghan President Mohamad Ashraf Ghani, December 6, 2014. Image courtesy of Flickr.

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5. A

tAlking Points

revisiting unresolved conFlicts

in this section

the conFluence oF the ArAB sPring And isis

Libya

Tunisia

Compiled by Michael Smerconish ’18 Civil War Rages On

he Arab Spring will begin its fifth year in 2015. Many of the conflicts that started in 2011 remain unresolved, including the the civil wars in Syria and Libya. Even in countries that overcame violent protests, such as Tunisia, internal political conflicts remain unsolved. Read more about the development of the Arab Spring in this edition of Talking Points.

Instability Within Islamic Party

Syria

Assad Holds on to Nominal Power liByA More than three years into its post-Qadaffi era, Libya finds itself politically fragmented and with its central government taking refuge in the small city of Tobruk after having fled the nation’s capital this past summer. Mired by violence between conservative Islamic fighters and secular political factions, Libya also witnessed the closing of numerous embassies within the country, notably the United States who evacuated its diplomats last June. In the wake of such instability, some have feared that Libya will become an increasing focus for Islamic State recruitment and support, a concern substantiated by the establishment of ISIS control in the Libyan port city of Derna in late November

Unexploded weapons from the Libyan civil war. Image courtesy of Flickr.

tunisiA Tunisia, the initiator of the Arab Spring, recently held its first democratic presidential election on November 24th with the consequent runoff election held on December 21st. Unfortunately, while its democratic success cannot be overlooked, it has come at the expense of divisions elsewhere in the nation. With the establishment of the Ennahda movement in 2012, Tunisia opted for a definitively more secular government, a decision also reflected by the chosen candidates of its recent elections. In doing so, however, Tunisia created a conflict with its more staunch Islamic conservatives, who still seek the establishment of a state built around Sharia law. Such a divide has been recently evidenced by Tunisia’s contribution of more foreign fighters to the Islamic State than any other country in the world. Tunis, Tunisia. Image courtesy of Flickr.

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Talking Points syriA Set in motion by the Arab Spring, a chaotic and destructive civil war still beleaguers Syria. Attention this past year, however, has shifted away from the atrocities committed by the Assad regime and over to the sudden rise of the Islamic State, which currently control an estimated 35% of Syrian territory. While in clear opposition to Assad’s government, ISIS has at times gone seemingly uncontested by the national army, which continues to wage its own wars against other smaller rebel groups. Stuck with the desire to combat ISIS yet continually weaken Assad, the US has struggled to find a policy that can balance the two objectives simultaneously.

Displaced Syrians in a refugee camp in Kilis, Turkey. Image courtesy of Flickr.

Learn more about issues relevant to American foreign policy on our blog, updated weekly, located at afpprinceton.com.

Acknowledgement

American Foreign Policy magazine thanks the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University for its generous sponsorship. The Program is dedicated to examining the application of basic legal and ethical principles to contemporary problems and offers numerous opportunities for student engagement, including sponsoring conferences, seminars, lectures, and colloquia throughout the year. The Program’s Undergraduate Fellows Forum provides opportunities for Princeton undergraduates to interact with Madison Program Fellows and speakers. For more information on events and how to get involved please visit the Program’s website. http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/

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