AFP Spring/Summer 2016 by American Foreign Policy Magazine

Fall 2015

Volume XV, Issue I

From the Editor-in-Chief

Staff Editor-in-Chief Molly Reiner ’17

Dear Readers,

For the spring 2016 edition of AFP, we are featuring two stories about the upcoming Brexit referndum vote on June 23, 2016. In our cover stories, Pierfrancesco Mei Innocenti and Charles Shaw discuss the downsides of Britain leaving the European Union. Pierfrancesco focuses on the inevitable decline of the EU as a result of this vote’s existence, regardless of the outcome. Charles discusses the role for the United States in stopping Brexit, highlighting the negative consequences that a Brexit would have on the United States and its “special relationship” with the United Kingdom.

Editorial Board Eric Wang ’18 Eli Schechner ’18 Justinas Mickus ’18

Our next article, by freshman Nicole Don, discusses the current situation in Turkey. Violence between the Kurdish population and Turkish forces has picked up steam, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has increased authoritarianism by cracking down on critics of his rule. Nicole highlights a role for the United States in stemming this violence before the situation becomes out of control. In our final article of the issue, Kennedy O’Dell reflects on America’s history of isolationism and imperialism, pointing out the contradiction between the isolationism emphasized by George Washington in his farewell address with Manifest Destiny and associated expansion. Kennedy says that coming to terms with an interventionist legacy is important for a nuanced understanding of U.S. foreign policy, especially when considering a move toward a more isolationist stance.

Editors-in-Chief Emeriti Tucker Jones ’16

Joe Margolies ’15

This is my final edition of AFP, and as sad I am to be stepping down, I am excited to introduce our new editorial board, rising juniors Eric Wang, Eli Schechner, and Justinas Mickus. They have contributed much to this issue and past issues and I am looking forward to seeing the direction in which they take the magazine next semester. As always, if you are interested in writing for the print or online editions, editing, or graphic design, please contact one of our new editorial board members at jmickus@princeton.edu, ehw2@princeton.edu, or elis@princeton. edu.

Blog Editor

Michael Smerconish ’18

Sincerely, Molly Reiner Editor-in-Chief

Graphics Eli Schechner ’18

American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. This publication strives to use all Creative Commons licensed images. Please contact AFP if you feel any rights have been infringed. All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 3611 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.afpprinceton.com

AFP Advisory Board

Wolfgang Danspeckgruber: Director, Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Cecilia Rouse: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School

American Foreign Policy

AFP

A merican F oreign P olicy Spring 2016 Volume XV, Issue II

ta b l e o f co n t e n ts

Feature: The Fate of the European Union The Effects of Brexit on the EU and the U.S. Pierfrancesco Mei Innocenti ’17 and Charles Shaw ’17

A Third Way? The Consequences of the Brexit Referendum on the EU Pierfrancesco Mei Innocenti ’17

6 8 10 8

12 13 14

Photo Credits: Flickr

A Special Relationship Why the U.S. Should Take Notice of Brexit Charles Shaw ’17

Global Update Justinas Mickus ’18

Erdo-how? Erdo-where? Erdogan

America’s Role in the Kurdish Question Nicole Don ’19 Looking Back The Myth of American Isolationism Kennedy O’Dell ’18

In Context Eric Wang ’18

Global Gallery The World in Pictures Lauren Wodarski ’17

Spring 2016

Cover Image by Molly Reiner ’17

Europe

Feature: The Fate of the European Union The Effects of Brexit on the EU and the U.S.

A Third Way? The Consequences of the Brexit Referendum

n 1998, the British sociologist Anthony Giddens famously coined the term ‘third way’ to describe the political objective of synthesizing liberal economic ideas and left-wing social policies. Twenty years later, the referendum on the United Kingdom’s stay in the European Union threatens to drive Europe towards its third way in the process of integration, started in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. Unfortunately for Europe, this time the third way does not represent an idea of synthesis. Rather, it portrays a third stage in the history of modern European institutions where the greatness of the original European project as envisioned by Schuman and Monnet is gradually abandoned. In the past, the project of a European political and economic integration has been marked by two major phases: firstly, by an attempt to design institutions capable of sustaining the development of an “ever closer union;” more recently, in order to deal with an increasing number of member states, by the necessity, and sometimes by the willingness, to proceed on a path of variable geometries and asymmetric integration. The perilous third way that Europe is currently risking to take is characterized by a slow process of ordered disintegration, of growing reluctance of its members and of more frequent quests for “exceptionalism” and membership à la carte. On June 23rd, the British people will vote on whether to remain in the EU under the new agreement on the UK membership obtained by Prime Minister David Cameron last February, or

Pierfrancesco Mei Innocenti ’17 leave the European family. Whatever the outcome of the vote, which to date appears extremely uncertain, Europe is exposed to the risk of an abrupt slide down the path of institutional and economic disintegration. Over the last five years, the Eurozone crisis, the endless Greek saga, and the dramatic migrants crisis have shed light on the fragilities of common institutions, on the difficulties in policy coordination, and often on the abysmal distance between member states. More significantly, these crises have demonstrated that national interests still undermine the principle of solidarity as expressed by Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union. While there is widespread consensus that the EU needs reforms, so far, little agreement has been reached on the extent and the design of such reform.

“Whatever the outcome of the vote, which to date appears extremely uncertain, Europe is exposed to the risk of an abrupt slide down the path of institutional and economic disintegration.” Paradoxically, the fate of Europe now hangs on the decision of a country that historically has been able to live simultaneously at the center and at the extreme margins of the European experi-

American Foreign Policy

ence. The dream of a united Europe was wholeheartedly embraced by Winston Churchill, who in 1946 advocated the creation of the “United States of Europe” to manage the post-war political and economic challenges of reconstruction. More significantly, in Churchill’s mind the UK would have played a defining role as the trait d’union between the European bloc and the U.S. Under many aspects, this intuition was correct, and the UK role in Europe allowed to cement the London-Washington special relationship for the rest of the 20th century. Nonetheless, as a testament to its troubled history within Europe, the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC) only in 1973, after two vetoes by French President Charles de Gaulle in 1963 and 1967. Only two years later, in 1975, Prime Minister Harold Wilson called the British people to a referendum on the EEC membership, which was embraced at the time by a large majority. However, since the 1980s, marked by the uneasy relationship between Margaret Thatcher and the European bureaucracy, while the UK has remained in the European family, it has simultaneously pursued the path of “exceptionalism.” Most notably, this happened because the UK differentiated itself in monetary and fiscal policy, as well as in immigration and welfare issues. These areas, while currently challenged by the perils of a sluggish economic recovery and by the migrants crisis, have arguably been the fulcrums of the integration process. This year’s referendum, from the perspective of further European integration, does not feature a good or bad

Europe

Britain will vote on whether to stay in the EU on June 23, 2016. Image Courtesy of Andrew Gustar (Flickr).

outcome. Rather, it is likely to present European policymakers with the complex task of either addressing an immediate and potentially explosive crisis in the case of Brexit, or managing the beginning of a slow process of unraveling of the European political and institutional framework should UK citizens vote to stay in the EU. In case of a vote to leave the EU, even more dramatically than what may happen in case of Grexit, the threat for the future of Europe would not come primarily from direct economic impacts. Rather, Brexit would set a precedent for other similar centrifugal forces across the Union, and, in the case of mild economic downside effects on the UK economy, it would provide Eurosceptics with a formidable argument for thir cause. It is hard to believe that, as some suggest, the exit of a reluctant member would ease the decision making process in Brussels. Many key decisions have already been taken without UK interference, which often shied away from EU policymaking through the adoption of opt-out mechanisms. Moreover, the main fault lines between European members have recently emerged along the core-periphery axis and. even more strikingly in the case of the migrants crisis, between the two main drivers of European integration, France and Germany.

A more positive vote to stay in the EU would pose a similar but subtler threat to the fragile European architecture. In the aftermath of a victory of the stay-camp, the agreements signed between Prime Minister David Cameron and the European institutions last February would enter into force automati-

sels. Until the beginning of 2016, the majority of European public opinion and policymakers have addressed the Brexit issue first as unlikely and then as a risk for the future and prosperity of the British people rather than for the European project. The uncertain signals emerging from the most recent opinion polls, and the presence of lead“Rather, Brexit would ing figures in the leave-camp, most notably the mayor of London and Tory set a precedent for other MP Boris Johnson and the Secretary similar centrifugal forces of State for Justice Michael Gove, made European officials increasingly conacross the Union, and, in cerned about a negative outcome of the the case of mild economic British referendum. But these fears may not be pointed in the right direction. downside effects on the So far, too little effort has been poured UK economy, it would on assessing the risk that the referendum also poses in the case of a vote to provide Eurosceptics with stay, especially in combination with the a formidable argument for other crises afflicting Europe. European policy-makers should ensure that a vote thir cause.” against Brexit will represent a disaster avoided and not the beginning of the cally, tearing the UK even further away “third way” of slow disintegration of from the original objective of an “ever the European project. Afp closer union.” This crucial step would go beyond the additional recognition of British “exceptionalism,” and would encourage other European countries to Pierfrancesco may be reached at leverage the threat of exit referendums pmi2@princeton.edu to ask for more concessions from Brus-

Spring 2016

Europe

Feature: The Fate of the European Union The Effects of Brexit on the EU and the U.S.

A Special Relationship Why The U.S. Should Take Notice of Brexit

n June 23rd of this year the British people will vote in a referendum on Britain’s position in the European Union that will have a profound effect on the future of their country and continent. Recent polls suggest that the country is split down the middle as to how it will vote. If the country decides to leave the European Union, it will be the first to do so since the creation of the EU, and it would have profound economic and political impacts throughout Europe. Economists and politicians have declared that the effects of the UK leaving the EU could be disastrous for the UK economy and the EU project as a whole. Goldman Sachs estimates that the pound would fall 20% against the dollar and Credit Suisse estimates that the UK economy could contract by 2 percent “immediately”. European leaders have expressed the fear that the whole EU project could unravel if the UK, the second biggest economy in the EU after Germany, decided to break with the Union. Yet, despite calls from President Obama mid-way through 2015, talk about ‘Brexit’ has been noticeably muted this side of the Atlantic. Most of the focus on Europe has centered on the expanding migrant problem, another source of trouble. But Brexit could affect American interests profoundly and the US should take notice. In 2014 the U.S. House of Representatives issued House Resolution 713 in anticipation of the Scottish Independence referendum. The resolution expressed “the support of the House of Representatives for a united, secure, and prosperous United Kingdom.” In-

Charles Shaw ’17 deed, the first issue on the resolution states the belief “that a united, secure, and prosperous United Kingdom is important for U.S. national security priorities in Europe and around the world.” Just as Scottish independence was a threat to UK unity and U.S. interests in 2014, Brexit, a threat to EU unity, is an even bigger concern. The biggest threats of Brexit to the US are political, not economic. The economic knock-on effects on the US are predicted to be marginal. While the British and European economies will certainly feel the effects, the threat to the U.S. is minimal compared with other current events, such as instability in China’s economy and the US election. In the event of Brexit it would be possible for the U.S. and the UK to engage in bilateral trade agreements to ensure that free trade across the Atlantic is not disrupted. Despite the lack of a direct economic threat to the US, however, America should pay attention to the potential consequences of a British exit from the EU. Firstly, America should be worried for the sake of Britain itself. Since the start of the “Special Relationship” during World War II, Britain has arguably been America’s closest ally. Britain is one of the world’s top five military powers, the world’s 5th largest economy, it is a permanent member of the UN security council, and it has considerable “soft power” deriving from its economic and cultural position over the last two hundred years. During the Cold War and the beginning of the 21st Century, alliance with Britain has been invaluable to America’s Foreign Policy. Despite sources of tension

American Foreign Policy

along the way – the Suez Crisis, Vietnam, and Britain’s decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – the UK has lent significant political support for U.S. intervention and foreign policy since World War II. In 2003 the UK showed a willingness to back the U.S. with soldiers in Iraq in the face of significant domestic and international opposition. Yet in recent years Britain seems to be withdrawing from international affairs. The British government under Prime Minister David Cameron has been far more domestically focused and reluctant to take on the mantle of a world power – a shift that does not bode well for the

“Despite the lack of a direct economic threat to the US, however, America should pay attention to the potential consequences of a British exit from the EU.” Anglo-American alliance. The importance of the support of Britain for American intervention was seen in 2013. President Obama called for the bombing of Assad’s forces in Syria in response to the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons against its own people, and requested British support. David Cameron, however, decided to hold a vote in Parliament on the issue. Cameron could have ordered British air strikes in

Europe

President Obama meets with Prime Minister David Cameron at the G20. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

Syria without Parliamentary consent, but he saw domestic support as more necessary than supporting U.S. strategic interests. Parliament voted against bombing, and Obama was forced to make a U-turn on the issue, agreeing to also bring it before a vote in Congress. The result of a British decision not to back bombing eventually led to the bombing to be shelved by the Obama Administration as well. This decision by Cameron, and British Parliament, is part of a broader trend that is worrying to American politicians: a UK withdrawal from world affairs. The threat of UK withdrawal from Europe is seen as symptomatic of this wider trend of British politics towards the internal and the parochial, which does not bode well for the American interests. This withdrawal from international affairs, combined with the potential effect that Brexit could have on the British economy, would severely diminish the utility of the ‘special relationship’. It is in America’s interest to keep the UK within the EU for the sake of maintaining its ally’s global strength and outlook. But there is also the question of U.S. influence in Europe. Obama stated last year that the U.S. wants a strong UK in a strong Europe. Britain has played up its role as the bridge between Europe and America,

and has often been the voice most aligned with American interests in Brussels. Indeed, Charles De Gaulle was reluctant to allow Britain entry into the European Community in 1973 for precisely this reason. He feared that British entry into the European Economic Commission would allow American influence to pervade European discourse. In the past year the Obama Administration has made clear signs to Germany, the bastion of the EU, that America wishes to develop closer relations. Nonetheless, Germany will not be the military ally that Britain has been; military prowess is currently not within the capability or desire of the German government. Additionally, there are still tensions over the widespread surveillance of German officials by the NSA, which came to light in 2013 and included the tapping of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cellphone. Clearly, having the UK in the EU is vital for the U.S. if it wishes to maintain its influence in European affairs. Lastly, there are concerns that Brexit occurring in tandem with the influx of migrants into Europe, estimated at over 1.8 million in 2015, could undermine the EU and potentially break the system. The free movement laws that allow people to move throughout Europe and that are fun-

Spring 2016

damental to the principles of the EU are under a lot of pressure. EU collapse is a worst-case scenario, but a tangible possibility. The breakdown of the EU, the shining example of liberalism in Europe would be bad news for America, especially during a period in which illiberal forces are on the rise around the world and even in Europe itself. It is in America’s interest to encourage the British people to remain part of the European Union and the British Government to maintain its strategic outlook on international affairs. American opinion holds significant weight in UK politics and American politicians can use the power of persuasion to convince the British electorate. The ability of American pressure to affect UK policy was seen last year when the Government committed to the 2% NATO defense-spending target. Cameron had wavered significantly on the topic but agreed to stick to the target after pressure from Obama. Britain is still a great power and a strong UK in a strong Europe provides stability that is vital to US interests in the region. President Obama is visiting the UK to throw his support behind Britain’s membership of the EU, hopefully he can convince the voters. Afp Charles may be reached at ceshaw@princeton.edu

A: The governor of PUERTO

RICO declared a moratorium on the country’s debt obligations due May 1. The tiny island of 3.5 million peole has amassed $70 billion in debt and will be required to pay $2 billion. As the U.S. Congress is struggling to pass the emergency rescue plan, the island’s default is not to be taken off the table.

The activists behind the 2014 HONG KONG pro-democracy protests, known popularly as the Umbrella Revolution, went on trial. They are accused of obstructing justice as they were protesting Chinese interference before an executive election in Hong Kong The defendants claim the trial is politically motivated.

B: The once-beloved president

of MEXICO Enrique Peña Nieto is suffering rapid losses in popularity as the country faces stagnant economic growth, rising violence, and multiple political scandals.

C: Greenpeace released 248 pages

of neogtiation documents that list the EU and the U.S. positions regarding the proposed treaty of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

H: The International Monetary

Fund has cut its estimates for the 2016 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN economic growth to 3%. The IMF identified the low commodity prices as the immediate cause for lacklster growth and stressed the importance of structural reforms.

American Foreign Policy

I: News from JAPAN indicates that

the country’s economy avoided a recession after growing 1.7% in the first quarter of 2016.

D: The European Commission in

E: The members of parliament in F: The vice-president of NIGE-

J: Apple opened an office in the tech-

K: BRAZIL’s President Dilma

Brussels, BELGIUM, has unveiled new plans to preserve the existing asylum seekers’ accommodation plans across the European Union. Member states refusing to accept the refugees designated to them would face fines of 250,000 euros per refugee.

nology hub of Hyderabad, INDIA, to develop its Maps service.

TURKEY came to blows after the ruling Justice and Development Party attempted to introduce a bill stripping members of the legislative from legal immunity.

Rousseff is facing impeachment proceedings in the senate for manipulating public accounts.

Spring 2016

RIA disclosed that the previous government officials in Abuja stole upwards of $15 billion from the government’s funds designated to fight Boko Haram.

L: A refugee set herself on fire in

NAURU, at an Australian-run refugee detention camp, in protest of how the refugees are treated by the Australian officials. Source:The BBC, CNN, The Economist, Reuters

Middle East

Erdo-how? Erdo-where? Erdogan Turkey’s Domestic War and America’s Role in the Kurdish Question

outheastern Turkey is beginning to look a lot like its neighbor, Syria. Shelled out buildings, streets of rubble, a lack of access to medical care, food, or electricity, and government curfews in place since July of 2015 have combined to create a humanitarian crisis for Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. This crisis however, overshadowed by Turkey’s strategic role in easing Europe’s refugee crisis and America’s partnership with Turkey in fighting ISIS, has been largely ignored as the Turkish President Erdogan cracks down on both what’s left of Turkey’s free press and even journalists abroad. What remains to be seen is the impact Turkey’s actions will have on American policy in the region. America will have to pick its priorities if the Turkish government continues to antagonize any of its opposition and wage domestic military offensives without regard to civilian casualties. Amnesty International has accused Turkish security forces of implementing what “amounts to a collective punishment” imposed on the largely Kurdish region of Southeastern Turkey. Turkey’s military offensive comes as a response to rising PKK hostility and terrorist attacks in the country. The PKK, short for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, is classified as a terrorist group in Turkey. Founded in the 1970’s, in 1984 it turned to armed struggle in its quest for a Kurdish state. Turkey has battled against its PKK Kurds for decades, but any peace developed over the last few years has clearly ended. Civilians in these provinces are being caught in the crossfire, and trapped in their homes due to curfews. An estimated 200,000 civilians now live in curfew-imposed regions. On March 27th, Turkey put eighteen new towns and neighborhoods within the district of Silvan, in Diyarbakir, under curfew as well. Other towns like Cizre were under uninterrupted curfew from December 2015 until March 2016, when the curfew was finally relaxed. For their safety, civilians must remain in a warzone, and many are choosing to risk their lives rather than remain sitting ducks. According to Amnesty International, more than 90,000 civilians have fled under curfew, about 20% of the population. The danger comes from both sides of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. The YDG-H, the

Nicole Don ’19 PKK’s armed youth contingent, has attacked Turkish security forces from urban neighborhoods with rockets, fire exchanges, IEDs, and armed patrols. A January 13th PKK car bombing in Çınar, Diyarbakır, killed one government official and five civilians in its wake, including two children, and wounded thirtynine others. The Turkish military, however, has likely killed more. As of late January, Amnesty International, citing the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, has reported that 162 civilians have been killed by Turkish state forces in curfew-imposed regions. Turkey’s Human Rights Association cites a larger figure from 2015 alone—407 casualties. Civilians are dying from heavy machinery and sniper fire, in some cases far away from PKK skirmishes. In the words of Amnesty International’s January, 21st briefing, “There is little doubt that the Turkish authorities are putting lives at risk by using lethal force excessively and recklessly.” Even electricity cuts, which the government claims to result from YDG-H attacks on infrastructure, seem to suspiciously coincide with newly imposed curfews. The U.S. State Department’s human rights report for 2015 too accuses Turkey of failing to provide adequate protection to vulnerable citizens, “[depriving] thousands of persons of access to food, shelter, and medical care for periods regularly exceeding a week.” But what separates these citizens from other Turks, or the refugees being cared for in southeastern provinces like Diyarbakir or sent mercilessly back over the border? The bad luck of living in a PKK stronghold, and two crucial distinctions—they are largely Kurdish, and other nations have yet to express concern regarding Turkey’s behavior. Turkey’s Kurds, who dominate Turkey’s southeastern provinces, occupy a precarious spot in Turkey’s history and an ever louder voice against Erdogan’s political aspirations. The Turkish government has largely repressed its Kurdish population—both politically and through cultural measures like banning instruction of the Kurdish language— since the modern republic’s founding in 1923. Erdogan commendably eased decades-long restrictions on Kurdish cultural expression upon becoming Prime Minister in 2003, garnering Kurdish electoral support in the process. His luck, however,

American Foreign Policy

ran a bit short this summer, when a referendum meant to increase his authority failed to gain the Kurdish political party HDP’s support and voter base. Since then, KurdishTurkish relations have deteriorated. In the 1990’s, when PKK violence peaked, southeastern Kurdish villages were destroyed by both PKK and Turkish state violence, leading to an exodus away from the region. As the conflict reignites, history is repeating itself. Distinguishing between civilian and PKK casualties has also become difficult, and complicated by a lack of critical press in the country. The Turkish opposition newspaper The Zaman had its Turkish offices were seized by court order in March, and its content quickly flipped to a pro-government line. Coupled with Turkish academics’ failed January petition condemning the Turkish government’s offensive against the PKK, press and academia in Turkey are finding that politics are threatening their human duty to report on potential humanitarian violations. A legitimate fear of legal repercussions has transformed dissent into a risky political maneuver. Following this summer’s failed referendum, Erdogan’s endgame appears to be a mere repositioning, a second bid toward the presidential system he so desires. As suicide bombings by both ISIS and PKK affiliated groups erode the public’s sense of safety, if a campaign to eradicate the PKK threat happens to lead to questionable civilian danger, personally cleaning up the media is one way to ensure a positive public reaction to this campaign. But at some point international alarm is due and allies must decide when friendly, strategic intervention is necessary and in our regional interests. This turning point has already been reached if we note how censorship in Turkey has spread to other nations. Turkey’s interference in its own press has stretched into the sizeable Turkish diaspora of Europe, and toward non-Turkish citizens as well. For example, the program “extra3” released a video in mid-March parodying through song Erdogan’s clampdown on dissent, corruption regarding construction of his latest residence, and generally questionable antidemocratic actions. Entitled “Erdowie, Erdowo, Erdogan,” i.e. “Erdo-how, Erdo-where, Erdogan,” it depicts Turks fleeing teargas and water cannons with lyrics boasting how Erdogan doesn’t think much on it, and that we should “be nice” to him since he’s so powerful. The program’s Youtube version of the song writes in German in the description, “In freedom of the press and human rights matters, the Turkish President behaves quite creatively…Our song for Istanbul.” Clearly some of the notes struck a chord. As Foreign Policy reported, the Turkish foreign ministry summoned the German ambassador over the issue, though as of now the

song remains up and running. The comedian Jan Böhmermann, however, has fared comparatively worse. His reading of a critical, profanity-ridden poem of Erdogan has led to a formal request by Turkey, approved by Angela Merkel herself, to prosecute him under a long-forgotten German law against insulting foreign heads of state. In a country like Germany, with three million citizens or residents of Turkish ethnicity, Merkel is treading into dangerous territory for the millions of diaspora Turks who may be or have already been critical of Erdogan online, and now fear reprisal previously thought impossible. Recognition of this constitutional loophole in Germany, has now moved to the Netherlands, where on April 24th, Dutch journalist Ebru Umar found police at her door in Turkey, while on vacation, for writing an oped for the Dutch Metro in which she criticizes President Erdogan. As the BBC reports, Umar lies in jail just as Merkel and Erdogan meet in Turkey to discuss migration policy. Since Turkey’s agenda regarding free press and its military offensive appear to be a Turkish or Euro-centric issue, how should America react? While the United States has yet to formally condemn Turkey’s spiraling censorship agenda, or use leverage to urge more caution regarding the lives of Turkey’s Kurdish civilians, the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 does address these issues. In addition to the previously cited warning on disproportionate violence in southeastern Turkey, it notes of the Turkish media in 2015, “Self-censorship was common amid a prevailing fear that criticizing the government could prompt reprisals.” This statement precedes the recent controversy in Europe. But how much can a State Department report accomplish if the White House feels tied down by its cooperation with Turkey in fighting ISIS, or perception of Turkey as a linchpin in solving Europe’s refugee crisis? As civilians in southeastern Turkey fear for their lives amidst the violence, it can be easy to dismiss “extra-3”’s video as irrelevant, and Turkey’s aggression towards German satire as misguided, single acts that will fade. But it points to a growing malaise, and a culture of fear. If the German or other EU governments, as well as the United States feel they cannot pressure Turkey on its actions in the Southeast without risking political compromise on the refugee crisis, Turkey gains a bargaining chip by default, a personal veto against future disagreements. Meanwhile, passively allowing such actions only further ferments an expensive internal displacement disaster in Southeastern Turkey, on top of the Syrian refugee crisis. Human rights violations aside, helping Turkey to prevent its own future humanitarian crisis means less required aid from the

Middle East

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

United States down the line, and fundamentally, a Turkey capable of devoting more resources toward shared strategic interests. The Syrian refugee crisis and war both merit serious aid, policy, and strategic efforts, as does the growing threat of ISIS attacks on Turkish soil. In contrast, Southeastern Turkey appears localized and almost negligible—after all, when have the world’s Kurds ever faced peace and equal rights, not only in Turkey but anywhere in the Middle East? No government is infallible, but when certain countries are allowed to conduct questionable policies that are impacting the lives of innocent civilians, ignoring one conflict entirely is not the same as prioritizing another one over it. In a sense, America has already tested its political waters with the Kurdish issue. In February, it refused to classify the Syrian PYD, a Kurdish group fighting ISIS, as a terrorist organization, prompting Turkey to summon the American ambassador John Bass in protest. In this situation, America sidestepped supporting the PYD’s ally and terrorist group, the PKK, while still affirming its strategic support to a leading force against ISIS in Syria. Turkey understandably fears a growing Kurdish authority in Syria, right beyond its borders, but at some point America will have to confront this fear head on and choose: allow Turkey’s war against its Kurds, or risk Turkish anger and support the rights of the Kurdish civilians of Turkey. The hypocrisy in choosing one Kurdish people over another, the Syrian Kurdish fighters but not their Turkish brethren, will

Spring 2016

not be lost should ISIS escalate its attacks in either Turkey or Syria. Unlike Europe, America does not need Turkey to stem the flow of Syrian refugees. If the U.S. truly sees the PKK as a terrorist organization, it could support Turkey’s offensive against the PKK, while simultaneously using this as an opportunity to push humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and human rights coverage into the region, and secure greater antiISIS support in Syria. If military intervention or advising is too great a step, public censures on Turkey’s handling of dissent may show, at the very least, that America is cautiously watching. America toed a similar line in 2013, during the Gezi Park Protests. Should Turkey try to reach into the American press, the United States can seize this opportunity as a freebie, a way to check Turkey’s political agenda while reaffirming its commitment to a liberal democracy. Regardless of whether the Obama administration risks taking a stand, as Turkey signs a deal promising to take in refugees in Europe, the warzone that is southeastern Turkey stands as a blemish to Turkey’s veneer of domestic security and democratic rights, a human rights violation waiting to be brought to justice. But much like in Syria, when the curfews finally lift and America decides to take a look, there may not be much evidence to uncover beneath the rubble. Afp Nicole may be reached at ndon@princeton.edu

United States

Looking Back The Myth of American Isolationism

Kennedy O’Dell ’18

emory is a tricky thing. Tainted by time and imagination, sometimes reality slips through the cracks as we reduce things to their perceived essence, their lingering lesson. This tendency, in psychology called memory distortion, has plagued beleaguered historians for centuries. History, historians like to think, is the art of discovering and sharing what actually happened, of combatting our tendency towards memory distortion with facts. And yet, despite their best efforts, people continue to reduce memory to myth. This is dangerous as a general tendency, but even more dangerous when applied to global political history. One particular myth, that of historic American isolationism, continues to haunt our political discourse. It is not for lack of effort, as scholars like William Appleman Williams could attest, but for lack of a receptive audience. Changing how history is told and which lessons decades of details are refined down to is difficult, but absolutely necessary. 21st century isolationism has its premise in a

false memory of isolationism that must be adjusted. While the high school history textbook telling of the development of the country narrates manifest destiny and the roll to the West with a sense of inevitability and predetermination, the reality was quite different. Continental expansion was not a foregone conclusion, it was foreign relations. Foreign empires, both native and European, bordered the colonies from their establishment. Americans get away with painting the birth of the nation as an isolationist moment only if they ignore the presence of these groups and imagine themselves to have been alone on the continent. While this origin in isolation is part of the elementary school narrative telling of the history of the United States, it is not an element of a developed and more nuanced understanding. A closer examination of period texts reveals that the aspirations of American diplomats did not find a providential conclusion on the current borders. Southern slavers looked greedily southward, imagining a sweeping slavery empire that

Woodrow Wilson meets with allied leaders at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Image courtesy of Wikipedia.

American Foreign Policy

would span the Caribbean. Others eyed Canada and the vast lands to the north. The desire for expansion brought the United States into direct conflict with the great global powers, be it the French, the British, or the Spanish. If the early conceptions of American isolationism are rooted in mistelling, iterations of antebellum isolationism are rooted in misinterpretation. George Washington’s Farewell Address is perhaps the primary document from which most isolationist ideologies flow. While a surface reading of the document indicates it to be a declaration of the universal merits of inward focused policy, a deeper reading brings about a more complex understanding. In the Farewell Address, Washington explains his hesitant neutrality and avoidance of alliances as conditional. In describing his reasoning he says “With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.” This is an endorsement of isolationism, but it leaves with it an undetermined expiration date. Those who point to Washington as the champion of isolationism fail to see that even he was only a conditional champion. His focus on European alliances also alleviates the burden of taking any definitive policy position on the then budding economic imperialism of the US in the Caribbean. The gun boat was coming of age and formal entangling alliances were not needed to insure the economic growth of the country. The course of historical events also undermines the conception of early American isolationism. Even from a strictly Eurocentric viewpoint, the argument that America was dormant and reserved at any point in our history remains shaky. The U.S. undermined Spanish control of South America, battled the French diplomatically for Louisiana, and swept in on the curtails of British diplomats in the Pacific. The United States did not just decide to burst onto the world scene with the Spanish American War in 1898, it was a step in a sequence. If you label this moment as America’s turn to the world you miss the invaluable historical facts that provide both a context and an explana-

tion. As we matured as a nation, we gradually moved farther away from the principle of hemispheric hegemony and into alliances that one could most certainly label as entangling. As the world shifted from the Vienna system, to the Paris system, to the Bretton Woods system, the myth of isolationism faded slightly from its place in even in political rhetorical musings. It enjoyed an unsurprising revival in the wake of the global disaster of World War I and it remained a strong current in politi-

“While the high school history textbook telling of the development of the country narrates manifest destiny and hte roll to the West with a sense of inevitability and predetermination, the reality was quite different.” cal thought until World War II. But even then, a yawning gap still existed between argumentation and policy. When a careful review of history is neglected, common lore becomes common knowledge and common policy. To act less often, to act more often, to act with different values in mind; these are the policy options we should be discussing as a nation. The current place of isolationism in American political discourse relies on a mythological past that must be discredited. Whatever the merits of isolation, the argument must stand on its own. It is a compelling myth and, perhaps, a compelling argument, but the two must no longer be wedded. We are, at all junctures, offered several choices in the world of foreign affairs. If isolationism is the route we choose, so be it. However, let us recognize this choice not as a return, but as an arrival. It is, after all, impossible to return to a place you have never been. Afp

United States

In Context Compiled by Eric Wang ’18

“We will consistently take hold on the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and boost self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity as long as the imperialists persist in their nuclear threat and arbitrary practices…” North Korean congress--the first to be held in 36 years--on North Korea’s capability, May 2016

“You cannot have neverendums. You have referendums.”

British Prime Minister David Cameron on Brexit advocates’ suggestion for a second EU referndum if Britain voted to stay in the EU on the first referndum scheduled for June 23rd

“Our country is one of the countries with the greatest scientific and technological talent resources, but it is also a country where the brain drain is relatively grave, and there is no lack of top talents among them. We must have a global vision in terms of talent appointment and promotion, and exert great efforts to bring in high-end talent.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping at the WOrk Conference for Cybersecurity and Informationization on April 19th, 2016

“It was made clear that Bashar al-Assad has two choices – either he will be removed through political process or he will be removed by force…” Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, warning tht it may be time for “Plan B” in Syria, following a meeting of the International Syria Support Group on May 17, 2016

“To deny the people that vote, to deny them the possibility of deciding, would make you just another petty dictator, like so many this hemisphere has had.”

Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Luis ALmagro, criticizing Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro over Maduro’s claim that a constitutionally required referendum on his own rule was “optional” Sources: CNBC, Financial Times, The Diplomat, RT, Wall Street Journal

Kennedy may be reached at kodell@princeton.edu

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Bernie Sanders hugs a supporter at a rally in Des Moines, Iowa. Image courtesy of Phil Roeder (Flickr).

Taiwan President-elect Tsai Ing-wen. Meanwhile, Australians demonstrate in support of refugees. Images courtesy of Wikipedia and Flickr.

Global Gallery The World in Pictures Compiled by Molly Reiner â&#x20AC;&#x2122;17

President Obama attends a baseball game in Cuba with his family. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

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Presidential Candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton Image courtesy of Flickr and Wikipedia.

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Acknowledgement

American Foreign Policy magazine thanks the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University for its generous sponsorship. The Program is dedicated to examining the application of basic legal and ethical principles to contemporary problems and offers numerous opportunities for student engagement, including sponsoring conferences, seminars, lectures, and colloquia throughout the year. The Programâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Undergraduate Fellows Forum provides opportunities for Princeton undergraduates to interact with Madison Program Fellows and speakers. For more information on events and how to get involved please visit the Programâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s website. http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/

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