american foreign policy
Summer 2015 Volume XIV, Issue III
From the Editor-in-Chief
Staff Editor-in-Chief Molly Reiner ’17
Dear Readers, We are excited to present our first online-only issue as we close off the 2014-2015 academic year. While the year is winding down, there is no shortage of important international issues, and we are glad to publish one more issue before the year is done.
President Jamal Maddox ’16
We start this edition with a discussion of the various interests behind the Yemeni civil war written by sophomore Daniel Waldroop. While the fighting is currently most aptly described as a civil war, the role of Saudi Arabia and perhaps Iran in opposing or supporting the Houthi rebels may turn the current conflict into a proxy war between much larger powers. As concerns about the nuclear ambitions of both Iran and Saudi Arabia rise, such behavior deserves international attention.
Editorial Board Michael Smerconish ’18 Eli Schechner ’18 Lauren Wodarski ’17
Next we move into a discussion of the Greek economic crisis and its political consequences. Freshman Andrew Hersh lays out the radicalization of Greek politics as a result of the dire economic situation. A part of a broader trend of political polarization throughout Europe, such political consequences must be considered in current efforts by other members of the EU to mitigate Greek debt. Our cover article, by freshman Eric Wang, discusses China’s naval ambitions and buildup by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Eric lays out the importance of balancing a growing Chinese naval presence in the South and East China Seas, namely to calm concerns in other East Asian countries such as Japan. This is sure to be a delicate diplomatic process, as a close allyship between the U.S. and Japan as well as an increasingly intimate relationship between the U.S. and China must all be considered in such maneuvers.
Layout
Molly Reiner ’17
Eli Schechner ’18
Continuing our discussion of China, Scarlett Grabowska ’17 takes a look at the role that social media might play in future domestic unrest within the People’s Republic. Looking through the lens of past Chinese protests, such as the 1989 Tiananmen democracy protest, and examining the role that social media played in the recent Arab Spring, Scarlett warns the Chinese government against strict media controls.
Editors-in-Chief Emeriti Tucker Jones ’16
Joe Margolies ’15
Instead of our usual finishing features, we end this summer’s issue with two unique articles. The first, by Eli Schechner ’18, gives a rundown of the foreign policies of our 2016 presidential candidates. The second, by Jamal Maddox ’16, provides an alternative analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in response to an article in our Spring 2015 issue by Connor Pfeiffer ’18.
Blog Editor
Michael Smerconish ’18
As always, if you have any questions or comments, or would like to learn how to get involved with AFP, please don’t hesitate to send me an email at mreiner@princeton.edu, or like us on Facebook and follow us on twitter @afpprinceton. See you in the fall!
Graphics Eli Schechner ’18
Sincerely, Molly Reiner Editor-in-Chief
American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. This publication strives to use all Creative Commons licensed images. Please contact AFP if you feel any rights have been infringed. All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 3611 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.afpprinceton.com
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AFP Advisory Board
Wolfgang Danspeckgruber: Director, Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Cecilia Rouse: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School
American Foreign Policy
AFP
American Foreign Policy
Summer 2015 Volume XIV, Issue III
table of contents
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The Collapse of Yemen A Proxy War Grows from Civil Conflict Daniel Waldroop ’17
6
Radicalism in the Eurozone Consequences of Greek Economic Woes Andrew Hersh ’18
8 9 10 12 14 15 16
Photo Credits: Flickr
Chinese Naval Modernization and the U.S. Response The Necessity of Balancing Eric Wang ’18
AFP Quiz
Michael Smerconish ’18
Global Update Molly Reiner ’17
Applying the Present to the Past The Role of Social Media in Chinese Protests Scarlett Grabowska ’17 The Way They See It A Look at the 2016 Presidential Candidates Eli Schechner ’18
In Context
Michael Smerconish ’18
Global Gallery The World in Pictures Jamal Maddox ’16
Summer 2015
Cover Image by Eli Schechner ‘18
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Middle East
The Collapse of Yemen
A Proxy War Grows from Civil Conflict
A
s Saudi bombs rain down over the Yemeni capital of Sana’a, it’s hard not to be reminded of the destruction of Tripoli during the French, British, and American airstrikes in 2011, or the current state of ruin in Syria and Iraq. In fact, the sudden collapse of the Yemeni government on January 22nd represents the fourth failed state in the region, after Libya, Syria, and Iraq. The conf lict in Yemen is a crisis with the potential to derail American projects in the Middle East—namely the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and the dismantlement of al-Qaeda—and to further plunge the region into sectarian violence. But the developments in Yemen also provide an opportunity for the United States to reexamine its objectives in the region. Just this past September, President Obama seemed confident that the U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Yemen were secure, telling the nation that “this strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years.” Fast forward four months: the situation has changed drastically. The friendly administration of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had led the desert nation since 2011, has dissolved, with President Hadi himself f leeing first from the capital of Sana’a to the coastal city of Aden and then to Saudi Arabia. The Houthi rebels who ousted President Hadi’s government now control Sana’a and Aden, the two largest cities in Yemen, and the third largest, Al Mukalla, has recently been seized by al-Qaeda militants. U.S. Special Forces operatives have been withdrawn, hamstringing the chief American objective in Yemen: bringing down al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). What went wrong? And what made
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Daniel Waldroop ’17
the collapse of the Yemeni government so abrupt? At first glance, this conf lict appears to fit the narrative of bloody sectarian violence erupting in yet another Middle Eastern state. The Houthi rebels are a fundamentalist Shi’a Muslim sect fighting against the remnants of a Sunni government. But commentators are quick to point out that Yemen, a country with relatively equal Shiite and Sunni populations, lacks the long history of conf lict between the two groups that has continuously plagued Iraq and Syria.
“Here’s the catch. While the situation in Yemen is for the time being best described as a civil war, it might not stay that way.”
Instead, the current situation better resembles a civil war. The Houthis, while new faces to Western media, are not a recent invention. They’re a Shi’a group which formed in 2004 in opposition to then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled Yemen since 1990. Operating from the lawless areas outside of Yemen’s cities, the Houthis launched a long campaign against the government which culminated in the overthrow of President Saleh in 2012 as the Arab Spring blew through Yemen. But the subsequent regime change did not fall in the Houthis’ favor; President Hadi came to power instead. So Houthis’ fight continued until just recently, when the Houthi rebels successfully overcame government forces to take control of Sana’a and drive out the Hadi administration. Here’s the catch. While the situation in Yemen is for the time being best described as a civil war, it might not stay that way. The interference of
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regional powers, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran, threaten to turn Yemen into a proxy of the ongoing struggle between the two dominant regional powers. In many ways, this shift from a domestic to a regional conf lict is a selffulfilling prophecy. Saudi Arabia’s fear of an Iranian client-state on its doorstep is exaggerated, but its reaction to the Yemeni collapse threatens to make it a reality. The Houthis would be a less friendly government to Saudi Arabia than was President Hadi, but they aren’t a threat in themselves. The Saudis’ fear of Tehran’s role in the regime change is misplaced. The Houthis, in contrast to the Iranians, are Zaydi Shi’a, diminishing the religious bonds between them. And while Iran has indeed proved eager to help the Houthis materially, there’s scant evidence to suggest that they exert control over them. Just two months into the rule of its new King Salman, Saudi Arabia has launched an aggressive air-campaign against the Houthis in the hope of restoring Sunni rule. To outside perspectives, the campaign seems ill-advised. To understand the Saudi fear one must go back to 1962, when Saudi Arabia’s chief opponent in the region was Egypt, rather than Iran. Led by ardent anti-monarchist President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt invaded Yemen and established a friendly government. The sudden switch of a border state from ally to enemy stunned the Saudis, who began to take a keener interest in the politics of its neighbors. To the new King of Saudi Arabia, today’s situation bears a frighteningly close resemblance. In addition, the fall of the Hadi government provides the Saudis with an opportunity to re-strengthen its ties with the United States. The Obama administration’s potential nuclear deal with Iran was a blow for the Saudis, who view the negotiations as a movement away from the traditional American-Saudi alliance. The campaign against the Houthis in Yemen is a chance to draw the Americans back in. The United States, conscious of not upsetting the nuclear deliberations with Iran, has given only limited support, first by advising the Saudi air campaign and second by blocking Ira-
Middle East
Yemeni soldiers from the 1st Armored Division in Sana’a, the capital city of Yemen. Image Courtesy of Ibrahem Qasim.
nian vessels to funnel weapons to the Houthis. The collapse of Yemen shifts the ground out from under American feet. In immediate terms, the conf lict draws Saudi attention away from the fight against ISIS. The Saudis’ limited military capability means that it will likely focus its power on only one fight. It also hampers the American campaign against al-Qaeda extremists. A friendly and stable government in Yemen has been crucial for the U.S. drone program. In a move that was deeply unpopular with the Yemeni people, it was President Hadi who secured bases from which the American military could operate. In the wake of this collapse, American Special Forces troops have been forced to withdraw, hampering intelligence, counterterrorism, and drone capabilities. The increasing power of al-Qaeda in Yemen, complete with jailbreaks of senior-level militants and the seizure of the city of Al Mukalla, threatens to reverse the progress that has been made. Moreover, the renewed tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran could not come at a worse time for the United States. The proposed nuclear deal with Iran could be a monumental feat for the Obama administration, poten-
tially thawing relations between the United States and the Shi’a state. By reestablishing relations with both Middle Eastern powers, President Obama could be moving towards balance in the region and away from reliance on Saudi Arabia.
“The Obama administration’s potential nuclear deal with Iran was a blow for the Saudis, who view the negotiations as a movement away from the traditional American-Saudi alliance. The campaign against the Houthis in Yemen is a change to draw the Americans back in.” But the Saudis’ ref lexive fear over regime change in Yemen and its campaign to reinstall President Hadi threaten that progress. The heavyhanded bombing campaign in Yemen has already begun to turn Yemenis against the Saudis, ironically moving
Summer 2015
them closer to accepting the Houthis as a legitimate government. The American support for this campaign, small though it may be, further tarnishes its reputation amongst the Yemenis and distances itself from the Iranians at a time when the US could be moving closer to normalizing relations. At the very least, the conf lict in Yemen may force the United States to reevaluate its priorities in the Middle East. If regional stability is the overriding concern, the U.S. should focus on reassuring the Saudis of their security guarantee while continuing to play nice with the Iranians. If the fight against ISIS is key, the U.S. should pressure Saudi Arabia to focus its limited military energies away from Yemen and towards Iraq. And if thwarting alQaeda is paramount, the US should be investigating if the Houthis could be a good ally against them. Navigating the Middle East has never been easy, but without clear prioritization of its objectives, all of America’s projects in the region are in danger. Afp
Daniel may be reached at waldroop@princeton.edu
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Europe
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras speaks at a rally for the radical left-wing Syriza party. Image courtesy of The Conversation.
Radicalism in the Eurozone
Consequences of Greek Economic Woes
Andrew Hersh ’18
I
n April 2010, as the United States was just emerging from the Great Recession, an exploding debt crisis in Greece engulfed the European continent in economic turmoil. Arguably the most volatile economic challenge of the present day, the current European crisis has its roots in speculation, wild housing markets, a weak European Central Bank, harmful Eurozone policies, and the country of Greece, whose disturbing economic status ignited the conflict. The effects of the crisis, which include the radicalization of rightwing extremist groups in Europe and the potential destabilization of the global economy, extend far beyond European borders. The Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union, was hailed for bringing Europe together and promoting greater trade and cooperation across Europe. However, by creating a single European monetary union while enabling independent fiscal unions, the treaty was a recipe for calamitous fights over monetary policy. Having failed to meet the criteria for an optimal currency union, the Eurozone proved disastrous in mitigating Europe’s economic
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woes. Countries such as Germany, on one hand, sought to prevent wild deficits and inflation by promoting greater fiscal austerity across the EU, while other countries, such as
“Talk of a Greek escape from the Eurozone might be in everyone’s best interests, as Greece’s economic crisis is merely placing a burden on the finances of the EU while remaining nearly unsolvable.” France, argued that loose fiscal policy was necessary to fight economic recession. Indeed, deficits were a prime cause of the crisis. During the Great Recession, tax revenue significantly declined while govern-
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ment social spending rose. Bank bailouts were wide and large, with some governments even taking on massive amounts of private debt. But the true panic began in 2009, when it was revealed that Greece had lied about its budget deficits to gain entrance into the Eurozone, launching a panic amongst Greece’s creditors. Greece has proven horribly inept at tax collection, and has been in a state of default for ninety years since independence, or half the time since Greece gained independence. Prior to the creation of the EU, this kind of monetary issue was often solved by devaluing the nation’s currency, but due to the Eurozone’s creation of a single monetary union, this was impossible to do for an individual nation alone. Other European countries, such as Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, suffered alongside Greece and required bailouts for their economy. Naturally, as more and more bailouts were issued, European citizens became less willing to assist their struggling Greek neighbors, as they felt little responsibility for what they perceived as Greek recklessness. Greece found itself unable to borrow and finance large deficits in order to fight its recession, thus falling into an irreversible economic sinkhole that only worsened with time. Absent the help of the outside world, the European Central Bank intervened by expanding their Longer-Term Refinancing Operations, and launching a new program
known as Outright Monetary Transactions, in which they purchased bonds of EU members. But these moves came much too late. Greece has already partially defaulted on some debts, and has frequently reneged on their promises of fiscal austerity in return for massive bailouts. According to the International Monetary Fund, Greece must reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio below 120% by 2020 to achieve stability, which currently seems highly unlikely. Talk of a Greek escape from the Eurozone might be in everyone’s best interests, as Greece’s economic crisis is merely placing a burden on the finances of the EU while remaining nearly unsolvable. The United States has largely remained on the sidelines, watching the crisis unfold, rather than involving itself in European affairs. It is difficult to criticize this approach—having just recovered from the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression, the U.S. had no desire to rescue Europe from its own troubles. However, as Princeton economist Alan Blinder points out, a financial panic in Europe could engulf the United States and the rest of the world, especially while the domestic economy remains vulnerable and weak. The notion of another Lehman scenario involving the collapse of the financial system is enough to send anyone into a panic, yet a largely noninterventionist approach was nonetheless adopted. Countries that export to Europe would be at great risk if the EU crumbles. Even countries without much involvement with Europe would suffer from a global liquidity crisis. It is hardly surprising that just two years ago, International Monetary Fund chief Christine Lagarde warned that the situation was reminiscent of the 1930’s Depression, and this downward spiral would reoccur unless intervention prevailed. In this regard, the U.S. has not done nearly enough to ensure the stability of our economy in the face of another global meltdown. However, from a different perspective, the European crisis has actually brought the U.S. and Europe closer together, despite the former’s hands-off approach to the crisis. American banks and businesses are keenly aware of the repercussions of a large-scale European financial panic, and desire stability on the European continent. Instability is never favored in markets, as evidenced by the fact that the Greek economy suffered from the political uncertainty surrounding elections. Europe has not done a thorough job of handling Greece. Now that Greece
Europe
is under the control of a new, left wing government hostile to fiscal austerity, it seems less and less likely that Greece will accept the painful steps necessary for recovery, and instead descend into even worse economic pains. Aside from Lagarde’s warning, there exists another parallel between the European economic downturn and the 1930’s – the radicalization of extremist groups on the right, which have gained popularity alongside left-wing groups such as Syriza, the radically left wing party of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. Great Depression historians would argue that hyperinflation in Germany during the 1920’s and the rise of Nazism in the 1930’s is a crucial link. In tough times, people turn towards extremism out of desperation, as evidenced today by the large numbers of Western individuals from poor economic backgrounds who turn to ISIS. Consider the rise of Golden Dawn in Greece, a modern neo-Nazi and fascist political party. Previously an obscure group with hardly any following, the group catapulted to power in 2012, winning 7% of the Greek vote and gaining 21 seats in the Greek parliament. In the 2014 elections for the European Parliament, Golden Dawn received the third-largest number of votes in Greece, obtaining 3 seats in the parliament. Violence and crimes against minorities became commonplace in Greece, as a cold wave of intolerance began descending over the continent. It should be noted as well that, at least in Greece, support for radical left-wing groups has also increased tremendously due to the discontent with fiscal austerity. In the most recent government, they have even managed to dominate the far-right and take control. The rise in popularity of both the far-right and the far-left has served to polarize and radicalize society. Nearly a year ago, EU commissioner Cecilia Malmström declared that right wing extremism posed the greatest threat to the continent – a threat greater than Europe’s economic woes. Although it is impossible to attribute this rise entirely to Europe’s economic state, the trend in Greece is certainly clear, and countries whose economies faced similar troubles also experienced similar rises in extremism. Not much has been done to counter this rise in extremism. The Greek government initiated a police crackdown on members of Golden Dawn, arresting six leaders in 2013, as they hope to counter the group’s rise in popularity and feared takeover of the government. Yet extremist
Summer 2015
ideology continues to attract many Greeks to Golden Dawn, as they feel under attack by other European countries imposing rules upon Greece, and in recent local elections, it was found that 1 in 6 Greeks voted for a neoNazi. Ultranationalist parties have capitalized on mistrust and skepticism of the Eurozone, and often carry an anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim agenda. Indeed, recent elections saw a 50% increase in support for far-right parties, with 79 Members of the European Parliament hailing from these groups. Their popularity amongst voters represents a threatening and ominous force in the continent. It seems unlikely that fascism will overpower European governments anytime soon, but the long-term prospects of such extremism are troubling. The rise in support for radical left-wing groups, at least in Greece, has also increased tremendously. This is no less concerning. The current Greek government is dominated by the left-wing Syriza party, which is hostile to the European Union’s just demands for a Greek recovery. Syriza is hostile to NATO, preferring the comfort of expansionist Russia and potentially fighting against new sanctions placed on Russia. As such, the new Greek government presents not only a threat towards European economic stability, but also directly interferes with broader European and American foreign policy. While currently their focus is on Greece’s debt crisis, their foreign policy sparks concerns of the potential spread of their extremist ideology spreading across Europe. Greek fiscal woes have evolved into radicalism and fear. The future place of Greece within the European Union remains uncertain, as does its capacity to solve its economic issues. What is certain is the threat this poses to the worldwide economy, as well as the potential for further increases in extremism – both on the right and on the left. These reverberations call for a united European stand against such radicalism, with a role for the United States in potentially urging greater progress on this front and ensuring the economic and political stability of the continent for the upcoming years. Much as financial panics have a way of spilling across borders, so does extremism. The question that remains is whether this spread will go unheeded. Afp Andrew may be reached at ahersh@princeton.edu
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Asia
Chinese Naval Modernization and the U.S. Response The Necessity of Balancing
C
hina’s Naval Modernization and the U.S. Response Anti-ship ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and an aircraft carrier are only some of the new weapons China’s navy—the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—has acquired in the last two decades. As the Obama Administration continues its Asia pivot, China’s military modernization has sparked increasing alarm in the U.S. media and military alike. First, merely the growth in China’s recent military spending has captured attention. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, China has increased its defense budget by 175 percent since 2003. As Foreign Affairs magazine reported, China has undergone doubledigit growth in defense spending for over the past two decades. As China’s economy expands, the fear is that China converts its wealth into stronger military capabilities that may be used against U.S.-Pacific interests. Of course, others perceive the issue to be less threatening. As Charles Clover of the Financial Times points out, China actually spends only 2-2.1 percent of its GDP on defense, a very small figure compared to the 6-10 percent of GDP spent on defense by Israel of Arab Gulf States. Moreover, as Clover continues, the proportion of China’s total government budget spent on military purposes has actually fallen since 2012, suggesting that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may prioritize military growth less than U.S. analysts might think. Additionally, others emphasize that many of the PLAN’s intentions are peaceful, by highlighting the PLAN’s operations in maritime security and humanitarian assistance. Yet, although the PLAN may spend less than some might think, analysts
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Eric Wang ’18 stress that the type of equipment the PLAN has been acquiring suggests that its modernization threatens U.S. interests in the Pacific. As the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) explains, China has been concentrating on strengthening its anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities—forces that can deter or delay U.S. intervention should China engage in conflict with Taiwan, Japan, or other U.S. allies in the region. As the CEIP writes, China might delay U.S. intervention in a Pacific conflict, by first attacking U.S. command-and-
“Yet, although the PLAN may spend less than some might think, analysts stress that the type of equipment the PLAN has been acquiring suggests that its modernization threatens U.S. interests in the Pacific.” control nodes, and then launching “air, missile, or special operations attacks on…U.S. air bases or seaports in the region.” China’s naval modernization— namely its acquisition of A2/AD capabilities—demands a U.S. response. First, failing to respond may jeopardize U.S. credibility amongst its allies in the Pacific. As the Council on For-
American Foreign Policy
eign Relations points out, the U.S. is bound to Japan by a mutual security treaty, which grants the U.S. “the right to military bases on the archipelago, in exchange for a U.S. pledge to defend Japan in the event of an attack.” China is extremely unlikely to stage a landinvasion of the Japanese mainland, as the monetary, human, and moral costs of doing so would far exceed any resource benefits. However, China may use its expanded capabilities to extract territorial concessions from Japan (via an attack or threat of an attack) on disputed islands—most notably the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. If the U.S. were not able to defend Japan in the event of a PLAN attack on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, or establish a sufficient military presence to deter against such attacks, Japan may seriously doubt US commitment to its security. This could hamper the US’s ability to make agreements with Japan or other treatybound Pacific allies in the future, and also prompt allies to renounce U.S. rights to establish military footholds in the region. Moreover, without credible U.S. defense commitments, China’s neighbors may fearfully aggrandize their own military capabilities, destabilizing the Pacific. As the New York Times reported in July 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration has already revised Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution—a historical “peace clause” outlawing war as a means of settling international disputes—to now permit Japan’s SelfDefense Forces to take more military action than ever since WWII. Beijing is likely to perceive such measures as threats to its own security, especially given China’s historical enmity with Japan, and Shinzo Abe’s controversial public gestures (e.g. his visit of Japanese war shrines.) As such, Beijing may react to Japan by only further expanding its military capabilities, potentially triggering a Sino-Japanese arms race that may favor preemptive first-strikes. While economic interdependence may deter an all-out Sino-Japanese war, fear and uncertainty over military capabilities and rising nationalism on both sides may be conducive to SinoJapanese military conflict should the U.S. not adequately defend Japan. Such
arms race contingencies also exist between China and other U.S. allies such as the Philippines, though to a lesser extent than the in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Thus, because the U.S. seeks to stabilize the Eastern Pacific for security and trade reasons (e.g. nearly 5.3 trillion dollars of U.S. trade pass through the South China Sea each year), the U.S. cannot ignore the dangers posed by China’s naval modernization.
“While economic interdependence may deter an all-out SinoJapanese war, fear and uncertainty over military capabilities and rising nationalism on both sides may be conducive to Sino-Japanese military conflict.” In the next few decades, the U.S. should respond to China’s naval modernization by both balancing against China’s offshore naval capabilities and engaging cooperatively with the Chinese navy. As the CEIP writes, the U.S. could pursue a “conditional offense/ defense” strategy that would enable the U.S. navy to “survive initial air and missile attacks” but still “conduct… punishing…attacks on Chinese A2/ AD-type assets operating offshore, along China’s maritime periphery.” The ability of the U.S. navy to effectively retaliate in the event of a Chinese attack on U.S. allies, both deters the PLAN from attacking, and maintains U.S. credibility amongst its allies in the Pacific. At the same time, routine joint-military dialogues and peacekeeping missions between the U.S. and Chinese navy provide room for clear exchanges of information. Such information exchanges reduce
Asia
the risk of misinterpreting the other side’s military measures—thus reducing the risk of miscalculating military strategy—and further codify procedures in de-escalating maritime crises. In responding to China’s naval modernization, the U.S. must be careful not to make China feel highly threatened or “contained.” First, this means refraining from deploying an overly robust presence in the Pacific. According to the CEIP, some suggest that the U.S. navy should not only balance against China’s offshore capabilities, but also China’s mainland capacities. Yet, if the U.S. force in the Pacific were to match China’s complete profile of military capacities, the U.S. would have much more difficulty assuring China that the US does not intend to attack or coerce it, but rather, simply intends to defend Pacific allies. Partial balancing—a sign of restraint—better enables the U.S. to communicate that U.S. intentions are limited to defensive purposes. Second, the U.S. navy must expand naval dialogues and exercises with the PLAN, again to assure China of America’s peaceful objectives. Third, U.S. politicians must avoid inflammatory rhetoric, as strong language of containment both fuels Chinese nationalism and escalates uncertainty in a tense military dynamic. Of course, even to partially balance China’s expanding offshore capabilities, the U.S. government will have to incur long-term budgetary costs. As U.S. expands its trade in the Pacific and continues its pivot to Asia, such costs may become more politically feasible and economically rational. Still, to avoid a costly U.S.-Sino military competition in the Pacific, the U.S. must actively engage with China in bilateral and multilateral talks and cooperative military exercises. As China’s navy continues to modernize, difficulty in communicating intentions and uncertainty over military capabilities may generate more fear and tension. Yet, by skillfully balancing against and engaging with China, the U.S. may very well be able to prevent violent conflict in the Eastern Pacific. Afp Eric may be reached at ehw2@princeton.edu
Summer 2015
AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Quarterly Michael Smerconish ’18 1. Which national leader recently said the following to media after a meeting with Pope Francis, “I read all the speeches of the Pope, his commentaries, and if the Pope continues this way, I will go back to praying and go back to the church, and I’m not joking.” A. Dilma Rousseff B. Vladimir Putin C. Raúl Castro D. Stephen Harper 2. The Obama administration recently gave the go ahead for which oil company to commence arctic drilling? A. Exxon B. Shell C. Gulf D. Sunoco 3. The UK’s Conservative Party secured how many of the 650 seats in the House of Commons in the recent May 2015 elections? A. 331 B. 385 C. 424 D. 487 4. Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the France’s National Front, a far-right political party, was recently suspended by his own organization, which is currently under the leadership of whom? A. Le Pen’s mother B. Le Pen’s twin brother C. Le Pen’s ex-wife D. Le Pen’s daughter 5. Which country was recently deemed by the Brazilian Instituto Igarape to have the highest murder rate per population in the world? A. North Korea B. Sweden C. Honduras D. Canada
Answers on page 16
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A: U.S. military officials stated
on May 20 that photos purporting to show a missile launching from a submarine off the coast of NORTH KOREA are fabricated. Such technology is thought to be well beyond North Korea’s capability.
B: Officials in SAUDI ARABIA re-
ported to Western media that they will consider pursuing a nuclear weapon in response to nuclear threats from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
G: Elections are to be held in ETHIO- H: The president of GUATEMALA, PIA on May 24, in the country’s first election since the death of long-time leader Meles Zanawi, whose Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front holds all but one seat in the Ethiopian parliament.
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Otto Perez, has announced major changes to his cabinet in response to mass protests over allegations of corruption.
American Foreign Policy
C: Former President of EGYPT
and member of the Muslim Brotherhood Mohammad Morsi was sentenced to death on May 16 after being convicted of the arrest and torture of protestors while in power.
I: Citizens of the UNITED STATES city of Baltimore protested in the wake of the death of Freddie Gray, who died in police custody.
D: The conservative Likud party,
E: A 7.8 magnitude earthquake
F: Parliamentary elections wre
J: LIBERIA was declared ebola-free
K: Prime Minister of GREECE
L: Chinese Premier Li Keqiang
headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, won a surprise victory in recent parliamentary elections in ISRAEL. Netanyahu and his party have since formed a coalition with other conservative parties in the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament.
on May 8 by the World Health Organization. Ebola has claimed 11,000 lives in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone in the most recent outbreak of the virus.
struck NEPAL in late April. Subsequent aftershocks have since struck the region. So far, the death toll has reached 8,000.
Alexis Tsipras will meet with the leaders of France and Germany to negotiate a deal to bailout Greek debt.
Winter 2015
held in the UNITED KINGDOM in May. The Conservative Party received a 12 seat majority. The election resulted in big losses for the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats.
traveled to BRAZIL to announce that China will partner with Brazil to boost trade, the financial sector, and infrastructure in the South American country. Sources: Reuters, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, The BBC
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Asia
“The quick spread of information would have Applying the Present to the Past kept the people in a constant The Role of Social Media in Chinese Protests state of passion so that Scarlett Grabowska ’17 new students coming into he Age of Information has changed of people protested, supplies were sent in from how the world works, and China has outside of the mainland, and protestors did [Tiananmen] Square would not been able to avoid these changes not easily disband, the still CCP managed to on its quest for modernization and maintain control. This was in part due to the not be replacing previous international involvement. Chinese people party being able to manipulate public opinion now have access to traditional forms of me- of the protest and to make the majority of the dia, such as official and commercial newspa- students seem like victims of revolutionaries ones, but rather joining them pers, as well as modern forms of media, such that needed to be set back on the correct path. as televisions and the Internet; however, they The Tiananmen incident would have pre- and building the movement.”
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face government censorship through the Great Firewall of China, Internet police word filtering, and outright banning of certain topics. Much research has been done on this explosion of mass media in China since the Reform Era, and has led political scientists to argue that the growth of both information sources and Chinese censorship can either legitimize or topple the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In her article, “China’s Cyber-strategy,” Nina Hachigian agrees that media could affect the future of the regime in either way; however, she states that scientists will not be able to predict such an outcome until insight is gained into the role media and censorship will play in potential societal crises of the future. For example, during the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, modern media in China was still in development and had a limited effect on the protest. Thus, one must consider that had mass media existed in China during 1989, then, by the use of the Internet as a mobilization vehicle through rapid and viral spreading of information, the Tiananmen protest would have presented an insuppressible challenge to the CCP. This consideration thereby presents a case for the argument that despite its strict censorship standards, the Chinese regime can be destabilized by mass media. The slow transmission of information during the Tiananmen Incident helped to suppress protest numbers and to keep the protesters disorganized—an act that could not have been achieved if the protestors had access to Internet sources that would make connecting with other protesters instantaneous. In 1989, people gained information through fax machines or contact they had with foreign visitors to China. The process of communicating information was time-consuming and arduous, and only limited numbers of people were aware of any given event. The party strictly controlled newspapers and television, thus resulting in any news received by the Chinese people always being monitored or manipulated by the regime. Even though large numbers
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sented a much bigger challenge to the regime if protestors had access to the Internet. Pictures of starving college students would have been passed from email to email. Varying interpretations of editorials and student intentions would have been made available. Foreign opinions of government reactions and repression methods could have been presented to the Chinese protestors and not just to people outside of China. The CCP manipulation behind the TV broadcast with Premier Li Peng would have been revealed to the people. The speeches made by those at Tiananmen Square could have been widely publicized. The student leaders could have used the Internet to organize themselves and maintain control despite the growing number of students. The quick spread of information would have kept the people in a constant state of passion so that new students coming into the Square would not be replacing previous ones, but rather joining them and building the movement. The violence employed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would have inflamed the country if videos of the victims spread quickly, leading to more political uprisings. After Tiananmen, the CCP was able to stop the transmission of any information about the Massacre because it controlled all of the media sources. If the Internet existed at the time, however, unless the Party wanted to risk economic or societal collapse, it would not have been able to shut down the Internet, and thus not been able to stop protest mobilization. The Arab Spring provides evidence for this hypothesis, as various researchers and policymakers have argued that protesters’ use of social media outlets was essential in the movements that toppled several governments. The use of Facebook and Twitter during the Arab Spring helped to coordinate large protest movements, and to disseminate information to the public which was integral for developing a democratic movement among citizens who had lived under the oppression of dictators. Furthermore, had the Internet existed and
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been widely used during the Tiananmen Incident, the government would likely have faced larger consequences for using force and delaying reaction for upwards of a month. The regime would be facing criticism from every corner of China and the international community, who would not only be relying on foreign journalists but also on real-time information from the protestors. Information included in the Tiananmen Papers would have been revealed at the time of the actual protests, motivating more people to join the students as they would see the political fracturing at the top, and the safety of mass numbers at the bottom. Private preferences would be revealed on public forums, and as more and more people realized that others were also dissatisfied with the government, they would go out and join the highly publicized protest. During 1989 people were already calling for political reform with the Democracy Wall, but they were quickly shut down by the regime. If they could have spread their ideas using the Internet then discussion about political reform might have emerged amongst the common people, and would have placed even more pressure and grievances on a highly vulnerable government. The CCP would not have been able to completely ban all information of the protest in newspapers or televisions at the risk of making citizens think they were covering up the protest. Even if information was to be banned, many people might already have seen it, and if this information was not mentioned in official newspapers or television, then the CCP would lose legitimacy. Chinese censors may be quick, but tidbits of information will always emerge before they can be banned, and Chinese netizens can use metaphors or riddles to overcome the censors. With the use of modern media, Tiananmen could not have been hidden or manipulated, and the device that the CCP used to monitor citizen grievances would be turned against it as people would use the Internet to mobilize and maintain the spirit of protesting. Private desires for political reform would reach a mass public forum that would take advantage of the
Asia
Chinese citizens and netizens use their mobile phones during a subway ride. Image courtesy of Flickr.
ongoing crises to push the government to react in a way that would either please the people, or result in the CCP losing legitimacy by attacking the protesters while being observed by the Chinese and people worldwide. Despite strict censorship standards, mass media would still lead to the end of the regime because people would be able to expose their grievances and hold the CCP accountable, while the CCP would struggle to maintain control over the Internet and be plagued by discord. However, here one may begin to wonder. The Hong Kong movement happened in a time when Internet was widespread in China, and
“Chinese censors may be quick, but tidbits of information will always emerge before they can be banned, and Chinese netizens can [...] overcome the censors.� information about the protest was quickly spread to Mainland China and all over the globe; nevertheless, the CCP still remains in power. Perhaps it is now too late for Chinese people to mobilize using the same old protest methods, despite the media tools at their use. The regime has gained much experience in dealing with protests, and even though the In-
ternet could now be used against the government during a protest, the CCP has changed its suppression methods to such a degree that it can survive the blows dealt from an internet-supported uprising. For example, during Tiananmen, violence was used against the people, but in Hong Kong, the police, knowing anything they did would end up on the web, showed great restraint towards the protestors, thus consciously making the effort not to incite more protests. The viral spread of images was not half as damaging as it could have been because the CCP prevented the protest from reaching a degree that would have amassed public sympathy. Furthermore, although the CCP could not stop the spread of information about the movement, they were able to control the tone of the information by also using the internet to transmit the message that protestors were inhibiting daily life by blocking off roads and busy working areas. The CCP has learned how to keep public sympathy away from protestors, and how to quell the protestors by allowing them to protest without receiving any strong government reactions. Therefore, the rapid transmission of information through the Internet has changed the nature of politics itself in China, and has demanded that the CCP toe a delicate line in terms of censorship if it wants to remain in control. It is now the protestors who must catch up to the development of mass media and come up with new protest methods to counteract the suppression devices employed by the regime. This may be a matter of reaching out to international communities for help, or, like the activist Ai Weiwei, utilizing social media platforms
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to create a gradual buildup to an explosion of grievances; however, unless the Chinese people figure out how to successfully protest in the context of a continually adapting CCP, then Internet mobilization will have little effect because the CCP has advanced enough to be able to manipulate its own loss of control. The use of Internet has changed China, and has affected the beliefs of the Chinese people in terms of the political and human rights they deserve. The Tiananmen Incident was one of the biggest protests in Chinese history, but because the internet did not yet exist and the CCP had a clear and unchallenged manipulation on all news sources, the protestors gradually lost passion for the protest, and after the Massacre there was no way to re-organize or to discuss the occurrences. Had mass use of the Internet been available in 1989, maintained mobilization through the rapid spread of information would have resulted in the Tiananmen Incident becoming a citizen uprising that would have toppled the Chinese regime; therefore, despite the strict censorship employed by the CCP, mass media can be used as a method for destabilizing the regime. If an event such as Tiananmen Square once again occurs, the people may be in a position to use the Internet as a method to get enough support to challenge the party; however, just like media sources had to develop, the people’s methods of protest also have to develop to counteract the advancements made by the party. Afp Scarlett may be reached at sg17@princeton.edu
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The Way They See It
Foreign Policy Creeds and Credentials of 2016 Hopefuls Eli Schechner ’18 and Molly Reiner ’17
Hillary Clinton
Experience: Secretary of State (2009-2013), Senator from New York (2001-2009; served on Senate Committee on Armed Services 2003-2009), First Lady (1993-2001) Strengths: Clinton has a full résumé of experience in public life and political affairs, even before her time as First Lady. As a result, she has longstanding personal and diplomatic relationships with many international decisionmakers. A predicted easy primary season will help her define her foreign policy narrative on her own terms. Weaknesses: Despite the experience, Clinton carries serious foreign policy baggage. During her campaign, Clinton will face tough questions from both critic and her liberal base about her 2002 vote to authorize the war in Iraq, her close association with what is largely viewed as a failed “reset” policy with Russia, her acceptance of large-scale donations from foreign governments to the Clinton Foundation, and the Benghazi terror attack that killed four, including Ambas-
sador Christopher Stevens, in September 2012. Overall, her relatively hawkish foreign policy may be at odds with her liberal base. In her own words: “I worked to reorient American foreign policy around what I call ‘smart power.’ To succeed in the 21st century, we need to integrate the traditional tools of foreign policy—diplomacy, development assistance, and military force—while also tapping the energy and ideas of the private sector and empowering citizens, especially the activists, organizers, and problem solvers we call civil society, to meet their own challenges and shape their own futures. We have to use all of America’s strengths to build a world with more partners and fewer adversaries, more shared responsibility and fewer conflicts, more good jobs and less poverty, more broadly based prosperity with less damage to our environment.”
Jeb Bush
Experience: Governor of Florida (19992007), Florida Secretary of Commerce (1987-1988)
Strengths: A moderate conservative with a strong record as Governor of Florida, Bush already has a legacy of leadership on which to build his presidential campaign. One of his strongest areas is education. In Florida, Bush supported national academic standards in addition to cutting taxes during his tenure as governor. Weaknesses: Bush’s family legacy may prove to be his biggest obstacle. Already facing serious questions about his stance on Iraq in light of George W. Bush’s decision to invade the Middle Eastern country in 2003. It will be difficult for Jeb Bush to distance himself from the legacy of Iraq without looking like he is alienating his family. In his own words: “Our foreign policy ought to be grounded in not just the export of our own values or nation building. Those are good sentiments, but first and foremost in security and peace. And I think what we’ve seen under this president is, as we pulled back, we’re creating an incredibly insecure world. And the narrative that the left wants to bring which is either you’re for this nuanced view of pulling back and they were leading from behind and that we’re part of the community of nations and blah, blah, blah, that if you don’t believe that, you’re a warmonger, I just reject that out of hand. The broad bipartisan consensus in the post-World War II era is to have a certain America, an America that leads, an America that understands its power should be used judiciously but needs to be used whenever it’s appropriate to do so. That’s not what we have today.”
(right) 2016 presidential candidate and former Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton; (left) 2016 candidate and former Governor of Florida, Jeb Bush. Images courtesy of Flickr.
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American Foreign Policy
Marco Rubio
Experience: Senator from Florida (2011-Present, serves on Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence), Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives (20072009), Member of the Florida House of Representatives (2000-2009) Strengths: Rubio’s positions on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee give him both the credibility that he knows what he is talking about, as well as experience actually thinking about and deciding American foreign policy. Because he has held these positions, Rubio has more foreign policy experience than Jeb Bush, one of his main rivals for the GOP nomination. Weaknesses: Some view Rubio’s foreign policy leanings as “hawkish,” a possible negative for war-weary voters. In his announcement of the foreign policy his campaign calls the “Rubio Doctrine,” the presidential hopeful cited John F. Kennedy’s Cold War policies, prompting concerns that his foreign policy might be based on an antiquated world order. In his own words: “There’s three things that should underline our foreign policy. The first is the acknowledgment that the world is a better place when America is the strongest country in the world and that’s why we need to increase our military spending. Get rid of these horrible reductions that we have seen and also our intelligence capability, they have to be robust. It is important that we re-authorize the Patriot Act. The second is America’s foreign policy needs to keep in mind that in the 21st century global commerce matters more than ever. We cannot allow any nation on earth to control shipping lanes, airspace, the cyberspace, outer space for that matter. And the third is our foreign policy should always be built on our values as a nation. We support freedom. We support nations and people who aspire to democracy. We support human rights and the respect to human rights.”Afp
Eli may be reached at elis@princeton.edu
United States
In Context
Compiled by Michael Smerconish ’18 “I would have [authorized the invasion], and so would have Hillary Clinton, just to remind everybody. And so would almost everybody that was confronted with the intelligence they got…By the way, guess who thinks that those mistakes took place as well? George W. Bush.Yes, I mean, so just for the news flash to the world, if they’re trying to find places where there’s big space between me and my brother, this might not be one of those.” Jeb Bush on how he would have likely made the same decision as his brother concerning the 2003 invasion of Iraq. “The liquidity issue is a terribly urgent issue. It’s common knowledge, let’s not beat around the bush. From the perspective [of timing], we are talking about the next couple of weeks.” Yanis Varoufakis, Finance Minister of Greece, on the rapidly increasing Greek inability to pay international debts. “Suddenly there was a loud crashing noise and everything started to fall over. Then my house also fell over. The walls around me collapsed, the ceiling came down too. Some of it fell on my chest as well…My arm and leg were trapped under the rubble. My daughter-in-law came and pulled me out…I don’t think it would have mattered if I lived or died, I’ve lived a full life” Fulche Tamang, the oldest survivor of the recent earthquakes in Nepal, describing his experience. “[It] is not only a humanitarian emergency but also a security crisis since smuggling networks are linked to and finance terrorist activities... We need an exceptional response.” Chief diplomat of the EU, Federica Mogherini, on the difficulties of the European migrant crisis. “We are in significant agreement on the most important issue of all, which is that [the conflict in Ukraine] will only be resolved by the full implementation of Minsk and all of us have responsibilities to undertake in order to affect that implementation.” Secretary of State John Kerry on his recent meeting with Vladimir Putin.
Molly may be reached at mreiner@princeton.edu
Sources: The BBC, CNN, Al-Jazeera, RTE News
Summer 2015
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AFP
Rescue workers attempt to find surivors after a Chinese ferry carrying over 400 passengers sank in the Yangzi River on June 1st. Photo Credit: Imaginechina/REX Shutterstock.
Protestors in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park commemorate the 26th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre on June 4th. In other news, the Islamic State captures the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra on May 20th, leading experts to fear that the group will destroy the UNESCO World Heritage site. Photo Credit: Reuters and AFP
Global Gallery The World in Pictures Compiled by Jamal Maddox ’16
AFP Quiz Answers Multiple Choice Monthly 1. C 2. B 3. A 4. D FIFA, soccer’s governing body, is racked by scandal after the arrest of 14 top executives in the US. PC: Getty Images
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5. C
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Winter 2015
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Looking Towards the Future?
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